

Gilles Deleuze

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Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines

St. Denis, Course 11

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... Which final question? The next question: supposing that it is correct to regard the capitalist system as an axiomatic and to equate its functioning with the functioning of an axiomatic, what results from this for a supposed or desired understanding of the global political situation? So, at the same time, this looks very ambitious; we must not have too many illusions because ... these are just small remarks, that is, can we find in... some events, in... in what appears practically, some reasons to confirm this hypothesis of capitalism functioning as an axiomatic? And for us, and ultimately for us, what... what a source of despair and also what a source for a bit of hope this is! Or else, therefore, what a source of some very, if needs be, very insignificant remarks.

So, I am having these remarks follow one another, asking you to remember..., I suppose you remember a little bit, the way in which we tried to define an axiomatic for itself, already at the level of mathematics . But now, you see that our problem is different, our problem is exactly: what axiomatic criteria can allow us, allow us to orient ourselves in current political situations? That's exactly it: what are the major properly axiomatic criteria that would allow us, yes, to find our bearings in possible current political situations? And so, I am offering my list of these criteria.¹

I am saying -- first criterion – addition-subtraction (*adjonction-soustraction*). In fact, it is true that an axiom implies a respective independence of axioms from each other since no axiom can be deduced from another. A proposition that is deduced from an axiom is called a theorem. So, in a social field, there are surely propositions of the theorematic type: they depend on axioms, but the axioms themselves, you cannot conclude an axiom from another axiom. The independence of axioms within an axiomatic obviously grounds the possibility sometimes of adding axioms -- at that moment, you say in mathematical terms that you are enriching the system, an enriched system, when we add axioms -- or else you remove axioms: this is called an impoverished system. I am saying: immediately, do these very abstract notions, borrowed from the axiomatic, have a corresponding notion that makes us say, why yes, that's how things occur, at a certain level? This is my first remark.

But I respond yes! Yes, it seems to me that in what is happening currently, in global political and economic phenomena, we are constantly witnessing something that's almost like two poles, and I

would say that it is the first great bipolarity, the first great bipolarity of the capitalist system, the two poles being a tendency to add axioms, to always add axioms to the axiomatic of capital, and a contrary tendency to withdraw axioms, to operate with a minimum of axioms. [It's] a double tendency: to enrich the system-to impoverish the system.

And this bipolarity, what is it? It seems to me that we can define it -- and in passing, we saw it previously, I'm going to ... I'm going to try to go all the more quickly; on this, I'm just going back to this first point -- we are saw this, it seems to me that it is represented precisely by two models of State. You remember our general thesis, namely that in capitalism, the State undergoes a kind of mutation, yes, a kind of mutation; that is, it no longer functions as an imperial model, that is, as a model to be realized, but functions as a model of realization in relation to the axiomatic. The State has become a model of realization for the axiomatic of capital. Well, I am saying, the first great bipolarity of modern States doesn't even seem to me to be democracy and something other like democracy. In terms of tendencies, I would say... there is a kind of totalitarian pole, and there is a social-democratic pole.

You will tell me: but the passages, they are ... obviously passages, they are ... they are very ... that is why if we had to create a typology of modern States, I would not speak of a democratic State, a totalitarian State, this State, that State; I would just limit myself ... -- if would you please stop laughing because it's disturbing to me in trying to speak; I don't mind your laughing, but it blocks me in what I'm trying to... to say, it's tiring. Uh ... that's a grade school comment, really ... It's bothersome, really, what... -- What was I saying?

A student: The totalitarian pole ...

Deleuze: Ah yes, you will tell me: there are passages perpetually, yes. I am selecting a typical case, which currently seems to me to be one of the most... the most important cases in what is happening in the world, namely the case of Brazil.² You know that, in Brazil, there is precisely a kind of situation which is an, how to say, an alternative, almost in the "either... or" mode. Either, or: I am not saying at all that this alternative comes from heaven; it is founded by a kind of economic development in Brazil ... by all kinds of givens -- we will perhaps see this as we go through our sections -- but there is a deadline which is currently set, namely the upcoming elections. There is a possibility, namely that, by virtue of a rather prodigious economic development, which has its reasons, which should be analyzed ... Brazil is faced with the possibility of truly developing an internal market. Fine. Very important.

Related to this, there was -- while it was a typically totalitarian regime -- there was the recall and acceptance by the exiles, the acceptance to return to Brazil. They came back en masse, right, the exiled Brazilians. Currently, this is really a tightrope, namely power is still held in a totalitarian way, and there are elements that are being put in place, why? For ... the other end of the alternative, namely the possibility of a regime, roughly speaking, of social democracy. There is a common enemy, namely... In any case, there will be a settling of scores, whether social-democratic or totalitarian, there will inevitably be... tendencies and people who will be liquidated in history. But this is not certain, here; again, it is not sure that there won't be a return to totalitarianism.

And if you just accept this example, Brazil truly as currently being a country that offers this kind of alternative in suspense, a kind of suspense, there, who can say if, in fact, the elections will be held and will be sufficiently free for a kind of Brazilian social democracy to be established, or for the totalitarian system to be reconstituted? I believe in history, right; this is a rare case in which such suspense occurs. There has often been a transition from social democracy to totalitarianism and vice versa, but I am saying, this situation ... we tell ourselves: well, what exactly is going to happen, and how? And the very understanding between the totalitarian elements and the social, social-democratic elements ... all that, how far will it go? Fine, this is very, very odd, very fascinating, it seems to me, the current situation in Brazil.

So, if you agree that there are indeed these two poles, and that these two poles are more relevant than the constitutional democracy distinction, etc., etc., well, if we give ourselves some perspective, what do they correspond to? I am saying, fine, it's very simple. Again, if we try to define what this is, that the totalitarian pole and the totalitarian State that expresses that pole, I am saying -- it is not difficult; well, it's not difficult! -- ... I would say, you have a totalitarian State when the axiomatic -- this looks very abstract, but it's not so much, I don't know ... well, it will be up to you to say... -- when the axiomatic of capital is realized in a model of realization which retains only a minimum of axioms.

In other words, as [Paul] Virilio says,³ and here I find once again that this is a very, very profound expression, the totalitarian State is not the State at maximum, it is the State at minimum (*un minimum d'État*). When you remove the maximum number of axioms, when you retain only the minimum number of axioms, you can only do so through a totalitarian State. What does that mean? It means a very simple thing: what is the economic-political structure of a totalitarian State? Well, I believe that it is above all a State which organizes the collapse of its internal market.

So, if you will, my first bipolarity, totalitarian State-social democratic State, becomes more precise since this bipolarity is based on two cases of the internal market-external market relationship. A totalitarian State is a State which retains, at the level of axioms, only the axioms necessary for participation in the foreign market. So, it organizes the liquidation or collapse of the internal market in a radical form or in a mitigated form. What does that mean, to organize the liquidation of the internal market? This means, to retain as the fundamental variable only the level of reserves and the rate of inflation. A typical example if you will ... There, well, an axiom, I would say at the extreme: an axiom for the reserves, an axiom for the rate of inflation. Which implies what? This implies openness to foreign capital, by virtue of the very nature of the external market. This implies industrialization of the country, but industry of food products and materials intended for export -- always the primacy of the external market -- and the collapse of the internal market, as well in the sectors of labor as of consumption, as of salaries, etc. So, here you see that all the capitalist axioms -- I indeed mean capitalist -- on which the internal market depends are going to be done away with or tend to be removed. In such a case, in fact, there are no more axioms for that region.

What does this mean? That the whole region of the internal market is not going to disappear just like that, but it no longer has its own axioms. They are no longer anything but theorems, that is, they are no more than propositions-consequences which depend on the axioms retained, or even worse still, they are wild propositions, that is, that are allowed to vary freely. An example of such a totalitarian State today, a most vivid example, is obviously Chile.⁴ And the Chilean government itself says this, in its inspiration which is precisely an inspiration from the theorists of American capitalism, from the famous [Milton] Friedman school, from the famous Chicago school, they say this: the main axioms that are retained are the rate of inflation, the level of reserves. And, in one text, a Chilean official says: the rest is only a consequence. I am saying: this is the very language of the axiomatic, "the rest is only a consequence", that is, it is in the nature of theorems, which depend on axioms, but you will not have axioms there. Your only axioms are openness to external capital, participation in the external market, and the rest results from this, namely the collapse of the internal market. I am saying, if in the case of Chile, it becomes clear that it is indeed a totalitarian State, well ... in other cases, it may be less clear. You will nonetheless be able to speak, to speak no less, of a totalitarian pole which is gains the upper hand.

I was saying: for France currently, it goes without saying that we... we cannot... we cannot exactly say that the liquidation of the internal market in France is occurring in the same way as it occurred in Chile, but it goes without saying that, once again, measures like the liberalization of prices, the axiom posited as predominant over any other, of making French production competitive on the foreign market, will imply that the the axioms be reduced, that a reduced number of axioms be made operative, the axioms expressing precisely this prevalence of the external sector over the internal market. And this is what defines the totalitarian pole of the State, namely the State is totalitarian when there is only a State at minimum, that is, when there is a tendency to restrict axioms.

So, what is the outcome from that? Concretely, what does that mean? Well, you can see how, in fact, this is the opposite of the social democratic tendency, namely all kinds of axioms will be withdrawn more or less visibly: social security; oh well, no, you only have to wonder what the other pole is: at that moment, it seems to me, we understand much better! If there is a social democratic pole, what does that mean? It means that the social-democratic pole, fine... it proceeds by the tendency of the perpetual addition of axioms. You will ask me: but how is it possible? Obviously, we would have to state the concrete circumstances in which such a pole becomes urgent or becomes possible. Once again, why in Brazil at present is there a social democratic pole that has emerged virtually, when the State regime, the State form, the State model were totalitarian? What ... what made it happen to allow this?

But, whenever you have a period in which circumstances are such that capitalism tends to multiply axioms, you can say: social democracy is taking shape. In what form? Well yes, we will add: you want an axiom for this, etc. As... as... as they say: popular pressure. Do you want an axiom for women? Okay, we'll make axioms for women. Axioms for employment? Well, a social democratic regime identifies itself ... well, especially with its axioms for employment ... for example: the axiom "full employment". There, fine, when you have a brandished axiom of

the “full employment” type, you can say that we are in social democracy. You see, every time you locate the ongoing emergence of some kind of economic or political proposition to become, to be constructed as an axiom, you can say that there is a tendency to multiply axioms.

And what fascinates me is that, in a capitalist organization, to what extent it is really flexible, sometimes for withdrawing axioms, sometimes for making them proliferate, multiplying them and, if necessary, moving from a pole to the other. You see how this occurred: for a long time, our economy really existed -- and here I have the impression of speaking at the same time very abstractly, but very concretely also --, for a very long time, our economy existed with kinds of axioms that were considered as, precisely, corresponding to a so-called "Socialist" influence... which were regarded as fundamental, full employment, fine. Yet everyone has known for a long time that, in particular, the plan provided -- including already the Debré plan, really⁵ -- provided a buffer of fundamental unemployment. The planned organization of a mass of unemployment has always existed ... in the sense of the totalitarian State, namely: regulation, and, ultimately, collapse of the internal market.

And all that, all that ... in a country's politics, you can very well assign this or that event according to this or that pole. And I am just saying that, currently, if in a sense, the so-called Giscardian regime,⁶ the Giscardian regime seems to me to have signified, politically and economically, the preponderance of the “restriction of axioms” pole, while the two poles crossed, shared the social field before. Here, we are in a time when French capitalism seems to me to have radically opted over a time period for the tendency to restriction, the subtraction of axioms. Fine.

A last remark on this first point: I was saying, and I remind you of this, that an ... a possible interest of this distinction of the two poles seems to me to be this, to lead us to multiply certain distinctions, namely, at that point, there is no question of ... confusing totalitarianism and fascism. It is not true that totalitarianism and fascism are ... are the same thing. Fascism, once again, is a very particular type of State which is not at all, and which does not correspond at all to the same problems as the totalitarian State. And I think the distinctions between the two are relatively ruinous, because they prevent us from understanding some things. There have been fascist States. As far as I know, there were only ... anyway, in Europe, there were only two, namely the Italian State and the German State, right, ... at the time of Nazism.

Okay, but how is this [a fascist State] not at all the same as a totalitarian State? I would say that the Spanish State, Franco's Spain, always was a totalitarian State; it seems to me very classic, and not at all a fascist State. Why? That's because the fascist State, if we question it and if we reflect on this notion -- according to the criterion that I have just proposed, addition of axioms or subtraction of axioms -- well, we see that, very strangely, it accomplished both at the same time. That the Nazi State called itself "national socialist" indicates well enough that, in a certain way, it was inspired either by social democracy or by what is still quite another thing, so-called socialist States. In what sense, and why? I am saying that what defines the fascist State is much more this: it is the conversion of industry into an arms industry. I would say, at that point, this is not at all an opening to foreign capital. Moreover, the fascist State is a state which explicitly

poses the economic question: how to manufacture internal capital, and which can only be understood on the basis of this question. If the famous Nazi economist [Hjalmar] Schacht was of importance, it was precisely because he carried out this internal production of capital necessary for the Nazi State.⁷

And this internal production of capital entirely calls upon processes of the "multiplication of axioms" type. It is not at all the same as a totalitarian State; it is simply obvious that Nazism is not a social democracy. This is National Socialism, which means what? This means that the domestic production of capital, therefore, which excludes the appeal to foreign capital... -- not which excludes it... which does not exclude it, there has always been foreign capital, but finally which does not... which does not make the appeal for capital ... for foreign capital a fundamental axiom, since it is, even when they receive it, it is a question of supplementing it [capital] with domestic capital as well – so then, this production of domestic capital occurs in the perspective of an industry which becomes exclusively or, in a prevalent way, a war industry, while for the totalitarian State, there is absolutely no ... there is absolutely no expansionism. If there is an expansionism that basically belongs to the fascist State, whether it was in Italy, whether it was in Germany, if this is a State that can only live under the form of an expansionism, that's precisely because its production of domestic capital is correlated with a conversion of the whole industry into a war industry, into an armaments industry. And we see that, in parallel fashion, to the totalitarian figure "appeal and openness to foreign capital", there corresponds a completely different figure which is that of Nazism or fascism, namely "the production of domestic capital as a function of an arms industry".

And, the other pole, the totalitarian aspect of "the collapse of the internal market" is found in a certain way; it is the famous restrictions, but it takes a completely different form, no longer simply the reduction, the restriction, the subtraction of axioms, but this time, some propositions, a proliferation of properly interior axioms, namely... -- which seems to me very important for all regimes -- of fascist type, namely the very, very bizarre constitution of a whole industry and a whole market defined by a very particular type of product, namely the production of ersatz (substitute) products, which you do not find at all in totalitarian regimes. There too, this... this is a big difference.

So, I would say that a fascist State is a State which is not ... which is relatively original compared to the two poles, to the first great bipolarity, totalitarian State-social democratic State. From one of these perspectives, it has its own way of suppressing axioms, and from the other perspective, it has a way of multiplying axioms. It's a very monster kind of composition. Fine. That's my first remark; it's precisely like that.

A second remark. The criterion that I am studying, at the level of this second remark, is no longer addition-restriction of axioms, from the point of view of the axiomatic, but the question of the saturation of the axiomatic. In fact, this is obvious: if it is correct to consider the functioning of capitalism as equating to an axiomatic, what about a saturation of capitalism? And in fact, what comforts me, what comforts me in ... in this ... in this problem, I am not encountering it by chance since this is a problem that everyone has always posed: it is an extremely classic problem

when it comes to the question of capitalism, namely is there saturation and in what sense? And here, this notion of saturation, which belongs to all economic reflections on capitalism, of eventual saturation, almost suggests that our axiomatic-capitalism assimilation is, in a sense, better founded even than we had perceived it to be.

What does this question of saturation mean in an axiomatic? This is quite simple, namely it is possible that an axiomatic, and more so, it is undoubtedly inevitable that an axiomatic reaches a moment when it is saturated. What does this mean, saturated? That means we can no longer add an axiom -- the axioms being independent, and we have seen: there is the possibility of adding or removing axioms --, well, one speaks of saturation when one is in a state where adding an axiom is no longer possible without the whole axiomatic becoming contradictory. An axiomatic such that you can no longer add a single axiom is said to be saturated.

What about for capitalism? Is there a limit at which capitalism can no longer add axioms? And what, then, would this limit of capitalism be? And that is why I referred to this famous chapter of *Capital*: "The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall",⁸ because it is in this chapter, it seems to me, it is in this chapter of *Capital*, very important, very beautiful, that Marx goes the furthest in the presentation implied, at least, in the implicit presentation of capitalism as axiomatic. And if I am trying to state the highlights of the chapter, by... by urging you to read it or reread it, I would say: it seems to me that there are like three, three moments, three very... -- this is an extraordinarily complicated chapter, very, very composed, in a very complex way --.

I would say there are like three levels: first there is a kind of analysis that Marx does, and which seems so modern to me, then, an analysis which addresses the following question, namely: yes, there is an inevitable limit of capitalism, and what is this inevitable limit of capitalism, namely that capitalism cannot be developed without changing the proportion of so-called "constant" capital and of "variable" capital, that is, constant capital becoming relatively more and more important? What does all this mean, that capitalism cannot be developed without giving a prevalence, without causing the prevalence of constant capital over variable capital? And how is this a limit of capitalism?

This is very clear in ... in Marx's presentation, this is even crystal clear (*limpide*). We call "constant capital", I remind you, at least it is a notion... -- I insist here because this is very important for all those who are interested in Marx, and he seems that among Marxists, it is really presented in a very, very confused way, this point, that I am insisting on parenthetically -- there are two great distinctions concerning capital: there is fixed capital and circulating capital, and then there is constant capital and variable capital. If one already mixes them up, it is not worth trying to read *Capital*. But I am saying that the situation is very confused because, in fact, fixed and circulating capital, this is a distinction which Marx renews, which he uses and renews, but which does not come from him, which is classic before him. Constant capital and variable capital, this is Marx's own contribution, and this specific contribution by Marx appears only in *Capital*. The *Grundrisse*, a fundamental work which precedes *Capital*, still only speak of fixed capital and circulating capital. There is a text of Marx's notes which seems to me to have enormous, enormous importance, in which Marx, between the *Grundrisse* and his writing of

Capital, explains that he considers that he has made a fundamental discovery by distinguishing between constant and variable capital.

So, I am saying... I am indignant; for once, I am saying: this is scandalous because, for example, in the Pléiade edition,⁹ you find a reference to this text which was coldly deleted... really why, then? [There's] a reference, and the text is not even cited. And in a note -- I wrote it down, it seems so scandalous to me -- I can read it, the... an incredible note for someone who is preparing an edition,... it's on page 1705, there, note six hundred... note ... never mind: "In an earlier passage which we omit, [*Deleuze emphasizes these three words*] Marx states that the distinction between constant capital and variable capital, which Adam Smith and his epigones confused with the categories of fixed and circulating capital, contains the whole secret of the genesis of surplus value and capitalist production." Period, okay, perfect. That tells you what an edition edited like that is worth, fine.

So, if we accept the idea that ... the, ... one of the great innovations of *Capital*, compared to Marx's previous works, will be this identification of the fundamental distinction between constant capital and variable capital, it is very easy to understand what these new Marxist categories mean, which, once again, did not exist prior to Marx. Constant capital is exactly the capital invested in the aggregate of raw materials and means of production. [*Pause*] Variable capital is the aggregate of the capital, the part of the capital invested in human labor. Marx's thesis, Marx's famous thesis, is that surplus value, capitalist surplus value, comes from variable capital, that is, from the share of capital invested in human labor. -- I have a paper to sign, don't I? Will you be open ... in a quarter of an hour? ... Thank you so much. [*Apparently someone from the secretariat entered momentarily*] -- You see, and a corollary of Marx's thesis, a corollary of Marx's thesis: the rates of profit, the capitalist rate of profit itself depends on surplus value. Are you following that? Because you have to follow, because it's ... it's not complicated, it seems crystal clear to me, it seems very simple, very ...

And what is the evolution of the capital? When it develops, what is its evolution? Marx says some things, continues to say some very, very simple things. Well, the evolution of capital, for reasons that will be seen later, is inseparable from a kind of fundamental technological progression. There is a technological inventiveness of capitalism. Capitalism is a virus-like thing: there is a very great kind of technological creativity. And what does this technological creativity entail? That the share of capital invested in the means of production tends to increase relatively, tends to increase more and more relatively, namely constant capital tends to gain the upper hand. Not absolutely: it goes without saying that the surplus value drawn from human labor increases, increases absolutely, but what changes is the "constant capital"- "variable capital" proportion the relation of two, namely the share of constant capital tends more and more to outweigh the share of variable capital. Hence what Marx will present as the inevitable crisis of labor in capitalism.

So, when people talk about the predictions that Marx makes, it always strikes me as bizarre that he is criticized precisely on the points ... [that] he did not foresee. If there is a point that he had not foreseen, it is what would become, for example, from the... the seizure of power by the proletariat... His predictions are very slim. On the other hand, when he speaks of a becoming of

capital, namely the share of constant capital tends to increase more and more. Of course, he already had the data in his era, but we can say that he is saying something fundamental for us today and that, after all, I can't see who... who else said it except him, namely what is confirmed by the simplest technological evolution, and as well technological development in the field of so-called computer or cybernetic machines, implies a reversal of the constant capital-variable capital ratio. The share of constant capital becomes more and more essential in modern capitalism, the process of labor being no more than a process as Marx said, adjacent to the machine.

So, you see what Marx is thinking here, that he is describing a limit of capitalism. I would say, this is fully within the problem of saturation: if it is true that constant capital tends to take on greater and greater relative importance, then what happens? Capitalism encounters a limit in what sense? In the sense that the surplus value drawn from human labor, and therefore the rate of profit which depends on the surplus value, tend to have less and less importance respectively. It is the downward tendency in the rate of profit, downward tendency. Here too, this is a matter of poles: there is a downward tendency in the rate of profit. That would be the limit of capitalism, but Marx does not say at all that this limit is reached: it really is a limit, there, again in the mathematical sense, namely something that we approach, and from which we are always separated by an infinitely small quantity, hence the expression "downward tendency". This is Marx's first great idea.

A second idea: if there is a downward tendency like that, or I would say as well, a tendency to saturate the system, you see, I would define the tendency to saturation by using the words again, there, that we are dealing with, by saying: yes, the tendency to saturation is the tendency of constant capital [*A student near Deleuze whispers: Did you hear that?, probably a noise outside*] to take a larger and larger proportion. Hence a second level of Marx's text: how ... how to account, then, for this tendency? What does it depend on? What does this tendency depend on in the sense of a tendency that is never reached: there is a limit, and a limit which, in a certain way, is pushed back as you approach it? This is the idea of... this is... it is an idea, there, caught... no longer in the axiomatic, but in differential calculus, in old-fashioned differential calculus, namely the more this limit is approached, the more, itself, it is pushed back.

How to explain that? In some very beautiful pages, Marx tells us something like this: yes, there are some limits of capitalism, only there you are, that's what we have to understand: these are immanent limits. -- There, I have a feeling that we will... stop. [*Apparently there are noises outside*] -- These are immanent tendencies, right? What do "tendencies" mean? Forgive me: these are immanent limits. What exactly are immanent limits? You can see: what is an outer limit? This is a limit that is encountered as an extrinsic obstacle [*there is a mechanical noise near the microphone*], we collide against such a limit. For example, capitalism very much likes to make us believe that it collides against an extrinsic limit. For example, this is the whole topic currently on the limit of energies, or the limit of food resources: capitalism presents itself as confronting limits which would be the limits of the universe.

Marx said something different: he says “yes” to limits, only these limits to capitalism are immanent limits of capitalism itself. Why? Because there is what Marx calls a kind of contradiction of capitalism. [Pause] He tries to define the contradiction in the following way, when he proposes, in this chapter on the downward tendency, when he proposes the idea of immanent limits. This contradiction, he says, is that capitalism both does not cease -- and cannot do otherwise -- it even invents that, it produces in order to produce, it has invented production for the sake of production, so it has ... we would say, in our language, when we speak of decoded flow, in fact, it has decoded production, it invented a product in order to produce and, at the same time, at the same time, in an inseparable way, uh ... [Pause]

Suddenly I am telling myself: something serious is going on, maybe, I don't know... You don't want to listen if...? Can you hear? No, yes, just listen with your ears, not... Ah, no!

Student: Stop!

Deleuze: Because... you can't hear, those who are near the door, what...? Ah, it's outside the window, a fine.

Various voices: [Inaudible]

Deleuze: Oh good, oh good! Tell us! Tell us!

Various voices: [Inaudible]¹⁰

Deleuze: Well, I think we have to go outside, because it's still very ... it's ... it's still serious. Okay, well, listen too bad, right? [Pause] When did it make the... decision, the Council? [End of tape] [43: 53]

Notes

¹ As was seen in sessions 8 & 9, on the axiomatic and the four criteria detailed by Deleuze, see plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), Proposition XIII, “ « Axiomatics and the present day situation, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 460-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 575-590).

² On Brazil within this context, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 463 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 579).

³ The texts by Paul Virilio that Deleuze and Guattari cite in *A Thousand Plateaus* that correspond to these comments are *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986; Paris: Galilée, 1977) and *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976; no translation).

⁴ On Chile in this context, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 462 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 578).

⁵ Michel Debré was the initial Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic (1959) but was forced to resign when he lost his position as député in 1963. He was quickly re-elected député from Reunion Island. He returned to the government in 1988 as Minister for Economy and Finance, hence the Debré plan.

⁶ The adjective *Giscardian* refers to the conservative French government under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 1974-1981.

⁷ Schacht was a banker and Hitler's minister of the economy.

⁸ This is from *Capital*, book III, part III (chapters 13-15).

⁹ The Pléaïde edition of any author's work, published by the respected editor Gallimard, is considered to be the definitive edition of that work for the author, hence explaining Deleuze's indignation.

¹⁰ Given the lengthy discussion at the previous session about decisions proposed to be taken by the Vincennes President and the University Council, the student no doubt explains something that has occurred on campus that morning, resulting in some kind of action by students (and professors), resulting in Deleuze suddenly ending the session.