

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980

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Part 1

Deleuze: ... like that ... we ... First ... uh ... First ... uh ... Eric, do you ... would you talk a little, or not?

Eric Alliez: Yes.

Deleuze: There you go, first I am looking either for confirmations or else – so that you understand what we are talking about -- confirmations or else complications on the theme that we have considered in the previous meetings, namely: a certain tax-trade relationship, such that, in a certain way, trade could only be developed in a social milieu of taxation. We considered that a lot. And so, among us, we have here, we have here ... Eric Alliez who has been working for some time on both an economic doctrine and on a period in which this doctrine was very important, namely mercantilism.¹ And so I asked him ... uh ... how, in his opinion, was organized, among these so-called mercantilist authors -- who are both practitioners ..., who are not only theorists, who are practitioners -- how was the tax-trade relationship organized, since this occurred at an essential moment in the historical formation of European trade? So, what would you say about this topic? What...?

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: You have to speak as loud as you can, eh, because ... uh, I don't know if ...

Eric Alliez: I was saying, there is a relationship that emerges between money and taxes [*Inaudible words*] insofar as mercantilism is the triumphant doctrine between, say, the middle of the 17th century and the middle of the 18th century, [*inaudible words*]. So, in fact, the thesis that I would like to try to extract is that, in fact, the best formulation, let's say, of the money-tax problem that the mercantilists could paradoxically have given is found in Hobbes. So, in fact, in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes identifies, let's say, two circuits of money, a venous circuit and an arterial circuit. So, I roughly have laid out the problematic. So, in fact, Hobbes says that the venous circuit of money is the taxes and levies which are placed on goods that are transported, bought or sold, a certain metallic mass. This one is channeled [*inaudible words*] that is, in the State coffers, and it is there that the metal will receive the vital principle, because in fact, only its authority, that is, the State authority, will be able to give it its rate (*son cours*).

Deleuze: This is very interesting. Is that in *Leviathan*? How about that.

Eric Alliez: Yes. For those interested, this is pages 268-269 of the, er, edition ...

Deleuze: French or ...?

Eric Alliez: Yes, yes, French. [*Inaudible words*] And, next, therefore, to this venous circuit is located an arterial circuit that he defines as the redistribution to individuals, and it is therefore the State which will give the impetus for exchanges of manufacturing and [*inaudible words*]. So we find in a ... in a French mercantilist named Vauban, let's say, a conception which is very, very close to that, insofar as he clearly says that the circuit of money begins at the time of government spending. And he explains it as follows: the horizontal circuit induced by State spending is the same as that which, naturally, links Paris to the heartland (*campagnes*) [*inaudible words*], simply money circulates there faster, and it is precisely this increase in the speed of circulation, and therefore of money, which will increase national wealth.

So, uh ... it seems to me that the ... the starting point to tackle the problem, let's say historically, is the repeated failure of all the so-called protectionist regulations, therefore all the attempts at overcoding that the territorial States make throughout the 16th century to put an end to the leaks of gold, what we will call cash outflows, and this failure has a demonstrative value on an essential point, namely that, in fact, these are the flows of commercial movements, known as the decoded flows, which regulate and disrupt the movement of cash and fluctuations in process (*en cours*). So, the mercantilists had an example, well, in front of them, one that's very precise; it was obviously the example of Spain which had an absolutely extraordinary wealth both in cash and in precious currency from the 15th to the 16th century, and Spain is absolutely incapable of retaining its wealth [*inaudible words*]. So, from there, something very important plays out, and it is mercantilism that completely takes off from all thought [*inaudible words*], metallist that always reasons in terms of the body of gold.

Deleuze: In terms of?

Eric Alliez: the body of gold ...

Deleuze: Ah yes, quite right, yes, yes.

Eric Alliez: That is, that the nation must absolutely preserve as much as possible all precious metals and prevent them from circulating and going to other nations.

So, in fact, what is very curious is that in all classical economic thought, mercantilism has been constantly assimilated to [*inaudible words*] whereas, well, we realize that historically [*inaudible words*] this is totally false. So, starting from there, well ... let's say that the war for money (*guerre d'argent*), what Colbert defines as a war for money, takes on a whole new face, and that's the famous theory of trade balance given by an English mercantilist named [Thomas] Mun, at the beginning of the 17th century, and there, he tells us very clearly that there is a need for circulation of currencies, of metal, to establish a positive balance of exports, and ... therefore, of

course, therefore, as I said, this mutation has been determined by taking into account, say, the impossibility of a direct coding of the movement of currencies.

So, from that moment on, essentially English mercantilists will try to stop all the policies of currency devaluation [*inaudible remarks*] which, up to that point, were the most traditional method to manage to pay off public debts, so that the State, in fact, no longer intervenes to regulate the movement of currency, by orienting the movement of the trade via indirect tax which [*inaudible words*] thus, that, Gilles had shown well the last time, public credit and, of course, a whole policy of borrowing, investment and financing, that is, obviously, public expenditure.

So, to summarize a little this ... this very general approach, in this way, to mercantilism, we can in fact say that mercantilism is truly a political geometry of power in that all its work consists of an operation of axiomatization of production starting from the creation of a new space of appropriation and distribution which is the national territory. And the national market is therefore the new comparative space that the mercantilists will cause to emerge from this appropriation [*inaudible words*] of the currency represented by taxes and public credit.

Deleuze: Can I ask a question?

Eric Alliez: Yes

Deleuze: Historically, we can clearly see that the mercantilists, in fact, are very closely linked to the ... er ... 17th century formation of ... large States such as the France and England types, right? Are there mercantilist currents that are linked to the autonomy of cities, or not? Are all the mercantilists uh ... really linked to the emergence of ... the so-called modern state in the 17th century?

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible remarks; he seems to speak directly to Deleuze and not to the audience*] question is difficult [*Inaudible remarks*] [Deleuze: mmh mmh, yes yes yes] [*Inaudible remarks*] the mercantilist current itself, consequently, is completely determined by the emergence of the territorial State.

Deleuze: Alright, alright, great. Yes, it is very ...

Eric Alliez: So, so we have ...

Deleuze: Although, indeed, it appropriates urban mechanisms ... that's it. Yeah, that's fine for us ... because ... okay, yeah?

Eric Alliez: So, we are used to defining this mercantilism by a nationalization of economic life, so, well, through the best known practices of mercantilist policy, namely: creation of large monopolies to promote and control both foreign trade; the [*inaudible words*] of part of this commercial capital to manufacturers in the form of subsidies, tax exemptions etc., and then, of course, a whole territorial planning policy with public works which aim in fact essentially at the creation of facilities of circulation. This is the entire policy, well, [*inaudible words*] to create

canals, problems [*inaudible words*], etc. So, there is an economic historian called Schuler in the 19th century, who precisely sums up this connection of mercantilism with the emergence of the territorial State. I've jotted down the quote; he said, "Mercantilism in its very essence is nothing other than the formation of the State, not the formation of the state per se, but the simultaneous building of the State and the economic system". Uh ... well ...

But what interests us here, beyond a very general approach to mercantilism, is to try to identify somehow zones of immanence [*inaudible words*] of the mechanism of capture constituting what we could call the abstract machinism of the economic-administrative striation of the mercantilists which is, obviously, the basis of the new assemblage, namely: the nation. So, in fact, this whole kind of ... gigantic informational machine that the territorial State is putting into place, let's say, which will simultaneously record, balance, regulate, distribute etc., the financial, commercial, industrial flows, and this obviously allowing the appropriation of the circulation of [*inaudible words*] foreign trade, derives its existence and its efficiency only from a more fundamental plane of appropriation -- this is what Gilles spoke to us about the last time -- namely, the tax that Marx defines, I believe quite rightly, as the economic existence of the State and, correlatively of course, the public credit that Marx defines, always in *Capital*, as the "credo of capital", that's a quote, since public debt operates as "one of the most energetic levers of primitive accumulation", it "endows barren money with power of breeding" by converting it to capital.²

So what is interesting at the level of mercantilists is that there is a very, very clear awareness of a conjunction developing these two [*inaudible words*], namely tax and public credit, the two being completely inseparable, more precisely, the State accumulation. And of this State accumulation, it can be said that it is really the continuous thread, properly designated. And fine, State accumulation, fine, indirect tax insofar being an advance on capital, while direct tax itself is [*inaudible word*] really the azimuth point which will allow this mechanism of exchange to be grasped.

So [*inaudible words*] as we said the last time there, [*inaudible words*] he says at one point something that sums up the problem very well, he says: "thus tax and currency appear to be transformers of economic wealth into political power."

Deleuze: yeah, yeah, yeah ...

Eric Alliez: It's ... it's ... So, what I want to do now to complete this ... this kind of overview, like that, would be to try to see what effectively happened in France and England at the level of fiscal policy between, say, the middle of the 17th century and the middle of the 18th century. So obviously [*inaudible words*].

A student: [*Inaudible words; she requests to be able to speak to the students, and apparently distributes an announcement for a meeting to be held that morning*]

Deleuze: Of course.

Student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: I think there are already some. But if you can ... yes. Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes. You will leave some, yes. You pass them around, yes.

Student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: No, there isn't? Wasn't it that that we ...?

Another student: Yes, it was.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes. But you can leave more of them, thank you.

Initial student: Bye.

Deleuze: Goodbye.

Eric Alliez: Yes, so then ...

Deleuze: Uh, those who want to go there at 11 am, eh, you can just go

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: We can't hear you, Eric.

Eric Alliez: So, I was saying that, in France and in England, mercantilism tends to identify two fundamental fiscal policies, namely: on the one hand, in France with Colbert, and in England with [William] Petty, so from, say, from the middle of the 17th century, it is the aggregate of all the indirect taxes that will be established as the basis of public revenues. So, for example, in England, I have the figures: there indirect tax is [*inaudible words*] percent of the total tax. And in France, in the 18th century, the direct tax only increased by half, while the lease of the general tax farm (*la ferme générale*), which collected all of the kingdom's indirect taxes, was going to quintuple. So, that is the first point. And so there, to return to what Gilles said earlier, what is important is that we realize that the nation-State is really reintegrating into its fiscal policy a fundamental element which was at the base of the wealth and expansion of all urban economies between the 13th and 16th centuries, [*inaudible words*] and then, the second element is: financial concentration. So, in France, with the general tax farm, and in England, with what one could call the mercantilism of paper currency, that is, the creation of the Bank of England, which is not only a deposit bank, but also a bank of issue.

So, I start with the general tax farm. So, what is interesting [*inaudible words*] is trying to see the articulation that exists between direct, constitutive tax, therefore, of rent, indirect tax, public debt and [*inaudible words*]. So, from the start, Colbert will link his entire economic enterprise to the financial reorganization of tax revenues. And he will constitute a real financial lobby which will develop a vast network at once economic as well as administrative, ending up covering the whole country with a gigantic, complex spider web operating on two fundamental levels, in fact via two key figures who, as we will see, represent exactly the same person.

So, on the one hand, it is obviously the finance officer who bought his office (*charge*) and who is responsible for the collection of direct taxes. And he will keep a high percentage of this collection by operating what is called a tax surplus-levy. And the second figure, the figure of the shareholder (*partisan*), [is] really the key figure in the general tax farm, who is responsible for collecting indirect taxes. So, what is this general tax farm system? Well, in fact, it's a private company that establishes a lease with the government. At its end, the company will have to pay a sum into the treasury, in the name of the tax in question, responsible for reimbursing itself and, of course, [extending] beyond. So, this difference will obviously constitute the corporate profit.

So, of course, there is a concentration since, originally, each of the taxes was [*inaudible words*] separately. And then Colbert will really constitute the system of the general tax farms with the lease operating on the aggregate of indirect taxes. So fine, and moreover, that will truly operate until the middle of the 18th century, the peak period being, roughly, 1725-1740. And ... So, this is nonetheless an absolutely gigantic operation, because we realize that by around 1730, there were more than 30,000 persons whose interests were completely tied into those of the farm.

So, this is where we have something that interests us particularly; it is that we realize that, in fact, the shareholder (*partisan*) type, paradoxically, therefore the one who, theoretically, deals with ..., is linked to the system of indirect taxation, is the finance officer, that is, the one who theoretically should collect direct taxes. Why? Because, quite simply, by [*inaudible words*] the function, his milieu, his alliance networks, etc., he is the most able to fulfill his role as intermediary since he is in permanent contact with potential leaseholders, large landowners who are, through the angle of the seigneurial system, some of the main leaseholders of the land, those who control directly or indirectly, obviously, the main source of wealth, namely the land.

So, what I mean is simply that ... let's say if the ground rent comes down from the heights of a form of hoarding in order to be reinvested, therefore, in the economy of the country, it is of course in large part through the advances of the lenders in [*inaudible words*], through this system of general tax farms. So, there, I believe that we fully verify Gilles's hypothesis, insofar as this is indeed the monopolistic appropriation of currency in the fiscal policy of the indirect tax, with the general tax farm, which truly opens up the market function of money ... er ... well, what Marx calls ... fine ... the becoming-capital of money. So, the indirect tax literally allows the deterritorialization of wealth originating from land and, therefore, this indirect tax will ensure the circulation of money through the creation of a market, of course artificial in nature, and determines in this same way the whole economic dynamic through the investment of this same capital.

So, we notice something that is quite ... that is quite symptomatic: it is that all the receiving managers (*receveurs généraux*), therefore, who belong to the indirect tax system, since it is they who [*inaudible word*] all the finance officers, fine, appointed by Colbert, in addition to their direct interests in the tax farm, are also shareholders of large trading companies, large industrial companies, not to mention the military navy since it is Colbert who is mainly responsible for the navy. And, so, all these large companies, the main origin of funds, are of course the officers and the [*inaudible words*]. So, there, I believe that at this first level, we verify exactly what Hobbes said, namely that ... well, it is really the State levy, the tax system, which is the venous circuit of money.

So, much more briefly, I wanted to look at another ... another point, let's say, of this system of appropriation, with the English reform, then the problem of public credit with the emergence of the bank of issue. So, what is going on in England?

Deleuze: When was the creation of the Bank of England?

Eric Alliez: It's 1690 ...

Deleuze: That's it, yes.

Eric Alliez: But what is interesting is that we see, well before the official creation, let's say, of this bank ... uh ... we realize that the mercantilists will try by all means to create a market for long-term government borrowing and a very, very low interest rate. This constant preoccupation with interest rates can be found in absolutely all mercantilists, essentially Colbert, and that, I think that Keynes sees it very, very well in the chapter which he devotes to the rehabilitation, precisely, of mercantilist policy, since the whole of classical economy will completely reject mercantilism. But then, Marx has a rather ... rather interesting interpretation on this matter. He says that, in fact, classical political economy rejects mercantilism because, in fact, it is the barbaric figure of all ... uh, let's say, the territorial political economy.

So, therefore, this market with long-term government borrowing will be created, and, as if quite naturally, of course, the long-term borrowing will be transformed into perpetual borrowing. And then, the interest is that obviously [that] the payment of interest no longer exhausts public credit, that is, one is no longer required to borrow and then return the borrowed money. One simply limits oneself to paying the interest annually. So, what seems quite important to me is that we realize that the mercantilists had nevertheless anticipated very well a fundamental mutation, namely that ... uh ... historically, we realize that it's the public debt, the whole system of public debt that will trigger, let's say, the fundamental mutation of both the stock company and the bank of issue. So here, I would like to read a passage from Marx on the ... precisely on the creation of the Bank of England. It's in *Capital*, it's the whole passage on the genesis of industrial capitalism.

Deleuze: What page? Euh, bon... [25 :00] c'est dans la Pléiade, tome I, page 1217.

Eric Alliez: Euh, well... It's in the Pléiade edition, vol. 1, page 1217. [*Inaudible words*] [*Laughter*]: "At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments, and, thanks to the privileges they received, were in a position to advance money to the State. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks, whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of England began with lending its money to the Government at 8%; at the same time it was empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital" – and this is obviously the important point – "by lending it again to the public in the form of banknotes. It was allowed to use these notes for discounting bills, making advances on commodities, and for buying the precious metals. It was not long ere this credit-money, made by the bank itself, became. The coin in which the Bank of England made its loans to the State, and paid, on account of the State, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand

and took back more with the other; it remained, even whilst receiving, the eternal creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced. Gradually it became inevitably the receptacle of the metallic hoard of the country, and the centre of gravity of all commercial credit.”³ At the same time that the burning of witches was stopped in England, banknote counterfeiters began to be hung there.

Okay, so, I think, there, uh ... I'm identifying two things that I think are quite important. On the one hand, with all modern money, this is a banking indebtedness since, in fact, well, that is the whole meaning of Marx's explanation: it is the debt claim that the bank draws on itself which takes the place of payment currency. So, what is the creation of money? It is, let's say, the projection of a circulatory flow in political economy, and uh ... therefore this is an extremely sophisticated appropriation formula [*inaudible words*].

And, on the other hand, we notice a second thing, which is that the function of money is absolutely not to exchange, but, let's say, to credit a flow of power [*inaudible words*] of deterritorialization, somewhat finally in the sense that I was saying earlier about the deterritorialization of commercial wealth with this entire general tax farm system, so that it is a matter of crediting with a flow of power [*inaudible words*] the operation of [*inaudible words*] which really constitutes the State apparatus. And I think that, in fact, the whole point of reflecting about mercantilism is to see that, in fact, State-creation (*étatisation*) is really, let's say, the very essence of all capitalistic axiomatization. And the creation of money is obviously the most sophisticated point of this axiomatization, obviously with all the development of the international credit system, etc. [28:42]

Deleuze: Perfect. So, listen, there is nothing to add, since everything is confirmation. I mean, there is no difficulty. It would be a mass ... Perfect. So, you see, we could have ... Then, surely, there are other examples. What I would be concerned about is ... then, in a whole different social context, but the example of the ... Eastern Empires. Uh ... to what extent, there too, is the tax system which ... allows the extension of trade, and at the same time, the appropriation of trade by ... uh ... by ... by the Empire. So, everything is fine. So, there we are. Uh ...

Today I would almost like to ... number our topics, and we will discover some problems similar to those of ... [*Deleuze does not finish*]. Here we are, my first question is this. And I would almost like us to manage to ... as if we might sense, to sense a complementarity between ... an inevitable complementarity between two events, two abstract events. The first event that I am considering is, again, the formation of the State as an apparatus of capture. So, we have already completed this aspect; we saw it the last time. I am just bringing it up again in order to summarize that this formation of the State as apparatus of capture, we can ... we can present it, in summary, as the overcoding-land system (*système surcodage-terre*), the overcoding-land system in contrast with what we could call, in passing, the primitive systems which are themselves systems -- is the word "system" appropriate there? It doesn't matter, eh -- code-territory systems. So, we saw that the overcoding-land system was something quite different, and that the overcoding-land system was but one with the erection of an apparatus of capture as such.

So, what interests me today is for this theme to become as concrete as possible. If I try to say what I would like to show I would like to show this: that when we find ourselves in a system

which overcodes, which overcodes flows, that is, which instead of coding territories or territorialities, overcodes aggregates formed under the conditions we have seen er ... previously, well then, when we find ourselves facing an overcoding system, when we find ourselves facing a system which overcodes the flows of a social field, inevitably, this overcoding will give rise to decoded flows, will itself at certain points cause -- simply, we will have to say which points and why -- but there is something, how to say this, inevitable. Literally, one could say: well obviously, you will not overcode flows, you will not launch an overcoding apparatus without thereby causing decoded flows, that is, decoded flows, I mean, which escape both ... that is, which escape both the primitive code and imperial overcoding, and State overcoding. This is the very act of overcoding of flows which will cause flows, within the social field, that are themselves decoded, flows themselves decoded which therefore tend to escape it, since, once again, "decoded", for us, that does not mean "whose code is encompassed", it means: "flows which escape the code, which escape their code".

So, if you will, so that this becomes concrete, I am taking ... I am coming back to my three ... we saw that the imperial apparatus of capture, the apparatus of overcoding, had something like three heads: public property, the public property of the Emperor who, once again, is absolutely not a private owner, who acts as the public owner of the land; land is an object of public appropriation, so it is owned by the municipalities, but it is an object of imperial property. Fine. So, the first head was public property. The second head was public works. The third head was public tax. These were the three forms of overcoding. And, in fact, in public property, it was the territory that was overcoded and through this became land. In public works, it was activity that was overcoded and through this became surplus labor. And, in taxes, it was the relations or exchanges between goods and services which were themselves overcoded and which became tax money. So, it would be necessary to show that, at these three levels, something very, very precise will act in such a way that the overcoding will not occur without, at the same time, flows appearing and beginning to flow into the social field, flows which escape the code and the overcoding, that is, start the stream of decoded flows.

And the last time I only said this, that this is where every time you must affix, eh, the point that will act like the source of these decoded streams. You understand where I am going with this: it's that if we assign these points well, henceforth ... well yes, necessarily the most archaic State, that is, the oldest Empire, already will contain germs or viruses within it. There will even no longer be any need to assume an evolution. In the oldest archaic Empire, there will already be kinds of viruses which will labor within it and which will ensure that imperial overcoding does not happen without itself creating something that will escape it and which, therefore, will undoubtedly to be included in forms of States which, apparently, appear to us much later or, in reality, do occur much later. But what will interest us ... uh ... what interests us is not an evolution; it is already to specify how these germs are distributed within the archaic Empire.

Now, the last time, what did I ... try to say based on the theses of ... the Hungarian sinologist Tökei?⁴ I tried to say this, something quite simple: yes, when the despot's public property overcodes municipal possession or, if you will, territorial possession, well then, at the same time, at the same time, we are going to witness a very strange phenomenon, namely flows of private property will come into being scattered here and there. And the overcoding produced by public property is itself going to give rise to flows of private property that, at the extreme, it is unable to

control – this story is very interesting -- uh ... that, at the extreme, it is going to be unable more or less to control this. More or less, that is, these flows which are decoded are going to be as if caught within a ... kind of tension, their tendency to escape the code and the State overcoding and also the way in which State overcoding must get complicated, must transform itself to catch up with them, to block them ... to, euh, inhibit them, to prevent them, or to master them, to control them.

And, in fact, I was saying: it is at the same time that the public figure of the despot overcodes all the territories as the public owner of the land, and that an entirely different character, who really seems a poor guy within this story, will bring forth the flow, a small stream ... a small stream of private property. And who is this rather ... kind of shabby, kind of weird figure, this character who, once again, complains all the time? For example, on the horizon of the history of China, but in all of universal history, we find this lament, this elegy, it is the freed slave, or the plebeian. The Roman plebeian, the freed slave of the Chinese Empire -- and, once again, the Roman plebs are partly made up of freed slaves, so the resonance between very different systems like Rome and China would be verified -- he is the one who becomes capable of private property, a small private property.

So, there, we can see very well how the overcoding, once again, of the territories, as produced by the Emperor's or the despot's public property, causes to flow under specific conditions -- namely: the freed slave -- a stream which, no doubt, at first appears tiny, a stream of private property. In other words, what ... what I am insisting on is that: it seems to me impossible for us to pass from the forms of the Empire's public ownership to a kind of privatization which would occur by a miracle. Once again, even the Emperor's functionaries who receive land under tenure cannot become private owners, since the whole point of tenure as function is precisely that one does not own it.

So, as Tökei said, the Emperor's functionaries can be made into little despots, [but] they cannot ... they can't be made into small private owners. All their interest, and all the income they derive from these lands, come precisely from the public character of the appropriation. The private owner can only come from elsewhere. So, we must show that it both comes from elsewhere and that this elsewhere is necessarily linked to the imperial system. And, we had a first response in terms of ownership. Once again, the overcoding despot's public property causes, at a precise point, that of the freed slave, the formation of a flow of private and no longer public property, that is, there is like a decoded flow that begins to flow into the overcoding system.

I would say the same about our second case: labor. I would say ... I would use the same expression: activity is not overcoded by the imperial labor regime, by the imperial public labor regime, without also a flow private labor being formed. And what will this private labor be? It will already be private slavery, namely the activity of the private slave insofar as being the property of a figure, who is who? Once again: who is the freed slave. It is the freed slave who begins to own private slaves for industrial work and especially mining, craftsmanship and especially mining. [*Pause*] Uh ... once again, sense that this is some kind of complementarity. As soon as you have an overcoding system, it is this overcoding system that causes within it the formation and flow of private flows, of decoded flows.

The third example: tax and money. If it is true that the form "money" relates to tax as overcoding produced by the imperial State, by the archaic Empire, it must be said that this money, this "money" form, it is the currency, is metallic currency. It's metallic currency. And, finally, metallic currency is State currency. [Pause] Only here's what we have: with this overcoding, we can imagine that a set of equivalences is established – something we have seen; I will not come back to that -- between goods, services and money, especially in terms of tax payment. Some will pay tax in kind, in goods, others will pay tax in services, others will pay tax in money, in money. It is also conceivable that commercial forms, henceforth, are developed since this whole tax system consists of initiating and operating a rotation and putting goods, services and ... and coins into circulation.

So, there is already a kind of circulation. There is already a kind of commercial circulation within this "tax" overcoding. And it is thanks to this system that commerce can be taken by the archaic Empire to the point at which the Emperor has precisely the monopoly of commerce. But I am saying at the same time, understand, this comes down to saying a very simple thing: you can't stop. As is said, ... uh, once something is unleashed, you can't stop it. You just never know what goes with it. You never know the complementarities in advance. These are not logical complementarities. This is another area. There is no logical complementarity between the overcoding by the archaic Emperor and the decoded flows of the freed slave. The freed slave is the figure who is indeed in a situation of decoding. As long as he was a slave, he was still overcoded ... he was encoded. The freed slave is like a ... you see: he is outcast, but outcast from within, he has no status, he has no public right. We are creating a very, very bizarre situation. And the overcoding system secretes that, secretes that.

So, I am saying: fine, you have the tax system, metallic currency, and through these, commerce is indeed appropriated by the State. The great example is, in fact, for example, the way in which the Chinese Empire tried, really, to overcode trade; it is the famous Chinese grid, the grid of Chinese cities which is typically a system of territorial planning that essentially belongs to the State apparatus as an apparatus of capture and which is a way of overcoding all commercial activities. And ... [End of the cassette] [46: 09]

Part 2

... metallic currency other forms of currency. I am taking the classic distinction in all er ... financial textbooks, where three forms of currency are distinguished. Metallic currency, you see, these are coins ... uh ... gold, silver, copper, whatever you want. The so-called "fiduciary" money consists of paper in the sense of banknotes. And so-called script currency (*monnaie scripturale*), what is this script money? Well, it's a kind of bill of exchange (*lettre de change*), discount note (*billet à escompte*). There you have it. The first two forms, euh seem ... very ... to appear around the 13th ... between the 13th-15th centuries, bill of exchange, discount note. There is a rather curious thing, if we think about it: fiduciary money does not seem very, very interesting to me ... because it is ... uh ... very interesting, because it allows precisely ... it operates as a kind of creation of financial capital. It allows, in fact, ... er ... on the one hand, to transform everything in the domain of circulation, but above all, it authorizes the increase of the quantity of currency. This is already a kind of creation of money.

But what interests me are the two extremes. If I take fiduciary money as constituting metallic currency ... no ... uh ... not ... If I take metallic currency and fiduciary money as expressing the same thing, being the simple expression and the complex expression of what might be called State money, script currency, and here's my question, is that it has a completely different origin.

You see that I am again locating my theme, in this third case. I am saying: at the same time, it has a completely different origin, and yet it is inseparably linked to State money, to metallic currency, to the point that you will not be able to unleash overcoded flows of metallic currency without also creating currencies. ... flows of decoded script currency. Why? In the same way I was saying earlier: you cannot turn the despot into the public owner of the land that overcodes all territories without unleashing a whole new level of flows of private property that connect back to the freed slave.

You see: the freed slave is not the same as the despot, but it turns out that, very oddly, there is complementarity in the sense that, and this is not surprising then, that in a story that you can already sense, the freed slave will become the Emperor's adviser. There is a very bizarre kind of correlation. Well, we are satisfied with all that. This is an illogical necessity. We would have to find a word for that: an alogical necessity, an alogical complementarity. Then it's not at all the same thing, in the same way, script currency and metallic currency are not at all the same thing. That still does not prevent, as soon as you ... er ... create a system of metallic currency which overcodes, which overcodes trade, you inevitably, necessarily unleash decoded flows of trade which, for their part, pass through the uh ... script currency. I'm trying to explain better ... Yes ... *[Deleuze speaks to a student who interrupts]* Yes, you will speak later, because maybe I will answer in advance ... because it is... *[Laughter]*

A student: *[Inaudible words]*

Deleuze: So, good. You are saying...?

The student: *[Inaudible words]*

Deleuze: You need to speak loudly, eh!

The student: ... that therefore traces were discovered of an archaic Empire which would have been discovered on the high plateaus *[Inaudible words]* which is very, very old *[Inaudible words]* And the trace that was found of this Empire is a system of clay balls containing small dice, small triangles with traces of color on them, also clay, and which were found swarming through everything that can correspond *[Inaudible remarks]* of the territory. I wanted to ask you if this is what can correspond to script currency.

Deleuze: No, there, I think this is a form of, uh ... pseudo-metallic, non-metallic currency, but which functions as metallic currency. Uh ... I guess.

Another student: *[Inaudible words]*

Deleuze: Yes, but these are functionaries ... in my opinion, they are functionaries Uh ... it depends, it's not in Mesopotamia, right? It's in Anatolia, right?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What? It's in Anatolia, yes. Yes, but that's what we talked about. When we created the hypothesis that there was no reason to stick to Neolithic States, you remember, I'll remind you very quickly about that: we said that, by virtue of relatively recent discoveries in archeology, you could even break with a pattern that had lasted until ... er ... recently, concerning these Empires ... the problem of the archaic Empires. The classic timeline was: these Empires are Neolithic Empires, and these Neolithic Empires already implied an agriculture, an elaborate agriculture, that is, an agriculture capable of forming stockpiles. We have seen that a very great archaeologist, to whom ... a lot of misfortunes occurred, but for other reasons ..., namely an Englishman called [James] Mellaart has been doing since ... -- or was doing ... he's ... he's been banned from excavations ... I think -- uh ... had been digging since ... uh ... 1960, about twenty years ago, had undertaken a series of excavations in Anatolia. And where he had found -- it seems to me that it is ... one of the great ... uh ... one of the great innovations, really, in archaeological discoveries for a very long time -- he had discovered traces of veritable Empires, eh, with a radius of about ... with an influence of ... an area of domination of 3000 km -- which is huge -- uh ... in Anatolia.⁵

And ... uh ... the example ... the first excavations concern a city with a name that gives you pause, a city, so ... uh ... very, very archaic ... uh ... which is famous thanks to Mellaart's work and which is pronounced roughly ... I do not quite know how it is pronounced: Çatal-Hüyük. Çatal-Hüyük -- uh ... c cedilla, a - t - a - l, hyphen, h - u umlaut - y - u umlaut ... uh ... - c - k -- But ... uh... because he started there, it seems there are even older ones. He actually traces back ... Archaeological dating goes back to 10,000-7,000, 10,000-7,000, that's huge. And the whole hypothesis ... by which that reverses everything that was said until then about the archaic Empires, as these Empires presupposed an already developed agriculture, etc., what reverses everything is that, obviously, nothing prevents us in addition from believing that these Empires are themselves successors ... Very difficult, these are Empires ... the dwellings are mud, so it is. .. uh... it's not even...that doesn't subsist at all. We can, at the extreme ... 10,000, that puts us at the very beginning of the Paleolithic ... er, of the Neolithic. We can, at the extreme, propose the idea of -- which would upset a lot of things about the dating of ... er ... of ... of this kind of problem -- we can propose the theme of a Paleolithic State, cautiously, right. There might be Paleolithic States of which Çatal-Hüyük would only be ... uh ... would only be ... a last link.

But I am saying: why is it important, this matter of dates? This is because, at that point, there is no question that Empires presuppose an agriculture. Once again, that was our subject: it is not a certain level of agriculture that makes Empires possible; it is archaic Empires that invent agriculture, specifically archaic Empires are directly in the grips of the world of hunter-gatherers. There is no need ... -- again this breaks the patterns of evolution greatly -- no need to presuppose agriculture, a passage to gathering ... ah ... a rudimentary agriculture, development of agriculture and, agriculture having developed, the archaic Empire becomes possible. No reason. On the contrary, we must in ... Must ... must break, there, all these patterns of evolution, in what form?

Since we see how is possible at least, thanks to Mellaart's work, the erection of an archaic Empire directly engaged in a world of non-farmer hunters. And there, how do we see it?

Well, for a very simple reason, it is that, what we see positively, is rather the way in which agriculture comes from the Empire and comes from the city, namely, there, the framework ... the evolutionary framework is completely transformed; it is even ... uh ... turned upside down, namely: it suffices to give you a system of abduction or exchange between hunter-gatherers where wild seeds are, literally, put in a bag. Everything comes out of a bag. This bag, it turns out, is the Empire bag, it's the apparatus of capture. You put in a bag ... uh ... wild seeds from different territories, so that does not imply any agriculture ... As a ... uh ... an urban planner who is very, very important, I believe, who started from James Mellaart's work, built a whole system ... a kind of imperial model. She's a very good English urbanist ... er ... who has worked a lot on American cities, and her name is Jane Jacobs.⁶ Jane Jacobs creates a model that she calls the new obsidian, "obsidian" I am saying ... -- Ah well here I am ... obsidian, for those who do not know, it is ..., but it is very ... normal ..., uh ... it's uh ... lava; it's linked to volcanoes, it's some ... it's uh ... there are several, this is not a type of lava, it is an aggregate of lavas which before, before any metallurgy, allowed the manufacture of tools, in the Paleolithic and the Neolithic. And, indeed, it yields ... you see, these are ... these are... these are... very beautiful lavas, very ... green black. And, in fact, they can be given a sharp edge, so there were obsidian knives, there was ... well obsidian, it's a very beautiful material. – Fine,

You see, if I insist on "before any metallurgy", I mean it was obsidian, it's just as if I said, "before any agriculture", right? So, there is no need even to assume ... eh, a nascent metallurgy, an emerging agriculture on which the archaic Empire would be formed. No, I am saying: everything comes out of a bag, that is, when you put in wild seeds from different territories -- this is indeed the system of the archaic Empire insofar as it overcoded the territories -- they put it all in a bag with functionaries guarding the bag, the despot's functionaries. What is happening? Everyone knows this. At a greater or lesser length of time, hybridization phenomena occurred, hybridization phenomena. And Jane Jacobs insists strongly on this; she is very, very brilliant regarding these hybridizations within the bag.

And what is going on? Well, the Empire and the capital Çatal-Hüyük, the great capital, it is there that agriculture is created. The capital is in a position to have seedlings, and comparative seedlings; that is, the capital is going to spread those seed hybrids ... she's going to spread them into the territories, where? But the capital is going to put them on its very own land. In other words, agriculture originates in the city and on the city's land. It's not born in the countryside, never, ever! It was born in the city, in the city, on the city's land. So, you see that here, evolutionism, in fact... uh ... is totally short-circuited. You have your hunter-gatherer territorialities, that is, your itinerant territorialities, you have the ... the "archaic Empire" apparatus of capture which does not presuppose any agriculture. And then agriculture will emerge from the apparatus of capture.

So, you will have two cases. In fact, when you plant seedlings, when you plant your seedlings on the city's lands, you can do it in two ways: either the same seedling on different properties (*terres*), or different seedlings on the same property successively. These are two interesting cases. This corresponds -- if you remember what we considered the last few times -- this already

corresponds absolutely to the expressions, in fact, of land and ground rent, and of ground rent which goes to the despot. That is, there is a comparativity of lands, or seedlings on the same property. Everything is going very well, right?

So... uh... in fact, this is very, very important... I am saying: the importance of Mellaart's discoveries is not simply to push back -- which would already be very, very important -- to push back the ordinary timeline of great archaic Empires by 3000 years or 5000 years; for once, this is no longer... this is no longer the Neolithic. It is the very beginning of the Neolithic and the end of the Paleolithic, and perhaps farther back. But this quantitative problem is secondary to the qualitative problem. It is that, if you push back the date, from that moment on, there is no ... no reason still to suppose -- as it still is in Marx's theory or in the theory of ancient archaeologists -- no reason to assume that the Empire supposes an elaborate stage of agriculture, no need. In other words, the Empire's emergence, we can say: this apparatus of capture is assembled, but it is assembled in one fell swoop. And it is contemporary, it is ... it is immediately contemporary with any social field. That doesn't mean that everyone is subordinate to it; there are people who escape it, but it's always there on the horizon, always on the horizon.

So, I come back to that, fine ... This kind of comes back to the same thing, we didn't really ... uh ... get off track from what we were saying. See, my complementarities ... Only I am adding: as soon as this Empire is there, as soon as this overcoding apparatus is there, it also contains the viruses that eat away at it. And if I go back over the list of the three viruses, which at the same time are something else, but something else inseparably linked to the system of overcoding, I would say ... I would start again by saying: public property which overcodes ... the public property of the despot who overcodes the land, engenders a shallow stream on the side of the freed slave -- at the beginning shallow -- a shallow stream, the decoded flow of private property, since the freed slave is the decoded figure. He has the right to private property only because he is excluded from public rights. At the same time, he becomes capable of having private slaves, unlike the despot who only has public slaves. The private slave is the one who, precisely, goes to work in metallurgy, in the craft industry, over which the freed slave has a sort of de facto monopoly.

And I come back to my last example: so, I have my State money, metallic or even fiduciary currency. I am saying, well yeah, fine, this is a currency of overcoding, with the "tax" system. It already operates a circulation, a rotation during which the equivalences of goods-services-money are constituted. So, it [currency] overcodes trade and commerce; it overcodes all systems of equivalence. Only here we have this: you cannot unleash this currency of overcoding without another, script currency constituting itself alongside, but necessarily always alongside, but in necessary complementarity. So, you will say to me: but what is this script currency? How do we distinguish it? If I take the two poles "State currency"/"script currency", "metallic State currency"/"script currency", the distinction is very well drawn by Marx, in the texts ... in his texts on currency.

Marx -- I am summarizing a lot -- Marx says roughly this: you understand, he says, uh, metallic currency, ... -- and he sometimes says State currency -- metallic State currency is by itself an element of socialization. That's fine with us ... if you follow me, this expression is fine with us; that is, [currency] is itself a social determination. In what sense? It socializes. What? Well, it

socializes whatever it comes into contact with. What does metallic tax money come into contact with? We have seen it: with goods and services since, in fact, it is at the level of tax that, once again, is created -- this, I will not stop trying to repeat it -- that it seems to me that the first systems of goods-services-money equivalence are established. So, this metallic currency socializes goods and services, that is, it is a question of a public social relationship. [*Pause*]

Script currency, what is it? There, Marx says it very ... -- I believe all the ... all the financiers ... would also say it; the analysis is very, very ... it is not especially Marxist what I am saying; any uh ... financier would say it, I think -- that, logically -- I'm not talking about de facto mixtures that are ... -- logically, what is called script currency is the expression of a relationship between two private persons. I'm not necessarily saying physical persons: it can be legal persons, but it is a relationship ... it is a monetary relationship between two private persons. In other words, script currency -- and this is what strikes me as essential, essential, if one tries to go beyond the purely ... er ... apparent definitions -- script currency is always asocialized; it is not itself an element of socialization. It must be socialized; it is a private relationship, private relationship between who and who? Between a private person that we will call a bank and a private person that we will call a merchant, for example. In other words, what Eric [Alliez] was saying clearly earlier, it is even the definition of the creation of money at this level; there are several creations of money. There is a creation of money, metallic currency. There is a whole different type of creation of money, namely: a bank issues a claim on itself; that is script currency. The act by which a bank issues a claim on itself is going to be the fundamental private bank-merchant relationship that will constitute so-called script currency.

So, we understand better the forms of script currency. It's going to be ... the first form, it's going to be the bill of exchange (*billet de change*). The second form, much more complex, will be the discountable note (*billet escomptable*). So, you will say to me: but the State intervenes ... but be careful, of course, the State will intervene. But we are dealing with logical determinations. Of course, it has to. But, if you will, we have to talk about a duality of money. There is money as a public social determination that belongs to the archaic Empire already; this is metallic currency. It refers to the tax system. The tax system makes goods-services-money equivalents possible and overcodes trade. But, at the same time, you cannot unleash this same overcoded circuit without, within this circuit, creating points of decoding. These points of decoding are the formation of a completely different monetary flow, a now fundamentally decoded monetary flow; it, "fundamentally decoded," that is, which expresses the private relationships between people.

You will say to me: why [can't] it be prevented? Well, because... it's at the level of this circuit... it's a bit like... -- if you will, there, I'm selecting a, uh... geometric metaphor uh... easy -- it's as if there were tangential points. You undertake your overcoding circuit: there are tangents that are emerging. There are tangents that take flight. So how will these be retained (*rattraper*)? -- I am correcting simultaneously what I have just said -- At the same time, this currency, therefore script, which is a private relationship, as opposed to metallic currency as a public agency, [about] this script currency, I am saying: it expresses a private relationship and not a social relationship in itself. But, at the same time, it is inseparable from a process of socialization. It is socialized to the extent that ... or through the intermediary of operations, of the commercial and banking operations it makes possible.

Which means what? This obviously means that there will have to be -- and there is a need for -- an adjustment from script currency to metallic currency. There will have to be a form of control over this script currency by the most archaic State. The State will have to make this up. And why does unifying the two currencies have a role? For one simple reason, both currencies need to be convertible. Script currency, if it is not convertible into metallic or fiduciary currency, it ... it makes no sense. If you will, it arises as a private relationship between two people, but can only work as long as it is socialized. And it is only socialized to the extent that, in one way or another, it aligns itself with metallic and script currency, with State currency.

There must be convertibility of the two currencies. And who is it that ensures the convertibility of the two currencies? It's the bank ... not just any; it is no longer the same as the one that issued the script currency. It's the bank that is rightly called "central" or "State", or at the extreme, the World Bank. The central bank is precisely the one that will ensure the convertibility of the two currencies, the passage from one currency to another, but the control of the other by one. Particularly striking example, for those who... uh... [*a few inaudible words*] for example, it is obviously the central bank which will fix the discount rate, the discount rate which concerns above all script currency. When you discount a draft, precisely there is a discount rate that is set by the central bank. You understand?

So, this is perfect. I mean: we possess our outline. I mean: you see that, in our three examples -- which are nothing more than examples since they are the three fundamental aspects of the State apparatus, of the imperial apparatus -- I say: yes, it is very odd but every time you form a circuit of overcoding which one can call "State apparatus", circuit of overcoding, either at the level of the public ownership of the land, with the comparison of properties, you remember, this is a veritable circuit -- from the worst to the best land, from the best to the worst, there is a circuit of the land, there is a land circuit (*circuit foncier*) -- you form an overcoding circuit. Well, at the same time, in certain points of this circuit, which can be assigned, you create the flow of flows that are decoded. This is private property, at which points of the circuit? The answer is: the freed slave, or the plebs. It [the pleb] is the mistress of private property... at first, eh? It's not going to stay that way for long in such a system. It's the freed slave as well

In the second case, when you create a circuit of labor, of public work, and you have there the second aspect of overcoding; you cannot do it without, at certain points, some flows of private labor, flows of work that will be called oddly free labor -- but it is a very, very curious sense of the word "free"; "free" means exactly "decoded" -- ... flows of free or privatized labor only flow at certain points of the circuit. What are these points? My answer: it is the private slavery of which the freed slave is something like the inventor.

And, thirdly, when you create your "tax" circuit, when you make your metallic tax circuit, you cannot do it without at the same time causing, at certain points of this circuit, flows that are decoded. Which points of the circuit? Our answer, our third and final answer, is not difficult: at the very points where script currency is formed as a relationship between two people.

So, this is going to be... this going to be a very amazing thing, the archaic Empire. It already has all the germs or viruses that force it either... either to disappear, or to evolve. This system of public appropriation, which did not include anything private, itself creates the conditions for the

formation of the flows of privatization. [Pause] I'm not managing to express this... I want to say it even more clearly, and then I... I don't know... is that clear? Ah...

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Really? There, I was going fast, in fact, because ... there you have it, it also seems that ... uh ... "slavery" ... well, it has already been said It is... it is a word that... that it has been linked so much to "private slavery", notably when someone, when men are the private property of other men, has been so linked to "private slavery" that we almost hesitate to speak of public slavery. When ... er ... certain authors, influenced by Marx, launch this category of what they call generalized slavery, what does that mean, "generalized slavery"? It is precisely slavery which is not private slavery. So, what is "general slavery"? Generalized slavery is the state of labor in the archaic Empire when either a certain number of workers are owned, we would say today, by the crown, property of the Empire -- you see, this is not at all... it is not property of the despot as a private person -- they have a function, namely a public work function. They are public slaves.

I would like to point out, for example, an excellent book by... I suddenly think of Métraux, of... a great ethnologist, Alfred Métraux, on the Aztecs, where... he insists enormously on the existence of public slavery, namely... uh... among the Aztecs, it is called yana (y-ana).⁷ There are... er... children taken away from their communities early on and who are public slaves to the Emperor, and who are assigned to public works duties. But public slavery goes beyond that, or slavery... what is called generalized slavery goes beyond that, because uh, generalized slavery is also... uh... the situation of surplus labor, namely municipal workers owe the Emperor a service in public works. For example... uh... the text we were talking about last time, I believe, the... the admirable text by Kafka on the Chinese wall and the construction of the Chinese wall, well, municipal workers owe a surplus labor, which goes toward constructing the wall, or else, in the so-called hydraulic archaic Empire, that is, which rests on an important hydraulic construction, well, the labor of the canals and of maintaining the canals, it is a public work.

There is therefore a generalized or public slavery. But therefore, the public slave is a slave either to the despot as the public owner of the land or to the despot's functionary insofar as this official receives land via tenure. But this is land of this function; it is not privately owned land since, when he ceases to fulfill his function, the land reverts to the crown; it reverts to the imperial authority. Or else, even, he is a slave of the municipalities... er... of the village communities which had slaves. For example, in China, the municipalities... er... the farming communities themselves had slaves. In each case, you see that this public slavery is the opposite of private slavery; there is no private property of a slave at all. And yet there is public slavery.

When does private slavery seem to appear? Well, here too, we repeat exactly, this is entirely the ... something symmetrical to what we saw for land ownership. When does land ownership appear as private property? It appears when we can assign persons, in the social field... -- it will precisely become persons, so this requires... this requires something like prejudging, anticipating... -- people who are excluded from public rights appear. So, the question: who is it that is excluded from public rights? Okay, I'm starting over... eh... uh... just to make it really clear, well, the despot is the master of public rights; the functionary is defined by public rights; village municipalities have public rights; public slaves have public rights and public duties. So,

in such a system, we say to ourselves: but there is no room for the slightest evolution, or for the slightest change. Everything is planned, everything is perfect. You never foresee ... it's that at the same time, there is this very bizarre mechanism -- you will say to me: why did it come up, this mechanism? No doubt... I don't know... that... that is beyond me -- but there is, in all Empires, this mechanism of emancipation.

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Where does that [emancipation] come from? I do not know. It.... Uh ... if you tell me, indeed ... well ...

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes ... Oh ... that ... if I am being reproached for giving it to myself, the freedman ... In that, I cannot go further, there, for the moment; maybe during another year, I'll have an idea... uh... You mustn't blame me... I am saying, fine, ... There if you ask me, in fact, "what necessitated a mechanism of emancipation?", I am not sure that we can find an answer, but that, there, then, that presupposes, in fact, things that I do not have on... on the Chinese Empire, for example, where... where the movement of freedmen has been so important. So, the movement of freedmen presupposes that emancipation is like a kind of institution necessarily, necessarily constituted in such a system ... uh ... I will allow [discussion] later, because, as I will lose everything if ... uh ... and because I'm almost done.

So uh ... well, given this criticism that can be made of me and which is very, very fair -- that I am not explaining why there is, there is this institution of emancipation -- I am saying: the freedman has no public rights. He no longer has public law. He is no longer a slave; he is not a functionary; he is nothing. He is excluded from public rights. The plebs, there, maybe it would be on the side of the plebs, because nonetheless, the Romans are more familiar to us; maybe, there, the answer would be easier to find, but... uh... in fact, we can see very well in... uh... I am considering Rome at a time when, while forcing things a bit, one can present Rome as a case of an archaic Empire. And in fact, everyone agrees on this, that the Etruscan Empire, that this is an Empire, this is an Empire of the archaic type ... er ... with all its public determinations, this public property, etc. This is the heyday of Kings, of what is called ... er ... in mytholo ... in ... legend, the Kings of Rome.

What happens? What will cause this Empire to collapse? Once again, you remember, we saw this during another year; these archaic Empires were odd in both seeming so perfect and then suddenly collapsing, suddenly collapsing, the Greek proto-Empires... er... of Crete, of Mycenae etc., which collapse like that with, we think, the Dorian invasion, which produce texts. The texts disappear, and the Greek City will rediscover texts from a whole different horizon and in connection with quite different things. There are all kinds ... the disappearance of a small

Empire, the Empire of Easter Island ... These disappearances are very bizarre that seem to have really corresponded to a "catastrophe" type, in fact. Fine.

So, I am saying: in the case of the Roman Empire... -- of... of this old Roman Empire, eh, I... I am not talking about what is classically called the Roman Empire... -- of... of the old Etruscan system, which is an archaic system, what takes place? Well, the patricians.... There are the patricians, and they belong entirely to the imperial system, er... public, in what sense? In the sense that they exploit public land. This public land is the eminent property of the Etruscan King; the patricians exploit and have the right to exploit the public land, *ager publicus*. Fine, there we are. There are public slaves, there are villagers, there is everything you want, there is everything that has been said to define the Empire, [that] the plebs are formed.

So, fine, what does that mean, "the plebs are formed"? So, well, we fall back on the same thing a bit. The plebs are made up, it seems, of inhabitants of the conquered territories, in part, in part freed slaves, we fall back on... uh... so no freed private slaves; that's not where we are, freed public slaves, freed imperial slaves, freed royal slaves. Once again, I am saying: if ... if ... uh ... yes, you are entirely too correct in telling me ... uh ..., but then why is there this emancipation, why is there this institution since ...? I do not know. I do not know!

Well ... well, the plebeian, you remember, he is excluded from all public rights, that is, he is not allowed to exploit the *ager publicus*. But, precisely insofar as being excluded from all public rights, he has the right to designate property from the *ager publicus*, that is, to claim possession of a small piece of land in a private capacity. A piece of what? Is it the *ager publicus* itself or land outside the *ager publicus*, some uncleared land? In my opinion, that changed; it's a very, very important problem, that, in which the only point that I know a little about is then... uh... royalty, but it is a very... relatively late case, the royalty of the Lagides, under Greek influence in Egypt. Well, this is very curious; sometimes... uh... it was an assignment of cleared land, already cleared, therefore already belonging to the crown, sometimes it was un-cleared land, right? In any case, whatever this point may be, whatever its importance, that does not prevent the plebe from having the right to assign the property of the *ager publicus*, that is, to receive as private property a... a small lot. So, it is confirmed that it is the freed slave who -- literally, if I may say -- invents, by suppressing, er... or benefits, creates; it is as a function of the freed slave that the flow of private property is created.

And this same freed slave, insofar as being excluded from public rights, will also have the right to engage in trade and crafts, even if it means, of course, still paying taxes to the Emperor -- there will be a whole system of special taxation -- and insofar as he is not only the owner of a piece of land, but he has a sort of de facto monopoly on industrial and commercial activity, which does not come within the rights of the patricians -- the patrician is not at all interested in this, at that time -- well, the freed slave will become the private owner of slaves that he puts to work, who will no longer be public slaves. And, ultimately, as a master of trade, he is the one we can imagine as initiating the first equivalents or the first seeds of a so-called script currency.

So, in fact, the more I speak, the more I am telling myself that your comment is quite correct, that, henceforth, if emancipation is so important, we must understand where such a thing comes from, this emancipation. Why does the Emperor need... why does the Empire have an

institution, uh... that he doesn't know, at the same time... the extent to which it is not going to deport him... that I don't know. I do not know. That will be for another time, eh, or one of you can discover this. There we are... uh... Is that clear? It should be very clear. What time is it?

Claire Parnet: Noon.

Deleuze: Yes?

Parnet: Ten past twelve.

Deleuze: Ten past twelve? Uh ... well, I'll add very quickly: there, all I just said is a complementarity that I'm going to call an intrinsic complementarity, between what and what? Intrinsic complementarity, that is, internal to the imperial system, between overcoding and the appearance of decoded flows. If I summarize this ... this intrinsic complementarity, I'll say: the more you overcode, the more you will also cause to flow, at other points, decoded flows which will be like the correlates of the points of overcoding. You see? Script currency, a correlate of metallic currency; private property, a correlate of public appropriation. But these are not at the same points, right? I am saying: we should add that ... there is also an extrinsic complementarity. So, there, maybe... aah, maybe, in this way... you have to take everything into account...

Extrinsic complementarity is what one might call the resumption of the great dossier ... er, that historians talk about, the East-West dossier. And here I am summarizing because I spoke about it during another year, I think; I am summarizing a kind of great archaeological hypothesis which, precisely, was the reigning hypothesis before Mellaart's work, but which, from what I retain, is perfectly valid even in light of Mellaart's work. This is the hypothesis that an English archaeologist, again, [Gordon] Childe, c-h-i-l-d-e, laid out very, very well in ... in two books, *Prehistoric Orient* and *Prehistoric Europe*. And Childe's archaeological outline, himself an archaeologist, is exactly this: he says, well yes, the great Empires were formed in the Middle East, Middle East, Egypt... uh... and, we can add... -- he does not deal with China... er... he is a specialist in Egypt... uh... -- we can add: in the Far East. It is the invention of the East, the archaic Empire.⁸ [End of tape] [92: 39]

Part 3

... China. It was under these agricultural conditions that the first large stockpiles were formed, the first large imperial stockpiles. So I won't come back to that, because we have changed the order of things: it's not the Empire that presumes the stockpile, it's ... uh ... the stockpile that presumes the Empire, etc., but that doesn't change anything.

Let us suppose the model of these great archaic Empires was precisely the East. Why? It would be necessary, there, to bring in all kinds of things about geography, about ... contemporary historians have done a lot, for example ... the West-East dossier, it's a uh ... it's a commonplace ... in contemporary history... uh... studying the ancient record. With [Fernand] Braudel, you find... uh... you find that aspect deeply detailed, the evaluation of both the potentialities of the West and the East... uh... why a particular thing happened here and why not there.⁹ For example:

what was the system... uh... what was the relationship of the East with wood, the relationship of the West with wood, the relationship with water... uh... in both cases, well, all kinds of things.

In this very general dossier, it seems to me that Childe was already raising a great cry. He said: you understand, oh well yes, the large agricultural stockpiles were created in the Near East, in the Middle East and, we add, in the Far East. Good. At that point, what else is there in the world? Well, there is already the world we call the Aegean world which will become the prototype of the West. But what is the Aegean world, this Aegean Mediterranean world? Well, he says: oh, they're unable, if only through the geographical conditions, they're unable to achieve a level of agriculture and to make stockpiles of the imperial stockpile type. The big bags of seeds, right, even wild seeds, if I go back, then, to the Jane Jacobs framework, uh... where the great hybridizations occur, er... the lands on which the seedlings are planted, all that... No, the Aegean world with all its small plots of land, its islands, all that, no! These are not... not the [right] conditions.

And Childe writes some very beautiful, very brilliant pages on archaeological excavations, when he, there, he really speaks as a specialist; he said: well, you just have to ... be a little familiar with ... tombs, the studies of tombs; we can see very well that, in the Aegean world, tombs give us absolutely nothing of the "stockpile" type, as we find in the oriental tombs. Finally, stockpiles are very, very ... much weaker; this is quite evident, right? He says, he manages to say: well yes, so we find Empires, the Cretan Empire, the Empire er... of Mycenae, Crete, Mycenae... But he almost goes so far as to say: but these are Empires as jokes. These are Empires for laughs; they're not... Agamemnon is not the Emperor of China. Agamemnon of Mycenae... Uh... or think of Plato's very beautiful text, those who know this text, in which the Egyptian told the Greeks: you are only children. "You are just children," said the Egyptian, because ... no ... uh ... uh ... you don't know ... at the level of an imperial machine, you don't know, you do not know what you're doing.

Why don't they know what they're doing? The Aegean world... We will see what that implies in Childe's framework, which seems very, very interesting to me. In Childe's framework, it means this: the Aegeans are too far from the great centers of the Middle East to be directly within the sphere of influence of these great Empires. These great Empires are already there, but the Aegeans, the Greeks are too far from the sphere of influence. By themselves, they cannot create the same thing. They can't afford to create stockpiles like that, to build an Empire. On the other hand, they are sufficiently close to know that they exist, to be in constant relations; what is going to happen? As long as they can, they plunder; the Greeks are great looters. As long as they can, indeed, the plundering, there ... er ... all Greek literature is crisscrossed with these big operations, these raids which are raids for looting the agricultural stocks of the Middle East.

Okay, but uh ... it's not always easy to plunder a great Empire, so what else can they do? Well here it is: they will have another regime, because thanks to agricultural stockpiles, what were the Eastern Empire doing? In Childe's framework, it's quite simple. So they were developing -- or, we would say: they were creating agriculture, but that uh ... difference matters little since it's no longer about that -- so they were developing or creating agriculture, on the other hand, thanks to the stockpiles, they could maintain castes of specialized craftsmen. Namely: there were people who lived on the Empire stockpile, and who took care of what? Either of metallurgy or trade,

both at the same time, since these Eastern Empires, in fact, are great, great metallurgists and yet lack raw material. So, they already needed some very, very extensive commercial circuits.

Fine. But you see that these trades, these specialized craftsmen, either metallurgists or traders, as they depended directly on the archaic Emperor, in fact, they lived on the stockpiles, they lived on the functionaries' stockpiles, on the stockpiles managed by the functionaries, on imperial stockpiles. Along with their families, they were like... functionaries of a different kind; they depended directly on the imperial stockpiles. As a result, the Emperor, the Eastern Emperor, the archaic Emperor had all the means to overcode trade and crafts. Trade, metallurgy, industry, he possessed them! But, here too, we will find exactly -- but, if you will, at another level, at the level of exteriority, what we found earlier at the level of interiority -- but, at the same time, their very function in the archaic Empire did not cease to put them in touch with the outside world, that is, with the Aegean world. In fact, metals ... metals, for example copper, which the Middle East was tragically lacking, they came through Egypt. So, these metallurgists and these traders came from very far off, they did not come from the Aegean, eh... uh... According to Childe, starting from the Neolithic, one finds, right, of... uh... for example, tin from Cornwall passing through the Aegean and arriving... but not in the Empires uh... from the Middle East, so that supposes immense commercial circuits, eh, enormous, enormous.

And so, these traders who were overcoded in the archaic Empire, they find themselves at the same time in another situation, under the other aspect where they are dealing with the Aegean world from which raw materials will come, that is, the Aegeans exchange raw materials for agricultural stockpile. As a result, the trader in the Aegean world has a completely different status than in the Eastern world or tends to have a completely different status than in the Eastern world. Likewise, the metallurgist tends to have a completely different status than in the Eastern world. And yet, in a way, he's the same. He is the same guy who travels around, there is an itinerance -- so a new form of roaming -- of the trader and the metallurgist. Sometimes it's the same kind, sometimes it's not the same. We understand, at that moment, what it could mean for a kind of corporation being formed, a corporation of metallurgists who would have like two heads, even three heads: a head in the Eastern Empire where it is overcoded, a head in the Aegean Empire... uh, in the Aegean world where it is much less established, and then an obscure head among the little known peoples who occupied Cornwall at that time and who deliver tin... Good.

It gets complicated. What does complementarity mean this time? It is that, at the extreme, the same figure who is overcoded in the East under the conditions of the archaic Empire, simultaneously exists as much less coded, as at the extreme decoded, in the Aegean world. And that's what Childe says, already: well yes, the vocation of trade and ... er ... of liberal trade, so-called "liberal" uh ... from the West, but it begins from that point onward. And this is not at all a virtue; this is a kind of complementarity. They don't have to create great archaic Empires because they exist from them. They exist from them, but this is a give and take.

Look at my two complementarities; I would say: one is consistent with Childe's archaeological framework, that is -- if I am looking for expression that summarize them -- it would be extrinsic complementarity consistent with Childe's scheme in archeology. It would be flows; the overcoded flows in the archaic Empires of the Near East and the Middle East necessarily

generate, or necessarily have as a correlate, flows which tend to be decoded in the Aegean world. There we have a geographic complementarity. Uh... we're crushed by global visions like that...

The intrinsic complementarity, this time around, conforms to the framework, if you will, of the sinologist Tökei, of the historian Tökei: the more the system of overcoding establishes (*assoit*) its power, the archaic imperial overcoding establishes its public power on the ownership of land, public ownership of land... uh... etc. etc., labor uh ... public labor and uh ... and uh ... tax, the more are formed, in correlation, points of decoding, decoded flows, first, of private property, second, of private labor and slavery, third, uh... of script currency. Phew, there you go.

So, if you understand this situation, imagine: we are in there, we are in this situation of double tension, intrinsic tension, extrinsic tension... Yes, it's a... uh... I think that this is one of the big points for understanding what could only be the archaic corporations. You see, these are multi-headed apparatuses, there as well. It goes without saying that, if need be, they were quite close branches, uh... guys who were familiar with each other, eh, the guys who uh... uh... the Aegean metallurgist, the Egyptian metallurgist, and then the Cornwall metallurgist. They had to maintain relations, they had to... there were... there were caravans, they went through nomadic populations, they went through... uh... At one end, who owned the mines? Who were the people who ran the mines, eh? At the other end, what were those Empires that already had a very strong metallurgical industry, whereas they did not have the metals necessary? What did that imply?

It implied precisely this complementarity between the overcodings. The more the Emperor overcoded trade and crafts, the more they had to... the more they had to unleash uh... more in some ways; on the other hand, there were all... all, so... uh... in favor of, uh... decoded flows, there were all the lines of flight, namely the metallurgists who were fed up, who had to go through entire collectivities to be settled in the Aegean world where they had good, much ... much better conditions. There must have been... uh... peasant revolts; they had always been in favor... always... very, very often, in the ancient world, they were related to the revolts of metallurgists, revolts in the mines, all that. The overcoding of mines ... The Emperor ... The Emperor attaches great importance to it. Uh ... still just not long ago, eh, and that's why historians ... that's one of the reasons historians explain very well that ... uh ... it is not China which invented capitalism, whereas it could have done so for a long time; starting from the 12th century, one of the reasons is precisely the overcoding in which the Emperor controlled... where the Emperor as a public person, of course, controlled the trade and labor in the mines.

For example, when he decided he'd had enough of this, the mines were closed, right, they weren't being worked anymore. There, it is typically, the Emperor of China decides the closure of the mines -- see the book by [Etienne] Balazs on... *The Celestial Bureaucracy*, where he explains very well this system of the mines which were closed periodically... er... which required maintenance officials for the state of the mines, that goes without saying.¹⁰ But uh ... this was really pure overcoding; a Western state can never ... uh ... can pull off something like that. I mean: they just imitated... and uh... took what they could from... archaic Empires, but there, there is a system of overcoding which, at the same time, will be simultaneous, then, with enormous flows. The grid of cities in the Chinese Empire consists essentially in preventing precisely, in principle, in preventing the trade flows from being decoded. So, there we code them completely. A particular city, right, will have ... er ... a particular trade monopoly, and not

another, right; it will not have to undertake another kind of trade. And, in the city itself, the neighborhoods will be completely gridded and partitioned. This is the partitioning method. In fact, this is a kind of overcoding method of.

And it turns out that the more you overcode, at the same time, the more there are these kinds of flows which are decoded, which ... either which are decoded in relations with the outside, or even inside. So, this is the double complementarity. Hence: you put yourself in the position of... of... being in an Empire like this, so what's happens? What's might possibly happen? Fine, shall we have a little break? What time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Half past twelve!? You've had enough, maybe, right? Yeah, eh? Yes. Are there any questions? Are there any questions? Did you understand all that? Okay, so, next time ... No, then ... I ... anyway, no! Excuse me. Uh... I... I... Can you hang in there for another 5 minutes? Yeah, 5 minutes, eh. In that way, that ...

So, I am quickly summarizing something that I ... a little ... that I had started, that I intended ... uh ... to develop much more, but we have to move forward. What might happen? Well, what's going to happen, I would almost say, here it is: we are going to witness the second figure of the State. Only, a second figure of the State, this is very complicated, this is very poorly expressed. This second figure of the State seems to be an evolution, not necessarily an evolution. On the other hand, it seems to be a somewhat homogeneous figure; it's not homogeneous at all; it's whatever you want. In this second figure, there are actually the most different, the most varied forms... They have nothing to do with each other.

What is an evolved Empire? I would say: an evolved Empire is an Empire in which the relations of function, in which the public relations of function, as we defined them previously -- I will not go back to this -- are constantly doubled and, at the extreme, replaced by relations of personal dependence. You will say to me: "relations of personal dependence", but then what is this, is this turning into a matter of psychology? Not at all, obviously. What interests me is not "personal"; it is the "relation", that is, it is the consistency and constancy of these relations, regardless of the person. The Roman Emperor can be Julius or Octavian, but that does not prevent that, between the Roman citizen and the Emperor, there being a relation of personal dependence. Fine, each time you have a sphere of personal relations of dependency that is arising, doubling, covering, replacing the public relations of the old archaic Empire, you can say, this is an evolved Empire.

We have seen that, precisely, the Roman Empire, how should it be defined? By the rise of this sphere, then, called "the private sphere". Not that it is not ... that it is not social; it is perfectly social, but the public has ceased to designate the imperial mode of appropriation, the public is no more than the means of appropriation which has become a private appropriation. So I was saying: that's it, this is the story of the Roman Empire; I am not starting over again, you understand, and it is not by chance that, here, we again find the fundamental figure of the freed slave. In the evolved Roman Empire... the Roman Empire occurs as an evolved Empire, it's that... it arises; there are Empires that are born evolved, the Roman Empire is an Empire that is born as an Empire evolved.

And in what form was it born? It was born with a double system already, the system of functionaries, which refers to the old topic of the *populus romanus*, the old Roman people, the Senate, etc. and which, very quickly, is only there as a kind of cover. And this whole system of imperial functionaries that remains, it's very curious -- imperial functionaries... uh ... public tax -- is doubled by another system, which is what? The freed slave as a member of the Emperor's private *consilium*. And it is the private *consilium* that governs, it is not the Sta... it is not the Senate, it is not even the imperial functionaries. The *fiscus*, which is a special tax or which covers a set of special taxes, and which differs from the public tax, and there you have this whole sphere, so, it is very complicated, because that, you see, there are... uh... uh... even in uh... this "evolved Empire" category, you have all kinds of extraordinarily varied figures.

But I am saying: its dominant feature is that relations of personal dependence duplicate public service relations. Well, on this, I am saying, let's forget about evolved Empires; they continue ... they continue, but that's not the only case. It seems to me -- and it's with this that I'd like to ... but I don't have the time anymore, so I am just quoting -- I believe that the organizations of town and city, which precisely stand apart, are decoded from Archaic Empires -- as we have seen, the "city" organization which is very different from the "Empire" organization -- well, the whole regime of corporations is another thing; they are relations of personal dependence of an urban type, very different from those of evolved Empires, completely different, but they must be analyzed starting from there. Private slavery ...

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Very different both from archaic Empires, but also from evolved Empires. They are relations of personal dependence of an urban type, very different from an "evolved Empire" type. Uh... feudalism, I'm not even developing that because feudalism is derived from that. It is a system of relations of personal dependency. Once again, what matters is not "personal" in this; it is that they are constant or consistent relations between persons determined as private persons. And the big difference between feudalism and false feudalism, between real fiefdoms -- that is, feudal fiefdoms -- and what is called, what historians call false fiefs, false fiefs, it is quite simple: it is the function lands which refer... which refer more or less directly to an archaic Empire. For example, it is the tenures granted to the functionary; it is what is designated by the Greek word not of fief precisely, but the Greek word *kleros*, it is the *cleruchies* I had spoken of, I believe, once previously very quickly. And there you are granting ... the Emperor grants the benefit of land to a functionary as a civil servant, the land reverting to the crown when the functionary retires or dies. The stronghold (*fief*) is completely different. It is private property with a relation of dependence ..., of personal dependence of the vassal vis-à-vis the lord. Private property there goes through all these types of relations of personal dependence. So I'll quote, like... uh... to satisfy myself about that, relations of personal dependence in the evolved Empires, relations of personal dependence in cities and towns -- and again: these would be... of... very, very different cases -- relations of personal dependency in the feudal systems... in rural feudal systems. So, it would be at ... at the level of land ownership, which then becomes private property.

And I am saying, and this is where I would like to end, what... what allows me to say that this is a second figure of the State? And I don't even need to say it anymore, because, if need be, someone will tell me: but there is no State, there is no longer State ... uh ... the State is in

feudalism, does the State exist? In any case, that doesn't interest me because there is always a State on the horizon. There is always a State on the horizon. Even in feudalism, there is always an Empire. There is still an Empire, either as an old archaic Empire that has broken up, or an evolved Empire that is alongside it. And the relations of personal dependence, they arise... they arise within... to double, to replace those imperial relations. Fine.

But then what do they express? What is it, since what interests me is that they are relations of dependence between private persons, but that they have a social consistency as ... as great as ... as the rest, as in sy ... as in imperial systems. I would say: well, it's not difficult, if you have followed me, there we ... we got hold of this. I would say... uh... and we will understand why there are so many varied figures at this level. Not so difficult, because, if you accept the idea that this second figure of the "State" -- in quotation marks, "State" -- this second figure of the "State" arises as a function of this phenomenon that we saw previously, namely archaic overcoding itself causes decoded flows and results in flows being decoded. I would say that relations of personal dependency are the expression of conjunctions, local, topical, qualified conjunctions between decoded flows. As a result, I will indeed have my two great figures of State, already, they are not the only ones; I will have: the archaic state overcoding, the archaic Empire, overcoding of flows in the archaic Empire, and then, there, topical conjunctions between decoded flows.

It is in fact necessary that all these flows which are decoded, they will have to enter ... What the relationship of personal dependence expresses is ultimately something completely impersonal, namely: these ... these local conjunctions, very ... which form *topoi*, places (*lieux*), these topical conjunctions, which form places that are at the same time places of legal discourse, places of society, places of the social field, geographical places, whatever you want, that are places in all senses of the word "place" (*lieu*)... Thus: topical conjunctions between flows decoded as such. And it's a ... in a way, that keeps them from being decoded even more; it keeps them from taking flight. That creates kinds of knots; that creates kinds of... uh... Fine.

How do you define courtly love? Courtly love is very odd. What has the tremendous uh ... importance of ... chivalrous love first and then of courtly love? I would almost say, you understand, what is marriage? Well, on marriage, this is not a bad thing to say about it: it's a particular system of overcoding system. In the end, the origins of marriage, we would have to look for them in the despot's marriage, namely uh...: marriage, in my opinion, is very well formed in the archaic Empires. Uh ... it's ... yes, this is an overcoding. It's an overcoding of a certain kind of relationship, and public relations, right? Fine. [*Pause*]

At the same time, it is not difficult to show that in a society, at the same time that there is a whole overcoding of marriage, well ..., there are flows, flows of sexuality, but also flows of feeling (*sentimentalité*), which tend to be decoded. And they did not exist before, these flows; it is indeed overcoding which provokes on other points, which establishes a circuit, the marital circuit, the public marital circuit, with the despot's marriage as a model, the pharaoh's marriage... well ... and then which will result in a whole system of flows that are decoded. Flows which are decoded, it is not with my wife that I could ... she, she is contained, it is not ... it is not that she is incapable of it, it is that ... she is caught in the overcoding.

Hence the systems that have existed in all societies, very, very odd. Chivalrous love and courtly love, this is love, both in one case and in the other; in both cases, it is not the same thing, but in both cases, it is the love a man feels for a woman who not only is not his, but has no right to be his. In a way, you will tell me: this is codified. Yes and no, it all depends on what is called a code. I believe it is codified as that which escapes the code. Uh ... this is the state of the decoded flow. You cannot have chivalrous love or courtly love with your own wife. And, at the same time ..., at the same time as I develop chivalrous love and then, above all, courtly love, what is being developed? A new system. It didn't exist before, I believe, or it did, but then in other forms. Love is defined as a relation of the personal dependence of a man in relation to a woman.

You understand, by definition, why you can't establish this with your wife. It would go completely against the system of marriage as an overcoding, which itself is based only on the primacy of the man. And the decoded flow is going to find its expression when it is going to promote a type of relation that is going to have its right, I would say that this is typically a topical right. Marriage is an overcoding, courtly love is a ... is something topical. Ah yes, this illuminates everything, this. Uh ... it's illuminating. It's something topical and which will be defined by... which will not be, in that way, a compensation, which will be the invention, the establishment of a relation of personal dependence of the knight in relation to the lady (*dame*). Well, it's going to be a conjunction between decoded flows.

Fine. And ... and in the entire institution of chivalry, courtly love, that won't be to say ... you understand, it would be really silly to say: this is ideology. It's not ideology at all. It is a... er... fundamental phenomenon which is like the correlate of the status of marriage at that moment, when a relation is established... It is not that there is a relation of personal dependence in the case of the marriage, it is not at all the reverse; it does not operate at all on the same level. This is something else.

So I would say, to sum it up, I can define an aggregate of apparatuses of power, let's say, a second type of apparatuses of power, however varied they may be, by trying to create a category, a proper social category that I will call: relations of personal dependence between private persons. And I am saying, these relations of personal dependence between private persons are defined by this, it's that they express conjunctions between flows decoded as such. In this way, they form a new right. As a result, I have at least two very vague figures: the system of overcoding of "imperial apparatus" flows, and then this thing, this much more blurry, much more varied zone that goes once again from evolved Empires to feudalism via urban regimes, topical conjunctions between decoded flows. What can occur after? After ... I withdraw "after", since it's a ... this is not an evolution, everything is already there, everything is still ... Finally... uh ... but it's for convenience. What even more horrible thing can happen after? Or even more beautiful?

Well, you can tell, this is where we will start next time. [*Laughter*] Everything is ready for... Everything is ready for capitalism to emerge. Oh... That's good. Very good. So, there we are. [2: 08: 30]

¹ Deleuze quotes the unpublished research by Eric Alliez in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 568, note 36 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 553-554 note 32) which will be published several years later: *Les Temps capitaux*, t. 1, *Récits de la conquête du temps*, préface de Deleuze (Paris : Édition du Cerf, 1991) ; t. 2, vol. 1, *L'État des choses*, vol. 2, *La Capitale du*

temps (Paris : Édition du Cerf, 1999), translated by George Van den Abeele as *Capital Times : Tales from the Conquest of Time* (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. 31, p. 535 ; <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf>

³ *Ibid.*, p.536.

⁴ Deleuze quotes Tökei concerning freed slaves in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 448, and the discussion of the three forms of decoding unfolds in the following pages, pp. 448-452

⁵ Deleuze refers to James Mellaart's work in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 565, note 11 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 534, note 11).

⁶ Jane Jacobs is, in fact, an American-Canadian author in urban studies and sociology whose major work is *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961; Vintage, 1992).

⁷ Alfred Métraux contributed notably to a publication in seven volumes produced by the Smithsonian Institute entitled, *The Handbook of South American Indians* (1940-47), with Julian H. Steward as the general editor.

⁸ Deleuze quotes Gordon Childe's work at several points in plateaus 12 and 13 in *A Thousand Plateaus*, notably pp. 412, 415, 428-429, 450-451, and 562 note 96, 563 note 101, 569 note 42 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 513, 516, 534, 561, 563).

⁹ Among the numerous references in *A Thousand Plateaus* to Fernand Braudel, see pp. 558 note 60, 558-559 note 64 (*Mille plateaux*, voir p. 478 n. 53 et 480 n. 57).

¹⁰ Etienne Balazs, *La bureaucratie céleste* (Paris : Gallimard, 1968).