

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image

Lecture 04, 01 December 1981

Transcription: [La Voix de Deleuze](#), Farida Mazar (Part 1, 1:10:33) and Mohammed Salah (Part 2, 46:31); Translation (with notes) and original transcription revised by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; additional revisions and transcription timestamp, Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

So... I'm going to begin with a brief summary of this first part of the work that we have now completed. This first part, this bit we've completed is something I sincerely hope some of you will want to discuss, especially as regards some serious doubts I have – doubts I already expressed in the strict self-criticism I made last week. And then I will also have to go to the secretary's office to deal with this business of credits¹. And as a last thing, we will start... so we'll have to do all of this quite quickly... we will start on the second part of our work. Did everybody hear all that?

Student: Yes, it's perfectly clear.

Deleuze: Good. Is it okay? Fine... So that's that. As I was saying, for me at least it's really necessary – even if it isn't for you – I think it's necessary to mark the conclusions we have reached so far.

So, as I said, we have now completed a first part, and we could give this first part a title so as to give things some order. The focus was on something we could call: *Three Theses... Three Theses of Bergson on Movement* – or, if you prefer – *Three Bergsonian Theses on Movement*.

And after all, ideally it shouldn't be me just giving lessons – but in theory, if I had to give a title to all that we've covered this year, I would have to call it something like: *Bergsonian Lessons on Cinema*.

So, I would like to summarize these three theses of Bergson on movement by noting, on one hand, at the level of each, its own particular content, but also... but also, since all of this is connected, in line with the rules we have given ourselves... so I also want to note the problem stemming from each of the theses that concerns us in terms of a more general reflection on cinema and philosophy.

So, I will begin in strict order... and then probably that order will be... you know every time I have such a strong desire for order at first... but then I don't know... I don't know what happens to this desire.

So here's the first thesis, Bergson's first thesis, it's the most well-known, I mean the one everybody has some idea of. If I were to express it, I would say: Immobile sections do not give us movement. They allow us only to reproduce or perceive it in the artificial conditions which are those of cinema. In terms of this thesis, what we have is a Bergsonian critique of cinema and of the very principle of cinema as movement.

So, immobile sections don't provide us with movement. They only allow us to perceive or reproduce it, which is to say to reproduce it in the completely artificial conditions which are those of cinema.

What is the question that interests us at the level of this, Bergson's most well-known thesis? Which is to say, the impossibility of truly reconstituting movement through immobile sections. The question for us, I summarize... we've already looked at it so I'm not going to go back over these points, I just want to recap the results... the problem for us is that obviously – and I'm not saying this against Bergson – here I'm speaking purely on our behalf. What I mean is that... of course all of this is possible – I'm not making any objection here, there's nothing to object to, I've really nothing to add. All of this is highly possible. Yet, despite all this, we cannot conclude – and here I'm not saying that Bergson does this, in this respect he leaves us hanging, he can't do everything after all – we cannot conclude the artificiality of the *conditioned* from the artificiality of the *condition*. It's not legitimate. It's not because the conditions of production are artificial that the resulting production or the product itself must be similarly artificial. I cannot logically conclude one from the other. To the extent that one could even say: Okay, fine, the conditions of the reproduction of movement in cinema *are* completely artificial. But that doesn't mean that the cinematographic *perception* of movement is artificial. Not at all. Not necessarily.

Moreover, the question I would ask is this: Is it not *by very virtue* of these artificial conditions of the production of movement, isn't it exactly *because* of these artificial conditions that cinema is able to draw out a pure perception of movement or, which amounts to the same thing, I'll explain this later, a perception of pure movement? A perception, in fact, of pure movement or a pure perception of movement *that is not given to us in natural perception*. Why not? Because natural perception necessarily implies an impure perception of movement, which is to say a *mixed* perception.

So I would say that the first problem at stake for us, corresponding to the first Bergsonian thesis, is the question of the perception of movement in cinema. In what sense can the nature of perception of movement in cinema be distinguished from that of so-called natural perception? So there we have the first thesis and the first question.

The second Bergsonian thesis would be this, we could express it as follows... it takes the first into account, indeed it follows on from it... and it would consist in saying: Are there yet two ways of reproducing movement? Indeed, there are two ways of reproducing movement, which the first thesis didn't distinguish between. So, second thesis: There are two ways of reproducing movement through immobile sections.

The first way: We reproduce it in terms of *privileged instants*, that is, in terms of forms that are coming into being, in terms of forms seized in the movement of their embodiment or

actualization. So, the first manner of reproducing movement is the case of sections that refer to privileged instants – that is to say, forms in the process of being actualized.

Second way of reproducing movement: We reproduce it through snapshots, which is to say *non-privileged instants*, simple instants that are defined as, or by, their equidistance. I'm not going to go back over this, I merely summarise things we are going to need for later on.

Bergson tells us that the first manner, the first reproduction of movement, is that which is proper to the science and metaphysics of antiquity. And that ancient science and metaphysics draw from this the idea that time is secondary in relation to eternity.

The second manner, on the other hand, is that which defines modern science and it calls for... or rather it could and should have called for... a new metaphysics. It could and should have called for a new metaphysics – which Bergson attempts to forge. You can already see that the situation is highly ambiguous. And by ambiguous, I mean that as a compliment.

It's true that what we have at the level of the first thesis is a Bergsonian critique of cinema. And this is a fact, it cannot be denied. And he doesn't go back on this. But in terms of the second thesis, which represents a more profound level, one that is infinitely more complex – since the cinematographic production of movement is composed not in terms of privileged instants but of simple instants, meaning an image mechanism of equidistant sections – *there is a liberation of time*, time is taken as an independent variable, which is the fundamental fact of modern science. And at that point a new metaphysics becomes entirely possible.

So now I'm going to develop what is at stake for us in this second thesis. It's that... I've tried to show how it is only in the second manner that cinema can be defined as a reproduction of movement. And this is where the novelty, the real rupture of cinema lies. Let's say you have a machine for projecting images. As long as this machine is based on the first manner of reproducing movement – that is to say in terms of privileged instants and not simple equidistant instants – you can have all that you desire, but you will have nothing that even approaches what we could call cinema. Yes, there might be things that resemble it, but only in the crudest of ways.

It is the second manner of reproduction that exclusively defines cinema. The problem for us is that this being the case, we now have to take the Bergsonian hypothesis literally. At that point, isn't it the case that cinema not only *calls for* a new metaphysics but that in a certain sense, and in the most innocent way, it actually announces itself *as* this new metaphysics?

So much so in fact that it's not even necessary to speak of... and once again the mediocrity of current production is no objection to this argument, that's not the issue for me. Metaphysics can be good metaphysics or else very bad metaphysics. But good or bad, isn't this something indissolubly tied to cinema, the idea that cinema indeed embodies something approaching the order of a new metaphysics? Which is to say the metaphysics of modern man, in opposition... in contrast, to the old metaphysics. To the extent that, once again, we shouldn't say that cinema is metaphysical. We should speak of cinema *as a metaphysics*, but which form, which type of metaphysics?

I think it was L'Herbier² who proposed a term suggesting this, he came up with the word "cinemetagraphe" (*cinémétagraphe*) in place of cinematographer (*cinématographe*). At one moment he said... at least I think this is what he said, I have to check, but I think I remember him speaking of the "cinemetagraphe". And isn't this more or less what he meant? Cinema as a modern metaphysics. But corresponding to what exactly? Corresponding to this discovery of modern science: the mechanical reproduction of movement. The mechanical reproduction of movement, which is to say reproduction of movement in function of *equidistant instants*, and no longer, as was the case before, in terms of forms in the process of becoming embodied – which is to say, of privileged instants.

This second question, I would say, is the problem of *thought* in relation to cinema, whereas the first question was the problem of *perception* in relation to cinema.

Third Bergsonian thesis on movement. Here, he's working at an even more complex level, which consists in saying: if it is true that instants are immobile sections of movement, then movement in space can only be a *mobile section of duration*. Which is to say... I'm not going to spend any more time explaining these equivalences since we've already spent hours on this question – which is to say that *they express a change in the whole*. If instants are immobile sections of movement then movement in space is, for its part, a mobile section of duration, that is to say, it expresses a change in the whole.

For us the corresponding problem consists in what? In the attempt that we have made to devise, or else to stress, the concept of temporal perspective as opposed to spatial perspective, and to consider this temporal perspective as being proper to the cinema image, what emerged from that -- and for me this is significant, because it's something we attained, that we can always question, but that we really came up with last time -- what emerged was an analysis of the cinema image – or for the moment what we'll call the *movement-image* – that identified three levels, three levels or three aspects of this image.

First aspect: the instantaneous objects presented by the image – what Pier Paolo Pasolini calls *kinemes*³ – through which we defined the cinematic concept of *framing*.

Second aspect: the relative movement between objects, the relative and complex movement between these objects by which we defined the shot, the *temporal plane*.

Third aspect: the Whole, that is to say the Idea to which the movement relates the objects, such that this movement expresses a change in a Whole. The ideal Whole, to which the relative movement relates the set of objects. This was what enabled us to define a third great concept of cinema: *montage*. How the shot, which is to say the relative movement between the framed objects, will come to relate these objects to a Whole. And in this sense, we distinguished between three types of montage: dialectical montage, quantitative montage and intensive montage, according to the manner by which movement in space was able to express a change in the Whole.

These three aspects of the cinema image: the objects, the movement between objects, the Whole to which the movement relates the objects... these three aspects of the image were in perpetual

circulation. In fact, the duration of the Whole subdivided into *sub-durations* corresponding to the objects in the same way that the objects were reunited in the Whole through the intermediary of movement, through the intermediary of the temporal plane (or the shot) – which is to say the movement, the relative movement.

To the extent that, to finish this point, I would say that yes, with these terms we have something like a cinematographic syllogism. The middle term being in fact similar to the shot, that is to say to the relative movement – the temporal perspective or mobile section – the relative movement that relates the objects to the Whole and that divides the Whole according to its objects. And so it's here, through the intermediary of this middle term – the relative movement – that all sorts of rich communications begin to happen.

That's where we've got to... So, what happens? I could say that we have tried to define... it's taken us all this time to try to define what we called the *movement-image* or the *cinema image*. To define, to define... yes, in the end that's what it was... and through this we tried to define certain concepts of cinema connected to this movement-image. And that's that. I mean, we are still a long way from being done with the movement-image... What does it consist of? What is it made of? How does it operate? What we have for the moment is a rough, general definition of the movement-image but no more than that, nothing else.

I remind you of all the texts of Bergson I've been using, all the texts relating to the Bergsonian part of our first analyses, in fact... what were they about? Particularly *Creative Evolution*, Chapters I and IV.⁴ Incidentally, though I haven't cited them, you will find many other texts confirming these themes of *Creative Evolution*... such as *The Creative Mind*.⁵ And, also incidentally, certain texts from the book prior to *Creative Evolution*... which is *Matter and Memory*. And in particular, in the last chapter and the conclusions of *Matter and Memory*.⁶

You notice that I haven't yet begun to address what I had announced would be one of the subjects of our work this year. Which is to say I haven't directly dealt with *Matter and Memory* itself.

And in fact, to finish with this summary, if this is the task that now faces us, even keeping to our set of previous definitions concerning the movement-image what we have to do now is to make an *analysis* of the movement-image.

So in this sense *Matter and Memory* gives us a direct line of approach. Even if *Matter and Memory* dates from before *Creative Evolution*, it may be that certain directions taken in *Matter and Memory* – and which Bergson never returns to again – go much further than his later books, including *Creative Evolution*.

So now I'll try to make a quick summary of the thesis advanced in *Matter and Memory*, because it contains something that will be very important for us in the future... and since we've now finished the first part of our study, I want to get started on the second part. And in that sense, I would even like to proceed by using short formulas, although you won't be able to get a more detailed picture of these unless you're already familiar with Bergson, otherwise the complexities

will elude you. Nonetheless, you should keep hold of them like little beacons, little lights that will come into focus as we go on.

So... If I were going to try to really summarize the whole of *Matter and Memory*, I would ask you to imagine a book that tells... that recounts a story. There are two types of image. One of these we call *movement-image* and the other we call *recollection-image*. So here we have two types of image. From a certain perspective, these two types of image differ in nature. But from another, we pass from one type to the other by imperceptible degrees.

It's interesting... actually you should find this very interesting, since none of what I'm saying is very much in line with current thinking. Before, there was... you understand... if I bring this up now, it's for very precise reasons. There you have it, all of a sudden, we learn, though nothing would have led us to anticipate it yet, just like that, we now learn that the *movement-image* – which we have already spent long hours trying to define – is just one type of image.

So how do we distinguish between these two types of image? Here, I'm going to have trouble if I want to stay at a relatively superficial level!

Let's suppose that *movement-images* are in some way *pellicular* or skin-like. They're surfaces. Well, they are actually planes, very special planes since they are *temporal* planes. We've already seen this, we can take it for granted, it helps us get our bearings, but that doesn't prevent them from being what are in the end, surfaces.

The other kind of images are *volume-images*. What's interesting isn't so much the word *recollection*, although we will see how interesting this turns out to be, since it directly connects to the question of Time. Temporal perspectives already connected to the question of Time... *Recollection-images* are voluminous, whereas *movement-images* are superficial. Which is not to judge them harshly, since the superficial can be just as good as the voluminous.

Okay, so what does this mean? What it means is that there are two types of image... so we're not yet done... it's to announce this new story, we're far from being done because there we were happily wading through the first type of image and suddenly, we learn that there will be another type to follow. And that doubtless our solution... if there is one... will derive from the rapport between these two types of image. But for the moment we should already have some inkling of this.

Okay... we clearly showed that there were *movement-images* present in cinema. And very quickly, we began to suspect that it was perhaps cinema that invented *movement-images*. Isn't it through and in cinema, that the *movement-image* is unleashed? Or that the image discovers itself to be a *movement-image*? But we can always go on with our vague intuitions... Oh, dear! Wouldn't cinema also contain another type of image? And wouldn't this consist in *volume-images*?

So, we'll leave the preface of *Matter and Memory* to one side for the moment, since prefaces of philosophical works are always very difficult – I would even say that in philosophy prefaces should be read afterwards rather than beforehand. If we address *Matter and Memory* beginning

from the first chapter... So now, I'll try to do the same for this first chapter, to summarize it in general terms, even if we don't yet know enough to be able to grasp it fully.

In the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, I would say that Bergson is dealing exclusively with the first type of image – the movement-image. Which suits us fine, it's just what we need, that's the point we've reached. So, great, we can begin with the first chapter.

And if I try to summarize the general thesis, Bergson tells us... and here what he's really giving us is an analysis of the movement-image... Once again, since we've already spent a whole three sessions on it, I think we can take for granted, we have the right to assume, the definition of the movement-image. Which is already quite a lot.

So, if I attempt to summarize the analysis of the movement-image the way it appears in this first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, it's actually quite simple. And this will already enable us to establish certain fundamental points of terminology. Bergson proposes... he doesn't exactly use these words or this formula but as you will see, it's pretty close to this... the whole first chapter leads us there: it basically says that there exist three kinds, three types of movement-image. This is before the image as a whole divides into the two of the movement-image and the recollection-image. We'll leave the recollection half to one side for the moment, we won't be in a position to deal with it for quite some time yet.

And so, the movement-image divides into three types. And these kinds of movement-images Bergson names as follows: firstly, *perception-images*, then *action-images* and, finally, *affection-images*. So, the movement-image itself consists of three very distinct categories of image. We're talking about the movement-image only. The movement-image consists of three very distinct, very different types of image, even if they are deeply connected: *perception-images*, *action-images*, *affection-images*.

I ask you for the minute to intuit the richness of such a distinction... hoping that it turns out to be well founded since we have yet to complete the analysis... to intuit the echoes that this already has with the movement-image in cinema. Doesn't the movement image in cinema in fact tightly combine these three types of image, according to a particular rhythm, which is that of the cinema itself? Images that we could call *perception-images*, that we could call *action-images*, that we could call *affection-images*. Well, it's highly possible. We'll see.

This is the point we've reached now... Now we can plunge into the second part of our study. If the first part was devoted to the theses on movement, from which we derived the *definition* of the movement image, this second part will consist in the *analysis* of the movement-image and the different *types* of movement-image.

So, following on from the three previous sessions and from the beginning of this one, now it's up to you to say what point you think we have arrived at. If you have any remarks to make, which is to say either things that might be of help to me or what you think about what we've done so far... What time is it?

Student: [*Inaudible response*]

Deleuze: Very good. [*Pause*]

A student: [*Nearly inaudible comment; he speaks of two conceptions of duration in works by Bergson and Proust, and also about a text on this topic; he ends saying*]: Precisely, I am beginning to understand why one speaks about cinema... [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Right. [*Pause*]

The student: It's just a comment, really.

Another student: I have a question...

Deleuze [*interrupting him*]: Excuse me, he [George Comtesse] want to speak first... Yes?

Georges Comtesse: I would like to pose a question concerning the last lesson, when for the first time you confronted the question of movement's relation to what was no longer a form such as the ones we have in traditional classical philosophy – Aristotle for instance – which is to say a form that would inform a material that would be actualised in this very form... all of which supposes that the concept of matter refers either to an exterior matter – as in the case of the material of a sculptor – or to an interior matter, in the sense where, for example, there would be a progression towards what for Aristotle would be a divine form, but which was instead another concept of matter that, in my view, you had to that point almost never addressed and which is in fact was linked to a fall – since, at that point, the movement falls into a matter that remains murky, cryptic, terrifying and so on... a matter that is swampy or stifling and that we find in German Expressionist cinema.

And then, at the same time that you have this fall of the movement in a zero intensity that distributes the regime of the soul, whether sentient or non-sentient... at the same time there is another movement that you sketched out which is the correlative movement of this fall: the movement of an elevation towards the divine. Thus, while on the one hand we have a dark, murky matter, on the other we have the divine.

So the question that arises is this: when we attempt to think this rapport between the fall and the elevation, aren't we not only still within a movement-image but also - which would reframe the whole question of the movement-image in cinema – within something that wouldn't entirely be a regime of death or of life but one that would in some sense form a bridge between the two, and which would be just as important as these two poles, since it would be a regime in which nothing is wholly in movement – unless it be relative movement – nor wholly at rest – in a state of absolute rest – and which would be precisely the question of the movement-image's relation to a regime of sickness?

In other words, a regime in which the movement-image would be defined as precisely this kind of alternation or oscillation, something that you were trying to explain, which is to say between fall and elevation, between life and death or life and another life – organic life and divine life... Wouldn't there actually be, connected to the movement-image, this regime of sickness?

And if it is actually true – and here we could refer to many different examples, to a whole slew of texts, such as when Blanchot questions the rapport between the work of art and sickness – if it's true that the regime of sickness is, as Blanchot says the impossibility of thinking the abyss, the absolute foreign or unknown, the neutral or in other words, the outside – which is to the regime of sickness can be considered as the fundamental impossibility of thinking death itself, as it is... that is to say, the impossibility for thought to imagine an affirmation of life that would neither deny nor affirm death but that would instead *think* it...

In other words, a regime of sickness that would renew – if one were able to think such a regime – even the very concept that, according to all that you said, remains a sickly concept, the very concept of cryptic, dark, nocturnal matter. In the sense that, with such a concept of matter, one remains a stranger to oneself, which is to say “sick” the way that Nietzsche for example in his *Genealogy of Morals* said: We remain necessarily – in as far as he defined this regime of sickness... we remain necessarily strangers to ourselves, we cannot do otherwise than mistake what we are for something else: each of us is the farthest from himself.

In other words, in this regime of sickness, not even in the sense of mediation, nor even as intermediary but as a milieu between two movements, shouldn't we actually pose the question of the rapport this regime has with the movement-image? And a regime of sickness that would pose, even from another angle, the problem you were addressing concerning the rapport between Bergson's notion of movement and Zeno's paradox, because you took up Zeno's paradox from the angle of Bergson's own perspective on it.

Now Zeno's paradox is actually a challenge that Zeno lays down. It's not a question of the type: is there movement, or does one find movement, in walking? Which would be very easy. It's not a question of movement but of immobility that Zeno poses. It's not a question of whether Achilles will ever reach the tortoise. Nor is it a matter of deploying this little tale, this little fable, of divisible space, since everyone knows that this remains in the realm of a story... The question that Zeno was posing, which justly pertained to the regime of sickness, is not a matter of whether or not one is able to reach something... Achilles reaching the tortoise, the arrow reaching its target... it's the question of the impossibility of even beginning a movement, in other words the question of movement's absence, in other words the question of immobility, in other words the question of the regime of sickness.

And it's a question that philosophers of the time such as Plato or Aristotle were themselves trying to address.

And that only, perhaps *only*, perhaps, Nietzsche in *Zarathustra* was able to address in another manner, taking up the challenge of Zeno and posing the question of the regime of sickness in a completely different way. That is to say, when Zarathustra... when you have the leap of Zarathustra with respect to the end of life – and Zarathustra's leap, though a leaping movement, is a movement that is arrested, it is interrupted, it is frozen at the moment Zarathustra sees himself in the eye of the Cyclops, the terrifying eye of life's end... And at that moment he is petrified, he undergoes that state of petrification that returns continuously in Nietzsche's text when he speaks, for example, of the frozen night, the eternal instant of petrification. And at that moment it is life itself, in the regime of sickness in which Zarathustra finds himself, that is able

to pose the question to Zarathustra in the text, namely: “You do not love me, nearly as much as you say.”⁷

Another student [*the student who spoke before Comtesse*]: As for me... what surprised me the first time, was this insistence on speaking about the fall. I was thinking there was something about that which didn't convince me. Deleuze spoke about the fall, about death, swamps... Even Bergson speaks about those things. But he forgets one thing and I noted it down. He says that we have to be able to seize literary or other kinds of beauty even in the lap of death. But beauty of that type does not intercede at the moment of death, and that's important to remember. He also starts from the regime of sickness, but he forgets the other side, which is of equal importance...
[*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Okay, I would just like to say how I am going to react to what Comtesse just said. It's perfect, I find it deeply gratifying because it's the kind of detour that I sincerely wish you would make, and it's great that there are many of you who already do this. He speaks about the personal detours that all this has led him to, and on that count, I haven't the slightest objection to make, since personal detours are sacred by their very nature. I just want to offer you my own perspective on the general thematics whose contours Comtesse has sketched out.

Something in this interests me greatly, and if I've correctly understood what he was saying, he said something like how, in the end, all movements are necessarily qualified movements and not only in the physical sense – there will also be movements that are qualified in a metaphysical sense. Because he, for reasons with which I am well familiar, since they are his own philosophical reasons... he insists, in what he just said, on the rapport *health-sickness* and how the Expressionist movement could not be grasped independently of a certain evaluation of sickness or even of a *thinking* relationship with death.

And I thought, yes, he's clearly right on this point. Others might say with respect to... it all depends on what film he chooses as an example, it's quite correct, though it works best in the case of certain films. In other cases, what you have is a kind of huge settling of accounts and a reprise of the problem of good and evil. German Expressionist cinema had a kind of... truly innocent way of starting again from zero regarding the question of good and evil. So, in this sense, if we try to understand in what way filmmakers may be natural metaphysicians, it suffices to think of the ways in which Lang, to take one example, poses the question of good and evil.

Anyway... Comtesse is sensitive to something that would be more like what you have in Murnau (or many others), which is a problem of sickness, of *sickness-health*. In this, he's absolutely right. I just want to make a couple of remarks, all in relation to my concerns about order. When I introduced – and this is something you should always bear in mind – when I introduced this theme of Expressionism the last time, it was as one example of montage among three types of montage.

Already, some of you were kind enough to express some interesting reactions with regard to this. One of these reactions consisted in saying: Yes, fine, in the end, real montage and the real force of montage can only be found at the level of intensive montage, namely in the third type of

montage. Whereas the other types of montage can never be *true cinema* except when they are able to seize something of intensity.

Okay, but for me, Expressionist montage is something I would only define as follows. Namely, given that the question is: How can a relative movement in space express a change in a Whole? – which was our initial problem – the Expressionist response would be: yes, movement in space, the relative movement in space, *can* relate both itself and its objects to a Whole – which is to say to a change in the Whole. But on what condition? On the condition that an intensity of movement is produced.

And it's from this point that Comtesse follows up with his question about matter, about the fall in matter, about health and sickness. I think he's completely right in saying this and that this would be the very metaphysics of Expressionism. And so my question would be this: Can we say, as Comtesse does, that it's *at the level of the movement-image* that all these problems – which I wasn't going to pose – can we say that it's at this level, the level of the movement-image, that all these problems can be posed? Or isn't there a need, in order to be able state them fully, for us to already consider the *second* nature of the image – namely the *volume-image*, the analysis of which I proposed we should postpone to a later date?

So much so that metaphysics as cinema will not take place at the level of movement-image alone, but also evidently in its rapport with movement and volume. And it's only at that level that, for my part, I would be able to address the kind of questions that Comtesse speaks about, namely the question of thought, the question of sickness and so forth. But otherwise, all that you have said is fine with me, it seems perfect to me.

Yet, for me... I think it would take me a long time to get to the point you appear to be at now, on account of this problem that I have of... whether there are two types of images and so on. And how do we pass from one to the other. And in what sense could we say that this constitutes the Whole of cinema. But other than that, it's all fine.

Comtesse: To the extent to which filmmakers like Pasolini, Marguerite Duras or even Godard have posed the question of cinema as a question of the very absence of movement,

Deleuze: Oh, there, we do agree... at the extreme...

Comtesse: ... in the movement-image itself...

Deleuze: Absolutely. But this absence of movement in cinema... I think we're in the process of equipping ourselves to understand this point... that won't pose much of a problem in itself. But that would be a pretty harmless objection. It's not the kind that will cause us to question what we should do, given the absence of movement. It's a fairly easy question to resolve.

Another student: Following the notion of the volume-image that you introduced this morning, I wonder if this isn't also a premature question...

Deleuze: Ah yes... undoubtedly! But I think one can perfectly well launch this as a question the sense of which will emerge later on... But you're right, it is a bit premature. What I was saying was actually very simple. What one calls an "ideal producer", I can very well conceive of there being someone who is, or who says: "I have the idea for a film... but I'm not the one who's going to make it. It's not up to me to make it."

But the producer is someone who can have the *idea* for a film, and for a while I felt the need for such an example because it was the moment, we were trying to understand what it was to have an *idea* in cinema. And having the idea for a film is completely possible. Hence the situation in Hollywood, where a producer might have the idea for a film, and from there they would hire someone... and they would treat filmmakers like they were household servants: "Right, you're going to direct this. Okay, so do it!" And if they did it badly, or if they made something completely different corresponding to another idea, the producer would say: "No, you're fired!" or "We're going to get someone else to direct!"

I wasn't saying this to defend such a harsh regime. It was, in terms of the three aspects of the movement-image, to show in what sense these three aspects (the objects, the movement, the Whole)... how that even if these three aspects are inseparable, it is always possible to place the accent on... they could be carried out by different functions. The function of the camera operator, the function of the set designer, the director function, the producer function – or else, all these functions could be united in the same person. Just like... you see, all this is just a question of different accents.

Likewise, the three types of montage that I've tried to identify, these three types of montage are always interlinked. But there is always a particular accent – sometimes on the quantity of movement, sometimes on the intensity of movement, other times on the opposition of movements etc. There are filmmakers who place more or less importance on the frame, others who give greater or lesser importance to the shot or to the division of scenes, others to editing and so on. They're like poles, they are not separate elements.

Okay, so now we're going to get started on the second part of this business of analysing the movement-image. But first, I have to pop into the secretary's office. So, you can all have a rest. [*Pause; interruption of the recording*] [49:00]

Student: It seems to me that the eye is no more than a gap, an interval that extends like a prolongation of the body towards the image, to the point that I finally said to myself: if you take the three aspects of the movement-image, especially the last aspect, the affection-image... I said to myself, that's it. When you are in the affection of a movement-image, the image immediately becomes a volume-image, meaning the relative volume, the volume of my body.

Deleuze: What I want to say to that, it's an excellent example... it's a bit what I wish for in my dreams. Of course, you have every right. So, considering that it's your right, beginning from the point we've reached... that being said, you listen well and you go off on a detour, you anticipate, you prolong... you're perfectly entitled to do so. So, you've just said something where you go off on a complete detour. For my part, the task I have is a bit bizarre. All I can say is: Okay, fine, if that's what you want to do. If that's the direction you want to take. It's not for me to say... and in

any case I couldn't do so, even if I wanted to... I can't prevent you from taking the direction you want.

Nonetheless, if I were to comment on each word you just said – and you know this perfectly well, it's not a question of whether I agree or not – actually, I don't agree with any of the points you made, but that's of secondary importance... What I will say is that, although what you said might be interesting in itself, it constitutes a series of formulations that would be absolutely foreign to, and even directed against, Bergson. To generalize in what might seem pedantic, scholarly terms, it makes you a good phenomenologist but a terrible Bergsonian.

Because, in this respect, Bergson goes so far... and this is what I still have to try to show today... namely that the premise according to which the movement-image would presuppose an eye to which it refers, is one that Bergson would regard as absolutely nonsensical. For a very simple reason. As he would say: but what is an eye exactly? It's a movement-image. So, if the eye itself is a movement-image among others, it's clear that the movement-image doesn't refer to the eye. On the other hand, this is exactly what a phenomenologist *would* say, and here my question is – and this is a good introduction to it – isn't Bergson's thought way ahead of phenomenology?

Obviously, these are questions... at this level, these are questions of attraction, not of taste. We can't just say any old thing, but you'll see for yourselves. I don't expect to turn you into Bergsonians. Nonetheless, what I want to say is that what he has just formulated so well constitutes a phenomenological thesis that has nothing to do with the theses of Bergson.

A Student: [*Inaudible intervention*]

Deleuze: Among others... among others... But that's a point of view that actually has nothing in common with Bergson, and this is exactly what makes Bergson so unusual. But all this remains to be seen and for that reason I will have to begin – and for this once again I apologize – with a short excursus on the history of psychology. So that you understand the problem. The problem that for us has become the analysis of the movement-image.

And I think, it's well known, it's repeated in every textbook, everybody knows this... and even if they don't, it doesn't matter... that for a long time there was a type of so-called “classical” psychology, and that then this classical psychology ran into, ran up against, a kind of crisis. That's what happens: conceptions are created that work for a while and last a certain time before they reach a point of crisis. In other words, they encounter an obstacle that until that point could be diluted or dissolved but which in certain given conditions... and what conditions are those... that's what interesting, the conditions when the problem can no longer be dodged.

And contrary to what is often said, I don't believe that classical psychology met its stumbling block around the question of Associationism. But what I'm saying is of no importance... Here we are in a classroom where you have all kinds of different people. Some are engaged in questions of philosophy, while others are not. It's not important if you don't understand something at a given moment. You'll be able to get it later on. It's of no importance.

As I was saying, it wasn't Associationism that liquidated what we call classical psychology. So, what was it? It's that 19th century psychologists eventually reached a point where they could no longer avoid a particular question. A question that seemed outrageous to them and that I could sum up in what form? Image *and* movement. What's going on? What are we going to do?

So, it wasn't association, it wasn't Associationism that proved to be their stumbling block. It was the relation of image and movement. Why was this? It was because in the end this type of psychology had the tendency to divide the world in two, in two parts. And these two parts were so heterogeneous that trying to weld them together became almost impossible.

On one hand, in my consciousness... on one hand in my consciousness there were *images* – what I'm doing here is as though I were making a sketch of the situation this psychology was in. So, on one hand in my consciousness there were images. And what did this mean? It meant there were representations, qualified representations or, at a deeper level, *unextended* qualitative states. An image was an unextended qualitative datum of consciousness. It was *within* consciousness.

And on the other hand, what did we have in the world? In the world there were *movements*. And what were movements? They were *extended*, and variable, quantitative configurations and distributions. So, you can feel that the crisis isn't far away. The crisis was not long in coming but how was it to arise? Perhaps a crisis had become inevitable, but that up to that point it had still been possible to paper over the cracks. But when is it that this crisis starts to become a more and more urgent matter? It's when the analysis of movement and cinematic reproduction affirm their place in the world.

So perhaps that's what constituted one of the moments of crisis in classical psychology. We don't know, we'll have to look into it. The introduction of film in experimental psychology, that kind of thing... They found themselves in an unbelievable situation. How were they going to manage? That's how theory works. How are we going to manage? Can we still maintain the idea that images are present in consciousness, that they constitute an unextended qualitative state and yet also exist in the world of movements? What was it that was problematic in any case, about both these conceptions?

If I say, well, you can see that it's not that difficult, in your consciousness you have images that are unextended qualitative states while in the world there are movements which are extended quantitative states. I could say that... Well, okay, but what is it that happens then, even in terms of perception?

A sense organ receives a shock: it's a form of movement. Fine. And all of a sudden, it's transformed into an image. I immediately have a perception. But when? Where? How? How is it that through a movement in space you can produce an unextended qualitative image? How can such a thing arise? These are all arduous problems.

While, on the other hand, you have all kinds of difficulties that concern... what is the “other hand” in this case? In this case, what constitutes the other hand is will and the voluntary act. You're supposed to have an image in your consciousness. And then you make movements. As a voluntary act. But how is it that an image in your consciousness could give rise to movement in

space? What rapport can there be between two natures as irreducible and as heterogeneous as images defined as unextended qualitative states and movements defined as extended quantitative states?

If in the voluntary act the image gives rise to a movement of your body... for example you want to turn the light off and you make a movement... quite a complex thing. How can I explain this, if not by saying that already the image is present not only in your consciousness, it must already be in your arm muscles? So, what then is an image in my arm muscles? Would there be little cells of consciousness there? Yes, why not? One could say that. There are authors who have written wonderful passages on these organic cells of consciousness. A thousand little “consciousnesses” in my muscles, my biceps and triceps, my nerves, my tendons... But it's bizarre, all these consciousnesses. Really strange. And inversely, in the other sense, a movement gives you a shock which gives rise to an image in your consciousness. How can that occur, if not because your consciousness itself is already traversed by movements?

So whichever way you look at it, it's a crisis situation. You see, if I sum up this situation of crisis that in my view dealt a mortal blow to this 19th century psychology, once again it is not as a result of the association of ideas and the inaccuracy of accounts of the life of the psyche taking their cue from this association. It is rather as a consequence of the rapport between images and movements – when images are defined as qualitative states in consciousness and movements as quantitative states in the world – having become impossible.

And how do they manage, in this crisis situation. How do they manage? What did they do to try to get out of this crisis?

As we all know, the strategies for getting out of this crisis were twofold, namely two successive strokes of genius, which proved to be irreconcilable. The first was Bergson. It was Bergson but not only he. In the same period, in England and in the US there were other authors who included William James in America and Whitehead, the great Whitehead, in England. But Bergson... Bergson was to play a particularly important part. And I'm not saying this just because he was French... I claim this first stroke, this first act of rupture and foundation of a new psychology for Bergson.

The second stroke, actually it happened more or less at the same time... was a current that had its origins in Germany and that was... here I'm being quite rudimentary, I could group together currents that fell under what was called Gestalt Theory, or the Theory of Form or of Structure. Once again, they were contemporaries of Bergson, the first pioneers of this theory. And also contemporary to Bergson was phenomenology.

So, my first question, and here I want to at the same time... I don't want to dwell on the matter because this is just my impression. I'd like to begin from... what I mean is... it's irreconcilable... this new psychology proposed by phenomenology is irreconcilable with the new psychology proposed by Bergson. But why is it irreconcilable, in what does this irreconcilability consist?

Here I'd also like to summarize... since today I'm throwing lots of formulas at you that can only be justified at a later stage... So, what was phenomenology's formula for exiting the crisis? It's

famous, everyone knows what it is, we've all repeated it at some point. That was all anyone said, however it was voiced, people sang it out in unison: All consciousness is consciousness *of* something⁸. You have to place the accent on the *of*. If you don't place the accent on the *of*, you are obviously not a phenomenologist.

All consciousness is consciousness *of* something. And Sartre says in his famous and quite wonderful text: Consciousness is not a stomach in which there would be something, consciousness is an opening onto the world, consciousness is consciousness *of* something... You see what that meant... Consciousness aims towards something outside itself, it contains no images within itself. All consciousness is consciousness *of* something.

If I try to relate the crisis of classical psychology, of image and movement to my own particular case of movement, how can all this be reconciled? How can I put them in relation, given that classical psychology in a certain sense refused to allow itself to find a way of relating them. I would say... it's not difficult, you see. All consciousness is consciousness *of* something... which also means – but not only this - that every image is an image of movement. All consciousness is consciousness *of* something, every image is an image of movement. What does this mean? It means that the image is not something *within* consciousness, it's a *type* of consciousness. And it's a type of consciousness that in particular conditions *aims* at movement.

If we want to be scholarly about it, what the phenomenologists said was: all consciousness is intentional, all consciousness is intentionality, which means that all consciousness is consciousness *of* something else that is situated outside of consciousness, it aims towards something, it aims towards something *in the world*.

So we can say that the image is a *mode* of consciousness and not something within consciousness, it's an attitude of consciousness, an *aim*. And movement in the world is what, in its turn, aims towards this consciousness. So, is all consciousness consciousness of something? Well, for Bergson, it isn't!

If we attempted to find a rival formula, what would a Bergsonian say? They would never say that all consciousness is consciousness *of* something. For them – here too I recapitulate – this would be an expression without meaning. But we need to try to explain all this. What for one is without meaning is for another something full of meaning. What does this tell us about philosophy in general? And it's obvious that for Bergson all consciousness is consciousness of something... no, sorry, I mean it's obvious that between Bergson and Husserl, between Bergson and phenomenology there is one fundamental point of agreement. And what is this fundamental point of agreement? It is that we don't perceive things in our consciousness, we perceive things wherever they happen to be, which is to say in the world. Bergson's formula, Bergson's wonderful formula, and in this regard, he never ceases to repeat this theme: We place ourselves in order to perceive. “We place ourselves in the very heart of things”.⁹

We can't put it better than that. There are no little images in our consciousness. On this point, the phenomenologists and Bergson are in complete agreement. There are no images in consciousness. There aren't qualitative states that would be in consciousness, nor are there quantitative states that would exist in the world. That's not the way things happen.

We place ourselves in the very heart of things, among things, in things. What's more, he will go as far as to say something a phenomenologist would put his name to. We perceive things where they are. If I perceive one of you... it's not that I perceive their image in my consciousness. I perceive it where it is. My consciousness goes out from itself.

So on this point there is absolute agreement between the phenomenologists and Bergson. But it is the only point, because once again, bizarrely Bergson would never be able to say: "All consciousness is consciousness *of* something". And what would he say instead?

All consciousness is consciousness *of* something... In the end we've become accustomed to this because, even if we've never heard the phrase itself, it's at work in the unconscious, we've understood, we're formed by it. But since Bergson has been completely forgotten, unfortunately, and so badly mistreated by the phenomenologists who settled their accounts with him, because all these disagreements are terrible things, and they descend into unforgivable conflicts... And so... and so anyway Bergson would never have said that.

If we were to look for something Bergson could have said, he would have said exactly these words: All consciousness *is* something.

So someone has arrived who tells us that all consciousness *is* something. So they say to him, a phenomenologist says to him. What do you mean by that? You mean to say *of* something obviously. And Bergson says: "No, no not *of* something".

If you put an *of* something in the phrase, it's all false... I'm lost, it no longer means anything. For Bergson, if I perceive things where they are it's because all consciousness *is* something, which is precisely *the thing that I perceive*. Whereas for a phenomenologist if I perceive things where they are it's because... all consciousness is consciousness *of* something, which is to say it aims towards the thing of which it is the consciousness.

The abyss is vast. But I haven't yet explained this abyss. For the moment, I just have an inkling of it. In any case, I will have to make a short parenthesis on this point: what is the situation of this discipline called philosophy in which there are such conflicting views?

How do we explain why Bergson never knew the phenomenologists? Perhaps he had read a little bit of Husserl. We don't know for sure, though I think he had. But it mustn't have been of much interest to him. The phenomenologists, on the other hand – since many of them came after Bergson – knew Bergson's work well. And they settled their accounts with him in a very, very violent... it makes sense when you think about it. After all they owed him a lot. But there is also a more noble reason.

What I want to say here is that philosophy has never been a question of taste. More than that, philosophy has little to do with a succession of varying doctrines. And yet it is true that philosophers tend to agree on very little. But what does this mean? As for me... I strongly believe in the idea of philosophy as a rigorous discipline – that is to say, as a science. [*End of the cassette*] [1:10:36]

Part 2

... It has to be seen for example that when Kant, as a philosopher... or when Leibniz critiques Descartes, or when Kant critiques Descartes, we shouldn't imagine that this is a question of taste, that everyone is entitled to position their own theory... No, it's not like that. It's that Kant, for example, believes that he has discovered a way to pose the problem of knowledge that Descartes was unable to imagine. And in relation to this new positioning of the problem of knowledge, Cartesian solutions could no longer function. At that point, there is actually some discussion because you might have a Cartesian, a disciple of Descartes who says "Careful! Watch out! I'm going to pose a particular problem in such a way that, even accounting for recent discoveries, it will require a reactualization of Descartes' solutions."

So, you understand... There may very well be polemics in philosophy but these depend neither on mood nor on taste. They have a scientific rigour equal to that which operates in the "pure" sciences, in mathematics or physics for example. And you can never judge a philosophical theory if you separate it from the problems that it poses, which are the only problems it can claim to resolve. Change the nature of the problem and you cannot remain within the framework of a given theory.

So, what does it mean to be, for example, a Bergsonian or a Platonist today? It means to consider that in Plato or in Bergson or in whoever we're talking about there are conditions of given problems that prove, even now, to be well posed. Henceforth, solutions of a Platonist type are still possible. But anyway, all this was simply by way of saying that what is at stake in discussions between different philosophies is infinitely more important than mere theoretical disputes. It's not a question of theoretical disputes. I would literally say, if you've understood what I'm telling you, that these are "problematic discussions", and by problematic I mean concerning the problems they pose, their conditions and positions.

And this is why I want to say now, that if I take the two formulas... I return to my question of before. The phenomenological formula: "All consciousness is consciousness *of* something" and the Bergsonian "All consciousness *is* something" – before we even have... once again, this isn't in Bergson but you'll see by reading Bergson, that here I'm doing no more than summing up what is clearly a thesis of Bergson's.

And so here is my question. If there is such a difference even before we have fully understood the Bergsonian formula, if there is this difference that we can intuit between the two formulas, it's obviously because they don't pose the problem in the same conditions. So, in that case... if I try to ask: "What are the conditions of the problem in one and the other case?", I would say that, in this regard, I couldn't claim to be able to tell you who is right. I would simply expect to be able to do my job – which is to put you in the condition where you can see for yourself what you... what works best for you. And perhaps what works best for you will constitute a further position of the problem. And at that moment you will create this and so you will become a good or even a great philosopher. But never presume to have an idea without having determined the problem to which this idea corresponds. Never, otherwise it's no more than small talk, it's just opinion, and while opinions may be interesting, they are only ever mildly so. Every sentence that

you come across, that can be enunciated in the logical form of “according to me...” is, philosophically speaking, null.

So, you see, the inkling that I have is this... and considering that I do nothing to hide my preference... it's that, however banal it might seem, Bergson is way, way ahead of phenomenology. And the problem that he poses is in the end much vaster, and much more subtle than that posed by phenomenology.

I want to finish quickly with this business of phenomenology, not out of any ingratitude or slyness on my part... but I suppose that... what I'm saying is... I mean, what is this problem we're considering at bottom? All consciousness is consciousness *of* something, every image is an image *of* movement. And on the contrary for Bergson, all consciousness *is* something, which means every image *is* movement. You see what I'm getting at? There's no need to say that every image is an image of movement since every image *is already* movement.

So, what is at stake in all this? What is the problem here? It's obvious that what we still have is a problem of the *reproduction* of movement. And for a simple reason. It's that the question of the reproduction of movement and the question of the perception of movement amount to the same thing. Which I tried to show in our first sessions. So, I don't want to go back to that.

Now I ask myself, what is the model of reproduction of movement for phenomenology? It's not difficult to say what phenomenology's model of the reproduction of movement consists in. Having set out the so-called natural conditions of perception, their precise task is to make a description, that is, a *phenomenology* (in the strict sense of the word), of this natural perception. But natural perception reproduces movement as it does everything else... it's always a question of a reproduction.

My question is simply this: if phenomenology claims to be a description of the natural perception of movement, then *what type of reproduction of movement does it refer to?* What type of reproduction of movement does it refer to?

Surreptitiously, implicitly... might I say that we should keep hold of it for the moment... because... what does it refer to? Well, let's look at the texts. I take the example of Merleau-Ponty. He wrote a very famous book, one of the finest texts of phenomenology, called *Phenomenology of Perception*.

With regard to the perception of movement, he refers to two fundamental concepts, two concepts that he uses to explain the natural perception of movement. The first of these, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the concept of *anchoring*. We are “anchored” in some way. This is a version of what phenomenologists call “being in the world” or “being of the world”: we are “anchored”. So you have anchoring. And then, on the other hand – but the two go together – you have the idea of “good form”, good form which is a concept that runs all through phenomenology and which is borrowed from Gestalt Theory, although there were always numerous communications between the Gestalt theorists and the phenomenologists. So, what does this mean?

Let's look at a text. Here I won't have time to comment because otherwise we'll be here... In the edition... this particular edition, let's see p. 322, 323: "The stone flies through the air". Here we have an example. "The stone flies through the air. What do these words mean, other than that our gaze, lodged and anchored in the garden, is attracted by the stone and, so to speak, drags at its anchors?"¹⁰ You see the situation. You're in your garden, and a stone comes flying at you from out of nowhere and you say, "Oh my, there's a stone!"

"What do these words mean, other than that our gaze, lodged and anchored in the garden, is attracted by the stone and, so to speak, drags at its anchors?"

That's nicely put, it's a fine phrase. So, "the relation between the moving object and its background passes through our body." What a phenomenologist you were, eh? My gaze is anchored, and not only my gaze, my body is anchored in the garden and the stone crosses my field of vision. And I say that it's the stone that moves. What does that mean?

Taking into account this organization of the field of perception by means of anchoring, to understand the stone as being in motion is "good form". As the Gestaltists said, it's the only significant form in terms of the organization of the entire field. And Merleau-Ponty goes on: "Now what precisely is the anchorage and how does it constitute a background at rest?"

In fact, all anchorage accompanies... or rather, implies, a background at rest. So, what precisely is the anchorage, and how does it constitute a background at rest? It's not an explicit perception – actually, it will be a condition of perception, so it's not an explicit perception.

"The points of anchorage, when we focus on them, are not objects. The steeple begins to move only when I leave the sky in the margin of vision. It is essential to the alleged fixed points underlying motion that they should not be posited in present knowledge and that they should always be 'already there'" and so forth.

"Cases of ambiguous perception in which we can at will choose our anchorage are those in which our perception is artificially cut off from its context" and so on. We should read the whole page... Just to remind you, it's pp. 322-324.

What I want to draw from this is a very simple thing. And, even if I turn out to be wrong, it doesn't matter, it's for my amusement, not yours. I said to myself, okay, but these phenomenologists, the time has come for some justice for Bergson, for Bergson's revenge.

So when they speak about the perception of movement, I note the insistence with which they always go back to a particular type of movement: *stroboscopic movement*. I don't have time to go into this here. It will mean something to those who already know something about it. I've seen that in a lot of historical accounts, many in the actual history of cinema, stroboscopic movement was regarded as a basis of cinematographic perception. On this point I am extremely doubtful. That seems to me not at all... not only can it not be taken for granted... I would say that it's completely false. But no matter, no matter.

I note that the model of movement most loved by phenomenologists is one they borrow from so-called “stroboscopic” movement and not “cinematographic” movement. I note that Sartre in *The Imaginary* begins with a series of examples, of images that cover many different typologies. Because he mentions *photo-images*, *theatre-images*, *images of coffee grounds*, *dream-images* but he says nothing about the *cinema-image*, not a thing on the *cinema-image*. That’s odd. Very odd, I’d say.

So, what do I mean by all this, what am I getting at? That in terms of the problem of the reproduction of movement, whatever it happens to be... and here I’m not going to say simply that what they’re doing is no good. What I want to say is that no matter how absolutely novel the phenomenologist may have been, the manner in which they posed the question of the reproduction of movement, hence of perception, refers us back to the first mode. Which is to say, the pre-cinematographic mode. They are from *before cinema*.

So, there it is, there it is, the appalling truth I’m revealing to you today, that phenomenology comes from an age before cinema. And it’s terrible because they absolutely believed in... it’s awful. A thing like that is just not possible. And yet it is! Because, as I said, this is the first manner of the reproduction of movement. You will recall, if you’ve been following, what the first manner of the reproduction of movement consisted in. It was a matter of reconstituting movement on what basis? On the basis of *privileged instants*, that is to say, forms in the process of becoming embodied. Reconstituting movement not on the basis of simple any-instants- whatever but of privileged instants in the process of becoming embodied... Now what does that refer to?

In antiquity it referred to forms that were in themselves *intelligible*. Here, I’m weighing my words carefully. It referred to essential or intelligible forms, eternal forms, whatever you want to call them. Therefore, it referred to co-ordinates that were intellectual. Phenomenology was to radically break with all that, but in what way did it do so? It broke with the old vision but keeping everything essential in place. Because from what I understand, for phenomenology the co-ordinates would no longer be intellectual coordinates but *existential anchors*.

Okay, so they refer to existential anchors, I’m not saying that this is the same thing. The forms in the process of becoming embodied will no longer be intelligible forms, they will instead be forms that are immanent to the field of perception, that is to say *Gestalten*. Okay the difference there may be immense. It is nonetheless insufficient to break with something that phenomenology will continue to share with the oldest way of seeing, that is *the idea that movement is reproduced by means of, and in terms of, coordinates and forms*. They changed the status of these coordinates, transforming them into existential anchors, just as they changed the status of the forms to make them into immanent or sensory forms that refer to the organization of a field of pure perception and no longer to anything intelligible. They did all this, *yet they continue to reconstitute movement in the old manner* through co-ordinates and forms. Hence, it’s clear that all consciousness would be consciousness *of* movement.

So, I would say, yes, phenomenology is indeed from a time before cinema. And in fact, what is it that they want? It’s self-explanatory. There is... it’s not because they ignore cinema. It’s self-explanatory, it’s self-explanatory, believe me, because it’s in virtue of what they want... what

they want, and this is their real problem, is a *pure* description of natural perception. And when I add this word “pure” to “description” what I mean is... it's not simply a question of writing a description. Here “pure description” implies a certain method that was formalized by Husserl when he spoke of the *phenomenological method*... I don't have time to explain all this and besides, it's really not my field. But that's what it is. They want a *pure* description of *natural* perception. Well, that's it for phenomenology!

I would suggest... don't make me say it, because it wouldn't be rigorous... think of everything I've just told you more as a question. But after all, isn't it true that... after all, isn't it true that the phenomenologists remain in a world from long before cinema? They simply don't take it into consideration. Husserl can talk all he likes about cinema, but in reality, he doesn't say anything about cinema, only stroboscopic movement. Husserl never even went to the cinema. Bergson neither, or not much... perhaps on an occasional Sunday, but... he understood it much better. It's very strange. In my view, Bergson was stuck. He was stuck between his condemnation of the cinema, namely that for him it wasn't real movement, and his call for a new metaphysics where he makes a strong claim for cinema as what would be the finest contribution to this new metaphysics.

It seems to me that he grasped something that the others hadn't grasped. What was it that he grasped? Actually, he proposes...and this is the subject of the whole first chapter of *Matter and Memory*... he doesn't say it in so many words, I must admit... he doesn't say it but it's not important, it doesn't matter... What he does formally say is that he is going to embark upon the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* in terms of a completely different mode of production of movement. For him, it all lies there. Modern science showed how time was an independent variable. Which is to say that the analysis of movement proceeded no longer in terms of privileged instants, that is, through forms and coordinates, but in terms of equidistant instants. It's the metaphysics of this science that we have to discover.

Well, if that's where Bergson is, then he is so completely. He's no longer at all interested in reconstituting movement, even it's by means of perfectly sensory forms and existential coordinates. That doesn't interest him at all, it's not his problem. Because his problem cannot be that of describing a pure perception of movement... sorry, I got that wrong, I'm getting everything mixed up... his problem cannot, like that of phenomenology, be how to make a pure, natural description of movement. So, what is his problem then? Something much more unusual.

For the moment I'm expressing myself like this... little by little it will all become clearer I hope... *To deduce a perception of pure movement*. And once again natural perception is absolutely not a perception of pure movement. The perception of pure movement... that's something we're still seeking.

And Bergson's idea is exactly... is it on the basis of... you see how the problem begins to ramify... is it starting from the movement-image, such as we have described it, thanks to Bergson... is it on the basis of the movement-image such as Bergson described it, that I can deduce a pure perception of movement? It's a completely different problem. On one hand, how to *describe* a *natural* perception of movement? On the other, how to *deduce* a *pure* perception of movement?

I would say that the response to the first problem consists in the formula “All consciousness is consciousness *of* something” – and if it's this first problem that interests you, before you know it you will discover you've become a phenomenologist.

But if, one day, you happen to manifest an interest in the second problem, it's very likely that in this regard you will become Bergsonian, none of which will of course much affect your future path. At least you will stop saying how Bergson and Husserl are in contradiction. Because in no way are they simply “in contradiction”. And in one sense it's a less serious matter, but in another it's much more serious. It's that *they do not pose the same problem*.

Knowing which is the best problem... ah, well, that's your business, that's everyone's own business. And if I ask you which of these problems you prefer... you'll probably tell me both, or someone in all good faith might say both. Impossible! Impossible! Because these two problems infringe on each other to such a degree that in the first case, the second problem becomes merely a minor consequence of the first, while in the second it's just the opposite that occurs. You *cannot* choose both.

Hence, we can go now back to... and finally... finally we are able, following this suggestion, to say that perhaps Bergson – and I think I've just explained this “perhaps” – perhaps Bergson is way ahead in this matter. And he's the only one to have posed a problem of perception of movement which is perfectly adequate to the cinematographic image. You will tell me, that's fine with us. Okay, yes, maybe, since... maybe our way of thinking cinema has much more to gain from Bergson than we initially thought. In any case, none of this really matters for the moment.

Hence...hence, no let's forget all that... these were just premises, a kind of general introduction. So, let's carry on. So, now... what is he going to do? Let's suppose that he wants to deduce the pure perception of movement from the movement-image. Given that the pure perception of movement is not natural perception. So, at that point, yes. Cinema does have something to do with Bergson. The others can content themselves pottering about with stroboscopic movement.

Phew! Are you tired? Shall I go on for a bit? Yes, you are obviously tired, I see your eyes starting to close. But I'm almost done with this.

All consciousness *is* something, all image *is* movement. In order to understand a proposition... you have to put yourself in the condition the proposition itself supposes. And there too, this is something I'm struggling with... it won't surprise somebody who is in the middle of watching a film. On the contrary, it will greatly astonish other kinds of people. A phenomenologist, for example. He will be very astonished to hear that all image is movement, all consciousness is something, all image is movement...

I'm responding to this now, because come next week, we'll no longer remember any of it. I respond to you, because, that... that was something quite extraordinary... But no one should think that I'm making a facile critique of phenomenology just to annoy you. It's not at all to... it's simply as a way of trying to situate these problems.

The phenomenologists are so... and I'm only joking when I say this... they're so behind, that they have retained an old metaphor which the metaphor of the eye. Now, the metaphor of the eye. What is it? It's the idea that there is a subject and that there's a light in his head, there's a light floating around in there and that it goes from the consciousness to things. So, here consciousness would be a light that, in one way or another, would *alight* on a given thing. Ah, look, I'll look at that, all at once...

You see how it works, the idea of light-consciousness, things lurking in darkness and the *beam* of consciousness... so in this metaphor you have all these terms. I'm not saying this constitutes a theory, what I'm trying to do is draw out the *metaphorical apparatus*. Light-consciousness, the object in the shadows, in darkness... The act of consciousness as a ray of light that passes from one thing to another.

If you really want to grasp the novelty of Bergson, and in my view he's the only one who presented things in this manner... He says, no! No, that's not it, it's just the opposite, the very opposite! Because *light is in things*. Light is in things. *It's things themselves which are of light*. Things *are* light. Little lights here and there... this thing and that... little lights... little lights everywhere. So... as he says, and this is a wonderful formula of Bergson's: "the photograph, if photograph there be, is already developed in the very heart of things".¹¹

If photograph there be... there are few formulas as fine as that... It seems to me an exceptionally fine phrase. The photograph, if photograph there be, is already developed in the very heart of things. Except, what is that's missing? It's the blank or black screen. The photo is developed in things but it's translucent. What is the object-light lacks is precisely darkness. You see, it's a total reversal of the classical positioning of the problem. *And we are the black screens*. That is, *darkness is what we bring to the question*. And it's only thanks to this darkness of ours that we can say: "Ah yes... we perceive things". If we didn't have this black screen, we wouldn't perceive them at all.

It's a complete reversal. It's things which are light and we who are the darkness. It's not we who are the light and things which are in darkness. If photograph there be, it is developed... it is developed in the very heart of things, except that it is translucent. In order for the photograph to emerge, a black screen is required, which is where we come in. But the photograph itself is in things.

So, all this is very interesting. I would therefore say, to complete my comparison with phenomenology... that phenomenology remains trapped within the classical metaphorical apparatus. It alters it slightly in making it all comes down to the level of a description of the lived, the level of a description of the sensory or the existent. But it remains entirely at the level of light-consciousness. And it's Bergson who completely reverses this.

Perhaps you can already sense it... we are getting closer to... we're not insisting on it... but we're approaching something of the order of "All consciousness is not at all consciousness of something". That would be the conception of light-consciousness. Instead, all consciousness is something. Light is out there, it's not in you. There has never been a negation of the subject as powerful as Bergson's, as what we find in Bergson. *A world without subject*... Finally we have a

philosophy that would deliver us a world without subject. What an author, what a thinker! Ok but what does this all mean? Let's pick things up again more calmly. We shouldn't get carried away with all this. Let's just calmly go on... really.

The image *is* movement. You see how, on the basis of this type of light that you have in the phrase "All consciousness is something" I'm trying to grasp... to circle around... Okay but let's take it down a notch. What does it mean to say the image *is* movement? Whatever way you look at it, it's already something new. And once again, for whom? I go back to my question. For whom is the image *movement*? Who knows if Bergson is right? And in what sense can we know?

Actually, when you think about it an image is a strange thing. I return to... I go back and forth. In classical psychology we are told about imagination... it's all about images, you know. Or even Sartre once more, in *The Imaginary*... "My friend Pierre... I look at the photo of my friend Pierre. Through the photo I aim at Pierre... and I aim at him in as far as he is absent..."¹²

I'm not saying that this is good, sorry I mean, I'm not at all saying that it's bad, that's not my... on the contrary parts of it were radically new but concerning other points. We would have to look for... and here I've been a bit dishonest because I didn't say that... I haven't even looked for... what the novelty of the problem of phenomenology consisted in... And so you understand, the photo of my friend Pierre... okay, okay... it doesn't move. But who among us can know that an image... it isn't an image if it... it's perhaps a semblance of recollection or it could be something else, I don't know but if it doesn't move, it's not an image?

Bachelard is completely Bergsonian when, in his attempt to rewrite a theory of poetic imagination, he begins by saying: But imagination cannot be defined as a faculty that forms images, because an image only begins from the moment that it starts to deform.¹³

There is only image if something moves and changes. Here we have a very simple kind of certitude. We don't need philosophy to tell us this. Of course, you can always tell me that literally speaking a photo is an image, that there are motionless images, you can tell me all that. Okay, yes, you're right but you will never unseat a little conviction I have that if there is nothing... that moves, that changes, *there is no image at all*.

The image is something that moves and changes. What does this mean? What does it mean? It's so obvious that it must mean something. But what does Bergson find himself reduced to here? You'll see, in the letter in the first chapter, he's clearly irritated, because with his small certitude that the images move and change, and if not, it's not an image... He's upset because he says to himself, he foresees the objection... But from what point of view are you speaking? That idiotic question: where are you speaking from? From what point of view? What he actually says is that this is a question neither of philosophy nor of science. Like all philosophers when they're irritated and don't quite know what point of view they're speaking from, he gets away with saying: it's common sense. But a philosopher as great as Bergson is wouldn't let himself remain stuck. It wouldn't bother him to say: I'm speaking from this point of view... I'm speaking *from the point of view of the cinema-image itself*.

After all, in a certain sense, the whole of imagination has been revealed by cinema. Because before cinema, you had poets and it was the same thing. For them, an image was something that changed, that moved, and it was on the basis of this that, as Bachelard says, we had a poetic image. If it doesn't change, if it doesn't move... an image that is not caught up in a journey, that doesn't involve a journey, that isn't the image of a journey, that isn't a *journey-image*, isn't really an image. It's nothing. It's not an image, it's a residue, it's the residue of an image. So that's what the photo of my friend Pierre is – *a residue*.

So, well, all image... You understand how it's not a question of saying that the image represents a movement... If we did that we would be in the same soup as classical psychology. There would be representations in consciousness but what rapport would there be between the representation and what was represented? The presentation would be in my consciousness, what was represented would be in the world. The image would be the image of a movement. That wouldn't do at all. And so Bergson too repeats with his usual calm certainty: *Image is movement*.

Alright, image is movement and perhaps also the reverse is... we'll see, this is where things get complicated. Can we say that movement *is* image? “Yes, yes, yes”, says Bergson. Yes! Image is movement and movement is image. Oh really... image is movement and movement is image? And so in what does their identity consist? There is the heart, the heart that each of us has. Oh, Bergson, help us to understand this identity between image and movement!

There's no reason why he should respond, but if he agrees to respond to us he will say... he will say – and this should make everything clear – he will say to us: Ah yes, the identity between image and movement consists in precisely what you have always, from time immemorial, called matter. Matter = image = movement. Oh my God!

Matter = image = movement. And the whole beginning of the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* teaches us this cinematographic truth, but one which, outside of cinema remains a fundamental paradox. It's an incredible paradox. Yet, since he doesn't refer to cinema – stuck as he is – this first chapter becomes something very bizarre. And what does he mean when he says: matter = image = movement. Or, to simplify things, what does he mean even before considering the question of matter, which he introduces as a third element that would be identical to the former two: image and movement.

What he wants to say is this: we cannot simply say that an image is merely subjected to the action of other images. Or that it merely reacts to other images. It is, strictly speaking, *identical*... an image is, strictly speaking, *identical* to the actions of other images to which it is subjected and equally it is *identical* to the reactions that other images have to its own operations upon them. In other words, the set of images and the set of actions and reactions of things upon each other are, strictly speaking, *the same thing*.

At this point we have to let things go. Don't ask straight away for too many rational justifications and so on. We have to... your task would almost be that of finding the cave where all of this is true, the world in which this would be true.

What do I mean by that? It means that, in a certain sense, one of the elementary parts of an image – and what would the parts of an image be? One of the elementary parts of an image is the actions of other images to which it is subjected, and the reactions that other images have to its own operations upon them. In other words, *an image is a set of actions and reactions.*

Therefore, there is clearly no difference between image and movement. In its most profound sense, that's what the image is: the very thing that is subjected to an action, the very thing that exerts a reaction. To the extent that the whole of the image, or rather – since, in the wake of our previous sessions, I would prefer in all rigour to keep the word “whole” for something entirely different – the *set of images is the set of actions and reactions that constitute the universe.*

As an immediate consequence... even if you understand it in that way... that is to say, understand it axiomatically... what I mean is... Bergson is perfectly within his rights to give the word image this meaning. But before understanding it... you should accept it as a formal definition even if you don't yet entirely grasp why this is so. An immediate consequence of this identity between the set of images and the set of actions and reactions that compose the world is that an image can be perceived – even if we don't yet know what an image that is perceived actually is – an image can be perceived, though not necessarily, not necessarily... an image might well also not be perceived. In other words, these images, defined as the set of actions and reactions that constitute the universe, are images *in themselves* that unceasingly act upon each other and react to each other – and here Bergson adds something very important – on all their sides. On all their sides. Or if you prefer, which amounts to the same thing, *in all their elementary parts.*

A world of images in themselves that unceasingly act and react on all sides and in all their elementary parts. That's what the movement-image is. You may very well say that, in this sense, the movement doesn't actually exist. If you had the hard-heartedness to say that... it would be terrible, but never mind. I'm not asking whether or not it exists, I'm simply saying that this is what Bergson calls the movement-image and it is on this that the whole analysis of the movement-image will depend. You might also ask if we will ever encounter this problem: the problem of whether or not it actually exists. Yes, we will, but not on this occasion.

So, just try to understand. But the eye, I go back to what I was saying before, what is the eye? Well, the eye, it's an image, a movement-image. And how is it defined, this movement-image? Through stimulation like all movement-images. It receives stimulation from wherever it arrives, wherever that is... And there are reactions... in reaction to what I see, for example I raise my arm. I see a stone that is about to hit me on the head, and I protect myself... it's a reaction. So, the eye is a system of action-reaction, that is to say, an image, a movement-image. Okay, says Bergson. The brain... the brain is also a movement image. You, your personality, is a movement image. What do you have? You are movement-images. Everything is.

If different things exist in the world, it's because there are different types of movement-image. And here we come to our main problem. But you, just like me, like the pebble like the eye and so on... so how can we expect the eye to condition anything at all. The image doesn't wait for the eye, since the eye is just an image among others... and my brain doesn't contain images – that's an idea that made Bergson laugh: saying that the brain *contains* images. Just as the idea that consciousness could *contain* something would make Sartre laugh. Can you believe that: that

someone would say the brain contains images? Because... it *is* an image. It receives and sends out vibrations. And of course, something happens between the two: that's what makes it an image. It converts a movement-image, it's a converter. It converts an action, it converts shocks.

You might tell me that something else is needed that acts. No, this thing too is an image. An image is... well, yes, the world is made of shocks and vibration, okay, this is something we all know. They tell us, no. It's made of atoms. But it's not really made of atoms, it's that atoms can themselves be defined by vibrations and waves and so on. And by the actions they receive and the reactions they trigger. Everything is movement-image. There are only movement images in themselves. And you are one movement-image among others. Or rather each of us consists of several movement-images but we don't go very far, we're not that heavy. We're just a tiny movement-image among an infinity of movement-images.

So, there you have it. Movement has absolutely no need either of my body or of my eye. Because my body, my brain, my consciousness, all that I name by these, is a movement-image and that's all it is. Henceforth, in this universal world of movement-images, which is to say actions and reactions, how is Bergson able to show that anything can be distinguished?

What is more, if I push Bergsonism to the limit, to conclude I would say that true perceptions are not something I have. So, who is it that perceives in this sense, to remain at this stage? What perceives are the movement-images themselves. So, what does it mean to perceive? To perceive means one thing only. It means to be subjected to an action. Or even to be subjected to an action and to have a reaction. That's what perception is. Things perceive *in themselves* both themselves and other things. Things *are* perceptions. Saying that they are movement-images amounts to the same thing as saying that they are perceptions.

Understand that what I'm going to say would be a catastrophic contradiction. There was once a philosopher who said that "to be is to be perceived".¹⁴ His name was Berkeley. There's no relation between Berkeley and Bergson because Berkeley wished to say that things are our states of consciousness whereas Bergson wishes to say the exact opposite: it is things in themselves that are perceptions.

The great philosopher Whitehead also said something interesting... He had a term that I find even better than the word perception. He said that things were *prehensions*.¹⁵ What does a thing prehend? *A thing prehends the set of actions to which it is subjected.*

So, we no longer even have a problem of pure perception. Pure perception is not a perception of something: it *is* the thing itself. It is in things that perceptions reside. The problem of deduction is: how is it that I, as a special image, I who was an image among others, can perceive and attribute perception to myself?

We live in a world of prehensions, it's not we who prehend things, we are rather a prehension among an infinite number of other prehensions.

Ah... Listen, I can see you're tired. There we have it. I will take this up again starting from... yes, did you want to say something?

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Write down "a prehension"...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, completely! You're absolutely right there... [*The student continues*] Yes, completely. We are at the point that... yes? [*The student continues*] Just a minute please... [*Deleuze is asking the other students to be quiet*] [*The student continues*] ... of semiotics? [*The student continues*] ... If that cannot be maintained, that means that semiotics got it wrong. ... Yes, yes, that will work itself out, I think. [*The student continues*] Yes, I'll be speaking about Peirce this year, yes, yes, yes, alright... [1:57:12]

Notes

¹ Evaluation of courses at Vincennes took the form of credits (in French U.V., *Unité de valeur*).

² Marcel L'Herbier (1888-1979), French film director of the early avant-garde. He was also a poet and theoretician of cinema as well as founder of the IDHEC Film School. The concept of *cinemetagraph* is developed in his book *La tête qui tourne*, Paris, 1979.

³ "Kinemes are primordial images, visual monads [which are] nonexistent in reality, or virtually so. The image is born of the coordinations of the kinemes" (Pier Paolo Pasolini, *Heretical Empiricism*, Indiana University Press, 1988, p.190.

⁴ *Creative Evolution* is a work of philosophy by Henri Bergson that first appeared in 1907.

⁵ *The Creative Mind* first appeared in 1934. A collection of nine essays, which Bergson had previously published between 1903 and 1923, it was expanded with a new introduction. This was the last work Bergson was to publish in his lifetime.

⁶ *Matter and Memory* was originally published in 1896.

⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III. 15. 1 (Trans. Adrian Del Caro), Cambridge University Press, 2006 (p. 183).

⁸ The formula "All consciousness is consciousness of something" appears in the second part of Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (1929).

⁹ Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer), London: G. Allen & Co, 1911 (p.67).

¹⁰ M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Trans. Colin Smith, (p. 278).

¹¹ Bergson's exact phrase (*Matter and Memory*, p. 38) – "The photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all the points of space" – is cited in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, chapter 4. (Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam), London: Athlone Press, 1986. Though their translation differs slightly: "Photography, if there is photography, is already snapped, already shot, in the very interior of things and for all the points of space".

¹² Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Imaginary: a Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, (Trans. Jonathan Webber, rev. Arlette Elkaim Sartre), Oxon: Routledge, 2004 – “II. The Sign and the Portrait”. The exact citation from Sartre reads: “Through the photo, I aim at Pierre in his physical individuality. The photo is no longer a concrete object that provides me with perception: it serves as matter for the image.” (p. 21)

¹³ See Gaston Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: an Essay on the Imagination of Movement*, (Trans. Robert S. Dupree), Dallas: The Dallas Institute Publications, 1988. “Studies of the imagination, like many inquiries into psychological problems, are confused by the deceptive light of etymology. We always think of the imagination as the faculty that forms images. On the contrary, it deforms what we perceive; it is, above all, the faculty that frees us from immediate images and changes them. If there is no change, or unexpected fusion of images, there is no imagination; there is no imaginative act”.

¹⁴ George Berkeley (1685-1753), Irish philosopher often considered an empiricist. His defence of immaterialism is summed up by the Latin locution “Esse est percipi aut percipere”.

¹⁵ See Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 1929, (New York: The Free Press, 1978), “A prehension reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an actual entity: it is referent to an external world, and in this sense will be said to have a ‘vector character’; it involves emotion, and purpose, and valuation, and causation. In fact, any characteristic of an actual entity is reproduced in a prehension”. (p. 19)