

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Part 1

... which does not concern our work, but which essentially concerns all of us: everyone is aware of the affair, of the René Schérer affair. I find it abominable, abominable because anybody really is, anybody is at the mercy of any denunciation made by some loser [*pauvre type*].

This affair is all the more troubling since the rumor is spreading -- about which I am not saying that it is certain -- the rumor spreading is that the Ministry [of education], for reasons which are its own and which do not appear to me to be pure, that the Ministry is suspending René Schérer. In my opinion, in the current state of the investigation, Schérer is absolutely correct in saying that this whole thing is causing him great harm; on the other hand, as the investigation stands, it is obvious to me that things will end abruptly, no matter what harm has been done to Schérer. On the other hand, if the Ministry, for shameful questions, were to suspend Scherer, this step would be taken at the very moment when the investigation and the indictment are collapsing. At that point, we all really would need to act, I'm not sure how, but to the maximum of what we can.¹

I am excluding a strike -- at least as far as I am concerned; strikes are so meaningless, that [if] the philosophy department were to go on strike, I have no idea what that could mean, or who it might disturb except ourselves. -- On the other hand, petitions supporting Schérer are already circulating; that sounds like the very least thing to me, although the petitions don't go very far. On the other hand, I believe that those petitions signed by all the students and carried to the Ministry with the requirement of direct meetings would have much more importance if this frightening matter of a suspension were to occur. So, there, I believe that we should all begin first by having the whole philosophy department and all the students sign, and then we can see if we extend it to the whole of Paris 8 and if, at that point, there might be some very, very strong steps to be taken regarding the Ministry, because this thing, this thing, it seems to me, this is an unbearable thing happening here and which is related besides... I can't quite understand, which is the same kind as any... you understand, this is not at all, I would say, to use the terms precisely of Left and Right, this is not at all in the same way that the Left denounces scandals or that the Right denounces scandals or pseudo-scandals.

There are operations of the Right which go back well before the war, which generally consist in dishonoring people. This is very, very curious; these are operations that I cannot manage to analyze. We ought to think about it, how they create some sort of encirclement where they toss something out, without any proof, then this succeeds; in the end, it succeeds. We have a very curious operation in this. So fine, I am saying this because it's something that needs to be in our

minds as long as this matter isn't settled. But I insist on the importance, from now on, of us being ready to really undertake a great movement, especially if it happens that he is suspended. But I sincerely hope that those in the Ministry desiring his suspension will not prevail. So, there we've covered the first point. Does anyone have something to say or have any information on this point? No? Good.

There we are. Second point: what we are going to do this year, and in this, my fate depends on it very closely, I mean even as regards this room, because... And I am telling you, I am telling you very frankly what I would like to do this year. If I sum it all up, I would really like to repeat myself. I would like to repeat myself. I would like to redo what I have already done. There it is. But I need to explain myself on this a bit. I would like to undertake philosophy in the manner of cows, by rumination. [*Laughter*] But rumination exercises are not yoga. Rumination, I think it's ... There is only one author who knew how to ruminate, and he was great among the greats, that was Nietzsche. This is why Nietzsche considered the cow as a sacred animal. He said that, he said that the cows were cows of the heavens, so that for him, rumination consisted of throwing out an aphorism and reading it twice. For me, it's not at the aphorism level, because the aphorism not my thing. It is at the level of needing to ruminate on something. Why am I saying that? This is necessary for my own clarity. I am saying: I truly and completely want to repeat myself and start the year with this repetition.

It turns out that last year -- and this is the least of things, which is why I feel the need to justify myself to you -- it is the least of things, that for so many years, I have changed the course topic every year. And it's not even a point of honor, but rather it's the requirement for any teacher. One changes the subject every year. And when we are criticized for having too much vacation time, then it seems to me... If changing the subject is required, it takes a lot, a lot of preparation. Fine. This is what I have done so far. And last year, I fell into something that I didn't believe in. I talked a lot about cinema, but what I had in mind was not cinema; yet I have talked about it a lot. What I had in mind was a classification of signs, all the signs in the world.

And the more I moved forward, the more I said to myself -- you remove all that is self-serving in what I'm saying, this will go faster -- the more I moved forward in this classification of all signs, and the more I said to myself: I've gotten hold of something. And the more I felt like I was holding onto something, and as I was at the same time preoccupied with the cinema that I was discovering, I went too fast, I let go of things, I did not develop them; there were things that I slipped by me, all that. And in the end, these were what interested me! Whereas those who were attending class were more interested in what I was trying to say about cinema.

At the end of last year, I found myself feeling like I had gotten close to something important for myself, and not having grasped it and having let it slip away. And yet, I tell myself, still talking to myself, that if I succeed in this classification of signs, obviously it will not change the world, but me, it will change me because it will make me so happy. It will work out for me, and that's what I want, that's what I want this year. What I want this year is really to start over -- I'm not even saying from another point of view, you will see --; this is starting over with a very different rhythm from other years.

When I reflect on my fate in the other years – here, I’m in front of you making a kind of confession, so you’ll forgive me for it -- I tell myself: what have I been doing for ten years? For ten years, I have been acting the clown! I’ve been acting the clown, and you know this well, that’s why there are so many of you. [*Laughter*] I do some kind of thing, fine, ... and so many of you show up. I’m not saying you show up for laughs, obviously not; if you come, it’s because this interests you, but it’s a show. It’s a show. You come ... besides, the proof is here, it’s these tape recorders. Half my audience is human, and half are tape recorders, sometimes they overlap: one human and one tape recorder; sometimes there are no more humans and one tape recorder, sometimes, well, all that. It’s a show.

So, in fact, this is good because there are some who show up to see what I look like, I stare back at what they look like, that’s it. [*Laughter*] And then I talk non-stop, non-stop, let’s say two and a quarter, two and a half hours, and I’m exhausted afterwards, you are completely beaten up. It’s on Sylvie Vartan’s level.² There we are. I’m not saying it’s wrong. For me, it has been great all these years, really very, very good, great. I was happy, you were happy as well. Basically, we were all very happy. We discovered things, and me, I always thought that a course implied a collaboration between those listening and the one speaking, and that this collaboration didn’t necessarily proceed via discussion. Even that it very rarely proceeded via discussion. People who use something that they are hearing generally use it six months later and in their own way, within a whole different context. They take it, they transform it, and it’s entirely marvelous.

What I have never been able to get are reactions. I’ve been able to get objections which, for me, are always painful and unbearable, but reactions -- this is my dream -- where someone says to me: ha, but you are forgetting which direction we could go to consider this. It was always a bit on my mind, it was a dream, how do I reach that?

So, you understand that what I would like this year when I say that I will repeat myself, yes, I will repeat myself completely. So, this will be a whole new approach that I’ve never done before; I’ve always dreamed of doing it and never could. Why have I never been able to? Because there were too many people, there were too many people, and in the end, we can only do this in a relatively small group or, ideally, half with former students, already having attended, and half with new. So that’s it. You understand?

I’ll explain it to you right away so that each of you can then judge. Okay, I did some things last year; I will not return to all of them, and I won’t return to them in the same way, but I will make much stricter divisions. I’ll say, ah, we have this: the topic of the day. Then sometimes on the same day, I will do two topics, three topics, and you will feel that this would be a very, very slow progression, and at the end of each topic, I would like for a group or one of you to judge the topic, so that you tell me: this works fine, this doesn’t, that just doesn’t work, and it’s up to me to say whether it works, that it will be developed under the following topic, the next one. I will number them, my topics; they will have kinds of headings, and then we will see, we will correct them on the spot.

That’s why I sit right here and why I can’t change places; I’ve placed myself near the blackboard because I really need to make small drawings, to make diagrams, so you can then correct the diagrams. So, at that point, it will be amazing! One of you there will come from the back -- you

know, in an amphitheater, that gets all screwed up – someone will come from the back and correct my diagram. At that point, I will obviously be furious, but maybe he will be right. Either way, we'll know what we're talking about; these will be very specific topics. It won't be about talking vaguely; it won't be about talking about something else. You will accept my authority only to say: we are talking about this and not that. You must not tell me: and why don't you talk about something else, because we are not talking about something else because that's how it is, that's all. But on the other hand, you will correct them for me, you will extend me. Fine. This is what I would like to do.

So obviously, those who can't stand it will be really -- and I insist on this – this will be a rehash, and even the best among you -- that is, I don't mean the best -- but those who seem to me the most favorable, will sometimes tell themselves: well, damn, why is he going back over this? Believe me, it won't be to save time, because even if you don't feel the need to do so, I will feel the need for myself. These are the things that are needed because it is not the same; when someone is speaking, the listener may well take it for granted. Very oddly, in my experience, but also inversely, in my experience, when you believe that something goes without saying, for me, on the contrary, it causes a problem; there is something that I am trying to hide that is not at all ready. And conversely, when you have the feeling that it does not go without saying, that there, there is something where I am passing by too quickly, for me, it's that it goes so much without saying and that it's so easy, then this is where a dialogue can start that is not in the classic mode.

It's neither you nor I who's right, do you see? I am not the one who is right when I say: this, for me, goes without saying, and this does not go without saying! And for you, I guess, it's the other way around. But that does mean something very important. Either way, people cannot listen to each other; I mean, some can only listen to someone -- this is the only equality between the speaker and those who listen -- people can only listen to each other if they have a minimum of implicit understanding, that is, a common way of posing problems. If you don't pose problems the same way, there's no point in listening to one another; it is as if one were speaking Chinese and the other English, without knowing the languages. So that's why I never considered a student wrong if he or she didn't come and listen to me. One can only come and listen to me if one has, for oneself, through a mystery which is affinity, a certain common way of posing problems. I say that very loudly for those who are coming here for the first time. It may very well be that after two classes, you tell yourself: what is this guy talking to us about? If you have that feeling, it doesn't mean anything against me or against you. It means that, to use a complicated word, that your problematics do not pass through mine.

Just think: when people say that philosophers never agree, that's something that has always struck me because I believe that philosophy is, much more than science, a discipline of absolute consistency. When we say that two philosophers do not agree, it is never because they give two different answers to the same question; that's because they don't pose the same problem. Only since you can never say the problem you are posing, I cannot both solve something and state the problem I am solving. These are two different activities. So, the problem is always what's implicit. Although I state, in general, that's what the problem is, you will always have to feel something beyond, and feeling something beyond, that's what makes people get along or not get along. So, if we don't have something like a common way of posing problems, then there's nothing.

So, what does that imply, what would I like to do, this repetition, this kind of rumination, rehashing about my classification of signs? I want to reach, ultimately, what I reached at the end of last year. That's what I want to deal with this year, namely signs and time. If I had to put it in a sentence, this year I would like to comment on the expression that can occur: "the hour is coming", or "the time has come". The hour is coming, or the time has come! *Zarathustra* ends on something like this. The hour is coming, or the time has come, *Zarathustra* said, and then it will be, hey ... it is exactly, it stops, perfect, there it is. He has come to this extreme point where the sign and time are like ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

What is the relationship between the sign and time? Are there any signs of time? What does that mean? Are there any special signs? Is this the being of a sign to have such a connection with time or not? Well, it doesn't matter. And there, I seem to be saying something new when, on the contrary, I am doing [*unclear words*]. So, I need to go back over my points, to create my own little personal things; so, I need an agreement with you. You can tell me -- you have all the rights -- you can tell me, well, no, you're exaggerating, it's too long, we understood that; we understood very well. But on the bulk of what we did last year, that I was so happy -- not for me -- that I thought there was really something, on this bulk, I need, I have a personal need to go back, to start again, to calm down, to see if it's getting me somewhere, and I'm sure it's getting me somewhere because, understand, what I want is a kind of, that's it ...

You know, many of you know what is called in chemistry the Mendeleev [periodic] table. What I want is a classification of the signs in the form of a Mendeleev table where, if necessary, I would get some empty squares. I will say: there is no sign, there, so how come? There should be one. And what if we were to invent it, the sign of the future. That would be good because suddenly we could make films on these signs, on these still unknown signs. In the end, no, we could not know them much, but we would say: we need one there! We can't find it. We don't know which one! Maybe then one of you would find it. That's what I need. Good.

So, I come back to the question that was asked of me by someone earlier. What is happening? So, I need a small group. So, you will tell me: well, the others, the others, who if necessary...? This year, I want -- I've never asked for it in the other years, except as a joke, I asked for it, but I didn't believe in it; this year, I believe in it -- the other years, that goes without saying... I'm excluding, I'm excluding doing what is called a "closed seminar" because that seems shameful to me. It's the opposite of what Paris 8 is; that's not what I want. What I want is, well, a small group, a very little group to fit into this room. Why? If you have understood my program this year, I cannot achieve it under any other conditions. If like last year, you are 200 or 150, I don't know what, in this room, many of whom are coming -- and that's good, I'm not saying anything critical -- many of whom are coming for the show and also are thinking what they'll need to take in what we are doing, they will take it at their own pace, all things that, once again, I find perfect, and as and when they would like it, that always seemed perfect to me, but this year, I'm looking for another approach [*formule*].

What I am requesting is the formation of a small group that both accepts the terms I am proposing -- to go back, rehash and refine and perfect with me what we have done. This involves a small group, let's say, it involves at most this room, again with everyone being seated. So that's not difficult. And the others? Again, for over ten years, I have prepared courses for everyone;

allow me to teach one this year that isn't for everyone. You will tell me: but for the others, where are they going to go? There is no problem. Although the philosophy department may be hammered [*frappé*], there are a lot of courses, there are a lot of courses. So, there is no reason for you to go taking all of them. You'll divide yourself up, and you will find courses that suit you better, especially those people that attended last year.

I would like a very small number, those who accept the conditions that I just stated... So, if you refuse my conditions -- which there is no question of me applying them as an authoritarian, of course, I can only apply them sneakily [*Laughter*] -- so if you don't agree to these terms, what's left for me to do? My project, to which I am committed as to my life, my spiritual life -- not like with my life itself, but it's the better part, my mental life -- this project to which I am very committed, I would obviously be forced to give it up. If there are a great many of you, once again it will be playing the clown. I mean "playing the clown" in the best way, honorably. Again, I have to play the clown; again, I have to do my act; again, I must speak to you, at that point, to avenge myself, I will speak to you, I don't know what, about Descartes and Kant, [*Laughter*] you will have asked for it! [*Laughter*] And then I'll prepare written lists of questions for you. [*Laughter*] You will have asked for it! Fine. You will have asked for a huge course, and those who will not know Kant's cogito by heart, I'll refuse them the UV [*credit*], [*Laughter*] all that, but that's what I'll do. And I'll go to the large lecture hall, which will make us all die; we will become yellow, blind, all that. Okay, well, there you go, but I'll do what you want. There you have it. Did I explain myself clearly enough? [*Pause*] Are there any questions?

A student: [*Comments generally inaudible; he asks about being able to speak in class and within the French education system that controls how a student can and should speak but having nothing to say*]

Deleuze: A very good question.

The student: [*Comments generally inaudible; he suggests that despite his admiration for what Deleuze is saying, as a student in the class, he isn't fully able to express himself there*]

Deleuze: There we are... Let me... You have explained it quite well.

The student: [*Comments generally inaudible; he suggests that there's a certain hypocrisy in the request that they are discussing*]

Deleuze: Listen to me, listen to me. It is true that "speaking" has lots of meanings, but for me speaking can only have one meaning. Speaking can mean that everyone expresses him/herself. That's the opposite of philosophy. [*Pause*] There is a very beautiful text by Plato -- that's so you'll learn something in this start of things -- there is a very beautiful text by Plato in the dialogues, a dialogue with Socrates where Socrates says: what's going on is odd; there are topics nobody dares to talk about unless they are skilled, for example, about shoe-making, or about metallurgy. And then there is a mass of topics about which everyone thinks they can have an opinion. That's a good Socratic theme, that. And, alas, this mass of subjects about which everyone believes themselves to be capable of having an opinion and therefore who are particularly agitated before or after dinner, or during dinner -- what do you think of that? what's

your opinion? – that corresponds precisely to what is called philosophy. As a result, philosophy is the subject about which everyone has an opinion. We can always talk about whether God exists when the cheese course arrives. [*Laughter*] Does God exist? Everyone has an opinion on an issue like this; everyone has their own thing to say. On the other hand, what about shoe manufacturing? Here we take greater care because we are afraid to speak nonsense. But there we are, about God, we have no fear of talking nonsense. It's still very odd. There, at the dawn of philosophy, Socrates got hold of something that was perfect. Why? Why? If we understood that, we would understand everything.

Philosophy, what is it? Philosophy is something that tells you first: you won't express yourself. You won't express yourself. Last year, I said, because it worried me a lot, these appeals which were the only ugly side of 1968: express yourself, express yourself, speak up, whereas once again, we do not realize that the most demonic forces, the most diabolical social forces are not forces that prevent us from expressing ourselves. The truly diabolical forces are the forces which invite us, which invite us to express ourselves. These are the dangerous forces.

Consider TV. TV doesn't tell me: be quiet! It asks me all the time: what's your opinion? State your opinion! Oo there, state your opinion! Polls! Your opinion, what is your opinion on this? What is your opinion on the immortality of the soul, on the genius of [Bernard] Pivrot,³ [*Laughter*] on the popularity of [Pierre] Mauroy,⁴ etc.? Give your opinion and then you have to express yourself. And then, if we are going to develop your neighborhood, there will be cost details, etc., come on, there's all that. I am saying this is a danger, it's a huge danger. If you will, you have to be able to resist those forces that require us to speak when we have nothing to say. That is fundamental. Also, any speech consisting of stating one's opinion on something is anti-philosophy itself, since the Greeks had a very good word for it. This is what they called the *doxa* which they opposed to knowledge, even before knowing whether knowledge was something existing: is there knowledge? In any case, we know that philosophy is not the confrontation of opinions.

So, speaking, this is not me saying, for example, "well here you have what I think", and you saying to me, "ha well no, that's not how I see it". Even to the extent that you are a philosopher, you refuse to participate in any such conversation unless it is about something insignificant. So there, on something insignificant, it's so joyful to say, "ha, you look good today!" "No, no, I don't look good; I'm not feeling good." This is the rule of *doxa*, this is opinion, and this is friendship. Friendships are formed at the level of *doxa*.

Understand, when you talk about the great philosophers, well, you can number the concepts that they created. If I say "cogito", well, "cogito" didn't exist; it is not an eternal proposition, it did not exist. It is a propositional concept that was created, literally, by a philosopher named [René] Descartes. Now, he created something. If you take the concept of "Idea" with a capital i, it's a very bizarre, extraordinary concept; it's not a matter of opinion. This is how philosophy implies knowledge. It's like in mathematics: if you don't know what Cogito is, if you don't know what an Idea is, if you don't know what, I don't know, a thousand other things are, you can be interested in philosophy, [but] you aren't exactly doing philosophy. Okay, all of that. Fine.

Last year I spoke about a concept signed by Bergson, which is the concept of duration. So, what do you want? What do you want to do? If someone says: "I don't agree", it's as if someone is saying: "I don't agree with Matisse"! Okay, you don't agree with Matisse, what then? Who does that disturb? What does that even mean? This is meaningless, "I disagree, I disagree". Unless someone tells me: I've created or I have another concept, I've created another concept that makes this one ineffective or inconsistent. So there, yes! But at that point, it's not "I don't agree", it's something entirely different.

So speaking is not at all stating one's opinion on something. On the other hand, to answer the question, when I say what I would really like this year, [that] it's for you to speak, I mean this: grant me this, if it is you who comes and if it's me who speaks, if it's me who speaks, then that's fine. But for you, for you to speak, for you, your task consists in really stating either on behalf of your thought, or on behalf of personal feelings of your own -- there are feelings of thought, thought is multiple -- that does not mean: my opinion. It means, well, yes, I have the impression in your thing that there is something that doesn't work; no, there is something that doesn't work, something unbalanced, that is... that would be necessary... Or else, you tell me: what you're saying triggers something in me, what you are saying, it triggers this, that I wouldn't have thought about at all, and if we put the two into relation, what happens?

Or else, you give me an example. You will tell me that I am reducing you to minor things. Not at all! One example that I didn't think of during my thing, if it occurs to you, it can change absolutely everything. A small correction, you intervene -- we'll see, this is all abstract because we haven't started yet -- it can change everything, you know? This is why if we take "speaking" in this sense, you have a perfect opportunity to speak. Last year, this has happened several times; several times last year, it happened that someone would speak and offer something that I had absolutely not thought of, and that then produced some really big changes for me. So, this is what I meant. This is what I meant in the hopes that you agree to these conditions.

A woman student: Why not employ a mutual effort, that is, to use the fact that there are several people precisely who attended several [*inaudible; possibly seminars*] who already have a certain familiarity, and starting with problems you would propose, to organize some work, I don't know, [*Inaudible words*] to gather together, but effectively instead of sending of half of the people into research topics or to say "I'm starting over"... [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Well, yes, but that doesn't move me forward because what I want to do, I can't do it in a large lecture hall...

The student: But that's not what I'm saying. When I say mutual teaching, fine, we can only use groups and work with one or two persons per group, and you could move between the groups of advance your teaching.

Deleuze: Yes, but how many will there be...?

The student: [*Comments generally inaudible; she tries to see how to organize 150 persons*] ... and the rest, they'll do what they do... [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: Ah right, but then the elimination will begin... [*Laughter*]

The student: [*Comments generally inaudible*] Historically these are things that have occurred... [*She insists on the possibility of small group work*]

Deleuze: Yes, but in the 18th [century], fine, but there might be... I just don't see that very well with my thing. So, I divide, for example, the classroom into small groups of ten, and there are nine out of the ten who just leave.

The student: That's not true. There are two ways of working, precisely; there is group work on a questions...

Claire Parnet: But what's the point of working in groups? [*The student tries to answer, but Deleuze speaks over her*]

Deleuze: So, they work in groups off on their own, without me; they're working without me. Ok, but what interests me... ok, that's fine. That's all I'm asking for. But when I'm there, what happens? [*Laughter*] I get a representative for each group? [*Laughter*]

Parnet: A delegate...

Another woman student: [*She asks the first student a question*]

The first student: [*She tries to explain her system of groups*]

Parnet: But if there are small groups, that means, that means we're required to talk to one another in order to find something that we no doubt will only manage to find all alone. The work is still solitary, right?

Deleuze: Yes, but that doesn't address my question. [*Laughter*] The small groups...

The very first student [*who had raised the initial question about "speaking"*] I for one find that stupid! [*Generally inaudible comment, accompanied by laughter*] [*He continues at some length with his remarks*]

Deleuze: It's not going to be difficult work; it's going to be repetitive work. [*The student tries to intervene*] I'm going to repeat myself. [*Pause*] And you don't like it when repetition occurs, but I need that. [*Pause*]

Another student: We need to summarize quite a lot of things and to go back over it...

Deleuze: There you go!

The student: ... in connection, by connecting them with previous seminars, by connecting one year with the other. That's what you want to do, right?

Deleuze: Well, no, the other years? That would be too much! [*Laughter; comments by several students*] No, last year... last year. [*Pause*]

Another student: Can I ask a question about the creation of concepts?

Deleuze: Yes! Why yes!

The student: Because it seems that even if philosophers don't want to exchange opinions about things, philosophers have often exchanged opinions while creating concepts, and even they didn't want that, concepts were articulated quite often as *doxa*, I mean, opinion. That gets very mixed up.

Deleuze: Ah well, that concepts then produce sources of opinion, yes, they cause opinions to flow, yes. Yes, fine. But that doesn't seem so serious to me. It doesn't seem so bad to me because it's completely harmless. Yes, and again, and again, we should not confuse things because, I would say, let's take an example, a very difficult, very difficult philosopher, who is... that one can consider as the philosopher par excellence: Spinoza. Spinoza, well, what does that mean that ... So, I choose an example: there is an eminently conceptual system in Spinoza. How is he a great philosopher? It's because this system of pure concepts is at the same time the strangest life there is. It's like an animal, it's a living system. Second stage: there are Spinozist opinions, that is, there are people who will say, for example: as Spinoza says, as we seem to recall, Spinoza is pantheist, that means God is everywhere and everything is in God. So, if need be, they will say: as Spinoza says, God is everywhere. I call that opinion. And then there is still something else: some will say that Spinozism maintained or generated currents of opinion.

And there is another stage. There is something else as well. There are, for example, writers or artists, or people like you and me, let's assume, not philosophers. Yet they may have been able to read Spinoza. They were struck by this, as if what they were up to or what they were thinking about resonated with this guy who lived in the 17th century, and it hits them. They are not philosophers. They do not propose to present a commentary on Spinoza. They are not teachers; they are not going to explain what Spinoza says. They have much better things to do. Thanks to this encounter, something amazing happens. That this encounter might enliven them for their own work or for their own life, for their own work, a writer, and all of a sudden, he's going to write pages about which we tell ourselves: my God, this is Spinoza. Not that Spinoza could have written these pages; so, I think, this might be [D.H.] Lawrence, this might be [Henry] Miller. They have a certain knowledge of Spinoza, they have an "artist's" knowledge, but no doubt, Spinoza has struck them to the depths of themselves. And yet they are not at all concerned with philosophy. On the other hand, they are concerned with Spinoza in what they want to do. This is a curious thing.

And they might be non-writers; I'm not taking the example... I'm leaving behind all that has to do with writers, artists. They can be people in their life. They read that, there is something that strikes them. As they say, for simplicity's sake, they're not quite like they used to be. Why? Not that they were doing philosophy, but they understood within philosophy, as it can happen to us when we see works of art when we are concerned with this or that artist, something that strikes

us, that is, it strikes you enough nonetheless to orient either your life or your activities. Something's happened, something passed between you to him, good.

So I would say there, the philosophical concept is not just a source of just any opinion; it is a very particular source of transmission in which correspondences are established between a philosophical concept, a pictorial line, a musical sound block, extremely curious correspondences which, in my opinion, must not even be theorized, that I would prefer to call "the affective" in general, the domain of affect or affectivity, and where it can jump from a philosophical work, that is, from a concept, to a line, to an aggregate of sounds. So, these are privileged moments. These are the privileged moments of the mind.

So, there you go, listen, so I'm going to start, I'm going to start, but... There you go. And as I stated it, I'll try to ... So, I'm going to return to that, yes; let me at least try. If there are no more of us than this, in my opinion, this will work. It will be enough to remove some aspects, but it will be fine. If there are any more, it's ruined! There you go. I'll start with a very specific point: what was this story from which I started last year about which I was basically saying ...
[*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 40]

Part 2

... There you are, this point, I would like to state it very quickly here, taking it for itself. And I was providing the reference because my wish is for you to read to the maximum; my reference is to [Henri] Bergson, the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, and it is a Bergson who is nothing like the Bergson that has been recalled, at the level of opinion, namely of a philosopher who speaks to us about duration. Indeed, there on the contrary, he speaks to us about matter. And there we have Bergson, and this is my first heading, and I will solemnly indicate when I move on to another heading, I hope not to stay on this long -- and right now, I need, I've thought of everything in my new organization, I bought some chalk, because I need chalk, but there were no more white ones. So, I have colored chalk. What do you prefer? [*Inaudible comments from students*] Ah... yes, good. --

Why are image and movement the same? Because we offer ourselves -- hey, why do we offer ourselves? Just that we want to! -- we offer ourselves an infinite set of images, which we define how? If we offer ourselves an infinite set that we are going to call images, we still have to define it in such a way that we understand why the word "image" is used. An infinite set of images, images because they are things that never cease to vary in function from one to another, in relation of one to another, on all their facets and in all their parts. In fact, given one of these images, you can divide it, however far you go, you divide it into parts, you can reverse it. How many facets does it have? Small n ! It has small n facets. I am not offering myself any dimensions of space yet. I don't know, I'm starting from that. You will tell me: easy. No, it's not easy. Why am I starting from that? We will only be able to understand it afterwards.⁵

I am giving myself a set of small n dimensions and small n terms, which I define by a set of things -- it is the vaguest word -- a set of things which vary perpetually, continuously in relation to each other on all their facets and in all their parts. Such a set, I call it a "plane". [*Deleuze goes to the board*] You will say to me, "plane"? But "plane", what then does two dimensions mean?

No, that doesn't mean two dimensions. I would also say – you'll forgive me everything; I'm moving forward like that, I'm proposing conventions -- I would say: this is a small n dimensional plane. Furthermore, I would say quite possibly that it has one dimension -- if you abstract it and only consider one image -- but it has as many dimensions as you will distinguish images. I thus define the plane by this infinite set of things which vary as a function of one to the other, on all their facets and in all their parts. In other words, it just keeps on moving. I call them "images", and why? Because "image" is where being and "appearing" [*l'apparaître*] coincide. [Pause] I would also say it's the "phenomenon", image or phenomenon; I take them in the same sense. This is what appears. What appears on the plane is this set of images. Moreover, this is the plane itself. There you are.

So, you understand, I opened a digression, and I'm coming back. If someone says to me "I don't agree", that doesn't make sense, that doesn't make sense, that doesn't make sense. On the other hand, if he already tells me, "But I don't see what it means at this level", if he says, "you forgot something", that's good, it's a useful comment. But since I haven't said anything yet, [Laughter] I run no risk in [*unclear word; perhaps forgetting*]. [Pause] So, since these images never stop varying from one to the other, I would say they are movement-images. They are perpetually in movement; they just keep moving. But the variations in these images extend as far as their actions and reactions. This is a system of actions and reactions. An image is inseparable from the action it exerts on all other images, and from the reactions it undergoes, and rather reactions that it has in relation to the action that it undergoes, that is, it sends actions onto all the other images, [and] it undergoes actions coming from all the other images. It is a system of actions and reactions. Fine, that's the first characteristic. [Pause]

Second characteristic: what can happen on such a plane? What can happen if you offer yourself such a plane? Still, let's try to clarify this plane a bit. I can become lyrical in describing it, as it appeals to me it so much. Can I tell you, "Try to live it"? Try to live it, I don't know, you can do so on one condition: that you put yourself into it, onto it; you have to do so, you are there, you are there. In other words, you are an image on this plane. Your neighbor is another image on this plane. You are divisible; these are parts of the image. You have a front and a back, yes, you have sides. For the moment, you have no privileges there. The table is one of those images as well. It just keeps on moving. You will tell me that you are not moving. It goes without saying that you are moving; things are moving within you, but that does not stop, the actions, the interactions. So, this is the plane of movement-images. Hey, let's suppose I give it a more precise name, and so I could say, this is the plane of consistency. Why? Just like that, because we're going to see that some things happen next. There you are.

What can happen? I'm holding onto my plane. Let's try to... let's try to... Let's shift to a lyrical mode. I would say of this plane that it is the set of all possibility. Outside of it, there is nothing. It is the set of all possibility. I would also say that it is the matter of all reality. It is the set of all possibility, that is, all that is possible is an image on this plane. It is the matter of all reality, namely everything that acts and reacts, and which is therefore real, is on this plane. At the same time, this is the set of all possibility and the matter of all reality. And finally, insofar as the law, and what we call law, the relation of an action and a reaction, I am saying that it is the form of all necessity. [Pause] There you see how I "sang" this plane: the set of all possibility, the material of all reality, the form of all necessity.

So there, pure association of ideas, that reminds me of something. See, it's like that; for you, it might remind you of something else. For me, that reminds me of something, because... because, only because I am a professor of philosophy. I say, hey, doesn't that remind me of something that, at first glance, has nothing to do with it? I recall, we are told that there is a case in which the same concept designates the whole of the possible, the matter of the real and the form of the necessary. This concept is the concept of a being, in Latin "ens", which is "that which is", "ens", the concept of a being such that its reality or its existence derives from its possibility and to the extent that it follows from its possibility, necessarily follows from it. [Pause] And this being such that its existence derives from its possibility and, deriving from its possibility, necessarily follows from it, what is it? It is the concept of God, and that the Latin philosophers, or those of the Middle Ages called it: *Ens originarium*, the original Being: God. Good. I tell myself, that's it. My material plane is God, it is the original Being! And I say, this is good because I don't need God anymore. I need a screen, no need for God. God is the screen, that is, this is my plane of consistency. It is the *Ens originarium*, that is, the set of all possibility as constituting the Whole of reality and, constituting it, necessarily constitutes the unity of the possible, of the real, and necessary. There you are. Fine.

You see this plane. [Deleuze writes something on the board] What have I done? Why did I add this? To make you feel, beyond words, to make you feel that this plane was not a small thing, but was a grandiose thing, that this plane, made up of movement-images, acting and varying as a function of each other, on all their facets and in all their parts, this plane was literally adorable, that is, it was God. So, you understand, if I am asked, "Do you believe in God?", well I say, Yes! I believe that there is an infinite set of images varying as a function of each other, on all their facets and in all their parts, and in this regard, I tell myself: Hey, I am a pure Spinozist. Well, you see, this is all very tiring already.

So, well, I ask myself, what can happen on this plane? Suddenly, I'm not calling it a "plane of consistency" anymore. You can tell me, you shouldn't have called it the "plane of consistency". You have to call him by its real name. Now, we strike out "consistency"; I was wrong. I should call it a "plane of immanence".⁶ There is nothing outside of this plane; this plane is everywhere, everything is on this plane. [62: 00] You, me, the room, etc., everything, everything, everyone! There is nothing that does not act on anything, or rather there is nothing that does not act or interact with the other points. It has been said all the time, physicists have said it: every point in the universe interacts. Fine, molecules, molecules, great, I don't care. Earlier, it was you on the plane, but it's also the molecules. It's up to you to transform yourself into molecules, into atoms. I am not making any difference in scale, you know? I am in the original Being. It is a wonder! We are swimming in a plane of immanence where the images you are considering will not be images anyway.

You will tell me that an image refers to something. Not at the point that we've reached. This is not an image for someone. How would that be an image for someone? You "are" an image! I defined the image by the shot/plane; I did not define it in relation to someone. You are an image, and if you are made up of atoms, atoms are images. Fine. If I take the whole system of atoms, that's exactly... I don't have to change anything, it's the same plane of immanence. An atom acts on another atom; they are two images that vary as function of one another, in all their parts and on all their facets. And what is called a wave phenomenon? A wave is a movement-image,

waving. It is the vehicle for action, for the interaction of two atoms, two parts of atoms, whatever you want. You see? So, whether it is you, whether it is not you, you change all the scales, you have nothing to change from your plane of immanence defined as original being, the originating *Ens*, that is, the God. There you go... Yeah?

A woman student: From the perspective of vocabulary, this is difficult!

Deleuze: Oh, the terminology is basic, especially for my plane of signs; you understand, all that, we have to Yeh, yeh...

The student: [*Inaudible comments, but she seems to complain about the difficulty of certain distinctions, notably between the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, that's quite right. It was because I was being careless; I was going too fast. I said "plane of consistency" because it's a notion that I find useful. And at the same time as I was saying it, I was thinking to myself, "that's a disaster, that's not it". That's because "consistency" will be a very special case which will be distinguished from other cases, linked to things, certain things which happen on the plane. So, I told myself, I am wrong to introduce "plane of consistency". As a result...

Another woman student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, the first one... Ah yes, if it's... ah, yes, yes, yes, yes... Let her come in! [*Someone enters the room; pause and laughter*] If it's indeed the secretary... [*Pause*] Oh, we have to say, we're really fine here... [*Pause*] Yes?... Hello! [*The person speaks to them about another room for the seminar*] Is it bigger? [*Inaudible reply*] Ah... [*She continues speaking*] Listen, I think that we can work things out... [*She continues*] They are quite happy with this room, so... [*Laughter; she continues*] ... Yes, but those ones, they cannot say they aren't happy. [*Laughter*] In any case, here, today, we are working, we're not leaving. I'll go look at [room] G later... [*She continues*] ... Yes, [*Pause*] is it a bit bigger? I'll go look at it later, and then I'd be happy to... I have to go see it... We have some things to... You're in the office until noon?... 12 :30? Fine. So, I'll go take a look later. Otherwise, have the others tell everyone else that next week, everything will be there... a week we'll have earned, that way. [*Laughter*] [*Pause*]

Because, again, understand, it's not... I'm assuming that there is a large group among you telling yourself, that's not working, I don't want to listen to you; I'm doing everything not to listen to you; I'm doing all I can. [*Laughter*] I would find it so normal, so good that some people were telling themselves, oh well, what he wants to do this year, that doesn't work for me. It's not normal for that to work for you! [*Laughter*] No, I'm speaking sincerely; it's not normal, it's not possible. I believe that what I'm doing this year may not be interesting as long as I... I don't know... You'll see. I'm already making mistakes with words... [*Laughter*]

So, yes, "consistency," yeah, I told myself, I'm going to need it with other terms for later. So, it's not that I have improved it; it's just that I was wrong. It's "immanence", it's "immanence", it's not the other way around; you will see, there will never be any transcendence, or maybe there will. Ha, yes! There's are going to be some... ah, la, la. But it will be outside the plane. It's not

just about a plane, you understand. Oh, we'll be working on this for a while, for the whole year. [Laughter] So, I am saying, you delete, you strike out "consistency". You don't say "consistency," it's only "plane of immanence", it's God, and we recognize this God, and you are part of it, and even your atoms. Your atoms are gods. Why do I call it God? This is something I've stated, that I've justified. I call it God since it is the unity of the possible, the real and the necessary, and since there, if you have done philosophy, everyone, anyone, every philosopher has always called it God: the unity of the possible, the real and the necessary, that is, Being such that its existence, its reality necessarily follows from its possibility. This is even what is called in philosophy -- I never shy away from the opportunity to teach you something -- the ontological proof of God's existence which derives its date and its perfect formulation from the philosopher Descartes in the 17th century.

Now if you want me make a parenthesis and tell you the ontological proof of the existence of God, which is irrefutable, which will make you believe in another God, but it will harm me, so no, I will not tell you because if I teach you the real proof of the existence of God, which cannot fit the plane of immanence, you are going to believe in the other God. But you mustn't do so! So fine, there we are.

I am saying, what can happen on this plane of immanence [Pause] which is nothing other than the set of interacting movement-images? [Deleuze writes on the board] Right? Plane of immanence, screen, plane of immanence or screen; [Pause] as someone said quite wittily, it's the total screen! It doesn't make you laugh. [Laughter] [Pause] The girls know what the total screen is, but the boys don't yet. [Pause] So, what might happen? Here, I fall back on Bergson, but in a way, we were already there in Bergson, chapter one of *Matter and Memory*. Bergson tells us, well, there you have it, on this plane of immanence -- he doesn't use the word, but no matter -- on this plane of immanence, we have to see that there are certain particular images. Understand, be careful! When you do philosophy, you don't have the right to change the conditions of a problem. He tells us: okay, on this plane of immanence, there are certain particular images. Fine. He has no right ... there is one thing he has no right to do: he will not have the right to define, assuming that there are particular images, he will not have the right to define them by terms other than those implied by the plane of immanence.

And "plane of immanence" implies only: image-action-reaction, it forms a set since actions and reactions are indistinguishable from images. Movement-images are the set of actions and reactions that they exert on each other. This is why they are continually changing. So, if I say that there are special, privileged, particular images, I don't have the right to say suddenly that they have a soul, or that they have a consciousness. I don't know what consciousness is. My plane of immanence does not involve consciousness. So how am I going to define them?

Bergson defines them in a surprising way. He tells us: these are images which present, only between the actions they undergo, between the actions they undergo -- from other images -- me, image, I receive actions from other images, and I have reactions on other images. Action-reaction, movement-image. Movement-image means sets of actions and reactions. Well, there are some very bizarre images because, between the action that they undergo, that they receive, and the reaction that they execute, there is what? Precisely there is nothing! That is, there is an interval. There is an interval! [Deleuze taps on the blackboard]⁷

This is what I am doing with dotted lines. [*Deleuze refers to the plane on the board*] In the case of the other images that you have, on the contrary, here is my image, it receives an action from another image, and it reacts. [*Pause*] A leaf, the wind, the wind is an image. The wind, the leaf, the leaf falls off a tree, torn off by the wind, or if it holds, it is according to another image, its peduncle, and it moves. The reaction links up with the action. There are very special images there. Suppose there are some very special images. They receive actions and the reaction is delayed. You see, I am not introducing anything new at all. I only introduce -- and my plane of immanence allows me to -- I am saying, it's odd, there are intervals. I am introducing an interval, that is, literally, a nothing, between an action and a reaction. There are intervals, there are certain images such that when they receive an action, they don't react right away. [*Pause*] We have to wait. [*Pause*]

This existence is very important; here is a new concept: the interval. The plane of immanence does not only include images in constant and perpetual actions and reactions; it also includes intervals between actions and reactions. [*Pause*] Well, it's these special images -- notice then, so I'm making a comparison; here also, I am extending a bit, I'm into another parenthesis; for those who know... what I've always liked here is the possibility, [77: 00] you know, it's true, to speak to all kinds of audiences simultaneously; some give up when what I'm saying doesn't interest them; that doesn't last long. But I am thinking of those who are, for example, philosophers, who are... I am thinking of a story, so I'll quickly open up a parenthesis. --

It has always been said that Sartre -- and by Sartre himself -- did not stop attacking Bergson quite violently, but they are pitted against each other constantly. But what strikes me is that -- I don't mean he copied it; it's not that at all -- but it's never how people say it; it always happens in another way, because if you take the beginning of *Being and Nothingness*, in my opinion, it is exactly the same as the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, to a very astonishing point because Sartre, what is he telling us? -- Except that I prefer the Bergsonian presentation to the Sartrean presentation. [78: 00] --

At the beginning of *Being and Nothingness*, if you haven't read this beautiful book, Sartre says, there is the world, and this world I call "the in-itself". [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] -- Here too we are not going to discuss this. Before knowing if this is a good idea, we must wait; we'll see what he derives from this. -- "There is the in-itself". And he said: and in this world "in-itself" which did not wait for me to exist -- and which waited for no one to exist -- in this world "in-itself", there are subjects that are born. And so there, Sartre brings out his whole metaphorical apparatus -- for him, concepts are always related to metaphors -- little bubbles which rise to the surface. This world is strange; there are little bubbles rising to the surface. The little bubbles, you have already felt it, they're us, they're you, they're me, a little bubble rising into the "in-itself". And these little bubbles are going to be what we call "subjects", you, me, or consciousnesses. But he doesn't give himself consciousness, Sartre. He gives himself little bubbles. In fact, then, this "in-itself" is rather a kind of swamp à la Sartre; it's not a nice graph like mine, a nice dry graph. [*Laughter*] It's a kind of swamp where there are bubbles rising up. And they're you and me.

And he says, what are these bubbles? Look out, this is a trap. If he says, "it's man," then it's all over. What does that mean, "man", really? It is a question of producing "man" conceptually. He

uses a perfect expression; he says it's little lakes of non-being, little lakes of non-being that come and settle there on the plane. It is absolutely, in another metaphorical apparatus, it is absolutely Bergson's story. His plane of immanence with variable images which act and react on all their facets and in all their parts, and then certain privileged images which present what? Which are defined only by the interval between the action undergone and the reaction carried out, this interval, this gap, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] is the equivalent of the small lakes of non-being. Literally, it's nothing. It turns out that this "nothing" is going to do something. What will it do? [*Pause*] It's going to do three things.

So, I will go back. [*Deleuze still stands on the board*] Here I place all my little images, this infinity of images. And then, the particular images, for simplicity, you see, I place two; to simplify, I place two of them. Fine. I have the right, once again, to have placed them on my plane of immanence since nothing, I am only introducing a gap between an action and a reaction. If I am asked, "where does this gap come from?", I respond I don't know, I don't know; let's not think about that just yet. Grant me this gap since I only offer myself action and reaction. I didn't sneak anything in. -- It's very important, you have to prevent... This is because the law of philosophy and concepts is to prevent any operation called "sleight of hand" where something you don't have the right to offer yourself gets slipped in. I have them there; I only introduced one gap, but once again, what innovation does this gap introduce? According to Bergson, it introduces three new things.

At that point, the first innovation, the first innovation, [*Pause*] my plane doesn't change; it just encompasses those particular images. The plane of immanence of all possible images remains, but among all possible images, particular images are possible. If they are possible, what happens? If they are possible, they are real; we saw it earlier in terms of the original Being. Well, what's going on? They will constitute privileged images, in what sense? No doubt, it's through all the other images continuing to vary one for the other, as a function of each other, on all their facets and in all their parts. This continues; it does not disappear at all, it continues. In other words, the world goes on.

But at the same time, things are going to happen to the plane of immanence at the same time. This doesn't detract from what I just said. The plane of immanence continues the same, but something is added to it. The first thing that is being added to it is that the images, all the other images, continue to vary for one another, as a function of one to the other. But also, at the same time, they are organized in such a way for all to vary, or at least part of them -- I am specifying, even if it means indicating what "a part of them" means --, a part of them will begin to vary as a function of the privileged image. In other words, a second system joins, does not eliminate, but a second system joins the first system. [*Pause*] On one hand, the images continue to vary each as a function of the other on all their facets and in all their parts, but on the other hand, at the same time, a number of these images start to vary in relation to the privileged image and as a function of the privileged image.

What images? I am saying, some images start to vary. [*Deleuze indicates them on the board*] In fact, it will suffice for the privileged image to move so that a certain number of images vary as a function of the movement. Now the images no longer belong only to a system where they vary with respect to each other; they belong to another system as well in which they vary in relation to

what? To the privileged image defined by an interval, that is, which constitutes a center, a center as a function of which the images acting on the privileged image vary. All the images acting on this privileged image will vary as a function of this privileged image which is, therefore, set up in the center. The center of what? The center of perception. *[Pause]* It does not cancel out the first system of universal variation. It connects another system to the system of universal variation where they vary as a function of the center.

How is this center defined? Only as the interval between action and reaction. This is why Bergson may call it a "center of indetermination". This is a center of indetermination since it is defined only this way: the reaction no longer links immediately with the following action. As soon as you have such a center of indetermination, the world of images in which a number of images organize themselves this time by tending certain facets [88: 00], tending their facets towards the privileged center. The privileged center will be said: to perceive. It perceives. And in fact, what is so surprising in its perceiving? What did that mean for there to be an interval between the action and the reaction, for there to be an interval between the action undergone and the reaction performed? It meant that this image is constituted in a very special way. It condemned some of its parts. Certain parts of this special image have acquired a relative immobility. This occurs as if certain parts of the privileged image have acquired relative immobility.

And at the same time, other parts of the privileged image have acquired a developed active force, a developed possibility of movement. This is a kind of compensation. Instead of having action-reaction, you have the received actions that are captured by parts of the image that have acquired relative immobility. The reactions performed are performed by parts of the image that have acquired particular degrees of freedom or power. This is encompassed in the interval; this is the immediate effect of the interval. If you give yourself the interval between action and reaction, you no longer have a direct link between the action undergone and the reaction performed. That is, the action undergone will be collected on certain facets of the privileged image, and these facets are condemned to a relative immobility for receiving the action, for receiving the excitation. And the long-awaited developed reaction, the delayed reaction, will be insured by other parts of the image which, in turn, have greater degrees of freedom. *[Pause]* All this is the phenomenon of the gap.

So, what do I have? If I give myself these privileged images defined by the gap between action and reaction, I already have two effects: the first effect, *[Pause]* the images acting on this privileged image curve in such way, that is, begin to vary as a function of the privileged image. *[Pause]* We will say that the privileged image perceives. There are perception-images. Perception-images are images insofar as all of them no longer vary from one as a function of the other on all their facets and in all of their parts. The perception-image will be the images insofar as they vary in relation to a privileged image, that is, in relation to a center of indetermination.

So, there we see that on my plane of immanence, I have perception-images available. The movement-image has become perception-image in relation to the center of indetermination. What does that imply? Once again, the center of indetermination is so constituted that some of its parts have taken on a relative immobility, what we will call in our language: organ of the senses.

And it is through these relatively immobilized parts that the privileged image will perceive excitations ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 33:19]

Part 3

... the perception-images in relation to a center. If I choose another center, the same operation will occur. And there, my plane -- I am not leaving the plane of immanence; all of this occurs on the plane of immanence -- I no longer simply have a world of movement-images in perpetual variation, in universal variation. Moreover, I have perception-images around the centers of indetermination in variation in relation to centers of indetermination. There you go.

Second point -- that I'll finish quickly, this second point, because, well, it is linked very well, I almost have already stated it -- the privileged image condemned some of its parts to immobility in order precisely to transform movement-images into perception-images. That doesn't prevent movement-images from continuing their business, right? Simply, a system, a centered system has been added to the acentric system of the plane of immanence. It [*the system*] hasn't deleted it [*the plane*]. I'm returning to this matter of the interval.

So, the immobilized parts get the received excitation and the privileged image, but they don't react right away. The interval, this interval -- this is where Bergson gets brilliant -- this interval is the brain. The brain is only the interval between the action undergone and the reaction performed. Don't look for what it means; it's not difficult. So, it's matter, the brain, yes. This is interval matter; what does that mean? Well, that means that when you have a brain, instead of receiving an excitation that will follow the reaction, there is an interval. There is a cut. How is this cut made? Because the brain as matter, as extremely complex matter, will ensure a kind of dispersion of the excitation received, so the brain will be an analyzer. It will deal with an excitation, it will translate it into micro-excitations. Henceforth, I have time, I gain some time.

So, that can be justified materially, but you've said enough when you say: the brain is an interval. Your brain is nothing more than the interval between the actions you undergo and the reactions you execute. Fine. In other words, this interval and the immobilization of the receptive parts allow you what? To gain time, for what? To organize a reaction which, by nature, will be unpredictable. You have gained time. Henceforth, you can react in a manner we'll call intelligent, but that's not what matters. What is an intelligent reaction? An intelligent reaction is a reaction that took some time, where you weren't forced to link the reaction to the action you underwent. You had some time; the brain ensured the division of the received excitation into micro-excitations. From then on, you can integrate the micro-excitations. You can integrate them into an unexpected, unpredictable behavior that will shield you, through the excitation undergone, will shield from or will answer the received excitation instead of linking into it. All that was needed was this little phenomenon of the brain gap.⁸

So, there, I would say, instead of the reaction being linked into the action undergone, the reaction will "innovate" in relation to the action undergone. This is what will become a veritable action. And I would say of these privileged images that they act. Instead of simply reacting to the excitation undergone, they act. That is, the excitation undergone having become a perceived excitation, they will be able to respond to the excitation perceived through a so-called adapted

behavior. In other words, earlier, as a function of the center of indetermination, I acquired perception-images. Now I have action-images.

On my plane, [*Deleuze continues to develop the plane on the board*] I'll summarize: here are my privileged images. I'm choosing two of them. I would say: the curvature of the other images around the center of indetermination of the privileged image will constitute the perception-images on the plane of immanence. Second aspect: the action undergone which is retained by the immobilized part, that is, the organ of the senses, will allow, thanks to the interval, a response consisting of a new action, an adapted response, and here [*Deleuze indicates table*] you have an action-image. There, you have a perception-image. [*Pause*]

A final effort since there is still something happening in these images. Everything rests on the interval. There you have, as first term of the interval, the forms of excitation are blocked on the surfaces of the relatively immobilized image. There you have a new action emerging thanks to the gap. A new adapted action emerges thanks to the gap. But between them, what can happen? What fits in between the two? What is inserted between these two poles, the excitation received [and] the action that will serve as a response? What slips in, what is introduced and in what case, when the excitation, for example, penetrates? Here you have, organ of reception of the privileged image, there you have, motor organ of the privileged image. What slips between perception and action? When excitation sometimes happens to penetrate the privileged image, it passes within. It will insert itself between the receiving surface and the surfaces of action or reaction.

Well, what passes, what penetrates the privileged image is what it [*the image*] would call, if it could speak, it would call an "affection". That's what introduces itself into the gap. And it is no longer an "I perceive", it is no longer an "I act" or rather x, a center of indetermination. It is no longer an x perceives, an x acts, it is "I feel", x feels. What does it feel? It feels something in itself. It grasps itself from within. What does it grasp from within? From within, it grasps itself as if penetrated by such an excitation, in a way that henceforth, when it [*the image*] has penetrated into the center of indetermination, into the privileged image, will be called affection. It feels itself within, and this "feeling inside" is what we call an affection. Good.

I'll summarize all of it. I started from a plane of immanence defined by the movement-image or by the infinite set of movement-images. It remains, it is not suppressed; but in this plane of immanence, movement-images are formed or are given, no matter, centers of indetermination solely defined by the gap between action and reaction. If you give yourself such centers of indetermination defined by the action-reaction gap, movement-images of the plane of immanence yield three types of images and only three. Here we are sure, right? We covered everything because the gap was given. Here we have one side of the gap, there the other side of the gap, and in between them. [*Deleuze indicates these three elements on the board*] So, we are sure that this is complete. Unless one of you has a great idea and says "no, there's still a fourth," and I can't see it. There are two limits of a gap, and then something, or rather, nothing in between. Well, what fills the nothing -- not to fill, really -- what's inserted between the two, into the nothing, is the affection-image. I'm creating time for myself. Center of indetermination, I can say: I perceive the world, at least a part of the world. I can say, I act on the world. And I can say: I experience, and I feel: perception-image, action-image, affection-image.⁹

Here we have created a genesis, and as in any genesis, we must state what we are offering ourselves. We are offering ourselves a plane of immanence of movement-images, certain images presenting a gap between action and reaction. If we have offered ourselves all this on the plane of immanence, we have obtained four categories of images which are not equal: the movement-images in the system of universal variation, and joining to them the division of the movement-images into three types of images: perception-images... into three types of images in relation, yes, that is, I'll state it better: the movement-image referred to the special image, the center of indetermination will yield three types of images and only three: perception-image, action-image, affection-image, full stop, that's it. There can be nothing else.

You will tell me, but nonetheless, there are plenty of other things there. If there is something else, it is because there is something other than my plane of immanence. For the moment, if I stick to my plane of immanence of the movement-images, this is already a lot. I only obtain movements-images and their relative division, that is, to the extent, once again, that they are related to centers of indetermination, their tripartite division into perception-image, action-image, affection-image.

Ah but, I have to ... But what's going on? What is happening at that level? Feel it! This is how I would like you to work, at least if you accept to do so. Let's take a break so we can tell ourselves, something is necessary. We have to take this in steps, we have to take this in steps. We should still better situate this story of the plane of immanence plane in relation to the images, fine. The three types of images that are born, you would first have to understand that quite well, so you have to think about it for next week. Did you understand all that quite well? Good. And then, if need be, sometimes it's by complicating even more that we understand, right? It wasn't hard enough for us to figure it out, right? It's indeed possible. It's too easy, so it seemed too simple. If there is something, if you don't grasp something well, that has to, I mean, that has to appear to you as going without saying.

This world that I'm proposing to you, you pretend to accept it. This plane of immanence where everything moves, where everything goes quickly, everything, etc., these centers of indetermination that arise, and then what happens, if you will, if you necessarily grant me a center of indetermination, there will first be an organization of perception-images on the level of immanence; second, an organization of action-images; third, an organization of affection-images. If this isn't crystal clear for you, then, I don't know, if this isn't crystal clear for you, we have to start over. But, to make sure it's crystal clear, fortunately, there is something.

A woman student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: It's ... ?

The student: [*Inaudible; the question concerns the concept of the gap*] ... It seems that there ought to be an interaction because the gap disappears, it seems, when there is affect?

Deleuze: No, not at all. It does not fill up. It especially does not fill up. No; how to say this? It inserts itself or else then it fills in insofar as being affect, but it is neither action nor perception. It is feeling [*sentiment*]. I feel, I feel within me.

The student: So, that doesn't modify...

Deleuze: It leaves the gap between the action undergone and the reaction executed, it leaves that absolutely intact. Moreover, when I have an affect, I don't know what to do, and I don't know what to perceive. I no longer know, when I have an affect, I no longer know what I perceive, and I don't know what to do. Even, there you've done well; suddenly, I'll read, I think -- as long as this goes well, alas I'm not sure -- I'll read a text by Bergson when he talks about affect. It seems to me that he says that, provided he says that. [*Pause ; Deleuze searches in his book*] Here, wait, we have to be suspicious: "I examine the conditions in which these affections are produced: I find that they always interpose themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements which I am about to execute" -- they are therefore interposed in the gap, they are interposed -- "they always interpose themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements which I am about to execute as if they some undefined influence on the final issue" -- "undefined", he says too much there, eh, but we are going to correct the text -- "I pass in review my different affections. It seems to me that each of them contains, in its own kind, an invitation to act, with at the same time leave to wait and even to do nothing" -- this text is beautiful -- "I look closer: I find movements begun, but not executed, the indication of a more or less useful decision, but not that constraint which precludes choice."¹⁰

The point I've reached, yeah, let's consider an example: someone walks into the room, and I don't like him. No, let's take the polite example: [*Laughter*] someone walks in, and I like him very much. I can perceive him, good. I perceive him, what does that mean? Okay, I react to what I perceive. I react in an unusual way, for example, a dream creature enters.

Claire Parnet: Again!

Deleuze: Well, I could choose the opposite example but like... A dream creature comes in, I have, you know, the... I'm not making any progress. [*Laughter*]

What is affection? It's not perception; it's me feeling within myself. What do I feel within myself? Well, something that disturbs my perception. What is it, what is it? What is a seemingly maladjusted perception, eh? And then, regarding action, I don't know what to do. What ... I'm going forward, I'm backing up. I pretend I haven't seen it. This is an affection. What does it consist of? I feel from inside. It's not a perception, it's not an action. As a result, that doesn't compromise the gap at all; it does not come to fill it. If you want to [*Pause*] -- how to say that? -- it occupies it without filling it. Yeah, that's it.

So, let's look for a confirmation. I have one here; I have one that comes from somewhere else altogether. There is something extraordinary. So here I'm choosing a text that I would like ... -- today we will not have time, but that's all the more reason for next time -- I would like you to read it. It's a very weird thing from [Samuel] Beckett, a very weird thing from Beckett. Beckett made a movie ["Film", 1965]. Beckett made a movie for which he went to find the aging Buster Keaton to act in it.

Parnet: The title is...?

Deleuze: And this movie, it is, you'll really, you'll really like it. Me, I consider it brilliant, magnificent. You know that Beckett's dream is to do a lot of television; he doesn't have much opportunity, no. But if he were allowed to do so, he would create some very ... But he doesn't have the energy of Marguerite Duras, Beckett. [*Laughter*] I'm not saying that against Marguerite Duras; I'm sorry Beckett doesn't have the energy to do what he wants to do in the movies. Anyway, he sought out the aging Buster Keaton who was furious because he found the movie appalling except at the end. Besides, Keaton wasn't happy because he was always being shot from behind. And Keaton said: "I still have an interesting face, why is he shooting me from behind, that idiot?" Well, it was going pretty badly between Buster Keaton and Beckett, but it doesn't matter; the film is stupendous and suggests something. I am explaining this to you to understand why I'm placing it here, something perhaps that will precisely make us understand this plane of immanence. This is what I would like.

Well, I wanted to start, but I have to go consult in the main office about this room. So, you rest, and then I'll come back, I'll come back. Simply, how to reach ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 55:12] *

... A woman student [*seated near Deleuze, her name indicated as Yolande in the Paris 8 transcript*]: I would like to know, I wonder if we have to lay down the plan of immanence first in order to get to what we reached. That is, we started with a philosopher named Bergson, and in fact, well, I'm pretending I don't know him at all; that is, it gives me the impression that we are writing a biological process. And I would say, in fact, it is because, biologically, there is an interval in the image that, thanks to this interval, we will succeed in defining a plane of immanence.

Deleuze: This is good, a good question. I call a good question any question for which I have the answer.... [*Laughter*] A bad question is any question for which I have no answer. So, a very good question.

The student: You respond easily!

Deleuze: Because... No, no, no, because you see, that's kind of what I was trying to have you feel, but not fully enough. This is because the advantage of starting from the plane of immanence, defined solely as a mixing of all the images in relation to one another, is that, whatever the level or the scale considered, it does not change anything. I mean, if you tell me "brain", I say okay, it's an image, it's an image among the images. I call "image" that which receives actions and that which has reactions by virtue of what precedes. So, the brain is not insofar as being a biological given, the brain, okay, it's an image. Hence Bergson's strength when he says, well, how do you expect there to be images in the brain? The brain is an image, fine. It's stupidity to believe that he is idealistic. So, based on that, people have... If you consider the text, that's not what interests him at all. It is this world of images in itself, of universal variation. And the brain is an image. If you tell me "atom", okay, atom, that's an image. If you tell me, "me", I say, you, that's an image. So, they are not at the same level. Insofar as being images, they are all on the plane of immanence.

So, it's not at all that the brain is biological or that the atom is physical or sub-physical that interests me. What interests me is that, whatever the term considered, insofar as being an image, it belongs with all other images, on the plane of consistency ...

Parnet: [*correcting Deleuze*] ... on the plane of immanence.

Deleuze: ... on the plane of immanence. And you will say, at that point, I'm choosing any proposition whatever: an electron hits a brain. That means: an image which acts on another image.

The same student: No, but I wasn't saying that in order to oppose images to real things, if you will. It's not on that order; it is more of a position -- how to put it -- because people have always considered that there is a world, and from the moment there was the human, it is an observer. And I would like to say the opposite: it's because there is the human that there can be this world, you see.

Deleuze: Ah yes, there, Bergson. So, there, we have to distinguish Bergson in chapter one of *Matter and Memory*...

The student: That's possible, right? That's possible?

Deleuze: No, it's a betrayal. You'd be tossing all his work up in the air. You have the right to do that. It would amount to saying, "I'm not interested in that problem", if we take up what I just said. But you'd just be tossing him up in the air. There is, for the moment, he offers himself no subject, no object. He offers himself nothing. He offers himself a set of images in variation between one another. You will say, why does he offer himself this? So there, this would connect -- here, in fact, if I manage one day before retiring, if I manage to present the course [that] I dream about, on "what is philosophy?" -- for me, it's very nice to say that a philosopher creates concepts. But where does this creation come from? What makes him want to do so? What is that? So, there are the very beautiful pages by Nietzsche saying, finally, philosophy is a matter of profound taste. So, obviously, when it's stated like that quickly, we draw from it a platitude and an idiocy, so, philosophy is like art, with tastes and colors, etc.! No! There must be impulses at the base of the concepts. That is necessary.

Why does Bergson need to do this when nothing destined him to do so, right? If you take *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, his previous book, he was going in a completely different direction.¹¹ There, and subsequently, he will never digest this: the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* is an extraordinary case in all literature. No, not in all of the literature; it is the pinnacle of an author's work, such a high point, so strange, so unusual that he himself will not know what to do with it. If you will, there are cases like that. In literature, for example, there are texts, not necessarily as long, all of a sudden, an author goes so far in such an unexpected direction, you say to yourself, "well my God, this story breaks with everything", and afterward he'll never know what to do with it. These are books, these are extremely rare books; these are someone's best books. So, either then he is silent, or else afterwards, he returns to something, something more familiar. And that, this first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, I never tire of it because for me, it is a text that is in suspension. No one was able to use it; that's why my dream

is to use it. Bergson later turned in quite different directions. Very, very strange, why did he do that? What did he take from it? Ah, he must have been..., I don't know, it's very odd... yes?

Anne Querrien: [*Comments difficult to hear at the start*] ... That is, we still must privilege "n" dimensions, the "n" dimensions of time; could we observe the "n" dimensions?

Deleuze: In my opinion, yes. It would be disturbing if that were the case. There would be something else that is off. You are right in part, but you only need an absolutely homogeneous and spatialized time. You need a time exterior to the time of succession.

Querrien: Yes.

Deleuze: And of solely equidistant succession. You don't need time, but you need a succession of instants.

Querrien: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: [*She tries to answer*] Ah yes, in fact, this is very important.

Querrien: Yes, but wait, no. What's important is that you could privilege, in fact all of a sudden, you need to privilege a dimension. I am saying "time" there because you chose metaphors, you used a vocabulary in which you said the reaction does not immediately follow the action; so, you used a temporal vocabulary, of time. But in the end, it suffices to privilege one dimension, not necessarily time, and it is in relation to a dimension of the system which begins to be something like that for the rest, that the entire reasoning takes place, that an interval can occur.

Deleuze: That's not a problem at all. It's not time. If you will, at that point, in fact, it's a correction, we are making a small correction. This plane of immanence is a space-time block, time being defined only as a succession of instants. However, time is clearly other than a succession of instants. So, I would say, there is no need for time. There is time as, if you will, yes, as an independent variable. But to the extent that, then, either there is no other time and there is nothing to say about time, or else time is something other than an independent variable, that is, a succession of moments, and at that point, you left yourself nothing of time. [*Pause*] You just have time as a series of cuts. In fact, the plane of immanence, then, you are right, the plane of immanence itself moves along a line of successions. That's fine, okay. Yes. But I almost understood it without thinking about what you are saying when you say: your plane of immanence is in small "n" dimensions. It's not a time, it's a dimension of the plane. It has at small "n" dimensions, and it moves.

Querrien: Yes, I don't know; I ask myself questions, maybe I don't know how to answer scientifically, right, but it would be worth trying. It's because, it seems that when you listen to [Isabelle] Stengers and [Ilya] Prigogine talking about their chemical composition and all that, I was saying: is that, possibly, from the moment when there are indeed certain molecules or I don't know what, certain parts of a thing which have this capacity therefore of interval that we're discussing, the phenomenon of concentration is not automatic? We would have to ask them the question, but it's ...

Deleuze: Is it not automatic? Yes, it's automatic.

Querrien: Mathematically automatic.

Deleuze: Obviously! Obviously! Moreover, the three figures -- perceptual curvature, active distancing, and affective occupation -- can be treated as three mathematical phenomena with the only difference that mathematics has no privilege. I can translate it equally well in physical terms, electronic terms, I don't know, in biological terms, the brain, etc. There, all languages are equivalent since, once again, this is normal since we are within God. I can say it theologically, I've tried to say it theologically. So there, we would have to find out in what way this is the Trinity, perception-image, action-image, [affection-]image ... It is a system as it is the original, it is ...

Querrien: But in that interval, in the affection, memory will be constituted.

Deleuze: No.

Querrien: Well, because images happen all the time on the surface of perception, they happen in the interval; there is something occupied, and the duration of the interval, we don't know it, it's indeterminate, and something's going on there. Things that are made up of each other in fact do not... [*Inaudible because Deleuze begins to answer*]

Deleuze: If there are things... if there are things that come to fill up the gap, they come from elsewhere. If there is memory, it comes from elsewhere. [*Pause*]

Querrien: Why?

Deleuze: Because... I do not have the means with my plane of immanence and my universal variation to produce anything at all that might be anything other than an instantaneous succession.

Querrien: Yes, but there is one of them, because the interval is completely variable...

Deleuze: It's undetermined, it is centers of indetermination.

Querrien: If it's undetermined, well then, something could happen there.

Deleuze: It could, you say it yourself, it could. But, as you do not offer it to yourself, on the plane of immanence, you can only have centers of indetermination; all determination comes from elsewhere. You absolutely cannot determine your center of indetermination at the level of the plane of immanence, otherwise everything is ruined. Since it is a means -- moreover, one must especially not -- since this is a means of offering an objective status to indetermination. It consists in saying: careful, indetermination is not a lack of determination. It doesn't need determination. There is an existence in itself of the indeterminate. This is what matters. When the indeterminate is determined subsequently -- but about this, we will have the opportunity to talk this year, it will be with Kant, they come together, they go well together -- when the

indeterminate receives a determination, it is because -- it will simply have to be necessary -- one will no longer be on the plane of immanence.

Querrien: Is there a composition in that?

Deleuze: There will be a composition between the plane of immanence and something = x and determination, and no doubt, determination will be time; it will be true time, with that, I agree! I agree on all that, but for the moment, we haven't reached all that.

A woman student [*near Deleuze*]: What was the other author you wanted to discuss?

Deleuze: What?

The student: Besides Bergson, what was this other writer that you wanted... who had reached such a level...

Deleuze: At such a level, I think of [Herman] Melville. Melville, it's something that ... where all of a sudden, he creates ... For him, it's his last book, a book that looks so unlike anything. We tell ourselves: well, what was he looking for, where did he want to go? Usually, when you come across books of such genius, you tell yourself, but where does he want to go, what is he trying to do? We don't have an answer because the guy stops. So, Bergson didn't stop. It's not that everything else isn't beautiful, it's wonderful, it's even awesome, but, no, something's there that only emerged there, in this first chapter.

The student: Is this Melville's *Billy Budd*?

Deleuze: No, it's [*The*] *Confidence Man*, fine. So, I'd just like to mention that because I'd really like for you to read it; it's easy to find.¹²

So there we are, I've completed my first heading in review, and here I haven't deceived you; I've truly gone back over a lot from last year. Now I'm making a little new heading that I'll really continue at our next session, but I just want to tempt you to see for yourself. So I'm saying, the second point that I want to consider: what is this strange work by Beckett called "Film" and for which Beckett has given a written transcription, which you will find in the editions of *Comédies et Actes Divers* in which there are two things: an admirable, prodigious television piece called "Dis Joe" -- as when I say: "hey, you there", right? -- "Eh Joe", [131: 00] that's a TV play, and a movie with Buster Keaton called "Film".¹³

And in "Film", Beckett does not explain what he wanted to do; moreover, he divides it into several parts. Here I ask you even more to read the text as I would like to divide it into other parts, not at all to do better than Beckett, but because Beckett divides into parts in light of what he wants to do with the camera. And then, I have the feeling that it also breaks down into quite different parts. And I immediately state the three parts which seem important to me. The film seems to me to be built on three figures, three figures.

First figure: Buster Keaton is perpetually seen from behind and flees down a street, the camera behind him. *[Pause]* He goes up a staircase, and the camera follows him under the same conditions. We will see what conditions, but still filming him from behind. -- This is where Buster Keaton expresses regrets, right, about his interesting face. He didn't know he has a neck and a back that are equally amazing, so there you go. -- So, I group in the first figure the part in the street and on the stairs. He arrives in a room, and the room is presented to us, and Beckett specifies precisely: it is a question of presenting at the same time the man in the room -- the man is called O -- and therefore, and the room as seen by man. The camera is called OE, eye [*oeil*]. It is therefore a question of presenting the room seen by O and seen by OE. Things will happen that I will clarify next time.

And the third figure... in the room, O is always seen from behind by the camera, except we will see, in certain exceptional circumstances, generally. The third figure: the camera makes a rotating movement that is geometrically extremely simple, but the complexity of which will be seen in fact, and ends up facing O, that is, Keaton. OE for the first time stands in front of O. At this point, the camera takes on a face, and it's Keaton's double. OE-Keaton-camera looks terrified -- no, what am I saying? sorry -- OE-the camera, Keaton's double, takes on an air of intense interest, interested; [135: 00] O looks terrified. O dies. *[Pause]*

Fine, so, you'll tell me, that's not a big deal. Let's call it experimental cinema; it has all the severity, abstraction and research traits of what we would call experimental cinema. Simply, what is he experiencing? I am clarifying this, but I would very much like that, by next week, for you to have created the diagrams yourself because he gives a number of diagrams, but it is not easy at all. There you have it, first thing, first convention for the first figure -- the first figure is the camera from behind, Keaton fleeing either in the street or up the stairs -- Beckett says, there is a convention. The camera films him from behind, and the angle must not be ... [*Deleuze returns to the board and begins to draw while describing the scenario*] Feel this, that's where we will find our plane, but in a different form. It's in this way that I need it so badly. You see, I'm dreaming; we would do a class, and then a practical exercise, right? A practical exercise, a little game, that's practical exercise, right?¹⁴

This is the convention for the first figure, ok? So, Keaton's flight, right? [*Deleuze draws and everything that follows is illustrated on the board*] You can only see him from the behind. The camera is on the side; here, there's a wall, a wall that Keaton grazes; there, there's a sidewalk. The camera is on the curb. It films Keaton from behind and at an angle which, as an angle, should in no case exceed 45°. Ok, are you following this thing? If the angle exceeds 45°, then there is a problem with the camera movement and Keaton's movement. If the angle exceeds 45°, Keaton goes into a state of panic, which [*Pause*] Beckett calls the anguish of being perceived, the anguish of being perceived. If it is less than 45°, Keaton leads his life, that is, continues his flight: this is the angle of immunity. Think of a fearful animal, a horse, for example. Think of a horse's field of vision. It has some very curious vision problems. This is the angle of immunity. However, the camera at the beginning, I am clarifying in the first figure; Keaton is not there.

The camera is there, and there is the street. And the camera, it's like a child, it's looking at things in the street. And it only films Keaton there, [*Deleuze indicates the position on the board*] while it is there, a little behind. It only grasps him when he is there following his path, at an angle

greater than 45 °. And Keaton, that's what infuriated Keaton so much, what Beckett was asking: at that point, that Keaton protect his face. He even had to have a handkerchief, he was required to wear his little skimmer hat, because Keaton there he didn't want that. So, Beckett agreed as long as he had a handkerchief. So, he spreads the handkerchief, he hides, and he stops. The camera is forced in this case, it filmed Keaton at an angle greater than 45 °, so it willingly moves back to achieve a lower angle. Keaton calms down and begins escaping... [*Interruption in the recording*] [2:20: 00]

... I would say, you will understand right away why, to act, since the only action of the film, for the moment, is the flight along the wall, provided that he is not perceived. If he is perceived, [there's] immobilization, disaster, he hides himself. There you have the first figure.

Second figure: the problem changes. [*Deleuze returns to his seat*] The first continues, the old one remains, but another problem is added. Beckett tells us, this is the problem of double perception. The room must both be seen by OE and seen by O. O is the character, OE is the camera. And Beckett wonders, through his own reflection, how he's going to manage the difference in the images depending on whether it's the room seen by Keaton or the room seen by the camera. So, what is Keaton doing in the room? He removes everything that can be perceived and everything that can perceive. In fact, the room contains a cat, a dog, a fish, a window, a tablet, and the essential instrument in any work by Beckett, a rocking chair.

Keaton's activity in the room is going to be to open the window, cover the mirror, chase the -- he specifies this, I don't understand why, otherwise, except that it's a comedic effect, the cat is significantly larger than the dog. [*Laughter*] It's necessary. Maybe someday we will find out why; maybe one of you will have an idea why it matters to him so much that the cat be so much bigger than the dog. -- So, he chases the dog out, he chases the cat out. There was some trouble on set because he dropped the dog who was afraid of Keaton, who was suddenly afraid. So, to run after the dog, it's awful. But anyway, cinema is always like that, there are always difficulties. So, he kicks the dog out, he goes back to place the cat out and the dog comes in. It gets complicated in the end. He chases them both out, he uses his coat to cover the parrot's cage, he covers it, he locks the door. In short, it eliminates at once everything that perceives and everything that is perceptible. Fine.

I would say that this second figure is no longer the angle of immunity that allows us action, although the angle of immunity continues. This second figure is the problem of double perception. And this is the stage, it seems to me -- this is where I really need this text -- it's going to be the stage of the action-image. [*Pause; Deleuze returns to the board*] Finally, up to this point, the camera has been very nice, OE has been very nice to O. Two or three times, OE has gone beyond the angle of immunity but immediately fell back or retreated. Keaton, being in all his states, is nestling in, hiding. Finally, there, when he eliminated everything that could be perceived and everything that could perceive, he hides in his rocking chair, finally it's happiness, he has always been seen from behind by the camera at less than 45 °. Let's say, there I would have to make an isosceles triangle in order to mark the maximum. You see, OE is there, O is there in his rocking chair. -- This is recreational, you see, that's exactly a practical exercise. You see, we will have done everything today, the abstract part, and then the practical exercise. -- And now, he falls asleep, he falls asleep, but what sleep? He falls into Beckett's sleep, a Beckettian

sleep. Ah, good, OE takes advantage in a cowardly way, sneaking around from behind. [*Deleuze marks dots on the blackboard*] It gets complicated.

The third figure, you see its strength; the angle of immunity was 45 ° in the first figure, why? Because there was the wall. In fact, the angle of immunity, what the camera can do, is [*Deleuze marks this on the board*] 90 °. Within that, there is no fear of being perceived. Now there it moves past it; he fell asleep, the other one in his rocking chair, and he moves past, [*More dots*] he goes to face him. Obviously, in the depths of his sleep then, this is the first time we've seen Keaton's face. Finally, we see his head, and he only has one eye, monocular vision, obviously very important, that. This is not just to add a headband; this is because of the conditions for monocular vision, and the angle of immunity applies as a function of monocular vision. Hence, it's very important.

And the camera approaches, it approaches, slowly. He wakes up, horror, horror on his face. [*Pause*] The camera [*More dots*] goes down, comes back. Phew, he shows all the signs of agitation, O, and reassured, he goes back to sleep. The ruthless camera -- what is it, this law of necessity, of the inexorable? -- comes back, and there, it won't let go. And we see it, the camera is double, the same headband. It's the double of Keaton, it's Keaton himself with just that difference, at one pole as an OE, Keaton-OE seems to be at extreme attention, like the attention awaiting something. O, Keaton-O seems at maximum of horror and terror. And finally, he puts his head in his hands for protection while rocking in the famous rocking chair. It goes on, it goes on, it goes on until the rocking chair's movement dies out. Good.

What is this third figure? I will end on this because I would like you to think about it. First of all, if I gave the full diagram, the full diagram -- we'll see that next time -- it shows this: up to here, you have the angle of immunity, then it gets moved past. What does Beckett mean here? I'm using his text, so you might think about it, right? What does his text tell us? He really likes to start off from a philosophical statement; this serves us very, very well, right, and then he does what he wants with it. He has the right. He says -- that's entirely Beckett humor, making philosophy be used by such beautiful things -- "esse est percipi". He is very fond of Latin, Beckett: "Esse est percipi", that is, to be is to be perceived. This is a famous phrase in philosophy since it is like a great battle cry uttered by [George] Berkeley, by Berkeley at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, to be is to be perceived. Which is, if you want a definition of the image, a status of the image, the image is "esse est percipi".¹⁵

And Beckett links this up. Yes, immediately, if you are the least bit of a Beckettian, you know that the quintessential Beckettian problem is: how do you manage not to perceive and not be perceived? "Film" attempts to explore this direction. And Beckett says to us: "perceived of oneself" -- and it is not by chance that, here, he gives to his style, he who is a great stylist, a kind of very philosophical, very theoretical formulation: "perceived of oneself, subsists the being withdrawn from any foreign perception, animal, human or divine" -- that is, understand, if there is only me perceiving me, still subsists the being who is not no longer perceived by anything else, neither by God, nor by animal, nor by anything at all -- he continues: "The search of non-being in flight from extraneous perception breaking down in inescapability of self-perception."¹⁶

We understand what he means, fine! I suppose that I propose not to perceive anything anymore and not to be perceived anymore by anything or anyone, the Beckettian dream. But now, the most unbearable remains: the perception of me by me. I perceive myself. What is to be done? So "Film" is a commentary on "esse est percipi". How can I no longer be? If "esse est percipi", to no longer be -- assuming this is our dream -- is to no longer be perceived, okay, I won't be perceived anymore. But how do I stop being perceived by myself? You will say, kill yourself. No, that's not it, not that, not that. Is there a way to no longer be perceived by oneself, that is, to no longer be without necessarily resorting to this means that might be called crude?

So, I'm just saying, go back to the three figures. First figure: the flight into the street and up the stairs, the angle of immunity that protects me from what? Which protects me from perceptions that would stop me, from foreign perceptions that would stop me. I am saying, and we'll see that next time, this is the status of the action-image. This refers to the angle of immunity: not going beyond 45 ° from behind, otherwise I can no longer do anything. I can no longer do anything.

Second figure: in the room, we have seen, a new problem intervenes, that of double perception. The same thing still remains -- there is no single perception -- the same thing still remains the object of double perception, at least possible. It's even that which labors perception. I do not have a perception without someone else also perceiving what I am perceiving or, which is the same thing, being able to perceive what I perceive. There is no perception that's my own. Any perception is at least a possible double perception. [Pause] Here is the problem: I would say, this second figure is the problem of the perception-image.

The third figure, easy. You just have to... The angle of immunity is crossed. The issue of double perception is resolved. There is nothing more to perceive, and there is no one left to perceive. Keaton himself is in his rocking chair, he closed his eyes. It's like two stages, the action problem has been solved, the perception problem has been solved. What will happen now? What is the third stage? Obviously, this is the affection-image. It's no longer about the element of perception at all anymore. The camera comes opposite. It's face to face. That refers exactly, it's the only way to represent with a camera "I feel from inside". Keaton has reached the point where nothing is to be perceived and he can no longer be perceived, but there he is, he is still perceiving himself. In other words, he feels. How can I no longer feel myself?

Hence, one Keaton is going to be camera, one Keaton is going to be under the camera, but this time face to face, this time it's going to be affection-image. How to remove the affection-image? What does this cinema mean? I would say, can we remove the action-image? And under what conditions? Yes, by going beyond the angle of immunity. There is an angle of immunity. Second: can we remove the perception-image? Yes, by breaking the mechanism of the double perception which is at the base of all perception. Third: can we break the affection-image in order finally to have peace? This is what Beckett calls: escaping the pleasure of *percipi* and *percipere*. Ah, that's his style, that's pure Beckett. He talks about people who are completely given over to the pleasure of *percipi* and of *percipere*. When you see people in the street, you can't help but think of this Beckett formula. You are delighted with the *percipi* -- hold on, this one ... -- and then, the other is looking at you at the same time, it is the double perception, etc. And also, there is the pleasure of acting and of being acted, etc., and then there is the pleasure of affections, of feeling, the pleasure of feeling oneself. Well, can we escape all these pleasures? In

other words, it is the vacuum of universal extinction. So, that will be greatly useful because I am taking a step forward.

In my stories of signs, won't there be particular signs of extinction? That's very important as a problem when we consider -- here I tossing this out to you, we will need it later, just to finish for today -- there will be signs of extinction. Wouldn't Beckett, wouldn't this Beckett movie be the movie that constructs the aggregate of signs of extinction? Because if I make a short and final parenthesis on cinema, it is much more important, the way in which the images fade out, than the way in which they begin. It is well known that among great filmmakers, what matters is how they finish shots much more than how they start a shot. There are surely signs of the beginning, but we will have to see if it is symmetrical. A sign of beginning is not symmetrical with a sign of extinction. Just as there is a bell to say school begins and a bell that says school ends; these are not signs, but they are very derivative signs. But in the signs that are truly signs, are there not signs of extinction, of the final sighs which are very odd signs, special signs? And in our classification of signs as I dream of them, we should not greatly take the signs of extinction into account.

There we are. So, next week, we will do some commentary on this Beckett text. [*End of the recording*] [2:39:00]

Notes

¹ This is an accusation against Deleuze's colleague, René Schérer, in 1982 for having in his writings made a case on behalf of pedophilia, an accusation charge that was withdrawn and the accuser then convicted of making a slanderous accusation.

² That is, on the level of the 60s-70s French pop star, Sylvie Vartan.

³ In *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Deleuze criticizes TV host Bernard Pivot in the "Letter to Serge Daney" (p. 75), and in "Mediators" (pp. 128-129). In a footnote (p. 199, n.3), Martin Joughin describes Pivot's original show, *Apostrophes*, as "a very influential Friday-evening book program on French TV, hosted by the literary journalist Bernard Pivot from 1975 to 1990 (it was voted 'best cultural program' in 1985)." went on to host another, broader based cultural program, *Bouillon de culture* (Culture Medium), a title that is a play on words with the biological experimental term.

⁴ Pierre Mauroy was a French Socialist politician who was Prime Minister of France from 1981 to 1984 under President François Mitterrand. He was also concurrently the Mayor of Lille, France, from 1973 to 2001 and was elected Senator in 1992.

⁵ On this infinite aggregate, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 56-58 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 82-86).

⁶ On the plane of immanence, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 58-61 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 86-90).

⁷ Deleuze considers the "interval" in this context in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 61-66 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 90-97); in fact, the "interval" plays a fundamental role in this entire book.

⁸ Although the following reference links chronologically to *The Time-Image*'s publication rather than to *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze publishes an interview with the *Cahiers du Cinéma* (no. 380, February 1986) titled "The Brain is the Screen", in *Two Regimes of Madness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT/Semiotext(e), 2006) pp. 282-291 [*Deux régimes de fous* (Paris: Minuit, 2003) pp. 263-271].

⁹ Deleuze initially develops this introduction to the movement-image and its three types of images in the Cinema I seminar, specifically sessions 4 & 5, 1 December 1981 and 5 January 1982.

¹⁰ Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: MacMillan, 1912; 2004), p. 16 [chapter 1, first paragraph].

¹¹ Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (1889; Dover Publications, 2001).

¹² This text by Melville (1857) becomes a key text in seminar Cinema III, especially in sessions 2 and 6, 22 November and 20 December 1983.

¹³ Samuel Beckett, *Comédies et Actes Divers* (Paris: Minuit, 1966).

¹⁴ For this development on Beckett's film and also the diagrams that Deleuze puts on the board, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 66-69 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 97-101).

¹⁵ Deleuze introduced this concept from Berkeley in session 4 of the seminar Cinema I, 1 December 1981, and he will return to this during session 17 on Leibniz and the Baroque, 12 May 1987.

¹⁶ Section titled "General" in Beckett's script of "Film", rohandrape.net (accessed 10/19/21).