

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Transcription: [La voix de Deleuze](#), Marc Haas (Part 1) and Alice Haëck (Part 2); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation, Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

... The 11th... I have to note that down. Lend me a pencil... thank you. [Pause] April, right? ... [Laughter] Well then, all that is almost done, right? [Pause] So, before noon, you'll have to, you'll have to alert me because before noon, I have to go take the list for those who're late in declaring the UV [*academic credit*]. [Pause]

Well then, today, here we are. I really must manage to be entirely clear, that is, to... what I'm calling "being very clear" is when we manage to specify, to organize, really, to organize a certain number of notions. [Pause] And the last time, we began discussing all sorts of concepts that we tried to distribute around the theme of movement/time. That's what we have to continue because that seems to me nonetheless the nexus, the nexus of problems in which, once again, all the approaches, all the approaches reveal themselves as being equal. Whether it's philosophy or cinema, we'll see, if needs be, whether it's painting or music, right, there is a set of problems here that, that... of course, these disciplines do not intersect in the same way, but in any case, they intersect, literally, along their paths. So, what interest me is to try... there are all sorts of other categories possible, but to try to form some concepts, to see which are opposed to one another, which are different in nature, right?

And, you remember our problem that we tackled the last time, namely [Pause] we are considering, as we've done from the beginning, the domain of movement or of movement-images. That's simple, on the condition of specifying that, at the point I've reached, I'm considering movement in its extensive aspect. What does it mean, the extensive aspect of movement? That means movement considered as the displacement of a body, of a body that we will call a mobile body. Ah well, but if I feel the need to say that, then would there be other movements? Would there be movements that should not be considered in the form of displacement of a mobile body? We don't know at the moment. I'm just saying, I'm starting from movement in its extensive form, from movement considered in extension.

And, I add – see, I'm trying to establish a progression of notions -- so extensive movement, I'm saying, it's a first notion. What does it connect to? Well, when I consider movement in an extensive form, as the displacement of a body in space, I seize it, or I try to seize it – in fact, I don't have the means yet -- I attempt to grasp it under what I would call "metrical relations." So,

you see, I'm making some tiny progress. We are letting ourselves, literally -- that's what we've been trying to do, right, from the beginning -- we are letting ourselves be lulled by notions or buffeted by notions. Sometimes it's "boom", a notion that collides into you, right, sometimes it's a notion that is linked with others.

Well, the extensive movement relates to... is considered therefore, it's movement; I would almost say, extensive movement is not simply... I started from a very simple first definition, see: displacement of a mobile body in space, of a body in space, this body henceforth being called mobile. And I'm saying, ah, well yes, but it's something else as well, a little deeper; extensive movement is movement related to metrical relations. So right away, my earlier question comes back: oh well, but why say that? Saying that is of interest only if there are movements which are not related to metrical movements, but to other types of relationships, good.

What are metrical relationships? See, I slip, I reach -- third remark -- what are metrical relationships? I'm saying that the metrical relationships to which movement is related as extensive movement are of two kinds: magnitude and the unit. Ah, magnitude and the unit, each time, a small remark is required; I'm saying, a very small one because these are things that we saw here -- I'm grouping them together, this is our last session -- "related to magnitude and unity", why say that? Because it seemed to us, rightly or wrongly, therefore rightly, [*Laughter*] it seemed to us that the two notions of magnitude and the unit could be made homogeneous, but that if we considered them as pure concepts, they were two quite different concepts. Of course, they can be arranged, of course, and they will be arranged in measurement. [*Pause*] Measurement unites both magnitude and the unit; it relates magnitude to the unit, and the unit to magnitude, and measurement operates by magnitudes and units. But from the point of view of a pure concept, from the point of view of pure concepts, it seemed to us that magnitude and the unit were two heterogeneous concepts. Of course, we can make their content homogeneous. [*Pause*] But from the point of view of philosophy, perhaps these concepts have an entirely different origin, source, nature. Alright, let's continue.

If movement receives metrical relationships insofar as it is given magnitude and the unit, measurable magnitude and the unit of measurement, what gives movement a measurable magnitude and a unit of measurement? The last time, our answer was: it's time, and that's why, in the most general sense, time will be said to measure movement. Well, if that's true, time as a measure of movement must be displayed as two kinds: a kind under which it determines -- even if these two kinds are inseparable; understand, it's not my problem if they are separable or not, obviously they are inseparable -- but from the point of view of concepts, they are two different concepts. Insofar as a measurement of movement, time must endow movement with a measurable quantity, but it must also endow movement with a unit of measurement. Fine.

So, there must be two aspects of time.¹ Under one of these aspects, time will be said to be the number of movement. In any case, time is the measure of movement -- we assign terms, in that way -- time is the measure of movement, but insofar as it confers magnitude on movement, it will be said to be the number of the time. Insofar as it confers on movement a suitable unit, a unit of measurement, it will be said to be the interval of movement. Henceforth, it's not surprising, in fact, that in antiquity, the major definitions of time in relation to movement oscillated between these two poles: time conceived as interval of movement, time conceived as number of

movement. [Pause] And once again, the two arrange themselves, but that's not our question. Just because that gets arranged doesn't mean they do not differ in nature. And in fact, these are two different apprehensions of time, one consisting in defining a whole of time, time taken as a whole, the other consisting in defining the part of time. [Pause] So I will determine time both as a whole of time and as a part of time. [Pause] Time as part is the interval of movement, time taken as a whole is the number of movement. Good. [Pause]

In what way... Anyway, we are already claiming as a new one, a small reference point. I would say about the part of the movement... I would say about the part of time which is also the interval of movement – that would have to be very clear; these are linkages, these are pure linkages, these are exercises, really, exercises of linking concepts -- so, you understand, the part of time which is also the interval of movement, we saw this the last time, it's the pure present. [Pause] It's the pure present or the variable present, because in fact, the interval of movement, okay, but there are as many intervals of movement as there are movements. We might say that each movement has its type of interval. I was saying the last time – here, what do I mean, here? Let's get back into the concrete, like that, that's fine, we're making small leaps -- I was saying, well yes, let's call the interval of movement the flight of a bird, the between-two-beats-of-wings [*entre-deux-battements-d'ailes*], that's it. The between-two-beats-of-wings, that's the interval.

Once again, you'll tell me, the present of the flying bird? It's the between-two-beats-of-wings, that's its present, its present as a bird. But myself who doesn't fly, we who don't run, but those who run, if needs be, I would say: what is it... -- here then, we can play -- each time, one movement or another, we'll ask, what is the interval? I would say, for example, that for a runner, the interval is between two breaths. [Pause] Fine, well, let's say it's possible to say this, this or something else. I would say that's the present, the runner's present. Well, you can clearly see that there are no two people running, not only running in the same way, but who have the same interval. Fine, let's assume all that. So, I would say time as a part is the pure present, the variable pure present, the variable present, and in fact, following the moments of my life, following the hours, etc., my present fills a very, very variable interval. But the interval is the irreducible part of time. It is time as part. [Pause]

And what is the other aspect of time, time as number, number of movement? So, is it not the present? No, it's not the present. Here, if you remember a bit of what we saw, especially about the ancients, ancient philosophy, what will the number of time be? Well, it's the vastness of the future and the past. It is no longer the variability of the present, it is the immensity of the future and the past as it goes beyond my comprehension. Under one aspect, time as a part is the present insofar as it never ceases to vary since it fills intervals which are themselves variable, and on the other hand, time as number, the other aspect, time in its whole, time in its whole, is the immensity of the future and the past.

OK, but how is all this useful to me? Well, at the point we've reached, I don't know, you can tell me all that precedes, you would have to... it's not working; that's fine, that, that's fine. If what precedes does work, at least I've grasped hold of something. The irreducibility of the two aspects of time, time as present, and time as... time as variable present, and time as the immensity of the future and the past, are two heterogeneous figures. In other words, we have broken any possibility of establishing a past-present-future succession, since the present refers, and defines

by itself, time as a part, and the immensity of the future and of the past defined itself... no, defines by itself time as a whole of time. [*Pause*] Well, there's nothing we can do about it.

Whereas that arranges itself in practice, so it might be made homogeneous, of course! But that is something that Bergson never ceased showing in all his work. In experience, we always operate with combinations [*mixtes*]. That is, contents are made heterogeneous and ... sorry, contents are made *homogeneous*, but the homogenization of contents, that is, the establishment, the constitution of combinations, has never prevented the heterogeneity of the concepts to which these contents refer. So, doing philosophy within the combinations, within the mixtures of experience, would therefore be discovering the lines of concepts, discovering pure concepts. It wouldn't be getting out of experience, not at all; this would be discerning -- to use a proposition that we've already used with regard to something else -- this would be discerning the lines of the universe, right, and extracting pure concepts from experience would not cease since our experience is a combination of concepts. Fine, but there we are.

And in fact, that always works out; I can very well pass from one of my poles of time to the other. I can always say: time as a whole is the interval of the Whole. Hey, the ancient Stoics used this very bizarre expression. Because, in certain texts which remain available to us -- fortunately we do not have many left because otherwise, it would be even more complicated -- in certain texts which remain available to us, they tell us: time is the interval of movement, and in other texts, they add, time is the interval of the Whole, or better, time is the interval that accompanies the Whole. Well, we can see very well how they pass from the Whole-interval to the large number-time. [*Pause*] Well, in the other direction, I can start from the large number-time, the Great Year, we saw, that is, the time as a Whole which will define the magnitude of movement, and from there, move on to the particular movement, which will be divisors of the Great Year. It is subdivided into all kinds of periods. No, it's not difficult to switch from one to the other.

And, in a context absolutely different from that of ancient philosophy, I found exactly the same thing for Descartes. And that interested me more because it answered the objection in advance: but all that is very old, it was what occurred like that at the Greek era. But no, but no, it's always like that in a way. Because, in the 17th century, I notice that if you consider Book II of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* [1644], you will find two aspects of movement. Again, one aspect in which he tells us -- it's around paragraph 30, before and after, of the second book of *Principles* -- you will find a kind of text in which he keeps telling us about the movement attributable to each body. This is the domain of relative movement. He tells us: movement is relative, but the fact remains that there are reasons to attribute it to one body rather than another. Then he tells us: and be careful, each body has its own movement. Well, Aristotle also said this already, but Descartes is going to say it in a completely different way. It doesn't matter, it's in a completely different way, we don't have the time, it's not our purpose to see in what completely different way -- completely different way or not -- Descartes finds and preserves this idea of: a movement -- of course, he adds: it can be broken down, this movement -- but there is a movement specific to each body that moves. Good.

And on the other side, Descartes tells us at the same time, there is a constant movement in the universe, which God maintains at each instant of continuous creation. Well, I was saying, this reproduction of creation in continuous creation, this reproduction of the creative act, that's the

equivalent in Descartes – I'm not at all saying that it's the same thing, but it's the equivalent -- that's what works in the Cartesian world analogously to the Great Year in the Greek world. This is the aspect of absolute movement. Good, and Descartes does not stop shifting from one to the other, from the relative movement, characteristic of each body, to the movement contained in the whole of the universe, and vice versa. And all of his physics will constantly shift from one to the other.

And we're going to find this kind of basic duality, see, so I am saying: if we consider -- and I'm just drawing the conclusion here -- if I consider, the... [Pause] if I consider movement in its extension, if I consider movement as extensive movement, I can draw from it two images of time, two images of time which are complementary, and yet different, homogenizable, and yet heterogeneous, two images of time. These images of time will be indirect images, why? They will be indirect since they are inferred from movement as an extensive quantity, or rather as movement in extension. And these two indirect figures of time, since concluded from the extensive movement, these two figures of time once again are: time as a whole, or the immensity of the future and the past. I don't say "infinite" on purpose because you can conceive of this immensity as finite or as infinite, as a circular finite, as infinite. Descartes can conceive it as infinite, this immensity; Plato can conceive it as circular finite; it's not... in any case, it's an immensity, that is, it exists such that there is nothing greater. I call "immense", yes, such that there is nothing greater. The Great Year among the Greeks, there can be nothing greater since, in fact, when the number of time defining the Great Year is reached, it begins again. So, the immense is a maximum. And then the other aspect, once again, the other indirect figure of time is time as interval, time as part, time as presence, as presence of the present. [Pause]

There we are. In general, that's the point we've reached. See, that already gives us a set of concepts because it is very important for the categories of time. So, what I'm holding onto, and what I ask you to hold onto, is the idea of a whole of time, on one hand, which will define immense magnitude, and the idea of a part of time which will define the interval or the presence, the present. [Pause] Given that, okay, have finished? No, let's try to..., I don't know, we sense that... [Pause; Deleuze does not complete the sentence]

So based on this, literally, a text opens its arms to us, and this text is a very great text by Kant. Is it going to bring us something new, is it going to bring us confirmations? At the point we've reached, we do not know; we just feel – if you like, here, it's like a relay -- you tell yourself, hey, but that speaks to me; there is a story. There is a story in Kant where, at a certain point... maybe that concerns us now, this text, at this precise moment. And it's in one of the last books, or it's in the last book, Kant's last great book, *The Critique of Judgment*. *The Critique of Judgment* is divided into paragraphs; one of the most beautiful parts of *The Critique of Judgment* is the Kantian theory of the sublime, which will have a great influence on German Romanticism. And this theory of the sublime, in this theory of the sublime rather, Kant distinguishes two forms of the sublime: the mathematical sublime, and the dynamic sublime. I warn you, because what makes us, what calls us for the moment, is solely the mathematical sublime. But it is good to know that for Kant, there are two forms of the sublime, that is, that we will perhaps also have to deal with the other form in connection with, when our analysis will have progressed sufficiently.

And I'm saying, what interests us in what Kant says is the mathematical sublime because in

these astonishing pages, very beautiful, very difficult, very beautiful, very... splendid, you have to read them, right, paragraph 29 – no, it's not paragraph 29; it's paragraph 26, the paragraph that interests me – it poses the problem of the measurement or the evaluation of magnitude. And he poses the problem of measurement for a very simple reason, which is that the mathematical sublime, if you will, is the excessive. So, it is indeed in connection with the measureless that we were interested or that we can be interested in measurement.²

What is that? Let us define measurement by the evaluation of magnitude, Kant tells us. So, I just want to insert here, I'm telling you a story, we should be able to tell it that like, well, a story, at the point we've reached in our analysis. Here we have a story, but a severe story. [Laughter] This is the first point of the story that Kant tells us. He says: there is a well-known way of evaluating magnitudes, it is mathematical evaluation. Or else, he says, evaluation – oddly enough, you'll see why, it's another aspect – logical evaluation. Why mathematical as well as logical evaluation? Because it operates by concepts. One evaluates magnitude by concepts, so it's logical; but these concepts are numbers, so it's mathematical. In short, magnitude is evaluated by numerical concepts. [Pause] And what do we do, Kant asks. [Pause] Well, let's see: what does evaluation entail? According to Kant, it implies two acts. To evaluate is, on one hand, to apprehend, [Pause] apprehension, and on the other hand, it is to understand, comprehension. All evaluation proceeds by evaluation [*Deleuze means "apprehension"*] and by understanding.

What does that mean? To apprehend, what is it? Don't forget, we are in the problem of the evaluation of magnitudes. To apprehend is to grasp something as a unit. [Pause] As a unit, for example, here I look at the table, and I'm telling myself, how big is it? I apprehend a unit. So, for example, I judge that even, I don't know anymore, that's 20 centimeters long, theoretically? I judge that, how many times 20 centimeters are there here? Good. I chose a unit of apprehension. I apprehend; that means I constitute a unit. I constitute something as a unit. I constitute a magnitude as a unit to measure the magnitude to be measured. That's what apprehension is. Only it is not enough to apprehend it; it also requires comprehension. What does Kant mean when he says comprehension is needed? Well, it means to measure is to repeat the apprehension, it's to reproduce the apprehension: how many times is there this space along the table?

What is the condition of comprehension? So, the first condition: it's to repeat the act of apprehension [Pause] or, if you prefer, to transport the unit, to transport the unit of measurement. So, I repeat the act of apprehension, I reproduce the act of apprehension, and second condition: well, I mustn't forget the previous apprehensions when I reach the following apprehension. See, I'm measuring, suppose – here I'm not turning around, it's too much, it's too tiring – I'm measuring something there, approximately. It's about this big, one, two, three, etc. If I forget the previous measurements when I get to the next ones, I have my unit of 20 centimeters there, so on the table, I measure one, two, three, four; if when I'm at four, I've forgotten the three previous ones – you'll tell me, this is all very silly; yes, but that's the marvel of philosophy: the sillier it is, the more beautiful it is, right? -- well, if I forgot my previous units, well that doesn't work, I didn't measure anything. In other words, apprehension must be linked – this text isn't difficult, for the moment -- must be linked to comprehension. Good. You tell me, so what's next? Okay. That means I must remember. [Pause] I have to remember the previous units when I get to the next ones. -- I'm looking for a text where he says this, but I can't find it, it doesn't matter. [Pause; *Deleuze searches in his text*] I should have underlined them. Well, it doesn't matter. --

What happens when I proceed toward a numerical, or mathematical, or conceptual, or logical evaluation? That doesn't bother me. Why doesn't that bother me? I'll tell you why that doesn't bother me. Because, ultimately, I can choose any unit at all, I will always find myself there, first of all. That is, I have no problems from the point of view of apprehension. I can ultimately choose any unit: it's conventional. Why? They are all equivalent because they are homogeneous. Ok, I'm not going to measure a table in kilometers, but kilometers are convertible into half meters. So, I'm going to measure my table, for example, taking 20 centimeters as a unit, or taking 1 meter as a unit. I will measure the road using the kilometer as a unit. What does it mean? It means a very simple thing: it means that there are never real units. There are no real units. Why are there no real units? Because a unit, as he [Kant] has just said admirably, is an act of the mind. There are no real units in things; a unit is an act of the mind, it's an act of apprehension. What constitutes your unit is the act of apprehension.

But the apprehended, it is never one; it's always multiple, it's divisible. In the unit, you must distinguish apprehension and the apprehended. What is one is the act of apprehension; the apprehended, the apprehended of the unit, it's not the one, it is the multiple; it is the divisible multiple. Simply, you can apprehend any divisible multiple as one; the unit has no privilege, you know, it has an apparent privilege. But it has no privilege for Kant. Nor for Bergson will it have any. There are all kinds of philosophers for whom the unit has no privilege. And it seems obvious to me that they are right. Well, no matter, but just understand that it's already enough. It's obvious, really.

What constitutes something as one is your decision to make of it the act of apprehending from a multiplicity. [Pause] But what corresponds to this unit and to this act, the object of this act, it is part of the multiplicity; it is itself a divisible multiplicity. I am saying three; well, three can be a unit as well as one; why wouldn't it be a unit as much as one? It suffices that, through an act of apprehension, I construct it into a unit. When do I construct it into a unit through an act of apprehension? When I count three by three. Three, six, nine, good. If I count one by one, it's exactly the same. This is my act of apprehension that constructs a unit. Any magnitude is a unit from the point of view of the act of apprehension that will determine the part that will serve me as a unit of measurement.

So, it's not surprising that since my units are conventional, it's not at all surprising that in the mathematical evaluation of magnitudes, there is a kind of homogeneity and convertibility of all units of measurement. You will tell me, this is not true in fact; it's not true in fact, no, it's not true in fact, but it is true by right. This is true by right from the point of view of the pure concept. What prevents it from being true in fact are areas in which I don't want to enter because we'd lose our thread here, and we'll see, moreover we'll see this a little later, why this is not true in fact. So then, there we are. So, from the point of view of apprehension, I never have any difficulty when I create a numerical apprehension of magnitudes.

And from the point of view of comprehension? You remember, comprehension is no longer the act by which I determine something as a unit, but the act by which I retain the preceding units when I reach the following ones. Well, in numerical comprehension, there is no difficulty either because I can comprehend to infinity. [Pause] Why? Well, for the same reason, because numbers are a conventional system that symbolically allows me to comprehend to infinity. I can always

say, ah, ten to the twenty-fifth power. I'm not saying that I'm imagining what there is in ten to the twenty-fifth power, but ten to the twenty-fifth power is an act of comprehension that does not pose any difficulty from a mathematical point of view. So, in the quantitative evaluation of magnitudes, I would say there is no apparent difficulty, even if it is very hard to do, based on certain quantities, but there is no difficulty, there is no real difficulty, for two reasons: because from the point of view of apprehension, all the units are homogeneous.

And in fact, as we saw the last time, it's because I am not considering intervals; in fact, I'm considering limits. I'm considering limits. As much as the intervals are heterogeneous -- you remember our earlier conclusion, that is, the pure presents -- so too the limits, that is, the instants, are homogenizable. So there, everything is revealed; it's absolutely coherent. So, from the point of view of apprehension, I have no difficulty, from the point of view of the evaluation of mathematical magnitudes. And from the point of view of comprehension, I have no more difficulties since my symbolic system goes to infinity; I still have the option of adding a number to the previous number. The possibility, the law of numeration, namely the possibility of always being able to add a number to the preceding number, precisely defines a comprehension which goes all the way to infinity. Okay, good.

And at this point, Kant appears and says "yes, yes, but"... But don't you see that you are in a kind of reference to infinity? For if every unit of measurement is itself something measurable that refers to another unit ad infinitum, [*Pause*] don't you see that you are in complete mystery? Namely, the unit does not cease to presuppose itself. [*Pause*] And although you may symbolically have the unit start at one, once again, one does not strictly mean anything except that the convention... [*Interruption of the recording*] [46:47]

... so, we never cease being referred from the unit of measurement to something which will measure the unit of measurement, ad infinitum. In other words, Kant's conclusion in this text which is very, very beautiful -- since a good text in philosophy is a text which starts off from things about which one tells oneself, "but, but all that's obvious, it's true"; only hardly have we finished telling ourselves "it's obvious" than we find ourselves in insane paradoxes, and we tell ourselves, "but what's been going on behind my back? What just happened?" -- In other words, Kant's conclusion: the numerical evaluation of magnitudes cannot have its foundation in itself. It calls for a basis other than numerical evaluation. In other words, there is another type of evaluation than the conceptual evaluation of magnitudes, and there would be no conceptual evaluation of magnitudes if there were not this other type. -- Ah! [*Pause; there's the sound of something falling*] I lost my glasses; maybe they're broken, I couldn't read here. -- Huh? You've got it? So, for the moment, this is easy.

Ah yes, and Kant says: well yes, any choice of units of measurement ultimately refers to a certain qualitative domain. What is this? Every time you find yourself measuring something, you choose your unit of measurement. And even if you take a ready-made metric, if you have taken precisely one meter, it is because you had a small idea which itself is not of a numerical nature, a small idea of what was going to serve as your unit of measurement. In other words, apprehension, that is, the determination of the unit, numerical apprehension supposes a qualitative apprehension. This qualitative or sensitive apprehension, and not conceptual -- you see, the terms are opposed one by one -- this sensitive, non-conceptual, qualitative apprehension,

we will call it – and it well deserves this name – “aesthetic evaluation”, as opposed to “mathematical evaluation”, “aesthetic” indicating precisely the domain of the sensitive and of an art of the sensitive, in contrast to the science of concepts, an art of the sensitive which makes you choose aesthetically, that is, within an intuition. Intuition is the domain of what is present, as opposed to the domain of the concept which is the domain of what is represented.

You choose a concrete unit of measurement -- and that was the text I quoted to you -- well yes, you measure a man by so many feet. And then you measure a tree, there you change the measurement, you change the unit of measurement. You say: this hill is as high as twelve men, or this tree, no, this tree is as high as twelve men, this tree is as high as twelve men. This hill is as high as three trees. You keep changing. That's your aesthetic apprehension of units of measurement. And this time, you are not capturing homogeneous instants, you are not referring to fictitious units. You refer to intervals, to pure presents. See the extent to which he doesn't say exactly say that, but here now, we have the right to introduce, it coincides so much with our research. And so, here, from the point of view of the aesthetic evaluation of magnitudes -- see here, the path, Kant's path -- the mathematical evaluation of magnitudes presupposes a hidden aesthetic evaluation.

And the first aspect of this aesthetic evaluation is the qualitative apprehension of heterogeneous units of measurement, qualitative apprehension of heterogeneous units of measurement, and this time, we fully rediscover our idea of the interval. What is the correct interval? *[Pause]* Yes, because knowing how to grasp the right interval didn't go without saying. When I see my bird, when I see my bird flying there, and that... here we have an aesthetic apprehension; I tell myself... because it's aesthetic, it's typically rhythmic, the beating of wings. I grasp the interval between two beats, and I make it the unit of measurement. What kind of unit of measurement? The aesthetic unit of measurement. I don't use my stopwatch; that would be a numerical or conceptual unit of measurement. But myself here, I put down my stopwatch, I follow, I am looking at the bird. You will tell me I'm counting; yes, I'm counting, yes, but we have seen that unity could be defined by the act of apprehension, whether aesthetic *[Pause]* or numerical. Well yes, here, two, three, that gets added in, but what counts for me is the reproduction of wing beats, the reproduction of qualitative intervals.

Well, so this, this gives me an aesthetic apprehension, according to which I have aesthetic judgments. For example, the race there, I calculate the equivalent, the beats of the wings of the runner are his inhales-exhales. When they get more and more frequent, right, a marathon, more and more rushed, I tell myself, hey, is he going to fall, isn't he going to fall? Well, there, that's an aesthetic apprehension. The numerical apprehension, the conceptual apprehension, on the contrary, would be: the others are catching up with him. The others are catching up with him, but the drama here is not that the others are catching up with him. The drama is that the interval between his exhales and his inhales decreases, that is, tends precisely towards the instant when he will only be the object of a numerical apprehension equal zero, that is, “wham” *[Deleuze seems to indicate that the runner falls down]*. *[Laughter]* Hey, that's life.

And understand that already here, I come up against an immense difficulty. It is that in the aesthetic apprehension of magnitudes, contrary to what happens in the numerical apprehension of magnitudes, I grasp real units of measurement, but they do not cease varying, they are

heterogeneous. [Pause] So that's already difficult. I measure the man in feet, I measure the tree in men, but it's not like before. Is there a conversion of these units of measurement? You will tell me, yes, yes, there is a conversion, because there is still something mathematical in this evaluation. But the farther I go, the less conversion there will be [Pause]; the more I arrive at incommensurable units of measurement, the more my feet stumble into each other, one upon the other, rather. Because it's worse on the other side; it's only one, the other side. There has to be the aesthetic comprehension of magnitude. That is, you remember, the law of comprehension is the need not to forget the previous units when I come to the next unit. Well, there you see that in the numerical evaluation of magnitudes, the mind knows no bounds; it can go to infinity. In the aesthetic evaluation of magnitudes, the mind quickly encounters a limit, a maximum, such that it can no longer retain [Pause] the preceding units when it comes to the following ones, precisely because these units are heterogeneous, creating different rhythms, and there we have the mind reaching a limit.

And yet, reason continues, reason, reason within us continues telling us: if you evaluate a magnitude, you ought to understand it, that's the law of reason. If you evaluate a magnitude, you must understand it, that is, you must retain the previous units when you reach the following ones. This is what reason orders me to do; there we see that in the aesthetic evaluation of magnitudes, reason orders me to grasp in a whole, that is, to comprehend, to grasp in a whole the magnitude to be measured. [Pause] And yet the magnitude to be measured continues to exceed the capacity of my imagination, my mind, to grasp that magnitude. The tension between the reason which commands me to grasp the quantity to be measured as a whole and the weakness of my mind, which cannot satisfy the requirement of reason, because the magnitude to be measured exceeds its power, [Pause] here we see the situation of the aesthetic evaluation of magnitudes. In other words, it comes up against the measureless. I will measure, I will measure men by feet, I will measure trees by men, I will measure mountains by trees, I will measure the earth by mountains, I will measure the planetary system by the earth, I will measure the galaxies by the planetary system, nothing will help, nothing will do. I will come up against the heterogeneity of units of measurement from the point of view of apprehension, and the limit of my imagination, from the point of view of comprehension. [Pause]

I can translate this into my current language: I will come up against two mysteries of time, two profound mysteries of time, the incommensurability of living presents or intervals, on one hand, on the other hand, the immensity or the "too much" of a whole of time. The whole of time overflows my faculties of comprehension. The whole of time, the immensity of the future and the past, is the sublime. The two mysteries of time, once again, are the non-commensurability – and they are complementary – it's the non-commensurability of the intervals of the presents. You understand, when I say present, past, future, I've forgotten all that; I did a mathematical evaluation. For these mysteries, I've substituted, I've substituted for the aesthetic evaluation of time -- here I am adopting Kant's terms -- I have substituted for the aesthetic evaluation a numerical evaluation of time. Yes, for that, I substituted a succession of instants that I can measure with numerical concepts. But the abysses of time, I would say the first abyss of time, from the point of view of extension – that's where we still are, we will see how many abysses of time there are -- it is the incommensurability of lived presents, the incommunicability of lived presents, if you prefer. And on the other hand, the immensity of the future and the present [Deleuze means "the past"] which defy all comprehension of the imagination, that is, there is an

abyss of the part of time defined as an interval, there is an abyss of the whole of time defined as the immensity of the past and the future. The limit of my comprehension defines the sublime. The whole of time is the measureless, but that's great. The whole of time is the measureless since we started from the definition: time is the measurement of movement. Well, it is precisely because time is the measurement of movement that the whole of time is the measureless. We can't help it, that's life. [Pause]

There we are. Well, if you still have a little strength, so, I'm going to say, well yes, hasn't this story always been, don't you find it in some more concrete areas? Because... read, I should have read you some pages from Kant, they are so beautiful. I would really like you to read this text, ok? Here we are, there is a text in particular, that interests me a lot: "In the aesthetic judgment, in the aesthetic judgment of a whole, thus immeasurable, the sublime is situated less in the magnitude of the number [of units] than in the fact that we always succeed by progressing toward larger and larger units".³ And all that he says about the measureless, this is a splendid text. So, there's nothing said about time, right? I'm the one who is applying that to time because there you go, what's more sublime than time, right? It's... fine. It goes without saying that if he says something in that direction, he says the sublime is not in nature, that it's about nature, and it's in the mind. You have to understand that... anyway, no matter, ok? Read, read all this.

So, I'm saying good, well, you understand, if we are looking... So, a little break, all the same. A little break. I would just like to pick up on a point. I'm saying, so in painting, in music, do we encounter stuff like that? Well, listen, in music, I'd be surprised if we didn't encounter it because understand that it's... the concepts are... I don't need to say that intervals are a concept that has a long, long musical history, right, and that the interval in music is something, right, and a whole, a whole of time, the equivalent of a whole of time? The interval, well, the interval, that would allow us to define the sound present, the musical present, not the sound present, but the musical present. It would perhaps allow us, perhaps it could be used for a theory of time in music. After all, theories of time in music are, are, are surely very important. There have been books on it, but we, we might say, don't we have a... I mean, it should be useful for that, those who are interested in this, in that, in what we are doing. Alright, I'm just saying that.

And of the whole, a whole of time, a whole of time which would be what? Well, of course, that would be measureless. It's funny, the whole of time; it's both the measurement of time... the measurement of measureless movement, musical measurelessness, well. I'm choosing at random, randomly -- that seems to be a bit arbitrary, but maybe we'll see later that it's not. -- I'm choosing a text... -- Ah yes, but I no longer have the reference; oh, if I could only stumble upon it. Anyway... I won't be so lucky. I didn't write the text down. Well, anyway, it doesn't matter, it's enough... it's as if I had quoted him, it's a beautiful text, right? Yeah, I can't find it. -- We tell ourselves, ah, well yes -- I'm saying really elementary things -- well, [Richard] Wagner? Wagner, ah, well yes, there is something measureless in that. Measurelessness, what is that? Anyway... the interval and the measureless: the whole of time and the part of time. The part of time is the interval; the whole of time, as exceeding our aesthetic comprehension.

A sublime, every time you say it's sublime -- it's a sublime, it's sublime -- you have to add: it's a mathematical sublime, right? Because there is the other case, which we haven't considered, which is very different. We'll now have to say, if you use this word in connection with the

measureless, we'll have to say it's mathematical sublime. It's mathematical sublime, well yes, some of it is. The whole of time unfolds, unfolds, toward what? Without you being able to manage to grasp it in one, and yet it is the whole of time which is there, and which exceeds your imagination. Okay, so I'm saying, Wagner, but I was looking for a splendid text that says exactly that in [Olivier] Messiaen -- and I can't find it -- in Messiaen. But, well, we feel that from a certain moment onward, yes, from time immemorial, music has been involved with the measureless in a very, very special way, right. It doesn't matter, right?⁴

But then I return to my stories of cinema. I'm saying, last year I said, and here I just want to complete that because I feel more certain of myself, well, there is something that interested me greatly, here, in what I vaguely called, to state it quickly, the pre-war French school.⁵ The pre-war French school, I find that this would be a concept that would be quite valid, historically. And, of course, like every time we talk about a great movement, it would bring together very different authors, and I was saying, for myself, the pre-war French school, of course, is [Abel] Gance, it's [Marcel] L'Herbier, it's [Jean] Epstein, yet my God are they different. And then, it's also the next generation, it's [Jean] Grémillon, it's [Jean] Vigo, good. There is a kind of French school, I think. They have a certain conception of light, they have a certain conception... there is a French light, just like there is a German expressionist light. It's not the same treatment of light, it's not the same... And, I thought to myself, what is there in common within this French school?

Well, and that's what made me, what delighted me, me personally, because they are very French, but in the best sense of the word, because they are Cartesian, they are Cartesian. And why are they Cartesian? Because what interests them the most -- I'm not saying that's only what interests them -- what interests them the most is the quantity of movement in the image. That's the French problem. If you tell yourself, in fact, about an Expressionist film, what interests them the most, what this is for an Expressionist -- we will see if we return to this a bit, we'll have to return to that -- it's obvious that what interests them first and foremost is light, and that's what concerns them. Why does light concern them? Well, we'll have to look for that. But it's the light that concerns them. And it's not that they don't care about movement, but movement is subordinate to light. There will be as much movement as is needed for light and the interplay of light, and the fundamental play of light with darkness, good. That's it, that's their thing.

I'm summing up, but these are experienced problems; I'm not doing theory here. I think that what concerns them is luminism. A Frenchman can have extremely learned kinds of light; Grémillon's lights are famous. But why precisely? They are obtained -- it's true in the French school; anyway, I don't have time to develop it -- the lights are obtained from all shades of gray. They are not at all obtained, even when there are very strong contrasts, they are never obtained with the Expressionist treatment where, on the contrary, they obtain light from a confrontation between light-darkness, light-shadow. That's not the French way at all. And it's because, in their work, in this French school, assuming that my concept is well founded, in this French school, light is subordinated, however far it goes, whatever its importance -- I'm not saying that it's... -- but it's subordinated to an even more important problem for them. And here we touch on what I have been telling you from the beginning: try figuring out why someone identifies with or experiences a particular problem rather than another. That's what the limits of philosophy are; this is: why is it that which interests you and not something else? We do not know. In your thinking, I'm not saying in your life; it is not in your life that you are going to find these

orientations of thought. Good. Your life confirms, life only ever follows [*elle ne fait jamais que suivre, la vie*]. Good.

What interests the French in the story of light is just the opposite of what interests the Expressionists, namely it's the best light for there to be the greatest possible quantity of movement. That's their thing. That's their thing: putting the greatest quantity of movement into the visual image. Hence Gance's splendid expressions, because you will tell me but, but it is also already true of [D.W.] Griffith? No, it's not the same at all. It's not the same at all, because -- and this is where we see how Cartesian they are -- in Gance's texts, there are some very, very beautiful sentences which at first sight seem purely lyrical, where he says: I raise up, I raise up movement [*Pause*] from the state of a simple arithmetic to an algebra, to an algebra of movement. We tell ourselves, ah fine, that's a turn of phrase [*manière de parler*]. We can tell ourselves it's a turn of phrase, it's a poetic, lyrical text, by Gance. But we can also tell ourselves, this is not at all a turn of phrase; he gets it quite right, whether he knows it or not... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:13:46]

Part 2

... What did Descartes do? One could say: the Americans had already created a lot of movement in the image; that's even what the movement-image is. But... in a way, whatever Griffith's genius was, it remained at the level of an evaluation, which Kant would call an aesthetic evaluation. He proceeded very empirically. When Gance is dazzled by Griffith, he tells himself in some way: I'm going to bring this to a... to an algebraic rigor. Very odd. That is, to a kind of Cartesian rigor. In other words, I'm going to subordinate -- I'm not going to evaluate, I'm not going to content myself with an aesthetic evaluation of movement -- I'm going to subject movement to metrical relationships. And all the time, the more modest Grémillon will no longer speak of an algebra of movement but will speak of a calculus of movement. And all that comes up constantly among the French, the quantity of movements subjected to metrical relationships. That's kind of what I was telling you. The Russians have another problem. The Soviets have another problem which was: the quantity of movements, subjecting it to dialectical laws, but this was a very experienced, very living problem, grasping it, not subjecting it, not... it was not artificial, grasping it through a dialectical conception of the world.

Well, the French, obviously, they are haunted by a Cartesianism of cinema, even if they don't know Descartes, even if they are not philosophers, even if... what does all that matter? They want to introduce into the cinema something that, a few centuries earlier, Descartes had wanted to introduce into mathematics, and into philosophy. And how are they going to do it then? There you go. To my knowledge, if it is true that the fundamental problem is the quantity of movements in the visual image, well, this French school will be defined by two aspects. It will be defined by two aspects, and I'm not forcing things; it's not my fault if this is coming together so well. It means that all of the above was true, that's all. Two aspects.

The first aspect will be this: [*Pause*] how to choose for a movement, for *one* movement, for a *precise movement*, how to choose for a determined movement a unit of measurement such that [*Pause*] the image will be fulfilled by [*Pause*] the maximum amount of this movement? [*Pause*]

What does it mean that the image might be filled with the maximum amount of this movement? Stretching out the interval. I'll offer two cases: if you stretch the interval to the maximum, you will have to slow down the movement to have the greatest amount of movement possible. Good. And there we see the French school discovers the power of slow motion, especially in works by one of its greatest representatives, [Jean] Epstein. [Pause] If you shorten the interval, [Pause] that will require you to accelerate [Pause] to get the greatest quantity of movement in the image or sequence of images. These accelerations find their brilliant expression in metrical relations -- and here, "metrical relations" is not a metaphor, indeed, since it implies accelerated montage -- and accelerated montage involves -- and montage, not accelerated montage -- montage implies exercising and enforcing very strict metrical relations -- how long does a shot last? what are the metric relations of field, width, height, depth, etc.? -- all metrical relations pass through this.

I can define this: French montage was really -- I'm not saying all montage -- French montage was: the evaluation of the metrical relations relative to the quantity of movement and to the maximum of the quantity of movement in the image. Slow motion is a maximum quantity of movement in the image when you have very long intervals. When your intervals are short or getting shorter and shorter, you are creating accelerated montage, etc., etc. All these things which were prodigious at the moment of cinema's invention, that is, when they really had the impression of discovering, of creating everything, that was enough so for it not to be a metaphor when Gance claimed to adhere to an algebra of movement. And in fact, you see, there... and the themes of the French school: there is not one Frenchman who does not come up against or who does not confront the French scene typical of French pre-war cinema and which in fact explains... it's understandable in itself.

It's a bit like in painting; you know, they have their test cases [*épreuves*]. Well, there are not many painters at a particular period who have not faced the problem of the crucifixion, or the descent from the cross. Well, there, in the French school, there is not one [filmmaker] who does not confront the fundamental problem of the little ball, the popular ball. And this is obligatory, this is obligatory because here, they maintain their thing [*truc*], and there is not one of them who will approach it the same way, obviously, or for the party, or for the carnival. It's their thing. This is not due to French realism; on the contrary, it's due to by their collective madness, their collective problem, namely this problem of establishing the metrical relations which correspond each time to the best and the greatest quantity of movements in the visual image. But what could you ask for better than a ball? This is the text case, the standard test case: filming a ball.

And it's not nothing, filming a ball. It's not nothing. And each of them will compete with his neighbor. It's through this that there will be a... when Grémillon creates his farandoles, well, Grémillon's farandoles are not L'Herbier's balls.⁶ This is obvious. Moreover, Grémillon thinks he's on to something, and surely, he is on to something: the farandole in a closed decor, amazing... He sets himself conditions. He does algebra. He does cinematic algebra. He is going to close off the decor, that is, up above, a closed ceiling, all that. Then he chooses to stage his farandole climbing up the stairs. With what montage? With what metrical relations? Both for each image and for the succession of images. Obviously, this is grandiose, this is a grandiose project, but... [*Suddenly Deleuze's voice is heard from another tape recorder, and Deleuze reacts to it*] ah that's me! [*Laughter*]

Good. This is the first aspect. See, this is the "interval" aspect, choosing the best interval to produce the greatest amount of relative movement in an image or a sequence of images. And I'm saying, that's signed either by Gance -- his famous accelerated montage -- or by Epstein -- his famous slow motions, or his big carnival in acceleration -- or it's L'Herbier -- "El Dorado" [1921], with the great ball of "El Dorado" --. [Pause] Well, you understand -- here, I'm going to say some very specific things -- if, afterwards, you find the theme of the ball in others' work, well, that won't have the same meaning at all! I'm thinking of [Max] Ophuls's balls. For Ophuls, it's absolutely not the same problem. The quantity of movement in the image is not what interests Ophuls, so not at all. However, there is movement, and yet he treats the movements tenderly, but that is not his concern. As a result, a ball by Ophuls will not at all meet these criteria of the French school. And yet, God they are beautiful, the balls by Ophuls.

But... when I'm speaking of the French school, I mean: what they were aiming for through the ordeal of the ball or the farandole, and in the Grémillon films, there are not many films in which you don't find the farandole; he didn't stop remaking it, in the sense that we will say -- so here, if we take cinema seriously -- in the sense that we will say of a painter that he never stopped reworking water lilies. He never stopped reworking water lilies, fine. Well, Grémillon never stopped creating and reworking the farandole. It's his thing. And no doubt, he was never satisfied with a farandole he made. He wanted something even better. And from his first one, he would continue living, so, he would still create more farandoles based on it. He never finishes, he never finishes creating a farandole... There you go. Good.

But the other aspect... That's the "interval" aspect. I'm saying: there we have the first figure of cinematographic time in relation to the movement-image. The first indirect image of cinematographic time -- you can see that we're landing on our feet completely, but without doing so on purpose -- it's indeed the interval time, the choice of the right interval to obtain the relative maximum quantity of movement in an image or a sequence of images. There we are. This is the first aspect of cinematographic time.

But in the French school, there was also another aspect, and a very bizarre one. [Pause] There was the demand for a "too much" [*d'un trop*]. There was the demand for an "overdoing it". There was a measurelessness [*démesure*]. There was a measurelessness which, in my opinion, has had no equivalent elsewhere. Others also had their measurelessness. Needless to say, that [Alexander] Dovzhenko or [Sergei] Eisenstein had this, their measurelessness. I'm not going to say that they were specialists in the measureless. But only once in the cinema, in my opinion, did the sublime emerge in the form of the mathematical sublime, and that was with the French school. Ah, it was with the French school that the sublime arose as a mathematical sublime in cinema, but yes!⁷ Because in Gance's work, there's always -- so I'll start with him -- there's always a theme: "and I'll give you too much, you morons!" He was perfect. From the start, he says, "I am not understood, I won't be understood". He's right, but he adds onto this. He didn't have, I was going to say, the kind of silence or containment or modesty of an [Erich von] Stroheim who had, who had, who didn't even feel the need to say that he was not understood. Gance never stopped explaining it -- it's not so bad -- he didn't stop saying: "You should, you should worship me like a god; you should break down the Eiffel Tower to make a crown for me; you don't...etc., you aren't doing anything, you pathetic guys".

But why, what is this measurelessness, this measurelessness in Gance? I'll provide a very simple example: already measureless, obviously, in his accelerated montage, measureless in the accelerated montage, faster and faster, this time reaching an absolute maximum quantity of movement. What does that mean, what will an absolute maximum quantity of movement be? Let's go back to the Kantian definition of the sublime; I would say the absolute maximum quantity of movement is when the movement exceeds the capacities of our mind's comprehension. So there, you have measurelessness, you have the mathematical sublime fully spelled out. But what does Gance tell us? He tells us: I am going to throw eighteen superimposed images at you. Be careful, he says, my eighteen superimpositions aren't going -- you see what superimpositions are, right? Images on top of each other, right? -- Eighteen simultaneous superimpositions: careful, which don't start off at the same time. Metrical relations! Metrical relations obtained during montage.

For example, you will start off with three superimpositions, and then, at a particular moment, ten more will be connected, but four of the first ones are removed. Understand that this is essential, because what he's doing -- and here, there's no metaphor -- he is making visual music. Exactly as in music -- and I'm selecting this example again because it seems to me that there are enormous correspondences between these two great authors -- exactly as Messiaen does in music, with all his theory and his practice of added values and subtracted values. And I subtract some, and I add some, and of course, you won't see anything. How do you expect to see eighteen superimpositions all at once? That's not even in question. Gance knows we don't see them. He's the first to say it. At best, we see three, four.

Here, you touch fully upon the operation of the mathematical sublime. To touch fully is, it is... Take Kant's text, it's word for word, place it alongside Gance's text, it's a marvel! There, you are touching... And yes, your comprehension is completely limited. At most, you reach four superimpositions. So why does he stick eighteen in? Wonderful answer: well, that goes beyond your comprehension, you don't see them, but it has an effect on the soul. It affects your soul. And if I throw in eighteen superimpositions, it will have an effect on you which will not be the same were I to throw in six. There will be an effect on the soul, if only a kind of feeling of the sublime. And this measurelessness will be subject to metrical relations, once again, in this case, rhythmic relationships, [*Pause*] the moment he adds them, the moment he withdraws them, the moment he brings them all together, the eighteen or twenty or twenty-one, shifts, shifts between values -- I'm using Messiaen's words --, added values and subtracted values. Good.

So, another example -- here, I don't even need to elaborate -- when he throws his famous polyvision at you. We have just seen, it's familiar, there are three great things in Gance that come up all the time: accelerated montage, we've just seen it; superimpositions, we've just seen it; a third big thing: his triple-screen polyvision, or without the triple screen. What is a triple screen? Here too, this means reaching this "too much". How to capture too much?... [*Interruption in the recording*]

...this will be the other aspect of time. You remember,⁸ we started from the first aspect: the interval time. The measureless is the whole of time, it is the immensity of the past and the future. It is no longer the variable present interval, it is no longer the variable present. It is the immensity of the present and the future. It is the whole of time constituted as what? Constituted

as “simultaneism”. And under Gance’s pen will arise the formula of simultaneity, a formula that echoes what? At the same time, painters proposed the watchword of simultaneity. And how do these painters differ from Cubism? They differ from Cubism, if only practically, on the level of the forms they adopt. Is it by chance that they are painters who never tire of exploring circumferences, circles, half-circles and quarter-circles, unlike the Cubists who need decomposition along the angular surface, along the edge? And these simultaneists, who are they? It's the Delaunays [Robert and Sonia], in whose work you encounter, whose whole work of painting is a meditation on circles and arcs of circles, and it's [Fernand] Léger, who will introduce to painting the most extraordinary arcs of circles that exist.

Well, it doesn't matter, this simultaneity, which we find... and Léger, who will he be? He will not only be a great painter; he'll be L'Herbier's decorator; he will be passionate about cinema as a function of the capacities of simultaneity in cinema. And about simultaneity, I would say it is not at all the present, the grasp of the present. That is, it's not Impressionism at all. One could say: Impressionism is the interval, it's the art of the interval. But simultaneity is not that. On the contrary, it is the eternity of time, not just eternity, the eternity of time, eternity as eternity of time, that is, time grasped as the whole of time, the immensity, the simultaneity of past and future, as a whole. And when and where are the past and the future simultaneous? They are simultaneous in, and only in, the whole of time. As soon as you take them out of the whole of time, they are no longer simultaneous. And Delaunay's wheel, and Léger's wheel, this is the whole of time as earlier we came across the interval of time. And when I say Messiaen, to add the third great name, I'll therefore have my trinity there, the Delaunays and Léger, Gance, Messiaen.

Messiaen develops -- and I believe it's at the same period -- a famous conception that he will call non-retrogradable rhythms.⁹ And the non-retrogradable rhythms are, for example -- I don't have the time, here, to specify this greatly --, for example, they're when you have two rhythms on the right and on the left, which are the reverse of each other, that is, they are the retrograde of each other, and in the center there is a constant rhythm. Well, the set of three, -- of the two rhythms which are on the right and on the left, the retrogradation of each other, and of the rhythm with a central constant value -- defines according to Messiaen a non-retrogradable rhythm.

Well, needless to say, in my opinion -- well not in my opinion, no -- needless to say that Delaunay's colors are typically non-retrogradable rhythms, the modulation of colors. And, in any case, there is a painter who used the expression "non-retrogradable rhythms" in connection with painting and the modulation of color, it was [Paul] Klee, in his diary, to the point that, obviously, there is a problem, which is, it's... -- since I haven't checked the dates -- does he come from Messiaen, does... Messiaen, in any case, cites the expression as having invented it himself, ok? So, I think the origin would be Messiaen, but we find it in painting. There are non-retrogradable rhythms in painting; moreover, Messiaen himself gives as an example the colors of a butterfly, the wings of a butterfly, as an example of non-retrogradable rhythm, that is, he gives a pictorial example.

Okay, but Gance's triple screen, understand? Understand? There's no mystery here, there's no mystery in that, or there's one hell of a mystery. He knows it well, he obviously knows it, it's to make retrogradable rhythm visual. The proof is that he himself says about his triple screen,

among other things -- he does not reduce it to that, but... --, among other things, you will have on your right and on your left two inverse symmetrical figures, and in the center a main image, that is, you will have two rhythms which are the retrogradation of each other, to the right and to the left. Look at these figures; for those who have seen Gance's triple screen, we always see on the right, you have from the top left of the screen, toward the bottom right a troop which descends, on the left you have the other figure, the two movements being the retrograde of each other, and in the middle you have, for example, Bonaparte: you typically have a non-retrogradable rhythm. And, as well at the level of the triple screen, what does all that mean? It is precisely the search for, and the constr... no, not the construction, the search, the capture of a measureless or visual sublime. And I'm just saying: this sublime, this visual immensity, is the whole of time, [*Pause*] it's simultaneity, that is, the immensity of the future and the past as they are simultaneous and are only simultaneous in the whole of time.

So, on that point, you have every right to tell me, the whole the time is a notion that for me has no meaning, understand? Very well. What does it mean? It means, well you see, it means -- which isn't bad --: you're not dealing with a Delaunay, you're not dealing with a Gance, you're not dealing with this one or that one; your concerns are elsewhere. This is why objections are so uninteresting. It is not a question of objecting about this or that to me, the whole of the time, etc. I'm talking to you about people who have given this notion a consistency, even if this notion does not have any consistency independently of them. And I'm telling you, as always: find your own notions, to which you will be able to give consistency. A Delaunay circle is an answer to: what is the whole of time? So, and then it's like that for everything.

So, I'm just saying, and I would add, for L'Herbier, it's not the same way. In L'Herbier's work, there is a "too much", but no matter. I am thinking of an analysis that struck me greatly, written by Noël Burch. Noël Burch asks a very interesting question about a great film by L'Herbier, "L'Argent" [1928].¹⁰ He says: it's very curious, people who have seen this film by L'Herbier, which is one of the greatest films by L'Herbier, they come away with the impression that it's full of movement and that it doesn't stop moving. And in fact -- and he indeed cites critics who speak of the movement-filled aspect of L'Herbier's film -- there are indeed extraordinary camera movements. There are extraordinary camera movements in "L'Argent", especially those that everyone knows, namely the aerial wire camera, there, which films the main floor of the Stock Exchange, well, all that belongs to one of the most beautiful cinema images. You realize there was a time when you could just film the Stock Market when you were making movies, one's very own Stock Market, and for a whole day, you did what you wanted, obviously, that's good. Fine.

But Noël Burch says: I watched the film again with my pencil in hand, with my little pen, all that: there is very little camera movement, very little. So how to explain this? In fact, there's the famous Stock Exchange sequence. But you will see, there are extremely few of them. Most of the time, the camera is immobile, as in most films of the era. He says, this is odd. Because he does not deny the fact, he says: yes, in fact, he gives the impression of being constantly in motion, and in fact, there's nothing at all. He looks for how this occurs: for L'Herbier, what was his solution? You will see that this is a very different solution from a Gance solution, and yet it has the same effect, the same result. [Burch] says: here, if you consider some sequences, for example, in the gigantic decors, L'Herbier's decors, then, there, if I tried to make the distinction

with Gance, thanks to Léger, thanks to the painter Fernand Léger, there are decors that can only be described as "enormous". There's a gigantization of the decor that Léger wanted like that. For example, the living room, in "L'Argent", the living room is a living room, right, which creates the effect of the Salle des Pas Perdus [*huge waiting area*] in the Gare Saint-Lazare; it is measureless. And all those who love Gance also love him as a function... the sets of "L'Insoumise" are measureless.¹¹ And here, it really works at the level of the metrical relation because for Léger, this was really a domain of the metrical relation.

Well, an impression of immensity, okay. But how is he going to obtain the "too much", the measurelessness of the movement? Since in fact, the camera does not move. So, is he going to make people run around, or on the contrary, the Epstein solution -- we could conceive of a stretching out, a slowing down. Well, it doesn't work with a money theme, it works with the House of Usher, it works with Edgar Poe. It doesn't work with Zola. A stretching out, no, it wasn't possible. L'Herbier's trick, Noël Burch explains, is: in a sequence, suppose that you have an average number of shots that are necessary, for example, in a sequence for which the main theme is a woman -- who was on the right of the screen -- has to go to the other end of the screen passing through a group, through a central group -- I'm speaking nonsense -- Well, you have a solution: it's to do everything in a single shot. If you make several shots, let's say you have an average number of shots that capture this movement, let's say, four or five shots. If you include fewer, there would be an ellipse; if you include more, it's too much. What Burch shows -- I was very convinced by his analysis -- is that at a spot where it would need four or five shots statistically, on average, L'Herbier throws in twenty, twenty-two. [*Pause*] And that's what will give the feeling of an excess.

If you like, this is very different from superpositions, Gance's superimpositions or accelerated montage or triple screen, and it leads to the same effect: to produce something measureless which, henceforth, will impress you despite yourself, that is, to make you believe in a completely insane quantity of movements. It is that each sequence is inflated by a number of shots. Obviously, it's a danger, there's a huge danger; understand that the danger, it's not complicated, it's the danger... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

Why are there filmmakers who are so little interested in montage? It's because their problem is to do everything so that there'd be none. [*Laughter*] Why do they care that there's no montage? Not just because montage doesn't interest them; it's because the more montage there is, the more your film can be screwed up, and the more it can be cut. And in fact, there are versions of "L'Argent" which are reduced. There is nothing easier. What caused [Erich von] Stroheim's misfortune, all that? What explains, if you will, that [John] Ford himself withdrew, that he wasn't part of the montage? It's because Ford had filmed in such a way that in his opinion, nothing could be cut, so he did not care. But what turned filmmakers into editors was getting panicked -- or not editors, it's the same cause -- it's getting panicked that the producer was cutting. Montage is a very, very dangerous art. It is a dangerous art on two counts because not just anyone can do it, but through montage, anyone can take it apart. As a result, a sequence by L'Herbier which normally lasts twelve minutes will get reduced to two minutes in all..., good. At that point, obviously, for him, everything he wanted to do is screwed, namely, to obtain this "too much" movement, this measureless movement which is one with a whole of time. It's botched.

So, this is the point I wanted to reach, namely, if I sum up very quickly here: from the movement-image conceived in extension, that is, a quantity of movements, two figures of time are discerned. These figures, which we call “indirect figures of time” [Pause] since we infer them from quantity, we infer them from movement, [Pause] these two figures of time, I call them, the first: [Pause] number of the movement, absolute movement, [Pause] the whole of time, [Pause] the immensity of the future and the past, [Pause] simultaneity [Pause] – I’m missing one; no, that’s fine, I am surely missing one; simultaneity, the whole of time, the number of time, [Pause] I don’t know anymore, well, you see, you add one in yourself – magnitude, I forgot, yes, magnitude of movement as well. – The whole of time, yes, simultaneity, the immensity of the future and the past, yes... well, I don’t see. The wheel, right? Wheel. [Pause]

The other indirect figure of time, I call it [Pause]: the unit of measurement of movement, [Pause] the interval of movement, [Pause] time as a part, [Pause] the living present. [Pause] That’s it. -- Ah yes! On the other side, the sublime... ah, that’s what I was forgetting, it’s the mathematical sublime in the first aspect. [Pause] -- Here, here are the two figures of time, already. What else could be there?

Ah, there, I’ve already missed it. [Deleuze seems to refer to his appointment at the main office] I have to go... oh, I’m not going. Does anyone have an envelope? Does anyone have an envelope? I’ll have to slip it under the door. Or is anyone staying this afternoon? Ah, thank you very much, that saves me, that. So, I would put it in an envelope at the main office. [Pause] Thank you, I already have one, thank you. Well, here we go, we’re going to stop soon because this is tiring, all that, right? So, good. Are you OK? Are you OK? Are there any questions, or can I [Pause], or can I continue? [Pause]

A student: [Inaudible comments; no doubt, this is a question about relations between Gance and Delaunay]

Deleuze: You have to look into this yourself, you have to look according to your... if it’s, if it’s... To me, it strikes me that, at the same time, these musical themes, these pictorial themes, these cinematic themes encounter each other. What I don’t know is Messiaen’s position in relation to..., Was Messiaen... Messiaen was enormously interested in colors, in color-music relationships. What I don’t know is if he was linked to the Delaunays. I haven’t thought about that, I would have to look at a biography of Messiaen: did he know the Delaunays, did he meet Léger? Did Messiaen even take an interest in film music? I don’t know. I don’t know. But for the Delaunay-Gance relations -- in any case, the Léger-L’Herbier relations, that’s no problem -- the Delaunay-Gance relations, [Pause] we’d have to see. Does anyone know anything about this? If they knew each other, if they met, if ...? Anyway, it’s of little interest, it doesn’t change anything. Well, no, it’s interesting.

Well then, if you have... So, I’m starting the follow-up, I’m announcing the program, and then we’ll separate, right, because... here, we’ve done a small part. But the follow-up becomes clear by itself, because for what follows, we expected that movement after all was not only extensive movement. What else can there be but extensive movement, that is, the displacement of a mobile body? Anyway, there is something else, yes, there is something else. What is there? It seems, very quickly, yes, there is intensive movement. Intensity: it’s a movement, it’s not the same. An

intensity is a movement; it's not the same, it's not a displacement in space, obviously, no. But in what way is an intensity a movement?

Why say that an intensity is a movement? I don't know, but if it was a movement, well would it be a movement, or would it be, would it be a movement displacement in space? Oh no, it wouldn't be a movement displacement in space; that's the extensive movement. So, what would it be? Well, it would suit us well if -- for the moment, we're groping -- it would suit us well if it were a light, or if the intensity was light, or in any case, if the light was intensity, yes, that can work. We tell ourselves: that can work, perhaps that could be... with that, there's not too many difficulties.

But then, light? About light? Doesn't it move through space? Maybe it's moving in space, maybe it's not moving in space. Or in any case, maybe if it moves in space, it doesn't move in space like a body, which changes position. So, the movement of light, would this be the very example of an intensive movement? Well, maybe, we don't know. And what is an intensive movement, then? How would that be different from displacement in space? So, let's take the opportunity to learn some things. I mean, there are things through which you have to grope, there are things where there aren't... where you have to learn.

I'm thinking of the problem of causality. At the most general level, philosophers, from the Middle Ages, from Christianity onward -- and this is very much linked to all the problems of heresy and of theology -- they distinguished three main types of cause -- I'm telling you this to furnish your vocabulary, to increase it -- three main types of cause: and one they called "transitive cause", and the other... they called "emanative cause," and the other they called "immanent cause." And they fought each other, and they tore each other apart, as they say, since... but you'll see that they weren't tearing each other apart at all -- well, yes, yes, they were tearing each other apart, but not in the way you think -- to know which of these causes was God.

And the transitive cause is not difficult; it's a cause which can and must be defined in this way: [*Pause*] it comes out of itself to produce, it comes out of itself to produce, and what it produces, that is, its effect, is outside of [the cause]. Two characteristics: its effect is external, and it comes out of itself to produce this effect. Such a thing would be a transitive cause. You see: transitive. I would say that in the displacement of a movement in space, the previous position is the transitive cause of the following position. There is exteriority. Needless to say, if Christianity needs a theory of transitive cause, it is urgently needed since it insists on the idea that there is a real distinction between the world and God, that is, God created the world. If the world is a creature and God the creator, it is urgently necessary for God to come out of itself to produce the world and for the world to be exterior to God. Therefore, God must be a transitive cause.

The emanative cause, ah, it's sneakier, the emanative cause. The emanative cause is a cause such that the effect is exterior to the cause. [*Pause*] Only, the cause remains in itself to produce, the cause remains in itself to produce, although what it produces comes out of it. The cause does not come out of itself to produce, but what it produces comes out of it. This is a complicated situation. It's not complicated if you think of something: light. Light is the type of an emanative cause. [*Pause*] The sun remains in itself to produce, but what it produces [*Pause*] -- [it] does not come out of itself, it does not move -- but what it produces comes out of it: the ray, the light ray,

diffusing light. And at the end of Greek philosophy – which, in a way, is almost contemporary with Christianity -- there are all sorts of movements around an emanative conception of the cause, [Pause] and this is what will be called neo-Platonism. And neo-Platonism invokes -- of which one of the greatest authors is the great Plotinus, P-L-O-T-I-N-U-S -- the great Plotinus never ceases to develop the most splendid luminous metaphors. He is the greatest luminist in philosophy, in the sense that we speak of luminism in painting. Good.

And so then, there are some who go even further, and they invent the notion of immanent cause. And the immanent cause is – and therefore, from then on, you will no longer confuse the two or the three, above all – and the immanent cause is a cause which not only remains in itself to produce but is such that the effect produced remains within it. A pure example of immanent cause is developed by the cursed philosophy of Spinoza. [Laughter] I say “cursed” since everyone will attack him.

But let's talk more seriously. Well, "let's talk seriously", we are very serious here... But let's talk about theology. You understand, it's not nothing, all that. Because here we are, God is not a question of opinion either; I'm not asking you whether you believe in God or not. No one is interested. Let's talk about the concept of God. Well, good, that's quite lovely. Is it a transitive cause, is it an immanent cause, or is it an emanative cause? For people who are interested, theologians, they can't avoid this, you know, they can't avoid this; on these points, they're going to act quite cleverly regarding the Church. They will be forced to admit one of the three; they will be forced to admit one of the three. They'll say, ah! they will tell the pope, all right: a transitive cause. There is a real distinction between God and the creature. We are, we are nothing, really. We are just little creatures. You understand, it's a catastrophe; if we deny the transitive cause, there is no more Christianity. There must be a real distinction between cause and effect. We are not gods. Well then, that's fine, a transitive cause. So, God is transitive cause.

Alright, but how did it create the world? The world is distinct from it [God], but how could it create it, the world? This is where this starts to get annoying. [Laughter] Because [God] could only create it in one way: [God] had to have a model in mind. These are Ideas, with a capital “i”, as they are contained in the understanding of God. [Pause] And it is by an act of will that God produces a world conformable to the Ideas that [God] has in its understanding. You follow me? So okay, there is transitive causality between God and the world, if you consider God, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the world created by the will of God. [Pause]

But if you consider God [Pause] and the model world that [God] has in its understanding, [Pause] there, you have immanent cause. This model world, these Ideas in the understanding of God, they cannot come out of the understanding of God. They remain in the understanding of God, and God remains in itself to contemplate them. We are fully within immanent causality. [Pause] Furthermore, to arrange the whole and to reconcile the two previous movements, they will have to invoke a kind of emanation, [Pause] emanation that goes from the world as God produces it, to the model world in the understanding of God. This time, there will be emanative causality between the world of Ideas in God's understanding and the real world produced in accordance with those Ideas. As a result, to my knowledge, there is no author, no theologian philosopher who does not have to appeal to the three causes at the same time, that is, they find themselves once orthodox and twice heretical, [Laughter] except Spinoza who finds himself a

heretic here, for everyone and for all religions, be they Jews, Catholics, reformists. Him, he makes, he makes the rounds.

But otherwise, the others... and they argue quite strenuously because, first, they use some very harsh, very nasty arguments; they denounce each other as they denounce many, one another; all that was not enjoyable. Today, it's nothing. What do you want to denounce? Not much, right, and to whom? *[Laughter]* It's not that we don't want to, it's that we don't know. It's not always that simple! They denounce each other among themselves. They tell the pope: well this guy, he must immediately retract what he said; you see, he introduced some emanative cause, he's into immanence, all that, he's an atheist. And all these stories, they're hugely important, and all the time, they're involved in rectifications of rectifications of rectifications, which are not at all, as they say, little arguments about the sex of angels, which are some very, very big discussions on the theory of the cause, because they involve an entire practice, and all kinds of... an enormous, enormous amount of things where you are... Someone who insists on the emanative cause is not far from turning light into God itself. To turn God into light or light into God can be annoying in certain respects, but finally, it's good as well, it is not bad; anyway, it's not orthodox, anyway, good.

So, why am I saying all this? Because this emanative cause which suits light so well, aren't we getting closer to a comprehension of: in what sense is it movement, intensity or light? Well, it produces something; it remains in itself to produce. What it produces does not remain in it. As I once said: "light falls", "light falls". What is movement, what is the movement of intensity? The movement of intensity is: light falls. That is, it is the distance which separates intensity as a degree... from what? From zero, the distance that separates an intensity as a degree from zero.

And here we have a completely new concept. From the point of view of the movement in extension, what did we have? We had two notions, and we started off from two notions: magnitude, the unit. *[Pause]* Here, hardly have we begun, and we find ourselves faced with two completely different notions: distance, zero. *[Pause]* Well, distance means that distances are not the same thing as magnitudes... No, in fact: a magnitude is an extensive and divisible quantity; a distance is, if you will, a magnitude, but an indivisible magnitude which separates any degree whatever *[Pause]* from zero. *[Pause]* This is the very definition of an intensity. *[Pause]*

Will there be a time of intensity? Will there be a time of intensity as we have just seen? Will there be indirect figures of intensity, as there were indirect figures of extension? Will we have here new figures of time? Maybe we can predict that we will have, this time... you remember, we had a whole of time, and we had parts of time, and that's it, from the point of view of figures corresponding to extension. Here, we will have -- which is entirely different -- an order of time, *[Pause]* an order of time. And it's this order of time *[Pause]* which itself will have abysses, which will itself... which will correspond to movement, to intensive movement. As a result, practically, we have yet to discover all kinds of figures of time. I can say, we have more or less settled the first two figures: the whole of time, that is, the immensity of the past and the future; the part of time: the living present. But now, here we come up against an order of time, and what? Should we say, "a zero of time"? What would that be, a zero of time? Would it be an instant, then, an order of time and an instantaneity of time? It's not certain that would be good,

but anyway... an order of time, certainly. An order of time refers to distances whereas the whole of time refers to magnitudes, to divisible magnitudes.

Fine, and here, how will time be defined? What do you want? According to the emanative cause, if it comes out of the cause in order to fall out of the cause, but the cause remains in itself, what can you do? One of two things: either you will fall, and you will fall to degree zero, or you will rise again, and you will be converted, that is, "you will be converted", that means: you will return toward the cause. So, the two movements, what are they? It is: the fall, and conversion or reversal. But these are figures of time, these are abysses of time! The fall and the reversal, the reconversion.

And I was saying, among the Greeks there have always been two, and if you like, there are two major tendencies: once again, those who relate time to movement. And we have seen this, and I was saying: those which relate movement to the soul. It goes without saying that we are fully within the atmosphere of a thought which relates time and which encompasses time as a function of the soul, in the double movement of the soul: the fall and the ascent or reconversion, [*Pause*] and these are movements. And that is what will define the order of time. Good, but this gets complicated, it gets complicated. We'll have to take a closer look at that. There will be a long story. And so, to end, there is a long story, yes. So, ... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... who wrote at the beginning of the 17th century, and who was called Jakob Böhme, and he was to be the master of the great German Romantics. And at the beginning of his life, he wrote one of his first books, it's called *Aurora* [1612]. One of his later books is called *Mysterium Magnum* [1623] He was particularly... The Germans have always known him very well; he is one of the very great German thinkers. But the French got to know him quite late -- well, a general public got to know him quite late -- and thanks to Alexandre Koyré, who wrote a huge book on Jacob Böhme,¹² and who had published selections from him with Aubier, some admirable texts by Böhme, if you find that in second-hand booksellers, jump on it, it's one of the great texts in the world.

And so here we have Böhme offering us a story that is like the one on this order of time, on this fall and this rise. See, I no longer have all the movements, the figures from earlier, right? We are going to be faced with stories of falls and rises. You will tell me: all that is going to be theology. No. It's going to be theology, of course. And in Böhme, there will be the fury of God, and there will be the desire of God, and there will be the love of God, and all that will fall into a series of truly insane concepts; what he calls the fury of God is one of the most beautiful things in the world.

But, but, but... here we see that for the German Romantics, and for Goethe, and there in Goethe's *Theory of Colors*, we find all sorts of elements, this time as secularized, and related, related, in which Böhme's stages work in a hidden way. I'm not saying at all that Goethe copies Böhme, but it will always be in a system of resonances that Goethe's *Theory of Colors* will refer to stages, to stages of the soul according to Böhme, and all that through a Romantic atmosphere which is, which will then influence [Friedrich] Schelling, so which plays a role in the history of thought, a fundamental role and which will have a cinematographic outcome. If we were led to look for

one, a royal culmination in German Expressionism, where there Böhme, they knew him, well those who read him knew him... fine.

Well then, I wish you a great vacation, and we'll take this up the next time! [*End of the recording*] [2 :23 :20]

¹ On these two aspects of time, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 31-32.

² On Kant and the sublime, see *L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 46-47, which Deleuze indicates as referring to paragraph 36 in Kant (p. 224, note 20), whereas on pp. 53-55, Deleuze indicates the reference as paragraphs 26-28 in Kant.

³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, paragraph 26.

⁴ In *The Movement-Image*, p. 224, note 24, Deleuze quotes a book by Antoine Goléa, *Rencontres avec Olivier Messiaen* (Paris: Juillard, 1961).

⁵ On this French school, see session 7 of Cinema seminar I, January 19, 1982; see also *The Movement-Image*, pp. 40-55.

⁶ On these comparisons, see sessions 2 and 3 of Cinema seminar 1, November 17 and 24, 1981, and also *The Movement-Image*, pp. 40-44.

⁷ On measurelessness for Gance, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 47-49.

⁸ Here begins the transcription on WebDeleuze and of part 1 on Paris 8.

⁹ On these rhythms, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 46-48, and p. 224 note 24.

¹⁰ On Burch's analysis, see *The Movement-Image*, p. 47 and p. 224 note 22.

¹¹ It is probable that Deleuze is mistaken in the title here since he refers in *The Mouvement-Image*, p. 44, both to L'Herbier's "L'Argent" and "The New Enchantment" (1924; "L'Inhumaine") with sets by Léger, among others; "L'Insoumise" by William Wyler is the French title of the American film "Jezebel" [1938], with no decorators indicated.

¹² Alexandre Koyré, *La Philosophie by Jakob Böhme* (Paris: Vrin, 1929).