

## Gilles Deleuze

### On Cinema, Truth and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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#### Part 1

As last time we almost got settled on the distribution of working materials, I would very much like it if, after the Christmas vacation, what happens, what transpires, is that I start doing more and more philosophy for you, something – how should I put this? – of a summary nature, although not too summary, but just a little so that ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]. What's going to happen is that we will return to philosophy, this year, just like that. I mean that I would really like you to properly get back into reading Plato, I'd like you to read, or re-read, Nietzsche. All that can only do you a lot of good, eh?

Now, someone has just passed me a note and I think this note is rather interesting, although I think I'd need your help to deal with it fully. Now in this note, which others haven't read, you seem to be interested, for example – I'm taking this example because it might be of interest to everyone – you seem to be interested not only in Kant, but in a very specific point in the Kantian conceptions. Namely, you are interested in the question of the World in Kant and in the way in which Kant tries to show how one can hold propositions about the World in itself, with regard to the World, that are called antinomical. And on that, your problem – and this is very good, it fits nicely into our framework – your problem, is: is it not then the case, where the World is the object of antinomical propositions, or let's put it more roughly if you prefer for the moment, contradictory propositions, is it not then the case that the history of the World is a case of falsifying narration?

I find the question interesting, and I say to myself, good, well, if you have this sort of idea, then it's necessary to look into it. With regard to Kant, we will have the opportunity to talk about him. What has to be said first of all is that the theory of the World cannot be treated independently. There are three things he does not want to separate: there is the World, but there is also the Self and God. [*Pause*] And why doesn't he want to separate them? It is because, according to him – and this will be a great contribution of Kantianism, a kind of very radical novelty in Kantianism – the Self, the World and God are, in any case, inseparable from 'illusions'. So the Antinomies, in the case of the World, are only one case of illusion. There are also the illusions of the Self, there are the illusions of God, alongside illusions about the World [*Pause*].

What is so astonishing about that? I mean, where is the richness of this idea to be found? It's always a question, when you read a philosopher – just like when you read a poet, – it's up to you to extract the beauty from it since these things are like an ore, or sometimes it's even more subtle than an ore. But reading or understanding is always really an extraction, and worse, it's whatever you like, it's an extraction, it's an absorption, it's a cannibalism, it's ... you make something out of it which becomes yours: all that, good. Well, when you read philosophy, you also have to treat it like that! The question is always: what is going on

underneath? And why don't they tell us, what's going on underneath? But of course by definition, when you write something, you cannot explain at the same time what is going on underneath. It is therefore up to the reader to find out.

So what is going on underneath? It is in any case a very, very formidable idea. I would say it is the idea that the Self, the World and God, are Ideas of Reason. For Kant, well, we can see right away, I don't need to explain how, how it can be said at least, that the Self, the World and God are Ideas of Reason. Look at what Kant tells us: the Ideas of Reason are inseparable from the illusions they engender. Why is it so strange to say that? Well, one feels it immediately. Before Kant, generally people always said, you know, you enter a state of illusion, but summon reason, call for help from reason, in order to dispel the illusions. That would be understandable; we've been told that a hundred times. I don't want to say that those who said this were simplistic authors, but in the end we've been told this from a hundred angles.

And here we have an author, no matter what his name is, well, he happens to be called Kant – I was going to say, no matter about his dates, but surely not – why is it that at this precise moment a proposition as strange as this starts to reverberate? No longer to call upon reason to dissipate the illusions of which you are going to be victims, but: beware of the illusions that Reason as Reason engenders. But I'll try to appeal to your heart. Try to realize: what is this story, what is it really about? I mean, that's how you have to read philosophy. It's like a novel; it's distinguished from novels by other characteristics, but still ... But what is it really about?

Here is a man, who comes to tell you, as a philosopher: no longer attempt to dissipate the illusions of which you are victims with the aid of Reason; but who says to us: Reason in its vigilance, Reason *as* Reason, Reason as right Reason, engenders illusions into which you necessarily fall. [*Pause*]. One could call that a fantastic revolution. [*Pause*] So does that mean: be against Reason? No. There are others who will be capable of drawing this consequence, but Kant, not at all. These illusions are inevitable, but you must become conscious of them, so as to give them a certain status of illusion. Good, very good.

But if one says to oneself that what needs to be done, that it's never enough when reading a philosopher – and here I am already starting to talk about what I wanted to talk about today – it's never enough when reading a philosopher – no more than a poet or any other type – it's never enough to read a text by the letter, or even to understand it by the letter ... It's true that the letter is dead, as long as you haven't grasped something – let's call it for the moment, of the order of the *affective*. What I call 'of the order of the affective' is a strangeness, a kind of strangeness – we will have to ask ourselves what such a strangeness signifies – it is something strange that underlies philosophical propositions.

It's bizarre, where does this idea come from? Where can this idea come from that Reason engenders illusions? That Reason in its ... in its vigilance, once again ... It is not the sleep of Reason that breeds monsters. It is the vigilance of Reason that engenders hallucinations and illusions. It goes without saying that the whole problem of truth is overturned by that. If I ask myself, where does that come from, it will again be a confirmation of our research – but one does not have to have this problem – if I am able to have it, why not, although it won't get me very far if you can't see it or lose the thread – but anyway, if we ask ourselves where this idea comes from, the illusions of Reason, we will see that it comes from a new conception of time. It is a new conception of time. [*Pause*] It is because Kant makes and imposes a new conception of time that, from that moment on, Reason can no longer be considered, can no

longer be considered as simple guarantee [*Pause*], or as the simple denunciation of illusions, but as *itself* the generator of illusions.

And illusion as illusion of Reason, as illusion engendered by Reason: what is that? Above all, illusion as engendered by Reason is, I would say, what phenomenology would much later call: the *horizon*, [*Pause*] the horizon. The World, the Self, God, are three forms of the horizon, and by virtue of that, inseparable. Illusions are always illusions of the horizon. The whole of the real is immersed, the whole of the real implies a horizon, but this horizon merges with the illusions of Reason. So in fact, your perspective is not wrong, to say that we are right in the middle of a falsifying narration. Kant, he cannot say that, he will never say that. He will say that one should not attempt to dissipate the illusion, but to become conscious of it as such, that is to say, *as such*, which means what, to become conscious of illusion as such? In so far as it is engendered by Reason. The Self, the World and God are the three illusions that Reason engenders.

And, why do I say ... but I hope you don't mind if I start with this rather than linking back to ... but I would like to take up one point here in particular, since we've ended up starting on this. Some years ago, I tried ... – oh, a long time ago, I have the impression we were still at Vincennes, and since I'm occupying myself with it again, I would like to take it up afresh here, especially as it links in fully [with our topic] ... – I actually didn't come with the idea of talking about Kant today, it's because of the note I was given, I came with the idea of talking to you about the way to read philosophers. Because – and you'll see how this links in fully with our topic – that's more or less the whole theme to which I'd like to turn today.

It is that we do not understand at all what philosophy is when we define it simply as an art or a discipline of concepts, and nevertheless it is that. [*Pause*] This is where I link up with what was said last time about Nietzsche. But philosophy is indeed something else, because a concept – if you deal with a concept on its own, well, it's not that interesting; it's satisfying for the intelligence and that's great, and again you have to like entering into that – but, in my opinion, concepts have never been separable from two other things, and these two other things, it is necessary to call them – if only for the sake of comparison – it is necessary to call them *affects* and *percepts*. [*Pause*]. And a concept is zero, but zero, zero, zero, if it doesn't change the nature of your affects, firstly, and secondly, if it doesn't bring you new percepts.

What does that mean? We will have the occasion to come back to it ... and feel that it's all very Nietzschean, that. We will have the occasion to look at it again because take a concept, it is something intelligible, it is an intelligibility. I say: every concept must be referred to an affect, and for every concept, one must ask: what new affects are you bringing me? [*Pause*] It would still be nothing, and you see, you have to ... Only it is not made explicit, you are presented with a concept, fine, but nothing is said about the new affects it brings along with it – that's left up to you! Concepts, they are of different kinds, they can be scientific, they can be philosophical. Well, I won't get into the question what difference there is, but let's say in any case that even when it concerns scientific concepts, until we know what they change in our affects, we haven't yet understood the meaning [*sens*] of the concept.

What is in question, I would ask, if I were to take up the question of sense again? What does that mean, the meaning, the sense of a proposition? In order to find the sense of a proposition, in my opinion, it is necessary first to lead it back to a concept, or one must designate the concept on which it depends. And then, one must discover two things: what affects is this concept connected to? And what does this concept make me perceive? It is implicit that I did not perceive in this way before. In other words, every concept is inseparable from an affect and a percept, or from several of these.

I mean: what you have the right to ask of philosophy, if you are interested in philosophy (and what you have the right to ask of science as well), is that when something is proposed, it is in order to give you, to inspire new affects in you – for in any case, it will do so, even if you don't know it, but it's better if you do – and to make you *perceive* new things, along with inspiring you with new affects. – On that I would like to borrow some formulations, very frequent formulations among certain philosophers, and to say that what is involved is this: ultimately, it is about increasing your power of existing. I use that as a term which would be common to Nietzsche and Spinoza. Or at least to modify, to modify your power of existing.

Surely you could move along and let them in, no? [*It's about a lack of seats and space in the room*] It's not possible? [*Long pause as the students move around*] ... So that I would almost arrive at a very, very bizarre definition, apparently very bizarre, of the concept, you know? It's curious, I find myself in the process ...

A student: [*Inaudible sentences*].

Deleuze: What? Ah! Well, the room is full. That's good, it cannot receive any more people, good. Can you close the door then? We should put up a sign, it's full, eh?, like in the cinema ... Good, now ... [*Deleuze whispers*]. I had the inspiration, now I no longer have the inspiration ... [*Pause*]

So, you understand, please try ... A concept, it would be something which modifies ... [*Pause, various noises, some students saying 'be quiet', 'shut up'. Deleuze's tone in what follows is quiet and exasperated*]. Well, you know, damn it, I've already said a thousand times before why I wouldn't be happy with a larger room. I know it's bad like this though. When it's full, it's full, and then too bad. But I cannot, I cannot, I repeat once again, I do not want to go to the amphitheater. Well, I won't go to the amphitheater for a very simple reason, which I repeat for the tenth time, although some of you weren't here in previous years: if I go to the amphitheater, I'll be stuffed, that is to say, what I have wanted for years and sometimes even manage to achieve and to capture, namely the possibility that anyone can intervene and say something, the possibility of being interrupted, even if it annoys me – all that vanishes in the amphitheater. My dream, I have never hidden it, it's really a dream that seems human enough to me, is really to be able to do courses with fifty people. It's not a question of me choosing them; I don't want to keep anyone out. But everyone here knows well enough, unless I've been doing a clown act, what I've been doing for more than ten years, and maybe one day, one day, I tell myself, I will have the right working conditions, which is not to be in an amphitheater, it is to work with fifty people maximum. So, in this respect, those who are uncomfortable should not resent me in the least ... [*Interruption of recording*] [22:38]

... it's all over, it's all over. Then I would give you a lecture, ready-made. And if you don't know what that would be like, I would show you what it would be like. That's why I'm sticking to this room, it's not through sadism that I'm bolting myself in here.

So, what I'm asking for as a convention is that ... – I know it's unfair, but I don't see ..., there is no other way for me to work, and I already find these conditions in a smaller room lamentable. I would need what is called a seminar in other countries, that is to say, thirty, thirty, forty people with whom I would work at that time. That would allow me to make very considerable progress. By teaching here, under these conditions, I can continue to make progress as far as I'm concerned. So, I hope this makes some sense to those who come along, but I know that in an amphitheater, I don't care what anyone says, it won't allow me to make any progress, not the slightest progress in my research. The amphitheater and research are two mutually exclusive things. If I claim to give you, and I think it's in my favor that I do this – I'm not the only one, generally professors do that; if one teaches, it does involve that – if I

claim to keep you informed or tell you about the state of my current research, and I don't see why I would do lectures otherwise, why I would bother to tell you about things that are already settled ... Well, anyway I cannot do it in an amphitheater, I cannot, it is not feasible. All this is to give some sort of justification to those who are surprised – every year some people are surprised – at this situation. But for me, it is vital, you see, ... I'm as uncomfortable as you, grant me that, but it's vital, I cannot go to a larger room, again because it's not the same work, and it has nothing to do with ...

So, what I'm trying to say – yes, now I'm coming back to the story ... You understand. Concepts have no meaning unless you have found what affections are connected to them, what affects are linked to them, how and in what ways they affect you, along with how and what they make you perceive. These are the two problems. [*Pause*] In other words, to put it simply, it is necessary that your way of feeling is changed by them, even on miniscule points. It is necessary that you see things ... but that you see, in the sense of perception, things that you didn't see before.

I mean in this sense, every concept is what? Is it not pulmonary and visionary, eh? I'll find a better word at some point; that is to say, it is inseparable from affects and percepts. And the English, the English saw that very well. James, for example, the brother of Henry, William James, proposed a philosophy that would truly be carved out of percepts, and he said: no concept without a percept.<sup>1</sup> Even more – concepts, he said, he was not even interested in them. What was necessary to him were new percepts, new ways of perceiving. Now as for me, I believe that there is rather a concept-affect-percept trinity which is fundamental. But a concept is something intelligible which only takes on its meaning through the affects to which it is connected as a concept, and the percepts, the new percepts it gives us.<sup>2</sup>

An author like Bergson also massively, massively insisted on this: a concept is a new way of dividing up the world. In a concept, you bring together things which until then were disunited, were foreign to each other, and on the contrary and at the same time, you separate things which up until then were unified. If you feel a need to unite what has been separated up until you, and to separate what was united up to you, at this moment you can say to yourself: I have a concept. That is to say, you induce a new way of perceiving, you make something seen. But as far as that goes, a concept is not innocent. [*Pause*] It modifies a power of existing; it can diminish it; it can increase it. That's an affect. An affect is a variation of the power to exist, it is a variation of the force to exist. Therefore, the true philosophical trinity is: concept, affect, percept. [*Pause*]

So I come back a little bit to Kant. Where does that come from? You know, someone will say to us: but you had thought up until then that Reason was going to help you combat illusions, illusions coming from the senses. That is a certain way of dividing things up. There were illusions (I'm schematizing), but there was a certain way of dividing things up. There were illusions coming from the senses, but then there was Reason which was going to dissipate the illusions. In dissipating the illusions, well, Reason augments our force to exist, our power to exist, and it makes us perceive things, things as they are. All that is very coherent. You had a system. And then Kant comes along, for reasons ... but which reasons, what reasons does he have? You need serious reasons, because you cannot throw these things together just like that, just anyhow. You realize? What a responsibility! In the end, it's not all so serious, but, well, you do need to have reasons for overturning things to that point. It's not just a game! He tells us: well no, it is Reason in its vigilance which engenders illusions. This changes everything. But then one will no longer perceive the world in the same manner. One is not going to carry on being affected in the same manner; the change of concept refers to new affects and new percepts, and I say, without yet explaining why, well yes, it is with Kant that

for the first time, we are going to perceive the horizon. Until then, the horizon did not interest philosophers much. With Kant, everything that appears in experience is related to a horizon. [Pause] There is a horizon, good.

One will say: a horizon, but what does that mean? Well ... a few years ago, I remember – to arrive at my point now that we've launched into this, but don't worry, we'll fall back on our feet, that is to say, back on to the point we reached last time – I said (I think we were still in Vincennes), well, I tried to find a formula to summarize the extraordinary novelty of Kant, different kinds of formulae, formulae with their origins elsewhere, thinking that I could present the great novelty of Kantianism through four or five great formulas coming from elsewhere, in order to gain clarity on precisely how concept, affect and percept are fundamentally connected.<sup>3</sup>

I think it's true for all philosophers, the philosophers that I love anyway, that they not only know something, but draw the consequences. They know that philosophy cannot just content itself with being a simple exposition of concepts; whereas others might just give expositions of concepts, and leave it to us to draw [the consequences]. No, it is necessary that philosophy *itself* grapple with affects and with percepts. It can't just leave them as consequences that the reader is supposed to draw. So, I was looking for formulas, like ... what could one say? How could one present the ... [He does not finish the thought].

And I said: well yes, if you attempt to understand Kant a little, if you have read him a little, then well, I would say that the first formula is: 'Time is off its hinges [gonds]' [Pause]. 'Time is off its hinges': what's that? Is it *Hamlet*? It's *Hamlet*! ... Good, well, Kant is the philosophical figure of Hamlet, and 'Time is off its hinges', what does that mean? Well, it means something quite simple: time ceases to be circular. The hinge is that around which something turns, it is the axis around which the door turns. The hinges of the door: it turns around its hinges. When Hamlet launches this splendid formula – I can say it to you in English, but it would be useless, it would just be French English ... The text literally is: "Time is out of joint", time has got out of joint, or more precisely, has come off its hinges. "Time is out of joint", it has been put out of joint. That means ..., well you see what it means, it means something very precise, the formula of Hamlet. It means: time has ceased – to allude to things we were talking about last year – time has ceased to be the measure of movement. [Pause] Time no longer measures movement, time is no longer the number of circular motion. Time has been liberated from astronomy, cosmogony and psychology, that is to say, it has freed itself from the Self, from the World and from God. Time comes off its hinges: there is no formula more beautiful than that, than this formula from *Hamlet*.

So if time comes off its hinges, if it is no longer circular, it unfolds, at the same time, it no longer measures the form of movement, that is: it no longer measures cyclical movement. Good, then it has become pure line of time. [Pause] It has literally unrolled, it has become the pure line of time. The labyrinth has ceased to be circular, the labyrinth has become a straight line. If you remember, that's exactly what Borges told us in a narrative I talked about before, when he makes one of his characters say: "I promise you the labyrinth made of the single straight line", and he specifies, "a labyrinth which the Greeks did not know."<sup>4</sup> Now, the labyrinth is the straight line, it is the line of time as 'pure form', which Kant will call (and to which Comtesse referred last week) time as empty and pure form. And time as empty and pure form, understand what that means. That means it has become straight line. Well then, here we have a concept – time comes off its hinges – feel how charged it is with affects, and feel how you are no longer going to perceive things in the same way ... That every concept is a reservoir of possible percepts and virtual affects. [Pause]

And why? This time of the straight line, what does it do? Pure and empty form, [Pause] it traverses. What does it traverse? It traverses something. Our relationship with time has completely changed. If you take this sentence literally, our relationship with time changes completely. [Pause] And it changes under what form? [Pause] I am in time, my very mode of existence is to be in time, [Pause] and at the same time, in so far as I am in time, I am going to become conscious of this: that I am fundamentally separated, separated from what? [Pause] But this separation is also my way of relating to, [Pause] despite being separated from them, the Soul, the World and of God. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Romantics draw from Kant a splendid concept, that of the *double turning away*, namely: man turns away from God, God turns away from man.<sup>5</sup>

Why? On either side of this line of time, what does that mean? Well, I would say: what would be the second splendid formula attributable to Kant? I would say, I recall, I had ..., I'm trying to say it very quickly, but you know, he is almost the first to have suggested – this time, no longer a formula that one would seek in Shakespeare, but a formula one would seek in Rimbaud: 'I is another' [Pause]. 'I is another.'<sup>6</sup> For a very simple reason, for a very simple reason, this would be literally true for Kant.

That, before Kant – here too we have to think about the state of the concepts beforehand – I don't want to say that it was bad, not at all; it was on the contrary all going well, there was a famous formula of Descartes, "I think therefore I am", and this formula of Descartes was "I think therefore I am, I am a thing that thinks." I think therefore I am: what am I? I am a thing that thinks. You will say to me, this is not ... For my part, what's interesting is that we can all the same admire the progression of the reasoning: 'I think' is what one will call 'a determination'; 'I think' is a determination. [Pause] 'I am' is 'an existence', like any existence. When I say nothing further than *I am*, it is a *determinable* existence, to be determined, indeterminate. I am, but what am I? Now: I think. Thought is a determination. 'I am' is the positing of something indeterminate. What am I? Answer: I am a thing that thinks. Well, of course, the undetermined, 'I am', is determined by the determination. Hence the Cartesian progression, the Cartesian reasoning, "I think therefore I am, I am a thing that thinks": that is to say, my indeterminate existence, 'I am', is determined by thought, so I am therefore something that thinks. I am not attempting to explain why Descartes said that, what problem it answers; never mind that.

Now look at Kant. It seems unstoppable as reasoning: 'I think' – 'I am' – 'I am a thing that thinks.' But Kant for his part says: no, it doesn't work at all, and why doesn't it work? "I think, therefore I am", he says, yes, that's fine. Why? Because if I say "I think", I thereby envelop even the existence of an undetermined something that thinks. If I say "I think", it implies an undetermined existence; 'I think' implies 'I am.' He will say, sure, "I think" is a determination; it implies the existence of something undetermined, "I am." But then Descartes comes along and says, well yes, therefore "I am a thing that thinks," that is to say, the determination *determines* the undetermined. Do you follow? It's not that difficult, philosophy, eh? It's truly of the type A plus B equals whatever. You follow me? The determination determines the undetermined.

Kant says: no, no, no, okay, he says, no, I don't want to ... it's not possible, that. There is a fault in the reasoning, there is a fault in the reasoning. You cannot say "determination determines indeterminate existence", you cannot! We say ... okay, but why? Kant's answer: because, in fact, there are not three things, there are four things. You haven't seen ... wait a moment, there's something you haven't seen; you haven't seen the fourth thing. It's that if it is true that determination implies something undetermined, that does not tell us yet under what form the undetermined is determinable by the determination. There are not three things:

determination, the undetermined, and the determined. [Pause] There are four things: determination, the undetermined, the determinable, that is to say, the form under which the indeterminate is determinable, and finally the determined.

I cannot say: “I think, therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks”. I can say: “I think therefore I am.” Fine, okay, I say: “I think therefore I am”. But “I am” is an undetermined existence. Under what form is it determinable by the ‘I think’? This is what Descartes has forgotten to ask. Under what form is it determinable by the ‘I think’? And Kant’s splendid response is: “under the form of time.” My existence is only determinable by the ‘I think’ under the form of time. You can see how that connects with the form of time taken as time become straight line, become pure and empty form. My existence is only determinable under the form of time. [Pause]

But under the form of time, what am I? Under the form of time, I am fundamentally a passive being, receptive; I wait. [Pause] Under the form of time, my existence is that of a passive, receptive being. My existence is only determinable as that of a passive and receptive being, [Pause] but at the same time the determination ‘I think’ is that of an active ‘I’. Indeed, to think is to be active or spontaneous, Kant will say. [Pause] From that moment, as far as I can see, the conclusion of Kant will be: *me*, existing in time as a passive, receptive being, [Pause] I cannot do otherwise than represent myself, than represent my own active and spontaneous existence as that of another. [Pause] “I am another” would signify, from a Kantian point of view, that between me and I, there is a line of time which passes and which makes it so that, me, I am in time a passive being which represents its own activity and its own spontaneity as that of another. [Pause] What a transformation! Me, passive being existent in time, I represent my activity and my spontaneity as that of another. I say, the second formula that Kant could have invented, in a certain way, is therefore the famous “I am another”. And there are indeed others he could have invented. [Pause]

Well, I’ll leave it at that, I’ll hold some things over for the future, for my (or our) future problems: how in Kant a new conception of time, that is to say, time unravelled, time become a straight line, will engender a species of illusion, will be at the basis of all the other illusions as a fundamental illusion, a fundamental illusion no longer connected to our senses, but to our condition of being in time. Namely: we, ‘beings in time’, we can only represent our activity and our spontaneity as those of another. [Pause] I am a *me* whose *I* is another.

If there is a critique of truth in Kantianism, that is its basis, and when, afterwards, he will address himself to the three great ideas of Self, World and God, understand that the illusions that he will seek to denounce as constitutive illusions, as illusions coming from reason itself, come precisely from our situation in relation to time. So all that is difficult, obviously. But then one has to alleviate that somehow, and that’s where my focus is at the moment, when I say that I’ve translated two Kantian concepts into two affects: “time is off its hinges” and “I am another”. Again, this is what you’re obliged to ask for, and I’ll now try to come back to my project such as it was, linking up here with last time, since it remained for us to look more closely at a certain number of texts, precisely Nietzschean, concerning truth; and you will see in what sense it is all absolutely similar.

Our theme at the point we are currently is exactly this: truth enters into crisis from the moment it is confronted with time, and from that moment, what I have said about Kant, however obscure it may be, goes in the same direction. In a certain manner, it has always been confronted with time. I alluded to the oldest Stoics in order to talk, already, of a crisis of the notion of truth. Therefore, it is in so far as it is confronted with time that truth necessarily enters into crisis, and we added: but what forces it to be confronted with time? And our

answer is – for want of a better justification for the moment – ultimately what forces it to be confronted with time is ‘morality’ or something like it. [Pause] And I invoked texts on this, texts by Antonioni, because they seemed to me to be texts of a very high philosophical value, which consist in telling us: well, yes, we are always ready to revise our scientific knowledge, but [Pause] our moral beliefs, we think we don’t have them anymore, but they continue to weigh upon you, they make us maladapted – you recall, we are sick of Eros, because Eros is sick – they make us maladapted, like the whole weight of a past, from which we only periodically manage to escape. But as Antonioni says, when you think you are free, it is for what? It’s for the shabby little tricks which one never quite manages to transcend. Okay, well, we were trying to untangle all that. So, I retain my theme: truth enters into crisis from the moment it is confronted by time, but it is something of the order of morality which forces this confrontation with time.

Let me start again from a new proposition: the true, what is that? I said from the beginning, the true is form. It is form! What the Greeks call *eidos*. Good. [Pause] The true world is therefore the world taken in its form. Note that I agree that the world is a form; if the world has no form, obviously, can the notion of truth even arise? Of course not! I remind you that from the beginning, we have set out from the hypothesis of a form of the true; if there is no form, there is not much of a problem. Okay, but what precisely is form? The *eidos*, and I can just as well say concept. At first sight, I offer a very concrete definition of it, if you like: it is ‘the view from nowhere’. It is the ‘without perspective’. It is what is ‘beyond’ perspective. We’ve been told all about it, it has even been taken up by modern philosophers. What is the difference between an image of a triangle and the concept of a triangle? What is the difference between a concept of a cube and an image of a cube, or a perception of a cube? What is the difference between a concept and a percept?

Well, we are told, for example, that a percept implies ‘perspective’. That means that you will only perceive a cube according to the law of horizons and facets. In other words, if you want to perceive the six faces of the cube, it will be necessary that you circle around it, or turn it round yourself. Otherwise, you will always apprehend it only from certain perspectives. Then you will be able to multiply the perspectives. Because you might very well say to yourself: oh that looks like a cube, but it turns out that it is not one. So, it is necessary that I go and look behind it. You go to see behind it, you see that one face is missing, and then you say to yourself: ah, well no, that’s not a cube. But if you see there’s a face, then good, you have it from another perspective ... The percept, we will be told, the percept is fundamentally perspectivist. Nothing too difficult there.

Fine, but that’s not worth much, such a flat remark, it only has interest if, provisionally at least, it allows us to say: but wait, a *concept*, that’s what distinguishes the percept of the cube and the concept of cube, because with the concept of cube, what happens? When you think of a cube, you think of it as a figure with its six square faces, in such a ratio of parallels and perpendiculars,<sup>7</sup> and the six faces are given to you at once. Given to what? Well, not to the senses, but to thought. In short, I would say, that is where the form of the cube is to be found, the form being the view from nowhere, the beyond-perspective. I could say of the form thus conceived that it is the *eidos*, the concept – from the point of view (everything starts from point of view) ... – it is the *eidos* or the *essence*, as it is supposed to exist in itself. It is the concept as seen by us. This what the true world is. You see, we looked into it and everything’s got easier; earlier, it was too difficult, now it’s too easy.

But who wants the cube in this way? I can say, the concept is the mind’s eye, and if I define the mind’s eye as the simultaneous vision of all the faces of the cube, I can see that such a vision cannot be realised by the eye as organ of the senses, even if it corresponds absolutely

to the concept of cube. But from that moment the painful question arises: so who wants such a thing? Who wants to see such a thing? That does not go without saying. Who wants to see such a thing? After all, maybe if you introduce into the true world ... – I just defined the true world, I said it was the world of forms, the forms being [Pause] the view from nowhere as grasped by the concept – so now I have to ask: who is it that wants to see the triangle or the cube in that way? And here I'm forced to let a strange being into my true world, a very strange man who it is necessary to call 'the veridical man', the truthful man. [Pause]

It's not that complicated, you'll see. Earlier, we were in the most difficult regions, now we are in the easiest part, although it's still serious. You have let the veridical man into the true world. In a way, this is a disaster. Now the true world refers to someone, and refers to someone in what way? I don't even dare to say more yet. Is it the truthful man who thus presupposes the true world, or is it the opposite, is it the true world which presupposes the truthful man? If it is the true world that presupposes the truthful man, that will take a long time to process, one will never have done with it; it means that the true world is entirely perspectivist. It is the perspective of the truthful man. Who is this truthful man?

Is he the one who wants the true? The classical philosophers, and the whole of classical philosophy is so troubled by this story, that there is only one option: to hide it. How? We take the truthful man for granted. We give ourselves the truthful man as self-evident, as if it were the least of things, namely as if it went without saying. How can we be persuaded that it goes without saying? In this sort of way: one just says that it belongs to man to want the true and to seek the true. But we know very well that this is not true. Who knows who is the real seeker of truth? I don't want to exaggerate this aspect too much ... And what does that mean, to seek the true? All that is kept silent, but we will be told: as a mind [or: spirit], why of course, you obviously don't seek the true because you are weak, the mind as mind naturally wants the true. It naturally wants the true: good, okay. The truthful mind is the mind that naturally wants the true. For the whole of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, this will not be put in question, because they have every interest in not putting it into question. The mind naturally wants the true; this is the only way of saving the primacy of the true world over the truthful man. [Pause] The only way. [Pause]

And nevertheless, the worm is in the fruit, because nothing stops you ... You have had to place the truthful man into the true world, and that has slapped a perspective into the true world. Perhaps you won't be able to stop there. If the true world itself depends on a perspective, it is the truthful man who is first in relation to the true world. And, in a text which might seem innocuous enough, which is why I cite it, Nietzsche says: "The true world, attainable to the wise, to the pious, the virtuous man" – that is to say, to the truthful man: "– he dwells in it", and with an emphasis by Nietzsche: "he himself *is* this world" – he *is*, "the truthful man *is* the true world."<sup>8</sup>

Of course, one can read that in a superficial way, but we are beholden to a more exacting, ultimately more provocative, reading of Nietzsche's text. He is telling us something that for him is very, very important. And he adds between parentheses: "(Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition 'I, Plato, *am* the truth')". "I, Plato, *am* the truth." It is signed. So the true world presupposes the truthful man. To then go on to say that the truthful man *invents* the true world, well you can sense that here we devolve back into all our stories about what is fraudulent or not fraudulent. Isn't the truthful man then going to be the first of all the falsifiers? [Pause] The text I am considering here from Nietzsche is from *Twilight of the Idols*, the famous passage entitled: 'How the 'True World' at last became a Fable.'

You see, I'm not saying anything too difficult, eh? I would almost like us to stop there, because from this point we have to proceed very carefully. The easier it is, the more softly one must tread. With this story, all I had to do was introduce – and there was no alternative – I was obliged to introduce a truthful man into the true World, [Pause] defined as the world of the concept viewed from nowhere. I was forced to introduce someone who thinks, that is to say the truthful man, the one who thinks the concept, and thereby, thinks the form. [Pause] The concept is the being-thought of the form. [Interruption of the recording] [1:08:32]

## Part 2

And if the true world has a perspective, is the truthful man not then primary<sup>9</sup> in relation to the true world? To the point that, following Nietzsche, it is necessary to say: it is the truthful man who *is* the true world. And if it is the truthful man who is the true world, well then, once again, the form of the true has already given way to the power of the false [Pause].

The chorus, in the tragic sense, laments! The truthful man, then: we now have to ask the truthful man what he wants. At this point, he can no longer say to us “we have simply uncovered it.” He can no longer say to us “you know, it just goes without saying that I want the true,” he can no longer tell us that. [Pause] He can no longer say to us “I want the true.” For how could he say that to us? Since the true is what is without perspective, we have to ask him: you, in your perspective, what do you want when you say “I want the true”? What is this perspective which needs to see, which wants the ‘without-perspective’ of the true? “What is your perspective?”, I ask the true man. I could not ask it to the truthful man, I could not ask it to the true world. [Pause] If it knew how to speak, it would have answered me: “I am without perspective, look at me. I am the cube seen by the mind’s eye from all sides.” That is what it would have answered me; I only had to shut up. But I waited to see the truthful man taking a stroll in the true world, and I said: ah, but you, you, you, don’t you see, you have a perspective! And yes, he had a perspective. And this perspective, he cannot tell me: it is the perspective that simply consists in willing the true, since the true is the ‘without perspective’. What is your perspective, truthful man? What do you want, when you say: I want the true?

And Nietzsche already says that he will begin to give an answer in saying to us: “I do not want to be deceived.” This time, paragraph 344 of *The Gay Science*. The truthful man answers us: “I want the true because I do not want to be deceived.” [Pause, sound of an aeroplane flying overhead] And why does he not want to be deceived? Who is it that does not want to be deceived? One can’t let him through just like that. He says: “I do not want to be deceived.” Who does not want to be deceived? And Nietzsche will show in this text that behind “I do not want to be deceived”, there is still something else going on. I refer you to paragraph 344 of *The Gay Science*. There is still something else, it is: “I do not want to deceive, either others or myself. I do not want to deceive.”<sup>10</sup>

Okay, you don’t want to deceive. You see, there is already a big advance there, that is transparent, it is very clear. The truthful man’s perspective is this: “I do not want to deceive, either others or myself.” And if he does not want to be deceived, it is because he does not want to deceive either others or himself. [Pause] Well, what is that? This is the moral perspective of the truthful man. At least, it’s the first appearance of the moral perspective of the truthful man. [Pause] So there would be a moral presupposition. It is this moral presupposition that it is necessary, it is necessary at all costs, to analyze; hence the passage to a second order of propositions. [Pause]

Well, the second order of proposition occurs in quite diverse texts by Nietzsche, where one has the impression that something always makes him indignant. And this something which always makes him indignant, it’s kind of what I was trying to get at earlier. You will find it in

*The Gay Science*, paragraph 319 and paragraph 345. The beginning of 345 is very beautiful, just after the text ... You see in 344, he has identified that, beyond the concept of truth, there was a problem of morality. And 345 is entitled 'The Problem of Morality.'<sup>11</sup> This is how the text begins: "The lack of personality always takes its revenge: A weakened, thin, extinguished personality that denies itself is no longer fit for anything good – least of all for philosophy. 'Selflessness' has no value either in heaven or on earth. All great problems demand *great love*." Very curious, that: the great problems.

We'll keep hold, to the extent we can try to do so, of what we feel we understand. I'll try to paraphrase it so as to make connections with what has just been said. Note that he is in the process of telling us: If you consider concepts in themselves, that is to say, in an impersonal and selfless manner, it is not going to be worth much. [*Pause*] Lack of personality is unworthy, above all for philosophy. Never consider a concept in a selfless or impersonal manner. "All great problems demand *great love*, and of that only strong, round, secure spirits who have a firm grip on themselves are capable."<sup>12</sup>

And that is what he wants to say, but it really has the air of a platitude, doesn't it? However, when it's Nietzsche platitudes, then after all, maybe we're interested. "It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an 'impersonal' one, meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought."<sup>13</sup> That comes across as telling us: get enthusiastic, invest your interest in things, etc. And it means just that. That works, fine. It means just that. It simply gives to it a depth that we did not know before. What is he in the process of saying to us, in effect? And it is the second type of proposition that I want to retain, which I have broadly outlined. *The concept*: a vision without perspective, I said. He adds for us: a selfless, impersonal vision, [*Pause*] that is worth nothing if you don't join a great love to it. A great problem implies a great love.

Now, without doubt that does not mean ..., let us eliminate immediately what that cannot mean. That does not mean: the scholar who very much loves his little ... for example, the specialist in beetles who adores his little beetles, or the Descartes specialist who adores the Cogito, the Kant specialist who adores ... and who put their whole life into that – it must not mean that, because the question we immediately feel raised is: ah, there must be no impersonal and selfless concepts ... No, I'm expressing myself badly, in fact it's a rather neat story. It's not that concepts shouldn't be impersonal and selfless, they are, this is the 'without-perspective'. Nietzsche doesn't say to us that those things are not necessary. Nietzsche says to us that if you do not join a great love to them, they're worthless. Fine.

So let us try to ask, what is great love? Great love, that can only be a state of life. Everything depends on life. I take up again my specialist in beetles. He has put his whole life into ... – and again that can be wonderful – he has put his whole life into ... something – I cannot even say beetles because he would say: but beetles, that is an infinite world – let us say into some particular beetle. And better still perhaps he has put his whole life into the articulation of the left claw of this beetle. Something like that. What is that then? It can be that. It can be that, but obviously great love designates a state of life.

A state of life? What does that mean, a state of life? A state of life is always relative. I mean, a state of life is always a passage. In fact there is no state of life; there are transitions from one state to another, passages from one state to another. [*Pause*] These changes of state can happen in two directions. I pass to a state that envelops a greater power of life, force of life, or I pass to a state that envelops less force of life. [*Pause*] Any shift in the direction of increase or decrease will be called an affect. Affects are passages. The affect that increases a

force of life, Nietzsche talks of it very often and gives it a particular name. He calls it 'intoxication.' [Pause] Intoxication is therefore not drinking, it is not drugs, although drinking and drugs can ... who knows? Nietzsche alludes to this at certain points. Do they produce such increases or not? Do we pay for these increases with a diminution that is just as considerable, etc? And all these problems, it would be necessary to examine them in each case.

But he will call 'intoxication' any intensification, any process of intensification that increases the power of life. [Pause] The more my power of life ... – you see, I don't get to choose, everything depends on the individual. – The important thing is that ... one decides, like that. It is better for a power of life to increase than to diminish. You will say to me, but there are cases where there is no choice involved at all: for example, in sickness, your power of life diminishes. This is not at all the question, you understand? Nietzsche is all the same pretty smart, precisely he who had such poor health. He is not telling us: Long live the tough guys! You've got to get tough! Not at all. He says that, whatever your state, whatever be your state, there are affects which are passages to a lesser power of life and affects which are passages to a greater power of life, including when you are dying.

It might happen one day that someone dying feels a slight caress of light or sun on their face which reconciles them with death. I would say: this was a fantastic augmentation of the power of life. If there was someone athletic in possession of all their means who looked around him and envied everyone, saying, I wish I had his ears, someone else's intelligent gaze, etc., I would say that this bitter man, however healthy his body may be, and even his soul if need be, never ceases to diminish in his force of life. Good.

Perhaps you can sense what Nietzsche is saying. It is not a question of replacing – especially not – the true with the useful. Because usefulness gives you no orientation: useful to whom? For what? It is a question of joining the concept, that is to say, the impersonal and selfless view from nowhere, to the greatest love, that is to say, to the affect, by calling 'affect' the passages [Pause] corresponding to the variations of the power of life, that is to say, the increases and decreases of the power of life. [Pause] We are constantly passing, that is to say, our power of life is constantly varying at each instant. Why? No doubt for a very simple reason, which is that affect is a passage, in fundamental relation with what Comtesse nicely called last time "the force of time"; because that is what the force of time is. The force of time is what makes a power of life increase or diminish.

Good: now add one last point to understand this second kind of text by Nietzsche. The more my power of life increases, the more I am apt to perceive things. This lets you know the extent to which it is not the useful which is a criterion in all this, which seems quite important to me. The more my power of life increases, the more I am capable of perceiving things. The more it diminishes, the less I am capable of seeing things. [Pause] And knowing how to see, to perceive more things, what a fantastic gain. What is this marvel? What must one say about people who are too bitter and unhappy? If not that, in a certain way, as is said, they have made their own misfortunes, they have secreted their own sadnesses. They see nothing, they do not know how to see. Truly, there are people who do not know how to see. Yes, they are the same ones whose power of life is always diminishing, decreasing. The more my power of life increases, the more I am able to perceive and to perceive more things. Who said that?

A student: Spinoza.

Deleuze: Spinoza. Spinoza never stopped saying that, and it is on this point that Nietzsche will say: "I have only one precursor, it is Spinoza",<sup>14</sup> and neither of them, in the end, are all that healthy, are they? They're not at all healthy, eh? So it's really not about being in good

health. This is not their problem. It is to increase one's force, one's power to exist, to increase the power of existing in such a manner that one is capable and becomes capable of perceiving as many things as possible. To become capable of perceiving as many things as possible is a theme which has not ceased to haunt English literature. [Pause] And this is why we meet up again with those directions of research I proposed to you on previous sessions.

If I take up again three great writers of American literature, Herman Melville, Virginia Woolf ...<sup>15</sup> I had a third, I no longer have him, he's disappeared.

A student [*near to Deleuze*]: It's Henry James.

Deleuze: Ah! Henry James. It is not by chance that he is the brother of the philosopher. If there were someone who reads English or American literature who wanted to do some original work – I don't think it's ever been done – what better than a comparative study of the two brothers, the philosopher and the novelist? There's a received idea that Henry James is great, while his brother is an idiot; but according to the philosophy textbooks, William James is a philosopher of genius. The two brothers did not like each other much, but that is precisely all the more interesting. They were nevertheless related and the comparison of William James as a philosopher and of Henry James as a novelist, in my opinion, would be fascinating, and I don't think anyone English or American has explored this.

But having said that, for those who have some knowledge of the work of Virginia Woolf, the work of Herman Melville, the work of Henry James, think about how one can say in a certain way that it is an inventory, a fantastic inventory of states and means of perception, [Pause] and that the great lesson, or one of the great lessons, of the English-American novel, is that you do not know how to perceive. In my opinion, this is one of the reasons why the English and the Americans have never seen fit to make the ruinous division we have in France between philosophy and literature. It is not by chance that it is writers who are their greatest thinkers. It is necessary, it's necessary.

I'll explain myself a little bit. Virginia Woolf, she has a simple idea, and all of them have a simple idea; for us [in France], Bergson was the only one with a similar conception. Everything is straightforward for us when there are just solids, right? [*Deleuze knocks on the table*] We always manage to perceive the cube, the perspective. Perspective here is a simple perspective, solid perspectives, that is to say spatial perspectives. Perception can draw on all that. But this is the mere embryo of perception, of what we perceive. It is the embryo and even more, it prevents us from perceiving what really counts. But what is it that really counts? It is that which has no form. To perceive what has no form, well, that starts to be interesting, that's more difficult.

What is it that has no form? Well, for example, it is what is between two things, perceiving between things. Okay, perceiving between things. Not so easy. I know how to perceive things but to perceive between things? If I start with that, perceiving between things, I can't just stop there, can I? There is a sentence made famous by Godard, the famous sentence on Vélásquez: "He didn't paint things, he painted between things."<sup>16</sup> Fine, but what is there when one perceives between things? Does everything have a form? What is it to perceive a cloud? What is it to perceive that which keeps changing form? What is the walk of Mrs Dalloway in Virginia Woolf? It will be the discovery of a whole graduation of scales, a whole scale of modes and degrees of perception. [Pause] What are all of Virginia Woolf's novels if not extraordinary perceptual studies? [Pause] What is art if not these two aspects at the same time? I mean, the affect and the percept, increasing the power of existing – or diminishing it, one will see, – and making you capable of perceiving.

What are you supposed to learn with painting? What you did not know and what you would never know if there were no painting, namely, you are supposed to learn to perceive. To learn to perceive the painting? Not at all, not at all. You are supposed to learn to perceive the world through a painting. Does that mean what the painting represents? Obviously not, obviously not. You are supposed to become adept at perceiving more and more things. What are people who do not perceive anything? This is not nothing. To take up Nietzsche's view and point to their morality, in effect these are people who lack any kind of interest. In the end, I don't know, of course they're going to be interested in something, but it is in themselves. Everything can pass under their noses, starting with the most beautiful, the simplest. What's that? The most beautiful, the simplest, that can be a current of air, a wind. The English, they are specialists in that. But to perceive the in-between, to perceive what has no form, all that, what does that imply? Perhaps it implies ... well, singular variations in the power of existing.

Why does Mrs Dalloway say: "Never again will I say *me*"?<sup>17</sup> It may be that this 'me', well ... there is a peculiar connection here with [*Deleuze knocks the table*] the solids. For what is this whole scale of a world of perception supposed to discover? I would say that the *lowest* degree of the world of perception is what? Well, you know, it is not difficult. In effect, it's the solid because it is an object of spatial perspective. [*Pause*] And what we know how to perceive are objects which offer themselves to a spatial perspective. My cube, I grasp it under one facet, then I either move around it to grasp another facet or I don't, as the phenomenologists put it very well, as the phenomenologists said, who never ceased to remain at this stage of perception when they were doing a phenomenology of perception. As Merleau-Ponty said, well of course "I intend the cube, the totality of the cube, through the facet which is given to me."<sup>18</sup> Good.

But then why say it is the lowest degree of perception? What happens when I realise that perceiving is more than that? Again, it's quite simple: to perceive is to become capable of perceiving more and more things which at first were not perceived. Well, what happens is that I replace more and more, I abandon more and more, the world of spatial perspectives, in order to attain something absolutely different, which we were talking about last year, namely: I become the man of temporal perspective.<sup>19</sup> It is time that acts as perspective. And only time acts as perspective, the true perspective is time. There is no perspective in space, or they are false perspectives. Only temporal perspective counts. But to attain temporal perspective, it is to become capable of perceiving what at first does not let itself be perceived.

But with that I now come back a little to more reasonable things. This is how the English and the Americans have always been Spinozists and Nietzscheans, even without knowing it. The great text by Spinoza was already at the end of Book Three [of the *Ethics*], the General Definition of Affects. And in the General Definition of Affects, you will find three themes. [*Pause*] A first theme: the representation or concept; second theme: my force of existing or my eminently variable power of existing. Each representation or concept is related to a variation, that is to say, varies my power of existing. I would say the representation in itself is the concept, the representation taken in itself, and considered for itself in a selfless manner, etc., this is the concept. The representation considered as making my power of existing vary at each moment – they are all representations – this is the affect. And [third theme:] the representation as what makes me more or less capable of perceiving a greater or lesser number of things is the percept. [*Pause*]

The first aspect, the concept, I say: no problem. Let us join it up with everything we've seen and say once more, it is the form of the true. But the doublet, affect and percept: the affect is: increase or diminution of my power to exist; the percept is: a certain state or a certain aptitude to perceive more or less things. That is no longer the form of the true; it is what? It is

the domain of power [*puissance*]. And with power, we rediscover the coherence of everything we have done here today, power as ... [*Unfinished sentence*]. Which holds equally for morality as for ethics.

From that moment, morality, morality, I don't even need it anymore, fine, let us say ethical. What is ethics? That means, and Spinoza always defined it like that, ethics means that each of us, as far as it is in him, makes it so that his power to exist increases to the maximum; and at the same time each of us, as far as it is in him, that is to say, as much as is possible in virtue of the objective circumstances – but I mean, this holds for a dying person as well, so one can't make that objection anymore, it goes for a sick person, it goes for ... – that each of us, as much as it is in him, strives to become capable of perceiving more things. I would say that this is the domain of power.

How to define these two aspects of power once again, affect and percept? Well, here [*Pause*] let us remain Nietzscheans, let us try to remain Nietzscheans. You can see that everything that he calls the will to power, Nietzsche, we are beginning to understand. It is indeed the same thing as intoxication, that is to say, the increase in the power of existing. Obviously that does not mean the conquest of [worldly] power [*pouvoir*], because to conquer power [in this sense] does not give you an increase in the power of existing, and above all it does not make you perceive more and more things. On the contrary, it greatly restricts your vision. It is well known that men of power see absolutely nothing. You even have to be singularly outside of power in order to see something.

Okay, so ... how to define these two aspects of power, the affect and percept? You understand? [*Pause*] I am not saying, therefore, down with concepts. This is almost the course I've been wanting to do for so many years on 'What is Philosophy?' It would consist in saying that there is a very special intimacy of the concept, of the affect and of the percept that constitutes philosophy ... It is ... Okay, but what do I *not* want to say at all? That we have to abandon the concept. As Nietzsche [said] in the texts I quickly gave an overview of, *The Gay Science*, 319 and 345, paragraphs 319 and 345 ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:45:40]

### Part 3

There are no good concepts without great love. There are no good concepts without a great love, but 'without a great love', that no longer means at all – try to think we've at least made some progress – that no longer means at all: interest yourself in what you do, because that's the least you can do. It means that concepts or the thoughts that you have, whatever they are, of a scientific order, of a philosophical order, of whatever order, do not occur without an increase in your power to exist and without making you perceive a multiplicity of other things.

Then, affect, how would I define that? What increases my power to exist. Nietzsche will give us the continuation: "It is that which makes us lighter." I mean, understand, because it is so concrete. Nietzsche wants to say very simple things to us: if you love someone, if you love someone, two things, and it won't be your fault: first, you will draw sadness, anguish from it. Who doesn't know the sadnesses and anxieties: does he love me? Does she love me? Is she deceiving me? Problem of truth: is she deceiving me or not? Anxiety: she's ten minutes late! ... all that. [*Deleuze knocks on the table*] Antonioni said: we are sick of Eros, we are sick of Eros. Well, I would say that in this case, love diminishes your power to exist. Does it make you perceive more and more things? No! From morning to evening, you're like a moron, [*Laughter*] ... I'm exaggerating, but at the end of the day none of that makes you very intelligent, nor does it make you more perceptive; it does not make us visionary.

On the other hand, even a love that is called unhappy – I imagine what I’m saying is Nietzschean; as far as I’m concerned, it’s absolutely Nietzschean. I don’t know if he absolutely lived like that, but it’s hard to live like that, he did not claim to; one must try to get there, but it’s very difficult – nevertheless might there not be, even in an unhappy love, in a certain way, one assumes, a joy in loving? To love someone, after all, it is to find them good – I mean, here too, it is to be capable of perceiving something in them that isn’t obvious, it’s never completely obvious [*Laughter*] – but we are able to perceive something in them. It’s not a question of knowing: does that really exist or not?

I have a perception. What would that mean, a perception? Well, if I perceive something, and someone says to me: but does that really exist? I’ll reply: are you out of your mind, what do you mean ‘really exist’? I might only be able to give outlines of it, as one sketches the shape of a nose. Then you’ll say to me: ah, so you’re saying that she has a trumpet-like nose – but on the contrary, it is quite clear she has a crooked nose ... Well, all such quibbling belongs to the order of solids, it is to do with spatial perspective. But if a smile, even addressed to another, gives me a kind of feeling of perfection, well, no one’s going to say to me: is that true, or is it false? I would say: what are you on about? What do you mean? That is not the question.

I say that such a love, which does not seem so insane to me after all, is rather happy to love, even, if oneself, one is not so loved; the latter is secondary. It is secondary; no, it is not secondary. But ultimately, there is nothing to cry about; all that, it will be found again, will it not? [*Laughter*] Nothing to cry about, there is nothing to be sick about, eh? That is a form of love which consists in increasing one’s power of existing and which suddenly makes you capable of perceiving more and more things and people. And it does not necessarily mean: multiply your loves, I do not mean that at all, and Nietzsche would not mean that at all, that it is necessary to love several. – But the more you love someone, the more you increase your power of existing, and the more you become capable of perceiving things, if necessary of a completely different nature.

You will say to me: what is this grotesque discourse on love? Don’t worry, it’s not serious, because it could be something other than love, you know? Take any affect, you have affects which diminish your power of acting, let’s call them heavy affects. You have affects which increase your power of acting, let’s call them light affects. What do we say that has to do with? We say that it has to do with what is most profound in wisdom and in the wisdom of all wisdoms, that is to say the relation you must have and maintain with a center of gravity. [*Pause*] The more you identify and localize yourself in your own centers of gravity, the more agile, rapid, you will be, the more you will increase your power of acting, [*Pause*] even at the price of imbalances, even at the price of a disequilibrium that will have to be perpetually compensated for, all that. The further you are from your centers of gravity, [*Pause*] the heavier you will be. Good.

It’s the heavy and the light when I define affect in relation to the center of gravity, and with regard to that, if I had to appeal to an author, this time it would be to a German, the German Romantic, [Heinrich von] Kleist.<sup>20</sup> If you define affect in relation to the center of gravity, you see that the affects which tend to increase your power of acting are the light affects, the others are the affects of heaviness, hence Nietzsche’s expression, “let the earth become lightness.”<sup>21</sup>

Second aspect of ethics: becoming capable of perceiving more and more things. But that doesn’t mean any old thing, it is not additive, it is not perceiving more and more tables, solid things [*Deleuze knocks the table again*]. We have seen that it means passing to another threshold of perception, perceiving other things and perceiving differently. I’ve briefly

suggested how it applies in Virginia Woolf; it also applies in Melville, especially since there is a very beautiful, still unpublished book on Melville by [Philippe] Jaworski<sup>22</sup> which makes – for example in connection with Herman Melville – a complete inventory of the states of vision, according to Melville, of the sea by the sailor, as a function of the positions of the sailor, which is to say here also as a function of his relations with the center of gravity: namely the sea seen from the top of the mast, the sea seen from mid-mast, the sea seen from the ship, the sea seen from a small boat, etc. There is a whole kind of ... in the whole oeuvre, according to Jaworski, there is a ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:54:28]

... a supposed center of inertia, but it is defined in relation to what? To a point of view, to a center of view, to an optical center. I keep in mind these two senses of the word center here – obviously in each case, these two centers which are connected, they do not stop moving – the center as being the point of view starting from which ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] – For what is important is not simply to perceive other things, it is that this perception is a veritable new ordering, a new ordination of things. It's not about arranging them in compartments like in a cupboard, we're talking rather about how this becomes a part of philosophy. It's not about arranging perceptions into compartments, it is a question of grouping them in new series. Not only to perceive new things, but to give them a new ordering. [*Pause*]

And I keep coming back to one particular example of such a regrouping. When I spoke to you last year, very quickly, about the theory of conics, what is that?<sup>23</sup> What does that mean in geometry, the theory of conics? It means a very simple thing, it is a theory which will precisely introduce perspectivism into mathematics, into geometry. Here one can see well enough what perspectivism means. [*Pause*]

Consider a cone and section this cone according to different sections. [*Pause*] So on each section plane, there will be a figure, and the eye, vertex of the point of view, to which these figures appear. What does the eye discover as the cone passes through the sections? It discovers a series: the circle, the ellipse, the hyperbola, the parabola, two right angles, a point, etc. I've just said them out of order, but I can say that, from a certain point of view, a point, a circle, an ellipse, a hyperbola, a parabola, are and share it in common to be conic sections.

I would say this is a typical case: I have perceived these things in a new way. I have not discovered something they would have in common which no one else has thought of. That would be of the order of the concept. I might have discovered a new property of one of these figures; but it is not that. No, I have discovered a relation of passage from one to the other, depending on how I orient my conic section. I can pass from a hyperbola to a parabola, I can pass from a circle to an ellipse, by orienting the section of the cone. If I say that, it is not of the order of concept, it is of the order of the percept.

Well, ouf, listen, eh? I'm summarizing. I'm summarizing, yes, because it is all very complicated. This is where we are: the form of the true, okay, we call it the concept – you remember, I'm just fixing the vocabulary so that we can agree on this – the form of the true, we call it the concept. I insist on form.

Power: we say that power always has a double aspect: it is the affect [*Pause*] and the percept. [*Pause*] We add: just as the true world refers to a supposedly truthful man, [*Pause*] the concept is not enough, but refers to the two aspects of power, the affect and the percept.

I would add that under one of these aspects (affect), power could be called – according to the phrase Comtesse proposed the other time – “the force of time,” since in effect, affect is

perpetually the passage according to which my power of existing increases and diminishes. [Pause] And it is time that makes us heavy, just as it is time that makes us light. [Pause] And I could say of time that it is like the force of the affect as such. [Pause] The percept is the other aspect of power, and the percept reinforces that, since one senses that the percept grasped from a point of view, from its perspectivist point of view, is precisely the temporal perspective, as opposed to mere spatial perspectives. [Pause]

The crisis of the notion of truth is the confrontation of the concept with its two correlates: affect and percept. [Pause] And when we find ourselves before the form of the true, before the concept, we have to ask ourselves: well, this very concept, this form of the true, does it increase our power of existing, or is it on the contrary the lowest degree of the power to exist? We have to ask ourselves: does it make us able to perceive more and more things, or on the contrary does it petrify, does it freeze all perspectivism? It is as if the heaviness and the lightness of time in perception refer to a temporal perspective, and it's there that we find the relation of the true and time.

But maybe, well, I should still make that a little clearer, eh? Does that work, or not? Because ...

A listener: It is clear.

Deleuze: It seems clear to you? Me, I suddenly just thought to myself, wow, what a mush ...

Another listener: What? Not at all.

Deleuze: No, it's difficult, I have to ... What I'm driving at, you see, yes, I'm going to try to say it again, in order ... and then I'll finish because it's going to become even more abominable.

You see, I say at the same time that the concept must be related to affects and percepts, but that there is nothing possible if there is no concept. Simply, what I think is that the form of the true precisely must be completely put in question, by what? When you put, when you confront the concept with affects and percepts, at that moment, the true passes through a fundamental crisis, and the force of time, under its double aspect, affect and percept, becomes through that itself a power of false, but a power of the false which will go where, up to where? Well, it's the same thing with Nietzsche, who in the same stroke could put truth into question and say that it is a catastrophic notion, while saying all the time, "We, seekers of truth ..."

I mean, in effect, that it is necessary to submit the true to the power of the false. Submitting the true to the power of the false means submitting it to affects and to percepts. And for what purpose, to achieve what? What can the force of time allow us to do if it makes us light enough for it? Well, what I'm saying is the flattest of things, it is the flattest, so I'll say it right away, that it is my object this year – but it will only be able to take on a modicum of consistency if I can also make some further advances – but I'll say it straight away for the sake of clarity, it's quite simple – what the power of the false can allow us to do, if we arrive at the highest degree of the power of the false, is to make truth into something to be created. And the idea of *creating* the truth, of creating the truth, of creating something truthful, creating the truth: this is actually a very strange idea.

I mean, if someone asks me the big difference between ancient philosophy and modern philosophy, for me it is just that. Ancient philosophy is a philosophy for which truth pre-exists and must be created [*Deleuze will correct himself*], that is to say, there is a form of the truth – sorry, what am I saying? – it must be *discovered*, that is to say, there is a form of the

true. I call modern philosophy a philosophy for which, on the contrary, truth must be created, constituted: *not* discovered, *created*. The creation of something true and the creation of the true, what is that? It is the creation of something new, it is strictly identical. Just as the discovery of the true for ancient philosophy is the discovery of the eternal, the creation of the true for modern philosophy is the emergence of something new.

Hence the most important philosophies ... the most important philosophers of what is called the modern age are philosophers like Bergson, Whitehead, Sartre, who have never ceased to put philosophy under the sign: under what condition is creation possible, the constitution of something new? And that is the anti-Platonic question par excellence, I would dare to say, that is to say, it is the question which is opposed to that of ancient philosophy. And Whitehead, Whitehead, for example, creates – an author who is too little known in France, because the French, they never like the English, but it's true reciprocally [*Laughter*] – Whitehead, who is one of the greatest geniuses of the twentieth century, made a whole philosophy of things that he himself calls 'the creative', 'creativity'. He invents all sorts of categories founded on the question: 'how is the emergence of something new possible in the world?' That is the modern philosophical question; it's not at all that the Greeks are superseded, they just did not pose this question. It follows that from then on, the relations between science and philosophy, etc., along with the concern for evolutionism, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, can be explained very well. It's really to do with the fascination philosophy has with this little problem: what is it that creates truth? To create truth, it is to constitute, it is to make something emerge which is new in the world. Good.

So what I wanted to say, well that's it ... When I say: 'in the form of the true' – you see, I've presented my schema for you to find your way around, but I feel slightly troubled because perhaps here and there things are still too obscure – ... When I say: the crisis of truth is bound up with time, that means the form of the true must be, if you will, confronted by and disappear in the power of the false. The power of the false has these two aspects: the affect and the percept. [*Pause*]

But be happy, don't lose heart, for the power of the false, raised to its last power will give you back the true, – obviously it's a little deceptive, [*Laughter*] I can't do anything about that – will give you back the true, but under an absolutely new form, that is to say not under the form of a thought of the eternal or of a form of the true, or under the form of an organic form of the true, but under a completely different form, the creation of something new, whatever that might be.

So with all the more reason, Nietzsche can say here: for anything new, however small, "great love is demanded." [*Pause*] I'm going to tell you, I have a vague sense of shame, but anyway, it doesn't matter, today I can't do anymore.

Next time, I'll have to go back over that in a much more scholarly fashion. I won't go back over everything all over again, but instead I will immerse myself in Plato ... Yes, that's it, the time has come for Plato. I sense that what is missing is some Plato [*End of the recording*] [2:10:55]

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the two Jameses are American.

<sup>2</sup> The trinity to which Deleuze refers here constitutes the basis of his last collaboration with Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill, London: Verso, 1994) [*Qu'est-ce que c'est la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991).]

<sup>3</sup> The formulas Deleuze develops from Kant are to be found in the Seminar on Kant, especially the sessions of 14 and 21 March 1978. See also *Essays Critical and Clinical* (translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1997) [*Critique et Clinique* (Paris: Minuit, 1993)], ‘On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy’, pp. 27-35.

<sup>4</sup> Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Death and the Compass’, *Fictions* (translated by Anthony Kerrigan, London: John Calder, 1985), p. 127-128. In fact the text reads: “I know of a Greek labyrinth which is a single straight line.” Cf. Session 3 of this Seminar, 29 November 1983.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘Remarks on *Oedipus*’, translated by Thomas Pfau in *Essays and Letters on Theory* (Albany: SUNY, 1988), p. 107-108; and commentaries by Beda Alleman, *Hölderlin et Heidegger*, translated from German into French by François Fédiér (Paris: PUF, 1959 [German 1954]), pp. 52-55; and Jean Beaufret, *Hölderlin et Sophocle* (Brionne: G. Montfort, 1983), pp. 15-34 and *passim*.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase is found in a letter by Rimbaud, known as ‘The Letter of the Seer’, to Paul Demeny, 15 May 1871.

<sup>7</sup> A lacuna of almost ten minutes with regard to the recording starts here in the transcription at Paris 8 and WebDeleuze.

<sup>8</sup> Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, ‘How the ‘Real World’ at last became a Myth’, translated by R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 40; translation modified.

<sup>9</sup> End of the lacuna in the transcription at Paris 8 and WebDeleuze.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Walter Kaufmann’s translation: “Consequently, ‘will to truth’ does *not* mean ‘I will not allow myself to be deceived’, but – there is no alternative – ‘I will not deceive, not even myself’” (*The Gay Science*, New York: Vintage Books, 1974, # 344, p. 281-282).

<sup>11</sup> Kaufmann translates the heading as ‘Morality as a problem’.

<sup>12</sup> *The Gay Science*, # 345.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>14</sup> Letter to Franz Overbeck, 30 July 1881: “I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza [...]” (*Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, edited and translated by Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996, p. 177).

<sup>15</sup> Again, Deleuze is not exact.

<sup>16</sup> Deleuze introduces this reference during Session 3 in the Seminar on Painting, 28 April 1981, but there he attributes it to a text by Élie Faure read out in Godard’s film *Pierrot le Fou*, a text drawn from *The History of Art*, Vol. IV, *Modern Art*, translated by Walter Pach (New York: Harper, 1924), p. 124.

<sup>17</sup> A precise equivalent of this sentence (“Jamais plus je ne dirais moi-je”) is not to be found in Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs Dalloway*, but in *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari talk about “tak[ing] a walk like Virginia Woolf”, adding in parentheses “never again will I say, ‘I am this, I am that’” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987, p. 29; cf. also 263), which refers to the sentence “She would not say of herself, I am this, I am that” in *Mrs Dalloway* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1925), p. 11.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (translated by Colin Smith, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 203-205.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Sessions 18 and 19 of the Second Cinema Seminar, 26 April and 3 May 1983.

<sup>20</sup> Deleuze refers to Kleist’s 1811 essay ‘On the Marionette Theater’.

<sup>21</sup> A phrase that also appears, without a reference to a specific text by Nietzsche, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 510.

<sup>22</sup> *Le Désert et l’empire* (Paris: Off-shore/Presses de l’École normale supérieure, 1986). Deleuze cites Jaworski’s study in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Roberto Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989), p. 292, note 9, and p. 306, note 27.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the fourth Session of the Second Seminar on Cinema, 7 December 1982; on perspectivism, cf. in particular the Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, 18 November 1986.