

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

So, regarding... regarding the question of the truth-time relation, we have been, as you have noticed, in a philosophical phase for several sessions now. This philosophical part I imagine we will continue for two or three more lessons, after which we will go back to focusing on images. We will have again found cinema and philosophy. For the moment, we are immersed in this history which, in the end, we took up in terms of the Greeks and Plato, and which is really the indirect image of time. And the whole subtext of what we're trying to do here is... when time, when time is, philosophically speaking, the object of an indirect image, and only of an indirect image, this presupposes a certain conception of truth. If the image of time undergoes mutations, it is obviously the concept of truth which is rattled and which itself undergoes a mutation.

Now, if I summarize the point we have reached and upon which it seems to me we have spent sufficient time, I would like to remind you of the schema we had arrived at before... before the holidays. I would like to make this schema very clear because I consider it to be the same thing whether addressed to the philosophers or non-philosophers here. It isn't any more complicated, for example, for those of you who are more interested in cinema, but I invite you to take it as a series of images which would literally, in the etymological sense, be cinematographic images. What did this first stage that we studied and investigated in Plato amount to? It amounts to saying: well, time, yes, receives its famous definition: measure or number of movement. We can see that, when we say that time is the number or measure of movement, it is an indirect image of time insofar as it derives from movement. It is an indirect image of time.

So, what does movement consist of? Its definition must not presuppose time. Well, in the Platonic schema, once again, movement is the movement of extension, what we call local movement, that is to say, the movement which consists in the following: that an object, that something passes from one position to another. It is therefore movement considered as an extensive quantity. You'll tell me: it's not that simple in Plato. Well, yes, no, no, it's never quite so simple with anyone. It's in the commentary that we can firm up our notions. Plato doesn't even have to say that movement is an extensive quantity and for a very simple reason: he cannot conceive of any other kind of quantity. You might say: yes, he does have an idea of another type of quantity. Yes, without doubt, he has an idea of another type of quantity.

We will have to make changes and ruptures with Plato in order to realize that he did have the idea of another type of quantity. That is to say, we will have to find the emergence of this

idea through other paths so that returning to Plato, we can say to ourselves: "Ah yes, that was already present in Plato". Because here is where things get very, very difficult: to assign for each great thinker or for each great author what is new in their work, what their particular novelty consists in, which novelties are still latent, and which ones are the formal novelties, that is to say, the ones that are formally presented and so on. To weigh things up, the art of weighing texts, which is also the art of the reader or the commentator, is very difficult because, in a text, you always have both what is implicit and what is explicit, there are always several levels that coexist. It is always a very difficult task.

But all I will say for now is that movement is the passage from one position to another, which implies what? Which implies that *the world is a configuration*. Time is the number or the measure of movement... But of what? Of the world. It is the movement of the world. The world is a configuration, but in what sense? In the sense that the world is inseparable from the allocation and distribution of the privileged points that operate on a matter, that operate, not of their own accord, but which the maker of the world, the demiurge, imposes upon a matter. So that the world is defined as a configuration, that is to say, distribution of these privileged points. And this distribution of privileged points in Plato's *Timaeus*¹ appears in the wake of operations that are those of the demiurge, the maker of the world, and it appears in an extremely complex mathematical-physical, or geometrical-physical form, that is well founded, as well as – here I'm mentioning what seem to me to be the main directions – as well as an extremely advanced geometric theory of proportions whose purely geometric elaboration we find in Euclid's *Elements*², one that goes extremely far and that will come to constitute the great theory of proportions.

But on the other hand, it is not only the theory of proportions that allows us to determine the privileged points. There is also a whole play – and here I insist – a whole play of planes, of planes in relation to one another. And we will see why I need to insist so much today, something I didn't do on other occasions, on the notion of the plane. And in fact, it is the planes according to which the world is organized that will permit, in addition to proportions, the determination of the privileged points. In what sense? For example, all this astronomy which begins by distinguishing the plane of the equator and the plane of the ecliptic. And, according to the orientations of planes in relation to one another – a plane can be perpendicular to another plane, we'll see the importance of that, it can be oblique in relation to another plane – it's this configuration of planes that will define something important. But what exactly? Well, the planisphere, the planetarium... and the distribution of privileged points on this planisphere, once it has been said that a privileged point always lies on a plane. And here I insist because all this is so little self-evident that we will see how everything will be called into question.

But, in terms of pure Platonism, it seems to me that this is how things are. The planetarium is like an organization of planes relative to one another. And it is according to this reciprocal organization of planes that the assignment of the privileged points – plane of the equator, plane of the ecliptic – is made, once again to come back to the basis of the *Timaeus* and of the astronomy of the *Timaeus*. Henceforth, you see that movement – I therefore first have the world, I have just defined the world – movement is a series of logical distinctions; chronologically speaking, it is all given at the same time. Movement issues straight out. Movement is therefore the passage of the world or of an element of the world from one privileged point to another.

Henceforth, we can immediately understand, in a third step, through a purely logical deduction, what time is... once said that you are entitled – but you still have to gain this entitlement – once said that you are entitled to define movement as the passage of the world or of an element of the world from one privileged position to another, which implies a planisphere – again, which implies planes, since privileged points exist only on planes, a privileged point implies a plane. A plane may include several privileged points but, in any case, a privileged point always lies on a plane – so, once you have defined the world as a set of planes organized in relation to one another, meaning the planisphere, you have the movement, the position of the world itself... I mean the passage of the world itself from one point to another, or of an element of the world from one point to another – I say an element of the world, since there are all sorts of spheres that are oriented according to the different planes that will be in motion – and *time is the number of the world's movement*, or the measure of the movement of the world, that is, it measures the passage from one privileged point to another.

Let's assume that what I've said up to this point is clear. What was it that we saw last time? It's a very simple schema. It's that, well, of course, of course, that's all very well, but it doesn't work so easily. Because, what we have just said is all the more valid the further we are away from the Earth and from human beings. That is to say, the more we go towards the supralunary – the Moon being the closest planetary body to the Earth – the more we go towards the limits of the world, the more this schema works, both physically and geometrically. The closer we get to the Earth and to mankind, the more accidents occur, that is to say, the more anomalies of movement appear... and what do I mean by anomalies of movement? Well, that movement no longer obeys rules that I could call planimetric, or planimetric relations, that is to say relations determined by the distribution of privileged points on assignable planes. So, the more it escapes planimetric relations.

Already we have this great anomaly, which is to say an anomaly of movement. You understand, it is, it is... Once said that we have defined movement as we just did before, this constitutes an anomaly. And one of the great anomalies of movement in Platonic astronomy is already the eclipse, the eclipse in terms of the Moon, yet far from the Earth. And the closer we get to the Earth, that is to say, the more we are in what Aristotle will call – since it is Aristotle who will find such fine words and the corresponding word already existed in Plato – the closer we get to the Earth, the more anomalies movement will present. What does this mean? Well, the less it will follow the directions or orientations that the planetary distribution of privileged points, on planes whose planimetric ratios, whose metric ratios, were assignable, has set for it.

And this has been our whole theme: the closer you get to the Earth, the more anomalies movement presents, and *the more anomalies movement presents, the more time will tend, if I may say so, to become independent of it*. It tends to become independent, and it's terrible, it's terrible. Why? It tends, for example, it tends, it tends to become rectilinear, it tends to become uniform. In other words, it abstracts itself from movement. It abstracts itself from movement and from the privileged points of movement. *It becomes abstract time that is valid for itself*.

But as I said last time, and that's what we ended with: if it is abstract and if it becomes abstract time, in so far as it abstracts itself from movement, in so far as it starts to be valid for itself, it also affirms a concrete reality of a completely new type, since it is irreducible to movement conceived as a passage through privileged points. What is it that it affirms as

concrete reality at the same time as it abstracts itself from movement? It *reverses* things. It is movement that becomes abstract, that now refers only to an any-position-whatever and no longer to privileged positions. And in this sense, it is now movement that depends on time. It is no longer time that depends on movement. Only, in Platonic and even Aristotelian terms, this is only valid by virtue of the anomalies of movement; it is a fundamentally "anomalous" situation. I say "anomalous" in the Greek sense of the word, meaning an irregular situation.

And this is terrible... but why? Time starts to become valid for itself, it tends to reverse its subordination to movement in order to subordinate itself to another type of movement, which is a purely rectilinear movement. It is no longer the same time. Literally speaking, we must once again, at a distance of centuries, take up Hamlet's cry, which is: "The time is out of joint"... "The time is out of joint". Well, among the Greeks, the closer we get to the Earth, already in Plato, the more room there is for Hamlet, that is to say, for Oedipus, time comes off its hinges, and the drama of Hamlet, or the drama of Oedipus, is not the miserable story of the father and the mother, it's the great story of time being out of joint.³

And what does it mean to say that the time is out of joint? You have to take it literally. What are the joints, the hinges? The hinges are what things revolve around... Our miserable doors are imperfect because they are really only halves of doors. I mean, they turn a mere 180 degrees. The door of the world, that is to say the door as world or the world as door, is a revolving door, that is to say a door that turns, that makes a complete 360-degree turn. The *hinges*... in the original English text, I remind you, and you have to excuse me for my accent, it's expressed as "The time is out of joint", which in French we translate as *sort de ses gonds* – You shouldn't laugh... first of all... it's not polite! If I started speaking Japanese, he wouldn't laugh... [*Laughter; Deleuze refers to the Japanese student near him, who answers something inaudible*] I would, but naturally, I can't remember how. But in French we say that time comes out of its hinges, time comes off its hinges. So, the hinges are what permits the door to turn.

What does it mean to say that the door turns? It means that it goes from one privileged point to another. What is "hinge" in Latin? It's *cardo*. The *cardo* is what something turns around by passing through the so-called "cardinal" points. This is the planetarium. This is the center of the planetarium. The hinge, the joint, is also the joint of the planes. You have a north-south plane, an east-west plane; you have two perpendicular planes that will distribute the door in terms of four squares and, if you spread it out, you have a passage through the west, north, east, south. That's the hinge. That's what the planetarium or the moving body revolves around, passing in such a way that it passes through these cardinal points or privileged positions.⁴

The time is out of joint. Time comes off its hinges. The door comes off its hinges. It is no longer the number of movement. It is no longer subordinate. It no longer measures the passage from one privileged point to another. It has come off its hinges. It literally goes off on a tangent... Henceforth, it is movement that depends on time because movement can only be related to any-position-whatever, to any-position-whatever of the moving body. Whatever the position of the moving body, there will no longer be a privileged moment, there will no longer be a privileged position. Time comes off its hinges; it is Oedipus who takes up his errant path. The most Semitic of tragedies, as I said, in Nietzsche's words, is *Oedipus* because Oedipus takes up his path of errance, that is to say, he literally goes off on a tangent.⁵ He enters into a time that has come off its hinges, just as Cain received the sign of Cain, and he took up the errant path, that is, of a time that is out of joint, that has come off its hinges. And

there, it is movement which depends on time, it is the long walk of Oedipus, the long walk of Cain which depends on time. It is movement which depends on time, and not the reverse.

And I said, you have to see that the Greeks live this, or lived it, indeed they have really lived it. In what concrete form did they live it? Well, in at least two very concrete forms. And this is my last recapitulation: they lived it from the moment when the law of the small city was no longer valid. What is the law of the small city? It is the just retribution of each. The just retribution of each or, if you prefer, the compensation of imbalances... The just retribution of punishments, of faults and of punishments. If someone exceeds their rights there will be a punishment. The living pay for their injustices towards one another according to the order of time, that is, according to the order of time that measures a movement.⁶ Here movement passes through privileged positions which represent the re-establishment of equilibrium, the re-establishment of balance, the compensation of imbalances. And the compensation of imbalances, as I was saying, is already – and this is a constant theme in Herodotus' *Histories*⁷... it is the theme of the whole ethics of the small city – and it is the theme, as we had seen, it is the economic theme of equivalences.

And as Eric Alliez said last time, if you were looking for a formula for this circulation or this compensation of imbalances, which ensures that movement always restores balance by passing through these privileged points where compensations are established, it would be the C-M-C formula⁸, where money is time; yes, money is time; at all times, money is time and time is money. It's just a question of knowing which time. In the C-M-C formula, commodity-money-commodity, time is the number of movement, that is, it is what measures the exchange of commodities. In this sense, it is the equivalent of goods. It compensates the imbalance of commodities, or it establishes the equilibrium of commodities. Time is money, and money is therefore the measure of the movement of commodities as it relates to human beings.

But in terms of man himself, this schema encounters more and more anomalies. As I said, what is put in question is the just retribution of goods and evils, the compensation of imbalances. What does this mean? Well, it means that there is no longer any compensation. Herodotus is succeeded by Thucydides. And History will be conceived as an already linear development, that is, a succession of states of imbalance that can no longer be compensated. A strange violence is sweeping through the small Greek city. It can no longer be compensated.

And what Eric showed very, very well at the end of the last session – I found his intervention attained a clarity that I could not reach myself – is that in Aristotle, the economy of ethics of the C-M-C type was juxtaposed with an economy of a completely different nature, which was like the collapse of the other, even if it was grafted on the other. It was both grafted onto the former, and at the same time led to its collapse, and it took as its formula M-C-M', that is to say where the commodity is only an intermediary between money. And here we can see that there is no longer any compensation of imbalances; on the contrary, there is production and increase of an imbalance, but in what sense? M' must always be greater than M. In other words: money produces money. Money produces money. It is chrematistics⁹ that calls into question the whole economic structure of the Greek city.

Money produces money. It is time that has become independent. It is time that no longer measures the movement of commodities and their circulation, in the true sense of circularity. The privileged positions marked by commodities have collapsed. There is only the rectilinear

and arbitrary succession of M, M', M'', M''', and so on, where M', M'' and so on is always growing. So that it is very strange, this abstract time which is also a time within which some is continually being born, is continually created, something that the Greeks are able to grasp, something that is always new is created as though marked by evil. It was the least of things, and it presented itself in this way. It presented itself thus.

And the just retribution of punishments has disappeared. It was still in the time of Aeschylus that the unjust man received the retribution of his injustice, that is to say that there was a restoration of balance. With Oedipus, there is no longer a restoration of balance. There is no more restoration of balance. Once again, Oedipus takes up this path of time where it is movement that depends on time and on the development of time, this abstract and yet at the same time productive time. Well, he follows his infinite path. One cannot even say that he is punished. There is a vestige of punishment: he blinded himself, he gouged out his own eyes. This is part of ancient Greece, the side of Aeschylus, because things are never done all at once. That's the side of retribution. But here it is, he blinded himself, yet it doesn't end there. And this is the old way, this is the old way, it's Sophocles' tribute to the ancient-style tragedy. And at the same time, Sophocles opens the new tragedy. Retribution has settled nothing. Nothing. He takes up his path, he leaves, he goes into exile. Similarly, there will be no retribution for Cain's murder. Cain will receive the sign that God imposes on him, and this sign will be the sign that no one has the right to lay a hand on him. He must continue his time. But now time becomes a kind of continuous line. It is at the same time pure abstraction, since it is the abstraction of movement, and the new concrete reality.

So, I summarize everything by saying: Yes, okay, number is the measure of movement. This is a formula that we can comment on literally: time as an indirect image. But be careful: if you ask, did the Greeks believe in this? Yes and no, it is very complicated, yes and no. The more you moved away from the Earth, the more they believed in it; the more you moved closer to the Earth, the more anomalies there were in movement and the more time went out of joint, that is, it became independent from movement. It was a complete questioning of the Greek concept of truth, but this complete questioning of the concept of truth was made under the Moon. It was made under the Moon. It was the right time. Truth was supralunar.

And it seems to me that it might be interesting – I'm not going to develop it here, but I think we've done it, that we've already done it – to consider the whole – if I wanted, if I thought there was a need, though I don't propose to do this – the possibility of a systematic exposition of Aristotle's philosophy which would take in more or less the whole of Aristotelianism, I mean its physics, its metaphysics, its economy, its ethics, etc., according to this schema. For it was Aristotle, much more than Plato, who marked this movement whereby the closer one gets to the Earth, the more accidental causes, the more anomalies of movement intervene, and how these anomalies of movement indicate a new time that can no longer be defined as Aristotle defined time, namely as the number or measure of movement.

That's where we are. It has to be crystal clear. It's like we're combining things. It's as if I were recounting a film to you... a science-fiction film. Yes, it's like that, it's... So, you must have it clear in your eyes, not in your memory, this world that, this world, this world that has... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

And so, I would say, well, I'm going to tell you something else that won't happen until many centuries later and where it gets very complicated, very complicated to weigh up the differences since, many centuries later, namely in the third century after Jesus Christ, a

philosopher named Plotinus comes onto the scene¹⁰, this is after Jesus Christ – although there is not the slightest reference in Plotinus to an event that would have been Jesus Christ – and who appears in the Eastern Empire. It's interesting how we now become immersed in an Oriental atmosphere. Plotinus came from a Roman family that had settled in Egypt, and he would go on to found what is called Neoplatonism. We must insist on the prefix "Neo-" because there have been Platonists at all times, from Plato to Plotinus.

But he practices Neoplatonism, which is to say he invents it. And it was Plotinus – I'm not going to tell you... well, yes, I am, since this is what I'd like to try to convey to you – he's extraordinary. He is one of the greatest philosophers of all time. And it's so strange, so strange, only you have to... as with all the great philosophers, you have to read him not only with your intelligence or your culture. If you read him with your culture, first of all two thirds of you here will not read him at all – I mean all those who have no philosophical training – whereas my appeal would be to read him as you would read a very great poet. He's not a poet, he's a philosopher, but all philosophers should be treated the same way, and you have to read him like that, you have to open the book in this way and see if it stirs something in you.

And if we play, if we play, because we can always play some kind of game, so what I propose is, let's imagine this game: what would you like to have written? Just a single page. I mean, there's no point in thinking of a whole book. Maybe each of us has a page we wish we had written, right? It's a silly game, I know, but for me, it would be Plotinus, it's a page of Plotinus. So, it's very odd, since he's not a philosopher with whom I feel any great affinity, but I'm telling you about it because it's a page of Plotinus that says this – I'm not going to read it to you on purpose so that you can sense that what I'm about to say is so much less wonderful than what he will say. You'll just have to go and seek it out for yourselves.

And what he says is: well, I'll tell you, everything is contemplation, everything is contemplation. And when I say that everything is contemplation, I mean that nature itself, the rocks and the beasts are contemplation. A rock is a contemplation. An animal is a contemplation. What does that mean? So we let ourselves be drawn in. Everything is contemplation. The rocks, the streams, and the animal that comes to drink from the stream. And he ends – the text is, only one page – he ends by saying: and they will say to me, and they will say to me: to say that everything is contemplation is a joke, and I answer, yes, but perhaps the joke itself is a contemplation... Splendid text, splendid. We'll see that there are texts in Plotinus that are equally splendid that deal with questions of this nature.¹¹

And I would like you to understand that here, something makes itself heard that no longer comes from Greece. And yet, it will not be difficult to take each notion of Plotinus and to find the equivalent in Plato, but the difference is even greater than if one did not find any such notion. Every notion of Plotinus can already be found in Plato. But they each undergo such a displacement, a transformation, such a radical change that, if one does not put one's heart into it, if one reads only with the eyes of the intellect, one can understand nothing, absolutely nothing of Plotinus. And this is true of all philosophers, it is true of all philosophers. Again, this is what I've been trying to tell you since the beginning: if you don't combine affects and percepts – for what does he make us see anew? What does he make us experience in a new way? – you can't grasp the concepts. You can't grasp the concepts because at that moment, everything comes back to the same thing. At that point, you find yourself becoming a commentator of philosophy, and you will explain that, oh yes, that such and such a text of Plotinus has its source in Plato... only who cares about the source? Okay.

So what happens then? What is Plotinus up to? If there was a Plotinian revolution, what would it be? I would say, first point, first point – here, there is no problem, we can deal with this quickly. First point, it's Plotinus' cry: No, time cannot be defined as the number or measure of the world's movement. Here, what we are promised is a new conception of time.

Plotinus' work was never published by the man himself, nor even written by him. It is, as often occurred at the time, and even before, in the form of notes taken by disciples; they are literally lecture notes taken by disciples. So obviously, it depends on the disciple, it's... and this disciple, I think he had a good idea: he organized them into novenas, that is to say, in groups of nine lessons, and he made six such groups. Nine times six is fifty-four, fifty-four lessons. Fifty-four lessons, and what lessons they are! Novenas. I find the title, it was the old title in French; we always referred to them as Plotinus' *Neuvaines*... it was much nicer. Now restoring the Greek term, we call the work of Plotinus the *Enneads*... Enneads meaning Novenas in Greek – he writes in Greek, right? – Enneads means novenas. Okay. There are six Enneads, that is, six groups of nine lessons. The one I'm referring to is the third Ennead, chapter eight...¹² [*Tape interrupted*] [45:55]

... 3.7, 3.7, 3.7, the chapter on eternity and time.¹³ And here, there are two themes: a negative theme and a positive theme. The negative theme is: why time cannot be defined as the measure of the world's movement, nor even as the measure of movement, or the number of movement. And here I summarize, I summarize, I extract what we only need, which is: from two things one – Plotinus often says this – from two things one – and then it branches all the time into two new things – from two things one: either you define time as the number of movement, fine, go ahead, but then, time relates to movement as number relates to something to which that number applies. You say, for example: ten horses, ten horses. But you could also say ten rabbits; it is well known that a number has a nature independent of what it counts. Therefore, if you define time as the number of movement, far from ensuring its subordination to movement, you will be forced to say what the nature of this number is, that is, what constitutes the nature of time. You haven't moved forward an inch. You have claimed to give the nature of time by saying that it is the number of movement, but you are in full contradiction: since the number is independent of what it counts, therefore there is a nature of the number that you have not seen. The nature of ten cannot be horses because it is also rabbits. As it is also fingers, and everything that can be counted in tens. It's simple, but it's good, it's very satisfying.

Or else you define it as a measure of movement. If you define time not as the number of movement but as the measure of movement, you mean that, unlike number, it is a measure that is attached to what it measures, and which is specific to what it measures. Indeed, if I speak of the meter as a measure, the meter is inseparable from what is measurable in meters. You are not going to measure the distance from the Earth to the Sun in meters. Or you don't measure the weight of something in meters. You take a measurement. So, if you say "time is the measure of movement" you're saying something different than when you say "time is the number of movement". If you say that time is the measure of movement, you are saying that there is reciprocity between the measured movement and the measure itself. At that moment, it is equally movement that measures time as it is time that measures movement... Things don't get any better than that.

So, in fact, time is neither a measure nor a number of movement. And here we should add, in parenthesis, "of the world". It is neither the number of the movement of the world, nor the measure of the movement of the world. Why not? It is necessary to add "world" because we

have seen that the definition, the indirect image of time according to which time is the measure or the number of movement, refers to the movement of the world, that is to say to the planetarium, to a configuration that determines the privileged points through which the moving body passes. That is a given. Well, you see, here it becomes very, very important if we try to follow what Plotinus is telling us. By telling us that "time cannot be either the number, or the measure of movement", he seeks to convey to us that *time is not dependent on the world*. So here it becomes more... it becomes stronger. Time is not dependent on the world. He adds – here I'm speaking Latin because it's convenient, just because it's convenient – in Latin we distinguish two types of reason, one called *ratio*, *ratio*, eh? It's written in Latin *ratio*, *ratio cognoscendi* or reason to know, and *ratio essendi*, reason to be.

Well, he tells us that movement – that is, the movement of the world – is indeed *the reason for time*. So here he seems to be in agreement with the ancient Greeks, it is indeed the reason of time. But be careful, they were wrong on one point: it is only the reason to *know* time, it is the *ratio cognoscendi* of time. You wouldn't know time if there wasn't the movement of the world. That's okay. On the other hand, *the movement of the world is not the reason for the existence of time*. The world in its movement is the reason under which we know time. It is what makes us know time. But there must be time. This is not the *raison d'être* of time. Ah, that's not the *raison d'être* of time, but then what is the reason for the existence of time?

The reason for the existence of time... well you no longer have a choice. This is also what I am trying to draw your attention to, that the philosophy is made up of these alternations of inspiration and of "no longer having a choice". We are not inspired all the time. It would be very bad if there were not something else. And almost the more inspired of the two moments is the second, it's when we no longer have inspiration. You have an inspiration; it happens once in a while. The important thing is to make use of it. What does that mean? You are inspired, that's why when you have an inspiration you have to note it down right away, it doesn't last long; it doesn't last long. You are inspired, but then you are sad, you are melancholic and unhappy if you are simply inspired and then you are no longer inspired.

The art of happiness is being inspired enough to push inspiration, for better or worse, to a point where you no longer have a choice. Let's suppose that an inspiration has come up, which is the most tiring thing in the world. You have to push it, not necessarily very high, you shouldn't go too high; you have to push it to the point where there is a virtual descent. If you don't push it to the point where there is a virtual descent, you're screwed, your inspiration is worthless. *The inspiration has to take you to the point where you don't have a choice*, which is, phew! you are going down, you have no choice... You can no longer say anything other than what you are going to say. After inspiration comes necessity. After inspiration comes fate. There is only destiny for the inspired, that is to say, there is no longer any choice. You no longer have a choice, it's, it's... We are dragged down the slope. Well Plotinus, he is dragged down the slope. If the world can only be the *ratio cognoscendi* of time, it is necessary that time has a *ratio essendi*, a reason for being, which is neither the world nor the movement of the world. The movement of the world and the world itself can only give us the reason under which we know time.

Well, the *ratio essendi* of time, so what? What is it? It's no longer the world, so what is it? The answer, Plato, I mean Plotinus would say is: there's nothing to panic about, you have no choice. You'll tell me: yes, I have a choice. Maybe we do have a choice. But in Plotinus' time, there is no choice. Basically, we can easily discern it: if it is not the world, *it must be the soul*. But what a difference! And where will this lead us? We don't know. This, this is the descent

to the grave, this, the descent to the grave. Where it will lead us, we can't know. We will need a new inspiration perhaps to know where it will lead us. We'll have to climb again. But right now, I have no choice.

Time, related to its *ratio essendi*, is the soul, the soul is the *ratio essendi* of time. You will say to me, oh it's no big deal. Whether it is the world or the soul, what does it matter after all? Apart from the fact that such an idea would make me sad, you have to give it some consideration: what might it do? At first sight, nothing, very little. Why not? Because at first sight – and I underline at first sight – Plato had already said it: that the reason of movement and of time was both the soul and the world. Moreover, Plato had a reason for saying this, which was that, according to him, the world was not separable from a world-soul.

So, if I take literally the Plotinian formula in this chapter "Time and Eternity", the formula "time is dependent on the soul", I would say in all conscience, it emphasizes another aspect of Plato, but an aspect which was already present in Plato since, when Plato said "the *ratio essendi* of movement and time is the world", he also meant the soul of the world. Well, okay. And that's probably why Plotinus is called a Neoplatonist.

Nevertheless, when we have had to wait until the third century after Jesus Christ for Plotinus to be able to say that "time is dependent on the soul and not dependent on the world", when he says this "and not", what it obviously means is that there is no longer the spontaneous harmony of soul and world as there was in Plato. And that therefore, for Plotinus, there is a real alternative and that for Plato to say that "time derives from the world" or to say "time derives from the soul", was in the end a single proposition. With Plotinus, the novelty is this: for him, the soul is conceived in such a way that to say "time depends on the soul" will mean something absolutely different from and unrelated to "time depends on the world". Thus, at the very moment when Plotinus seems to take up Plato, he transforms him completely. He gives – it's worse than if he was opposing, and this is the most modest way to proceed. You see, it's always like that, you must never oppose, you must do your job, you must do your job. [Tape interrupted] [1:00:36]

Part 2

You should never criticize, you should not oppose, you should just do your job, and then hope that this work you have done will have changed everything. But you shouldn't announce it in advance, you shouldn't say it in advance. You mustn't say it ahead of time. Those who say in advance: "You will see, this is great, what I'm telling you is completely new!" are, generally speaking, not very new at all. But there are others who operate like moles! The ones who really bring something new are always the moles. They don't seem to bring much that is new, and at the same time, it's... it's very interesting, in fact it's amazing.

So, for the moment I would just say, it may seem like I'm going back to Platonic terms, but this is not at all the case. It's a break, and we can see an absolute break that Plotinus makes with Plato, and this break manifests itself in a simple form: *time is dependent on the soul*.

Is that so? But then, once again, we'd have to show in what way this is absolutely different from Plato, to the point that Plato couldn't even conceive – and it's normal to take some distance – couldn't conceive at all what Plotinus was telling us. Neither can we, for the moment, conceive it. What does all this mean? We merely sense, we can just say to ourselves: Ah well, yes, there is perhaps something there, it's a great conversion, this

Plotinian conversion because... you see I'm making some headway but it's still an indirect image of time. This time, we will be told that time is relative to the movement of the soul. Ok, but the movement of the soul, there too, the movement of the soul is something we could find in Plato. It could already exist in Plato, this movement of the soul, but the movement of the soul was finally the same as the movement of the world. Whereas, when Plotinus says that time depends on a movement of the soul, this movement of the soul will be absolutely new. It will be a type of movement which I cannot find even the slightest approximation of in Plato. A type of movement that is completely... Well, so this gives us some work to do.

In what sense is this a break? How does he break while keeping the same words, the same...? Yeah, there's a conversion, something has happened to the terms; he can keep the terms, world, soul, and so on, and yet everything has changed. Well, we should look into what has changed. That's what I mean. I mean that, in the end the essential thing in Plato is the idea of a configuration... it's the idea of a configuration, and what Plato calls a form is precisely a configuration. What counts is a configuration. What is a configuration, that is to say, a form? And Aristotle will conceive form in a different way from Plato, but it will still be a configuration.

I would say that, I can say this according to our previous analyses, that a configuration is a distribution, a regulated distribution, that is to say one determined by laws, a regulated distribution of privileged points or positions. The privileged points or positions are like so many divisions or subdivisions. The form is the configuration that corresponds to a regulated distribution of privileged points and positions. The privileged points and positions are thus the divisions and subdivisions of the form. The form is thus not only geometrical-physical, but also organic... in the sense that, for example, leg, thigh, torso, neck, head, are the organic subdivisions of the human form... the organic subdivisions of the human form.

Hence, the form defined as configuration implies movement. Movement... movement is the passage from one privileged position to another, the passage from one notable point to another. And through and within movement, it is the form as configuration that is subdivided, just as the subdivisions are gathered and collected in the form. Time will be dependent on the form insofar as it will be the number or the measure of each movement.

Now, if you define form by configuration, I insist that consequently there is a notion that takes on fundamental importance, and it is a confirmation of everything we have just seen, it is the notion of "plane". Does this mean that configuration is the same thing as plane, that it is planitude? And here, you have to know, yes or no? It depends on what you mean by *plane*. By plane, you might understand "*monoplanar*". It's certainly not that. The configuration or the Platonic form is not *monoplanar*. Why not? I would say: it would be so un-Greek, it would be so un-Greek. It would go so against the genius of the Greeks. Why would it go against the genius of the Greeks? Because it was already taken: the idea that, the idea of a world-plane, as *monoplanar* was the great Egyptian idea, and it could be no other way, since it is the idea that belongs to the desert.

It is the Egyptian idea, it was the Egyptian thought. It is the Egyptian idea, it was the Egyptian thought. It was the Egyptian art and how we can formulate it? Form and background are on the same plane; form and background are on the same plane. There is only one plane, which is the frontal plane, this was the idea of ancient Egypt. You might ask what this means. It doesn't matter. It's like that, that's the way it is. So when they thought, they thought in terms of planitude. When they made art, it was as *bas-relief*. The form and the

background were monoplanar, separated by the contour. It was the contour plane that distinguished form and background, while relating them to each other on the same plane. Fine.¹⁴

What will the Greeks be? What is the fundamental difference between the Greeks and the Egyptians? Oh, it has been said, but... It has been said, it has been very well said, but we have to say it in our own way. The Greeks discovered the multiplicity of planes... what does that mean? Especially not the multiplicity of planes in the sense that there would be a foreground, then a second plane, a third plane, all parallel. Because the idea of parallel planes will derive from what the Greeks discovered. It is not a principle of the Greek discovery. The great Greek discovery is that there are planes which are differently oriented and which exist in intersecting relationships. There can be a plane perpendicular to another plane or a plane oblique to another plane. That's what it is.

What does the idea of a plane that is perpendicular to another plane give? Art critics have said it very often: the whole difference between Greek art – well, it's easy to say – the most visible difference between Greek art and Egyptian art is that Greek art is made in the form of a cube, they discovered the cube. But what does the cube mean? It means that there is a plurality of planes that are perpendicular to one another. So, of course, this will give you planar sections. In other words, you no longer have equality between form and background; a foreground emerges, and in relation to the foreground, planes will be arranged in intersections, either perpendicular to the foreground, or oblique in relation to the foreground. In other words, the shape is a voluminous configuration.

They discovered the cube, their sculpture is cubic; it is the same thing to say: they discover the sphere. In some very brilliant pages, Riegl¹⁵, an Austrian commentator, asked what was it that the Egyptians never ceased doing? Hiding the cube, hiding the cube. What did they find to hide the cube? The pyramid. The small burial chamber is a cube, but it will be cancelled by the flat faces of the pyramid.¹⁶ So, the liberation of the cube is the work of the Greeks. This applies as much to their philosophy as to their art: it is a cubic philosophy as well as a cubic art. What does this mean? It simply means multiplicity of planes intersecting with one another. This is the planetarium, this is the planetarium. This is what Plato means by configuration, and this is why the Platonic form is a configuration. I insist on the prefix *con-*figuration: it means both the confluence and the concurrence of planes.

Well, okay, you see that I can say then, it gets complicated, I can say that for the Greeks – well, even if this formula is not too general – for the Greeks, everything is planar. Everything is planar, except that their world is not at all like that of the Egyptians. For the Greeks, "everything is planar" means that all the remarkable points, all the privileged positions of a configuration, are necessarily situated on a plane, but not the same one: the configuration is a volume. There will be privileged points in the foreground just as there will be privileged points on the plane perpendicular to the foreground, or on the oblique plane. It's much more complicated. I always come back: equatorial plane, ecliptic plane, it's their planetarium. All privileged positions lie on a plane. Yes, but we [*the Greeks*] are not Egyptians... because we have several planes and we can therefore establish intersections between planes. We give birth to sculpture in volume. And the sculptor, what does he do? He carves his figure, that is to say he constitutes a configuration by varying the orientation of the cutting plan, according to well determined rules depending on the work to be obtained.

The demiurge is a sculptor in Plato, that is, he works with volume. The planetarium is a volume. It implies its intersections of planes, which are sometimes perpendicular to the others and other times oblique in relation to the others. This is a really important point. What the Egyptians chose to hide will become, on the contrary, the very form of the Greek temple, the Greek temple will replace the Egyptian pyramid. It will be the triumph of the cube, it will be the triumph of the intersection of planes. The planetarium is a multi-plane. Once again: and the platonic configuration, you understand, the platonic form or configuration, is the set of planimetric relations. I can again go back to the formula I mentioned before, which in the meantime has been enhanced. These are planimetric relations between privileged positions, "planimetric" meaning the relations between the different planes to which belong the privileged positions under consideration. And Greek sculpture is known to be a real planetarium, that is to say, it is the rules of geometrical proportions and the rules of planimetric relations between the different planes which bring the figure into play. And it will be a whole system of harmony, that is to say, of Euclidean proportions, which will not be applied, but which will rise up from statuary, as they rise up from astronomy.

So, when I said that form is a configuration, you understand that it was much more complicated than it seemed, because once again, configuration is something I can now define as the distribution of privileged positions or remarkable points, on different planes which enter into planimetric and determinable relationships, determinable, that is, by the rules of proportion.

Well, what does all that mean? It means that the image is no longer flat. [*Deleuze moves to the blackboard*]. I have acquired my volume, but how did I acquire it? Oh... it's odd, isn't it? We have an echo there, and there, yes, there; that's what has to... You see? Do you see? No. It's the same. Okay. That is something we already had. Okay.

But basically, I had that Egyptian marvel that we would find in the bas-relief, the single plane that we could find in the more complex figure of the pyramid, whereas the Greeks... Here, or here, we have P1, the foreground. You see the difference with Egypt; it's that as soon as I have effectively posed a privileged plane, a P1 plane, it can no longer be confused with the background. There is no more background. The Egyptians gave us a background that was co-planar, co-planar... co-planar with the figure, with the form. But the Greeks... we should go there, we should, where there is no more background. They hit you with a plane that has become a foreground. Why? Because it refers to other planes. There are only planes. You have a perpendicular plane, you have oblique planes, you will have parallel planes, you will have whatever you like, it will give you the cube. There is no more background, that is to say there is nevertheless a depth, since there is a foreground and there are several planes.

Well, that's where you have to be careful. Does it have depth? No, I don't think so. Nietzsche – but he meant something else altogether – says in a splendid phrase: "How the Greeks lacked depth...". Oh, okay, that's literally true. They have the cube but they don't have depth. Depth is something else. Or they will say our depth is the depth of the cube, but what is the depth of the cube? And you understand that depth is an idea that's so... that's so obscure, so necessarily, well... So, what do they have? Let's say that, the foreground is like the emergence of the figure for the Greeks. Everything is determined in terms of the foreground since the other planes will be defined in relation to it. The foreground is that which the other planes are either perpendicular, or oblique, or parallel to. So you have what the Egyptians didn't know about. I would say that the foreground is the first determination. Once you have this as the first determination, then you no longer have the Egyptian world, since there is a

break with the background. I was telling you that there is no more background, well yes, there is a break with the background. There is now a foreground that allows you to define the other planes. The other planes are those that are parallel or perpendicular or oblique to the foreground. That gives you the cube. That gives you the sphere.

Is there any depth? I don't know. If there is depth, it is reduced to a plane. I would say that depth in this case is the plane perpendicular to the foreground. See, in my figure, it's a height, but because my figure is two-dimensional. In fact, this is, this is pure, pure perspective. This is a right angle, you see, if this is my foreground, my perpendicular plane is this one. I would say... you see? You understand? You have to understand this, but then a median... I would say okay, but since the form, since the form is a configuration, everything will always be on a plane. Not on the same plane, I say again, they are not Egyptians, they are not Egyptians anymore. Things will not be on the same plane. But everything will be on a plane whose relationship will be determinable in terms of the foreground. In other words, the depth will be a plane.

In other words, what did they do here? *They imprisoned depth*. Depth is something so dangerous that they trapped it in their cube. But this... this is going to have huge consequences. *They have made it one dimension of the form*. They have transformed depth into a dimension of the form. Of course, they make their geometry in space. But what is the third dimension? The third dimension is homogeneous to the other dimensions. And why is the third dimension homogeneous to the other dimensions? Because it is defined by a plane, it is defined by a plane perpendicular to the foreground... That's what they did with it.

It's in this sense that they are Apollonian. This isn't the way Nietzsche presents it – though it can be presented in so many different ways – Apollo, Dionysus. They are Apollonian, but as Nietzsche says, "Dionysus roars". Depth is not happy to have allowed itself to be imprisoned in the cube. It roars. This is the Dionysian roaring. But finally, the cube floats there, the cube undoubtedly floats. It has imprisoned depth, imprisoned depth, which is to say, reduced it to a plane.

I would like to find a philosophical confirmation of this. It is obvious in sculpture. But why is it obvious? Because Greek sculpture, as Worringer¹⁷ has definitively demonstrated, Greek sculpture is the primacy of the foreground. It is the primacy of the foreground... So everything, in fact, everything is organized according to the foreground, and all the other planes are determined in terms of their harmonic relation with the foreground. And this is the great break with Egyptian sculpture.

But then, you have to understand. Let's talk about philosophy now. What does it mean to do philosophy, for Plato? It's not difficult, to do philosophy is to divide things according to concepts. It is to make divisions. It is to make divisions the rules of which are concepts and ideas. How does a thing divide itself? That's what philosophy is all about. That's why Plato always uses the metaphor of the butcher. He says: it is like the butcher's shop! It's a matter of finding the articulations! Ah, the joints! The articulations, that suits us perfectly, it is the articulations of the organic form! It's the divisions, the subdivisions! You have to cut things according to the planes that traverse them. This is the planimetric view. That's what the butcher does. To do philosophy is to divide. I take a notion and I ask, what is it? For example, the notion of art... [*Tape interrupted*] [1:31:51]

... he says this, and how did he discover it? There are arts of production and arts of acquisition. Okay. But what is acquisition? There are two types of acquisition. You can acquire by exchange, acquisition by exchange, or you can acquire by capture. So, what is exchange or what is capture? We will continue, we will divide. Until what? As long as we can. And every time, it's as though we had a plane and we cut this plane into two planes. He will call this – here I'll give you the Greek term because it's important – It's the process: *kata*, no problem; *kata*, which means "according to", eh, *kata platos*... *kata platos* is the division according to width. It's the division according to width. Actually, *platos* is the foreground. Width is the foreground. And at the end of the *Sophist* Plato tells us that division operates first *kata platos*, according to the width.¹⁸

And then he adds, but you mustn't forget, it also operates, *kata*, grave accent, *kata mēkos*... But what is *mēkos*? In the dictionaries, just as *platos* is translated as width, *mēkos* is translated as length. All I want to say at this point is that I believe that for Plato or other philosophers the definition is much more rigorous than that. *Kata platos* is the foreground, and *kata mēkos* is a perpendicular plane, that is to say, I divide a thing according to two planes. In the foreground, it gives me a right and a left. *Kata mēkos*, according to the perpendicular plane, gives me a front, a front and a back. In other words, division is voluminous. Division as an operation of philosophy is voluminous. It operates *kata platos* and *kata mēkos*.

What do I mean, why did I tell you that? You see, you see what Plato did? What horror! What horror! What he did, but really in the way we would recount a legend, is that he imprisoned the dragon. He reduced depth to a mere *mēkos*. Oh. He reduced depth to a mere *mēkos*, but that's easy to say because the Greeks have another word for depth. And it's not *mēkos*! It's, it's the last Greek word I'd like you to remember because we'll need it, it's *bathos*, *bathos*! B. A. T. H. O. S. The expression *kata bathos* also exists.

But in reality, it doesn't exist in Plato. In Plato, you find the word *bathos*, in the sense of depth. But you don't find *kata bathos*, according to depth. But you do find *kata bathos* – and this should open up many horizons for you as well as serve to explain why I insist on and labour this point so much – you find *kata bathos* in Plotinus. Why don't you find it in Plato? Well, I'd better be careful here, or if you do find it, it would be only once and purely by chance, but in my view, you won't find it. You'll find *bathos* again because it's a common term, but I'm not interested in that. You won't find *kata bathos*. You will find *kata platos* and *kata mēkos*, because he reduced *platos* to *mēkos*. What does it mean, to reduce *platos* to *mēkos*? Well, it's, it's an operation... inevitably it's a swindle, it's the Greek swindle. I mean, it's... it's great at the same time. Depth, you see, I see you in depth there, but what does this mean? It means, among other things, that you conceal one another. There I see there is a system of covering, of overlapping. Do you follow me?

So, I have my foreground; that's it, my foreground, I make my little drawing. There.... So, a head, a mustache, a head, I make the eyes, a head, I have my foreground, my depth... You see. There, the forms overlap. You see? One is hidden behind the other or a bit of one is hidden behind the other. Okay? Only, I'm the one who's here. There is always someone for whom my depth is a length. And so, the one who is there... there is always someone for whom my depth is a length. But on what condition? On condition that for him there is a depth, which for me is a length. In other words, depth is a possible length. But it cannot become length without ceasing to be depth, that is, without another depth taking its place. But

it is true that depth is a possible length. We must add the word “possible”. As a real depth, it is irreducible to length.

But once it was given, the Platonic conception of configuration, of the voluminous configuration defined by planes and their intersections, you see how he could only conceive the deep or depth, the *bathos*, in the form of a length, in the form of a *mèkos*. Depth was domesticated by and within the cube. Depth was nothing other than the plane perpendicular to the foreground, that is to say, a length.

So this is very important. My two results for the moment are: the Greeks, including Plato, necessarily conceive of form as a multiplanar configuration. The multiplicity of planes is constitutive of the planetarium, that is to say, it consists of harmonious, assignable and geometrically determinable relationships between differently oriented planes. Any point or any dimension belongs to a plane. Therefore, depth belongs to itself, it is reduced to a plane. What does this mean? It means that form, as a configuration in Plato, can only be spiritually or sensibly a rigid, solid form. It is geometrical-physical.

All this is connected: the solid or rigid character of the form, the planimetric or multiple character and the reduction of depth to length, that is to say, to a plane, to a plane perpendicular to the foreground, all this defines both Greek art and Greek philosophy at the time of Plato. We should add a fourth and last aspect. Are you following all this? Do you follow me? This is... Try to remember this, okay? And the last aspect is also important. It's light... well, it's the same thing. Light, in its turn, is dependent on the cube, that is to say, on the planetarium and its planimetric ratios... and its planimetric ratios. [*Tape interrupted*] [1:44:53]

Part 3

In other words, what is light? It is the medium that occupies the cube. We might as well say that light is inseparable from a medium. And no doubt here, we must immediately add all sorts of qualifications, otherwise we risk being misunderstood.

It is well known that, in Plato, there is, as we say, a transcendence, but a transcendence of what? Let's say for the moment that it is a transcendence of light in relation to limits, in relation to configurations. Light is superior to any configuration. Sensible light, the sun, intelligible light, the Good. And the sun is not a sensible form because any sensible form implies... it is beyond any form, so it cannot be determined, or even looked at. And the Good is not an idea, that is to say, an intelligible form, it is beyond any idea. Ah well, yes, but that does not mean... Wouldn't there be in this transcendence of the sun and of the Good, wouldn't there be a kind of depth in this absolute transcendence? There is indeed something like that, which cannot be reduced to a plane. That is beyond all planes.

So, if there was a Platonic *bathos*, it would be this transcendence. But then let's be precise: in Plato's actual texts, what does this transcendence affect? It is not a transcendence of light, no. If you look at the texts, it's not a transcendence of light. I say no, I say no. In *The Republic*, Book VI and VII, among others, plus all that we know – and I will explain what I mean by this "plus all we know" – it's not a transcendence... Light is a transcendence of the light source... a transcendence of the light source. You'll tell me: Oh well, that's okay. Yes. Well, no... it's very important because if it's true that the source of light in Plato is endowed with an irreducible transcendence which implies a kind of background, or which seems to emanate

from a background, light itself on the other hand is not at all like that. Light is a medium. And light is a medium that brings the luminous source to the eye.

Here, I'm getting ahead of myself because there is no text of Plato that says this. Some may suggest it. But Plato goes far beyond the texts we have of him. Commentators who speak to us about Plato, those who refer either to lost texts or to his teaching in the academy, give us all the details of the Platonic theory of light. These details interest us all the more because they are taken up by Plotinus who presents all the theses, all the Platonic theses concerning light in the 4th *Ennead*, chapters 4 and 5 – for those who want a thorough scientific review of the Greeks' whole theory of light. But beware, Plotinus proceeds as if – obviously he is speaking to an audience who are supposed to know all this. So he proceeds by allusions. They're hard to grasp, it's not at all easy. Fortunately, we have the commentators' notes. All of which is quite useful, but what we learn from them formally is a point on which all Platonists agree, namely that light is a medium. Not only is it inseparable from a medium, namely air, but air is a medium of light only by accident.

Light itself, that is to say, in its essence, is a medium and an intermediate medium between the light source and the eye. And why? This is the great thesis: if light were not a medium, there would be no universal sympathy. What is universal sympathy? Universal sympathy is the conspiracy of all bodies and all beings within one and the same world, that is to say, it is the fact that all beings enter into the same configuration that we call the world. This long reference allows me to conclude in advance that light in Plato, in a way similar to depth or *bathos*, is reduced to a plane perpendicular to the foreground, that is to say to a length. In the same way light, whose source evokes a *bathos*, an unfathomable depth, is brought back to a medium, an enclosed medium, a medium enclosed in the world, contained in the cube or in the sphere.

If you have been following me, we have reached the summit, we have reached the goal. I can now say what's new in Plotinus? It was necessary to make this detour in order to say some very basic things. What's new in Plotinus will be three fundamental things. Yet at the same time he is able to use the same terms as Plato. None of which prevents these terms from having taken on a completely different meaning.

The first new thing in Plotinus is the Oriental side, what Worringer calls the tendency to project to infinity, as opposed to the Greek tendency to finitude. The tendency to project to infinity... but we, we have now reached a point, which is better finally, we are in better shape than Worringer... anyway, what is the tendency to infinity? It's not just any simple thing, nor is it situated on any plane. It is the discovery of a *bathos*; it is the discovery of a depth that is irreducible to two dimensions... the discovery of a depth that is irreducible to length and width, therefore irreducible to the plane, irreducible to the plane. Irreducible to the foreground, that goes without saying, but also irreducible to any plane, whether perpendicular or oblique.

In other words, well, does this represent a return to Egypt? How could I not go back to Egypt? That is, how is it that Plotinus the Egyptian doesn't return to Egypt? But how can the Egypt to which one returns be the same as the one we left? No, you must understand, this isn't in any sense a return, it is something absolutely new; it is, if I dare say, a third great moment, another great moment, it's fantastic. For the Egyptians, form and background existed on the same plane. The Greeks made a first great mutation through the regulated multiplication of planes. Hence, we had the reduction of the background to a depth, since it is

no longer the same plane as the foreground, but also a reduction of depth itself to a plane, a plane that is perpendicular to the foreground. So, the Greeks discover depth, but they discover it by domesticating it. For the Egyptians, there is... there is a background but no depth, since the background is on the same plane as the form. For the Greeks, there is depth, but it's a tampered-with depth, a depth already reduced to a plane, simply it's a plane other than the foreground, a perpendicular plane. So, what we have is a depth reduced to a length.

Do you follow me? The contribution of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists is the discovery of a *pure depth* that cannot be reduced to any dimension, that is the matrix of all the dimensions of space. In other words, it is neither an Egyptian background, nor a domesticated depth, it is *bottomless*.¹⁹ The discovery of a depth that is bottomless, or deeper than any bottom, of a bottom that we will never finish deepening, of a bottom from which everything emerges, this is the Plotinian contribution... Good.

I can't even say, I could say it like that, that they, who perform the opposite operation of the Greeks, discover that they start from the background. Yes, yes, I can say: the background is the rearmost plane, but that's badly expressed. It's no longer a plane at all; it's beyond any plane, it's what all the planes will emerge from. In an order, perhaps, but what order? It will no longer be a planimetric order, it will be a highly bizarre order. Can an order come from the bottomless depths? It can't be the same kind of order. What is this order that springs from what is bottomless? What a story. So you sense how philosophy is in the process of changing, really changing, changing its nature.

So, he may speak like Plato when he says “the One”, the One with a capital O. He will tell us that the One is more than Being, that the One is beyond Being. And we'll say: well, obviously, that's why he's a Platonist, because Plato too had said so. And in some famous pages of the *Parmenides*²⁰, Plato considers the hypothesis according to which the One is more than Being. Moreover, by saying that the One is more than Being, the Neoplatonists seem to present themselves as Plato's commentators. In fact, they have nothing in common. Yes, there is actually something they have in common, but all the terms have changed their meaning, because to the One beyond Being is now the bottomless, it is the depth that is irreducible to any planitude, it is the depth irreducible to any dimension.

In other words, I can say exactly the same thing as before. The Neoplatonists will tell us, just like Plato that to practice philosophy... and with them a strange expression appears, less in Plotinus himself than in his disciples – he has disciples who have very, very beautiful names, so I'll spare you; it goes on, let's say, from the 3rd century to the 10th century – but after all, I specify this because of Byzantine art, which we'll have occasion to talk about.

No need to say that for this first aspect, you only have to make the conversion into art, just as earlier I was speaking about Greek art in relation to Greek philosophy. As specialists in Byzantine art say, what is the first thing that strikes you about Byzantine art as opposed to Greek art? It is that you have the primacy of the foreground. The forms literally spring from a background as if from a bottomless pit to the point where you can't even tell where the form begins and where it ends. Which obviously implies a questioning of the rigid and solid form. But by what? We'll see that in a moment.

And why, and how is this realized? It is realized through a bottomless depth, which is the bottomless depth... so you will tell me that there is a background. Optically speaking, there is no background. There is a tactile background, but you are not in a position to lay your fingers

on it. The dome, the vault, the arch, with their disproportions, with the type of very particular perspectives that they will give, imposing a lengthening of the quasi-verticals. You see? In a Byzantine mosaic, for example, the dome functions as something which is not at all simply half of sphere; it really plays the role of the bottomless depth from which all forms emerge.

In other words, the division, for it is indeed a question of dividing, the fundamental operation both of art and philosophy will be to divide and to subdivide, only the Neoplatonists divide *kata bathos*. What does this mean: *kata bathos*? Oh, but of course they keep, since after all they are Platonists, they tell us "oh yes, there is a *kata platos* division", but here it is very odd, very odd. Plato explicitly distinguished between *kata platos* and *kata mèkos* – see the end of the *Sophist* – but the Neoplatonists, ah, they know, they know how to torture texts, they dare to claim to be influenced by the *Sophist*, but, in fact, we realize that what some of them say, what they're really speaking about is both a *kata platos* division and a *kata bathos* division. Why did they change? Because it changes everything.

The division... they say: "Oh yes there is a *kata platos* division, there is a division according to width." What would this be? It is, for example, the division of the gods into heterogeneous gods. You have Zeus, the god of gods, and they divide into heterogeneous and heteronymous gods, that is to say, they don't have the same name as him and they don't have the same name as each other, and nor do they have the same functions. I don't know... I forget all the gods, the god of this, god of that. Anyway, that's the *kata platos* division. The gods divide, no sorry, the god of gods divides into gods who have neither the same name nor the same functions. It's an anomogenic division, that's what it is. A division into species.

But they also speak of *kata bathos*. Zeus defines himself differently. And what is the *kata bathos* division? *Kata bathos*, Zeus defines himself thus: Zeus to the first power and Zeus to the second power, Zeus, third power, Zeus fourth power – well, let's not try to understand it for the moment since we'll run into it again; so it becomes something that is not Platonic, doesn't it – What is this succession of powers? To each power, there is a *kata bathos* division: it is homogeneous and homonymous. Zeus does not stop being called Zeus. It is within his powers. And we can give names to these powers. There will be the titanic power. There will be the demiurgic power. There will be his power over the elements. There will be the Athenic power. Here I'm thinking of a successor of Plotinus who adds to this list with a splendid vocabulary, but who obviously appeals to religious matters, to things of mystery, to things... well, things that specialists know. But it is a real succession of powers...

[Someone from the secretary's office interrupts the seminar]

Ah, I'm going... Shall I give them to you now? Yes, because it's good timing. Time for a short recreational break! [Tape interrupted] [2:07:40]

So, later on when German Romanticism will rediscover the bottomless depth, this will also be... it will also be in terms of a theory of powers, I think, for example, of Schelling. I'm not at all saying that this happens under the influence of Plotinus, but it's obvious that these are people, at least in the case of Schelling, who have a great knowledge of Neoplatonic philosophy, and it will assume another meaning for them, then, in 19th century Germany. In Romanticism the bottomless depth will take on a completely a new value, but I believe that if there is an origin of *bathos*, that is to say, of unbound depth, unsubdued depth, that is to say, the depth that is not subject to a perpendicular plane, it is there, this is where the origin lies, in the Neoplatonists' idea of *bathos*.

So, there will be an enormous problem since they keep... they remain platonic, they keep the *kata platos* division. For example, Zeus who defines himself through several gods who do not have the same name, but Zeus defines himself in terms of width, divides himself in terms of width through heteronymous gods, but at the same time he divides himself in terms of depth through homonymous powers: Zeus one, Zeus two, Zeus three. There is no escaping this... What is the relationship between the two divisions? For Plato, there was no problem because the *kata mèkos* division was a plane and referred to a plane, and the *kata platos* division referred to another plane. These two types of planes could very well function with each other in the planetarium. But things are going to get trickier: how do you reconcile the *kata platos* division, which would be on a plane or planes, with the division that emanates from the bottomless depths, the division of powers? To give you a small taste of the equivalent in art, what is it that Byzantine art discovers? It discovers two great scales: the luminous scale and the diatonic scale or, if you prefer, the chromatic scale, the so-called chromatic scale, and the diatonic scale.

But what is the chromatic scale? It is the series of powers that go from the saturated to the rarefied, that is to say, the same color has values that are saturated, less saturated and so on up to the rarefied, that is to say, from dense to pale. You can recognize immediately in the chromatic scale – which is very little known but we will come back to this problem – in the chromatic scale, you can clearly recognize a *kata bathos* division, a division in terms of depth. And what is Byzantine art? It's the way a saturated color comes to resonate with a rarefied color, ... no, I mean with a rarefied version of the same color. But I've already said too much in speaking of all of this. In fact, for the moment, what is it? It's the degrees of light, the powers of light that go from dense to pale, from saturated to rarefied, *kata bathos* division.

What is the diatonic scale? It is the division of the colors. With four main Byzantine colors: gold, yellow, blue... no, what am I saying: gold, blue, green, red. These four fundamental colors therefore become the object of a diatonic division, see, from one tone to another, from one hue to another hue, from a color to another color. I would say, literally, this time what we have is a *kata platos* division.

Now, what will be the relation between the diatonic scale, division in terms of width, and the chromatic scale, division in terms of depth? You can immediately sense that, for the Neoplatonists, it will be necessary that following their reversal of Plato... it will be necessary that division in terms of width is subordinated and submits to depth as the power of the bottomless. Death to Plato. I mean that here depth is unbound. Depth unleashes itself and is thus recovered. It will no longer let itself be reduced to a dimension, that is, to a space in terms of width. It will no longer let itself be reduced to a length, that is to say, to a plane perpendicular to the length. On the contrary, it is the foreground, the *platos*, which will be grabbed by the bottomless depth, such that the One of Plotinus will obviously be completely different from the One of Plato, since it is the bottomless depth itself. You might as well say that light is liberated. If depth is liberated, light too is liberated. And indeed, light is the direct emanation of the bottomless depth. It is interesting because it is obvious that, for Plotinus, bottomless depth is the luminous par excellence.

In other words, light is no longer a medium, and the whole treatise I just quoted from Plotinus marks a fundamental break with Plato and the Platonic school, namely: in what way is light not only no longer a medium but does not even require a medium? And why doesn't light require a medium? It's quite simple. Plotinus' answer is necessarily a luminous one. What

does it mean? How can you expect light to require a medium? It requires it purely by accident, in the way it strikes bodies. And this is what Plato thought, that it strikes bodies. But it doesn't strike bodies. Light doesn't require a medium for a very simple reason, *it strikes souls and the soul has no location*. So, there's no need for light... there's no need for a medium for light. There's a direct relationship between light and the soul independent of any medium.

Why is this? Because without doubt, if light is the first power of bottomless depth, the soul itself is a power derived from bottomless depth, so there is no need for a medium... The bottomless depth is light. But you see that this won't be the case for the German Romantics. There is something astonishing about... what we don't see, this the great idea of the Greeks; *what we don't see is light itself*. What we don't see is not the dark. But for German Romanticism, things are much more complicated. There the bottomless depth becomes black, or at least it tends to become black. But for Plotinus, it's not at all like this. What is bottomless is light. Well, that's the first aspect, see? This discovery of *bathos*, of a liberated depth.

But, the second consequence, second consequence and I'll be done, and I'd like to go on from there next time. Can you feel it? It can't be the same conception of form anymore. The Platonic form is finished. He may use the same terms, ideas, forms... [*Tape interrupted*] [2:17:55]

... is of no interest unless you can define in what way, in what way they are geometrical-physical forms. They are necessarily geometrical-physical forms since, once again, they are organized according to planimetric relationships. It's because it's a configuration of privileged points that can only be determined on planes, the relations between planes being assignable. So, it's because the Platonic form is a configuration of planes – no, sorry – is a configuration of positions and points that refer to planes whose relations are assignable to one another, planes that have assignable relations, that the configuration is rigid. It's geometrical, solid. You see? And this is almost all you had to understand today, it's not difficult...

What does he invent? What does Plotinus invent? Something astonishing. We are nowhere near having exhausted discoveries of this type. It is, finally, that *forms are not rigid*. They are not geometrical-physical. What are they? *They are purely optical*. In other words, they are forms of light. Light is no longer a medium within the form as it is in Plato. It is the light that creates forms. The forms are luminous and not rigid or geometrical. Figures are figures of light and not figures of geometry. If you want a formula that sums up, among other things, Byzantine art, you would say that in this domain the figures are figures of light and not geometric figures. Goodbye to the cube. No more cube. And the figures of light emerge from the bottomless depth. It is light that is sufficient to create forms. What does that mean? There is no need to put it in a rigid form or even to make it reflect upon a rigid form. Oh, there's no need? No need, no: it's enough in itself to create forms.

Let's jump forward to talk about a painter who owes a lot to Byzantine art and who we spoke about last year: [Robert] Delaunay.²¹ What is Delaunay doing? What difference, then, what difference is there between Cubism and Delaunay? I owe the knowledge of this to one of you who has helped me understand it better. Delaunay makes... he makes a splendid remark in one of his notebooks. He says: "Cézanne had broken the fruit bowl". That means: Cézanne broke the rigid form, he broke the geometric form. "He broke the fruitbowl (*compotier*)."

And he says, "The mistake of the Cubists" – this is a page where Delaunay tries to explain his

great difference with Cubism – he says, "The mistake of the Cubists, is that they aim to try and put it back together." That's very strong, that's very, very beautiful, and indeed, that's what the Cubists literally did. They just put it back together in a messy way, they put it back together like that, they put the pieces back together, they glued Cézanne's fruitbowl back together.

This is where he accuses them of a return to classicism. He says: they didn't understand that, if Cézanne had broken it, it wasn't so they could glue it back together. What had to be discovered, when Cézanne broke the rigid form? One shouldn't find a way of reconstituting it – Cubism – in the old way of the solid-rigid. It is not by chance that Cubism is called Cubism. You have to literally see it the way I do as a tribute to Greek art, to classical art, whereas Delaunay is Plotinian, he is Byzantine. One had to realize that *forms are created by light and not by the reflection of light on a rigid object*. That, the reflection of light on a rigid object, is of no consequence. It is still light subordinated to the rigid figure. No, it is light which is the creator of forms. There are luminous forms, and the luminous forms are primary. Rigid forms are derivatives of the luminous forms, they are luminous forms that have crystallized, solidified. But what comes first is the form of light.

If what is primary is the form of light, it is because light is endowed with a movement. Well, yes... light has a movement that is quite distinct from the movement of the object that moves under the light. And Plato only knew the movement of objects that moved under the light. That's why he's always talking about reflections. But no, it's not that. And just as Delaunay opposed Cubism, which recomposed solid structures and rigid forms, he also opposed Futurism, but why? Because Futurism considers the effects of light on a moving object. So, in the same way, it was a mistake to recompose rigid forms, since light is itself the creator of forms, forms of pure light, and similarly light has a movement of its own that has nothing to do with the movement of a moving body under the light. Hence, neither Futurism, nor Cubism. What Delaunay practices could be considered a neo-Byzantinism: namely, a movement of light and luminous forms emanating from a bottomless depth, emanating from a *kata bathos*, a *bathos*. This *bathos* will find a kind of figuration in Delaunay's work, in the famous form of the spiral.

Well, then, we seem to have strayed very far, but since the very beginning what we have been trying to say is this: what would a Plotinian revolution mean in relation to time? A Plotinian revolution in relation to time means exactly this: time is the indirect image of a movement. Yes, okay. Yes, time is the indirect image of a movement, but this is the only point of agreement. Because this movement is not the movement of the world, *it is the movement of the soul*. It is not the movement of an object under the light, it is the movement of the light itself. The soul... the world may be a geometrical-physical configuration, meaning geometric figures and solids. But the soul is a figure of light. Time is dependent on the soul. It is a language, it is a world, it is a philosophy that has absolutely nothing to do with that which spoke to us about time as number of the movement of the world.

It is now a matter of another movement, another conception of form. And what will this movement of the soul be? *Time is the expression of the movement of the soul*, that is, *it is the rhythm of the figures of light*. How can we define this movement of the soul which not only gives rise to time, but which constitutes it? It is the movement of the soul that gives rise to time. I can say at the same time that it continues to maintain – and this is what's strange – it continues to maintain the subordination of time to movement. Only this is a totally new movement, a movement of a completely new type. What is it? The movement of light in

itself, and no longer the movement of the object which reflects the light; the movement of luminous forms in themselves and not the movement of rigid forms, or solid forms; the movement of figures of light and not the movement of figures of geometry. Everything has changed; we are in another time. It remains subordinated to movement but it is a completely new movement, radically new. And between these two types of philosophy there is as much difference as between Greek art and Byzantine art.

So, what is this new movement and what kind of time emerges from it? That's what we'll see next time. [*End of the recording*] [2:29:39]

Notes

¹ In the *Timaeus*, Plato gives a meticulous account of the formation of the universe and an explanation of what he sees as its impressive order and beauty. He presents the universe as the product of rational, purposive and beneficent agency, the handiwork of a divine Craftsman (*Demiourgos*) who, in imitation of an unchanging and eternal model, imposes mathematical order on a pre-existent chaos to generate the ordered universe (*kosmos*). The governing explanatory principle of the account is teleological: the universe as a whole as well as its various parts are so arranged as to produce a large number of positive effects.

² Euclid's *Elements* is a large-scale mathematical treatise consisting of thirteen books that present a collection of definitions, postulates, propositions (theorems and constructions) and mathematical proofs of the propositions. *Elements* has proven instrumental in the development of Western logic and science. Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton to name a few were all influenced by Euclid and applied their knowledge of it to their work.

³ Deleuze develops these perspectives in session 5, December 13, 1983, and also in an essay, "On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael E. Greco), pp. 27-35. He also invokes Hamlet's "cry" in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* op. cit. pp. 41, 105, 112, 287.

⁴ Deleuze presents this development on *cardo* in session 1 of the seminar on Kant, March 14, 1978.

⁵ Nietzsche discusses the tragedy of Oedipus in both *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. The idea of Oedipus being a Semitic tragedy is a theme that Deleuze, following Holderlin and Nietzsche, takes up also in *A Thousand Plateaus*. See "On Several Regimes of Signs" in G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit. p.125.

⁶ Deleuze quotes Anaximander's words on this subject in the previous seminar.

⁷ Herodotus' *Histories* is a historical narrative that aims to describe and explain the long history of conflict between Greeks and non-Greeks, culminating in the Graeco-Persian Wars of the early 5th century BC.

⁸ The formula C-M-C (Commodity-Money-Commodity) and its inversion M-C-M are presented by Marx in the first volume of *Capital*: "The first distinction between money as money and money as capital is nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation. The direct form of the circulation of commodities is C-M-C, the transformation of commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities: selling in order to buy. But alongside this form we find another form, which is quite distinct from the first: M-C-M, the transformation of money into commodities, and the re-conversion of commodities into money: buying in order to sell. Money which describes the latter course in its movement is transformed into capital, becomes capital, and, from the point of view of its function, already is capital." See Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1* (trans. Ben Fowkes) London: Penguin, 1990 pp. 247-248.

⁹ Chrematistics (from the Greek *krema*, meaning money) is the study and theory of wealth as measured in money. Aristotle established a difference between economics and chrematistics that would be seminal for medieval thought. For Aristotle, Chrematistics is the accumulation of money for its own sake, especially by usury (an activity that was considered dehumanizing) while economics is the natural use of money as a medium of exchange. According to Aristotle, economy is licit providing that the sale of goods is made directly between the producer and the buyer at the right price, and that it does not generate a value-added product. On the other hand, it is illicit if the producer purchases for resale to consumers for a higher price, generating added value. According to this theory, money should only be a medium of exchange and measure of value.

¹⁰ Plotinus (204/5-270 C.E.) is generally regarded as the founder of Neoplatonism. The term 'Neoplatonism' is an invention of early 19th century European scholars to indicate that Plotinus initiated a new phase in the development of the Platonic tradition. His writings are collectively known by the name given to them by his student and editor, Porphyry, as *Enneads*.

¹¹ Deleuze refers to Plotinus in the following seminars: session 11 of the seminar on Spinoza, February 17, 1981; session 7 of the seminar Painting, May 26, 1981; sessions 13 and 15 of the seminar Cinema 2, March 8 and 22, 1983; and sessions 8 and 13 of the same seminar Cinema 3, January 17 and March 13, 1984.

¹² As we see from the next section, Deleuze means chapter 7.

¹³ In “Eternity and Time” (*Ennead* III.7) Plotinus discusses the notion of eternity. Although his views are developed through an interpretation of both Plato (in particular the *Timaeus*) and Aristotle (in particular *Physics* 4), Plotinus’ theories of eternity and time are quite singular and are centred on three points: firstly, the notion of eternity as the lack of duration and extension in time (so Plotinus distinguishes eternity from everlastingness); secondly, the idea that time is associated with the activity of the soul rather than with the movement of bodies; and thirdly, the notion of life as a mode of being that characterizes, in different ways, both the Intellect and the Soul, and accounts for the nature of eternity and time as well as for the derivation of time from eternity.

¹⁴ On Egyptian art and bas-relief, see sessions 5, 6, and 7 of the seminars on Painting, May 12, 19 and 26, 1981.

¹⁵ Alois Riegl (1858-1905) was an Austrian art historian, one of the principal figures in the creation of art history as a discipline. He is known principally for his theory of the “Kunstwollen”, a concept which describes the creative drive that shapes each era’s artistic output. Riegl’s theories aim at revealing how and why artists from different periods represented the perceptual and social world in the way they did.

¹⁶ The text that Deleuze is thinking of here is most likely one from *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, where Riegl writes apropos of the apparent flatness of the Egyptian pyramids: “Approaching from afar, the observer always sees a simple trapezoidal surface, which, he knows, yields a pyramidal form when combined with three like planes. Once again, we are dealing with an objective, two-dimensional surface that is clearly bounded on each side, and we draw on our tactile experience to flesh it out into three-dimensional form. In themselves, however, form and surface still remain sharply distinct. This division makes itself especially evident in the way that surfaces are completely covered with figural reliefs, which freely extend themselves as decoration across the whole plane without this filling of the blank surface ever serving to make the surface appear part of a larger whole. To put it another way, we are missing that quality which in classical art we call the tectonic: the consideration of inner structure and ‘the spiritual.’ Here, form and surface are kept wholly discrete and not made to cohere...” See Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts* (trans. Jacqueline E. Jung), New York: Zone Books, 2004. p. 200-201. On Alois Riegl, see also sessions 5 and the seminar on Painting, May 12 and 19, 1981.

¹⁷ Wilhelm Worringer (1881-1965) was a German art historian. One of his best-known works is *Abstraction and Empathy* where he argues that there are two main types of art: art of “abstraction” (which at the time was generally associated with a more “primitive” world view) and art of “empathy” (which was associated with realism in the broadest sense of the word, and applied mainly to Western art since the Renaissance). Worringer argues that abstract art (for example Islamic art) is in no way inferior to realist art and was worthy of respect in its own right. His work has been widely discussed and influenced Klee amongst others. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write that he is the first person to see abstraction “as the very beginning of art or the first expression of an artistic will.”

¹⁸ *The Sophist* is a dialogue from Plato’s late period (most likely written in 360 BC) where the interlocutors employ the method of division in order to classify and define the sophist and describe his essential attributes and differences in relation to the philosopher and the statesman.

¹⁹ Here Deleuze plays on the common root of three terms, *fond* (background), *profond/profondeur* (deep/depth) and *sans fond* (bottomless depth) in a way that is impossible to replicate in English.

²⁰ Plato’s *Parmenides*, part of which takes the form of a fictional conversation between Socrates and the venerable figure of Parmenides, consists in a critical examination of the theory of forms. According to this theory, every predicate or property has a corresponding form that is single, eternal, unchanging, indivisible and non-sensible. The theoretical function of these forms is to explain why things (particularly, sensible things) have the properties they do. Thus, it is by virtue of being in some way related to their corresponding, immutable forms that things are the way they are. Fundamental to this theory is the claim that forms are separate from (at least in the sense of being not identical to) the things that partake of them.

²¹ Robert Delaunay (1885-1941) was a French artist who, along with his wife Sonia Delaunay and others, co-founded the Orphism art movement, a breakaway offshoot of Cubism that moved towards lyrical abstraction and exploration of color at a time when the Cubists were experimenting with monochromaticism. His own work is noted for its increasing focus on the tonal values of colors and geometric shapes, particularly spirals and concentric circles that in later paintings tended towards pure abstraction. On Delaunay, see sessions 15 and 19 of the seminar on Cinema 2, March 22 and May 3, 1983. On the “compotier” see session 4 on Foucault, December 11, 1985.