

Gilles Deleuze
On Cinema, Truth and Time: The Forger, 1983-1984

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[Note that following the February 28th session, there was an unscheduled week off, with no audible explanation in the recordings. It is clear that this seminar directly follows the February 28 session.]

Part 1

My hair has turned whiter... you're not very polite, you could say: "No! No! It's not true!" Well, okay... At least you will recall that we are studying a reversal. A reversal is no big deal, but it is nonetheless something of considerable importance. It's when, you see... time was for a long time defined – I don't want to fix things too much, this is just a flight of inspiration – time was long defined, or rather it was long sought, looked for, in terms of a movement of the world or the body in general. And when I say we mustn't fix things too much, well, of course, the soul was already in question here since the soul, in a certain way, refers to a body. It refers to the world, there is a soul of the world, there is a soul of the body... obviously all this is possible. The fact remains that time was sought more in terms of the world and of the body and could thus be given a definition, an approximate definition, namely, it would be the measure or the number of the extensive quantity or of the extensive movement of the world or of a body in general. I insist on this point since it is in any case our main theme this year, because all of this is directly related to, and could even be considered the development of, what we looked at in the first trimester, namely, a Platonic conception of truth.

And then I said: what's going on here? Well, what's going on here is a very, very important moment in the history of thought, whereas we are trying to... Here, if you like, what I would like to try to do, following the last session, is to bring this very important moment to life a bit more. This moment which occurs very late, after Jesus Christ, but in complete ignorance of Christianity, which occurs with the School of Alexandria, with Plotinus, beginning from the third century CE, and which explodes – not that it hadn't been prepared in advance, obviously it had been prepared in advance – and what does this reversal consists in? Time will no longer be sought in terms of the world or of a body in general, *it will be sought in terms of the soul*; it will be sought in terms of the soul. Well, but you see, and this is what is important for our schema, I can say in advance that it remains subordinate to movement. It's simply that this will in no way be the same movement.

Instead of being the number or measure of the extensive movement of the world or of a body in general, it will be the number and measure – hence, it will remain subordinate to movement – but it will be the number and measure of the movement proper to the soul,

namely, the *intensive* movement of the soul. And there could be all kinds of mixtures between the two; there could be all manner of co-mingling within this new conception. Moreover, there could be all kinds of elements within the old conception that were preparing the new one. So, as I was saying earlier, even if you don't want to fix things too much, in the end you have to fix them somewhat to make it clear that, even if it was prepared, what we have here is something completely new.

None of this means that we don't remain wholly within the atmosphere of... time being only captured in an indirect image. Time is not seized... The hour has not yet come when philosophy will confront itself with a direct image of time. And, I would say that this reversal perhaps brings us closer to this hour when... so anyway, time will now be the number or measure of the intensive movement of the soul, now that time depends on the soul and not on the world or the body in general. This implies that the terms number and measure change their meaning. Indeed, the number and measure of an intensive quantity cannot be of the same type as the number and measure of an extensive quantity, that is, of local movement. We'll have to find another meaning; we'll have to find another theory of number, and here too, this could have been prepared by Plato, of that there is no doubt. No, it's complicated.

And then, what we saw last time is that, at the same time, we have the same difference, and the same relationships too, but the difference that we can trace, it seems to me, between the School of Alexandria, that is to say, Neoplatonism, and Plato or Platonism, is the same that we can draw, from the point of view of art, between Byzantine and Greek art... And what we saw last time was like an introduction to this that clearly shows it – and which, I'll summarize very quickly – concerning four fundamental points, four fundamental points that enable us to distinguish between Plato and Plotinus on the one hand, and Greek art and Byzantine art on the other.

The first fundamental difference concerns form, namely that in Plato, in a certain way too – if you also there, if you fix this too much, it becomes... it borders on a misunderstanding, but if you allow for the necessary nuances, it becomes quite precise I think – in Plato, form is geometrical – my God, I'm rushing things in saying this – that is to say that form is above all a rigid configuration. And what defines it? What defines a rigid configuration? It's an intersection of planes. It's a matter of planes in relations that are parallel, perpendicular or intersecting. Form is therefore a rigid configuration defined by an intersection of planes, that is to say, by a distribution of privileged positions on these planes, once again, plane of the ecliptic, plane of the equator, the whole of astronomy, the whole of geometrical astronomy.

With Plotinus – and yet he will often borrow and pass by way of Plato's vocabulary; that's what makes things fascinating and means that the texts have to be interpreted... – with Plotinus, even when he returns to Platonic terms, one feels that the atmosphere is quite different, it is another atmosphere, it's not the same world. It is that, for him, form is no longer a rigid configuration; *form is above all a form of light*, it is a figure of light. And rigid figures are simply the consequences... of figures of light. What does this mean? And in what way? And how will these figures of light ultimately emerge from the rigid figures? It's that mathematics and geometry will become subordinated to a whole optics. Primacy of the figure of light over the rigid figure.

I'll make a short parenthesis here: this isn't completely without relevance to cinema. I mean, I'm thinking of treatises from the beginnings of cinema, the great text, for example, the great text by Abel Gance on luminous architecture, it's an idea that we will find at the beginning of

the 20th century: the architecture of lights.¹ Moreover, we can also find a dark version of this idea... There's a very fine book that you have to read – and I will tell you another time why you should read it before the end of the year – there's a book by Paul Virilio which is called... a book on the relations between cinema and war, called *The Logistics of Perception*.² And Virilio reminds us that at the very end of the war the Nazis, when everything had already been destroyed, when Berlin had been completely destroyed, launched attempts, in what was an act of total madness, right up to the end, they would send off their trains of deportees etc., as if they still had time. There, in the ruins of Berlin, Berlin was reborn, thanks to the famous Nazi minister Albert Speer who rebuilt Berlin using only light beams. It became literally a city of light, meaning that the beams of the anti-aircraft searchlights were supposed to reconstruct the destroyed architecture using columns of light.

Well, then, from Gance to this diabolical version of the Nazis, this idea which, in fact, arises at the beginning of the twentieth century and which continues with an architecture of light that in fact was only taken up again by the Nazis, well, if we had to look for the distant ancestor, the distant ancestor of this idea of an architecture of light before being an architecture of stone, it was Byzantine art and the philosophy of Plotinus. So that was the first point, the substitution of the form of light for the geometric form, that is to say, for form defined as a rigid configuration.

Second point, which no longer concerns form but concerns depth, what the Greeks call *bathos*, b-a-t-h-o-s. And I was saying, from a Platonic or classical Greek perspective, depth is always contained or enveloped, that is to say, it is subordinated. But what is it subordinated to? It is subordinated to width and length. The philosophical process that we call "division" in Plato – how we divide a concept? – is a process that is, in Plato's own words, occurs in terms of width and length. What does it mean to say that width and length enclose depth, or domesticate depth, subordinate depth? The Greeks of the classical age are afraid of depth. And, indeed, what will come to domesticate depth in Greek art? It is the foreground. It is the foreground which, in fact, will be the determining plane, the fundamental plane because it is the one which will determine the other planes, because it is with it and in relation to it that the other planes will enter into relationships of intersection. There will be a primacy of the foreground (*avant-plan*). The figure is defined by the foreground, and it encloses the depth within its width and length. And all of Greek statuary adheres to this general criterion. The most powerful instances of Greek sculpture are those which immediately appear in the foreground.

As I said, referring to Plotinus, as well as to Byzantine art, here we witness a fundamental phenomenon which is *the liberation of depth*, the liberation of *bathos*. Liberation of depth as something *bottomless*³, and this bottomless depth is light itself. Light comes from bottomless depth. Light is *bathos* itself. So that this light will present itself as a series of powers, a series of powers. Depth will consist in a series of... – and it comes back to the same thing at another level – width and length will simply be the consequence of depth and of the spacing out (*échalonnement*) of depth's powers, just as I said earlier that geometric figures, rigid figures will be no more than the consequence of figures of light. Here I would say – and it comes back to stating the same thing in other terms – width and the length will be no more than the consequence of depth and of the tiering (*étagement*) of its powers.

Therefore, the division... the Platonic division – they might claim to be Platonists, but the division will no longer be, as it is in Plato, in terms of width and length. The division, as a process of thought, meaning the way in which a concept is divided, will now be *a division in*

terms of depth. The god will no longer divide himself in terms of width, or solely in terms of width in order to produce all the different types of gods – the god of this, the god of that, the god of the other. Instead, the primary god will be spaced out in depth according to a series of powers... Zeus one, Zeus two, Zeus three, Zeus to the power of four, Zeus to the power of five etc. What will be discovered is the *bathos* of division. Of course, you understand, they will not wholly renounce division in terms of width, that of the different gods? But division by width will have to be subordinated to division in terms of depth. I mean that the different gods can only appear in relation to a certain power of Zeus in depth. For example, it is at the level of Zeus to the power of four that certain gods will appear. Whereas at the level of Zeus to the power of three, the power of two, the more you go up... It's as though the tiering of degrees of depth, that is to say, a movement in terms of intensity, would come to express itself at such or such a level in the width-based divisions. It is now width and length that will depend on depth, whereas formerly it was width and length that imprisoned depth. So here we have the liberation of depth, which is something essential in art, particularly in Byzantine art.

That was the second point, you see... Third point: it was no longer a question of form or depth, it was something that directly concerned movement. From this it follows that movement was no longer an extensive or local movement – which amounts to the same thing – local movement being, in fact, a movement such that the moving body passes from one place to another place, that is to say, from one privileged point to another privileged point on a plane. So planar movement is no longer the passage of a rigid body from one position to another. That goes without saying, it's a natural consequence. Since the figure is no longer the rigid figure, movement can no longer be the passage of the rigid body from one position to another. So, what will it be? *It will be the movement of light itself.* Light does not illuminate rigid bodies in movement, because they are only a consequence. The rigid body in movement does no more than reflect the light.

Well, long before that, that is, at a much deeper level, there is another type of movement, namely that *light is in itself movement.* It is in itself movement, but in what sense? In the sense that it creates forms. And there will be as many types of movement as there will be types of light. The light of the sun is not movement in the same sense – that is to say in terms of the tiering of depths – as... the light of the sun has a higher power than that of the moon. Also, the movement of solar forms is not the same as the movement of lunar forms. And ultimately, local movement, which is to say extensive movement, is in its turn only an extreme consequence of the movements of light in and by itself. In Byzantine art, the movement is that of light. It is not the movement of a form that reflects light.

You see how these three points are exactly the same, at three different levels: from the point of view of form; from the point of view of the bottomless, that is to say, of bottomless depth; from the point of view of movement. If I try to summarize them in a fourth formula, I would say: it is the idea of illuminations that replaces the idea of transport. And you will say to me: But light, light... Plato never stops talking about it! Of course, and then what? Well yes, he talks about it, he talks about it all the time but only as a geometrical optic. It is a light subordinated to transport. Whereas what does it mean to say that illumination replaces transport? They thought that... it's very simple, you just have to look closely at the whole play of metaphors both in Plato and in Plotinus. It's not... it's another world, a whole other world to ours, a whole other very strange world.

I mean, what is it that ceaselessly occurs in Platonism? What happens in Platonism is something we saw in relation to the doctrine of truth in Plato. What is fundamental is the model-copy, the model-copy relation. What does the demiurge, the one who fabricates the world, do? Ultimately, he makes it using one eye and one hand: he contemplates the model and he makes the copy. I would say that the key metaphor here is the *imprint*. And the imprint is, indeed, a theory of *plans*⁴. It is the imprint. Or, if you prefer, I would say that it's a philosophy that is dominated by the concept of impression, in the true sense of the word. The demiurge "imprints" the mark of the model upon the matter. It is the domain of the stamp, model-copy.

In Plotinus, we might say that the same thing occurs, but this isn't the case. If you try to live these metaphors, for him, it's not at all a question of model-copy and for a very simple reason: it's that the demiurge – he may invoke the demiurge, but this isn't at all the same demiurge as Plato's – it's no longer a demiurge that contemplates with one eye and produces with one hand. It is a strange power that needs only to contemplate in order to produce. It does not produce because it contemplates; *it produces by contemplating*, because it contemplates. *It is contemplation that is itself production*. What does this mean? It means that the relation is no longer that of model-copy, that is, it is no longer a question of printing. The great notion, this time, is expression. *Light expresses itself*. And we will see this in the two fundamental metaphors that will replace the model-copy. This will be source-mirror, on the one hand and seed-development on the other.

And this will mark philosophy for a long time, it will mark philosophy up until the Renaissance. It will be a philosophy of expression: the seed expresses itself in the tree, the mirror expresses the light. And during the Renaissance, you're will continually have, for example, right up to the famous cardinal Nicholas of Cusa of the 15th century, who will be of fundamental importance for all modern thought.⁵ You will have entire pages discussing whether something is more like a seed or more like a mirror? This is not Plato; it derives from Plotinus. It's no longer the domain of model-copy. That's all over. Because the model-copy is still a tactile model. Here it derives from the optical model. Well, there you have it. That was my starting point, regarding this sort of Alexandrian or Byzantine revolution.

What we have to show is in what way, then – this is where we are now – what we have to show is in what way this new conception of time, by which I mean, time being the number or the measure of the intensive movement of the soul, really emerges, necessarily emerges, You see what we still have to do, today, what we still have to do is to understand why the soul has an intensive movement. What is this intensive movement? If you have been following these initial points, you should already be able to sense it. We already have all the elements we need to be able to define it, but still we have a hard task ahead of us: to show how the soul is inseparable from an intensive movement that is no longer a local transport, that is no longer an extensive movement, and to show how this intensive movement can be measured by a number, which will be time. But again, this is what matters to me: the number or the measure of an intensive movement cannot be of the same type as the number or the measure of an extensive movement, of a movement in space, of a local movement which passes from one position to another.

Hence, my first problem: what is the nature of the movement of the soul? This is my first problem: what is the nature of the soul's movement taken as an intensive movement? If I know this, I will have made a great deal of progress on the figure of time. Well, we know this, we know it. We know it, and here I always come back to the fundamental difference

between intensive quantity and extensive quantity. For how is the extensive quantity thought?⁶ It is necessarily thought in terms of the part and the whole, and its regime is the exteriority of parts. We call an extensive quantity a quantity where the presentation of the Whole presupposes that of the parts and where these parts are external to one another. We will say of the parts that they compose the Whole. As such, one part does not contain another. What contains the parts is – even if it is a part, it is a part in relation to another Whole – What contains the parts is always a Whole, it is the Whole of these parts. Do you understand?

Whereas what is the paradox of the intensive quantity? It is that it cannot be thought in terms of the following relation, that is to say in terms of the part-whole relation; it can only be thought in terms of a profoundly paradoxical relation which is *the one-zero relation*. It operates with one and zero. It does not operate with part-Whole. Part-Whole are the two poles of extensive quantity; *one-zero are the two poles of intensive quantity*. Why does it start with one-zero? Well, yes, one-zero... It is because intensive quantity is that whose magnitude can be apprehended only as a single unity. Understand well! that whose magnitude, whatever it may be, can only be apprehended as a single unity... [*Interruption of the recording*] [34:02]

... Forty degrees is not composed of forty times one degree. Whereas forty meters is composed of forty times a meter. Forty times a degree is a degree; forty degrees is not forty times a degree. Forty degrees is a quantity that can only be understood as a unity exactly like thirty degrees, like a hundred degrees, etc. Any intensive quantity is such that its magnitude can only be apprehended as a unity.

You will say to me, "We know that: it is the definition that Kant gives of intensive quantity". Yes, I don't mind, because I think that here we have a major misunderstanding regarding Kant – and when we talk about Kant, we'll have to come back to this point – it's a major misunderstanding regarding Kant, and one that has led to some very unfortunate interpretations of Kantianism – if anything can be said to be unfortunate in this field – that has led to some extremely unfortunate interpretations, to believe that Kant provided an "original" definition of intensive quantity. And there is even a whole theory among the Germans who base their understanding of Kant's novelty on the Kantian theory of intensive quantities, whereas, in my view – and it's obvious that I'm right, there's no choice – Kant merely took up the most traditional of the definitions of intensive quantity, although it can't be denied he has a great novelty but that's not where his novelty lies.

Once we've rejected this objection, I would say, well yes, the intensive quantity is the one whose magnitude can only be apprehended as a unity, but that is not enough. What will enable us to distinguish two unities, since every quantity is intensive and has a magnitude that can only be apprehended as a unity? You understand, the second aspect of intensive quantity follows directly from this, I don't even have the choice anymore. What will distinguish two intensive quantities is the variable distance of the unity under which one apprehends its magnitude from zero. The distance of forty degrees from zero will be greater than the distance... greater? Yes, greater. But what does "greater" mean here? We'll leave it in quotation marks – it will be greater than the distance of thirty degrees from zero.

However, distances are indecomposable. Otherwise, they would be extensive quantities. The distance from thirty degrees to zero is indecomposable, the distance from forty degrees to zero is indecomposable. So how can you say that one is greater than the other? Very simple. This is what we call an "ordination". I don't say by how much because I don't have to say by how much. You will say no, I say it's ten degrees... not at all. I don't say it's ten degrees. I

will say this when I have translated the intensive quantities into extensive quantities. I can only say that there is an ordination of distances that are all indecomposable, and that forty degrees is further away, more distant from zero than thirty degrees. Ah, well! So that's the distance to zero. That's why I say that the intensive quantity is no longer thought in terms of the part-whole relation, but in terms of the unity-zero relation.

Is this supposed to astonish us? Oh, no! It is not supposed to astonish us! It is that *intensive quantity is depth*. You don't have a little piece of chalk? I would like to make a... I would like to make a little drawing... No? No little drawing... It's depth. I would say, everything happens in intensive quantity in terms of the one-zero relation. What does this mean? It means that the intensive quantity is inseparable from scale. The ordination of indecomposable distances is called scale.

So, what will the scale be? A power of one, in intensive quantities... there is no 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. This would be the extensive use of number. What is there? Is there at least first, second, third, fourth? Ah, but we're moving too quickly just saying first, second, third, fourth. It's the *ordinal number*. That's already more interesting, it's closer to the intensive. But where does the ordinal number come from? Ah, I have only one idea in this regard, it's that the ordinal number is extremely Neoplatonic, but I don't know, it's that the ordinal number, in fact, *derives from the powers*. It derives from the powers. You can't understand anything about the ordinal number... Logicians have made all possible attempts, in my view, modern logicians since Russell⁷, they've made all manner of attempts to find the origin of the ordinal number, either from the cardinal, or from itself. They have always failed – and always in my view, it's a feeling I have – they have always failed for a very simple reason, it's because the only possible origin of the ordinal number is the power. You have to consider that powers come first with respect to ordinal numbers.

In other words – never mind, I'm not going to develop this – it's... I ask you what is intensive quantity? It's not 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or at least the number of the intensive quantity is not 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. It's 1 *to the power* of one, 1 to the power of 2, 1 to the power of 3, 1 to the power of 4, 1 to the nth power... I mean that each intensive quantity has a magnitude that can only be grasped as a unity, yes. I can specify: each intensive quantity has a magnitude that is grasped as a unity under a determinable power. 1 to the power of 3 is not the same thing as 1 to the power of 4 from the point of view of intensities.

What is the series of powers? The series of powers, each of which is apprehended as a unity under this or that power, is depth. You see in what sense the intensive quantity is thought in relation to the two unique terms – one and zero – since each intensive quantity will have a magnitude grasped as a unity under such and such a power, and the scale of powers will be determined with respect to zero. 1 to the power of 1, 1 to the power of 2, 1 to the power of 3, 1 to the nth power... zero. No sooner do I say this than in your hearts you will say, no, no! You will say to yourself, That's not possible. Or, at least, it's much too basic. Because... you could say to me, if you're right, we need to redraw the schema. And I answer: of course, let's redraw it, to anticipate your desires, let's rework it. The expression of intensive movement will obviously not be... I need a piece of chalk... I'd like to do like Laurel and Hardy. You know the way Laurel used to light his thumb? I'd write with my fingers, I'd write with chalk... Don't you have a little chalk there? It's powerful, a little piece of chalk... Oh, besides, considering what I have to write, it's still... it's coming, it's coming... [*someone has found a piece chalk*] Great! Ah, well! I can't believe it! Thank you very much.

Okay. I would say that this formula is quite shocking. What's good about what I just said, if I may say so? What is good is the idea that... phew, that intensive quantity... Ouch! ouch! Crushing one of my leg bones with the frame of a chair, that's not very platonic, is it. Okay. That's the secret of intensive quantity, so let's develop the secret. You know? To mark a power, as it were, while... [Deleuze draws on the board] While, then, I can oppose... Ah no! It's not finished... [Deleuze draws on the blackboard for quite a long time] You see? This is the extensive quantity, I mean the number of the extensive quantity. This is the number of the intensive quantity, apparently...

Student: Can I make a small, fatuous comment?

Deleuze: No, not right away, in two minutes, you can make your fatuous remark... I have a hope that it will no longer be necessary. But... this is very shocking! It's absurd, it's absurd. Why did we have to go through this? We have to go slowly. We have to put it back in its proper place. It's because... how should we go about it? You have to, you have to be guided to the intensive quantity, so obviously that's why I began with 1... but that's not the movement of intensive quantity.

We have to re-establish the series in terms of depth, which would be the true formula of intensive quantity: 1 to the nth power, which is the bottomless... And then? And then what? What will we put after that? You can invent it, it's not in Plotinus; he didn't state it because he thought about it so much that he didn't feel the need to say it. And then, he didn't have this symbolism, but here, I specify, it can't be in Plotinus, though it is there in spirit, it is there in light. I give the credits for the second semester to the one who... it's not up to me to validate it, I have no choice.

So, there is 1 to the nth power, 1 to the power of n-1, 1 to the power of n-2..., etc., zero: there we have shown our scaling in terms of depth, you have the power of the bottomless in 1 to the nth power, the One-beyond-all, what the Neoplatonists will call the One-beyond-all, which is bottomless depth. This depth is the succession of what they will call "hypostases"⁸, which are the powers. And here we understand that each one is defined by what exactly? By its distance from zero. 1 to the nth power has a... Everything becomes luminous! 1 to the nth power is at an indivisible distance from zero. How can you say that it is by nature greater...greater than what? Greater, in terms of depth, than 1 to the power of n-1? And you will never say that 1 to the power of n = 1 to the power of n-1 +1. That would be strictly geometrical nonsense... mathematical nonsense, arithmetical nonsense.

There, you hold, you hold to your series of powers from a bottomless depth, and you have justified the initial idea, which you will find in Kant. But not by chance. There are those who are surprised by this, by the chapter on intensive quantity in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is a brilliant chapter of four pages. But it's not surprising for us! Since, again, it is not an original chapter of Kantianism. He doesn't need more than four pages to recall things that, up until the Renaissance continued to encumber the treatises. It's only because we've lost it that it comes back to us fresh, and we say: "Ah, Kant!" when it's not. Again, I don't want to say that Kant is not new, but if you don't situate the novelty of an author where it should be, if you don't correctly assign an author's own creations to their proper place, you're screwed, because then you distort everything. This was the drama of many German Neo-Kantians. They stole things from Kant, saying that this was the Kantian revolution... when Kant mightn't have been that at all. It's very unfortunate, it's very unfortunate, hence the

misadventures of Heidegger. Well, so there you see? So, the silly remark... is it still in the room?

Student: It's in relation to the nature of numbers which constitutes a limit. If we look at natural numbers, we would have to say that the 1s that appear above the limit, meaning 1 to the power of 1, 1 to the power of 2, 1 to the nth power, are not the same thing as the 1s below the limit, as in 1 to the nth power, 1 to the power of n-1 and so on.

Deleuze: Well, I think that none of them are... natural number, natural number. A long time ago the Greeks came up with this notion of the natural number, yes. But I would even say of the set 1 to the power of n-1 and so on that none is... since, it is a unity, it is literally what it will become necessary to call or what will later be called... the numbers called "numbering" numbers. They are *numbering* numbers as opposed to *numbered* numbers, the numbers of extension, the numbers of extensive quantity, being numbered numbers.

So, indeed, the origin of a theory of ideal numbers or of numbering numbers is in Plato. Fortunately, in texts that we have lost. How do we know this? Well, we know it from Aristotle. We know from Aristotle and other commentators that Plato's teachings included a famous theory of numbering numbers, which we have tried to reconstruct. All I said is that there are already elements in Plato – I don't want to say that it's a radical revolution – but all we know is that the theory of numbering numbers in Plato is very different from this idea of a series of powers. It's something else altogether. They are supra-geometric numbers, but they will precisely account for the order of geometric combinations. So, it wouldn't be, it wouldn't bother us. So this is the first point. But I'm adding things... do you understand?

Hence, regarding extensive movement, I said how it is the fact of a body changing position, a body which passes from one privileged point to another as defined on a plane or planes, according to what we had seen previously. Here, I can no longer say this. Intensive movement, defined through the relation of the series of powers to zero, that is to say through the ordination of indecomposable distances, will be inseparable, not from a change of position but, let's say, from a *fall*, from a fall. But then again, we always come back to the same thing... oh, but the idea that time is inseparable from a fall and a fall of the soul, is not so new, it's not specifically Plotinian, since it already appears in Plato. Ah yes, there is even a famous myth, the myth of Phaedrus⁹, to explain this story of time and the fall of the soul. So okay, it's already in Plato, this idea of time and its relation with the fall of the soul.

Well, yes, but that's not what counts here. What counts is that with Plotinus we have – alas, not purely, we can't have everything at once – we have a fantastic renewal of the idea of fall... the idea of fall, and this fall is completely new. Because for Plato it's not so problematic. The fall is a real fall, it's a degradation. One falls into the body, the soul falls into the body, it's a fall, I would say, to put it simply that it's a pejorative fall.

In this sense, notice how Plato is closer, he is closer to the Christians than Plotinus, and this is obvious. Among his contemporaries, Plotinus... but Plato is closer to the Christians, closer to the fall in the Christian sense, though are things really as simple as that for the Christians? Whereas here, you feel the fall, I hasten to say, of course, that this will all continue, and in Plotinus the fall remains a fall, let's say a real fall, a real fall. To say that time depends on the soul is to say that it is the number or measure of the fall of the soul. And Plotinus states this formally, in the third Ennead, in the chapter on time.

So it's not a matter of disputing this. The point is that "fall" becomes an extremely ambiguous term because it has two meanings, and that, for the Neo-Platonists, *the fall is not only real*. Moreover, there is no real fall without there also being, more profoundly, an ideal fall. What does this mean, an ideal fall? It is a fall that does not need to occur for it to be a fall. It is the most beautiful of falls. *It is the fall that is not a degradation*.

For ultimately, what is it that experiences a real fall? It's the rigid figures. You have to be rigid to fall... to have a real fall. Light falls, but an ideal fall is perpetually ideal. That is, it doesn't need to actually fall in order to fall. Light falls. I, a rigid body, fall when I stumble. But light falls... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:00:40]

Part 2

... Light falls, the ideal fall: it has a famous name in painting, a very beautiful name, and even in physics, one says.... Oh, I lost my chalk again, I can't write it down! They say... what? Is it there? Oh, I don't have my glasses.

Student: It's there, under the paper.

Deleuze: Under the paper? Ah, ha ha! They say that light, that light falls. Imagine this: here is the sun. [*Deleuze draws on the board*] What do you find in many paintings, many paintings from the Renaissance and again in the 17th century? I make a cloud, you see? What is this figure that ensures such beautiful effects of light in the paintings we love? [In French] it is said of light that it falls in "glories" (*gloires*) or splendors¹⁰, but we should use the plural, in good French. These are the "splendors of light", light falls in splendors. Ah well, light falls in splendors, that is the ideal fall. The ideal fall, I would say the ideal fall is the distance of any-power-whatever to zero, keeping in mind that the power cannot be defined independently of this distance to zero. This is an ideal fall. If, on the other hand, a power runs through the series of powers up to zero, then it is a real fall. Do you follow me? Light falls in splendor, light falls... light falls. Yes, but it is an ideal fall, though strangely enough it is also accompanied by a real fall. In Plotinus, it will be both, but the two will not merge.

It's the same ambiguity that one might experience in front of a neighboring notion: degradation or disintegration. I would say that there can be both a positive and a negative sense to these. Disintegration can be the movement by which light itself breaks up, or by which its power diminishes. But when Paul Claudel, in some splendid pages, comments on Rembrandt's *The Night Watch* – he writes two or three pages that are among the finest that have been written on this painting – the disintegration of a group by light, what does that mean this time? It means that the group taken as a rigid figure – hear me well – the group taken as a rigid geometric figure is undone to the benefit of a form of light. This time, the disintegration is no longer the movement by which light loses its power, but on the contrary the movement by which light imposes its power against the rigidity of geometrical forms. The disintegration of light introduced into a group.¹¹

Light falls, here it is, a marvelous text, Plotinus's finest text which is in the third Ennead, in the great text that I just mentioned, on contemplation: he makes nature speak. I read this text, and here we have the Plotinian style in its purest form, it's quite beautiful. Alas, when I say "Plotinian style", I have an idea about the Plotinian style and the style of the Neoplatonists: they are teachers, they are great teachers. But alas, we only know their works through the disciples who took notes. So this is a bit annoying, it's clearly annoying. But it's a style which

seems... first of all it seems difficult, it's very difficult, almost unintelligible. With Plotinus it's okay, but with the others, it becomes hard, very hard. At least in the translations. You'd have to be an expert Hellenist to be able to read the original texts.

But all the same, one can gather up their marvels even through translations that are not very good, and then they have such beautiful names. I haven't told you the names of Plotinus' successors: there's Proclus, in order, he's not bad; and then the great Iamblicus, the great Jamblicus. They were all called Diadochos, these were the successors, the leaders of the school: the Diadochos. So, there was Proclus Diadochos, the "great Plotinus Diadochos" and the "little Proclus Diadochos", Iamblicus Diadochos and then the last of the Diadochi, and here I forgot to look in the Larousse... No, I looked in the *Larousse*, but it's not there, in the *Petit Larousse*, so it must be in the *Grand Larousse*, so you can look for it... I don't know for sure, but if I recall, it was between the 7th and the 9th century CE, very late, during the Byzantine era. His name was Damascius, Damascius, it seems to me, I read that a long time ago, and I have only this dazzling memory... I read what I could find of these people, and I remembered them with wonder, it's wonderful. And Damascius... why did I say that? Yes... yes!

So those who speak about their style speak about the use of verbs. And that's understandable because I imagine the position of the listeners who take notes, they can't obviously render the style; they take notes in abbreviated form. There is only one thing that the notes fully preserve and that's the verbs. It's the verbs, you can't change them, you can't summarize them, you can't... So, they have a force... it is perhaps for other reasons, it is perhaps because it is a very dynamic philosophy, a deeply dynamic philosophy. It is at the level of the verbs that the great Diadochi run riot, especially Iamblicus. It is he who launches the great theory; we should assign to each exactly what they... anyway he was the one who launched the great theory of the series, he was the first to make a dialectic of the series, of the series in depth. Which means that all this is very important, very important.

So, I come back to my Plotinus text, 3-8, third *Ennead* chapter 8: "And if one were to ask..." – I read quite slowly – "If one were to ask nature why it produces, if nature were willing to listen and answer the questioner, it would say" – and now she's going to speak, listen, it's nature who speaks – "You should not..." – and she speaks very well – "you should not ask," – says nature – "You should not ask but understand and fall silent yourself." This is a technique that I have learned quite well from nature: whatever question I am asked, I answer, or I would answer from now on: You should not ask but understand and fall silent yourself!

"As I am silent" – says nature, and then I'll cut a bit from the text – "and not accustomed to speak. Understand what, then?" – it is always nature who speaks – "Understand what, then? That what comes to be... that what comes to be is my vision, in my silence" – Good! – "that what comes to be is my vision, in my silence... and that since I come to be from this sort of contemplation" – I am born from a contemplation, not only nature, but you, you, and me. You must not believe that... you will tell me, we are born from our parents. Yes, but our parents are themselves contemplations. And how did they make us, our parents? By contemplating each other and filling each other with contemplation, nature says... – "Since I come to be from this sort of contemplation, it is necessary for me to have a contemplation-loving nature. And my contemplating produces an object of contemplation..." – We will need this later, that's why I insist. I, Nature, I am a product of a contemplation, first point. Second point: I, Nature, contemplate. Third point: I, Nature, by contemplating, in turn produce.

"And my contemplating produces an object of contemplation " – we are okay with this – "just as geometricians draw lines as they contemplate." – Aha, this is the fundamental moment of the text! – "Just as geometricians draw lines as they contemplate..." – What is it? A wink at Plato. We will say: oh no, this doesn't work. It no longer fits, it no longer fits. Why does he say this, all of a sudden? Why does Nature say this? She was in the process of telling us something completely different and Plotinus has to go and tell us... what a trap, this text, just as we were beginning to understand... This is very philosophical: the moment you understand, everything is taken away from you. It is not that. Oh, no, it is not that! Just as geometricians draw lines as they contemplate... Geometricians contemplate with one eye – that's the Platonic version anyway – with one eye they contemplate the idea and with the other hand... they contemplate the ideal triangle, and with the other hand they trace the triangle on the board. It is the model-copy relation, the rigid figure. "Just as geometricians draw lines as they contemplate..." – No, that doesn't work at all! – "And my contemplating produces an object of contemplation, just as geometricians draw lines as they contemplate..." – it does not work anymore, it's half-baked.

But fortunately, Plotinus doesn't abandon us, and he tells us that Nature adds: "But without my drawing" – so she doesn't draw. But without my drawing, this seems no more than a little poetic flourish, but not at all. What he says here is: be careful, I'm not just regurgitating what Plato wrote. It was fundamental for Plato that the geometer draws... Why was that? It's not the act of drawing in itself, we don't care about that. It's that the very act of drawing leads us to the Platonic concept of model-copy. The demiurge contemplates the model and makes the imprint, reproduces, we've seen all that... But Plotinus didn't want this anymore. "But without my drawing" – that is to say, it is no longer the domain of printing, it is no longer a model-copy relation – "...while I contemplate, the lines of bodies come to exist... while I contemplate..." In other words, I don't need anything else but to contemplate. *To contemplate is to produce*. My parents don't need to contemplate an ideal model, the child they would like, with their eye, while, dare I say it, they fornicate, that is, try to reproduce the imprint... No, the Plotinian parents only have to contemplate each other, to fill each other with their mutual contemplation in order to produce. They do not draw, they do not print, *they express themselves*.

"But without my drawing, while I contemplate, the lines of bodies come to exist *as though falling out of me*" – This is the text that we needed! I swear, it's written like this. And then, those who know a little bit of Greek, who have studied Greek, you can check the Greek text... the word "falling", the word "falling", in the most rigorous sense of the word, they fall out of me. They fall in splendors, and this is not at all Platonic. Never a triangle fell from the idea of the triangle in Plato, never!¹²

What's more, it takes all the violence of the demiurge to force the idea to accept that it be produced. It never falls. You see, that is the ideal fall. It falls out of me, nature says. There is no need for a geometer to draw the lines of rigid bodies. In other words, the figure of the bodies is a figure of light which falls out of itself in the manner of light before being a real figure, sorry... before being a geometrical figure in which the model would fall according to a real fall. What comes first is an ideal fall. One-zero as the formula of intensive quantity expresses the ideality of the fall. What is ideal is the fall. Do you realize that... Then of course he will say, of course he will say that the fall is a bad thing. And yes, there will be a fall in terms of the rigid bodies, there will be whatever you desire. But before there is an actual fall in terms of bodies, yes, before this bad fall, there will be the fall in splendor. Bodies of light

falling from the light source as rays fall from the sun. [*Interruption of the recording*]
[1:20:05]

... appearances that are so unchristian, or at least they are of an Eastern Christianity that is very different from Western Christianity. This is the ideal fall. It is the art of falling in the way that light falls. It is to fall in splendor. This is the splendor of Byzantine art.

Ooh So, where are we? You understand this? I mean, regarding this matter of one-zero, if we accept the real expression of intensive quantity, this is what it will be: from bottomless depth to the order of depths, and that's what it is; this is what the intensive movement of the soul consist in. Does it imply a real fall? Answer: yes. It implies a real fall, the old Platonic idea. Is it confused with the real fall, another old platonic idea? Answer: no. Because the real fall is only an accessory consequence of something even deeper than the ideal fall, which is to fall in splendor.

So, what must be said in order to finish with this first point? What is the relation? In my series of depths, what is the relation between one unity and another? Since all intensive quantities, again, are apprehended as unities under this or that power. You see, I can now transform the Kantian formula: "apprehend as a unity in relation to zero" into "apprehend as a unity under such and such a power". But what relation is there between 1 to the power of $n-1$ and 1 to the power of $n-2$? What relation is there between two unities in terms of the order of their depth? We have to go right to the end.

The Neoplatonists propose the following idea to have done with this nature of intensive movement; they will tell us that it is a division. Intensive quantity is not composed of parts, it is extensive quantity, as we have seen, which is composed of parts. But each intensive quantity apprehended as a unity, at any level of the series, contains all the following, unlike the extensive quantity, where one part never contains another. As we say, the formula of extensive quantity is *partes extra partes*, it is the exteriority of the parts. A part does not contain another part, unless it is a Whole in relation to some other part that it contains, that is, it is not a part in relation to this part. Whereas here, I can see that each unity contains all the following ones. In what form? It contains them, but in what sense? I would say that it contains them *virtually*... It contains them virtually. What does it mean to say that it contains them virtually? It doesn't contain them actually, because actuality is the law of extensive quantity. It contains them virtually, which means that each intensive quantity has a magnitude apprehended as a unity and, by the same token, a multiplicity apprehended as virtuality, a multiplicity apprehended as virtual.

Each unity contains those that follow but contains them virtually. What does it mean that it contains them virtually? It means that it is not composed by the following ones but it decomposes. Again, the fall. It decomposes in the following. So... it decomposes in those that follow, does it? But if it decomposes in those that follow, then the virtual becomes actual. Yes. It decomposes in those that follow. When a unity decomposes in the following unity, the virtuality that it contained becomes actual. But at what price? That a new unity is born, 1 to the power of $n-2$, but a new unity which in its turn *virtually* contains those that follow. It contains those that follow virtually, which to say that to it decomposes in those that follow. It decomposes in those that follow, which means that *the multiplicity becomes actual*. Yes, it becomes actual, but it becomes actual as a unity... So, we have $n-2$, which in its turn will virtually contain the following unities. It will decompose in the unities that follow. But when it decomposes in the following ones, it is the following one that becomes an actual

unity, an actual unity that virtually includes those that follow it and which therefore decomposes in the following ones. But when it decomposes in the following ones, the multiplicity becomes actual; yes, it becomes actual but no longer as a multiplicity, it becomes actual as a unity which in its turn includes a virtual multiplicity. Is everything OK? You see this sort of process of division where at each stage of division I change unity. And a unity that includes a virtual multiplicity, by virtue of that virtual multiplicity, divides into a new present unity which in turn includes a virtual multiplicity according to which it divides, etc., ad infinitum. To infinity. We'll see, right?

Well, it is in this sense that when Bergson comments on Plotinus, he will come up with a very good formula, he will say... What will Bergson say? He will say in *Creative Evolution*: For Plotinus and the Alexandrians, "The position of a reality... the position of a reality..." – 1 to the power of n , 1 to the power of $n-1$, since reality will be the position of an intensive quantity as a unity – "The position of a reality implies the simultaneous position of all the degrees of reality intermediate between it and nothing." – we will see the importance of this word – "implies the simultaneous position of all the degrees of reality intermediate between it and nothing"¹³ – here Bergson must have been translating. Let me restate that, you can translate it onto our schema: the position of any-reality-whatever, for example, 1 to the power of $n-1$... the position of a reality implies, envelopes, the simultaneous position of all the degrees of reality, 1 $n-2$, 1 $n-3$, 1 $n-4$, and so on... it implies the simultaneous position of all the degrees of reality intermediate between it and zero, meaning nothing. Do you understand?

In terms of this scheme, in terms of this scheme, which you have to remember because it will be very important to us, each unity is actual. In intensive quantity, each unity is actual and as such, includes, contains, a virtual multiplicity. The virtual multiplicity is actualized in the other unities, each of which in turn contains a virtual multiplicity that will be actualized in the other unities. It's a spiral, you see, it's a spiral.¹⁴

Is everything okay? All this has to be crystal clear. So, it can... You may not like it, you may say to yourself: oh no, that's not my world, but you shouldn't be surprised that it resonates through the centuries. For example, it will be the world of Robert Delaunay, though he doesn't need to have read Plotinus for me to make the comparison I made last time. I'm not saying that there won't be changes, that there won't be other elements in Delaunay's work and so on, but it will be Delaunay's world. It will be this world of luminous forms. Okay. It's all too beautiful.

Here we are, we have barely finished, we have barely finished with this first point on the nature of the intensive movement of the soul, where we can answer that it is the ideal fall. You see now what I call the ideal fall, the fall in splendors. And I would fall in splendors, and I would never again, I who speak – Here I am nature – I would never again speak of my *splendor* again, I would say my *splendors*. I would say my splendors because my splendors are all these things, all these powers that I contain, whose virtual multiplicity I contain and which is actualized in the descending series of powers. And I fall in splendors.

So there you have it, it should be very clear, otherwise I'll just start all over again. For me it's okay, we can say to ourselves that it's worth a year's work if it helps you understand Plotinus a little, it's good. I find that all this is so current. It's very... light, light, we haven't made much progress on our research on light. You understand, this is something else than the idea of the truth being luminous and so on. This is a drama, it's a cosmic drama for light. Which light are we referring to, and what is this fall to which we are invited? It's very sly because to

leap into the ideal fall... you can't make an ideal fall without also making a real fall, you understand? Ah but if you make a real fall, what will happen? Won't it impede the ideal fall? Well, here we're at an impasse.

Let's try to see, let's attempt the ideal fall, and you'll see if you fall. So, there's a bad way to go about this, it's to believe that you can fly. But we are not able to fly, are we? It's clear, it means... as for me.... This isn't the way it should be understood, there's a misunderstanding here. It's something else, it means something else. Does it mean risking a real fall to attain the ideal fall? That's too prosaic, it's not that, it's not that, no. Does it mean that in the real fall there is already the ideal fall? That would be more Christian. But does that suit us? I don't see why not. But this must imply something else altogether. So, what would it be? What is it? What is it? Well, Nature, it's Nature that speaks, it's not God or Christ who speaks in Plotinus, it's Nature.

Well, in any case, we can't know because for the moment, three difficulties have landed on our backs when we thought we had solved everything. Three difficulties, it's not fair. I would say that the first difficulty is...strictly speaking I have just shown that each degree of power, each unity of power contains the lower powers since it contains the virtual multiplicity in depth. But does it contain the higher powers? Does the intensive quantity contain not only distances which are inferior to it, inferior to its degree, but also those which are superior. So this is my first problem.

Second problem, where we have to zoom out a little: the disintegration, the fall, in what sense is it real or ideal or real-ideal?

Then, there's the third problem: what is zero? This is something that concerns us. What is zero? What is zero? Well, I mean, there is an answer that we are immediately given, which we feel is very logical: zero is what is rigid. It's the rigid, that is to say, in terms of various aspects, zero will be matter. It will also be the form of the matter. It will be the geometric. How is this possible? This is a real conversion with respect to Platonism, because all this, the whole domain of rigid forms and matter, will now be on the side of zero. But how can we say that all this equates to zero? It's too hurried to say that it's without soul. No, it's not sufficient to say that this is because it is not animated by the soul, or because it is drawn, as Plotinus says of the geometer who is forced to draw his triangle on the board. None of this is sufficient, it is not rational. From what point of view will the Neoplatonists be able to identify matter, including the form of matter, meaning geometry, with the degree of zero? Now things are getting exciting.

You could say that Plato was already doing this. And yes, Plato was probably already doing it, but he had his own reasons that can no longer be the same ones, on account of all the Plotinian reversals. They cannot be the same reasons, and you can already sense the answer we will arrive at. And obviously, matter, extension, geometry undoubtedly equate to zero, but we will still have to learn from which very particular point of view. Well, here too, we have no choice, fortunately. They will be forced, even if they don't actually do so, but they *have to* do this – we're waiting for them to do this – they will have to show that if matter, extension, space and geometry are on the side of zero, it's not from the point of view of space, *but from the point of view of time*. That is, it is *the zero of time*. And what does this imply? A definition of time. This implies a definition of time *such that time will be understood in terms of its unity*. Time will be *the series of powers*. But why? How? It is not enough to just say all this. Whose limit will be zero and rigid figures will obviously not be zero in space, but rigid

figures will be zero in time! And depth, *depth as it emerges from the bottomless will be the order of time, and the order of time will be this order of powers and their distances, their indecomposable distances.*

This, after all, is not surprising since, if you follow one of the first reversals of Plato that we have seen in Plotinus, it is indeed a matter of showing that width and length, that is, the determinations of space are no more than the final consequences of depth, that is, of the figures of light. The rigid figure is the zero degree with respect to the figures of light. Only it is necessary that time passes by way of the series of figures of light. Time will be the whole series of figures of light. But then how will he be able to measure it? That is... how will he be able to measure... he says... I don't know anymore; we have to take a break for 10 minutes, or 5 minutes because it's too hot... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:41:55]

In a sense, here we have a formula, the first formula that could reconcile everything, or put us on the way to reconciling the real fall with the ideal fall. One would say that the more one descends, the more one descends in the series of powers, the more one descends in the series of deep powers, the more the ideal fall tends to become a real fall, just as the more the virtual multiplicity contained in the One tends to become an actual multiplicity. The more also the One with a capital O – 1 to the nth power – the more also the One loses its power, the more width and length, which is to say extension, tend to imprison depth, and the more rigid and geometrical forms tend to prevail over forms of light.

We could say that, but it wouldn't be sufficient because this series of powers that constitute the depth emanating from the bottomless... we have seen how this series of powers in its ideal-real fall constituted intensive movement and yet intensive movement is even more complicated. It is even more complicated than this, because what is it that happens at each degree, at each degree of power, meaning, with each unity? The intensive quantity apprehended in the magnitude and apprehended as a unity, we can now call a degree or a power, whatever... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:45:33]

Part 3

What happens at each degree, at each degree of power? Everything happens as if you have three terms. These are the famous Neoplatonic triads. Ah, those triads! They are the triads of light. You have the One under such and such a power. The One under such and such a power... let's say that it is the principle in relation to what comes after. It is itself contemplation. Indeed, it acts by contemplating. But then what does it contemplate? Because it does not contemplate models. It contemplates itself. It is a self-contemplation.

What does "contemplate" mean? Actually, the English will retain this. The English are Neoplatonists, you know! All of English Romanticism is Neoplatonist. You can think of Coleridge. Coleridge is one of the greatest modern Neoplatonists. Coleridge is fantastic! They know Plotinus very well, the English, they love that. Just as they love the Alexandrians, they adore all that! Why did I say that? Yes, well, you see... if I said that, well...

Several students: Contemplate!

Deleuze: Oh yes! The English have words, which I have forgotten to mention, they say fill yourself, satisfy yourself, rejoice – there is "enjoy" in there. There are some admirable texts by Samuel Butler on the grass that contemplates, the wheat that contemplates and that

contemplates itself, that contemplates what it proceeds from and contemplates itself, fills up with an image of itself, that is to say, completes itself. See, there is the double metaphor of the seed it develops and the mirror. This isn't a question of narcissism. When I contemplate myself, I fill up with an image of myself through which I produce.¹⁵

So, the first principle, the One from which I begin at any degree of my series, the One of which I say that it contemplates itself and is contemplation of itself. But by this very fact, it produces. So, what does it produce? Well, it produces the virtual multiplicity that it contains as One. And this virtual multiplicity proceeds from the One, as they say. It is the procession. And what is this virtual multiplicity? It too is contemplation. It is *contemplation in itself!* It is contemplation in itself, which literally issues from contemplation of the self. The first principle contemplates itself, and in contemplating itself produces a virtual multiplicity that is itself a contemplation. But how can this virtual multiplicity avoid passing to the actual, that is, avoid making the real fall? Because precisely in so far as it is comprised in the One, in so far as it is comprised in the degree apprehended as One, the virtual multiplicity that this One contains, includes and returns to the One. This is what the Neoplatonists will call "conversion".

And the act by which the virtual multiplicity makes its return to the One that it has produced by contemplation, this act of conversion is itself a contemplation, a contemplation of that from which it proceeds. So that at each degree, you have the envelopment of the intermediate degrees between that degree and zero, an envelopment which occurs according to a kind of circular line where the degrees inferior to the unity in question make their return to the superior unity. That's why I said, in fact, that it's not a line, it's a perpetual spiral. And you have the famous triad: the One as principle; that which proceeds from the One, meaning the virtual multiplicity; that which returns to the One, but which will return to the One in the form of the next unity, which in turn will contain a multiplicity, which will return to the One, but will do so in the form of the unity... the next unity, and so on ad infinitum.

So, because we don't have any more time, I don't want to develop this now, but this would be the moment to take up again, in fact, the whole topic of the regime, the regime of light and color in... Byzantine art. There are some marvelous pages by Henri Maldiney... Maldiney, spelled M.A.L.D.I.N.E.Y... in a book called *Regard, parole, espace*, from page 242 on, where he makes a close analysis of mosaics.¹⁶ If I try to draw from it – it is among the most beautiful things that have been written, that have been written on Byzantine art – and strangely he does not make the connection with Delaunay at all, but I believe that he takes up another point of view. For him, the only great modern painter who has grasped Byzantine art, and has drawn something completely new from it, is Georges Seurat¹⁷, oddly enough... it's Seurat. And there is a wonderful demonstration by Maldiney, well, better than a demonstration, he writes something extremely profound on this, but anyway...¹⁸

I'm trying to say how there is a Byzantine circuit which is absolutely – but now I need my chalk, I've lost my chalk – I've drawn the schema in a very small corner, because I have no more space... so I would say, here you have a Byzantine mosaic, though you won't recognize it. And you have a fall, a great fall of light. Obviously, what I'm saying is silly, what I'm saying is silly... It falls, it falls in splendors. And I'm saying that what I say is silly because I would have to be able to speak of all these moments at once. So, all the objections that spring to mind for those who know a little bit about Byzantine art, you can keep them for yourselves because my schema will only function once you put it all together. But I am forced to introduce it little by little, which makes for some terrible misunderstandings.

You have a line of falling which, for me, corresponds precisely to this bottomless depth. And so, I would say that above all it goes, that what determines it – but I'm saying this by way of abstraction – that what determines it, is the passage from saturated to rarefied. From saturated to rarefied is what we call the chromatic scale. Byzantine art marks the birth of the two scales, the two modern scales, the chromatic scale... So, if it is a color – but you will immediately say to me: you don't yet have the right to speak about color! But I'll do it anyway – if it is a color, we will have the saturated form of the color and the rarefied form of the color.

So, what do the Byzantines do? They make one resonate with the other. From the point of view of the components of the mosaic, the small cubes or pseudo cubes, which are called *tesserae*, what do we have here? We have two types of tesserae, one called *smalt*, that's the correct term, and the other, marble, white marble. Of course, the smalt tesserae are colored, and it is by way of abstraction that I say... that I extract a fundamental determination of the Byzantine mosaic: the black. And strangely, this black is not at all that of darkness. *This black is light*. You ask me how this is possible? Wait, wait. Undoubtedly... Isn't the Byzantine black actually *light in its pure state*? And it's precisely because of this that we always find it depicted in these colors. But I cannot yet speak of colors. So, accept the idea of a black sun, a black light. This is light. *Black is the bottomless depth of light*. Okay? It's the saturated form, the saturated form par excellence. It will resonate with the white of the marble. The white of the marble, let's show it like this. Like that. This in its pure state would be the chromatic scale.

And, in terms of depth... you find, between saturated black and... between oversaturated black, between oversaturated black and rarefied white, you have all the powers. Black is 1 to the nth power... saturation, degree of saturation or rarefaction. Is everything okay up to this point? So... what's going on? What's going on with the chromatism? There, it's already passed to white. At each level of saturation, you have a virtual multiplicity. Each level is a unity, right? We have seen this. And each time, this virtual multiplicity is that of forms, of pure forms. This is the ideal fall. The ideal fall will be presented as the resonance of the oversaturated black in the rarefied white marble. Imagine how beautiful this already is.

But I say that actually this moment does not exist in pure form in the Byzantine mosaic. You will not find a single example. Here I'm making an abstract schema... The further down I go, the more the luminous forms become – I would say – become colored, the more the pure forms of light become colored. Why colors? Well of course, colors! What is happening here? It's no longer division in terms of depth. The colors are tones, it's the diatonic scale. It is a division in terms of width. I can conceive a moment in my ideal fall from the oversaturated to the rarefied, from the black to the white marble, from the black of the smalt to the white of the marble, I can conceive a moment where the colors are completely distinguishable from one another. Indeed, there, there is already color. Colors are always a matter of division in terms of width. You see? Why?

Three colors, three colors, the golden yellow... three Byzantine colors: golden yellow, blue, green, the green that I put here at the crossing, and which is a mixture of the yellow and blue. But here we don't yet have the colors, they are very contained, they exist virtually, it is the virtual multiplicity of the corresponding degree of light, of the luminous power. But the more I descend, the more the colored forms gain autonomy in relation to the forms of light. And here I had, for example... And that's when I realize that here... I have my colors: golden yellow, blue, green, and that if I was already speaking about their presence before, it was

submerged in the forms of light, and that it was by conversion that I was able to speak about them before. And I was right to speak about them before, even if they were still only virtual. Okay.

But each one, each one of these colors... you see, here is my division in terms of width that will only become actual, let's say, at this level, at the level of this power here. And even when it takes on actuality, its color will in turn be so subordinated to the chromatic scale of depth – that's the trick: it's the equivalent of Plotinus's trick, subordination of division in width to division in depth – my division in width is so subordinated to my division in depth, that each color will assume its saturated form in a smalt and its rarefied form in marble. And you will have these echoes, these resonances, between, for example, a green smalt and a white marble that tends to green... or between a blue smalt, a saturated form of blue, and a bluish marble, a marble tending towards blue. From where we get a whole space of diffusion, where it is firstly light, and secondly the color which creates the space, as Maldiney puts it very well. You see the rigid figures there. Already the color figures... the color figures are already less pure than the figures of light, and yet they are inseparable. But that's not all. Third moment... [Interruption of the recording] [2:06:07]

... that is to say, to the division in depth. So, you will have a tendency of the colors toward saturation, as well as to rarefaction, on both sides, the yellow, the green, the blue, or rather the yellow, the blue, the extremes, undergoing an operation that will bring them to saturation. And what is this the operation by which each color in its turn becomes oversaturated? This is the production of the fourth color, namely, the production of purple, the production of red, the famous incandescence that will correspond to the oversaturation of the color, where the saturation of yellow, the saturation of green, the saturation of blue will give this kind of reddish glowing light through which the whole circuit recommences. At each instant, you see the chromatic scale producing the diatonic scale which again produces the chromatic scale. And it is this circuit that will constitute the circuit of luminous forms and color forms in Byzantine art. In the case of Plotinus too, divisions in width will still exist, but always subordinated to the great division in depth, relaunching this division in depth which will itself refuel them, refuel the divisions in width and so on.¹⁹

Whew! So now we get to the essential problem, the one I was just hoping to get to. Perfect, perfect, that's good. At this point, we only have one problem left. It is that, ok, through all this I have just defined, I've precisely defined the intensive movement of the soul, the intensive movement of the soul which would be all of this taken together, which is therefore firstly the series of powers in depth and secondly – because it's not as simple as that – the way this is accompanied by divisions in length that are taken up in the system,

So what is time? Time will be precisely *the new number or the new measure of this very particular movement that we have defined as the movement of intensive powers*. How will it function? Well, this will be Plotinus's splendid answer, and I can't say to what extent it is new in the philosophy of Plotinus's time, and it is that Plotinus discovers something that will then continue through the whole of Kantianism and so on, namely that *time is a synthesis*. Time is a synthesis. What does this mean? It is *a synthesis operated by the soul*. In other words, *time is the act of synthesis that the soul effectuates on its own intensive movement*. The soul carries out a synthesis of intensive movement. And the soul is itself the synthesis of its own intensive movement, and *the synthesis of intensive movement is time*.

So that when one lends to Kant – hence the second remark that I will develop next time – when one lends to Kant the idea of a discovery of time in its relation to synthesis, one is guilty of a major misunderstanding because this is the aspect, the only aspect, on the contrary, which Kant retains of Neoplatonism. Once again, the novelty of Kant is absolute and profound, but it is not here that it lies. The first to have defined time as an act of synthesis which concerns intensive movement and therefore by which the soul determines its own intensive movement – and this is what constitutes time – is Plotinus in the third *Ennead*. Well, that's what we'll look at next time. [*End of the recording*] [2:11:19]

Notes

¹ This probably refers to a text by Gance that appeared in Pierre Lherminier's *L'Art du cinéma* (Paris: Seghers, 1960). See *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*, op. cit., p. 224, note 19.

² Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception* [Translated by Patrick Camiller], London: Verso, 2009. Virilio's seminal text explores how the technologies of cinema and warfare have developed a fatal interdependence, analysing these conjunctions from a wide range of perspectives. It offers a detailed technical history of weaponry, photography and cinematography, discussing films and military campaigns.

³ *Sans-fond* which here we translate as “bottomless” or “bottomless depth” is a term Deleuze employs extensively in both this and the previous lesson. The same term appears in *Difference and Repetition* in relation to the shift between Platonism and Neoplatonism but where it is given the more properly philosophical sense of “groundless” in Deleuze's discussion of the conditions of philosophical claims.

⁴ Here Deleuze begins using the word *plan* in the double sense it has in French, both as geometric plane and as ‘plan’ in the sense of a project or outline.

⁵ Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), also referred to as Nicholas of Kues and Nicolaus Cusanus, was a German Catholic cardinal, philosopher, theologian, jurist, mathematician and astronomer. He is considered one of the first German proponents of Renaissance Humanism. Deleuze often refers to him in his writings. See seminars 1 and 4 on Leibniz, April 15 and May 6, 1980; seminars 2, 3, 8, and 11 on Spinoza, December 2 and 9, 1980, January 27 and February 17, 1981; seminar 24 on Foucault, May 20, 1986; and seminar 17 on Leibniz and the Baroque, May 12, 1987.

⁶ Here Deleuze makes the mistake of saying intensive when he actually means extensive.

⁷ Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was a British philosopher, logician and social reformer. He was a founding figure in the analytic movement in Anglo-American philosophy, and recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Russell's contributions to logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics established him as one of the foremost philosophers of the 20th century. To the general public he is also known as a campaigner for peace and as a popular writer on social and political issues.

⁸ Hypostasis from the Greek ὑπόστασις, meaning ‘foundation’ or ‘essence’. The Neoplatonists believed that beneath the surface, phenomena present themselves to our senses in terms of three higher spiritual principles or hypostases. For Plotinus these are ‘the soul, ‘the intellect’ and ‘the one’.

⁹ Plato's *Phaedrus* is a dialogue between Plato's protagonist, Socrates, and Phaedrus, an interlocutor in several dialogues. The dialogue was presumably composed around 370 BCE, about the same time as Plato's *Republic* and *Symposium*. Discussions revolve around the nature of the soul, logos, the art of rhetoric and how it should be practiced, metempsychosis and love. One of the dialogue's central passages is the famous Chariot Allegory, which presents the human soul as composed of a charioteer pulled by two winged-horses, a “good” horse tending upward towards the divine, and a bad horse tending downward towards material embodiment and passions.

¹⁰ Deleuze's use of *gloires* (glories) to evoke the fall of light has no equivalent in English where the word “glory” is saturated with connotations of pomp on the one hand and religion on the other. The closest translation that conveys a similar sense of magnificently falling light would be “splendor” as in Tennyson's use of the word in the line “The splendor falls on castle walls” from the eponymous poem. This is the term we use here, though pluralizing it as Deleuze does with *gloire*.

¹¹ Claudel writes, a propos of the painting: “An arrangement in imminent danger of disintegration, it is easy to prove that that is the whole explanation of the *Night Watch*. The entire composition from front to back is arranged on the principle of an ever-increasing movement like a sandbank beginning to crumble. The two characters in the foreground are on the march, those in the second ranks have already taken a step forward, while those in the background are only beginning to measure the extent of the road they have to travel whose direction is indicated by the hand of the philosopher on the right, but already, like tiny grains of sand that begin to flow apart, the little boy on the right with the powder-horn and the little dog on the left have started to leap

forward. See Paul Claudel, *The Eye Listens* [Translated by Elsie Pell], New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. pp. 48-49. Deleuze also refers to Claudel's text in the seminar on Painting, Session 6, May 19, 1981.

¹² See Plotinus, *The Enneads* (Lloyd P. Gerson ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018 pp. 358-359

¹³ Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, (Trans. Arthur Mitchell), New York: Random House, 1944. p. 351 (translation modified).

¹⁴ Deleuze gives a brief explanation of the intensive quantity of light, as well as of the fall, in *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*, pp. 117-118. "There is indeed an abstract kinetic art (Richter, Ruttmann), but the extensive quantity, the shifting in space, are like the mercury which indirectly measures the intensive quantity, its rise or fall. Light and shadow no longer constitute an alternative movement in extension and enter into an intense struggle which has several stages."

¹⁵ On Samuel Butler and his conception of pleasure see Seminar 13 on Leibniz and the Baroque, March 17, 1987.

¹⁶ French philosopher Henri Maldiney (1912-2013) was one of the main representatives of the phenomenological tradition. His prolific writings focused primarily on psychiatry and aesthetics. Maldiney was a friend of the psychiatrist Jean Oury, who founded the Le Borde clinic where Guattari also worked, and whose practices were influenced by Maldiney's writings on schizophrenia. In his book *Regard Parole Espace* (Lausanne: L'Âge d'homme, 1973), which is composed of a series of essays, the earliest written at the beginning of the 1950s, Maldiney develops the concepts of "sensing", "rhythm" and "openness to the event". Whether they concern painting or psychiatry, they all have one central concern: to think our opening onto the world from our perception and its necessary spatialization at the point where words take root. His writings are often considered a renewal of phenomenology.

¹⁷ Georges Seurat (1859-1891) was a French post-Impressionist artist who devised the painting techniques known as divisionism, or chromoluminarism, and pointillism (using myriad tiny coloured dots which interact optically) which as well as initiating Neo-Impressionism would have an indirect influence on later schools of painting from Cubism in the 1920s to Pop and Op art in the 1960s to contemporary digital pixel-based art. Seurat's most well-known paintings include *A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte* (1884-1886) and *Bathers at Asnières* (1884).

¹⁸ Deleuze often refers to Maldiney. See *A Thousand Plateaus*, "The Smooth and the Striated"; see also session 9 of the seminar on Spinoza, 13 January 1981 and session 1 of the seminar on Painting, 31 March 1981.

¹⁹ Deleuze develops this analysis of chromatism in numerous contexts. He talks about Goethe and his *Theory of Colours* in session 6 of the seminar on Painting, May 19, 1981. Moreover, he discusses Jacob Böhme and Goethe in sessions 16 and 17 of the seminar on Cinema 2, April 12 and 19, 1983.