

Gilles Deleuze

On Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

We only have one more Tuesday, oh, sorry... we only have one more Tuesday [*March 27*] before Easter. Just like every year, I've only managed to do half of what I wanted to do, not even. So, I'd like to get the whole philosophical side of the time-image done by the Easter holidays – it's only by making a commitment that I can force myself to do. So, for today and then next week we'll be dealing with Kant, and then we will chart the overall consequences of what happened in philosophy and likewise what happened in cinema. That way, we'll be very happy and then we can go on vacation. And in the last term, we should have enough to establish a clear status of the crystal-image the way began analyzing it in the first term so that it would be, you know. It would be perfect! It is perfect! It's obvious that I'm announcing this program because we won't be sticking to it.

Today I've made a perfect schema, extremely precise, except nobody can see it. [*Laughter*] So that way it's even more perfect. If you could see it, I could get on with my knitting while you copy it, since there would be nothing else to say. But seeing as you can't see it, I'll have to explain.

But before that if I may, I'd like to make a digression. I want to make a digression that has nothing to do with where we are now, but I need your help, I need your thoughts on this because, I don't know, but some of you may be able to come up with things I don't know or that I'm missing. So, for now we're going to completely forget where we are. But it will still relate to what we're doing this year.

You will recall that, as I was saying just now, in the first term we spent a lot of time sketching out a primary status for what we called the crystal-image. Okay. So, this is where I'm going to digress for a moment and explain what I'd like you to think about, so that before the Easter holidays, those of you who come up with something can pass it on to me. Okay.

What I am saying here is something quite messy that's bothering me in the work I'm doing. So it may be that some of you... So, when we studied the crystal-image in the first term, and when we tried to define it in terms of a first dimension which was, not the confusion, but the undecidability between dream and the imaginary, we presented it in an optical manner, and indeed, the crystal has optical properties. But the crystalline notion, the notion of crystal, of

the crystal-image, seems to me so rich that it not only has optical properties. The crystal is also sonorous, it also has acoustic properties. And it has many other kinds of properties: electrical properties, properties of all types. We'll see this in the third term, after the Easter break. We'll come back to this point.¹

Now, something we established in the first term was that the crystal-image is fundamentally linked to time. You remember in what form that was? It was in a very simple form. What do we see in the crystal? What do we see in the crystal ball? What we see in the crystal ball is *non-chronological time*. This is of great interest to us as far as cinema is concerned, but it's also highly interesting in terms of philosophy. Right. So in this sense, the crystal is indeed and can rightly be called a crystal of time insofar as what we see in the crystal is time in its foundation. *It is the foundation of time that we see in the crystal*. If that were true, it would be beautiful.

In this respect, as is only natural, I want to attribute this notion to the person to whom it belongs, which is the least I can do. The person who came up with the notion of the crystal of time by considering the crystal from a sound perspective was Félix Guattari, who developed this theme of sound-crystals conceived as crystals of time. He developed it in a book he wrote by himself, called *The Machinic Unconscious*.² And this sound-crystal of time is something he links, for reasons of his own, to a musical phenomenon he calls the refrain: the refrain would be a sonorous crystal of time. You can see how rich this idea is, but I'm not trying to comment on it here. He applies it in particular to a study on Proust and on the little phrase, the little musical phrase in Proust. Well, I don't want to comment on it because, I mean, all that concerns me is that it might tell you something, that it can tell you a little something, that you will say to yourselves, Ah, yes! I imagine a certain number of you will find this interesting.

This is where we are. You see that there are crystal-images; the crystal or crystal-image is not only optical, it is also sonorous; every crystal reveals time. So there are sound-crystals of time. According to Guattari, who invented this notion of the crystal of time... according to Guattari, the refrain is the sound-crystal of time par excellence, a little refrain. That's where we are. And here I thought to myself... It's always like this, we take turns. That's why I'm calling for a relay, which you would also take up in relation to myself. Just as I'm trying to take this up from Félix, you could also take it up from me, provided that you report back to me, just as I'll report back to Félix. So it would go up and come back down and so on. This is what collective work is all about.

I say to myself... After all, well, the refrain is perfect, but it's not sufficient. We would need something else, either within the crystal, or else something that wouldn't occupy the same position in the crystal. We would need something to make the crystal turn, to make it move. The refrain is a good start, but I would say that after all, it is only one aspect of the question. Why do I think that? I have no idea. It's what we call an inspiration... an inspiration can be great. But I say to myself: well, the refrain is fine, it's perfect, but I want something else. And if I want it, I will find it for sure. And now I ask myself: what I can oppose to the refrain?

I'm daydreaming. I mean, it's almost... not exactly a lesson, more a proposition of methodology. You see, I feel as though Félix is only telling us half the story. Again, why do I have that impression? I don't need to justify myself. But what would the other half be? Oh yes, it would be... I find myself thinking: why don't we try to oppose something to it then... What is the refrain? It's linked to the roundelay, the roundelay, birdsong, birdsong, and Félix

and I, at one point, spent a lot of time looking at birdsong. We worked so much on this, oh my, oh my! To the point when we could no longer stand birdsong. And ever since then I can no longer bear listening to the sound of birds, it's awful, especially as we were looking at technical notions, since bird song is very technical. At one point, we knew everything there was to know, but I've forgotten everything.

Birdsong, well, I say to myself... ah, this is something we find in music. So that would be a fork in the road for me. In music, there was a great period for birdsong, with the polyphony of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. There's one famous composer, a great French composer called Janequin³, though every composer attempted imitating birdsong in polyphony. So this gives me one direction, there are the famous lines – I can't sing them, but there's an admirable version you can find among the recordings of Janequin's music – the famous "fri, fri, fri, fri, fri". They form a little refrain, a delicious little refrain. I suppose that there will be some among you who know Janequin, so those are the ones I'm addressing now. I would like to know some more details about music related to birdsong in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, it's a possible direction: how are the pieces structured? Why is polyphony linked to the refrain? What is this link between polyphony and the refrain? Well, these are already some of the notions that are beyond my grasp. But if you come up with some, if you come up with some lines of research in this regard, I will be extremely happy.

But no sooner do I indicate this musical direction than I find myself saying: Well yes, there is another thing I have in mind. What is it that can be distinguished, that can be distinguished and that posits itself only insofar as it can be distinguished, in such a way that we would find ourselves becoming Hegelians in the blink of an eye? Well, I've found it, it's the *gallop*, it's the gallop. And I say to myself, here again without any justification, it must seem obvious to you. It's the gallop. Ah, the gallop? Yes, the gallop, the gallop is not a refrain. It's a linear vector that precipitates, that increases its speed. You will tell me: the roundelay can also increase its speed. But it isn't a line, it is not a line of... it is not a vector. Ah, the gallop. For this to work, the gallop would have to be as important a musical element as the refrain. But I'm making some headway, I'm talking to myself. I'm making a lot of headway.

So this is what I would like to demonstrate now, just to piss off musicians and musicologists, because it's always fun to do that. I would say that the two great moments of music, *the two great movements of music, are the refrain and the gallop*. That way, we are sure either to be misunderstood or to have insults hurled at us. These are two invaluable advantages. To be insulted as incompetent, pathetic and what have you. The gallop... You have to remember that it's not a balanced movement. The gallop, in music, is only instrumental. You can perhaps make vocal gallops, but it's mainly instrumental. The refrain, the polyphony, is fundamentally vocal. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, birdsong imitation is fundamentally vocal.

So, I meet this guy – just to give you an example of what I would like to see – I meet this guy who tells me that indeed, there are gallops. And in the schools of the Middle Ages, which we only rediscovered very recently, you find these gallops. So I ask him, What do you mean by gallops? And he says, I don't really recall. So that creates a blockage. You see, you think you've found a path, but it's blocked. He says, In the 14th century, and he mentions some names that are completely unknown to me. And he says that in the music of the troubadours, there are instrumental gallops. And then he says to me, But in Janequin – this guy I'm talking about obviously knows his Janequin – there is one piece, *La Bataille*, that has a descriptive, instrumental gallop. And I want to embrace him. That would work, you could say that there

are two non-symmetrical poles: gallops and refrains. In other words, music would have the horse and the bird as its main elements. Ah, it would have... So now I'll have to break the sad news to Félix that there is also the horse! Well. What conclusions can we draw from this? Because it's no joke.

I'm going to make a jump into film music now because it gives me, it gives me something I can... There is a niggling problem in film music. Which is: is there a musical specificity of film music, or would film music, if it were good, be simply good music, period? You know that it is rarely good. Here I'm putting aside what is a completely different problem, the use of great music in cinema. Like you have in the last Godard film⁴ and others This is a special problem that raises all sorts of questions. This is a special problem, but it's not the one I want to pose just now. Which is the problem of a film score.

Now, in film music, the way the problem is normally posed is that we are told – there are many film composers who say this – there is no reason why film music should be specific. They deny its specificity. And there are others who recognize its specificity, but they do so badly in my view, because they recognize it in a Hegelian way. And this is the case of Eisenstein, and in a slightly different way Adorno. Both of whom are Hegelians. To recognize the specificity of film music in a Hegelian manner is something that goes without saying. It consists in saying: film music is auditory, sonorous, like all music, but it is inseparable from the optical, from the visual image. It must enter into a relationship of dialectical opposition with the visual image such that a superior synthesis is born. Eisenstein and Adorno don't conceive this dialectical synthesis in the same way. Yet both conceive of film music as inseparable from a dialectical synthesis between sound and vision, that is, they insist that music must not accompany the image. It must have its own autonomy, but precisely this effect of the auditory on the visual⁵ must create a third reality, which is the cinematographic reality. You see?

I would say that this is no good, and it's no good because it places the emphasis on the relationship between the two. But it has to be in the music qua music that something like a specificity of film music appears. That's what I would like to show. Again, why? I don't care, but that's what I would like to do. So, I was saying: wouldn't film music unveil these two hidden elements, elements present in all music, in their pure state? It would bring them out in a pure state, and it would be precisely here, in terms of the givens of the visual image, that these constitutive elements of all music would be unleashed: the gallop and the refrain, Ah well! Whether good or bad is of no importance. So what would that give us?

I'll take the simplest examples, the most obvious first. The western. The western: well, there you have galloping music. You have the descriptive gallop themes that accompany the great gallops of the Western. And grafted onto this great gallop in the western, you have a little refrain that rises up, usually on the harmonica. Since the holidays are approaching, I'd like to sing you some songs... but one of the best examples in this sense, because the music is very fine, as is the composer, excellent, very fine – I can't remember his name, but it's something like Tomkin⁶ – the theme from *High Noon*⁷ with the famous little refrain that continually returns: "Do not forsake me, oh my darlin"⁸... this little refrain that is grafted onto the riding music, the gallop music. Okay.

Then we have the musical, which is even more about the music itself. I mean, don't get me wrong, if you look at the whole of the musical genre, you will find these two clear musical elements. But it's not bad music, the music of the great American musical. You see these two

great lines, right? The gallop can be of all types. And here I make an aside within the aside; think of Honegger⁹, who did an enormous amount of film music. The sound of the train is already gallop music, it's typically a gallop. It's a great gallop, train music. So what has cinema done with train music, and sometimes in a very, very beautiful way? And, of course, none of this prevents the train from having its little harmonica with its dancing refrain. There is always this complementarity of birds and horses.

So, in the musical, what do you have? You have two great moments, two great movements. What has the musical ever done? For example, with Berkeley¹⁰, when it's not yet very individuated, where really is the troupe, it really is the collective. It's obvious what that produces: a strange gallop that we might as well call the *step*. In a lot of musicals, you have a military element, a sexualized military element which often emerges in the form of a troupe of girls. The girls form a sub-proletariat, the sub-proletariat of Hollywood, of the poor and unfortunate. What do they do? They make a train, they march in step, they march like soldiers and so on. And at the same time, they're very rhythmic steps. This is the galloping aspect. In the great films of Fred Astaire or Gene Kelly, you find this fundamental form of the step. And then you have the little song, you have the little refrain.

So that works. I could say that the gallop and the refrain... wouldn't they therefore be the two pure manifestations of film music? Here I would need more rigorous confirmations, but I can anticipate them. More rigorous confirmations. Well, I can already see one and obviously what will disturb everything is that I'm linking this to the problem of time. Don't worry, we're not wasting time, you know, because this will already be material for the third term so I won't have to come back to the sound aspect of the crystal – except in relation to what you're able to come up with by next week. But whatever you are going to bring me, it must be before the Easter break – because... if what we see in the crystal, therefore, or in the case of sound, if what we hear in the crystal is the very foundation of time, if it is time itself that we hear in the crystal, if it is the noise of time, then the noise of time must be double. And indeed, what is the gallop? The gallop is the cavalcade of the present passing by. Accelerated speed, the cavalcade of the present passing by: that's what a gallop is. And what is the refrain? The refrain is the round of the pasts that are preserved. Oh, that's good, I hadn't had that idea before. That's very good.

So here we have what are like two figures of time that correspond to the gallop and refrain. We don't know what the sign of each is. The sign is variable. So, let's try to distribute things. So, we introduce a new couple: life-death. What I would like to show you, as you already know, is how an idea can gradually be enriched, little by little. Here I introduce two criteria: sign of life-sign of death. And I say to myself, there are directors for whom life is on the side of the gallop. Life is the cavalcade of passing presents. I know of at least one, a great film director for whom life is the cavalcade of passing presents, and who will find a perfect sound expression in *French Cancan*¹¹ and this is Renoir. And death is the never-ending round of the past that is preserved and that puts pressure on us. The melancholy of "Do not forsake me...", the little song that plunges us into the past, that brings us back to the past, that brings tears to our eyes. That little refrain is death.

Another possibility is that the cavalcade of passing presents goes fast, it makes us run. But where do we run to? Not at all within life: we run towards the grave. Where are they running to? They are running toward the grave. And on the contrary, the little refrain would be real life. It is what saves us from the race to the grave. It is the proof of the eternal. It is what will alight upon us like a halo, like a sonorous halo, and remove us, if only for a moment, from

the race towards the grave. Here, the signs are reversed: it is the refrain that contains life, and the gallop that leads us to death.

Is there a great film director who has done this? Yes, and he's probably the one who has had the strangest alliance with one of the greatest film composers, and this is Fellini. With Fellini, you have constant gallops. Fellini's composer was Nino Rota¹². And Nino Rota is, I think, a great composer, an excellent composer. And Nino Rota built all his music on what? The gallop and the refrain. And in Fellini, what goes with a gallop, what constitutes a gallop, are Fellini's famous tracking shots that pass along a line, for example the line of spa-guests in *8½*, with their little receptacles¹³. Where are they going with their little receptacles? They are heading towards death. These famous Fellini faces, these famous Fellini heads, which are filmed in a very slow tracking shot. There are very slow gallops. They are caught in a slow gallop, and where each one in turn stares at the camera as if they were a bird of prey taken by surprise, surprised by the light.

You know, those Fellini faces that stare at the camera all of a sudden, and seem extraordinarily disturbing, as though perpetually caught in malicious thoughts or actions. These kinds of monsters, the whole series of monsters from *Satyricon*¹⁴ the series of monsters from *8½* and so on. Here you have a guy always with a little music which very often accompanies a hurried walk. That's what's so striking about Nino Rota. You'll notice that when Rota does music for directors other than Fellini, for example, for Visconti, it's very good music – he notably did the music for *Rocco and His Brothers* – but it doesn't work. I mean, it seems to me that it doesn't work so well. If we look for a case where there was an encounter, just as there is sometimes an encounter between a great director and a great actor, well, if there was a real encounter in the history of cinema between a great composer and a great director, it was the Fellini-Rota encounter.

And then, from this hurried walk, or from those long Fellini tracking shots, all of a sudden, optically speaking, someone emerges from the line. For example, the face as though pure and purified, the apparently freshly cleansed face of Claudia Cardinale, the dreamed-of nurse who distributes receptacles to the spa-guests, the line of spa-guests. And then it's no longer a gallop. Around this face forms a luminous circular halo that extracts it from the line, and that is already like a visual refrain, at the same time as Rota's music produces a real sound refrain. The refrain here is the mark of election, it is the chance that someone may be saved from this perpetual race to the grave. Lost, saved, lost, saved... Lost is the line of spa-guests running to their deaths; saved perhaps is the haloed nurse on whom the refrain alights for a moment. At the end of *8½* will everything be saved? It seems that under the guidance of the white child who plays the flute, a kind of round is organized where it seems that everything will be saved. Or will everything be lost? At the end of *Casanova*, the death machine, the gallop reaches its supreme stage in the great dance with the mechanical doll. And the breaking, the breaking, in the debris of this woman machine, nothing will be saved, everything will be swept away by death.

But Fellini is neither fully within one nor the other, neither in the supposedly happy ending of *8½* nor in the supposedly tragic ending of *Casanova*. And the best proof of this, it seems to me, is *Orchestra Rehearsal*¹⁵. Because in *Orchestra Rehearsal* you have the orchestra rehearsal in its pure state, and what does that mean? Well, it constitutes the two elements, it constitutes them initially in an autonomous manner, and then mixes them more and more in such a way as to show that we can never know in advance what will be lost or saved. And what about the end? For those who remember, it will be a splendid gallop of the violin.

Because here we have a gallop – violins are a fantastic, wonderful galloping instrument – a splendid galloping glissando of the violin, a kind of sliding violin gallop. Right. And in this violin gallop a little musical phrase takes shape, a little phrase. Then the gallop resumes, as does the little phrase. And there is a compenetration of the two elements, in the form: is it saved? Is it lost? Saved, lost, saved, lost... And it is very beautiful. In this respect *Orchestra Rehearsal* seems to me a great, great success.

Well, then, we could say that about cinema: film music would play with these two fundamental elements and would as if by reaction make them the fundamental elements of all possible music. But they would have to be present in the music itself. This is where I come back to the questions I was asking. So, I would say that there is some research to be done around the Middle Ages on gallops and refrains and the relation between the two. If we skip centuries... *La bataille* would interest me a lot, for example.

But if we skip forward a few centuries – there, as I've already inquired anyway – there is Clément Rosset, who is a very good philosopher of music, whom I asked about this.¹⁶ In particular, he has recently written, in the latest issue of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*¹⁷, an article on the refrain in which he takes up the question of the refrain. It's good, because he agrees with Félix and me on this question. But he talks only about the refrain.

So I asked him, and he said quite simply, Well – you see, that's what gathering information involves, trying to find something, you can't be expected to find everything by yourself, it's too tiring all by yourself, and I don't know anything about this – so he said, he answered me, he told me: “Well, yes, I think you can without fear” – that's his way, that's his style – “and with good historical and musical reason, oppose the refrain to the gallop”. He also said: “In the 19th century, the gallop is a lively dance of Austro-Hungarian origin, which concludes the ball, it's the climactic moment of the evening”. Now, you see, this bothers me because what interests me is not what comes before and what comes after. What interests me is that there are two things that differ in nature, but the fact that one is organized before and the other after is of no interest to me. But, in the end, “one finds traces of this in many of Offenbach's finales, such as the famous final gallop at the end of act three of *La vie parisienne*. Before that, the galop is not so much a separate dance as an accelerated coda that ends a dance sequence” – he holds to the idea that the gallop is an ending.

This isn't wrong in terms of one form of gallop which is the farandole, concerning which there is a brilliant director, namely Jean Grémillon. You find a farandole in all of Grémillon's films.¹⁸ Grémillon would be the director of gallops-farandoles...” Before that, the gallop is less a separate dance than an accelerated coda that concludes a sequence of dances, a series of counter-dances, quadrilles, and this has been the case since the Renaissance, it seems to me” – so perhaps there are some Spaniards here, eh? I would need them now... last year there were some Spanish people, but now when I need them there don't seem to be any – “It's still found, for example, today, in the... – how do you pronounce it, *jota*, right? *jota* – the *jota*, that is danced in Aragon. A sequence of returns of the same very simple theme – so, there we have the refrain – a sequence of returns of the same very simple theme, sometimes faster, sometimes slower, but which ends with a sort of frenzied gallop, which the Spaniards call *estribillo*...” Ah! They call it *estribillo*, you see? – from the verb *estribo*. I am still reading Rosset's letter: “From *estribo*, which means stirrup: this is the idea of galloping. *Estribillo* also literally refers to the line that is repeated at the end of the stanza to mark the end. It seems to me that there is a similar phenomenon in rock songs.”

So, I say to myself, he's talking about rock. Let's take the succession of American singers: the crooners and the rockers. There's something that bothers me a lot about this. Crooners, it's very simple, it's the song-refrain. Okay, okay, okay. It's the little refrain. That's what the crooners were. When the rockers arrived, I would say, well, the rockers obviously implied the imposition of a kind of gallop, and this is quite normal, it's understandable. We'd had enough, we'd had it up to hear with refrains, so we went for a gallop. What kind of gallop? A very, very, important gallop. But there's something that doesn't work here? You see, I look in my English dictionary, this is the extent of the research I have to do, right? And where does "rock" come from, or "rocker"? And I realize, in a way, I was thinking it would be good if it was rocks, a tumbling. A galloping of rocks. But it doesn't come from stones at all. It comes from a completely different kind of "rock", which is the lullaby, the rocking movement. So now I don't understand anything anymore. Why did the rockers call themselves rockers, when they were opposed to the crooners, who were the real rockers? There is something that is not clear...¹⁹ [*Interruption of the recording*] [40:43]

There is something scandalous about this that we have to resolve. It's not a very serious objection, but we have to make sense of it somehow. It's troubling. But fortunately, fortunately, we can forget about it for now though I would like you to help me make sense of it.

And, finally, what is the great... And in fact, Rosset, in his article on the refrain, invokes it – that great piece of music that is among the most beautiful that we should really analyse and analyse in detail, this very simple, really very simple music; it's obviously the celebrated *Bolero*²⁰, the famous *Bolero*. And what is the *Bolero*? You have a little phrase. Here, it would be typical of, of... and to think that Ravel wanted it like that. It's a little phrase, a famous little phrase that you all have in your head, because once you hear it you never forget it. Ravel used to say: what have I done? Nothing else but that: I invented a little phrase, and I knew how to orchestrate it. Because the little phrase, in the whole duration of the *Bolero*, there is absolutely no change. I mean, there's no melodic change, and no rhythmic change. There's no rhythmic change in the whole of the *Bolero*. There's only a change of speed, a change of intensity, and a change of orchestration, because indeed, it is an orchestration. But the resumption of the little phrase follows a gallop, which leads to the splendid end, which is not an extinction of the refrain, but a real "breaking" of the refrain. It breaks exactly the way a plate breaks, which is to say the pieces fly apart at the extreme speed of the gallop. So there you would have, in terms of this famous piece of music by Ravel, a way to build a simple matrix with the two elements, refrain and gallop. So, there you have it.

That's all I wanted to say. Anything you could give me, I mean, by way of association, in any field, whether classical music... Let me give you an example. But I don't have the record. I could have bought it. I seem to remember, but it's a confused memory, that an extremely beautiful lied by Schubert, which is called, I think, the Maiden and Death or *Death and the Maiden*... Yes, *Death and the Maiden*²¹ [*the students correct Deleuze*]. So, it isn't a lied? My memory must be confused? It's a quartet. Well, my question is: isn't there a slow gallop? I remember a very strange kind of gallop, which would not be surprising, in fact. The gallop in this case would be typically deathlike. But you see, I don't really remember it, to the point that I thought it was a lied.

So, anything you might find, in the music you know, whether it's classical music, whether it's rock, whether it's medieval music, whether it's a question of any technical knowledge you might have about the role of the different instruments in the gallop. All of that. I consider it a

mere detail to find a way out of this troubling rock business, which is urgent... well, actually it's not that important. I would be profoundly grateful for anything you could give me, in this sense. And of course, I'll give you twelve credits for your whole life, even more. There you go, well. That's what I meant. It's like a call for proposals. Right. On that note, let's move on. So, I would like you to tell me next week, if you have found anything, whatever it is, because after that it will be too late, it will be too late for me anyway. So be nice and try to dig up some things. Once again, we'll keep it all aside for this course, you can be sure of that. As for the sound-crystal, we'll discuss it more in the third term.

So, here we go, let's get back to where we were. And why did I make this schema, which you can't miss? Does anyone see my diagram? No one? What a life! What a life! Now I'll explain it to you. We were at this point: we had seen the first half, we had seen and we hadn't quite finished the first half. What defines the soul is an intensive movement, or we could say that *there is an intensive movement of the soul*. As for the second half, you know in advance what it is going to be: *time is the number of the intensive movement of the soul*. So, time depends on the soul and not on the world. This is the splendid tradition of Neoplatonism, which goes from the 3rd century to the 6th century, from Plotinus to Damascius²².

Now we still have to finish with the first point. There is an intensive movement of the soul. The soul determines an intensive movement. Actually, it is not true to say that it is the soul that determines it, but it is in terms of the soul that the intensive movement appears more clearly. We will see why this is. I take a quote from Damascius, the last of the great Neoplatonists. Damascius says, and here the translation is exact, the translation is almost word for word: "Like a sponge" – an admirable text, and here too it's something you should learn by heart – "Like a sponge, the soul loses nothing of its being but becomes porous and rarified or densely compacted."²³ We have seen how density or saturation, scarcity or rarefaction constitute the two intensive poles. Of what? Of density, density being an intensive quantity. Just like a sponge, without losing anything of its being, the soul can become only more dense or more rarified. Here we have the very illustration of... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

So, I would say that this is what I was presenting as a dialectic, one that is both very different from what Hegel's dialectic will be, but also very different from what Plato's dialectic consisted in. It's the quintessential Neoplatonic dialectic, for which I can't think of any other word than the word used by Iamblicus: serial dialectic. It is a series.

So, I can pick this up again since my schema was already quite advanced the last time. So I'll start from there. Now I would say that if I give myself a scale, you see, I also give myself a series, I say that at the bottom, this series tends towards zero. What is this zero? Well, when we've understood that, we'll have finished what we have to do. This series tends to zero, and its starting point is 1 to the nth power, it's there. You will tell me that I put something there. Yes. Yes. [*A student indicates wanting to ask a question*] -- Please, not now, okay? -- 1 to the power of n, I say, 1 to the nth power, let's give it a name: it's what the Neoplatonists will call the One, with a big O, "the participable One". Participable, what does that mean? It means that the following degrees will participate in this One, will participate in this power. Why? Necessarily so, since they emanate from that first power, and emanating from that first power, proceeding from that first power, they participate in it. That is to say, *they receive its effect*. They take part in it. Yet this first power has no part. So they participate in it in another way than following the part. This is self-evident. Therefore, 1 to the nth power will be said to be the participable One.

This means that the following degree, the following degree, which we would normally call 1 to the power of n-1, well, this will be precisely the second power, that is, the one that participates in the participable One. Plotinus calls this second power "spiritedness", soul-being or "thought being", once it has been established that in terms of this second power, there is a unity, an absolute unity of being and thought. But you see that here the unity is no longer that of the One, it is that of being and thought. This unity of being and thought is what Plotinus calls the *noûs*, in Greek, or *noos*, which is conventionally, and quite badly, translated as "intelligence" insofar as it comprehends all intelligibles.

I will therefore say that the second power, 1 to the power of n-1, participates in the first power, 1 to the nth power. Following the participable One, there is spiritedness. This spiritedness participates in the participable One. Why are being and spirit one? Precisely because they participate in the One. Is that clear? From 1 to the power of n-1, will somehow derive a third power: 1 to the power of n-2. This will be a lower power. It will participate in spiritedness. And this third power which participates in spiritedness, and which through spiritedness participates in the participable One, is what Plotinus will call "the soul," *psykhê* [ψυχή]. You see, and then, there it varies. I took something that's useful to me. I'm not saying it's exact. And then you have a third, a fourth... Fourth power: *physis*, nature, which participates in the soul. The cosmos, and then the appearing or appearance of phenomena, that is, *physis* in its sensible splendor, which is to say *physis* considered as a set of phenomena which forms a still lower power, etc., etc., etc., down to zero. Again, what this zero is remains a mystery.

First question: why did I do... when I put dotted lines at the bottom? You see, my schema is becoming clearer, I hope, as I comment on it. I put dotted lines at the bottom because in a sense, it goes on forever. There will be a whole series of powers before we get to zero. Eventually, each thing taken in its individuality will itself be a power.

And why did I put up at the top... Ah, what do you call these little dashes... dotted lines... Why did I put these dotted lines up there, with 1, this time, to the power of N, but N written with a capital letter? It's because, as is well known, the Neoplatonists in their excellent attempt to always erect the One above Being, were never done with the question of depth. It is a dialectic of depth. Now, that's what I was trying to show... I'm not going back to this: depth can only emanate from the bottomless.

The "bottom" or "ground" is something that the Germans, and Schelling in particular will remember. Schelling was very familiar with Neoplatonism. I don't mean to say he was a Neoplatonist, but he knew their philosophy very well. When Schelling teaches us that beyond the ground, that is to say, the *Grund*, there is the *Abgrund*, the bottomless or groundless abyss, and that beyond the *Abgrund*, we have the *Urgrund*, which is beyond the bottomless or groundless. And he will write these splendid passages, which will form the foundations of German Romanticism, playing on *Urgrund*, *Abgrund* and *Grund*. Though they are not the same thing, these passages already have singular echoes with the Alexandrians, particularly with Damascius. Therefore, I would say that 1 to the power of N is the deepest, but it's nonetheless already the participable One. So it has to "come out" of something. The deepest must derive from something, from a bottomless depth. And this bottomless depth is the imparticipable One. The imparticipable One, meaning that it is impossible to participate in this One, this power... [Interruption of the recording] [59:54]

Part 2

So, what is the function of this imparticipable One, which retreats to infinity? In Damascius, it's very moving, this imparticipable One, which we can't even touch; every time we touch it, it recedes, since at most, through the mist of being we can glimpse the participable One. The imparticipable One is inconceivable. It is the inconceivable in its pure state. It is the unthinkable. But it is necessary that what thought thinks must also include the unthinkable. The unthinkable will be the imparticipable One.

But then what is its function? It is necessary for the whole series. Because, very strangely, it is the imparticipable One that gives a participable... [*indistinct words*]. If there were no imparticipable, there would be neither participation of being in the participable One, nor the participable One in which being participates. Always, Damascius is the one who would say: "Behind every One, there is a One that is even more One". That is to say, a One, which is nothing more than One; this is the bottomless or groundless. Good! So, for those who can see – maybe try to turn the light off, that way we'd see my schema better, if you can try to turn it off. Can you see it better? No? Obviously, you're not likely to see it, I'm blocking your view I see... Wherever I stand, I'm blocking someone's view... Well, then, you can turn the lights back on... Sorry, you can turn them back on if you like.

Let's take an average situation. You see, when I centered everything on the soul, I wasn't exactly justified, but I already thought that you would be able to correct it on your own. I wasn't exactly justified, since the soul, in fact, arrives with the third power. But it doesn't matter, it's of no importance. Because I can very well say that the higher powers are higher souls, and that the lower powers are lower souls. If I took the soul, it was because it is in it that the movement of "becoming dense" and "becoming rarified" is revealed in its pure state, precisely in relation to what we are going to see now. It is the element most adapted to producing the things which follow and to turning back to things which came previously. It occupies a kind of key position. But we can't say that this is a dialectic of the soul; it's a dialectic in which the soul is one of the degrees of power among others, in the series of the bottomless or groundless.

So, let's look at my schema of the soul. I'll draw in pink, since today I have different colored chalks, so the soul is 1 to the power of $n - 2$. That's it, that's where the soul is. First movement: it opens itself, pours itself out. It gives of itself. It turns towards what follows it. It turns towards what follows it. It gives of itself. It gives of itself, but what does this mean? The Neoplatonic gift... it's a philosophy of the gift. Giving means: giving to participation, giving to participation. It gives of itself so as to participate. What does it give of itself to participate in? Well, to what participates in it, or to what will participate in it. Namely, that which comes after the soul, which is to say, nature.

So, I have a first movement, which is what I put here in red: the soul, in giving of itself, pours itself into nature. *It produces nature*. It produces nature. This production is what – and I quote this word, because it will be important to us later on in terms of a modern author who is strangely dependent on this whole story, though he's a great, extremely modern author – the word that the Neoplatonists will use is: *poiesis*, that is to say, a production-creation. You see... by giving of itself to something that is not yet, what it gives itself to, it makes, it produces by giving of itself. All of this is full of love. It's very religious, it's full of love. It is very powerful. It's something that you have to live. If you like, these are concepts, they are at the same time philosophical concepts. But I always go back to my refrain: if you don't

redouble them with affects, they mean nothing, they are worth nothing. These people lived like that, they were holy men. They were holy men, non-Christians, non-Christians, right? Yeah. They were men... Ah, what men they were! And better yet, what philosophers!

So this *poiesis* by which the soul will produce the lower power that follows it, this movement that goes from 1 to the power of $n - 2$ to 1 to the power of $n - 3$; this movement that goes from – I could as well say, from the first power, to the second, from the second to the third, from the third to the fourth, from the fourth to the fifth – this is something the Neoplatonists call *procession* or *emanation*. The next term proceeds from the previous one, or emanates from it. Each degree of power, taken by itself, will be a *-manence*²⁴. What we call *-manence* is something that dwells within itself. It dwells within itself. That which remains within itself, we will call *-manence*". Because we're mixing Latin and Greek to show that we know all languages. *Manere* is to remain. So, *-manence* is what in Greek we would call a *hypostasis*. And you can hardly read or browse Plotinus and even more so his successors, without coming across the Greek expression, *hypostasis* on almost every page.

Or, as I said, it's a power, but it's not a power that opposes itself, it's not a power in the Aristotelean sense. In Aristotle, it's very different; in Aristotle, a power or potency is opposed to the act²⁵. Potency is what is *in potentia*. For example, wood is a statue *in potentia*. A statue... if I make a statue out of wood, the material is its potency while the form is the act. Excuse me for those who know Aristotle, not that what I'm saying is wrong, but what I'm saying is so rudimentary that... Obviously, Aristotle goes beyond this point of view, but in the end, in his thought there will always remain a distinction, and even an opposition, between being *in potentia* and being in act. For the Neoplatonists, the act is always the act of potency itself. *The act is the expression of potency as such*.

It goes so far that a Renaissance philosopher, who I just mentioned briefly before, Cardinal Cusa, came up with an admirable concept. Cusa created a wonderful concept, a very, very fine concept. But you have to know a little, you have to know Latin to understand it, because it's only worthwhile because of the term. He wanted to explain in opposition to Aristotle, this unity of potency and act, that the act was always an act of potency *as potency*. And he created this concept – he made it a real concept of his philosophy – the concept of *possest*. He spoke about about *possest*, *the possest*. For those who haven't studied Latin, let me explain: *posse*, p, o, double s, e, is the infinitive of the verb "to be able". *Posse* means "to be able", "to have the power to do". The third person of the verb *pouvoir*, he/she can, is *potest*, *potest*. The Cardinal creates a barbaric word, but a formidable one nonetheless, namely, he creates the word – assuming that it corresponds to a notion – "*posse-est*", which could be translated as – I don't see any other way of translating it – "is-ability"... "is-ability". Why does he need to forge a barbaric word, "*possest*", the concept of "is-ability"? To show that power considered as a power is act. Well, in any case, I can say of each of my degrees of potency that it is *-manence*, potency, hypostasis, which is to say "*possest*" or "is-ability".²⁶ From one degree to the following degree, or from one degree to the inferior degree, I have a path which that of procession and emanation.

You see that *-manence* is the act by which a power or potency remains in itself. Emanation is the act by which the lower power proceeds from the higher power. Hence my little red marks from P2 to P3, from P3 to P4, from P4 to P5, from P1 to P2: I have an emanation, a procession. But a thing doesn't emanate from P1, which is to say that P2 doesn't emanate from P1 without turning back to where it came from. P3 doesn't emanate from P2 without turning back towards where it came from. This is the complementary movement of

procession or emanation, namely *conversion*. Each power turns back toward that from which it proceeds, and no power proceeds from a higher power without turning back to that from which it proceeds.

As soon as I say that, it is clear that, it is obvious that what I have just said is inexact. Because conversion does even better than that. Conversion is not satisfied with being the symmetrical inverse of emanation. That's what's great, that's what's really beautiful. And this, I insist, is what we often risk not seeing. At this point, the serial dialectic is turned into something very linear. Whereas you're now going to see how you obtain a beautiful spiral and even a series of interlocking spirals. Aaaaah!

I'll say, for the sake of clarity... let's say that B proceeds from A. No, that's not what I'll say. Let's say that C proceeds from B. Power 3 proceeds from power 2. But in the conversion, power 3 doesn't simply convert to power 2, it converts to that from which power 2 itself proceeds. Hence, in fact, it couldn't be otherwise. Since the power from which it proceeds... power 2 from which power 3 proceeds, could only exist by converting itself back to the preceding power. So, the power that proceeds from a power must convert not only towards the power from which *it* proceeds but also to the power from which that power – the one from which it proceeds – proceeds itself. And this means – damn, I've put this in pink – that the conversion has two degrees of power.

So that you will have a formidable movement, where each time, the conversion will go back up the line. It will unite all the powers, putting them into each other. Do you understand? I would say that the third power *proceeds* from the second power, but also that the third power *converts* to the first power. So it goes on like that, it goes on by way of a great conversion, a great procession. Each time, the conversion takes up not only the procession – because otherwise there would be a rupture in the series – but ensures something akin to a reunification of the whole series, at each stage of conversion. It's beautiful, quite beautiful. Good. Oh my, I can hardly go on!

So that should explain something to you? To finish up with all this, in what sense does this constitute intensity? Every degree of power is a unity. That's why it is intensity. Every degree of power is a unity. That's the first point.

[Second point]. Each unity contains a virtual multiplicity. Each unity contains a virtual multiplicity, namely: the multiplicity of terms that proceeds from it, or the multiplicity of powers that proceeds from it.

Third point: why is this multiplicity virtual? Because when it is actualized – here you have to understand it in a flash, it is not a question of reasoning it out – it is because the multiplicity contained in a power is necessarily virtual. *It is the multiplicity of degrees that proceeds from that power*. Now this multiplicity when it is actualized... it is indeed actualized, but in what form is it actualized? In the form of the following power which, at that moment, functions as a unity. And this unity in turn contains a virtual multiplicity, the multiplicity of the following degree. But when this multiplicity is actualized, it is actualized under the unity of the following degree. So, it is still a virtual multiplicity. A diabolical trick! The multiple will not cease to be a multiplicity comprised... The multiple will not cease to be comprised in the One since it will be purely virtual and it will only be able to actualize itself in the form of a new One, which proceeds from the One that contained the multiplicity.

Aaaaah... Yes? Does that work for you? What do you expect? We're no longer in Alexandria. You understand that over time, you understand that... there are things we can only grasp now, right? Okay. Well, then... But that's not all! Oh, that's not all. That's why I come back to my theme, because this is what interests me, we're getting closer to more modern matters.

But then again, we have absolutely no right to treat Kant's famous text on intensive quantities as an original text by Kant. And this matters a lot to me in terms of what we have to do next week. Where is the novelty of Kant? Because again, of course there is a novelty of Kant, but the chapter on intensive quantities in *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled "Axioms"... no, "Anticipations of Perception"...²⁷ Kant is not new in this respect, since what Kant tells us is present throughout the Middle Ages and goes back to the Neoplatonists. He asks, what is an intensive quantity? He tells us that it is a magnitude, a quantity whose magnitude is apprehended as a unity. A degree of heat of any kind, whether it be a hundred degrees, a thousand degrees, ten thousand degrees, or three degrees, well, the intensive quantity is always apprehended as a power, one. So it is a quantity whose magnitude is apprehended as a unity in which plurality is virtual. And indeed, thirty degrees is not two times fifteen degrees. It contains two times fifteen degrees, but only virtually. It is not by adding fifteen degrees to fifteen degrees that you make thirty degrees. Otherwise, as Diderot once wittily remarked, it would be enough to add snowballs to make heat. So intensive quantity is not additive, it is not additive, that's clear. It is extensive quantity that is additive.

Thus, Kant tells us: 1) The intensive quantity is that in which the magnitude is apprehended as unity; 2) Therefore, it is that in which multiplicity or plurality is virtual; 3) It can only be represented by its approach to a negation equal to zero. That is, by its indecomposable distance to zero, provided that the inferior degree will itself be defined by its indecomposable distance to zero, and that we will therefore have a nesting of indecomposable distances. But we will not be able to say by how much. We can say that one distance is smaller than another, but we can't say by how much. This is Kant's definition of intensive quantity.

I'm just saying that there's nothing new here. So, all those who have relied – and we'll see that this is a powerful school of interpretation of Kantism – who have relied on the chapter on intensive quantities to understand the whole of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by definition, seem to me to be completely missing the point, since this was not where Kant's novelty lies. What's more, it makes Kant, at that point, a kind of Platonist, and that's not by chance. Those who – there, I've said too much – those who interpreted Kant in terms of the theory of intensive quantities... actually it was a very interesting German school of the end of the 19th, beginning of the 20th century, whose main representative was Hermann Cohen²⁸, a very, very remarkable but unknown philosopher. He was never well known in France, anyway, but he was a very, very important philosopher. Well, Hermann Cohen's whole interpretation concerns, on one hand, intensive quantities, and as we've already remarked, it consists in Platonizing... in Platonizing Kant. And this is why he inevitably misses the novelty of Kantianism. All of Heidegger's interpretation, concerning Kantism, is directed – that's why it's important to know it at least – is directed against Cohen's interpretation. We'll see why. But here the question would be: doesn't Heidegger also, in a different way, completely miss the novelty of Kantianism? Can we say that? Yes, we can say that. Is it true? You be the judge. Well, that's that. But anyway, we're not talking about this right now.

But, you see, it's inevitable, and, how can extensive quantity be defined if not in opposition to this. So, extensive quantity, I would say, is that whose multiplicity... it's a magnitude whose

multiplicity is always actual. And then, second aspect, it's what... it's a magnitude whose multiplicity is always actual and... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:26:51]

... [which is to say it is a width], whereas intensive quantity is a depth. Except that... Except that. Except that, before we're done – we're getting to the point of this first part – before we're done, something else must be said. The more I descend – you'll tell me that this will change everything! No, it doesn't change everything. But you have to be sensitive to this descent of intensity... [*sound of a door closing; Deleuze says a few indistinct words*] The more I descend and the more I consider *-manences* projecting the world, the more I consider the lower powers, that is to say, to speak like Damascius, the rarified powers, rarified as opposed to dense, the rarefied powers! Let's place 1 to the power of N at zero. I have a whole scaling of powers that are less and less dense and more and more rarefied.

Well, the further I go down my scale of powers, the more the multiplicity tends to become actual. It tends to. It gets more complicated. The more the width, that is, the extensive quantity, tends to become present, and therefore, the more the ideal fall – since we saw that already in the highest power, we had an ideal fall, in the sense that light falls without ceasing to remain within itself, without ceasing to be a *-manence* that remains in itself... it falls in this ideal fall of light which is not a real fall – well, the more I go down the scale of intensities, the more the ideal fall tends to be doubled by a real fall. And the three become one. The more the multiplicity tends to become actual, the more the width asserts itself at the expense of depth and the more the fall tends to become real instead of merely ideal. Do you understand? In other words, it loosens. The further down I go, the more my scale of intensities loosens. Okay

Are you still with me or do you need a little pause?... Oh, yeah? Well... We have to open the windows again... Well, not for long then, eh? Four-minute pause. Four minutes! [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:30:47]

This is our second part... you see what our second part is about? It's sad to have to close the door when there's such a beautiful sun outside, but it's really bothering me right now.

See, our second part is precisely... Well, once we have this extremely complex intensive movement of the soul, how will time arise as the number of this movement? To understand this, we must first consider something that is self-evident: eternity. Eternity is what the Greeks call *aiôn*. It is the famous Greek *aiôn*. I have to schematize this too, because there are many other things involved, and in *aiôn*, there are already all sorts of things. *Aiôn*, what does *aiôn* designate? *Aion* designates the fact that everything is together, that all the powers are inside one another. They are inside one another, both the powers that follow and the ones that precede. The powers that follow are in those that precede through emanation, while the preceding powers are in those that follow by way of conversion, which is to say conversion of the following powers. The following powers grasp the preceding ones by conversion. The preceding powers grasp and contain the following ones by emanation, by procession. This interiority of powers inside each other is *aiôn* or eternity.

So, we've already stated the essential point. The fact they are inside one another doesn't prevent them from distinguishing themselves. If you understand this, you've understood everything. It's enough to understand this, and. I repeat: *it doesn't prevent them from distinguishing themselves*. I would add that perhaps it prevents them from *being* distinct. But the Neoplatonists are very careful with the terms they use. It doesn't prevent them from

distinguishing themselves. Maybe it doesn't prevent them from being either distinct or distinguished. Why? Being distinct or distinguished is what we'll call the state of an extrinsic difference. The chalk distinguishes itself from the table. [*Chalk falling on a table*] The wall distinguishes itself from the wall perpendicular to it. – No! Oh no, what am I saying? Oh no, I got it all wrong. – The chalk is *distinct* from the table. Poor chalk, it cannot distinguish itself, how could you expect it to? The chalk is distinct from the table. And it is distinguished. But it is distinguished by me, by me, by the *noûs*, by the soul. It is distinct in itself, from an external distinction. I mean, the chalk is outside the table. So what is the external distinction? It's the status of extensive quantities, *partes extra partes*: extensive quantity is defined by the exteriority of its own parts. This is what the Greeks in their own terms – I emphasize these words because they're very important – this is what the Greeks call the domain of *tà álla*. *Tà álla, tà álla...* what is *tà álla*? It is the others! And it is written "t-a", neutral article "a-l-l-a": *tà álla*. It's the others in the neuter. That's it! I would say *tà álla* is the *actual* multiplicity or the extensive quantity. It is the extrinsic distinction.

Now, *there is no question of there being an extrinsic distinction between powers*. That would be against the demands of the *Aion*, against the demands of eternity. The requirements of eternity are that *all powers must always be together!* In other words, all powers are together insofar as they are One! In other words, they do not exist in the realm of *tà álla*. Any single power cannot be other to another. But while it is true that the powers are not distinct or distinguished, *aiôn* does not require or prevent them from distinguishing themselves. The Greeks have a verb in the pronominal that works perfectly, they use the term in the pronominal to indicate this. And they have another word than *tà álla* to mean "others". They have the word *héteros*, which has given us "heterogeneity", and which is therefore very difficult to... so rich is this word in the Greek in its difference from *tà álla*... so it's very difficult to translate. They obtain a noun from this, which is *heterotès, heterotès, heterotès*. See, you can't even call it otherness. The best translation of *heterotès* would be the fact or the act, the power-act of distinguishing oneself, the *distinguishing itself* grasped in its power-act. The powers are all taken together, *but they are distinguished by an internal distinction*. *Heterotès* and not *tà álla*.

Why do they distinguish themselves? All the degrees of power are taken together in the *aiôn*, and yet one degree does not become confused with another. The set of processions and conversions puts all the powers together in the *aiôn*, but at the same time the set of conversions and processions distinguishes each degree of power from the others. Each degree of power is grasped in the act of distinguishing itself from the others. In what sense does it distinguish itself from the others? In the sense that the others, meaning those that follow it, *proceed*, while it *converts* itself to these others, meaning those whom it precedes. There is a *distinguishing oneself* taken at its source as a distinction internal to *aiôn*. In this sense, it is taken in the act of its internal and pronominal distinction, of its reflected distinction, a distinguishing oneself from the other, *heterotès*, with an h-e-t, *heterotès*, h-e-t-e-r-o-t-e-s, with a grave. Your body and mine – but again, we should look more closely at this – are *tà álla*, while our souls, our souls are in the realm of *heterotès*. It's an internal distinction. *They are distinguished within the soul*. And this distinction is inseparable from a process of distinguishing oneself... of distinguishing oneself. Okay.

Insofar as each degree of power distinguishes itself from the others and is caught up in the process of distinguishing itself, we will say that it is a *nûn*. You're learning a lot of words today, aren't you? A *nûn* – I have no more space on the board... no, there, I still have a little room... It is a *nûn*. And here again, it's very difficult to translate this Greek word, *nûn* – n-û

with a circumflex-n – it's a *nûn*. I can't say anything more than that. So if we try to put it differently something, what would it be? It's a "pure now." You'll tell me, that by saying this I'm already giving myself time. Not at all, I give myself the *aiôn*, that's all. The eternal. The Greek *nûn*, or at least the Neoplatonic one, does not presuppose time. They are not stupid. It doesn't presuppose time. I would define this "now" as the "point-act" of the internal distinction within the *aiôn*. So, I give myself nothing of time. Each degree of power is a now, insofar as it distinguishes itself from within from the other degrees of power. The *nûn* would be its distinguishing itself from time. Fine.

You can sense that we already have the starting point of this generation of time, of this genesis of time in Neoplatonism. The *nûn* will obviously be the matrix of time, but why? It's Plotinus' stroke of genius, and it was a real stroke of genius... because to my knowledge, this is really the first, the first great text that tells us what the activity of the soul as soul is. *The activity of the soul as soul is synthesis*, it is synthesis. Third *Ennead*, Chapter 8, Book 7, "On Eternity and Time". It is in this key chapter that we learn that the principal activity of the soul is the *nûn*, therefore synthesis.

Oh, but you will tell me I'm going too quickly. Why *nûn*? You have understood that the *nûn* does not suppose time. The *nûn* is the pure now, that is, the "distinguishing itself" of each power insofar as it distinguishes itself from within from the other powers. Is that clear? Are you ok with that? I'm going slowly, because I think I'm reaching the point of exhaustion, and I imagine you are too... Okay. All right.

But what right do I have to already be saying that this is synthesis? The *nûn* is the synthesis. You understand, if I can show you this, we're home free. Because, if it's a synthesis, what is it the synthesis of? *It's the constitutive synthesis of time*. The Neoplatonists – I say this because we often treat it... The Neoplatonists were the first to conceive that *time was inseparable from a synthesis of time*. And according to them, it is the soul that performs... *whose very essence is to perform the synthesis of time*. And when one claims to discover this idea in Kant, even by transforming it a little, by saying that it's not quite the same in Kant, this is absurd because once again Kant couldn't have been the first to say this, since it had already been said, and it had been said by Plotinus. But Kant doesn't really appreciate having to...

So why is *nûn* the synthesis of time? In a sense, we have already said it; there is nothing left to do but to repeat it. Notice how odd it is. The *nûn* is two things for the moment. It is the *distinguishing oneself*, and it is the synthesis. But how can the act of distinguishing oneself be a synthesis? [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:48:15]

Part 3

This is strange. In fact, it's usually the opposite. Distinction is normally analysis. Synthesis is what unites. It's strange... it's also part of the astonishing Neoplatonic discoveries. It is through synthesis that it is distinguished. It is through synthesis that distinction arrives at the pronominal. This distinguishing oneself... perhaps things distinguish themselves *tà álla*, and that would refer to analysis. But distinguishing oneself is the very act of synthesis.

Why? Why synthesis? Why the *nûn*, the *now*, the now of the eternal, the now that is included in the eternal, just as each degree of power is included in the *aiôn*, how is the *nûn*... in what way is the *nûn* a synthesis? Well, we've seen it; where? It already creates. Each *nûn* as a degree of power that internally distinguishes itself is grasped in the act of distinguishing itself

from the inside. In what sense does it distinguish itself from the inside? It distinguishes itself from the inside of the other degrees of power and does so by two simultaneous movements: the movement by which the following powers proceed from it, and the movement by which it turns back and converts itself to the preceding powers. This is its act of distinguishing itself. Insofar as subsequent powers proceed from it and insofar as it turns itself back toward the preceding powers, it distinguishes itself both from the preceding powers and from those that follow, right?

As for the movement by which it turns towards the following powers, let's call it *projection*, *project*. It projects itself. It pro-tends itself, protension. It leaps forward. Whereas as for the movement by which it turns back towards the preceding powers, the movement of conversion, let us call this *retention*, *recollection*, *memory*. In other words, in its "distinguishing itself," each degree of power as *nûn* distinguishes itself in act and at the same time constitutes what distinguishes it, namely a past and a future.

What is time? The *nûn* does not presuppose time. We have seen that. Time is the product of the distinction by the *nûn* of a future and a past in the *nûn*. *Time is the product of the internal distinction of a future and a past in the now*, the past referring to conversion, the future referring to procession, leaping towards, turning towards. In other words, time is the product of the synthesis performed by the *nûn*.

What is this synthesis? It is the distinction in time – no, sorry, I got that wrong – it is the distinction within the now of a past and a future. And at each level, for each *nûn*, for each degree of power, for each power, there will be a constitution of time, there will be a synthetic constitution of time. And the synthetic constitution of time is the act by which the *nûn* divides into a past and a future. The past and the future are not dimensions of a pre-existing time. The past and future are the expression of the internal distinction proper to the *nûn*, proper to the now.

What will show this? It is very simple. What is this past and this future, this past of conversion and this future of procession? That is, we will have to say that the *nûn*, insofar as it divides into past and future, is the *originary* time. It's the originary time. What does this mean? Why originary time? It's quite simple. Time, why would it be originary time? It's perhaps that there is another time, but another time that will spring from from the originary time... because for the moment, what we have is something very striking. I spoke about past and future. But when I say it is the *nûn* that divides into past and future, I must also say that it divides into the past *in its pure state* and the future *in its pure state*. What do I mean by "pure future" and "pure past"? I mean that the past and the future are *forms*. Well, yes, they are indeed forms!

Before I can say – listen to me, this will be the last difficult thing you'll have to understand today – before I can say that something is past – this is a point that has never changed, I don't even think it's possible to discuss it, but just remember that when you've grasped it, it will change your whole life. There isn't a single philosopher in disaccord with this, everyone agrees – so, how can I say that something is past? *There must be a form of the past*. Where would the past come from? Where does the past come from? If you answer me: well, the past isn't complicated, it's a former present, it's a present that is no longer, I would say, no, not at all. I didn't talk about the present. The *nûn* is not the present, as we have seen, it's something completely different from the present. But suppose someone who is not a philosopher says: well, yes, the past is the former present, isn't it? it's a present that is no longer. Of course, it is

no longer. But I ask myself under what conditions can I grasp it as past. Under what conditions can I grasp the former present as past?

Same thing on the other side. Can I say that the future is the present to come? Not at all, I can't say that. The present to come is a past... I mean a present that is not yet, period. But under what conditions can I say *future*? Under what conditions can I treat the former present as a past, and the present to come as a future? That is, under what conditions can I treat the present that is no longer as a past and the present that is not yet as a future?

Answer: under the condition that I have a form of present and a form of future that I could apply, on the one hand, to the present that is not yet, and on the other hand, to the present that is no longer. If the form of the past did not come from elsewhere, I would never say that the former present is past. I wouldn't have the opportunity to do so because it would no longer be. For me to be able to say that it is past, *the idea of the past must come from elsewhere*. So where does the idea of the past come from? Where does the idea of the present come from? In other words... No, sorry, I meant to say, where does the idea of the future come from? *There is a pure past and a pure future*. And what is a pure past and a pure future? It is not difficult. A pure future is *a future that will never be present*. A pure past is *a past that has never been present*, that is to say, a pure form: form of the past, form of the future. In other words, I can only treat a form present as a past because *I have the idea of a past that has never been present*. If I did not have the idea of a past that has never been present, I would never be able to grasp former presents as past.

But the Greeks had known this from the beginning, they had known it since Plato. Because Plato had always said that memory is based on something deeper called *reminiscence*. And he said that reminiscence is what I recall having seen in another life. Of course, at this point all the Greeks were laughing. They knew that it was just a manner of speaking, that is, a myth, at a time when they no longer believed in myth, when they had long since stopped believing in myth. For Plato, it was necessary to speak in this way because speaking is very difficult when ideas are complicated. You have to invent a language. It can only be expressed like this.

What he really means is that *reminiscence is the recollection of a past that was never present*. So mythologically, it translates as: recollection of a present, or recollection of something that was present in another life. But in fact, he obviously means something much more rigorous, namely that you could never grasp the present, you could never grasp the former present of your life as past, *if you did not have a past as a pure idea, as a pure form*. And the pure form of the past is obviously a past that has never been present. You must have the form of the past in order to apprehend the former present as past. So I repeat: you must have a past that has never been present in order to apprehend the former present as past. It's brilliant. The same thing goes for the future.

The soul is the synthesis, or rather the *nûn*. The *nûn*, the now, is the synthesis that produces time. Or if you prefer, it is the synthesis of time. It is the constitution of originary time. And what is originary time? So you see why synthesis and distinction are one and the same, they merge completely. What is originary synthesis? Well, it is the distinction of a past and a future in each *nûn*, in each *now*.

Do you understand this a little bit now or are you lost? So here we have the beginning of our answer. The soul, in fact, produces the number or measure of the intensive quantity because in its synthetic activity, it constitutes an originary time that measures intensity. Hence the

fundamental question: What does it mean to say that one time is longer than another? It's not difficult. One time being longer than another, refers to this: that time is *extensio*, time is the extension that corresponds to intensity. What is this *extensio*? The *extensio* that corresponds to intensity is the extent of the past and the future that corresponds to each *nûn*. One time will be said to be longer than another when the corresponding *nûn* produces a greater past and future than another *nûn*. Thus, there will be longer and shorter times.

An admirable modern text takes up all of this – and I urge you to add it to the list of readings I proposed to you – an admirable text entitled *Art poétique* by Paul Claudel²⁹. It's a text that's only a few pages long, about forty pages in all. Very strangely, I don't understand why – but I haven't read the introduction, maybe it's explained in the introduction – it's not included among Claudel's prose works published in *La Pléiade*³⁰. So, that's very, very odd, even though it's one of Claudel's most beautiful prose texts. Why, they don't explain it. Maybe they're planning a second volume, I don't know, I haven't read the introduction.

But this admirable text *Art poétique* – Claudel at the same time was a very great poet – but you see that... you won't be surprised to find there isn't single sentence about poetry in this text. On the other hand, it's a text placed under the sign of Saint Augustine. St. Augustine knew something about Neoplatonism, even if he made some very important changes to it. *Art poétique* is a return to the Plotinian, Neoplatonic theme of *poiesis*, of that action-creation which is, precisely, synthesis. And I'll read you... he precedes his very fine text with an even more beautiful summary, which he actually conceives in a humorous style as a kind of lesson. It is a treatise. *Art poétique* is made up of three treatises, the first of which, the one I'm interested in, is called "Connaissance du temps" ("Knowledge of Time"), and it's a great text on time. And I'm going to read you a few passages from the summary of the text, the summary that Claudel made himself: "The generative difference" – I take words here and there like that, but you won't have any trouble understanding; the generative difference is the internal distinction, it's the act of *nûn* – "space or the finished drawing" – drawing as in *actual drawing* – "space or the finished drawing, time or the drawing in the process of being made".

Here again, you have to be careful, because if you hadn't read Plotinus, you would say to yourself: This is Bergson, Claudel is influenced by Bergson, his famous distinction between the "made" and the "in the making". Not at all. This is a trap. An abominable trap. Be careful not to fall into it. So this gives us – the same goes for Bergson as for Kant – we often say, Oh yes, the Bergsonian distinction between the "made" and the "being made"! If that's all Bergson had told us, well then this wouldn't at all be Bergson. Those who first said this and who said it fully and who said it once and for all, no need to repeat, are the Neoplatonists. So I again take up my theme: if Bergson tells us something new, and God knows he tells us new things, it won't be about the difference between the "made" and the "being made". It will obviously lie elsewhere, it goes without saying. Because the "made" and the "in the process of being made", as Claudel well knows, come from the Neoplatonists and Saint Augustine.

The finished space or drawing – that is, the drawing once it is made – is the domain of *tà álla*, the external, extrinsic distinction. The generative difference, or the drawing that is in the process of being made, is the *heterotès*, the internal distinction, the "distinguishing itself". And Claudel continues: "The drawing that is being made in a universal movement that is time". One cannot put it better, one cannot better summarize the generative difference, or the drawing in the process of being made, which is to say the internal distinction. This is what time is, time which receives its genesis from the *nûn*, in the *nûn*, namely the power-act of the distinction in the process of being made. This is pure Neoplatonism. And he goes on: "The

origin of movement is the quivering of matter in contact with a different reality, the Spirit" – the fall to zero. Two points; notice here something that arises suddenly which will be crucial for us next time – "the fear of God". What does he mean by this? And finally, the argument with which the summary ends: "The past is the ever-increasing sum of the conditions of the future". We might as well say that in the generative synthesis of time, which consists in the distinction of the past and the future in the *nûn*, there is a primacy of the... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:12:54]

It doesn't matter, we don't have time. What I just want to emphasize is this *fear of God!* What a marvel, the fear of God. It took a convert like Claudel to be able to rediscover, to resurrect this notion of the fear of God. So, what can this fear of God be? Well, let's take a look at it even if we don't have a particular talent for this. What is it then? We'll always have the chance to be afraid of God. And the fear of God is... no, it's not funny, it's not funny at all, but we understand. God is what never ceases to perform the ideal fall all through the *nûn*, and through eternity. But here we sense that in terms of this question of time, the ideal fall is really nothing, the ideal fall is the fall of light, it is the fall of the angels. But it's not the devil. But now the ideal fall redoubles. It will be redoubled more and more by a real fall and there will be no ideal fall without a real fall.

We might as well translate this in terms of time: there will be no productive synthesis of an originary time without a derived time being released into nature, and where will this derived time lead us? This is no laughing matter. It's a serious business. The real fall redoubles a fall which is the ideal fall, the fear of God. In other words, we have the same movement: from time as a measure of intensive quantity, a fundamental anomaly will be born, just as a fundamental anomaly was born from time as a measure of extensive quantity.

This is where our two studies strictly converge. Simply that the anomaly that arose from extensive quantity and time as a measure of extensive quantity... what was this anomaly? We had very clearly identified it, if I may say so. We said it that was the crisis, it was the crisis in physics, in politics, in the city, and in economics. It was the great crisis, the great world crisis. Necessarily so, since it was the movement of the world that time measured. So, when we consider time as a measure of the intensive movement of the soul, a no less terrible anomaly will arise, one that is perhaps even more terrible. *And it will no longer be crisis, it will be fear.* It will be the time of fear, and no longer the time of crisis. And it will be the fear of the soul and no longer the crisis of the world.

So, there can be only one way out: smash all of this, smash it all, make anomalous time arise and rule; accept anomalous time; join with anomalous time. At what cost? Overcoming fear, overcome the crisis. At this point, it will be necessary, painfully necessary. to turn away from Plotinus and turn away from Plato and turn away from Aristotle and turn away from Saint Augustine. Then what? Make the reformation, become Lutheran, become Calvinist. It won't be fun. But we'll have to try it! Immanuel Kant. Though in the end, we won't have finished with Plotinus.

So, this is exactly the point I've reached: this synthesis of originary time, how will it bring about fear? How will it operate and how will it bring about fear? And perhaps we'll understand this better by going from Neoplatonism to Saint Augustine. Which we'll do very quickly next time, since we'll conclude all this and then pass on to Kant very quickly. That's all for today. Don't forget my little question of the gallop, eh? [*End of the recording*] [2:18:08]

Notes

¹ See sessions 2 and 3 of the first term, November 22 and 29, 1983.

² See Félix Guattari, *The Machinic Unconscious* (trans. Taylor Adkins), Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011, p. 280. Deleuze refers to Guattari's idea of a "crystal of time" also in the last session of the previous seminar, *Classification of Signs and Time*, 2.23.

³ Clément Janequin (c. 1485-1558) was a French composer who lived during the Renaissance. The programmatic *chansons* for which Janequin is famous were long pieces with multiple sections, and usually involved the clever imitation of natural or man-made sounds. *Le chant des oiseaux* imitates bird-calls, while *La chasse* reproduces sounds of a hunt. *La bataille (Escoutez tous gentils)*, which is probably Janequin's most celebrated work, written after the French victory over the Swiss Confederates at the Battle of Marignano in 1515, imitates battle noises, including trumpet calls, cannon fire and the cries of the wounded.

⁴ Here Deleuze is referring to *First Name: Carmen* (Orig. *Prénom: Carmen*, 1983), a film by Godard starring Maruschka Detmers, Jacques Bonaffé, Myriam Roussel and Godard himself. The story, loosely based on Bizet's opera, *Carmen*, concerns a young woman, sometimes known as Carmen, who plans and stages a bank robbery that goes wrong where a fatal meeting with a bank guard leads to the two becoming fugitives from the law. Interspersed with scenes of the robbery and the lovers' flight to a seaside hideaway belonging to Carmen's uncle, a washed-up filmmaker (played by Godard), are images of another young woman, a violinist who is part of a string quartet grappling with the challenges of playing one of Beethoven's late quartets.

⁵ Here in the tape recording Deleuze makes the mistake of saying 'sound' when it is clear from the logical flow that he means 'visual'.

⁶ Dimitri Tiomkin (1894-1979) was a Russian-born film composer best known for his soundtracks to Western films including most notably Howard Hawks's *Red River*, *The Big Sky* and *Rio Bravo*, King Vidor's *Duel in the Sun* and Fred Zinnemann's *High Noon*. He is also remembered for his scores for a number of Hitchcock films including *Shadow of a Doubt*, *Strangers on a Train* and *Dial M for Murder* (before Bernard Hermann became Hitchcock's regular composer).

⁷ *High Noon* (1952) is a western directed by Fred Zinneman and starring Gary Cooper, Grace Kelly and Lloyd Bridges. The story, which takes place in the real time of the film's duration, concerns a small town marshal whose sense of courage and duty is tested when he has to choose between facing alone a band of killers who are about to descend on the town or leaving with his wife. The film is considered by many to be partly an allegory of America under the communist witch-hunts of Senator Joseph McCarthy.

⁸ The theme song of *High Noon*, composed by Tiomkin with lyrics by Ned Washington, became a country & western hit for singer Ted Ritter.

⁹ Arthur Honneger (1892-1955) was a Swiss composer, one of the members of the circle of composers known as *Le six*. His most famous works are the opera *Antigone*, with a libretto by Jean Cocteau, and the orchestral piece *Pacific 231*, inspired by train sounds. Honneger's love of trains was well-known, prompting him to say at one point, in a statement that would no doubt have pleased Deleuze: "I have always loved locomotives passionately. For me they are living creatures and I love them as others love women or horses." He was also known for the music he wrote for the films of Abel Gance, notably *J'accuse* (1919), *La Roue* (1923) and the multi-screen epic, *Napoléon* (1927).

¹⁰ Busby Berkeley (1895-1976) was an American choreographer and film director, most famous for his strikingly complex, often highly abstract and geometrical dance sequences involving large groups of dancing girls. Though Berkeley actually directed relatively few of the many films he was involved in, the singularity of his choreographies has elevated him to the status of a grand auteur. Among his most famous films are *42nd Street*, *Gold Diggers of 1933*, *Footlight Parade* (all 1933), *Dames* (1934) and *The Gang's All Here* (1943).

¹¹ *French Can Can* (1955) is a French-Italian musical written and directed by Jean Renoir and starring Jean Gabin and Françoise Arnoul. The film is a homage to the Parisian café-concert culture of the 19th century with its popular singers and dancers, while visually evoking Impressionist painting including that of Renoir's own father, Pierre-Auguste. Significantly, it also marked Renoir's return to French cinema after a long Hollywood exile that began in 1940.

¹² Nino Rota (1911-1979) was an Italian film composer, known for his collaborations with Federico Fellini and Luchino Visconti and for the music he wrote for Francis Ford Coppola's *Godfather* trilogy. Rota's compositional style often involved pastiched incorporation of themes from existing classical music, a tactic for which he was as much criticized as praised. Among his most celebrated scores are those for Fellini's *I Vitelloni* (1953), *La Strada* (1954), *Le Notti di Cabiria* (1957), *La Dolce Vita* (1960), *Otto e Mezzo* (1963) and *Amarcord* (1973) and Visconti's *Senso* (1954), *Le Notti Bianche* (1957) and *Rocco e i Suoi Fratelli* (1960), as well as *The Godfather* and *The Godfather Part II* (for which he won an Oscar).

¹³ *8½* (Orig. *Otto e mezzo*, Italy, 1963) is a film by Federico Fellini starring Marcello Mastroianni, Anouk Aimée and Claudia Cardinale which follows the surrealist adventures of a blocked filmmaker, as he struggles between dream and reality to make (and equally not to make) a science-fiction film in 1960s Rome.

¹⁴ *Fellini's Casanova* (Orig. *Il Casanova di Fellini*, 1976) is a film directed by Federico Fellini from a screenplay he co-wrote with his frequent collaborator Bernardino Zapponi adapted from Casanova's autobiography and starring Donald Sutherland and Tina Aumont. In detached, almost mechanical style, the film follows Casanova's adventures and his decent into debauchery even as he strives to keep alive the flame of his one true love, Henriette, and to gain respect as a writer in a world whose decadence knows no bounds.

¹⁵ *Orchestra Rehearsal* (Orig. *Prova d'Orchestra*, 1978) is a satirical film by Federico Fellini in which the members of an Italian orchestra mount a chaotic strike against their authoritarian German conductor. The film initially takes the form of a TV style documentary in which the different members of the orchestra are questioned by a reporter, voiced by Fellini himself, and who reveal themselves to be quarrelsome, arrogant and highly opinionated.

¹⁶ For some of Deleuze's letters to Rosset, see *Lettres et autres textes* (Paris: Minuit, 2015) pp. 19-25; *Letters and Other Texts*, ed. David Lapoujade (New York: Semiotext(e), 2020), pp. 19-25.

¹⁷ Presumably issue 373, February 1984.

¹⁸ On Grémillon's farandoles, see especially session 15 of the Cinema 2 seminar, March 22, 1983. Grémillon's farandole scenes include those in *Misdeal* (*Maldone*, 1928), *The Lighthouse Keepers* (*Gardiens de phare*, 1929) and that which occurs near the end of *Summer Light* (*Lumière d'été*, 1943) in counterpoint to an imminent tragedy.

¹⁹ Deleuze's confusion about the sense of 'rock' here probably derives from an unfamiliarity with African American culture for which the term 'rock and roll', like 'jazz' before it, and like 'house' would be in later decades, is a euphemism for sex. Actually, the first uses of the expression 'rock and roll' date back to the jazz and blues age where it appears in songs like Trixie Smith's 1938 hit, "My Daddy Rocks Me (with one steady roll)". In this sense, it could be argued that the aspect of the gallop that Deleuze wishes to attribute to rock music, in opposition to the lulling melodic crooners of the 1940s, might be found in the accelerating movement of sexual intercourse in its rush towards *le petit mort*.

²⁰ The *Bolero* (1928) is a single movement work for large orchestra composed by Maurice Ravel, one of Ravel's last completed works. Based on the Spanish dance and musical form known as *bolero*, it began its life as a simple one-finger piano melody that Ravel played to a friend and, impressed by what he called its intensive quality, decided to systematically repeat in a long-form composition (one of the reasons the piece is considered a forerunner to minimalism). Though the ostinato rhythm underpinning the piece remains the same throughout, the melodic line which begins diatonically then divides into two melodies, the second of which incorporates more jazz and modal elements, in such a way that the repetitive mechanical rhythm is gradually subjected to passages of syncopation.

²¹ *Death and the Maiden* (1824) is the more common name given to Franz Schubert's *String Quartet No. 14 in D minor*, composed when Schubert was dying and not published until three years after his death. It is now regarded as one of the cornerstones of the string quartet repertoire. Deleuze is not wholly mistaken, however, in remembering it as a *Lied*, as Schubert had previously written a song with the same title in 1817, the piano accompaniment to which became the principal melodic line of the quartet's second movement.

²² Damascius (c. 458-after 538) was the last scholar of the Neoplatonic Athenian school. He left Athens after emperor Justinian I had the Athenian school closed down (around 529 AD) and most probably sought refuge in the court of the Persian King Chosroes before being allowed back into the Byzantine Empire. His surviving works consist of three commentaries on the works of Plato, and a metaphysical text entitled *Difficulties and Solutions of First Principles*, which is the last surviving independent philosophical treatise from the Late Academy. It traces a survey of Neoplatonist metaphysics and offers a discussion of transcendence and a compendium of late antique theologies.

²³ See Damascius quoted in Gregory Shaw, "The Role of Aesthesis in Theurgy" in *Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism* (Eugene Afonasin, John Dillon, John F. Finamore eds.) Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012 p. 98.

²⁴ *Manence* in English exists only as a root (of words such as immanence, permanence etc). It derives from the latin *manere* (to remain) and more distantly from the Proto-Indo-European root *men-*, meaning 'to think'.

²⁵ Here, in relation to Aristotle's conception, we have decided to translate *puissance* additionally as "potency", echoing translations of Giorgio Agamben's work on Aristotle where "potency" is described in a subtle distinction from Deleuze, as the power to withdraw from acting, to withhold action, or to act through not acting.

²⁶ On Nicholas of Cusa and the "possest", see session 3 of the seminar on Spinoza, December 9, 1980, and session 17 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, May 12, 1987. Here we have decided to translate the word with a neologism of our own, "is-ability".

²⁷ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trans. eds. Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998, pp. 290-295.

²⁸ Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) was a German Jewish philosopher and one of the founders of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, which dominated academic philosophy in Germany from the 1870s until the end of the First World War. Earlier German philosophers finding inspiration in Kant tended either towards speculative, metaphysical idealism, or sought to address philosophical questions with the resources of the empirical sciences, especially psychology. In contrast, Cohen's interpretation of Kant offered a vision of philosophy that maintained its independence from empirical psychology, without at the same time simply lapsing back into uncritical metaphysics. Cohen focused on a wide range of topics, writing about epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, law, political theory and aesthetics.

²⁹ See Paul Claudel *Art poétique*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1907, p. 8.

³⁰ Established in 1931, the "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade", an imprint of Gallimard, is a French editorial collection of classic literary authors' complete works. Entry into the Pléiade is considered a major acknowledgement of an author's importance and is rarely accorded to living writers. Claudel was one of those to be included while still alive and current exceptions include Milan Kundera and Mario Vargas Llosa.