



GILLES DELEUZE

Foucault

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...a long time ago. So that a recapitulation is necessary of Foucault's account of power-knowledge relations – relations, you will recall, which are organized according to two axes: the knowledge axis and the power axis. Well, how might we sum up power-knowledge relations? We understand clearly that in experience, we always find ourselves confronted with mixtures of power-knowledge. But that does not in the least deny philosophical analysis the right to disentangle two heterogeneous axes, a knowledge axis and a power axis, despite the fact that concrete experience always presents us with mixtures. It is exactly as if I were to assign power to be the ordinate along the vertical axis [*en ordonnée*] and knowledge to be the abscissa along the horizontal axis [*en abscisse*].

Well... and what we have seen in all that has transpired so far is how Foucault began by studying the forms of knowledge on their corresponding axis, which it is easy, in his list of books, to assign: up until *Discipline and Punish*. Not that power was ignored, only that it is posed implicitly, presupposed. We have seen that he already implicitly needed a certain conception of power centers [*foyers*], that starting from the theory of the statement, he could not form the corpora of statements without reference to power centers. We saw all of that, but it remains the case that the power axis, up until *Discipline and Punish*, was neither treated in its own right nor explicitly considered. It is *Discipline and Punish* that marks the first break in Foucault's oeuvre, passing from the knowledge axis to the power axis.

Thus, that being said, in our summation, which should conclude this study on the power axis... We began the first term by studying the knowledge axis, so we have followed the chronological path in Foucault's oeuvre, and next we thus took up the power axis. In the necessary recapitulation, I believe we must first posit that there is a difference in kind between power and knowledge, between the two axes. There is a difference in kind. I am reminding you of the major points, how this difference in kind is organized. Well, the first aspect is that power mobilizes what are essentially points or affects. Points of domination or, if you prefer – it amounts to the same thing, affects being punctual –, affects that refer to the two aspects of power: the power to affect and the power to be affected. We have seen, in effect, that power consists in relations of forces, and that force is presented at once as the power to affect other forces and as the power to be affected by other forces.

These affects are thus singular points. Power, therefore, is presented as a distribution, as a distribution of singular points that are points of domination. (I am not going to go back over that here since this is a summation, so you must tell me later if it is necessary to return to certain aspects.) Whereas knowledge mobilizes not points and distributions of points, but forms, and it organizes forms. Power is informal; knowledge is the organization of forms, is



fundamentally formal and formalizing. There are forms of knowledge, whereas there are only points of power, which Foucault puts very well in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*: power runs from one point to another.

The second aspect is that power consists in relations of forces (in the plural), and we have seen that force exists only in the plural, force is said in the plural. Why? Because force is inseparable from its relation to other forces. Force is the generic or abstract name for a multiplicity. Whereas – and you recall that, when I say “power is a relation of forces,” this means that the dominated force belongs no less to power than the dominant force, or, if you prefer, the power to be affected is no less constitutive of power than the power to affect – whereas knowledge is a relation of forms, and we will not conflate a relation of forces [*rapport de forces*] with a formal relation [*relation de forme*]. We have seen what these forms are, the great forms of knowledge, the two fundamental forms of knowledge: seeing and speaking, the visible and the enunciable. There is a form of the enunciable, and there is a form of the visible. The form of the enunciable is language, such as Foucault conceives it; the form of the visible is light, such as Foucault conceives it.

The third aspect is that power – I remind you, as always, that when we distinguish between power and knowledge, it is a matter of abstraction since, once again, the concrete only ever presents me with mixtures –, from the point of view of abstraction, I am entitled to say thirdly that power concerns non-formed matters and non-formalized functions, whereas knowledge supports and involves formed matters and formalized, finalized functions. That, no doubt, is the most important point. This is how you can distinguish the difference between what I have proposed to call categories of power and categories of knowledge. I remind you: what, for Foucault, are categories of power? He tells us very clearly, for example, in societies of so-called sovereignty that the categories of power will be to levy whatever activity – it’s the “whatever” [*quelconque*] that is essential – that the operation of the sovereign is to levy whatever activity and to decide death. The Sovereign decides death in general. Whether it be death at war, or the death of convicted criminals, or whatever death, whatever levy. It is when you can raise a category to the coefficient of the whatever [*du quelconque*] that you grasp a category of power.

In disciplinary societies, that is, in modern societies, I remind you, what is a category of power? Well, he tells us: to impose whatever task on whatever limited multiplicity. To impose whatever task, that is discipline. Discipline as power: there is discipline as power from the moment that you impose whatever task on a small multiplicity. There you have a first category of power in disciplinary societies.

And finally, when power manages life. You see that disciplinary societies are distinguished from societies of sovereignty, since instead of levying whatever activity, you impose a task on a small multiplicity, and since instead of deciding death, you manage, power manages life in a large multiplicity. ... [I]t is a category of power, precisely because you don’t have to say who it amounts to or what, which activity [?]; to impose a task on whatever small multiplicity, on whatever multiplicity on condition that it be small. To manage life in relation to whatever multiplicity on condition that it be large. These are the two aspects of disciplinary power. I thus say: power concerns and mixes together non-formed matters – whatever multiplicities – and non-formalized functions – imposing whatever task.

By contrast, what will the categories of knowledge be? The categories of knowledge concern formed matters and formalized functions. It will be, for example: to educate, a knowledge of educating; to punish, a knowledge of punishing; to set to work, a knowledge of setting to work. It will be all the formalized ways of imposing precise tasks, tasks qualified by a determinate multiplicity. The ones to be punished will be the prisoners; the ones to be educated will be the children. And all that no doubt is subsumed by the category of power “to



impose whatever task on whatever limited multiplicity,” but when it comes to categories of knowledge – to educate, to punish, to set to work, etc. –, these are obviously not the same thing. Thus, I can say that perhaps we better understand why the concrete, by definition, only presents mixtures of power and knowledge, for experience never reveals something as strange as “to impose whatever task on whatever limited multiplicity”.

In experience all multiplicities are qualified: it’s this or that, it’s schoolchildren, prisoners, workers, soldiers, etc. Which is to say, it is always a matter of the qualified and the task itself; the imposed task is always determined, namely, it is a question of educating, of punishing, of setting to work, etc. This is why Foucault tells us, for example, that the categories of power are of the type “to incite, to provoke... etc.”, which is to say, they do not say the quality of that to which they are applied, nor the form into which they enter, since as soon as they enter into a form, they constitute forms of knowledge. I believe that this point is the most important for evaluating the difference between power and knowledge. I will say yet another aspect, and all these aspects are linked together: power is constitutive of a microphysics, and knowledge is constitutive of a macrophysics. It is even for this reason that power has no form; that power, by definition, goes from one point to another. It is a set of infinitesimal relations, a set of fluid, evanescent relations. It is knowledge that gives them a stability. And finally, power is the object of a strategy, while knowledge is the object of a stratification. Knowledge is the object of a stratification, it being said that strategy is the use or the distribution of a non-stratified matter.

Obviously, all this presupposes everything that we have done previously, but I am ready to return, if you deem it necessary, to this or that point. For this purpose, if I were to try to give a very general approximation, I would say: yes, knowledge is a matter of archives, the archive being audiovisual, that is, an archive of sight and an archive of the statement, an archive of the visible for each period and an archive of the enunciable for each period. Knowledge is an archival matter; power is not an archival matter. Power is a matter of cartography, of a moving cartography, a strategic map, always reworkable, always fluid. So that up to this point, Foucault’s two words could be: until *Discipline and Punish*, I am an archivist; with *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, I am a cartographer. The strategic map is millimetric. The millimetric map of power is of a different nature than the archives of knowledge. And over the archives, over the archives of strata, over the archives of stratified formations, it is necessary to superimpose strategic maps, the millimetric maps that state the relations of forces or power relations of a given period, the relations of forces or of power that correspond to such and such stratified formation. There are relations of forces that correspond to each stratified formation, but the two differ in kind as power and knowledge differ in kind. This difference in kind does not prevent concrete experience from only ever giving me mixtures of one and the other. Thus, here you have the first aspect: there is a difference in kind between power and knowledge, and this point must be very, very clear. But the second aspect: that there is a difference in kind does not prevent there necessarily being reciprocal presupposition between the two. There is reciprocal presupposition, that is, the one presupposes the other and the other presupposes the one, but obviously in two different ways. The first way: knowledge is fundamentally formal, that is, it is an organization of forms, and of two forms, the form of seeing and the form of speaking, which are variable when it comes to each formation, that is, when it comes to each historical period.

It remains the case that without power relations, without the relations of forces, knowledge would have nothing to actualize, and its forms would be empty forms. It is in this sense that it presupposes power. But inversely, without the forms of knowledge, power would remain punctual, fluid, evanescent, unstable, and could neither be conserved nor reproduced. The third and final aspect: not only is there a difference in kind between power and knowledge, not only is there reciprocal presupposition between the two, but there is a primacy of power



over knowledge. In what sense is there primacy? It is, or rather, they are the relations of forces or of power – I would remind you that the “forces” in “relation of forces” must always be written in the plural, and “power relation” in the singular – the power relation is the relation of forces. And well, it’s the relations of forces or of power that are causal. Causal how? I would say: as immanent cause. What are they the immanent cause of? Of forms, of historical formations, the historical formations that constitute forms of knowledge [*les savoirs*]. So that I can say: power necessarily implies knowledge, but knowledge necessarily presupposes power.

Student question: does power implicate [*implique*] or explicate [*explique*] knowledge?

Deleuze: both. Both, by which I mean that implicating and explicating are never opposed to one another. To implicate, literally, is to envelop; to explicate is to develop. It goes without saying that what envelops, develops. One can say, in effect, that knowledge envelops relation of forces or of power, and equally that it develops them. What I mean is: do not think that implicating and explicating are in a relation of conflict. It is a relation of complementarity. If I say that B implicates A, I also mean that B explicates A. The contrary of implicating and explicating... implicating and explicating form a whole, and the term that would be contrary to implicating and explicating would be to complicate. So I can say in effect: the relation of forces complicates knowledge.

Which is to say: it comprehends it. What is opposed to implicating and explicating is comprehending, that is, complicating. Hence I can at least reply, as the outcome of this summation, I can reply to two questions that two of you asked me. The first was the following: in accepting that power is in a certain manner a cause of knowledge, or if you prefer, that the relations of forces or of power are the immanent cause of forms of knowledge, does this not restore a kind of unity? We have seen previously in what sense Foucault, in my view, made a theory of multiplicities, where unity disappeared in favor of a new status of the multiple. A status of multiplicities that could be thought without reference to something functioning like a unity. How to think the multiple in its pure state? From this point of view, then, if you have followed me in..., previously, it would be very important that the idea of an immanent cause not restore a kind of unity. As to the question whether there is a restoration of a unity, I believe we have the answer from the moment that what plays the role of immanent cause exists only in a state of radical dispersion, that is, in the form of relations of forces, force being irreducible to any unity since force exists only in the multiplicity that relates force to force in the form of a power to affect other forces or a power to be affected by other forces. Force presents an irreducible multiplicity and can only be conceived in the multiple; thus there is no restoration of any unity whatsoever.

The second question that was posed to me was the following: if there is a difference in kind between power and knowledge, won’t we have an infinite regress? The question meant the following. You will have to recall what we have learned in analyzing the domain of knowledge. We encountered the same fact of a difference in kind between the two forms of knowledge: sight and the statement, the visible and the enunciable. And we came across the following problem: how can there be agreement between the visible and enunciable when they are heterogeneous and differ in kind, to the point that we never see what we say and never say what we see? It is thus the difference in kind between the two forms of knowledge that compelled us to go beyond knowledge in order to find a reason or a cause on the basis of which, despite the difference in kind between the two forms of knowledge, these two forms would be co-adaptable. And we found it at the level of power relations. It is power relations that explain that the two forms of knowledge are co-adaptable. Why? Because power relations are informal and are not subject to the conditions of the two forms of knowledge.

Thus they are able to account for the coadaptation of one form to the other. But then the question was as follows: if there is a difference in kind between power and knowledge, are



we not yet again referred to a third term, a new cause that would account for the coadaptation? No. We are not referred to a new cause, to a cause of the cause, on condition that we understand how the immanent cause acts, which is to say, in what sense power relations or relations of forces are indeed the immanent cause of forms of knowledge. And well, in what sense? If I try to take a very general formula, I would say that the forms of knowledge actualize relations of forces or of power. In other words, the effect actualizes its cause, and it is the effect itself that does the actualizing. In what sense?

In effect, we have seen that relations of forces by themselves, according to Foucault's analysis, would remain completely fluid, unstable, evanescent, if they were not actualized in their effects, their effects being a stable form. Thus I would say: the effect actualizes the immanent cause, and in effect an immanent cause is a cause inseparable from its effect, that is, a cause that remains entirely virtual if one separates it from its effect; in the first place, but then what does the actualization consist in? I would remind you, these are things that we have seen more recently: according to Foucault, actualization isn't simple, but looking closely at the texts, it seemed to me that the actualization of relations of forces or of power consists in two operations, two simultaneous operations.

On the one hand, the effect actualizes insofar as it integrates. The actualization is an integration. I would say: knowledge integrates the relations of forces; forms integrate the relations of forces. This is what Foucault tells us, it seems to me, in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, pages 93-95. When he says that in the forms, the relations of forces then constitute a general line of force that traverses the local confrontations and connects them, proceeding based upon them... and in return, the forms will carry out redistributions, alignments, homogenizations, arrangements, and convergences.

In other words, the forms align, homogenize, integrate the relations of forces or of power. I would remind you that, concretely, we have carried out a very precise analysis, we have tried to obtain a very precise analysis where we could invoke mathematics in order to say: well yes, it's very simple, you see in mathematics – and even if there is no need to know the math... it is enough to have a basic understanding, it's not difficult – in mathematics, in the theory of functions, one distinguishes two elements as differing in kind. One distinguishes the distribution of singularities, of singular points... whichever you like: points of inversion, points of tangency, nodes, foci.... You distinguish a distribution of singularities, that is one thing, and you distinguish from it the speed of the curve that is precisely called an “integral curve”, integral curve, curve of integration, the integral curve that passes through the neighborhood of the singularities. [?]

Now, the distribution of singularities in a vector field is what we will call – no longer in mathematics, in Foucault – it's what we will call the emission of singularities corresponding to the relations of forces, the distribution of singularities in a vector field: but what is completely different, or rather of another mathematical nature, is the speed of the integral curve that passes through the neighborhood of the singular points and that performs an integration. Here, then, we see quite well what [?] in which the effect integrates the immanent cause, the relations of forces: it's a distribution of singularities, but the effect integrates, that is, the forms of knowledge will trace the curves that pass through the neighborhood of the singularities of power. This is very clear.

The second aspect in Foucault's other text: integration. You see, we will be able to define integration in many ways. I would say: to integrate is to align, to homogenize, etc. I would equally say: to integrate is to trace the curve that passes through the neighborhood of singularities. The singularities being the points of power. The curve that passes through the neighborhood constituting the forms of knowledge. I will also say, with Foucault, that to integrate is to institutionalize. Institutions are inseparable from forms of knowledge; it is to



institutionalize, to finalize. Remember, in fact, that as we have just recalled, the relations of forces or of power concern only non-formalized and non-finalized functions; when you assign a finality, you are already in the domain of knowledge. To impose whatever task on whatever multiplicity is a category of power, but to educate is a formalized and finalized function. So, too, to set to work and to punish. Thus, to integrate is to institutionalize, to finalize, to technologize, Foucault says, and to rationalize. In effect, these are the four great species, it seems to me, under which functions receive a form and a finality.

At the same time, it seems to me necessary to make this summation, and also it seems to me very abstract, but ultimately, you will have to remember a bit of what we did before, we will see... There you have it, that is the integration aspect. I would say: the effect integrates the cause, that is, the great forms of knowledge integrate the relations of forces and of power, the informal relations of forces or of power, giving them a form. Yet, yet, yet, yet... that does not suffice [to me?]. It must be the case, also and again, that actualizing not only be integrating. Actualizing must also be differentiating. The effect does not integrate the immanent cause – that is, the fluctuating relations, the relations of fluctuating forces – in order to stabilize it, the effect does not integrate the relations of fluctuating forces that constitute the immanent cause, without, at the same time, introducing a differentiation. To be actualized is always to be actualized following divergent pathways, as if the whole of the cause was not able to be actualized in one go, but must be actualized in at least two divergent directions. And I told you: the very idea that to be actualized is to be differentiated, for example, is an idea that was fundamentally and ... so well-developed by Bergson, that actualization inevitably implies a process of differentiation – I am not going back over that. ... But you must hold in mind concrete examples.

And in fact, in Foucault, you see the actualization of relations of forces always implying large differentiations: it is at the level of the actualization of relations of forces, that is, the way in which the relations of forces are embodied in the large forms, in the large stratified formations, it is at this level that the large differentiations of sexes appear... – You recall Foucault's theme ... at the level of punctual relations, sexuality is without sex. The difference between the sexes, the differentiation of sexes, appears at the level of the integration of sexuality. ... Sexual differentiation, political differentiation, social differentiation of classes, etc. All that appears at the level of the stratified formations. It's that the relations of forces cannot be actualized without following divergent pathways of actualization. To be actualized is to create the differentiation of pathways according to which the actualization takes place.

Now, for us this is essential because it is the only thing that enables us to reply, once again, to the question over which we had lingered at the level of knowledge. Once again, you have a form of the visible and a form of the enunciable, and there is a chasm between the two. I do not say what I see, and I do not see what I say. All of Foucault's analysis arrived at this result. There is no agreement between seeing and speaking; there is a battle between the two, and the whole theme of a battle between what I see and what I say was developed by Foucault in a masterful manner. Good, but then... we were here when we were studying knowledge: how can we even speak, can he speak of battle? Since "battle" between seeing and speaking implies at least that there be a minimum of relation, but to the point where we have steered his analysis, there is no relation. On the one hand, I see, and on the other, I say. But I do not see what I say, and I do not say what I see. Okay, it would seem, then, that we find ourselves confronted with, as Blanchot put it, a non-relation between seeing and speaking, and we had ended our analysis of knowledge by saying: okay, how to explain that there is a coadaptation between seeing and speaking? Since the whole analysis of knowledge pronounces a non-relation between the two? And it is now that we are in a position to respond.



... pronounces a non-relation between the two? And it is now that we are in a position to respond. Seeing and speaking constitute two fundamental lines of differentiation. It is in this sense that they are in non-relation. Seeing and speaking diverge. Why, at the heart of their non-relation, are they nevertheless in relation? How to explain that a relation emerges from the non-relation, to such an extent that a battle between the two is possible? You see, the answer is that the differentiation, the divergence between the two forms, is in fact the actualization of the same informal element, the relations of forces or of power. It is precisely because the relations of forces or of power are informal that they are able to be actualized in two divergent forms, which, on their own account and by themselves, are in non-relation, but which enter necessarily into an indirect relation with each other by virtue of what they actualize. So that means the last question is: but why is the fundamental seeing-speaking differentiation well-suited to the actualization of relations of forces?

The answer will be the following: it's that force is always in relation with other forces. In other words, force is multiple, but each force as element of a multiplicity already has two aspects: it has a power to be affected by other forces, and it has a power to affect other forces. The power of a force to affect other forces is what we will call the spontaneity of force; these aren't Foucault's words, but it doesn't matter since their purpose is to make things clearer... The power of force to be...

The variation of the relation of a force with other forces. Sometimes it is affected by the others, sometimes it affects the others. But, if you recall what we learned in the first term when we were analyzing knowledge, the visible appeared to us to be the form of receptivity. In this case the form, eh, no longer power. The visible was the form of receptivity under the condition of light. The statement was the form of spontaneity under the condition of language. Therefore we understand that the two powers of force, the power of spontaneity and the power of receptivity, are actualized in two differentiated forms, one of which must be a form of receptivity and the other, a form of spontaneity.

It is thus not by chance that power relations are actualized in sight and in speech. Not that power, which consists of informal relations, itself sees and itself speaks, but as Foucault says so well, power makes see and makes speak. What is power itself? Itself, the conception that Foucault makes of power is quite analogous to a kind of Kafkian conception of the burrow. Power is a burrow, a tunnel, a tunnel that runs from one point to another. Power is the mole. The tunnel, the burrow, the mole, then, from one point to another. Ultimately, power is blind and mute. But it makes see, and it makes speak. As Foucault puts it in very moving passages in "The Lives of Infamous Men," it draws us into the light briefly and compels us to speak for a moment. A complaint is lodged against me.

It is very Kafkian, think of *The Trial*. And then, in my obscure existence, literally in my infamous existence, which is to say, without reputation, I am drawn to the light, as they say: I am brought into the spotlight. I take my turn, and then I'm off. That's what power is, it draws us, it flings us into the spotlight, and then, okay, go on, you had your time. That's what relations of forces are, eh. It forces me to speak. It forces me to speak. "You will speak Tuesday at 9:00, at 10:00..." and then, afterward, I am returned to my mute existence. Someone who is thirsty for power is someone who would like to be always in the spotlight, always compelled to speak. So we have foreseen this: the colloquia ... or else the nocturnal life, the neon, you are drawn to it, good... Okay, then. Power makes speak, it makes see, it shows, it does not itself see, it shows, it does not itself speak, it compels to speak. Thus, what interests me is that... What is the question that I am asking you? ... Namely: have we answered our question well if I gather together everything that we have done since the beginning? Have we provided a response to the problem that we have, namely: what are the relations between seeing and speaking if, by themselves, they are in a non-relation? It was necessary to go beyond the knowledge axis, to



situate ourselves on the power axis, to discover the content of the power axis in order to understand how power relations, by being actualized in stratified formations, necessarily create two divergent forms, sight and speech, and how these forms therefore were in an indirect relation, even though directly there is no relation.

So I would say: when I spoke of a kind of Kantianism of Foucault, yes, yes, if I remind you that in Kant there was not at all the same problem, but an analogous problem. Kant determined a form of receptivity: space, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter that in Foucault it is light and not space. And he determined a form of spontaneity: the concept, the spontaneity of force. It doesn't matter that in Foucault, it is the statement and not the concept. What matters to me is that in Kant, the form of spontaneity, "concept," and the form of receptivity, "space-time," differed in kind. And Kant encountered the question: since space-time, on the one hand, and the concept, on the other, differ in kind, how can we explain that concepts apply to space and time? How can we explain that despite the difference in kind, there is coadaptation between the form of spontaneity, the concept, and the form of receptivity, space-time?

And Kant said: it's a great mystery. That concepts can be applied to space-time when there is a difference in kind between concepts and space-time is truly mysterious. He said: this is only possible because there is a third instance. But, you understand it right away, this third instance cannot be a form. And he said: this third instance, he called it the schema of the imagination. The schema of the imagination, about which he said: it is in our soul, the most mysterious faculty, for the schema of the imagination is on the one hand homogeneous with space and time and, on the other, homogeneous with the concept. Which yielded: space-time and the concept are heterogeneous, but there is an instance, these are two heterogeneous forms, but there is a non-formal instance that is homogeneous with each of the two. You see, it was very curious.

In effect, the schema is very curious. What is it that we call a schema? It's not the same thing as an image, it's a spatiotemporal determination, a spatiotemporal dynamism conforming to a concept. You can experiment with it, to have schemas of the imagination, it's quite fun. There was a school of psychology not too long ago that called themselves Husserlian, and all the time they did what they called thought experiments, like this, this is roughly what it consisted in, and they often used the same term of schema: one was given a concept, and then you tried to have not an image corresponding to a concept, but a schema of the concept. It's funny; try this at home, eh? For example: the concept of lion. The concept of lion is the definition, for example, of the lion in a classification of natural history. Mammal with a mane and long teeth, etc., you see? That is a concept. A lion image, you see as well what that is. But a lion schema, what is that? What spatiotemporal dynamism do you put under the word "lion"? It can vary according to.... I don't know, incidentally, to what extent it can vary, it's really quite amusing, in any case.

Ahh. And in order for you to better understand, it would be necessary to do a differential schematism, for the schematism... one that I discouraged... For the schematism is differential; compare the schema of the louse and the schema of the lion. The louse itself has a concept, for there is no object, however small it may be in nature and however noxious it may be, that doesn't have its concept. But the schema, what is the spatiotemporal dynamism of the louse? What is its manner of being in space and time? This is not part of its concept. In vain will you turn over in all directions the concept of lion, you will not find its manner of being in space and time, namely... and already I've said too much about it, what I am going to say is too much image. You begin by telling yourself: the lion sleeps all day, eh; good. Then he wakes up when evening comes, five o'clock in the evening, the lion opens his eye, he sniffs the air, and he sees if there are any antelope, and it's the lioness who hunts. Okay, all that.



Good. Try to repress what remains of images there – inside, hold on only to pure dynamisms, spatiotemporal dynamisms.

Okay, the schema. You have almost reached the schema, pure directions, pure directions in space-time. That's what it is: you are not calling to mind a particular lion, but nor are you calling to mind conceptual characters; you call to mind pure orientations or directions, dynamisms. There is a dynamism of the lion that is the most beautiful portrait of the lion. Or else you call to mind the octopus and the eagle. The octopus and the eagle. You see, you can think them as concepts, you can give yourself an image. An octopus that is familiar to you, for example, and that you particularly like. And then an eagle. The schema is neither image nor concept. The schema, the spatiotemporal dynamism, will be at once the way the eagle flies, which is not the same thing as the way a buzzard flies or a hawk flies. The way the eagle swoops down, for what counts for birds of prey is always the descent and never the rise, obviously. Or the way they soar, or the way they build nests [*fondent*]. There you have a schema. You imagine an eagle, you retain the pure spatiotemporal dynamism. That is what a schema is. Whereas the octopus is not at all like that. You cannot confuse an eagle dynamism and an octopus dynamism. The octopus isn't rapacious movement. If you think a rapacious movement in its pure state, without knowing [???], there you will have a bird of prey schema. A rapacious movement that comes from above. I would say: that is the schema of the bird of prey. That's the trick. If you think of a movement with multiple limbs, but "limbs" is already too much of an image... with multiple paths, with stuff that sticks, with a "something that sticks," you remove images as much as possible in order to extract the pure schema, that is, a way of being in space-time, and that gives you a schema. You understand?

And who did this for the octopus and the eagle? Who always defined animals by dynamic schemas? Lautréamont. Lautréamont never describes an animal, he states the dynamic movement. It's never pleasant since it always results in catastrophes, but that is a schema. Now, I am not saying that... When Kant... Not all of this is Kant, it's not Kant that I am telling you about. It is to help you understand what Kant means by schema when he tells us that a schema of the imagination is neither an image nor a concept, neither an image nor a concept, but something else, a set of spatiotemporal determinations that correspond to the concept. I would say that the schema is homogeneous with space and time since it itself consists in spatiotemporal dynamisms, but on the other hand, it is homogeneous with the concept since it corresponds to the concept itself. So that I can say: the concept, on the one hand, and space-time, on the other, differ in kind, are heterogeneous with one another, and yet the schema of the imagination is homogeneous with space-time, on the one hand, and with the concept, on the other.

That is the admirable theory of the schematism in Kant. Now, I am just saying that in Foucault, you have something similar. The visible and the enunciable are heterogeneous. They are in a non-relation. These are two forms in non-relation. But there is an informal element that will act as the cause of their setting-into-relation. Only in Foucault, it will not be the schema of the imagination, but the relations of forces or of power, and the relation of forces will be at once homogeneous with the form of sight and homogeneous with the form of the statement, even though the two forms are not uniform, which is to say, are not homogeneous, are heterogeneous. It is in this sense that the problem which we encountered at the end of our study of knowledge in Foucault finds its solution here: namely, it is power relations that explain the coadaptation of the two forms of knowledge. There you have the summation that... that I wanted to make... And here I will make a solemn appeal to you, quite solemn: is this clear? Is there anything to go back over? Because, practically speaking, we have finished – practically, I say, for in fact more will remain for us for a little while, you will understand why – we have practically finished our analysis of power in Foucault. Thus: are there any points that are still



obscure? Is there still anything that... It is necessary for our summation, just now, to have been crystal clear, which I am not sure about. It is up to you to say, eh, if there is anything to go back over, or if I can go on. It's essential because we will not go back over all this. It's now or never.

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: of immanence?

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: in the general sense of the word, which is to say... I mean... in the sense in which every person using the term "immanent cause" should be in agreement on this point, about which there is no debate. A cause is immanent when it does not need to go outside of itself in order to produce its effect, and when the effect remains within it. You see, one distinguishes... yes, so then, this leads me to some... We are making rough distinctions; there is an infinite list of causes that belongs to what is beautiful in philosophy. But in general we retain three major types of cause. In fact, many more are retained, but we will stick to three of them. Efficient cause, emanative cause, immanent cause. For philosophy is like mathematics, you won't do it if you don't learn it, and if you haven't learned it... I mean: we cannot just say whatever we like, thus it's very... it is just as precise as mathematical definitions, and we must distinguish in philosophy between what is open to debate – in what sense of debate – and what is indisputable.

This topic is part of the domain..., this is not debated, that's how it is. The efficient cause is defined thusly: it is a cause that needs to go outside of itself in order to produce its effect. It goes outside of itself to produce its effect, and its effect is external to it, which is to say, is really distinct from it. For example: God is the cause of the world. God goes outside of himself to produce the world, and the world is external to God. I would say: God is the efficient cause of the world. Emanative cause: it is a cause the effect of which is external, but which does not need to go outside of itself in order to produce it. It is a cause that remains in itself to produce its effect, but the effect is external to the cause. It will be said that the effect emanates from the cause... Transitive, that's efficient. Yes: efficient or transitive cause. Immanent cause, you see: it's a scale, it's a scale of progression. Immanent cause: the cause remains in itself to produce, and the effect that it produces is internal to it, remaining in the cause. Among these three types of causes, you have all the transitions possible, which is what makes it possible to infinitely multiply the types of causes. For example, God and the world. God and the world, to your liking: is God an efficient cause? Is he...

Take, for example, the case of an emanative cause. I would say, it's not certain incidentally, but at first glance I would say: no longer God and the world, which, from the point of view of Christianity, is an efficient or transitive cause. God creates the world. The case of an emanative cause: the spider and the silk, but as the great philosopher Hume said, what proves to me that God is not a spider? It is an important question, if God were a spider... Because if God were a spider, then from that moment the world would not be the object of an efficient cause, but the object of an emanative cause. The silk emanates from the spider. In fact, the spider remains in itself to produce... It remains in itself to produce the silk, but as for the silk, it does not remain in the spider, it forms the web. I would say: the spider is the emanative cause of the web.

The immanent cause, you see, it's not only that the cause remains in itself to produce, but that the effect remains in the cause. Spinoza is the greatest philosopher who developed the idea that between God and the world, there was a relation of immanence, that is, God remains in himself to produce the world, and the world remains in God. Plotinus, the philosopher of so-called "emanation," would say, to simplify things greatly, that God is an emanative cause, that is, that the world emanates from God, meaning that the world does not



remain in the cause. By contrast, Christianity tells us that God is an efficient cause, that is, that God does not remain in himself to produce the world and that the world does not remain in God. That is what will be called a creationist point of view.

All this to say what in general is called an “immanent cause”. And each time that I use the term “immanent cause,” verify that it conforms well to this definition, for if not, the word “immanent” is not suitable. In Foucault’s sense, but at the same time I retract that, since Foucault does not use the word “immanence,” telling us just that power and knowledge are each in the other. To translate this in terms of immanence does not seem to me to be exaggerated. Power and knowledge are each in the other, I would say, good... and I gave the reasons for why I thought that we can say that relations of forces or of power were the immanent cause of forms of knowledge.

And in effect, this means that relations of forces, which is to say, the cause... it means a little bit more than my general definition; it follows the characteristics of the general definition, but I would add that, in this precise instance, it must be understood that the cause would remain virtual without its effect, which is to say, the immanent cause will be a cause which the effect actualizes, that is, integrates and differentiates at the same time. Thus, I would say that we must now account for the general quality, the general characteristic that we have just seen determine [??] immanent cause, and further, we must add to it a more original characteristic, which is this idea of a cause undergoing actualization in its effect. Does that answer your question?

Interlocutor: the question that I asked remains, it’s the same question, but I do not agree when you say that power includes knowledge. If you say this [??] Either there is immanence [??] or there is a dialectic with the autonomy of knowledge [?]

Deleuze: Sorry, I do not understand, will you start over? Where do you see a difficulty? You tell me: I do not agree. With what do you not agree?

Interlocutor: [??]

Deleuze: [restating the question] If I say that power and knowledge both presuppose one another... Yes, if I say that?

Interlocutor: No, it’s not that. If you say that power implicates knowledge, you say that power implicates and explicates knowledge. If you are doing that, then it’s that which I do not understand [?]

Deleuze: Listen, take a word from me, change it by yourself, you’re old enough, it’s only verbal. I said “implicates” for convenience, I didn’t take [?], that has no importance.

Interlocutor: it’s not in order to dispute over a word. It is in order to understand if there is a causal relation: of the kind “power explicates knowledge,” or if there is a double causality of the kind, in the manner of [Gramsci?] [?]

Deleuze: I will say to you: okay, but the two... for me, at the same time, there is an autonomy of the two axes, knowledge power, there is an autonomy for the simple reason that these are two axes and that, moreover, they differ in kind. And at the same time, I can do nothing, things are complicated, it depends on what point of view we... If someone says to me: is there a difference in kind? I would say: yes, there is a difference in kind between power and knowledge. Therefore, there is autonomy. If someone says to me: what relation do they have with one another? I would say: they are in a relation of cause and effect, quite simply, and there is a whole sphere of the autonomy of the effect, and yet it is immanent.

So then, what does this mean? There is indeed heterogeneity between the two axes, there is a difference in kind and thus an autonomy of each axis. But at the same time the power axis would remain virtual if it did not become incarnated, if it did not become actualized in the forms of knowledge. Which does not prevent... the forms of knowledge are effects that actualize the cause – which does not prevent these effects from being autonomous, since they



integrate their own cause and differentiate their own cause. So I would say that it is both at once; it's complicated, it all depends, there is a level where there is a strict autonomy, there is another level where there is reciprocal presupposition, there is another level where there is causality. So much so that I believe none of these points of view does away with the others, it seems to me. There was a sentence that struck me as fairly representative in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, on page 98. Here you are, this strikes me as representative: "Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority", here this would be... When I say "no exteriority," it means there is immanence. "...even if they have specific roles." "Even if they have specific roles," this is difference in kind. "...and are linked together". "And are linked together," this is reciprocal presupposition. "...on the basis of their difference." Everything is contained here... There is immanence, yet autonomy, the specific function of each one,... the linking together, but notice a linking together on the basis of their difference in kind. There I believe, yes, to respond to your question that I now understand, we will thus start from what could be called the centers of power-knowledge. Yeah, I... is this something of a response?

Interlocutor: ??

Deleuze: it's contradictory for you, okay. I do not want... yes. You completely have the right to think that this doesn't work; as for me, I think it works. So if you think it doesn't work, there are two things: either it's me who doesn't work in what I am saying about Foucault, or else it is Foucault who doesn't work. I would prefer, in fact, that you think... hmm, what would I prefer? As for me, I believe you have the right, but that at this point, we could speak for a long time, and we would not convince one another, eh? Me, I do not see clearly why you see a contradiction, and then, even if there is a slight contradiction, it is more a matter for me of knowing if it thus accounts for everything he tells us about the concrete mixtures. If it contradicts itself, well... contradictions are never all that serious, eh! Me, I don't see it. I don't see it. Me, I believe that if you see a contradiction, it is because, in your mind, even if it's not yet clear, you would like for the power-knowledge relations to be posed differently, and because in fact you have in mind another position on the problem, given that it goes without saying that Foucault does not exhaust all the ways of posing power-knowledge relations. It's because you have in mind another way of posing the problem, but at this moment, this gets away from our... I believe, because personally, I see no contradiction. So then, what you say, a contradiction, would equally apply to Spinoza, it would apply to all thought of immanence because immanence has never claimed that the effect has no specificity. For Spinoza, for example, the world remains in God. God produces the world, but it is a production of immanence, thus the world remains in God who produces it. And this does not prevent there being between the world and God a difference in kind; only, Spinoza tells us, it is not a real distinction. The world is not distinct... the world... is not to be mistaken for God, but it is not really distinct from God. Spinoza will say, in his own terminology, that there is a modal distinction between the world and God, but there is no real distinction. So then, I don't know, have you read Spinoza? A little? Do you see contradictions in Spinoza?

Interlocutor: No, not at all, but precisely,

Deleuze: not at all? So then?

Interlocutor: in Spinoza, God does not implicate the world

Deleuze: but yes

Interlocutor: he explicates the world

Deleuze: and it's the same thing... and no, it's not at all the same thing! What do you mean? It is the world that implicates God and that explicates God. Once again, I will reuse my term because it is I who am inventing it: God complicates the world, and the world implicates and explicates God.



Interlocutor: You are answering on Spinoza, that's not the question

Deleuze (laughing): what a feeble argument you suddenly direct toward me

Interlocutor: I agree with your book on Spinoza. It's the relation between explication and implication.

Deleuze: how strange, what you are telling me! To complicate, by definition, is to hold together. Only God can complicate the world. No?

Interlocutor: yes

Deleuze: thus God, and this was a formula of certain authors in the Middle Ages, *Deus complicans*, it's beautiful: God complicates everything! But each of us, or indeed the world, implicates God and explicates God; or we will say that God is explicated through the world. So then, God does not explicate: he is explicated. Alright, is that okay?

Interlocutor: ?

Deleuze: God is explicated, but he does not explicate. He is explicated by way of the world, and what explicates God is the world. I say that because, in effect, for those who are not following, you have, especially around the Renaissance, but between neo-Platonism, you have there a trinity of extremely interesting notions, which are *implicare, explicare, complicare*. To complicate, to implicate, to explicate. And, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, there is an entire tradition where they develop a whole theory of complication, explication, and implication, which is very important for a logic of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and it's very beautiful. Good. Are there any other points?

Interlocutor (another or the same??): ??

Deleuze: in fact, there you have it, inevitably when I speak of Foucault, I am necessarily compelled to go a bit further. I cannot say, I cannot get a text out for you where Foucault says that there is primacy. What makes me say that everything transpires as though there were in Foucault a primacy of the statement over the visible? Several things. The principal one is the following: that there is a book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. And in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault does not speak, as he did in his previous books, he does not speak of the visible and the enunciable. However, he comes up with the purest and most complete theory of the statement in this work, and the visible disappeared, and instead of a duality between stating-seeing or enunciable-visibility, in place of such a duality, there is a duality between discursive milieu or discursive formation (to which the statement corresponds) and ...

He does not speak of the visible and the enunciable. However, he comes up with the purest and most complete theory of the statement in this work, and the visible disappeared. And instead of a duality between stating-seeing or enunciable-visibility, in place of such a duality, there is a duality between discursive milieu or discursive formation (to which the statement corresponds) and non-discursive milieu or formation. Thus, I can say that in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, visibility as positive form is placed in parentheses, and that what is not the statement is simply designated in a negative manner: non-discursive milieu. I say to myself: how can we explain this, that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* short-circuits the visible and holds onto a theory of the statement, if it is true that knowledge has two poles? It is there that I go a bit further, saying: in my view, it is because, the whole time, the statement had primacy. If the statement has primacy, we can conceive how, in a book that treats of the statement, the other pole is no longer designated except negatively, since it is not the essential pole of knowledge.

That forces me to say – at least, once I have made this hypothesis that accounts for a real problem in Foucault – it forces me to say: if it is true that the statement has primacy, why would it have primacy? Why would the statement in language have primacy over the visible in light? Thus, I am again forced to go a little further and to say that yes, there would be one way of answering: ultimately, the visible is dependent on the statement, one sees only what one



says, this would be a first hypothesis to verify. That is, the visible is a simple product of language. Okay. I say to myself... so perhaps some of you could say: well yes, this hypothesis is sufficient, it's good, it suits me. As for me, it doesn't suit me. Why? Because then it would be necessary to dispense with the texts, the infinite number of passages in Foucault that have always posited an irreducibility of the visible to the enunciable. These are two irreducible forms, and I do not see how... He never went back on these texts. Certain ones, like the text on Magritte, *This Is Not a Pipe*, are late texts... Thus, it is impossible to construe the visible as dependent on the enunciable. However, when I say "the statement has primacy over the visible," when I say that, I am not at all saying that the visible is reduced. Having primacy over does not mean letting oneself be reduced. So all that I am committed to is trying to say how...

Insofar as, on the other hand, the function of language is the production of statements, a matter of producing statements, I can say: the enunciable is the form of spontaneity of language. Hence the importance of the difference that Foucault made – this was the object of our analyses at the beginning – the statement differs in kind, is not the same thing as a phrase or a proposition, for by [?] the statement in its difference with the phrase or proposition, I believe that Foucault wants to reveal the form in which language exercises a spontaneity. So then, if you grant me this, though it is a lot to ask, I am aware, if you grant me this, there are no longer so many difficulties. For I can say: if the statement has primacy, it is because the statement is a form of spontaneity, whereas the visible is only a form of receptivity, and it is up to the form of spontaneity to determine the form of receptivity. The form of spontaneity, what is spontaneity? It is the act of determination. Whereas: what is receptivity? It is the form of the determinable; the receptive is that which is determinable. Therefore, to say "the statement has primacy" is to say: the statement is determinant, the visible is only the determinable. Does that clarify things? Is that clarifying?

Interlocutor: [??] I do not understand why affecting has primacy over the power to be affected [??]

Deleuze: that is a new difficulty, but I would say: at the level of relations of forces, there can no longer be any primacy; the primacy is of one form over another form, and relations of forces do not pass through forms. Thus, there is no primacy, or at least, we will see that there is a primacy, but in the relations of forces, it is a third element, which is neither the power to affect nor the power to be affected, but which will be something else. Is that okay? Is all that clear?

But I think it may be the impression of many of you that this year, what we have done from the beginning seems sometimes extremely abstract. So that bothers me a lot because, obviously, that's most unfortunate, and it shouldn't be like that. So I would like to add a formula for those who find that what we are doing remains abstract. [?]

I believe that to make all this concrete, we must take our bearings. The first milestone, the first landmark regarding knowledge, is that things must tell you something. This must speak to you. If this tells you nothing... I am speaking... when I say "This must speak to you," I mean by that: it is not all about the understanding, the understanding is abstract. But if something speaks to you, then we are in the concrete. What should speak to you when it comes to the analysis of knowledge is: in what situation do we see clearly, do we realize that seeing and speaking are not the same thing? In that case, it is concrete. That is a concrete point. Speaking is not tied to seeing, but between seeing and speaking there is a battle, there is a difference in kind to such an extent that, once again, I see what I do not speak about, and I speak about what I do not see. That is very concrete, it accounts for the status of the audiovisual. And I was telling you: the whole effort of contemporary cinema, in one of its aspects, is to widen these differences, these divergences between seeing and speaking. So I hold onto that. I would say: if there were a concrete source of all the analyses that I have



proposed to you regarding knowledge, that is, regarding the interrelation of seeing and speaking, that would be it. What takes place between seeing and speaking?

For what we have done regarding power, then... If this does not speak at all to you, it's that either I have failed or else it's you who do not respond to a theme, which can happen, it's a theme that literally says nothing to you. In that case, then, I am impotent, I can only do something insofar as there is a complicity, that is, insofar as this speaks to you. When it comes to power, I would say the same thing. What is very concrete, the concrete source of all the analyses of power, what would it be? It would be this idea that, in all our experiences, even when we do not realize it, we encounter power; that is, power is always an ensemble of micro-power, and it is these micro-powers that Foucault purports to analyze. But the idea that we constantly encounter power... this is something simple enough, yes, the idea that I cannot cross the street or that I cannot stop my car without there possibly being a cop... with a ticket..., but something this simple is enough to make everything concrete for me. We ceaselessly encounter power. Okay, then, if our life is circumscribed by micro-powers that we exercise and that are exercised upon us, the power to affect and the power to be affected, what do these relations of power consist in, etc.?

And finally, the third concrete point: is it true that these relations of power are like a fabric that accounts, for us [*chez nous*], for the relations between seeing, when we see, and speaking, when we speak? It seems to me that that is what's concrete. I have the impression, then, that if these themes, these three very concrete, very simple themes... That's not philosophy, it's like points of reference in our lived experience. I would say: in lived experience... there you are, the lived experience that Foucault... if one has no complicity with this lived experience, then you might indeed understand everything that I say, but it will remain abstract. These three points of lived complicity, if I feel ... affinity for Foucault, it is because I have participated in these three points – not in the same manner, surely, but in a different manner. If I had not participated in these three points in the name of a kind of lived experience, it's obvious that I would do something other than a course on Foucault. So then, if I try to restate... In your lived experience, you must have a certain problem, even if it is spontaneous or involuntary, a certain problem: what happens between seeing and speaking? I understand very well: you can be extremely intelligent, extremely creative, all that you like, and your problems might be elsewhere. I would say: what is certain is that Foucault was not the only one, even in art, since, once again, all of contemporary cinema plays on this chasm between seeing and speaking, this “between”, “what is there between seeing and speaking?”

I would say, for example, if you take another important philosopher: in Merleau-Ponty, you will never find a problem of this type, since for him speaking is linked to seeing. It is a very specific realization of certain situations of vision and certain situations of speech. If you say to me on this point: why does Foucault valorize these situations of vision and speech that announce a hiatus between seeing and speaking? I will tell you: ah, well no, that amounts to saying “why does Foucault say what he says?” It's because he is Foucault, I don't know why, it's what he needed to say and wanted to say, so... That should be the first complicity. The second complicity is that micro-powers form a fabric which we ceaselessly encounter in our lives. That is the experience that Foucault calls the experience of the infamous man.

The infamous man is the one who, like a fly or a butterfly, collides ceaselessly..., it is fairly close to the Kafkian experience of the offices in *The Castle*, always an office next to the office, okay... A whole system of micro-powers. So then, good, for me, I try to... I try to translate it through my experience. It's not a personal experience. “Lived experience” does not mean “a personal experience,” it means “what we notice in life”. For me, I am struck by... so here I am no longer doing Foucault, I am struck..., so I told you this, in the most everyday experience of life, how one jumps from one micro-power to another. I was telling you about



the distribution of micro-powers in a household, eh. When a man comes home in the evening or when a woman comes home in the evening: “what a face you’re making,” says one to the other. “Ah, what a face you’re making.” It’s funny: “what a face you’re making,” good, which is to say, the summons to speak, or the summons to show, explain yourself. I was telling you this last year because I live this, and it is necessary that you also live this or else it will be abstract. I was telling you: for me, what strikes me in life is not at all that people do not manage to express themselves, but that they are forced to express themselves when they have nothing to say. And that is power.

What is the power of television? What is the power of the newspapers [?]. Okay, he calls up some poor guy and says to him: “express yourself, talk a little about your opinion.” It’s an alarming thing that in disciplinary societies, we are invited morning, noon, and night to give our opinion, but on stuff... [??] or not often in any case, not in the form of that question there, it’s... Good, that is a micro-power. When I say to you: power makes see and makes speak, you will be forced to speak, I would say, at that moment, it is not only the television. And in fact, in households... and it’s compulsory, I am not saying that it is bad. How can we do otherwise? To keep quiet isn’t good, it ends up being oppressive. There is no escape from all that, but it’s the slop of lived experience. If I come home tired, I claim the right not to speak. It is delicious to not speak. But it’s fantastic: to have no opinion! Ah, but it’s a joy! So then, what are people in power? They are those who do not know that it is a joy to have no opinion. To have no opinion, it’s not at all to be like the guy in the public opinion polls who responds “I have no opinion,” eh? That one there has an opinion. It’s indeed something else. Nor is it to maintain an interiority. To not have an opinion is to empty yourself [*faire le vide*]. It is to empty yourself. And emptying yourself is precisely – we are getting to what I still have to say – it is a manifestation of resistance. When not having an opinion is simply not having an opinion; these requests for information are obnoxious.

But when not having an opinion consists in saying “on that point I go blank because it doesn’t concern me or doesn’t interest me,” alas, that can also be bad, that can be to completely deliver oneself over to power, it can also be that; everything depends on... which means that all that is... I am making an appeal to experiences.... So if there are some among you who do not have or are not in touch with this type of lived experience, which seems to me to be at the root of Foucault’s philosophy, then in effect this course runs the risk of not offering you very much. And that can happen, the years change, we change subjects every year, it may very well be that one year, what I have to say speaks to you and, another year, it doesn’t speak to you. But what I am trying to explain is that there are always two operations, two simultaneous operations when you have the ... patience to listen to someone; you must indeed understand according to concepts, but you must also have a sphere of lived experience that intersects with what it is that the concepts are about.

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: um, I don’t know... There is no specific relation, but Foucault belongs to the many who have an admiration... It goes without saying that Foucault was led to intersect with Artaud on many levels, because he had necessarily encountered him already regarding *History of Madness* and all throughout the period when Foucault was trying to ask himself at best what madness meant. Yes, yes, that’s right. There is a relation, generally to... What interests Foucault? Who are the great authors that Foucault admired between the end of the nineteenth century and the... Well, there is the whole group of Raymond Roussel, Brisset, there are the madmen of language, there is Artaud, there is Mallarmé, these are Foucault’s great authors. There is Heidegger, we will see why. Yes, he knew Artaud admirably well. Did Artaud exert an influence on him? I do not think so. But there was love and admiration for Artaud, that seems clear to me.



Question: inaudible

Deleuze: yeah, but then, you understand, you bring me to concepts that are already too complicated, namely, what Artaud will call the void, whereas for me, I wanted to say something quite simple about lived experience, without justifying the words, namely, I only wanted to say: if you want to understand by means of concepts, you must always combine some lived complicities together with them. If you have no lived complicities, it's not your fault, it's because your experience is structured differently, and now, in effect, everything that I am telling you will appear to be extremely abstract. I believe. I believe. That is why I am telling you that we must always let ourselves go along with someone when we listen to them. It's complicated: a double attention is necessary, an attention according to concepts, because if you content yourselves with the lived... you must perpetually refer to some life experience, otherwise it won't work. Notions should always be very, very difficult. The correlative life experience should be as simple as a child. That is why examples are fun, they are always about stuff that is absolutely [?], totally simple.

Question: [??]... That might be turned around, since it is possible that the more a man of power is deaf, blind, and mute, the more it is possible also to make him speak.

Deleuze: Yes, but [?] you know, that's normal.... What you say is very true, it's because the man of power is not taken, is not exhausted by the relations of power. Moreover, power relations do not pass between men: as soon as there is man, there is form. Which is to say: the man of power is necessarily led to himself speak and to himself show or to himself see; he is necessarily led because he participates in the effect, participates entirely in knowledge. It is insofar as he presents himself as knowing that the man of power speaks and sees. And in effect, concretely there are only mixtures of power-knowledge. The political man invokes a form of knowledge. He does not invoke the fact of having power, he always invokes a form of knowledge, and it's insofar as he invokes a form of knowledge.... This is what I was telling you: power and knowledge are strictly inseparable in the concrete. It's for that reason, and it's insofar as he unfailingly participates in knowledge, that the political man, as you say, is necessarily also the one who speaks and the one who sees. "I see you," eh? You look at the posters there. He watches us, he watches us in the name of a radiant future, he sees and, I don't need to tell you, he speaks. But, if they see and they speak, it's insofar as they are terms or elements taken up in relations of power, and it's insofar as they are also forms – they take care of their form, as one says – forms taken up in relations of knowledge.

Question: ?

Deleuze: How does this come about? Well, listen, I am done for, you have struck a fatal blow against me (laughs), since I thought I'd been ceaselessly explaining why power and knowledge were strictly inseparable. This comes about because power and knowledge are strictly inseparable.

Question: [?] an example?

Deleuze: not only in the concrete but in the abstract, but in two different ways. In the concrete, because experience presents us only with mixtures of power-knowledge. In the abstract, because if power relations are causes, they are immanent causes, and their effect, that is, the forms of knowledge, are internal to the power relations themselves; there is no exteriority. And yet we are going to see the contrary in just a bit, but... [?] He says "there is no exteriority" because there is nothing but exteriority, thus we cannot say that there is exteriority. At any rate, we are going to see this in just a bit to finish you off.

Question: ?

Deleuze: the what?

Question: the power about which we are speaking is never mine [?]



Deleuze: everything depends on what you understand by “mine”. If that means “that of a person who is me,” then no, power is never mine. If you mean “of a singularity that is in me,” then in that case, power is yours. Which is to say, we have not yet broached this because here, too, it must be concrete: the person – or the individual, it’s already not the same thing, but let us identify them – the person or the individual, on the one hand, and the singular points or singularities, on the other, are two completely different instances. For example: we are not leaving behind our story, thus, for example, I take my chalk. Those who would respond to one of these names, see me in just a bit. There you are... The names there, eh. There you have a form. It’s a gentleman, eh. There you are, that’s a form. Let us say that this is an individual. He says “me”. Good, it’s a form, [?]. This form, I would suppose, it’s a supposition that this is an envelope of singularities. [?]. These singularities do not exist outside of him, they belong to him. But it is another domain. It is another domain.

What are these singularities? For example, you see someone, you see someone and you say to yourself: oh, that’s weird, that guy there, everything is organized, for example, around his neck, he stands like that; and there you have the singularities of perception. You will do it with the neck in this case, though it’s not necessarily true for everyone; there are some who have a neutral neck, there are some who have a very pronounced neck, as if their entire face was organized around their neck. You will say: good! It is a singularity of [?], you remember, and then you see it at the same time – and you do not understand – enter into a rage. With all the characteristics, let us say, of a paranoid rage. A bizarre guy. I will deliberately take an example, another trait that is not physical, a psychological trait. You will put “other singularity,” note them down. You make the table of singularities of someone, it’s an innocent game, disinterested and innocent. “Neck,” “explosive anger”.

And then, after his anger, he says to you “goodbye,” and you say to yourself, “what a funny way to wave your hand”. You see, it’s bizarre. This time it is a gesture, as one says, a gesture belonging only to him. Why we love or hate people is never because of their form, eh, but because of the singularities that we have noticed in them. I once knew someone whose way of saying goodbye seemed so mysterious to me that I was never able to decipher it. For... it’s important. For, when he said goodbye, he made a whole series of movements, so it was a very surprising spatiotemporal dynamism. He arm was down along his leg. First moment of dynamism: he raised his arm; his arm remained stiff, but he brought it there. And his arm still remained stiff. And he opened his hand and invited you to slide yours next to his, but he touched the tip of your fingers.

Okay, when one stumble across this, one doesn’t forget. Third singularity. I would say: we have a form, which we can call at once... we have a form... qua individual, we have a corporal form, which I would say is the organic form. We have a physical form. We have a moral form. Finally, the best among us have a metaphysical form. Many forms, eh. It is as a function of these forms that I say: my body, my soul, me, etc. I would say: that is the domain of forms. But there is something else. Ultimately, the forms are packets or envelopes of singularities; we envelop singular points that exist only in us, and that nevertheless are not us. So then, there is such singularity: ah! It comes from my grandfather. It planted itself there, it planted itself in me. Ultimately, we are a packet... I would like for you to understand. Here too: either this speaks to you, but you must experience it like that and not force it. If you don’t experience it like that, you experience it differently, and that will be great too. [?] Packets of singularities, a packet of foreign bodies. As for me, I experience myself much like that: I am a packet of foreign bodies. I look like a self [*moi*], then, I have all the appearances of a polished self, but it is absolutely an envelope of foreign bodies; there is only that, there are only foreign bodies. So, we envelope a certain number – we don’t have infinitely many of them – of foreign bodies.



For example, think of the way that Proust describes Baron de Charlus; it is a marvel when he writes, in an unforgettable passage, “Charlus’s voice enveloped a brood of young girls”. Charlus’s voice, when Charlus suddenly begins to speak piercingly, Charlus’s voice enveloped a brood of young girls. These are the singularities of Charlus. Twelve, twenty, forty young girls haunt Charlus’s voice. There are animals in us, but not animals as forms. There are animals as singularities in us, which is not the same thing as a form; no one is ever a cow among men, but there are men who have bovine singularities.

So I am talking about the set of singularities that I shelter in my bosom, and it’s indeed of a different nature than my forms, my body, my soul, etc. And we will find here the domain of forms and the domain of relations of forces. The relations of forces and the relations from one singular point to another. What relation is there between such a singularity – the neck – and such an explosion of anger? There is a relation of forces there. That would be an example of power. I would say: literally speaking, what are you? It all depends on what you call “yourself,” what you call “me”. Yes, we can still say “me,” mustn’t get indignant, mustn’t say that you’ll no longer say “me,” we must speak like everyone else. We readily say “the sun rises” even though the sun does not rise, eh, it’s the earth that turns, but we continue to say “the sun rises”; there is no reason to change, no reason to say it less, it is of no importance. A certain number of people know that there is no self, but we will continue to talk about the self, because the self is precisely a habit; so we stick to our habits. It’s not that we have the habit of saying “me” [*moi*], it’s the self [*le moi*] that is a habit. I am habituated to myself, so the self is that of habit.

Well, but what am I? One can live like that, but what am I? I am a fabric of singularities. A fabric of singularities, and then my physical or psychical forms, which are curves that unite these singularities. If you experience yourself like that, first, life will become much more pleasant to you. If you experience yourself as an integral curve, who traipses about and encircles singularities of another nature, yes, you can decide that... in any case, you don’t need to force yourself. Either what I am saying speaks to you or it doesn’t, and you say to yourself: he’s crazy. It’s a good criterion because if you say to yourself [?] or he’s crazy, if you tell yourself that, it’s because you don’t have... and this is not at all a reproach, you don’t have this lived complicity when it comes to this year. Next year, it may be that I am speaking about something else with which you have a lived complicity. If what I am saying to you sounds very confusing, since here I am speaking only about this structure of lived experience, if this speak to you, then yes, now everything that I have been recounting since the beginning makes sense, that is, you can no longer consider it to be abstract, it’s not abstract. We must simply be sensitive to this, I believe...

From the point of view of concepts, it becomes quite an affair: to give a status to singularities, to give a status to the integrals that pass through the neighborhood of the singularities.... Ultimately, the integral curve will have as its product: me. And the curve encircles something quite different than me. The curve surrounds the constitutive singularities. You see, then, there may be one there that comes from a grandfather,... that is, belongs to a genetic line. There is another one there that comes to me, for example, from a relationship with a friend.... This would be an acquired singularity. There is another one... that was created by me, but which me? In any case, we are constituted by singularities. What is called a character, then, is an average of someone’s singularities. One always takes an average of singularities. So one says: ah, well yes, he usually gets angry. That’s not the singularity; the singularity is the precise circumstance of a single rage, which in a certain way contains all the others. That is the singularity. If you take an average where you conclude “ah, well yes, I am irascible,” then you are in the domain of forms, no longer in the domain of singularities, of punctual singularities.



But once again, if this does not speak to you, that's fine. If this does speak to you, that's great, you live like that. If this does not speak to you, that's very good too, you live differently.

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: ah yes, I will reply to you right away... because I was assuming... your remark is very fair, I am assuming that the other aspect goes [a little without saying?] since, for everyone, power consists in affecting others. What is more original is Foucault's idea that being affected by others is just as much a part of power. Precisely, and this corresponds, to reply to someone who spoke to me a bit earlier, this corresponds precisely to Nietzsche's idea, namely, that being dominated is just as much the will to power as being dominant. That is absolutely... it's the transcription by Foucault of the Nietzschean idea.

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: oh completely! We consider the two sides, once it has been said that the two sides only approximately form a sort of dual distinction; for what matters far more are the thousand ways of being dominated and the thousand ways of being dominant, which is to say, it's the multiplicity that counts much more than the [?].

Question: inaudible

Deleuze: I understand, yes, I understand. I would say... I would distinguish... I would not say "open self" and "closed self," for at the level of the open [*l'ouvert*], there is no longer a self; at the level of the open, there are castings and distributions of singularities, there is no longer anything that resembles a self. ... And here, too, you understand, I have always been... I do not understand, there is something that I do not understand. It's when one does national philosophy, when one construes philosophy in terms of nationality. [?] that Nietzsche [?], oh well yes, the Germans, their philosophy is bizarre, they think like this, here are the great traits... otherwise all the others [?]. Only Nietzsche knows how to speak of English thought, German thought, French thought without succumbing to the grotesque. He doubtless had a method... And one of the things that seems important to me is that, in these national characteristics of philosophies, the French always floundered... no, I'm wrong to say "floundered through" [*patanger*] because that sounds pejorative, and it's not at all that... they have always evolved through the self [*évolué dans le moi*]. They made the self into a philosophical category. To such an extent that we... [?] we are always told that it begins with Descartes, "me, I think," and of course it's not the ordinary self, as we know and are taught, it's not the ordinary self.

And bizarrely, it is expressed in the form: "me, I think". The Germans, they... so the Germans do not remain at "me, I think," which they did not find clear; they require a pure form. A pure form: the I. And the difference between the self [*le moi*] and the I is that the self is strictly constituted, but the I is the pure constituent. The Germans raise themselves up to the foundation, they can only breathe [?]. ... The English, it's very curious. You know how one can recognize an English thinker? And I ask myself how. In the case of the French and the Germans, there would be means of responding. But the English [?] because they are philosophers who are immediately recognizable in that, for them, the "I" means nothing. And is it by accident that they are the same ones who take as their philosophical method such and such lived experience when I say such and such word?... This was the founding act of English philosophy: I say a word – hence the attachment to language from the beginning of their philosophy – I say a word: what lived experience can I exhibit, can I show as corresponding to this word? So...

Lived experience. This was the founding act of English philosophy: I say a word – hence the attachment to language from the beginning of their philosophy – what lived experience can I exhibit, can I show as corresponding to this word? So one says to them, "I"... – "What do you mean? Explain to me, show me!". So, obviously, [?] what corresponds to "I" cannot be shown. The English say: okay, that does not interest us anymore; it's cut short. You notice



that there is no discussion. For the self [*le moi*], they are even more cunning; it's not that they say that it's a word emptied of meaning; they say: ah yes, "me," one can say "me," only there you are, "me" is a habit. It is a habit, a custom. You realize, then, as an operation, how contrarian they are! What is for the Germans the most sacred foundation... [?] "Yes, the self, it is a manner of speaking, yes, the self is a collection of states that are associated with one another according to certain rules. Oh well yes, one can still say 'me,' but only if one sees there nothing other than a habit."

So that is very curious. It is a [?] that French philosophy has never digested. Never ever. It has never been able to do it... Hence the most cheerful thing in colloquia is the encounter between a French philosopher and an English philosopher. The English philosophers, then, are masters in the art of saying: "what is it that you have just said? That does not mean anything, it is nonsense!" Whereas to say "that is nonsense" is not a German or French argument. The Germans have other arguments. "You contradict yourself," that is a French argument. For the Germans, it's not that, they would have other arguments, eh, what would they have? I don't know well. "You contradict yourself" is a great French argument. Whereas to say "what you say is nonsense", that's something else. There are national characteristics of philosophers... [?]. Ah yes, so as for me, I believe that there is no self at the level of the open, the open implies the dissolution of the self. So what one might call the open self is the self that, opening itself, releases its singularities and then dies. It is absolutely like a flower... like a seed, eh, when it releases its spores... And there you are, yes, that is what I wanted to say: we are seeds, eh, we are seeds, full of spores. So then, in good moments... [?]

Interlocutor: for me, I think of it differently, I understand it as [?] open like a door onto the world [?]

Deleuze: If you like, if you like, but we can add something else to make it vary a little (laughter). Good: we're cracking up; in fact, what, then, would it mean "to crack up" [*s'éclater*]? The self who cracks up? Surely, then, it cracks up in very bad ways because there is only one way of cracking up, which is philosophy...

Certain singularities of Foucault are going past us in what I am telling you... It's... and even if it mingles with other singularities, it doesn't matter. Yes. But at any rate, let us move on.

That is all that I wanted to say about the conditions for finding a little bit of [?] because it may not work out afterwards.

Question: ?

Deleuze: (laughs) we do not know! So then, perhaps that means there will be no more difficulty with what I believe is an important point, which is the necessity, when it comes to terminology, of distinguishing between two terms that you find fairly frequently in Foucault. These two terms are the outside, on the one hand, and the exterior or exteriority, on the other. What I mean is that on this topic, Foucault never gives a rigorous definition; it is thus up to us as readers to see how these two terms are distributed, for I have the feeling – and this will be decisive with regard to everything that remains for us to do – I have the strong feeling that these two terms do not mean the same thing, and that Foucault does not use them in an identical sense. When he speaks of the exterior, what is it a question of? I believe that the words "exterior" or "exteriority" in Foucault always refer to forms. There are at once forms of exteriority and an exteriority of forms, an exteriority between forms. Forms are external to one another, and at the same time, each form is a form of exteriority. For example, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 120-123, Foucault explains in what sense history is a systematic form of exteriority. Form of exteriority. What does this mean, "form of exteriority"? For Foucault, and this is one of the original points of his thought, every form is of exteriority, but what does that mean, "every form is of exteriority"? It means that it is not like in Kant, who



distinguishes a form of exteriority – space – and a form of interiority – time; in Foucault, there is no form of interiority, every form is of exteriority. But why? What are forms? As we saw, it is light as form of the visible, language as form of the statement.

Good. In what sense are these forms of exteriority? It is because no form contains that of which it is the form. In this sense, these are not forms of interiority. The role of the form is the following: that which it informs, that to which it refers, is dispersed or disseminated – I am forced to say “in it”. In fact, it is necessary to speak properly, it becomes so complicated. If forms are indeed always exterior, it is because that to which they refer exists only as dispersed, disseminated, through [*sous*] this form. The form is exterior because it is fundamentally dispersion or dissemination. For example: language as form contains phrases and propositions and words... That is true. But it does not contain statements. Foucault never says “language contains statements,” he always says: statements are disseminated, dispersed in language. In other words, language is the form of interiority of words, phrases, and propositions, but it is not the form of interiority of statements; it is a form of exteriority in relation to statements, for it is in language or through language that statements are dispersed or disseminated, and it belongs to the essence of the statement to be dispersed or disseminated. Likewise, light can be said to contain things, quality, states of affairs [*états de choses*], but it does not contain visibilities. We have seen the differences between things and states of affairs, etc., it does not contain visibilities. Visibilities are, as Foucault tells us, a second light, made of shimmerings, reflections, etc. that exist only as dispersed through the first light; this is the Goethean conception in the pure state. In other words, light is a form of dispersion, of dissemination, and thereby a form of exteriority. Thus, for Foucault, every form will be a form through [*sous*] which what it conditions is dispersed or disseminated.

You see: hence this use of the word “exteriority” tied to form. I would add that forms are not only forms of exteriority, but: there is exteriority between forms. Forms are not internal to one another, and the form of the visible is external to the form of the enunciable. Speaking and seeing differ in kind, there is a chasm between the two, there is a hiatus between the two; in short, the two forms are exterior. There you are, this allows us to fix the use of the word “exteriority”. It should be said that I see externally [*à l'extérieur*], I speak externally, and between seeing and speaking, there is exteriority. Foucault summarizes that every form is exterior by saying: history – history being fundamentally the history of forms – history is the systematic form of exteriority. So much for exteriority.

You encounter another word, another word in Foucault, which is “the outside”. This word is borrowed from Blanchot. It is not without relation to what Heidegger, following Rilke, called the Open, with a capital O. It is good to remark that a French philosopher from the same period as Heidegger fundamentally developed a theme of the open, and that is Bergson. And if there were a possible comparison to be made between Heidegger and Bergson, I believe that it would be at this level, the conception of the open in both. In any case, in Foucault, he retains the theme of the outside, not that of the open, but once again, these are two closely neighboring themes. And what concerns me is the difference between the outside and the exterior in Foucault. For example, he will entitle an article paying homage to Blanchot “The Thought of the Outside,” and you feel right away the theme of “the thought of the outside” – there is no need to read the article at this point, no need yet – you sense right away that this will be a text trying to explain that thought is not at all defined by an interiority, but that thought only exists in a relation with the Outside, capital O, the thought of the Outside. Good.

Now, what is the outside? Should we consider it to be a simple synonym for exteriority? Not at all, and this will be decisive for everything that will follow. I would say in the first place that it seems to me, according to all the uses of the word “outside” in Foucault, that the outside no longer concerns form – exteriority concerns forms – the outside no longer concerns form,



but it concerns forces. In what way? Forces come from the outside. That is the element of force. A force comes always from the outside. One force always affects another, or is affected by it, from the outside. Forces have no other element than the outside. Forces have only the outside. There is no interiority to force. Perhaps there is an interiorization of force – though afterwards, following a very complex process – but there is no interiority of force. And to designate this non-interiority of force, Foucault will make use of the word “outside”. So what is this outside that is not to be conflated with the exteriority of forms? Here is where it gets complicated. For I can say: the outside... For I can say as a first approximation: the outside qualifies the relation of forces, the relation of a force with another force. Which amounts to saying once again: a force affects other forces from the outside, it is affected by other forces from the outside. It is not false, though we will see that it is insufficient. If I remained at this level, I could say something: power comes from the outside, and returns to the outside. I will not conflate the outside with the external world – that is a solemn declaration since, from session to session, starting now, we will be led to dig into this idea, that the outside is not to be reduced to, or conflated with, any exteriority. If it is necessary to find a formula in order to remember, even if it is only to remember, I would say that the outside is more distant than any external world. The form of exteriority designates dissemination or dispersion in Foucault, but the outside expresses pure distance. Pure distance, the distance more distant than any external world: this will be called the outside.

If you ask me: but what is it? For the moment, we know absolutely nothing about it. What will Foucault do with it? How will he make use of this notion “the outside”? I am just trying to situate it, to situate it in a [?]. The outside is more distant than any external world, so that I could not say of any external world or of any form of exteriority, I could not say “that is the outside”. The outside is beyond all exteriority. Further away than exteriority, there is the outside. It becomes mysterious. The outside was already mysterious in Blanchot. If we do not start from there, then in any case we will not be able to understand. But I would say indeed that saying this does not suffice for understanding. I am just saying that the exigency of the outside is to be more distant than any external world, than all exteriority.

Good, but then... The relation of forces, where the forces come always from the outside and affect each other from the outside – we have seen what this was, that it is expressed in a diagram. You remember: the diagram is the exposition of a relation of forces corresponding to a stratified formation. I would already say that if the forms, if the stratified forms are forms of exteriority, then for its part, the diagram plunges into the outside, the relation of forces. I would say that the relation of forces is, how to put it, the outside of a stratified formation. It is the outside of a historical formation. What I mean is that a historical formation has nothing outside it, nor is there anything beneath it – here we must take a great deal of precaution, it has nothing beneath it, nothing outside it. Why? It is itself a form of exteriority; how would a form of exteriority have something external to it? It has nothing outside it, but it has an outside. The outside of the formation is the set of relations of forces that govern [*régissent*] it, that determine [*régissent*] this formation, which is to say, that are incarnated in it. The set of relations of forces that are incarnated, that are actualized in a historical formation – for example, the disciplinary diagram that is actualized in modern societies, in the modern formations – is such that this diagram is the outside of the formation. It is not outside the formation – you see that I save my immanence, for it is first and foremost not outside the formation –, but it itself constitutes the outside of the formation.

Thus, the diagram plunges into the outside. Let’s take a closer look. This will perhaps led us further into the layers of the outside. A diagram, that is, an exposition of relations of forces – for example, the diagram of our modern formations, the disciplinary diagram, as we have seen. I warned that there are as many diagrams as one would like, that we must not let ourselves



be taken in by the text of Foucault, which speaks of the diagram as reserved for disciplinary societies. There are as many diagrams as you want. I remind you that in our analyses that I would have liked to be concrete, we saw numerous diagrams; we even invented, at our own risk and peril, a diagram of primitive societies, the relations of forces such as they are presented in networks of alliance.

Good, the alliances of primitive societies, the networks of alliance of primitive societies, this would be a diagram. Next, I announced that Foucault, in his last books, discovered a Greek diagram. The Greek diagram, the relations of forces upon which the forms of the Greek city-state will depend, and from which they will result, are strangely, according to Foucault, agonistic relations, which is to say, relations of competition between free agents; that is a diagram of power, and in a certain manner the forms of the Greek city-state depend upon it. There is a feudal diagram, there is a diagram of sovereignty, the one which we have analyzed. There is a diagram of discipline; as we have seen, it is the one that is defined as imposing whatever task on small multiplicities and managing life in extensive multiplicities. It is a diagram of forces. From this, there results our modern societies, so-called disciplinary societies, by contrast to societies of sovereignty. I would say: the disciplinary societies in Europe, in Europe, the disciplinary societies followed societies of sovereignty, the hinge point being established around Napoleon. And the passage from societies of sovereignty to societies of discipline, that is, the diagrammatic mutation, the changing of diagrams taking place around Napoleon. Good.

If you understand that, I will say that the diagram, which is to say, the exposition of relations of forces, can only be grasped in a double relation with something else. On the one hand, a diagram of forces is in relation with the stratified formation that results from it, or if you prefer, of which it is the immanent cause; this is not such a problem. The disciplinary relations of forces are incarnated in formal institutions, in formalized institutions that we have previously seen (prison, factory, school, etc.). Thus, a diagram of forces is always in relation with the stratified formation that results from it; or if you prefer, the map, the strategic map is always in relation with the archives that result from it.

Good. But at the same time, a diagram is related to the preceding diagram, in relation to which it marks a mutation. Which is to say, there is nothing beneath [*en-dessous*] the strata; but on the underside of [*par-dessous*] the strata, a diagram communicates with the preceding diagram. Why? Because, as we have seen, every diagram is a distribution of singularities. A distribution of singularities that is incarnated in the formation. Thus, there is no first diagram, no more than there is a last diagram. Every diagram is always the mutation of a preceding diagram. Which is to say, a second roll of the dice. Every diagram is by definition a second roll of the dice, or a third, or a fourth. There is no first roll of the dice. There is no first diagram. So that every diagram is in relation with what follows from it, but also in relation with the preceding diagram of which it is the mutation... or in relation to which it performs a new distribution of singular points. The relations of forces corresponding to societies of sovereignty are not the same as the relations of forces corresponding to disciplinary societies; diagrams must be equated to two dice rolls that give solutions, that give different combinations.

So perhaps you understand better: every diagram comes from the outside. Every diagram comes from the outside: which is to say, one diagram does not follow from the preceding one, but is in relation with the preceding one... I would say to you: it's not a chain of diagrams, they are separated from each other by the formations that each one determines. There is no chain of diagrams, but there is perpetually the second... the third diagram links back up with the second from the very fact that it performs a new distribution of singularities. The fourth links back up with the third. It is a series of re-linkages where the givens are as though reset, a



new roll of the dice. They are partial re-linkages. The outside is the element of the castings of dice throws, dice throws coming from the outside.

Thus, it is no longer enough to say, as I said at the beginning.... Here are the three fundamental propositions regarding the outside, in order to understand this quite strange notion.

Firstly, the outside is something other than the external world and every form of exteriority. The outside is more distant; the outside is distance in its pure state, that is, a distance that can never be approached. It is not a relative distance, but an absolute distance. Thus, the outside is more distant than any external world.

Second proposition: the outside is the element of forces and their relations. Force comes from the outside, forces are affected from the outside, and thereby it is the element of the diagram; the diagram is the outside of historical formations. It is not outside the historical formation, it is the outside of the historical formation that corresponds to it or that follows from it.

Third proposition: the diagram itself comes from the outside. For the diagram is multiple, and each diagram corresponds to a drawing [*tirage*]; thus, each diagram is a reshuffling [*retirage*] since there is no first diagram, and the diagrams are ceaselessly shuffled [*brassé*] from the outside.

Oh really?! For the moment this story is very abstract, but remember, I would add, let us always return to this example: casting of singularities, integral curve that passes through the neighborhood of the singularities, of the singular points. You recall that this was our famous thing about *azert*, as an example of a statement. The statement *azert*. Which is to say, the statement of the series of letters, singularities, in the order they take on a French typewriter. A Z E R T, Foucault told us: A Z E R T do not form a statement, but *azert* is a statement when I state the order of the letters on a French typewriter. And we have seen that this amounted precisely to saying: the casting of singularities, a casting of singularities is not a statement, but on the other hand the curve that passes through their neighborhood is a statement; and Foucault told us therefore that the statement is always in relation with something else or with an outside. The outside of the statement: that is the singularities by which the statement passes.

Thus, all the diagrams are shuffled by the outside. The outside is the mixing of diagrams, which makes it so that, a diagram being given, there will always be another diagram emerging in a kind of mutationism that is evident in Foucault. The diagram is agitated by mutations; the mutations come from the outside. So that, you see, I can no longer maintain – and this is the object of my third remark – I can no longer maintain the identity of levels between the outside and the relation of forces. My three remarks are: first, there is an identity of levels between exteriority and form; second, there is an identity of levels between the outside and the relation of forces or the diagram; third..., it must be added that no, in certain regards, there is not an identity of levels, for the diagrams are drawn from the outside. The outside is, how to put it, even more distant than the diagram. The diagrams issue from the outside. What is that, then? It's not a form, you recall, forms are exterior; the outside is not a form, but that from which the singularities emanate.

Oh really? But then, if the singularities... it must be said, therefore, that the singularities exceed even the relations of forces, which will lead us very far, it's complicated... Until now, we have identified singularities and points, relations of forces: we can no longer say that. We will say: the singularities are taken up in relations of forces – and this will be much more beautiful, even more beautiful – the singularities are taken up in relations of forces at the level of the diagrams. But as pure emissions, where do they come from? They come from the outside... You will tell me: this does not get us any further. It is by repeating this word that



we will perhaps get something from it. Let us accept this: we must go so slowly. They come from the outside. Here, there is a kind of romanticism of the outside in Foucault that is very important, very essential. We will not be surprised that if seeing and speaking find their status at the level of forms of exteriority, thinking does not find its status at the level of forms of exteriority; thinking finds its status at the level of, and in relation to, the outside. Thinking is the relation with the outside.

Alright, but what does that mean? Before knowing... I always proceed with the same method. Before knowing what it means, we have every interest in drawing a consequence. If all of this means something, then we have a rude consequence, which is that the singularities exceed the relations of forces; the singularities enter into relations of forces, yes, but only to the extent that they are taken up in a diagram. Insofar as they come from the outside, they are not yet taken up in a relation of forces. You see: there would thus be three stages. Emissions of singularities [?]. Second stage: these singularities are taken up in relations of forces. Third stage: they are incarnated, actualized in forms, in forms of exteriority. Ah yes, that's very clear! Oh how clear it is! Eh? Very, very clear, it's rare that I am so clear as this! Ah yes! Good. Do you want me to repeat it? You will regret it (laughter), you will regret this brief moment of clarity. And well,... what is the essential consequence? That, in the diagram, there will be strange singularities. There will be singularities taken up in relations of forces, yes, that will happen: power to be affected – power to affect. The power to be affected and the power to affect are taken up in relations of forces. But there will be some singularities, how to put it, that are a little floating, singularities that attest to a potential exceeding the diagram. Insofar as the diagram comes from the outside, it captures singularities that it does not manage to take up in its relations of forces. So that, in fact, the forces have not two aspects, but three. We could not say this before. First aspect: power to affect.

Second aspect: power to be affected. Third aspect: power to resist. To resist is the potential of force, if you will, insofar as it does not allow itself to be exhausted by the diagram; or, in what amounts to the same thing, it is the potential of the singularity insofar as it does not allow itself to be exhausted by a relation of forces given in the diagram. There are resistances. There are resistances, and it's Foucault's great passage in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, pp. 95-96. I will read it to you: "Power relationships [?]" "The existence of power relationships depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance".

Points of resistance: there are thus singularities of power, whether it be the power to be affected or the power to affect, but there are also singularities of resistance, which explain that in effect there is something that exceeds the diagram. "Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt," etc. "Instead there is a plurality of resistances [that is, of singularities], each of them a special case," and he will give us the list. Resistances "are the odd [*autre*] term in relations of power," that is, are the outside of relations of power. The relations of power are the outside of the stratified formations, yet there is still an outside of relations of power. Resistances are the odd term in relations of power. Above all, there would be a misunderstanding that you will be wary of and avoid, which would be to say: ah well yes, the odd term, that is the power to be affected, it's the other term in relation to the power to affect. That is not it at all. The power to be affected is not a resistance. The power to be affected and the power to affect are the two aspects of every power relation, but there is something other than power relations, which is the resistance to power.

Where does the resistance to power come from? It would be unintelligible if there were no singularities of resistance, and the singularities of resistance can be understood only if the



diagram does not enclose the outside, but is itself stirred [*brassé*] by the outside, so that there can be points of resistance that are irreducible to the diagram. Do you understand a little? And it will be on this point that Foucault, in a text that is not part of a book, will suggest something that we will have to explore in more depth, namely, that resistance is even in a sense primary in relation to what it resists. The primacy of resistance in relation to what it resists: a theme that seems very important to me, and that we will have to.... So the power relation is what combats a prior resistance, what strives to overcome a prior resistance. Resistance is not second, it is first. This idea, which can appear very strange, is explained at least abstractly for us if you understand that the diagrams or relations of power are not the final word. The diagrams were, once again, distributions of singularities insofar as these singularities entered into relations of forces, but in this sense, every diagram emanates from an outside. The outside attests to its irreducibility, which is to say, to its irreducibility to the diagram itself, by inspiring irreducible points of resistance in each diagram. You understand? And perpetually the diagrams are changing. Why? What is the force that compels the diagrams to transform [*muer*]? To undergo mutation. It goes without saying that if the diagram were not strewn with points of resistance, there would be no mutations. It is the points of resistance that force and bring about a mutation of the diagram, which is to say, a second drawing that comes from the outside, no less than the preceding one, which will also have its points of resistance, and a third drawing, etc., which will thus determine... not determine, which will trigger...

...to undergo mutation. It goes without saying that if the diagram were not strewn with points of resistance, there would be no mutations. It is the points of resistance that force and bring about a mutation of the diagram, which is to say, a second drawing that comes from the outside, no less than the preceding one, which will also have its points of resistance, and a third drawing, etc., which will thus determine... not determine, which will trigger the mutations. It is the moment when the points of resistance are globalized that there will be a toppling of the diagram in favor of a new diagram. So that... Ultimately, I could say: we're done now. Because what is this resistance, where does it come from, all that? We must try to see, but roughly speaking, we have finished with the axis of power. Because we have already gone beyond power: we saw that, in a certain manner, there was what must now be called a line of the outside, a line of the outside, ah the terrible, terrible line of the outside! Who is it that has spoken of the line of the outside?

Why do I use this express word? The line with two free ends [*aux deux extrémités libres*], which surrounds the whole skiff, that is, the whole stratified formation, which surrounds the whole lifeboat, and which, when it takes off [*file*] – it, the line of the outside – always runs the risk of carrying away a sailor; hence terrible, the line of the outside. This is Melville's whale line in *Moby Dick*. Needless to say that *Moby Dick* is the absolute outside. The whale line is the line of the outside. Two free ends, but it surrounds the whole lifeboat so well that, under the weight, under the pressure of the fleeing whale, the line is strained to its limit and, in its tension, risks cutting off the head or the arm of a sailor, or carrying him off, plunging him into the water... The line of the outside, the line of the outside that takes off... And Foucault supposed that there is a line of the outside; what is this inspiration? Here I am posing the question seriously: does he owe something to Melville? Does he owe something... who else has spoken of the line of the outside or something equivalent? Michaux, and yet very independently of Melville, Michaux has splendid pages on the line that twists like the lash of a raging charioteer. The line that twists like the lash of a raging charioteer... good, that is the equivalent of the line of Melville. So then, must we call Michaux's line, the line of Melville?

In the audience: the line of Proust as well...

Deleuze: ah, listen, I do not think it's the same thing, I don't know, you will have to tell me what you mean. Must it be said that...? For the moment, we are at this point: that beyond



diagrams, there is still something else, which is this line of the outside from which the diagrams emerge, from which the diagrams are derived; it is the line that throws the dice. If I dare say that it's the line that throws the dice, then in this sense, it will be the line of Nietzsche; we could mark as nodes on this line: Melville, Michaux, Nietzsche, Proust if you like, all that... and good, okay, perhaps we have gone too fast. Let us stick with the capacity to transform the diagram. This capacity to transform can only be explained by the line of the outside. We agree on this, but in order to not go too fast and to try to unravel such a mystery as the line of the outside, we must go back and ask: what exactly is a diagrammatic mutation, a change in the relation of forces? And we are going to run up against a theme that is so well-known in Foucault – and we will have to look at it clearly because so many stupid things are said about it –, which is the famous theme from *The Order of Things*, the death of man. What does it mean, “man is dead”? It may be said that this theme aroused sometimes indignation, sometimes approbation, but regardless, what is it? What does it mean? And on this point, what relation is there between Foucault and Nietzsche? In a certain manner, you sense that it signifies that we are in the midst of a mutation of the diagram.

[?] for the next time – which is still part of the analysis of power, but the conclusions – what the theme “the death of man” signifies in *The Order of Things*; so if you will be able to have re-read the last chapter of *The Order of Things* for next time, that will help you.