

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

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Translation and supplements to transcript based on YouTube video,¹

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Part 1

Deleuze: So, first point: I believe that Georges Comtesse wanted to speak about a rather strange text, but there are a lot of strange texts by Leibniz, where Leibniz... But I don't want to say what it is ahead of him... So, go ahead.

[Georges Comtesse, a faithful regular attendee at Deleuze's seminars, reads some excerpts from a book not by Leibniz, but in which Leibniz provided some comments, entitled *Treatise on a few points about the religion of the Chinese by the reverend father Nicolas Longobardi* (1701), 0:25-9:50]

Deleuze: That's very good. I would like to say that he provided a very fine account, it seems to me. [10:00] I would like to say only two relatively insignificant things in relation to what Comtesse has said. The first is a rather frequent theme during that era, at the end of the seventeenth century: a type of confrontation between Christian thought and Chinese thought. For example, there is a text by Malebranche that is rather odd, a conversation... the title is something I can't remember, something like "Conversation of a Christian philosopher and a Chinese philosopher", in which he creates a kind of dialogue, with very comparable themes to what you developed about Leibniz.

So, I ask myself, what makes this so urgent? Certainly, there is all kind of information at the end of the seventeenth century showing that there already was a great Orient-Occident confrontation. So, one has to understand historically and geographically why philosophy at the end of the seventeenth century marks a turning point in this confrontation.

But on the other hand, there is an anecdotal reason, a properly philosophical reason that reintroduces an additional interest to this confrontation for philosophers at the end of the seventeenth century. In the end, it's the great absent one in this kind of text because as an aspect of a confrontation with Chinese thought, either to condemn it, or – as you showed well was the case for Leibniz – to appropriate something from it, the great absent one from within this text, the one who is not cited but who is obviously in play, obviously is Spinoza. What they want to show, in the end, and starting with the Jesuits, is that Spinoza does not think like a European, like an Occidental, but thinks like a Chinese, which is a grave accusation.

And all that on the theme, matter, atheism, etc. it's directly aimed against Chinese philosophy, it's a mask behind or under which Spinozism is being denounced which in

that ear has a very great influence in Europe and is considered the most dangerous form of thought. So, there is a whole settling of scores with Spinoza who is assimilated to a completely exoteric thought, you understand? But that takes nothing away from what Comtesse said; in fact, everything is centered on life-matter relations. Is there a life-matter that is sufficient, and what does atheism mean?

So, what I have for today as well, what I would like to do goes somewhat in this direction. We'll see. What I'd like to do... The last time, we ended with this question, one that's very funny, very important, very funny, very important, very funny, very important: [*Laughter*] what is compossibility and what is impossibility? What are these two relationships, the relationship of compossibility and impossibility? How do we define them? We saw that these questions created all kinds of problems and led us precisely to the exercise, however cursory, of infinitesimal analysis.

Today, I would like to create a third major rubric that would consist in showing the extent to which Leibniz both organizes in a new manner and, moreover, creates some genuine principles. Creating principles is not a fashionable task of late. As a result, this third major introductory chapter for a possible reading of Leibniz is one I will call: "deduction of principles", precisely because principles are objects of a special kind of deduction, a philosophical deduction, which does not go without saying. And I am trying to number them because there's such a rich abundance of principles in Leibniz's work. He constantly invokes principles while giving them, when necessary, names that did not previously exist. In order to orient ourselves within his principles, we have to discover the progression (*cheminement*) of Leibnizian deduction.

And I am saying, the first principle – provided that, from time to time, we consider some things we have seen, so I will get quickly – so, the first principle that Leibniz creates with a rapid justification is the principle of identity. It is the minimum, the minimum that he offers himself, the principle of identity. So, I would almost like to create headings: What is the principle of identity? I'd say, here it is: every principle is a reason, and the principle of identity, I can say, A is A. A thing is a thing, it is what a thing is. I have already moved forward slightly. A thing is what it is; I'm continuing to say nothing, but a thing is what is, that's better than A is A. Why? Because it shows that it [the thing] is the region governed by the principle of identity. If the principle of identity can be expressed in the form: a thing is what it is, this is because identity consists in manifesting the proper identity between the thing and what the thing is.

You might tell me, that just doesn't work. Yes, it does! Yes, it does! Yes, it does! Yes, it does! (*Si! Si! Si! Si!*) Because if identity governs the relationship between the thing and what the thing is, namely what thing is identical to the thing, and the thing is identical to what it is, I can say: what is the thing? What the thing is, what the thing is, everyone has called it the essence of the thing. I would say that the principle of identity, here quite directly, is the rule of essences or, what comes down to the same thing, the rule of the possible. In fact, the impossible is contradictory. The possible is the identical so that, to the extent that the principle of identity is a reason, a *ratio*, r-a-t-i-o in Latin; to the extent that principle of identity is a *ratio* then which *ratio*? It is the *ratio* of essences or, as the

Latins used to say, or the Middle Age terminology long before: *ratio essendi*, the *ratio essendi*, e-s-s-e-n-d-i, namely, reason as the reason for being. There we are. [Pause]

I choose that as a typical example because I think that, once again, I tried to say it the last time, that it is very difficult to do philosophy if you do not have a kind of terminological certainty. What I am saying simply, is that this terminological certitude is like for mathematics although [*indistinct words*]. Never tell yourself that you can do without this terminological certitude, but also never tell yourself that it is difficult to acquire. It is exactly the same – this is what I’d like to do, and also this is why those who don’t like Leibniz don’t like him – it’s exactly the same as scales on the piano. It’s exactly the equivalent of what is called piano exercises. Fine.

And this is not at all difficult to acquire. But if you do not know rather precisely the rigor of concepts, that is, the sense of major notions, then it is very difficult to... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*] One has to approach that like an exercise. Fine, I believe that pianists practice what they call ‘études’; they do this for three hours a day. It is normal for philosophers to have their own scales, their own scales, it is their mental piano. It’s really a thing for... One must sing the tune of the categories, one must sing; one must know what the categories are; one has to know what the principles are, etc. Otherwise, it’s not serious not to know it, but it can be embarrassing, it’s embarrassing. At that point, otherwise, you go around in circles a lot more. You’ve haven’t practiced your scales. So, the mistake to have screwed up the exam over the scales. That’s not good at all. But, on the other hand, if you approached that really like piano exercises, I truly believe that... fine. The history of philosophy can only be created by philosophers, yet alas, it has fallen into the hands of philosophy professors, and that’s not good because they have turned philosophy into examination material and not material for study, or for scales. But when Debussy studied piano, he did some exercises of greater or lesser difficulty, in fact; this is exactly how one has to approach this. [Pause] You understand? [*A student near Deleuze answers, “Yes, certainly”*]

So, fine, so there we are, I would say going forward, let us assume that even to vary the exercises, I am saying: each time that I speak of a principle according to Leibniz, I am going to give it two expressions, two formulations: one formulation – I should have, if I had known, if I had been able, if I had known enough Latin, I should have done this whole course in Latin [*several comments from students*]; that would have been a completely different exercise. You would have understood everything, in any case, you know? You don’t know what you know; only, precisely, without knowing it, you no longer know anything at all [*Laughter*] – I’ll say that, for each principle, I will offer a *formatio vulgaris, communis*, that is, a vulgar formulation and a scholarly one. Do you follow me? And then we shall see, why did I want to do this? Because I tell myself, this would be a very good procedure on the level of principles to pose the necessary relation between pre-philosophy, pre-philosophy, and philosophy, this relationship of exteriority in which philosophy needs a pre-philosophy.

The vulgar formulation of the principle of identity, I am saying that we have it. The vulgar formulation is: the thing is what the thing is, the identity of the thing and of its

essence; the principle of identity, the principle of identity manages essences. You already see, in the vulgar formulation, that there are lots of things implied. The scholarly or technical formulation of the principle of identity, we have seen it, so at this point, I am organizing here, and I'm not at all developing it, it's: every analytical proposition is true. That's more complex, right? Every analytical proposition is true. In fact, what is an analytical proposition? It is a proposition in which the predicate and the subject are identical. An analytical proposition is true, A is A, is true.

You recall that by going into the detail of Leibniz's formulae, one can even complete the scholarly formulation: every analytical proposition is true in two cases: either by reciprocity or by inclusion. An example of a proposition of reciprocity – once again, I am not going back over this, I'm solely recycling so that you'll have, for those that this might interest, so that you'll have your complete outline of principles – an example of a proposition of reciprocity: the triangle has three angles. Having three angles is what the triangle is. [Pause] A second case of a proposition, no longer reciprocity, but inclusion – so, every analytical proposition is true, either by reciprocity or by inclusion – this time it's: the triangle has three sides. In fact, a closed figure having three angles envelops, includes, implies having three sides. We will say that analytical propositions of reciprocity are objects of intuition, and we will say that analytical propositions of inclusion are objects of demonstration. [Pause]

I'm organizing all this; I'll end by saying about this first point, I'll say, fine, you see, the principle of identity, the rule of essences, or of the possible, *ratio essendi*: what question does it answer? You recall, I tried to state this: to which cry does the principle of identity respond? The pathetic cry that constantly appears in Leibniz's works, corresponding to the principle of identity, why is there something rather than nothing? Which is the cry of the *ratio essendi*, of the reason for being (*raison d'être*). If there were no identity, no identity conceived as identity of the thing and what the thing is, then there would be nothing. There we are, you see, this is fine; we already have established a principle. [Pause]

Second principle: principle of sufficient reason, [Pause] principle of sufficient reason. [Pause] What will this be, this time? We have seen a few things; I can again go quickly. This refers us back to the whole domain that we located as being the domain of existences. The ratio corresponding to the principle of sufficient reason is no longer the *ratio essendi*, the reason of essences or the reason for being, it is now the *ratio existendi*, the reason for existing. It is no longer the question: why something rather than nothing, since the principle of identity assured us that there was something, namely the identical. It is no longer: why something rather than nothing, but rather it is why this rather than that? Explain to me why this rather than that. [Pause]

Ratio existendi, the principle of sufficient reason, what would its vulgar formulation be? We saw that every thing has a reason. Indeed, every thing must have a reason. [Pause] What would the scholarly formulation be that will help us understand: every thing has a reason, why this rather than that, that is, every thing has a reason for existing? You see that we apparently are completely outside the principle of identity. Why? Because the

principle of identity states and concerns the identity of the thing and what it is, but it does not state whether the thing exists. The fact that the thing exists or the fact it does not exist is completely different from what it is. I can always define what a thing is independently of the question of knowing if it exists or not. For example, I know that there are no unicorns, that the unicorn does not exist, but I can state what a unicorn is. Thus, a principle is indeed necessary that makes us think of what exists (*l'existant*).

And just how does a principle that appears to us as bizarre, as vague as "every thing has a reason" make us think of what exists? It is precisely by means of what the scholarly formulation will explain to us. We find this scholarly formulation in Leibniz's works in the following statement: every predication -- predication means the activity of judgment that attributes something to a subject; when I say, "the sky is blue," I attribute blue to sky, and I operate a predication since blue is said to be its "predicate" -- Leibniz's statement is: every predication has a basis (*fondement*) in the nature of things, [*Pause*] every predication has a basis in the nature of things. We tell ourselves, ok, why not? Fine, this is the *ratio existendi*. It's no longer the *ratio essendi* at all; it's the *ratio existendi*. But we tell ourselves, ok, fine, but what could that possibly mean? It's a little disturbing.

Let us try to develop this better, how every predication has a basis in the nature of things. This means: everything said about a thing, [*Pause*] -- fine, we'll leave in parentheses, everything said about a thing, what is it? It's the predication -- the entirety of what is said about a thing is the predication concerning this thing. Everything said about a thing is encompassed, contained, included in the notion of the thing. This is the principle of sufficient reason. You see that the formula which appeared innocent a short while ago - every predication has a basis in the nature of things, taking it literally - becomes much stranger: everything said about a thing must be encompassed, contained, included in the notion of the thing.

So, what is everything said about a thing? First of all, I'd say it is essence. In fact, the essence is said about the thing. Only one finds at that level that there would be no difference between sufficient reason and identity. And this is normal since sufficient reason includes all the properties (*tout l'acquis*) of the principle of identity, only it's going to add something to it. What does it add? It adds, what is said about a thing is not only the essence of the thing, but also the entirety of the affections and of the events that refer to the thing, or belong to the thing. Thus, not only will the essence be contained in the notion of the thing, what corresponds to the principle of identity, but the slightest of events, of affections concerning the thing as well, that is, what is attributed truthfully to the thing, is going to be contained in the notion of the thing.

We have seen this, we have no choice -- it's Leibniz's great theme that I addressed, so once again, I can undertake a rapid organization -- we have seen this: crossing the Rubicon must, whether one likes it or not, it must be contained in the notion of Caesar; sinning must also ... all that, these are events, crossing the Rubicon, sinning, eating the apple, etc., these are events. Well, then, they must be contained. Events, affections of the type "loving" and "hating" must be contained in the notion of that subject feeling these affections. In other words, each individual notion -- and that which exists (*l'existant*) is

precisely the object, the correlate of an individual notion -- each individual notion expresses the world. We saw why, closer and closer: that is what the principle of sufficient reason is. So, every thing has a reason means that everything that happens to something must be contained forever in the individual notion of the thing.

This is why the definitive formulation of the principle of sufficient reason is quite simple: once again, every true proposition is analytical, every true proposition is analytical – in fact, notice that this is one of the very amazing consequences – if it is true, since, in fact, every true proposition, for example, every proposition that consists in attributing to something an event that really occurred and that concerns the something – well then, if it is indeed true, the event must be encompassed in the notion of the thing.

What is this domain? We have seen this – and here I am only in the process of organizing -- this is the domain of infinite analysis, [*Pause*] this is the domain of infinite analysis, whereas, on the contrary, at the level of the principle of identity, we were only dealing with finite analyses. There will be an infinite analytical relationship between the event and the individual notion that encompasses the event. In short, the principle of sufficient reason, I can say, is the reciprocal of the principle of identity. Only, what has occurred in the reciprocal? The reciprocal has taken over a radically new domain, the domain of existences. It was sufficient merely to reciprocate, to reverse the formulation of identity in order to obtain the formulation of sufficient reason; it was enough to reciprocate the formulation of identity that concerns essences in order to obtain a new principle, the principle of sufficient reason concerning existences.

You will tell me, good, why... that this was not complicated. Yet it was enormously complicated, so why? Because the reciprocal was only possible, this reciprocation was only possible if one were able to extend the analysis to infinity. And the notion, the concept of infinite analysis is an absolutely original notion. Does that consist in saying simply that this takes place in the understanding (*l'entendement*) of God, which is infinite? Certainly not since this implies an entire technique that we have tried, into which we have hardly attempted to enter, namely the technique of differential analysis or infinitesimal calculus.

Is this true? Having said that, I'll say: third principle, is it true that the reciprocal of the reciprocal would yield the first? It is not certain. Everything depends, there are so many viewpoints. To reach my third principle, according to Leibniz, I am saying, let us again try to vary – this is a method of variation – I am trying to vary the formulations of the principle of sufficient reason. For sufficient reason, where I left things was saying that everything that happens to a thing must be encompassed, included in the notion of the thing, which implies infinite analysis. In other words, if you are following me, for everything that happens or for every thing, there is a, for each thing, there is a concept. In fact, I had insisted on this, that what matters is not at all a manner for Leibniz to hearken back to a famous principle. On the contrary, he does not want that at all; this would be the principle of causality.

When Leibniz says that everything has a reason, this does not at all mean that everything has a cause. Saying everything has a cause signifies a refers to b, b refers to c, etc. ... Everything has a reason means that one must account for reason in causality itself, namely that everything has a reason means that the relationship that a maintains with b must be encompassed in one way or another in the notion of a. Just like the relationship that b maintains with c must be encompassed one way or another in the notion of b. Thus, the principle of sufficient reason goes beyond the principle of causality. It is in this sense that the principle of causality states only the necessary cause, but not the sufficient reason. Causes are only necessities that themselves refer to and presuppose sufficient reasons.

Thus, I can state the principle of sufficient reason in the following way: for every thing there is a concept, which is very different from for every thing there is a cause, for every thing there is a concept that takes account both of the thing and of its relations with other things, including its causes and its effects. For every thing, there is a concept, you see? That's a beautiful principle, that does not go without saying, for every thing there is a concept. Lots of people will say, no, not at all. There are even many who will think that existence indeed consists of not having a concept. [*Pause*]

So, for every thing there is a concept, so what would the reciprocal be? If I've said that, understand that the reciprocal obviously does not at all have the same meaning. Here as well, I don't wish to overwhelm you, but In Aristotle's work, that also belongs to the piano scales in philosophy – there is a year in which I would do only that, but it's not while ... the last year before my retirement, I would only do that, I would only undertake scales like that -- in Aristotle's work, there is a treatise of ancient logic, it seems to me, of ancient logic that deals solely with the table of opposites. What is the contradictory, the contrary, the subaltern, what is it that, ... etc., etc., there is an entire table? There as well, in certain domains, if you don't know how, if you can hardly live, but not well, you must know. You cannot say the contradictory when it is the contrary, no, you cannot say the subaltern when it's... I don't know. There is an entire table, but in the end, this would be too much; if we are doing Leibniz, we are not doing Aristotle's scales, so we must not do everything at once. You see, that exists. I am using the word reciprocal without specifying, like that, without at all specifying. When I say, if you grant me this, for every thing there is a concept -- yet again, this is not at all certain – for every thing there is a concept, assume that you grant me that. In this, I cannot escape the reciprocal.

What is the reciprocal of “for every thing there is a concept”? We have to be careful here. For every thing, notice, one has to hum it, really. This is also what I wanted to say; we have to distinguish in philosophy, and regarding concepts, almost the equivalent of cries and chants. And cries would be like these kinds of things that [*indistinct word*] in philosophy, which if needs be are implicit, which crisscross, and what are nonetheless at the basis of a style of a philosophy. And cries are developed in chants, or give themselves over to chants, and then chants return in cries.

When do you place a cry into a chant? Not in the same way, no doubt, in so-called classical music and in modern music, the role of cries in modern music, well, no doubt,

there are similar things in philosophy. In philosophy, I believe that concepts are basically kinds of chants that... that refer, that refer to underlying cries. Fine, the basis of everything would be animals; there again, we spent so much time on that, at a certain point, a year, two years ago, I believe, that I'm recall that for the record. It would be necessary to start over again, I believe... For a theory of the concept, it would be necessary to start again from birdsongs. But here, I am making a parenthesis; this is not Leibniz, but it's fine.

For a theory of the concept, we would have to start again from the bird song. The great difference between cries and songs -- cries of alarm, of hunger, and then bird songs -- and we can explain acoustically what the difference is between cries and songs. In the same way, I would dream on the level of thought, there are cries of thought and chants of thought (*chants de pensée*). How could one distinguish these cries and these chants? But in the end, this is not Leibniz then. Leibniz contains this though. I believe that we cannot understand how a philosophy as chant or a philosophical chant develops if we do not refer it to coordinates that are kinds of cries, continuous cries. So then, let's look for all that. These cries and songs are complex.

For example, in the example that always comes to my mind, if I return to music, the example that I recall again and again is the two great operas of [Alban] Berg; there are two great death cries, the cry of Marie [in *Wozzeck*] and the cry of Lulu.² When one dies, one does not sing, and yet there is someone who sings over the deceased, the mourner. What does she do, the mourner? There are mourners who cry and mourners who sing. But in the end, the person who loses the loved one, he sings, he sings, or cries, I do not know. But in the end, there are two great death cries, whether it's Marie, assassinated by *Wozzeck*, or whether it's Lulu who dies assassinated by Jack the Ripper, there are two great cries what arrive in these operas and are sublime moments in the opera; these cries are such beautiful cries. Fine. They are encompassed in the contexts of chants.

So, what is that about? What is the repeated note of these cries? In *Wozzeck*, it is a ti-, it is a siren, absolutely. When you put sirens into music, you are placing a cry there. It is strange. And the two cries are not the same type, even acoustically: there is a cry that flits upward and there is a cry that skims along the earth, Marie's cry that skims along the earth, and the cry... And then there is the song (*le chant*), the cry of, what, who is it? It's the Countess, the Countess, the chant of Lulu's great woman friend who sings death. There is a transition to the chant that is fantastic. This is signed Berg. I would say that the signature of a great philosopher is the same. When a philosopher is great, although he writes very abstract pages, these are abstract only because you did not know how to locate the moment in which he raises a cry. There is a cry underneath, no, no, it's in the form of a cry, something that is terrifying. [*Deleuze pronounces a few words very softly that are not at all clear*]

So let's get back to this calmer region which is like a song of sufficient reason, a little song, "every thing has a reason", one has to practice scales here; one has to sing it. Ah, ah, ah [*Deleuze starts singing*], "every thing has a reason", we could create a kind of melody, we could harmonize, so there would be a harmony, a melody of concepts. But

underneath there would be rhythmic cries, rhythmic cries. So there, a kind of drumbeat would be introduced into philosophy, bam, bam, bam, kinds of howling, no, no, no. There would always be some “no, no, no”... [*Interruption of the recording*] [45:17]

Part 2

[*The following text is furnished by WebDeleuze, cut from the BNF recording*] I am returning to my chanted formulation of the principle of sufficient reason. One can sing off key in philosophy. [*Return to the BNF recording*] People who sing off key in philosophy, it's for them that... they know it very well, but it [philosophy] is completely dead. So, they can talk interminably about “did Descartes really say that?” or “think that?” or something else as well. Perhaps that's interesting. Perhaps that has no interest at all. [*Pause*]

Sufficient reason, the song of sufficient reason: for every thing there is a concept. Ah yes, for every thing, there is a concept. So, starting off already, you can sing that. You imagine, starting...? From which I reach the concept: What is the reciprocal of every thing, there is a concept? If I say, “for every thing...” ... Follow me: [*Pause*] For every thing, there is a concept. There is, it's exactly what is called... What is that called in music...? [*Pause, Deleuze is looking for a term*] Reciprocation... There is a famous piece consisting entirely of reciprocations in music... It has a name in English, “Joke” [*Comments from student near Deleuze*] Non, these are series, it's, it's... [*Olivier*] Messiaen employed this considerably... retrograde series, retrograde series. And there is a fantastic retrograde series in this piece... So, there, I am losing the names, it's a piece for piano in which there are all sorts of very odd retrograde series, it's funny, very, very funny, the music, funny, funny, funny. [*Pause; comments from students near Deleuze*] And the musicians of the seventeenth [century], eighteenth, you will find this... You'll be ashamed not to have thought of that.

Fine, so, I am still looking for my reciprocal: “for every thing, there is a concept”. I'd say: what is the reciprocal? Let's look for it. We mustn't make a mistake; it's not easy to reciprocate. For every thing, there is a concept; I would say the reciprocal is: for every concept, there is one thing alone; for every concept, one thing and one thing alone. [*Pause*] Ah, for every concept, one thing and one thing alone. Why is this the reciprocal of “for every thing a concept”? It's because, suppose that a concept had two things that corresponded to it, there is a thing that has no concept. No, I cannot; in that case, sufficient reason is ruined (*foutue*). I cannot say “for every thing a concept”. As soon as I have said “for every thing there is a concept,” I have necessarily said that a concept had necessarily one thing alone, since if a concept has two things, there is something that has no concept, and therefore I already could no longer say “for every thing a concept.” Have you understood this? If you've understood, you've understood everything.

What does that mean, “for every thing...”, euh, “for every concept, one thing and one alone”? So, the true reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason will be stated like this, in the form of a third principle by Leibniz: for every thing, a concept... No! Crap! [*Laughter*] For every concept, one thing and one alone. Fine, that is a reciprocal; notice

that this a reciprocal in a very funny sense. This is why, earlier, I indicated that in other conditions, we would have had to undertake a study and do without the word “reciprocal” which would be much too vast, much too vague. But in this case of reciprocation, sufficient reason and the other principle, notably "for every thing, a concept" and "for every concept, one thing and one alone," I cannot say one without saying the other. Reciprocation is absolutely necessary. If I do not say the second, if I do not recognize the second, I destroy the first.

In the other case, when I said that sufficient reason was the reciprocal of the principle of identity, it was not in the same sense since, if you recall the proposition of the principle of identity -- namely, every analytical proposition is true -- I reciprocate and I obtain sufficient reason, namely, every true proposition is analytical, but here, there is no necessity. I can say that every analytical proposition is true without, through this, that any true proposition only being analytical. I could very well say that every analytical proposition is true, but careful, there are true propositions that are something other than analytical. Thus, when Leibniz created his reciprocation of identity, he accomplished a master stroke. He accomplished this master stroke because he had the means to accomplish, that is, he let out a cry. He had the means to accomplish a master strike because he had himself created an entire method of infinite analysis. Otherwise, he could not have done so, or else, that would have been null, what he had done. Whereas in the case of the passage from sufficient reason to the third principle that I have yet to baptize, there reciprocation is absolutely necessary. It had to be discovered. [*Pause*]

So, the time has come: what does it mean that for every concept there is a thing and only one thing? Here it gets strange, you have to understand. We have no choice. It means that there are no two absolutely identical things, or [*Pause*] every difference, it comes down to the same thing, every difference is conceptual in the last instance. If you have two things, there must be two concepts, otherwise there would not be two things. Fine, what does that mean, there are no two absolutely identical things as regards the concept? It means that there are no two identical drops of water, no two identical leaves. In this, Leibniz is perfect, he gets delirious with that principle. He says that obviously you, you believe that two drops of water are identical, but this is because you do not go far enough in your analysis. They cannot have the same concept. Here this is very odd because all of classical logic tends to tell us rather that the concept, by its very nature, encompasses an infinite plurality of things. The concept of drops of water is applicable to all drops of water.

Leibniz says, of course, if you have blocked off analysis of the concept at a certain point, if you have blocked the analysis of the concept at a finite moment; but if you push the analysis forward, there will be a moment in which the concepts are no longer the same. This is why the ewe recognizes its lamb. [*Pause*] How does the ewe recognize its little lamb? That is, it's one of Leibniz's examples; it's already in Lucretius, this moving example. They [*Eux*] think it is via the concept. A little lamb does not have the same concept as the same individual concept, and it is in this manner that the concept extends to the individual, another little lamb. Fine, what is this strange principle? There is but a single thing, a single thing; there is necessarily one thing per concept and only one.

Leibniz names it the principle of indiscernibles. We can state it this way: there is one thing and only one thing per concept, or every difference is conceptual in the final instance.

There is only conceptual difference. In other words, if you assign a difference between two things, there is necessarily a difference in the concept. And well, Leibniz names this the “principle of indiscernibles”. And if I make it correspond to a ratio, what is this? You sense correctly that it consists in saying that we only gain knowledge through the concept. In other words, the principle of indiscernibles seems to me to correspond to the third ratio, the ratio as *ratio cognoscendi*, the reason as reason for knowing (*raison de connaître*). [Pause]

And let us look at the consequences of such a principle. If it is true, if this principle of indiscernibles were true, namely that every difference is conceptual, there would be no difference except the conceptual; it’s a principle nonetheless, there, there, Leibniz asks us to accept something that is quite huge. Let us proceed in order: what other kind of difference is there other than conceptual? – I am saying immediately, we’ll have to take break because I am going to see someone in the main office – I will say it very quickly so that you can reflect on this: we see immediately, even without undertaking any theory, there are numerical differences. For example, I say a drop of water, two drops of water, I take my medicine, my potion, one drop, two drops, three drops, four drops. I distinguish the drops – I am again speaking Latin – *solo numero*, by the number alone. I count the elements of a set (*ensemble*), one two three four, I neglect their individuality, I distinguish them by the number. This constitutes a first type of very classic distinction, the numerical distinction. Second type of distinction: I say, "take this chair", take this chair; some obliging person takes a chair, and I say, "not that one, but this one." This time, it is a spatio-temporal distinction of the here-now type. The thing that is here at a particular moment, and this other thing that is there at a particular moment. We sense that there are spatio-temporal distinctions. Finally, there are distinctions of figure and of movement: figure, roof that has three angles, or roof and I follow the movement with my finger, or the rest, I would say that these are distinctions by *extensio* and movement, extension and movement.

Understand what this commits Leibniz to here. It commits him to a strange undertaking, merely with his principle of indiscernibles. He has to show that all these types of non-conceptual distinctions - and in fact, all of these distinctions are non-conceptual since two things can be distinguished by the number even though they have the same concept. You focus on the concept of a drop of water, and you say: first drop, second drop. It is the same concept. There is one of them that is the first and there is one that is the second. There is one that is here, and another that is over there. There is one that is shaped like a pear and there is one that is shaped round. There is one that goes fast, and another that goes slowly.

We have now nearly completed the set of non-conceptual distinctions. Leibniz arrives and calmly tells us, no, no. These are pure appearances, that is, these are only provisional ways of expressing a difference of another nature, and this difference is always

conceptual. If there are two drops of water, they do not have the same concept. What of any great import does this mean? Understand; I choose the very example. It is very important in problems of individuation. It is very well known, for example, that Descartes tells us that bodies are distinguished from one another by figure and by movement. Even a lot, there is no need to list examples, a lot of thinkers have judged that bodies distinguished themselves among themselves through the figure and through movement. Notice that in the Cartesian formula, what is conserved in movement (mv) – namely, the product of mass times movement -- depends strictly on a vision of the world in which bodies are distinguished by the figure and movement.

What does Leibniz commit himself to when he tells us no? It is absolutely necessary that to all these non-conceptual differences there correspond conceptual differences; they only cause it to be imperfectly translated. All non-conceptual differences only cause a basic conceptual difference to be imperfectly translated. Leibniz commits himself, for example, to a task of physics. This is why we cannot say just anything; we tell ourselves, well then, I mean that, but afterwards, you endure abominable tasks. [*Pause*] In other words, he has to find a reason for which a body is either in a particular number, or in a particular here and now, or has a particular figure and a particular velocity. So, he will translate that quite well in his critique of Descartes when he says that velocity is a pure relative. Descartes was wrong; he took something that was purely relative for a principle.

It is therefore necessary that figure and movement be surpassed (*se dépassent*) toward something deeper. Do you understand what that means? That means something quite enormous for philosophy in the seventeenth century. Specifically, that there is no extended substance or that extension (*l'étendue*) cannot be a substance. That extension is a pure phenomenon. That it refers to something deeper. That there is no concept of extension, that the concept is of another nature. It is therefore necessary that figure and movement find their reason in something deeper. Henceforth, extension has no sufficiency. You see? I am not saying that it is common, but it is not by chance that this is precisely what makes a new physics; he doesn't invent that notion, but he completely recreates the physics of forces. He opposes force, on one hand, to figure and extension, on the other, figure and extension being only manifestations of force. It is force that is the true concept. There is no concept of extension because the true concept is force. Force is the reason of figure and movement in extension. Hence the importance of this operation that appeared purely technical when he said that what is conserved in movement is not mv , but mv^2 . Squaring velocity is the translation of the concept of force, which is to say that everything changes.

And, if you will, it is physics that corresponds to the principle of indiscernibles. There are no two similar or identical forces, [*Pause*] and forces are the true concepts that must take account of or justify everything that is figure or movement in extension. Force is not a movement; it is the reason for movement. Hence the complete renewal of the physics of forces, and also of geometry, of kinematics (*de la cinématique*). Everything passes through this, merely by the squaring of velocity. MV^2 is a formula of forces, not a formula of movement. You see that this is essential. Take a short break. [*Interruption of the recording*] [63:56]

To sum up generally, I can also say that figure and movement must move forward toward force. [*The BNF recording is interrupted here*] ... It's hot here, right? It's hot... The number... [*Pause*] goes beyond itself toward the concept. [*Pause*] One must... must what? [*Deleuze seems to be seeking his path*] Space and time must also move beyond themselves toward – a third term -- a concept. So there we are, you can complete it yourself!

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: When he is Leibnizian, he becomes very, very well known because that creates a concept that goes all the way to the individual. We are all concepts; each of us has his/her concepts, you understand? It's nonetheless a concept solely for the self. That become rather joyful. This isn't the huge concept from classical logic. [*Pause*]

But here we have a fourth principle developing step by step. And here we have Leibniz naming it the "law of continuity". Ah ha! Why did he say "law"? That is a problem. When Leibniz speaks of continuity that he considers to be a fundamental principle and one of his very own great discoveries, well, he uses the term "law" and no longer the term "principle." This we cannot lay aside because we have to explain that. It's odd, the "law" of continuity; ok fine, not as a "principle". And if once again I look for a vulgar formulation of the law of continuity, it is quite simple, I'd say, and the expression is found often in Leibniz when he wants to go quickly, nature does not skip over anything (*la nature ne fait pas de saut*), j-u-m-p. Nature does not skip over anything. [*Pause*] Nature does not skip over anything, fine, there is no discontinuity.

But there are two scholarly formulations, here as well. One, listen to me well, because here as well, that's going to pose all kinds of problems. It's complicated; it is something like this: if two causes get as close as one would like, [*Pause*] to the point of only differing by a difference decreasing to infinity, [*Pause*] the effects must differ in like manner. I immediately say what Leibniz is thinking about because he has it in for Descartes so much, so much. This is very important: in the laws of movement, what are we told in the laws of the communication of movement? Here are two cases: two bodies of the same mass and velocity meet each other, -- [*Deleuze comments on one of the tape recorders facing him*] Here there us someone whose machine has red things constantly, it's going to blow up [*Laughter*] – So, first case: two bodies of the same mass, you are going to add to small points, and of the same speed encounter each other. The masses of the same speed collide off each other. One of the two bodies has a greater mass or a greater velocity, so it carries off the other, you see? It carries off the other. Leibniz says, nothing of the sort; that this cannot be. Why? Here you have two causes, two states of the cause. First state of the cause: two bodies of the same mass and velocity. Second state of the cause: two bodies of different masses. Leibniz says that you can cause difference to decrease to infinity, you can act so these two states approach one another in the causes.

And we are told that the two effects are completely different since in one case, there is a collision (*rebondissement*) of the two bodies, in the other case, the second body is

dragged off by the first, in the direction of the first. [Pause] There is a discontinuity in the effect whereas one can conceive of a continuity in the causes. It is in a continuous manner that we can pass from different masses to equal masses. Thus, it is not possible for there to be discontinuity in the acts (*faits*) if there is possible continuity in the cause since it leads him again into a whole, very important physical study of movement that will be centered on the substitution of a physics of forces for a physics of movement. I was citing this to refresh our memory.

But the other scholarly formulation of the same principle, and you will understand that it is the same thing as the preceding one. The other scholarly formulation, I could say that a case being given, a case being given, for example, bodies of unequal mass, a case being given, the concept of the case ends in the opposite case. This is the pure statement, it seems to me, of continuity. Example: a given case is movement, the concept of movement ends in the opposite case, that is, in rest. Rest is infinitely small movement. This is what we saw from the infinitesimal principle of continuity. [Pause] Or else, we have seen this, but this results from our previous session that you recall so well, I would say that the last possible scholarly formulation of continuity is: a given singularity extends itself into a whole series of ordinaries all the way to the neighborhood of the following singularity, etc., to infinity, which is the same, extends itself, etc. This time it is the law of the composition of the continuous. [Pause] We worked on this; I don't need to go back over this. Fine.

But then, right when we thought we had finished, there arises a very important problem. This is very important for us if we know how to draw conclusions for philosophy in general. Are you of the same opinion as me, or of Leibniz's opinion, namely something impels me to say – and of course, I am not the only one because you are as well – something impels us to say that, between principle three and principle four, there is a contradiction, that is, between the principle of indiscernibles and the principle of continuity, is there a contradiction? First question – you see that the questions are going to start increasing, but I would like to so quickly that it's, fine, understand, it's tragic, that – contradiction between the principle of indiscernibles and the principle of continuity: in what way is there a contradiction?

Second question: the fact is that Leibniz never considered there to be the slightest contradiction. Here we are in that situation of liking and profoundly admiring a philosopher, yet of being disturbed because some texts seem contradictory to us, and he did not even see what we might tell him. This is constantly this way in the obsession of objections. State an objection to someone. You see a contradiction there where he sees none at all. One would already have to talk out whether there is indeed a contradiction, all that. Where would the contradiction be if there was one? I return to the principle of indiscernibles, every difference is conceptual, there are no two things having the same concept. At the limit, I might say that to every thing corresponds a determined difference, [Pause] not only determined but assignable in the concept. There are two concepts, so the difference – no, yes, euh, I was speaking poorly -- the difference is not only determined or determinable, it is assignable in the very concept. There are no two drops of water having the same concept, that is, the difference one-two must be encompassed in the

concept. It must be assigned in the concept. Thus, every difference is an assignable difference in the concept. If I consider the principle of continuity, what does it tell us? It tells us that things proceed by vanishing differences, by infinitely small differences, that is, by unassignable differences.

You understand? That gets really awful; one cannot say both at the same time. Can one say that every thing proceeds by unassignable difference and say at the same time that every difference is assigned and must be assigned in the concept? Ah! Would Leibniz be contradicting himself? Might he have made a mistake? We can move forward a small bit by looking at the *ratio* of the principle of continuity since I found a *ratio* for each of the first three principles. You remember? Identity is the reason of essence or *ratio essendi*, sufficient reason is the reason of existence or the *ratio existendi*, the indiscernibles are the reason for knowing or the *ratio cognoscendi*, and the principle of continuity is not at all... one has only to consult the list of *ratios*, it's the *ratio* – as the Latins said – it's the *ratio fiendi*, that is, the reason for becoming. Things become through continuity. [Pause] Movement becomes rest, rest becomes movement, etc. The polygon becomes a circle by multiplying its sides, etc. This is a reason of becoming; this is a very different reason of becoming from the reasons of being or of existence; it's very different. Here, you have philosophical categories: the *ratio fiendi* needed a principle, and it is the principle of continuity.

Fine, that still doesn't keep us [from asking], how do we reconcile these *ratios*? How do we reconcile continuity and indiscernibles? Here's what it seems to me: moreover, we have to show – understand the bet almost that we're required to make – we have to show that the way in which we will reconcile them must take account of this at the same time: that Leibniz was right to see no contradiction at all between the two. Well then, I am saying that – there we are, I know... I don't know... I'd need a lot of time; you'll excuse me, we must not get bored – I am saying that we are having the experience of thought. I return to the formulation, to the proposition: each individual notion expresses the whole world. Adam expresses the world, Caesar expresses the world, each of you expresses the world. This formula is very strange. In Leibniz's work, it's quite fine, concepts, and concepts in philosophy are words. A great philosophical concept is not simply a word; it's a complex, it's a proposition, or a propositional function.

I mean, this would even be a game, once again, as well as exercises of scales, philosophical exercises of piano scales; one would have to do exercises in philosophical grammar. Philosophical grammar would consist of this: with a given concept, find the verb. If you have not found the verb, you have not rendered the concept dynamic. You have to render the concept dynamic. Good, so otherwise, you cannot understand it. You cannot live it. You can understand it abstractly, but that's not good philosophy. You cannot live it. The concept is always subject to a movement, a movement of thought. A single thing counts: movement. When you do philosophy, you are looking only at movement. It's even through this that philosophy, cinema, painting, dance, all that, are the same. You are looking only at movement; only it is a particular kind of movement, the movement of thought. So, a concept being given, you ask yourself, what is the verb?

If you haven't found the verb, you are not a philosopher. Sometimes the philosopher states it explicitly, sometimes he does not state it. [*Pause*]

Is Leibniz going to state it? In each individual notion that expresses the world; fine, there is already a verb, this is expressing. Fine, there is a verb. But what does that mean? It means two things at once, as if two movements coexisted. Leibniz tells us at the same time: God... -- and this is very important; it's two expression of, it seems to me, it's that in the end, we've produced Leibniz's secret -- God does not create Adam the non-sinner... no, excuse me, God does not create Adam the sinner, but creates the world in which Adam sinned. He [Leibniz] would say the same thing for Caesar: God does not create Caesar crossing the Rubicon but creates the world in which Caesar crosses the Rubicon. Thus, what God creates is the world and not the individual notions that express the world. It does not create Adam the sinner; it creates the world in which Adam sinned. So, it creates the world and not the individual notions that express it. Second proposition by Leibniz: the world exists only in the individual notions that express it. If you privilege one proposition over another, it's crazy. [*Pause*]

Henceforth, if you accept that, what results is like two readings or two complementary and simultaneous ways of understanding, but two understandings of what? Let's see. You can consider the world, [*Pause*] but yet again the world does not exist in itself, it exists only in the notions that express it. But you can make this abstraction, you consider the world. How do you consider it? You consider it as a curve, a complex curve. A complex curve has singular points and ordinary points. A singular point extends itself into the ordinary points that depend on it all the way to the neighborhood of another singularity, etc. etc. . . . and you compose the curve in a continuous manner like that, by extending singularities into series of ordinaries. I would say, the world for Leibniz, that's it. The continuous world is the distribution of singularities and regularities, or singularities and ordinaries that constitute precisely the aggregate chosen by God, that is, the set that unites the maximum of continuity. Agreed?

If you remain in this vision, the world is governed by the law of continuity – we have seen why -- since continuity is precisely this composition of singulars insofar as they extend into the series of ordinaries that depend on them. Fine. You have your world that is literally laid out in the form of a curve in which singularities and regularities are distributed. This is the first point of view; that is completely subject to the law of continuity.

Only here we are, this world does not exist in itself, it exists only in the individual notions that express this world. What does that mean? That means that an individual notion, what Leibniz calls a monad, that means that an individual notion or monad is constructed, that each one encompasses a small, determined number of singularities. It encloses a small number of singularities; it is the small number of singularities. . . . -- You see, we are making enormous progress – if we now ask... You recall that individual notions or monads are points of view on the world. It is not the subject that explains the point of view, it is the point of view that explains the subject. Hence the need to ask oneself, what is this point of view? A point of view is defined by this: a small number of

singularities drawn from the curve of the world. This is what is at the basis of an individual notion. What makes the difference between you and me is that you are constructed, on this kind of fictional curve, you are constructed around such and such and such singularities, and me around such and such singularities. And what you call individuality – you see, there are all sorts of quite distinctive notions in Leibniz – an individuality is a complex of singularities insofar as they form a point of view. That becomes very beautiful. [Pause] Fine. ³

I can say, the world has two states; there are two states of the world. It has a developed, unrolled state, and it has an enveloped, rolled up state – a rolled up state of the world, an enveloped state of the world: it's the world such that it's in each individual notion that expresses it. [Pause] Developed state of the world, as all individual notions express the same world, you can always develop the world in order to consider it abstractly in itself, like this curve endowed with pure singularities. In that case, you will be speaking about the world.

I would say that in light of this, the world is an aggregate of compossible individual notions insofar as they are developed, [Pause] and the individual notion is the world insofar as it's enveloped in the points of view that express it. [Pause] The world develops the individual notions; the individual notions envelop the world. Envelop, develop; roll up, unroll. An individual notion is the world rolled up from a certain point of view. The world is the aggregate of unrolled individual notions.

To envelop, to develop. Here we have the dynamic verbs that I have been seeking. To roll up, to unroll. When logic proposes to us, yet again the concept or the doublet, two concepts, to implicate, to explicate... to implicate, to explicate, you understand? These are [undistinct word] terms for us; if you like logic, there are not [unclear word] terms. *Implicare, explicare*, in Latin, it's precisely *involvere, devolvere*. To implicate is to envelop, to roll into; to explicate is to unroll, to develop. The world develops an aggregate of individual notions; each individual notion envelops the world from its point of view.

It's the dynamism and the coexistence of envelopment and development that is going to provide all the underlying movements, like geological movements, that run through Leibniz's philosophy. So, did he invent them? No, there is a whole tradition, a tradition going back to the neo-Platonists. It's the neo-Platonists that create a kind of amazing *mise en scène*, the degrees of envelopment and development in the world, the sense in which the seed envelops the tree, the sense in which the tree develops the seed. Simply, all sorts of problems arise that are not only problems of logic.

And certainly, just as Ariadne did things too well, he added a third concept there that is rather lovely. In order to translate the simultaneity of the two movements of envelopment and development – the world that develops notions, the notions that envelop the world – a term is very necessary because... What is there above the world and its subject, the world that develops the subjects, and the subjects that envelop the world? There's always God; there's always this story of God since it's a philosophy that is linked so much to a certain theology. But God is not a point of view; it's not a subject; it's not even the world. God

creates the world, as we know, and in creating the world, he creates subjects, or vice versa. But you see, subject and world are completely correlative because one is in the developed state what the other is in the enveloped state. That's what's so great. Do you understand fully? One is in the state... The subject is in the enveloped state what the world is in the developed state. It's so beautiful!

And, and, and, from this you also grasp how continuity and the indiscernibles ... there is no contradiction. The law of continuity is the law of development, and the indiscernibles are the principle of envelopment. If one day you manage to read all that, if you look for this expression applies to, "Everything distinguishes itself through the concept; every different is conceptual," it's obviously to the state of enveloped things in subjects. On the contrary, the evanescent differences are the state of the world insofar as they are developed. [Pause] As a result, there is no contradiction. Difference, yes, is evanescent and unassignable to the point of view of the development of the subject in the world; it is assignable and conceptual to the point of view of the envelopment of the world in the subject.

So, God, what does it do since... it's neither enveloped, nor developed, God. What is it? There's a lovely word, created by philosophers prior to Leibniz: God is the great "complicator". It does not implicate, and it does not explicate; it does not envelop, and it does not develop; it complicates. Superb definition of God: the universal complication. So, what is it, to complicate? It's to maintain the mutual simultaneity and immanence of envelopment and development. If I say that that guy's complicated, what does that mean? *Complicare*, it's a very beautiful word. It complicates... And complicating is not necessarily a weakness; to complicate is really the equivalent of understanding but understanding in the strong sense of the term. In fact, I was thinking that there was a doublet, but there's a triplet: to complicate, to explicate, to implicate.

God complicates the subjects in the world. In all of Renaissance philosophy, complication is going to undergo development; it will be one of the most beautiful concepts of Renaissance philosophy, notably in two great philosophers that Leibniz knows admirably, Nicolas de Cusa, and the great Italian philosopher, [Giordano] Bruno, who died burned to death, who dies complicated by fire. [Laughter] That happens with fire. The movement through which someone was burned to death, it diminishes, then... So that's *complicatio*; God is fire. There you are. God complicates.

So, you see, we have found the dynamism, and in then [we ask], why is continuity called a law? It's very simple: continuity is called a law because the developed world responds solely to phenomena; it's only a phenomenon. It's the apparition; it's not the thing, it's the apparition. The thing is the subject; it's the subject that envelops the world. If you develop the world, it's as if you went to the world of pure apparitions, of pure phenomena. So, continuity will be the principle of all the laws of phenomena, whereas the indiscernibles will be the principle of all reasons of the thing or the subject. [Pause]

Finally, the fifth principle – we've just reconciled the third and fourth [principles]. With the fifth one, I am stopping to leave it for the next time. But finally, because the fifth principle has so many aspects that it's valid for an infinity of principles, the aggregate of what Leibniz presents as the principles of finality. And what is the *ratio* of the principles

of finality? This refers to the last *ratio*; there are five *ratios* that have crossed through philosophy since philosophy has existed: it's the *ratio agendi, agendi*, that is, the reason for acting (*raison de faire*). You have the list of five reasons that you have to learn by heart: reason for being, reason for existing, reason for knowing, reason for becoming, and reason for acting (*raison d'être, raison d'exister, raison de connaître, raison de devenir, et raison de faire*).

Good, so we will see. This is what remains to do, this story, but have you had enough? Ah yes, indeed!... So, I close finally on this, because only... what I am going to do at the start of our next meeting.

Understand the problem: what I would like is for you to think about this from now until the next time. What it is: as we will begin, we find ourselves facing a privileged example for our understanding of philosophy. I have indicated that after all, these five principles from Leibniz don't go without saying. Imagine a philosopher – and this philosopher existed shortly after Leibniz – who really does not agree with these principles. I choose the example of Kant. He does not agree on two fundamental points that I will explain: here we really need to proceed in a very, very technical manner. Kant is the one who says, first, no, every proposition is not analytic. There are synthetic propositions, and it's in this very way that there is knowledge. One person says white, the other one says black. Second Kantian proposition: no, every difference is not conceptual. But a certain number of determinations, notably the number lets time pass, are irreducible to concepts. So, it's a double negation by Kant that creates a great rupture with Leibniz after having been Kantian for quite a long time. This is his great rupture: he negates the principle of sufficient reason, and he negates the principle of indiscernibles.

The next time, we will find ourselves facing a privileged case, that I insist on in order to attempt to deal with this stupid notion about the status of philosophy, when we are told : on one hand, philosopher spend their time saying the same thing, which doesn't keep them from getting into fights, because it's a question of words ; on the other hand, which comes down entirely to the same thing, we are told that philosophers never stop telling us the contrary, to one another; they fight among themselves, one says this the other says that.

The question that I want to ask the next time is about this privileged Leibniz-Kant example: what does the Leibniz-Kant opposition mean? Is this an opposition? What's going on? What are the conditions of these propositions? You see, I am organizing four propositions, two for Leibniz, two for Kant, and I'd like to comment on them as a function of my real project, which is what are concepts in philosophy? Take a proposition from Leibniz: every proposition is analytic; Kant's anti-proposition is: no, there is knowledge only beginning with synthetic propositions. Second proposition from Leibniz: every difference, in the final instance, is conceptual; second Kant anti-proposition: no, there are non-conceptual differences without which there would be no knowledge, such as numerical differences, spatio-temporal differences, etc. So, starting from this privileged example, what can this common expression mean, that two philosophers do not agree.

So, there we are; think about it. It's obvious they don't agree, and it can even be logically proved; it's a proposition devoid of all meaning. There we are; I give you my blessing.

Notes

¹ Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fJtM_5xBUg

² Cf. "N as in Neurology" and "O as in Opera" in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*.

³ End of the tape, for the WebDeleuze recording; I am completing the seminar by adding the additional 13 minutes on the YouTube recording, reference above.