

Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries : Charles J. Stivale

Cinema: The Movement-Image, November 1, 1981 to June 1, 1982

(21 Sessions)

In the first year of Deleuze's consideration of cinema and philosophy, he develops an alternative to the psychoanalytic and semiological approaches to film studies by drawing from Bergson's theses on perception and C.S. Peirce's classification of images and signs. While he devotes this first year predominantly to what he considers to be the primary characteristic of cinema of the first half of the 20th century, the movement-image, he finishes the year by emphasizing the importance of the post-World War II shift toward the domination of the time-image in cinema.

Cinema 1.1 - November 10, 1981

Deleuze outlines his goals for this new seminar: to provide a reading of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*; likewise, to consider Kant's *Critique of Judgment*; and to link these to a reflection on cinema and thought, without the seminar being on cinema, but rather entirely on philosophy. The generative question for this session (and in some ways, for the seminar) is, how are these three distinct topics unified? Bergson, Deleuze argues, leads us to a confrontation of cinema and thought. As for Kant, Deleuze speculates on whether, in proposing the Sublime in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant isn't proposing a new relation between image and thought that might be considered pre-cinematographic. So then, Deleuze begins (and similarly in chapter 1 of *The Image-Movement*) with a presentation of two theses by Bergson from *Matter and Memory*, starting with a detailed consideration of movement and its constitutive elements, notably, instants, immobile sections, and he argues that rather than understanding the cinematographic perception as movement being added to the image, Bergson helps us understand cinema as creation of a movement-image, a synthesis of movement, but one that is an immediate perceptual synthesis, which captures as one the image and the movement. Hence, the invention of the movement-image is the act of creating cinema. With this first position in place, Deleuze considers cinema's reconstitution as privileged instants, and indeed defines the development in cinema as the emergence of equidistant any-instants-whatever and of intervals occurring between such instants. Through a review of how Bergson moved his philosophical thought toward what he judged to be contemporary science, Deleuze reviews the second thesis and prepares to devote the second session to considering the third.

Cinema 1.2 - November 17, 1981

At the end of the first session, Deleuze asked: "is it not to all cinema that the idea would apply: movement in extension as section (*coupe*), the extensive movement as section of a duration? What would that mean in terms of the cinema image?" Having discussed Bergson's first two theses in the previous session, these questions lead Deleuze to develop Bergson's third thesis (located also in chapter 1 of *The Movement-Image*, pp. 9-11). After initially addressing some students' questions with particular references to Eisenstein, Deleuze states the third thesis as: the instant is an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration,

which he also articulates here with a formulaic equation. He develops the second statement (and second part of the equation), and considers movement as transformation of a Whole, especially examining diverse aspects of such transformation, and expressing this with a more complete formula: movement as relation between parts expresses change as affection of a Whole. Deleuze reexamines different facets of this term, “the Whole” (e.g. open and closed systems, aspect of “the Open”), and he adds that what mattered for Bergson (cf. *Duration and Simultaneity* [1922]) was to undertake a metaphysics of real time rather than one of the eternal, leading to Bergson’s proposal of a “simultaneity of flows.” Then, he shifts direction from Bergson’s philosophy to cinema technique as a way of determining if the philosophical elements work on the actual, cinematographic level. Marking a shift toward *The Movement-Image*, chapter 2, Deleuze considers the technique of framing, and offering Pasolini’s term for elements that compose a shot, the “cineme”, he also defines “shot” and “cutting.” In this light, he reflects on specific filmmakers understanding of “the Whole” as well as other Bergsonian terms in relation to these techniques (notably, Pasolini, Eisenstein, Wilder, Wenders, Hitchcock, Murnau, Rossellini, Rivette, Pudovkin, Gance, Grémillon, Epstein, Stroheim).

Cinema 1.3 - November 24, 1981

Following the opening discussion with students and Deleuze’s self-examination and critique concerning how he has approached this topic, he reviews the previous work on Bergson’s theses, notably that in the movement-image, movement’s transformation expresses duration, that is, a change in the Whole, from which results, in cinema, a temporal perspective, that is, a kind of perspective unique to cinema and different from so-called natural perspective. So, Deleuze sums up the movement-image with three levels: first, image content and frame; second, the image and shot; third, the idea and montage, the latter being a determination of the relation between movement or shot with the Whole that expresses it. Deleuze discusses numerous aspects of this question of montage (moving into *The Movement-Image*, chapter 3), notably in the Soviet school (Eisenstein), the French school (Grémillon and Gance), and in German Expressionism. Concerning the latter, Deleuze introduces the notion of intensive quantity in terms of movement and notably as regards light and shadow in matter and contrasts this non-organic vital line to Eisenstein’s organic vital line of classical harmony. Deleuze pursues the movement of such lines in a number of examples (in painting as well as in cinema), and after another exchange with students, Deleuze draws some consequences of the earlier three-art summary of the movement-image. He also offers a detailed reflection on the role of producers in the process of creating ideas for cinema, providing an example for French cinema, producer Toscan du Plantier’s role with film projects (eventually, Téchiné’s “The Bronte Sisters” and Bolognini’s “La Dame aux Camélias”). Deleuze’s purpose with this is to understand the concept of a film’s “author” in relation to “producer” and “director” and closes the session on this point for consideration at the next meeting.

Cinema 1.4 – December 1, 1981

As this session seems to constitute a transition between the first part of the Seminar (devoted to Bergson’s theses on movement) and the second part (at the juncture of chapters 3 and 4 in *The Movement-Image*), Deleuze summarizes material developed in the first three sessions and

addresses directly for the first time Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, where Bergson proposes the movement-image (or surface images) and the recollection-image (or voluminous images). The former subdivides into three types: *perception-images*, *action-images* and, finally, *affection-images*, and Deleuze proposes to devote the second segment of the seminar to their development. However, he first entertains numerous questions on the work to date. One of Deleuze's responses leads him to provide a lengthy background to the development of phenomenology and Bergson's role in a renewed understanding of psychology, perception, and consciousness, and notably his contrast to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (thus, entering *The Movement-Image*, chapter 4). Deleuze argues that phenomenology is really from a time before cinema, seeking a pure description of natural perception, whereas Bergson, despite limits and reticence, proposes a completely different mode of production of movement, in *Matter and Memory*, adequate to the cinematographic image. So, Deleuze reflects on what it might mean, à la Bergson, to say that the image is movement, and for whom, but also that movement is image. Deleuze concludes that one of the elementary parts of an image is the actions of other images to which it is subjected, and the reactions that other images have to its own operations upon them, thus *an image being a set of actions and reactions*, on all sides and in all their elementary parts. This argument widens the understanding of the movement-image, and he concludes by adopting Whitehead's terms, extending this development to prehensions as well as perceptions.

Cinema 1.5 – January 5, 1982

Due to a schedule misunderstanding, a 5-week hiatus occurred since the previous session for which Deleuze apologizes. Deleuze reminds the participants of the premise of his earlier consideration of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, namely the crisis endured by early twentieth-century psychology, the difficulty of explaining at once images in consciousness and movement in the body. Deleuze suggests that it's not by chance that the crisis coincides with the start of cinema, and he traces some reactions to this crisis, to wit, phenomenology and Bergsonism, both of which move beyond the aforementioned duality. Deleuze proposes to study chapter 1 of *Matter and Memory* in detail, to look at the heart of the movement-image that Deleuze develops in terms of action and reaction that compose it. He also considers certain states of matter (gaseous, liquid, solid) that explain such actions and reactions thus providing types of movement-image (as detailed in *The Movement-Image*, chapter 4). Hence, he concludes for the existence of a triple identity: image = movement, and matter = movement-image, and he particularly considers Bergson's proposal of a mechanical universe of the movement-image not inscribed in a closed system, not proceeding by immobile sections of movement, and excluding and exceeding contact action. Deleuze compares these to traits in cinema (i.e. points raised in *The Movement-Image*, chapter 5), notably the importance of the interval between action and reaction, and this leads him to specify two types of image and distinct traits of different types. However, all this rests on understanding the difference between a thing and one's perception of it, or borrowing from Whitehead, its prehension. By extending this reflection on perception, Deleuze proposes a first major type of movement-image, the perception-image and its characteristics, and rather rapidly moves forward to propose two more types, the action-image and the affection-image, hence laying the ground for discussion in the next few sessions.

Cinema 1.6 – January 12, 1982

Deleuze starts with a review of the three varieties of movement-image (within *The Movement-Image*, chapter 4), laying out characteristics and then providing several examples from directors (notably, Lubitsch, Lang). First considering the perception-image and a film genre dominated by this type, the Western (and the “false Western”), he draws from critical perspectives by Bazin and Leslie Fiedler. However, Deleuze also distinguishes certain types of montage corresponding to these image types, and following this overview, he dives into the perception-image (developed in *The Movement-Image*, chapter 5) for which, at a first level, there are two poles, objective and subjective, each having three sub-facets (perceptive, active, affective), and each sliding endlessly toward the other pole. He also emphasizes technical aspects (e.g. shot-reverse shot) and the link to spatial determinations and psychological determinations, these combinations corresponding to numerous examples, at once technical and typological. Deleuze then introduces “Pasolini’s very strange theory” of the “semi-subjective” or free indirect image, a term requiring a brief digression into linguistic theory. This perspective allows Deleuze to raise another aspect, Subjective Perception or “consciousness-cinema”, itself having various sub-types, with which he contrasts Rohmer’s take on this same discourse of direct and indirect styles and images. Admitting that in this analysis, he has lost the original duality of poles, Deleuze offers yet another duality: the character’s subjective perception and the camera’s fixed consciousness. Hence Deleuze starts to reorganize: a first level, objective-subjective; second level, a “real” definition of these two which refer to two systems of perception, one realized by the camera-consciousness, the other being its correlate, realized by the movement-image, that is, subjective perception-image. Concluding the session with an attempted reclassification of distinctions, Deleuze indicates finally that he will need to review all of them at the next session.

Cinema 1.7 – January 19, 1982

Developing concepts from *The Movement-Image*, chapter 5, Deleuze continues examining the perception-image on its first level with objective and subjective pole. Then, with reference to Pasolini, he recalls the free indirect image as well as the split within the indirect free subjective image into two directions, characters in movement, on one hand, and the camera’s fixed consciousness. This summary brings Deleuze to analyze the second level of the perception-image, with the same two poles as departure point, and he draws again here from Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*, chapter 1, to provide real definition: a first, total, “objective” system in which movement-images vary individually and in relation to each other (the machinic universe); and a second, “subjective” system in which movement-images vary in relation to a supposedly privileged image (e.g. a character’s body). He names these, respectively, “documentary” and “dramatic” systems, images of universal interaction and images of privileged interaction, both united in the movement-image. Examples of the former, particularly a “liquid perception” are from Grémillon, and the latter, particularly a earth-based perception are from Losey and Renoir, with intermediate examples from Eisenstein, John Ford, Paul Newman. These examples lead Deleuze to consider Jean-Pierre Bamberger’s analysis of Jean Vigo’s “L’Atalante”, and he follows this by seeking a third level of the perception-image, calling on Vertov and Mitry (in conjunction with Bergson) as well as Brakhage and René Clair for guidance, eventually reaching the “gaseous perception”, but linked to different technical cinematographic aspects. Deleuze

concludes with reference to experimental filmmaker George Landow as an example of liquid perception, and all of these sub-types correspond to what Deleuze calls molecular perception, with the perception-image revealing a “genetic element” of the movement-image, that is, a non-human eye. He also states that at the next meeting, participants are expected to intervene with ideas for research directions.

Cinema 1.8 – January 26, 1982

After reviewing the key points of the previous session, Deleuze recalls references to Vertov’s cinema experiments, the double operation in his work causing transformation within the movement-image, and he links this to more recent analyses of American “structural cinema” and, notably, the experimental films of Michael Snow and George Landow. These film techniques, including blinking and looping, reveal molecular perception, especially evident in the development of video imagery in American cinema. But, Deleuze links these effects beyond the arts to mind developments with drugs, with Zen Buddhism, and alternate perceptions revealed in the writings of Carlos Castaneda: “stopping the world,” “grasping things within their web” (at a molecular level), creating “lines of power” and light. While these are translated cinematographically, Deleuze argues, in experimental films, they also tend to be reinjected into the cinema movement-image (three examples named are from Antonioni, Bergman, and Godard). After summing up the perception-image analysis with a nine-point outline, Richard Pinhas gives a brief presentation on looping and recording innovations, focusing on the experimental musician, Robert Fripp. Deleuze then moves forward discussing of the affection-image for which he immediately summarizes with the expression, “the affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face.” Of course, Deleuze must distinguish characteristics of each kind of cinema shot, and he links the particular importance of this shot and the fact to the horror genre, notably with the two poles of the close-up, an intensive pole or series through micro-movements, and a pole of reflected or reflecting qualitative unity. Moreover, he links the former to traits of faciality and the latter to surface facialization, both of which he examines at length, notably through a brief history of portraiture. Then, with different cinema references (Pabst, Griffith, Clouzot, Albert Lewin), he creates a polar comparison between Griffith and Eisenstein. Hence, after devoting this session’s first part to chapter 5, he shifts to the first section of chapter 6 in *The Movement-Image*. Following this presentation, the session ends with an exchange between Deleuze and Georges Comtesse (heretofore absent from the French transcript).

Cinema 1.9 – February 2, 1982

Continuing with the second kind of movement-image, the affection-image (remaining in chapter 6 of *The Movement-Image*), Deleuze reviews details offered in the previous session, specifically that this type of image “is” the close-up, which “is” the face, for which he provides numerous details. Of particular note is the establishment of two strictly complementary poles: on the one hand, material traits of faciality entering into intensive series (e.g. degrees of horror), concerning different organs (e.g. an eye, a nose, a mouth); and on the other hand, a qualitative unity of a reflecting surface. Deleuze poses the basic question of how to grasp the identity of the face and affect, so here he draws both from Bergson’s definition of affect – a motor tendency on a

sensitive nerve – and on Descartes’s “Theory of Passions” which also suggest the tripartite structure of images. Then, Deleuze considers more fully traits of the face – notably, individuation and socialization – from which he derives the individuality-collective distinction of the close-up between Eisenstein and Griffith (*The Movement-Image*, ch. 6 part 2), that is, respectively, the indivisible individual, and the divisible aggregate; direct, unbroken intensive series, and the series broken by the binary structure; close-ups that think of something all the way to a pure quality, and direct intensive, and unbroken series that overcome any duality. Then, Deleuze shifts to Sternberg as well as Varda, Duras, and Snow for potentializations of space and lightness, and then to German Expressionism with its complementarity of light and shadow and its conditioned mix of the two. Deleuze closes with the question of the status of the white space in Sternberg’s cinema, to which the Seminar will return after three weeks of winter break.

Cinema 1.10 – February 23, 1982

Deleuze introduces the session by reviewing key points of the previous discussion, notably the two poles of the affection-image, with the close-up, face, affect triad linked to the opposition of Eisenstein and Griffith. Moreover, he compares expressionism and Sternberg, and then reflecting on the close-up itself, he includes examples drawn from Chaplin and Fellini, and distinguishes reflection and refraction, once again evoking Sternberg's relationship to expressionism. Then, Deleuze shifts focus to the face itself, what he calls its power and quality, and also the close-up's triple power of unmaking individuation, socialization and communication. He especially considers Bergman's films in this light, notably "Persona". Then, regarding the close-up's erotic charge, he evokes the complexity of Hitchcock's cinema in relation to Bergman's. Deleuze continues to develop aspects of the close-up, including the face as quality or power, the affection-image as expressed, and he evokes the phantom as an entity that is extracted from all spatio-temporal coordinates, specifically faces. Here, Deleuze refers to Kafka's "series" (translations and phantoms) as part of the author's lived experience and also how these are revealed in Wenders's cinema, bringing him to the end of the material developed in *The Movement-Image*, chapter 6.

Cinema 1.11 – March 2, 1982

At midpoint in the Seminar, Deleuze muses about the difficulty of completing this cinema and thought project in only one year, wondering if it might take him two, even three years! He then continues with the affection-image by reviewing elements of the close-up’s relations with the face, and throughout this session, Deleuze maintains a dialogue with an interlocutor, Alain, a vocal participant in the previous session. Shifting between chapters 7 and 8 in *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze considers a singularity of affects in the facial close-up that is distinct from individuality, called the “here-now” for a thing, a “duration” for a person. Hence the operative question: what does one call the singularity of affects insofar as it is completely different from the individuality of a state of things or of a person? Deleuze creates the distinction between affect and pulsion, the latter being an interiorized affect within a consciousness or a person, and then he proposes that when an affect is actualized, in whatever form, it enters into the domain of the action-image. In a digressive conversation with Alain, Deleuze discusses issues of human inclusion and exclusion as well as what he calls the “pathetic” problem of maintaining one’s

silence (*se taire*), and manages to link this to affect expressed through the face that emits a quality or power (*puissance*) or potentiality, an expression that Deleuze exemplifies with cinematographic forms of terror. The close-up's principal purposes, he argues, is the difficult task of extracting a pure affect, and Deleuze identifies three kinds of affects, those referring to a person (e.g. someone terrified); those referring to another person (e.g. the terrifier); and those referring to object-affects (e.g. a knife). He offers a broad range of terror/horror-affect examples in films, then shifts to examples of supernatural and hallucinatory affects, allowing him to return to the importance of the quality-power of affects in the affection-image. Shifting back to section 3, chapter 7 of *The Movement-Image*, he then offers a concept proposed by Pascal Auger, images of "any-spaces-whatever" (*espaces quelconques*), thus considering another range of examples, including shadow and struggle in German Expressionism, color-images in Antonioni, Godard and Varda, and types of any-spaces-whatever in the Straubs, Fassbinder and Schmid. Finally, discussing directly with Pascal Auger, Deleuze turns to Michael Snow's "Wavelength", i.e. any-spaces-whatever in experimental cinema.

Cinema 1.12 – March 9, 1982

Following a brief q&a, Deleuze approaches the action-image by explaining how philosophers' work intersects with the real and, to illustrate this, he takes what he calls a detour through the 19th century philosopher Maine de Biran, particularly his consideration of the primitive state of the self and consciousness of self. He develops this as an explicit extension of the study of the affection-image before moving on directly to the feeling of reality located in the action-image. Deleuze introduces Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, and suggests how these categories intersect with reflections by Eisenstein and Godard, and even how Whitehead's terminology might provide insight on facets of the movement-image. Based on the Peircian terminology and an illustrative graph, Deleuze introduces a range of "signs", as a basis for starting to examine the action-image at the next lecture. In some ways, parts of this session provide material from earlier chapters of *The Movement-Image*, but are located nonetheless on the cusp of the discussion of the affection-image and the action-image.

Cinema 1.13 – March 16, 1982

Deleuze opens with a number of responses to students' questions, notably on the place of mysticism within the theoretical references (notably, Bergson), but he then returns to open discussion of the action-image within the terminological framework derived from Peirce. The naturalism of Stroheim and surrealism of Buñuel, as well as the literary works of Zola and Huysmans, provide references for the initial discussion, situated within chapter 8 of *The Movement-Image*. In developing these examples, he insists on the importance of the concept/practice of "repetition," indicating Raymond Roussel and Kierkegaard as importance sources for this concept. Buñuel's "The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie," "The Exterminating Angel," and "The Milky Way" provide clear examples, and Deleuze concludes this discussion of a first level of action-image, suggesting to a participant that the next session's discussion will take up his comment about Marco Ferreri's cinema in this regard.

Cinema 1.14 – March 23, 1982

Continuing discussion of the action-image by considering “historico-geographical states of things in precise milieus”, but also how the action-image emerges from “originary worlds”, for example, “a world of hunger, a world of sexuality, a world of money, a world of impulses,” Deleuze compares these two tendencies with continued reference to Buñuel, Stroheim, and Visconti. Deleuze contrasts this with how characters are developed in realism, and he develops this contrast in terms of different levels of Secondness in the action-image, with reference to Lang, Sjöström, the American Western (Hawks), & Flaherty’s documentary style. He also considers different facets of montage of action (which he argues Griffith invented), contrasting it in different directors’ works (Eisenstein, Lang, Flaherty, Chaplin, John Ford). He concludes on the importance of the art of ellipsis in the depiction of behaviors in the grand form of the action-image. Deleuze develops these perspectives succinctly in chapters 8 & 9 of *The Movement-Image*.

Cinema 1.15 – April 20, 1982

After a four-week break, Deleuze undertakes consideration of the degradation of a character in cinema, starting from an Expressionist degradation, and then the problem of the actor and the acting process in different forms (Expressionist, Naturalist, Realist), with reference both to the Peircian categories already introduced and to a broad range of cinema styles and national practices. Deleuze employs a literary text that he analyzed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Fitzgerald’s story, “The Crack-Up”, in the context of American degradation, taking Hawks’s “Rio Bravo” as a key example. This session provides the distinction of the large form action-image, the focal topic of chapter 9 in *The Movement-Image*, and the small form to be addressed next.

Cinema 1.16 – April 27, 1982

In this truncated session (with part two missing and no recording available), Deleuze continues developing different facets of the action-image, notably by contrasting two models, the “large form” described as “ethical” or “epic,” and the “small form”, elliptical, with rhetorical figures implying an absence of information within the narration. Deleuze also examines how a comparative analysis of these forms might proceed, employing data that are successively epistemological, aesthetic and mathematical. While the following lecture commences within examination of the “small form”, in chapter 10 of *The Movement-Image*, what has been lost seems to correspond to chapter 11, part 3, since Deleuze will refer extensively to this very segment throughout the opening part of session 11, Cinema year 2 (22 February 1983).

Cinema 1.17 – May 4, 1982

As the lecture begins, Deleuze still remains deeply within the discussion of the action-image “small form”, particularly focusing on plot characteristics, aspects of dedramatization, with various film and style references. He discusses the literary reference of John Dos Passos and his influence on Italian cinema, but he develops this reflection in terms of a crisis of the action-image, discussing different sorts of strategies: non-hierarchical characterization particularly Altman’s films; what he calls “la balade”, the voyage or road-trip (à la Kerouac), notably in Wenders and numerous American directors; the voyage-event in Truffaut, especially with the actor Jean-Pierre Léaud; the use of clichés (physical, optical, auditory, psychic) to hold together

a disconnected world. He concludes that having spent this lecture on fairly negative filmic determinations, the positive determinations would be evident by reviewing the history of Italian neo-realism. He also points out that this lecture implies the possibility of leaving behind the movement-image, and hence the material developed here is located more concisely in the final chapter of *The Movement-Image*.

Cinema 1.18 – May 11, 1982

As Deleuze comes toward completing the initial discussion of the movement-image, he returns to an earlier discussion at the participants' request in order to continue to contrast the "large form" and the "small form" through the particular examples of the slapstick (or burlesque) style, i.e. Keaton, Laurel & Hardy, Chaplin, material developed in the final section of chapter 10 of *The Movement-Image*. Then, Deleuze takes up the suggestion from the end of the previous lecture, to discuss a positive determination of the action-image in Italian neo-realism, and then contrasts this with French New Wave cinema and other directors of the post-World War II era (e.g., Jacques Tati). He concludes by attempting to define a first trait of the optical and sound situation, proposing to continue this consideration on perception. Deleuze thus moves the discussion toward the transition to the complementary concept with material developed in chapter 1 of *The Time-Image*. We should note that the shift between the session's first part (on the burlesque) to the second (on Italian neo-realism) is quite abrupt, and both the session's shortness and this abrupt shift suggest the possibility that a missing cassette resulted in the middle section being omitted.

Cinema 1.19 – May 18, 1982

Having completed discussion of the action-image, Deleuze continues to confront the concept of pure optical and sound images outlined in the previous session based on Italian Neo-Realism and the different branches of French New Wave. Here Deleuze begins to recap the first year's study of the movement-image given the examples presented concisely in chapter 1 of *The Time-Image*. Unfortunately, throughout the session (and the first thirty minutes in particular), Deleuze is uncommonly disturbed by the comings and goings of students and especially by a loudly squeaking door which breaks his focus, agitates him, and causes him to take several breaks. Gradually, he gains greater ease, and after outlining the commonalities between the French New Novel and the New Wave cinema (of the 1950s-1960s), and Robbe-Grillet's four propositions on the New Novel, he then traces what he calls the collapse of previous, traditional sensory-motor situations (e.g., the old realism, the action-image) which allows the emergence of pure optical and sound situations. Drawing from Robbe-Grillet's reorientation of realism toward surfaces and lines, referring to a total subjectivity, Deleuze takes Scorsese's "Taxi Driver" as an exemplar. Then, in the second part, he returns to Bergson's *Matter and Memory* to consider nuances around memories and perceptions and discusses in this vein Orson Welles's "Citizen Kane" and Resnais and Robbe-Grillet's "Last Year in Marienbad". Deleuze reflects on how one makes mental jumps in order to create memory circuits of recognition, linking this to an introduction of a study of time in Resnais, and closes on a question from Georges Comtesse on "Marienbad" not being a film about time. This session corresponds generally to different sections of *The Time-Image*, notably chapters 1 and 3.

Cinema 1.20 – May 25, 1982

Having ended the previous session on Georges Comtesse's, Deleuze very generously allows him to start the session with an intervention, a detailed follow-up to Deleuze's discussion on Robbe-Grillet's novels in relation to cinema. Then, as he does in the final chapter of *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze links up the long discussion of the different facets of the movement-image with the second major cinematographic concept, the time-image. This development brings him to the real question, as it were: "is there a specific relation between cinema-image and Thought?"

Deleuze considers the two paths developed to answer this, on one hand, the path of the cinematographic Idea and, on the other hand, the suspension of the sensory-motor image and the emergence of the pure sensorial image. In this path, Deleuze outlines four modes of image corresponding to the pure sensorial (imaginary, didactic, critical, and "attractional", that will subsequently be called temporal), and then he develops six sub-modes of the imaginary. In the process of considering the relation of these modes to the general question of "cinema-thought", Deleuze develops an important connection with Artaud understanding of cinema, particularly through his little-known scenarios.

Cinema 1.21 – June 1, 1982

In this truncated session (with a opening missing recording), Deleuze reaches the end of the first year, providing a succinct review of the different signs and images proposed in the Seminar and, in some ways, recapping the contrast he has made between the movement-image and the time-image. At the start, Deleuze seems to have continued from the previous session his review of "modes", particularly the three he had not discussed fully (didactic mode, critical mode, temporal mode), and the last mode seems to have allowed him to introduce the linguistics proposed by Gustave Guillaume. Then, he moves on to a complete review of eight levels that provide course overview, from the opening movement-image, through fifteen kinds of signs (some not having been proposed earlier, in session 12), finally coming to the time-image that overlaps and deepens the opening movement-image.

However, at the end of the session, to a participant's question about the 82-83 Seminar topic, Deleuze initially answers that his next seminar would include a semester on the history of philosophy, and then mentions what he failed to address during this first year on cinema, to wit the question that he really wanted to address: how is cinematographic perception a different perception from our so-called natural perception, and what are the relations between them? This lapse, for want of a better term, will generate not a seminar on the history of philosophy but, in fact, a second year on the material already considered during year 1, but from an alternate angle of approach, as he explains in the opening session in fall 1982.