

**Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries : Charles J. Stivale**

**Cinema, Truth and Time: The Falsifier, November 8, 1983 to June 12, 1984**

(22 Sessions)

In contrast to his rather apologetic return at the start of year 2 to the Cinema material discussed in year 1, Deleuze commences year 3 with a forthright proposal to discuss the intersection of cinema with the theme of truth, time and the falsifier. Adopting this topic, that constitutes the specific focus of chapter 6 in *The Time-Image*, means that Deleuze intends to situate these thematics within the broader framework of the concepts introduced in years 1 & 2 as well as those that inform his development of *The Time-Image*.

**Cinema 3.1 - November 8, 1983**

Deleuze begins to introduce the Seminar theme in a forthright manner, "truth, time, and the falsifier", and also a methodology that works as a dual faceted approach, on one hand, discussions of a diverse group of texts and topics (six in all), and on the other hand, a plea to the participants to begin their own parallel research on these texts or topics for class presentations. The research directions named by Deleuze are: Herman Melville (*The Confidence Man*); Plato (5 specific dialogues, 4 related to the Sophists, one on politics); Nietzsche (*Twilight of the Idols* and *Beyond Good and Evil*); specific filmmakers "of the false" as well as of the time-image (e.g. Welles, Resnais, Robbe-Grillet) and links between both aspects; crystallography and its possible relations to philosophy; and reflection on description and narrative from the perspective of the French New Novel, related to the development of contemporary logic, but also in cinematic narration and description. In this regard, possibly the key point addressed on the research projects is how the global theme connects with the previous year's work, since Deleuze states his explicit intention "not to remove ourselves from what we've been doing for two years". He asks three global questions: What is the strange relationship between the cinematographic image and time and the falsifier? Why is the falsifier a fundamental character from the cinema perspective? And what is the special relationship between cinema and the power of the false?

Then, moving on to the introduction proper, Deleuze reflects at length on the Classical distinction between true and false, emphasizing the need to distinguish real and imaginary, with the false being the confusion of real and imaginary, or of essence and appearance, or of representation and modification. But these distinctions, he also insists, occur in the image, which leads him to modify the previous distinctions, namely: whereas error is the action of confusing the two aspects of the image (that which represents something and that which expresses a modification of soul and body), the true is the action through which the image's two aspects are distinguished, notably by the truthful man (*l'homme véridique*). But even if the false has no form, it does indeed have a power of action (*puissance*), defined as the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary. Deleuze considers various facets of indiscernibility, first with reference to Robbe-Grillet & Resnais's film "Last Year at Marienbad" as well as to Robbe-Grillet's commentary on the film in *For a New Novel*, and Deleuze quickly introduces "the falsifier" as

the “ideal viewer”, the one who constructs the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary. He considers this “concretion” of real and imaginary with reference to Welles’s “The Lady from Shanghai”, and then, in order to establish a formation, a locus for this concretion, he proposes the obverse term to “organic” for the true, a “crystalline formation”, rendering objectively indiscernible that what is real and what is imaginary and in which the power of the false appears in the form of a series of mathematical “powers”. And forecasting developments to come later in the seminar, Deleuze proposes that what one glimpses within the crystal in nothing other than aspects and accents of Time. For reference purposes, many texts and authors that Deleuze cites in the opening discussion are located within Chapter 6 of *The Time-Image*, “The powers of the false,” notably Melville, Nietzsche and Godard. The following session’s discussion is to be grounded in Melville’s tale, *The Confidence Man*.

### **Cinema 3.2 - November 22, 1983**

As is often the case, the second session of the Seminar is attended by students who missed the previous one, so Deleuze begins by repeating the Seminar’s theme (“truth and time: the falsifier”) and indicates that the title is meaningless unless a clear relation can be established between the “character” (*personnage*) of the falsifier and truth and time. Thus, he reviews material developed two weeks earlier, particularly on distinctions between true and false; indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary; powers of the false (distinct from the false itself); the type of image characteristic of this indiscernibility; and crystalline formations in contrast to organic forms. To justify this latter distinction, he draws from Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* to distinguish conscious and unconscious perceptions and emphasize the possibility (in contrast to contemporary ideas) that Time had no more destructive powers than space as regards perception. Then, he links crystalline formations to “descriptions” through Robbe-Grillet’s comments on “Last Year in Marienbad”, and particularly his theories of description and narration. Deleuze describes the circuit of erasure and creation in the process of description and develops a distinction between “organic description” (real distinction of the object from its description) and “crystalline description” (indiscernibility within a description between real and imaginary). Here Deleuze adds “the falsifier” as the creator of the crystal-image or crystalline formation, a first definition that he then examines within cinema (Robbe-Grillet, Fellini, Godard) and concludes that this creation leads to “voyance” (illuminated vision) and thus to power of the false. Moreover, through the narrator, the falsifier author inserts himself within the crystalline formation and, in fact, (second definition) exists not in the singular, but in a multiplicity, a chain of falsifiers with different mathematical powers (exemplified by Welles’s “F for Fake” and Godard’s “Le Grand Escroc”), with truthful and falsifying forms of narration that Deleuze examines from the perspective of subject of enunciation and subject of statement.

The latter part of the session (approximately fifty minutes) is devoted to “applications”, that is, examples of the falsifier and powers of the false in description and narration: first, Herman Melville’s novel, *The Confidence-Man*, particularly how the series of falsifiers develops within the narration. Then, as in *The Time-Image*, chapter 6, he considers Melville’s resemblances with the falsifier and powers of the false in Welles (e.g., “F for Fake” and others), in Robbe-Grillet and Resnais, and in certain directors of Third World cinema in order to prepare the important

encounter between the problem of time and powers of the false, insofar as the powers of the false overlap with filmmakers of the direct time-image.

Let us note that the order of this session's three parts is entirely confused both at Paris 8 and WebDeleuze since the part 2 transcription (approximately 60 minutes) is missing entirely given that the opening transcription (listed as part 1 at Paris 8) does not belong at all in this session but rather as the opening section of the following, 29 November session. With gratitude to Marc Haas's effort and generosity, we establish the transcription order that corresponds to the actual recording.

### **Cinema 3.3 - November 29, 1983**

Deleuze begins by restating that the premises developed in sessions 1 and 2 which provide him the basis for "telling some stories", i.e., tales based on the distinctions that he derived from crystalline formations on two levels: descriptions (both organic and crystalline) and narrations (truthful and falsifying). His "tales" provide different examples of these distinctions, initially from Alain Bergala's 1983 "Faux-fuyants" which offers an exemplary case of the interweaving of crystalline descriptions and falsifying narrations. Then referring to a contemporaneous trio, Welles, Resnais ("Stavisky"), and Robbe-Grillet, he ponders why these "auteurs" develop the series of powers of the false while colliding with the problem of Time. Deleuze then traces the history of the "crisis of truth" in philosophy by seeking "truths of existence" starting with the Ancient Greek Stoics, notably Chrysippus, and Cleanthes. This reflection results in Deleuze adding two more definitions of "falsifier" to the two developed in the previous session and helps him propose the possibility of contingent futures. Then, to clarify at once the different aspects of description and narration already developed as well as these definitions of the falsifier, he pursues the "tales" promised at the start of the session, from Leibniz's *Theodicy*, Borges (two stories from *Fictions*) and a Maurice Leblanc novel (all three will be examined again in session 8 of the Leibniz and the Baroque seminar, the 27 January 1987 Leibniz lecture). With the Leibniz tales of an infinity of Sextus and Adam, Deleuze grounds Leibniz's theory of impossibility within the framework of the falsifier but shows how Leibniz reestablished faith in the truthful God as a conciliation of truth and the force of Time. The Borges stories reinforce the movement of contingent futures ("forking paths") as well as the crystalline image of the pure empty line of Time. The Leblanc novel illustrates this point as well, linking the powers of Time to the powers of the false, and leading Deleuze to conclude, for the future sessions, that truth's interrogation can only occur at the same time as a pure line of Time is revealed, since it is Time that formally places into question the form of the truth.

Let us note that as with the previous session, the order of this session's three parts is entirely confused both at Paris 8 and WebDeleuze since the part 1 transcription is missing (or rather, is inappropriately located in session 2 as its first segment) while part 2 appears twice on each site. With gratitude to Marc Haas's effort and generosity, we establish the transcription order that corresponds to the actual recording.

### Cinema 3.4 – December 6, 1983

This session is, in some ways, a chance for Deleuze to sum up the previous sessions – “to readjust my levels of analysis” (*refixer mes niveaux*) -- and, in particular, to develop points suggested the previous week as well as to review the Seminar’s research topics and then to organize student presentations. He emphasizes three themes: the indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, for which Robbe-Grillet’s *For a New Novel* offers the clearest clarification. Deleuze distinguishes aspects of Italian Neo-Realism with reference to films by Antonioni and Fellini. For the former, Deleuze discusses his objectivist, distanced view of characters as well as the disconnected spaces therein. Associated with Antonioni is Fellini who accomplishes similar goals, according to Deleuze, but from the opposite direction, that is, respectively, objective distance in contrast to intense subjective sympathy. Then the second theme is the indiscernibility of true and false, no longer concerning a theory of descriptions, but rather a theory of narrations, specifically falsifying narration or powers of the false. He points out two paradoxical aspects: from the possible emerges the impossible; and second, that which is or has been, is not necessarily true, thus two extremes between which the powers of the false are developed. These are two figures of the falsifier that he locates in Welles’s cinema. The third theme stems from the first two, the crisis of truth linked to the emergence of the time-image, evident for Deleuze in Welles, Resnais, and Third World cinemas. He concludes the session’s first part by asking who was first to save the concept of truth, and the answer, Leibniz, brings up the previous session’s examples supporting the theory of compossibility illustrated by Borges’s tales and Leblanc’s novel.

Then, referring to links between truth and Time, he considers two interviews with Antonioni in which the filmmaker, in one, distinguishes himself from Italian neo-realism as creating “neo-realism without the bicycle”, a neo-realism that takes Time into account rather than just movement, and in the other, clarifies what’s terrifying about Time is that, at our birth, Time loads us with feelings, and truth is placed into direct relation with Time through a morality of owing or obligation (“you must”). Then, Deleuze introduces three texts from Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science* as a means of summing up the previous development and reflects on the importance of Empedocles as having understood that, behind the problem of the true and false, lies the problem of love and hate.

The session’s third part is intended to be, first, a question-answer session with the participants, most notably a key intervention by Georges Comtesse. Second, Deleuze concludes by soliciting volunteers from the participants to undertake oral and/or written projects on the different topics for complementary research throughout the Seminar. He reviews the list that he considerably expanded since the first session: 1) crystallography, 2) Melville’s novel (*The Confidence-Man*), 3) the time-image in Welles & Resnais, 4) Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science*, *The Twilight of the Idols*, and *Zarathustra*; 5) five dialogues by Plato (cited on 8 November) and 6) for any logicians, consideration of theories of description and narration, particularly from the perspective developed by Gérard Genette.

### Cinema 3.5 – December 13, 1983

Deleuze continues his reflection on the relation of Time with powers of the false by situating the concept's source in the history of philosophy. Here, responding to a student's request, he considers Kant, the antinomies, Ideas (self, God and world) as ideas and illusions of Reason. Deleuze considers how one can make sense of a proposition, by linking the concept to affects and to percepts, and he refers to William James as founder of a philosophy of concepts and percepts. Two digressions occur during this segment: Deleuze's restatement for his rationale for not holding the seminar in a larger auditorium, and also a discussion of the principles of his reflection on "what is philosophy?", notably the triad of concept-affect-percept which connects to the main discussion. Then, through Kant, his reflection includes several key expressions (*formules*) summing up Kantian thought, notably a new conception of Time with the Hamlet quote, "time is out of joint", and through the Rimbaud quote, "I is an other", the fundamental subjective relations with others, thus a response to Descartes's Cogito, but also a fundamental transformation of our relation with Time.

Then, he states the session's main theme: truth comes into crisis once it confronts Time, but something in the order of morality forces it into this confrontation. After defining the "true world" (the world of forms grasped by the concept as being without perspective) inhabited by the "truthful man" (*l'homme véridique*), Deleuze explains that this was a concept hidden in plain sight throughout Classical philosophy. Here, with the "truthful man" and Nietzsche's moral perspective from *The Gay Science*, Deleuze returns to the question of the falsifier, concluding that the form of the true gave way to the power of the false. He draws from Nietzsche the importance of "the great love" in creating concepts, that is, a "state of life", or better still, both from Nietzsche and Spinoza, passages or affects to greater or lesser powers of life, *puissances*, in direct relation with the force of time. And in light of the importance of increasing one's power of life for increasing powers of perception, he calls on Virginia Woolf (*Mrs. Dalloway*), Melville, and Henry James, then turns to Spinoza's general definition of affects (book III of the *Ethics*) to define the crucial trio of concepts: the concept, the affect, and the percept, in their relations to the domain of power of life, *puissance*. He then links the importance of increasing one's powers of existence to Nietzsche's formulation: "it's what makes us lighter and lighter," which brings Deleuze to consider love and the power of existence, optical point of view and perception, Time as a force of affect. All these are aspects of the crisis of truth and powers of the false, and in contrast to ancient philosophy's trait of seeking to discover an a priori truth, Deleuze emphasizes modern philosophy's idea of comprehending innovation (notably, Bergson, Whitehead, Sartre), as the very possibility of creating truth.

### Cinema 3.6 – December 20, 1983

Deleuze concludes the first trimester's work by conjoining discussion of the Seminar's main philosophical texts (notably, by Plato) with the main literary texts (notably, by Herman Melville). However, before discussing Plato, Deleuze remains with Nietzsche's *The Twilight of the Idols*, on the theme of the real world becoming a fable, with Deleuze pointing out that the artist places appearances higher than reality. He also recalls the phrase from *The Gay Science*, "abolish your venerations," in order then to call what follows the five-step tale of the truthful man, to which he links Plato and Platonism, Nietzsche's relation to Plato, and Herman Melville,

their commonality being: to have lived and undertaken the confrontation with the form of the true and power of the false. Deleuze offers a careful review the truthful man's emergence in Plato as well as in Melville's *Pierre, or the Ambiguity*, thereby raising the problem of the model and the copy, and the truthful man, as user, linking the copy to the model. But as Plato's *The Sophist* asserts, there is no organic reality, only shadows and reflections, or degraded copies, or crystalline apparitions, bringing the truthful man into the power of the false. Tracing the five steps, Deleuze associates other texts with this activity: Melville's *Bartleby*, as truthful man; *The Confidence-Man* as original man, but also in *Moby Dick*, as well as Empedocles, the first to have created the original from love-friendship, that is, the appearance unified by love; the ordinary man, in Maurice Leblanc's character Balthazar, holding the discourse of the law, that of arranging perspectives, but also the Nomos-Physis in *The Protagoras*; the remarkable man, in Melville's Ahab and Claggart in *Billy Budd*, Don Quixote, and in Plato's *Gorgias*, the importance of *kairos* (the favorable occasion), and the final part of *Zarathustra*; finally, the emergence of something new, Nietzsche's "overman," Melville's *Pierre or the Ambiguity*, the object of modern philosophy versus the object of ancient philosophy, the truthful man now transformed as inventor of the new.

### **Cinema 3.7 – January 10, 1984**

Having traced the five steps of man before the holiday break, concluding that the truthful man is the one who invents new matter, Deleuze reminds the class of the year-long theme, the crisis of truth under the effects of Time, based on specific authors (notably, Plato, the Sophists, Nietzsche, Melville, Robbe-Grillet) and cinema references. Rather than Time's content of change placing the notion of truth into question, this occurs through Time's force in the form of the paradox of contingent futures (with its two paradoxes), and what enters into crisis is precisely the organic form of the true. Deleuze proceeds to detail a series of five oppositions between truth and its questioning, moving from the organic description, the organic distinction of real and imaginary, to the form of the concept of truth and the circuits of the crystalline formation, in contrast to the point of indiscernibility within the formation and the depraved perspective.

Then Deleuze returns to material from earlier seminars to oppose the sensorimotor (i.e., truthful) linkage with Bergson's help, contrasting the sensorimotor recognition with attentive recognition which are linked, respectively, to organic description and the crystalline formation. Here Deleuze indicates that, for cinema (with reference to Bresson) the collapse of sensorimotor linkages gives birth to the recourse to disconnected spaces which define crystalline linkages. This shift from outside into the crystalline formation leads to the final distinction, between organic or truthful narration and falsifying narration under the power of the false. With these traits in place, Deleuze studies how the form or force of Time operates in order to place truth into question. To do so, he states that the Seminar will henceforth focus on the reversal of time-movement that liberates the pure force of Time as well as on how modern cinema was created as a form of placing movement into question. Deleuze begins by tracing some ways in which this time-movement reversal arises in different film authors (Welles, Resnais, Mankiewicz), especially (for the latter) questions of bifurcation in the manner of Borges and Fitzgerald. He concludes that what is in question is at once a reversal of Time's subordination in relation to movement and in relation to memory,

which leads to him to propose studying next how this occurred in Kant's philosophy as well as in Ozu's cinema.

### **Cinema 3.8 – January 17, 1984**

Having concluded in the previous session that what is in question is at once a reversal of Time's subordination in relation both to movement and memory, Deleuze proposes studying this process in philosophy and cinema, two separate and yet interlinked histories. He now outlines this two-faceted historical set, four philosophical moments (from Antiquity to the 17th century; the Kantian reversal, and beyond) and four within cinema, and then opts to begin on the cinema side rather than launch into Kant. Thus, he moves through different phases of the shift from movement toward Time with reference to several cinema authors (Pasolini, in particular), noting the importance of montage in relation to the movement-time intersection. Deleuze also discusses another conception of the movement-time intersection, derived from Neoplatonism, in which the intersection occurs with the soul's movement in space. This leads Deleuze to conclude that Time is successive states of light as they directly express the changes of an expanding soul. He also recalls the sensorimotor linkages in the movement-images that assure three specific types studied in previous seminars (perception-image, affection-image, action-image) and engender an indirect image of Time. But he also insists that despite his description of the movement-image, numerous movement-image aberrations occurred during this era, and through which one could glimpse aspects of the direct time-image.

Then, referring to a text by Jean-Louis Schefer, *L'Homme ordinaire du cinéma*, Deleuze emphasizes that what changes is not movement, but disturbance added to movement, and through which, moreover, cinema is the sole experience in which Time is rendered as a perception. Deleuze then follows Schefer's theses again with reference to cinema authors (again, Renoir, Pasolini, Dreyer, Epstein, Rossellini, Visconti). Deleuze concludes that since this is but the first aspect of this revolution, an outline is needed for next time: the sensorimotor situation linked to the indirect image of Time; the disconnected situation of its sensorimotor extension linked to the direct image of Time; these two levels corresponding to Bergson's two forms of recognition, sensorimotor recognition and "attentive" recognition (of an object's optical and sound description). The seminar is also remarkable since Deleuze is interrupted by university management and returns to announce that henceforth the course will meet in a larger room, that Deleuze describes as "our dream house".

### **Cinema 3.9 – January 24, 1984**

Continuing with the history of movement's reversal by Time, Deleuze notes that the previously outlined four characteristics of the "mutation" (the reversal of the relations of movement and time) continue through the particular importance of aberrations of the movement-image as both a philosophical and cinematographic problem. Deleuze reviews the four characteristics developed in the previous session, notably the use of montage within the movement-image to yield an indirect image of Time; the unfolding of a sensorimotor schema revealed through the types of images studied in the previous Cinema seminars; the image as "organic description" linked to a "truthful narration" with the subject passing on the same level from one object to another; and the aberrations of movement within the movement-image that, according to Jean-Louis Schefer,

produce a disturbance in the image. He hypothesizes that through these anomalies of movement, a *direct* time-image might emerge, and he offers examples of anomalies of movement from Epstein, Dreyer, and Italian Neo-Realism and French New Wave, where entry into Time became evident. Deleuze reflects on “two manners of being powerless” that emerged in cinema following World War II, one in classical cinema, the other with a “limit situation” and a kind of mutation, transforming into a cinema of “clairvoyance” (*de voyant*), with Antonioni, Fellini and Visconti revealing different facets of this new “seeing”.

Then shifting to the initiation of pure optical-sound situations, Deleuze suggests that what arises increasingly is an entire pedagogy of the image teaching viewers to become “seers”. Then, to discuss the shift toward a direct time-image, Deleuze relates the four phases of burlesque in cinema, with Jerry Lewis and Jacques Tati as the two exemplary filmmakers, whom he contrasts with the musical comedy. This leads Deleuze, through Bergson, to propose a system of circuits (physical and mental, real and imaginary) through which the crystalline description emerges as well as the falsifying crystalline narration, for example, in Godard, Antonioni and Ozu. After developing links to the classification of signs, Deleuze considers the possibility of developing “a new pedagogy of the image”, that is, a means of analyzing the image differently from how the movement-image was analyzed, by emphasizing the image’s conditions rather than its elements, and also maintaining an entirely new relation with thought. To examine the direct time-image, Deleuze selects Ozu and what he calls the real subject in his works, the most daily, banal, ordinary life, and its flip side, the remarkable and extraordinary, contrasting him with Antonioni as well as to an article by Paul Schrader. Instead of this distinction, Deleuze finds in Ozu two types of ordinary, one that is frankly banal, but another which that of the visionary. Finally, Deleuze links Ozu’s works to the development of still life in Cézanne and concludes with a topic for future discussion: what Cézanne achieved with apples, Ozu achieved with the vase, their link being a “bit of time in pure state”, that is, the unchangeable form of what changes, the pure optical sound situation, the direct time-image.

### **Cinema 3.10 – January 31, 1984**

After reviewing aspects of the previous session, notably the circumstances determining the revolution that placed the sensorimotor situation into question, Deleuze suggests that the rest was no longer action, but “la balade,” the stroll (discussed in *The Movement-Image*, chapter 12), transforming cinema into “cinema of clairvoyance” (*cinéma de voyant*). The great authors of this reversal include Rossellini, Resnais and Ozu, and Deleuze traces some consequences of this reversal, and then reminds participants that their collective goal is to shift this very discussion into the philosophical domain. Before doing so, however, he invites two Japanese students (one being Hidenobu Suzuki, responsible for all the Deleuze seminar recordings) to contribute some insights regarding Ozu’s cinema. Both contributors challenge Deleuze’s conception of the time-image as still life and introduce the additional concept of indirect free style in Ozu’s images. In responding, Deleuze reviews the distinctions he has already detailed -- distinctions that he needs, while perhaps others do not -- in order to resolve a particular problem, that of distinguishing the optical-sound situation (empty interiors and exteriors) from the direct time-image (still life). In fact, Deleuze sees the former as enveloping the latter. To Hidenobu Suzuki’s detailed reply,



Deleuze's recasts his position within (or in contrast to) the terms of his own problematics and classifications, emphasizing how Ozu's film technique shifts entirely from the sensorimotor schema. He thus employs the interventions as a way of clarifying the previous distinctions on "chronosigns", "lectosigns", and "noosigns", suggesting that while Suzuki's remarks emphasized the "lectosigns" in Ozu (original relations between elements of the image), Deleuze is more interested in the "chronosigns" (the direct time-image through the optical and sound system more specifically). He also employs these interventions, that he calls "collective research", to emphasize the oft repeated lesson: each time one has an idea, one must determine precisely the problem with which the idea is engaged.

Then, suggesting (at the 80-minute mark) that he had gone too quickly in the previous session, Deleuze reviews the four stages of the burlesque previously detailed, carefully outlining the traits and representatives of each stage: the first, sensorimotor stage (e.g., Max Sennett); the second, refined and affective sensorimotor stage (e.g., Harold Lloyd, Laurel & Hardy, Buster Keaton, Chaplin); the third, a sensorimotor stage framed by logical interrelations of mental images (Groucho Marx, W.C. Fields, and Chaplin's sound films); the fourth, the pure optical and sound situation (Jerry Lewis & Jacques Tati). Whereas the first three stages belonged to a burlesque of the machine and tool, the new burlesque corresponded to the rise of diverse forms of electronics. After the break for smokers, Deleuze shifts toward philosophy, recounting how, "once upon a time", with the ancient Greeks, the movement-image unfolded an indirect image of Time through a vast cosmic machine, the "planetarium", but that simultaneously, aberrations of movement within movement threatened to tip the world into Time freed of movement. Deleuze considers more closely the very definition of movement in terms of the number, requiring the resources of Greek astronomy, the summary of which Deleuze derives from Plato's *Timaeus*. Through this reflection, Deleuze reconsiders the question of aberrations through Greeks' understanding of these as raising doubts about the possibility of measuring movement via Time. Deleuze outlines their conception of different sorts of aberrations -- at once mathematical, physical, psychopolitical, and economic -- and following Aristotle, he develops the hierarchy of beings, in which anomalies exist between each level, in order to provide the concluding question (for the next session): where do all these aberrations of movements lead us?

### **Cinema 3.11 – February 7, 1984**

Deleuze continues to consider aberrations in movement, shifting the analysis to the philosophical side by reviewing some key questions: in what conditions is Time subordinate to movement? In what conditions does Time free itself from movement? And what are the consequences of this liberation? He then reintroduces the "cry" that "everything is ordinary," and proposes that this applies to Time as daily banality, but also to something quite diverse. Deleuze considers how, related to this axis of the daily, philosophy stands in contrast to and rises above the daily, juxtaposed through reflection on the eternal, thereby linking it to production of the new. With references from Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Bergson, Deleuze considers the difference between transcendence and the transcendent, and then develops a philosophical montage as a means of obtaining Time from movement. Thus, he devotes the session to reviewing the Greeks on different facets of movement vis-à-vis Time: their sense and forms (astronomical and

physical) of the “eternal return”; Hesiod’s *Theogony*, and the mythic model’s collapse giving way to philosophy and the model-copy relation; Plato’s *Timaeus*, particularly on mixture, geometrical progressions, the image and copy, and their relation to movement and Time, notably how Time is domesticated by the demiurge; Aristotle’s hierarchy of “sublunar creatures” as they relate to aberrations, and how this system of movement of circular souls relates to Time; Anaximander, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, and representations of the complexity of aberrations as they relate to Time. Finally, Deleuze summarizes theories developed by Eric Alliez linking the Marxist system of circulation to Aristotle, and then with Alliez contributing, he and Deleuze close the session, first with Alliez commenting on Deleuze’s presentation, then in a dialogue, with Deleuze proposing that Alliez continue his intervention three weeks hence, after the winter break.

### **Cinema 3.12 – February 28, 1984**

Following a three-week winter break, Deleuze reviews key points previously developed: Time, as number or measure of movement, is an indirect image of Time; Plato’s conception was of a local movement, having extensive quantities, and the configuration of the world’s movement, privileged points operating in matter, occurred through the demiurge’s imposition of an interplay of planes on which the points exist. Deleuze reviews the hierarchy of “sublunar creatures”, concluding: the closer one gets to the Earth, the more movement has anomalies, and the more time takes on independence, that is, a value in itself, transforming itself as now subordinate to a purely rectilinear type of movement. Then, as movement tends toward abstraction, the more concrete Time becomes, movement depending on it, and hence the import of Hamlet’s cry, “time is out of joint”, Time on a tangent. Deleuze notes also that the Greeks lived this through the disappearance of their system of compensating imbalances via punishments. Deleuze moves beyond Greece to Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, the “all is contemplation” and the *Ennead*, particularly *Ennead* 3.8, on negative and positive time, from which he derives the reason through which we know time, no longer the world and its movement, but the soul (Time’s *ratio essendi*).

To emphasize the importance of the Greek formal configuration, Deleuze creates a detailed contrast between the Egyptian monoplanar perspective, bas relief, and conceptions of volume and depth, and how depth differs in Plato (and for the Greeks) with their main characteristics of rigidity and light, hence the triumph of the cube (the Greek temple) over the pyramid. With the Greek formal configuration developed, Deleuze also distinguishes the element of light in the Greeks as it relates to the possibility of depth, in distinction with the particular chromatism of Egyptian and Byzantine art. He then returns to Plotinus and the depth or profound as “depthless” *sans-fond*, and the liberation of light given that, for Plotinus, light creates form. Deleuze links this to a more contemporary artist influenced by Byzantine art, Delaunay, and his transformations beyond cubism in order to make a connection to the Plotinian revolution regarding Time: Time is the indirect image of movement, but that of the soul, the movement of light itself, hence two philosophical distinctions that he proposes to consider next.

### **Cinema 3.13 – March 13, 1984**

Deleuze ended the previous session with the Plotinian revolution regarding Time, i.e., Time as the indirect image of movement, that of the soul, the movement of light itself, two philosophical distinctions that he develops here. Deleuze says one has to discover another “number and measure” of an intensive quantity than the “number and measure” of extensive quantity that Plato proposed. Deleuze reviews the four key points of distinction between Plato and Plotinus and their eras, notably with the emergence of figures of light in the latter through form; the transformed concepts of depth; transformation of concepts of movement into light; and the expressions of light replacing the model-copy metaphor. Deleuze then states the basic problem to be addressed: what is the nature of the movement of the soul as an intensive movement? Deleuze maintains that this is a matter of distinguishing between intensive and extensive quantities and can only be understood in terms of numerical powers (not ordinal number sequences). Moreover, arguing that Time is inseparable from a collapse (*chute*) of the soul, Deleuze explores the differences of this term from Plato to Plotinus for whom this collapse is no longer pejorative. Then, in a lengthy discussion of Plotinus’s *Ennead*, he links this to understanding the shift of light that falls or collapses (in several senses). Drawing on Bergson’s comments on Plotinus, Deleuze notes that in the intensive quantity, each unit is actual and encompasses a virtual multiplicity, in a spiral fashion.

Yet his reflections have led to a first problem of whether this intensive quantity encompasses the distances to which it is both inferior and the superior. His second problem then is: in what sense is disaggregation or the fall real and/or ideal? And a third problem: what is zero, and how is it possible? The focal problem is how to reconcile an ideal collapse with a real collapse, and he resolves this by returning to the questions of powers. Deleuze notes that at each degree of power is contemplation (linked here to English Romanticism), and the conversion of virtual multiplicity occurs by linking superior and inferior powers within a spiral returning infinitely to contemplation, a process to which Deleuze associates Maldiney and Seurat, but more importantly, Byzantine art. Deleuze then concludes that the intensive movement of the soul is an aggregate, the series of powers in depth; divisions in length within the system; and Time as the new number or measure of this special movement, Time as a synthesis operated by the soul. This links to the next session, Deleuze intending to comment on Kantian innovation in contrast to Neo-Platonism and intensive movement.

### **Cinema 3.14 – March 20, 1984**

Deleuze proposes finishing the philosophical aspect of the time-image, and then see what the global consequences are at once for philosophy and cinema, with a goal of deeper analysis of the crystal-image. Deleuze opens a parenthesis about the crystal-image, notably the need to consider both its optical properties and sound, acoustic, electric properties, as well as their links to Time, particularly requesting that interested seminar participants undertake research on the crystal and associated facets to assist him in forthcoming sessions. Deleuze cites Guattari’s work in *The Machinic Unconscious* as a source for the crystal as concept (applied by Guattari to Proust) and proceeds to reflect on music in film in relation to numerous filmmakers’ use of film and different kinds of music therein, notably the western (“High Noon”), musical comedy, the Fellini-Rota

intersection and creation of different kinds of refrain-gallop pieces. Deleuze also reads Clément Rosset's historical details concerning the refrain-gallop conjunction (following which arises Deleuze's befuddlement about the origin of the term "rock") and finally, he discusses the refrain qualities of Ravel's "Boléro".

Then, closing the parenthesis on the crystal-image, he returns to the main discussion, addressing the intensive movement of the soul (working from a drawing on the board) following the series of powers, and then discussing the movements of the soul. He points particularly to Nicholas of Cusa's concept "possest", that is, immanence, power (*puissance*), hypostasis, a path of emanation from one degree to the next in a complex movement of procession, emanation, and conversion. Then, regarding intensive quantities, he emphasizes Kant's debt to the Neo-Platonists for his understanding of this concept, and he indicates that the scale of intensity relaxes as one proceeds downward along the scale. Then Deleuze moves into a "second part," how is Time going to emerge as number of this movement? As this requires understanding the concept of eternity, known also as "aiôn", Deleuze examines details of Neo-Platonists' distinctions, notably from Damascius, regarding eternity and powers in order to reach the fundamental activity of the soul, that of synthesis, and Time being realized as a result of synthesis realized by the "pure now" (or "nûn"). Here distinctions arise of past and future in relation to the present, and Deleuze creates links on this point to the soul, the production of intensive quantity, and constitution of an originary Time that measures intensity. Citing a prose text by Paul Claudel on the knowledge of Time, Deleuze moves forward with the generative difference for movements of Time linked to "the fear of God" as well as to the Time of crisis. So, Deleuze concludes with a question for the next session: how will the synthesis of originary Time itself operate and then bring forth fear? To address this, Deleuze suggests finishing the consideration of Plotinus, then proceeding to consider Saint Augustine, followed by Kant.

### **Cinema 3.15 – March 27, 1984**

Having invited input from students on topics related to the crystal-image, and also having previously invited Eric Alliez (7 Feb session) to make a presentation, Deleuze spends part of this session in discussion with Alliez after his intervention (only partially audible). However, Deleuze first returns to several points from the previous sessions "in order to finish this matter of Time and movement of the soul". First, on the Greek *nûn*, or the "pure now", the privileged instants that traverse extensive movement, the late Neo-Platonists use the term *complicatio* for all the intersecting degrees of power, this copresence belonging to eternity, i.e., to the *aiôn*, yet allowing the degrees still to be distinguished from within. Deleuze's concludes that the *nûn* is power-action through which the soul is distinguished under an intrinsic mode of distinguishing of superior units from inferior units. And as *nûn* engenders Time through a process of self-distinguishing, Time will be the measure of intensive quantity and movement of the soul. On a second point, Deleuze considers the effects of the zero degree of power and the ideal collapse (*chute*), matter's extension into space. This leads Deleuze to see a pure instant creating a synthesis between past and future, and derived Time receives a measure of originary Time such that originary Time is both the number of intensive movement and the measure of derived Time,

or else the pure instant drops, reflected in a purely vanishing moment. Yet, he links this synthesis to a solemn fear of these forms of Time throughout history, and he draws from Plato's *Parmenides*, on which the Neo-Platonists commented (notably, Proclus and Damascius), and also from the Russian novelist Mikhail Saltykov on the pure nothingness of the drunken stupor.

At this point (after 90 minutes), Deleuze calls on Eric Alliez to discuss St. Augustine, and this presentation (here newly restored) outlines points in which Plotinus and St. Augustine overlap to some degree. The rest of the session consists of Deleuze and Alliez in dialogue about distinctions that St. Augustine developed in syntheses of Time in contrast to the Neo-Platonists. After a break, Deleuze summarizes the progress made during the year to date, with the exploration of three indirect images of Time. Then Deleuze provides a number of difficulties that he lists as a sequence of anomalies, and then gives alternative responses: either attempt to save the primacy of movement over Time, or accept Time's liberation from movement, that is, saving the harmony of the soul or accepting Time being "out of joint", with various consequences. The final consequence is the disturbance and crisis of truth with the powers of the false, and the result for cinema after World War II is to reconstruct direct time-images. For the next session (after Easter break), Deleuze proposes to consider the philosopher who constructed the first time-image, Kant.

### **Cinema 3.16 – April 17, 1984**

Having previously traced the philosophical development of movement in relation to Time, Deleuze now considers Kant's role in the reversal of movement and Time. Deleuze summarizes the earlier work: in Antiquity in quite a number of different ways, Time depends on movement, whether it's the extensive movement of the world or the intensive movement of the soul. But even to the extent that Time and the time-image depend on movement, thinkers of Antiquity indeed marked various anomalies of movement with which they risk upending the Time subordination to movement. So, to finish this reflection on how movement and Time intersect from the philosophical perspective, Deleuze considers "how Kant operates" by following his path through the *Critique of Pure Reason* in several points: movement is in Time and not the reverse, Time depending on nothing but itself; there is no originary Time, as for the Ancient philosophers, but only ordinary Time, or (Deleuze citing Hamlet), "time out of joint". A third point is that if there is only ordinary Time, there are no truths to be discovered, thereby creating a radical change in the status of truth, with everything under Time collapsing and Time's synthesis bearing on its modes: succession, simultaneity, and permanence. Deleuze relates this to the matter of the "I" and "me" as phenomena in Time, to which he applies another poetic formulation, Rimbaud's "'Je' est un autre" [I is an other] as identical with Kant's position. He contrasts this with Descartes's philosophical "Je pense, donc je suis," suggesting that the Kantian cogito is "cracked" (*fêlé*) by the thread of time. Time's independence, then, occurs at three deepening levels: first, an ordinary Time that rejects the originary Time/derived Time distinction; second, the emergence of a pure form of time creating the "I" as an other; and third, truth losing its ancient model of privileged positions and instants, appearing instead as the production of "the new", a correlate of ordinary Time just as discovery of the true was a correlate of originary Time for the Ancient philosophers. Thus, instead of confronting the indirect image

of Time, henceforth the seminar will confront direct images of Time, but what precisely are these? This is the question to be considered next.

### **Cinema 3.17 – April 24, 1984**

Deleuze begins by summarizing the year's work so far: first trimester, the force of time, power of the false, and crisis of truth; second trimester, the philosophical reversal of the movement-time relation. The third segment will be a double inquiry: trying to see how a direct image of Time or time-image is constructed, as well as "Time" as a concept, and understanding the relations between this concept as philosophical and this image as aesthetic. To dispute the commonplace of cinema's time being that of the present, Deleuze takes issue with Robbe-Grillet's writings and asserts that cinema's time is instead an indeterminate temporality. Moreover, the more that aberrations of movement gain independence, so too the time-image ceases depending on movement, as was evident from the philosophical perspective in the previous sessions. And to demonstrate that montage becomes the operation through which Time relations are determined, or at least complicated, in a direct time-image, Deleuze points particularly to Welles, Fellini, and Dreyer. Then, Deleuze considers the problem of depth of field (in contrast to depth within the field) as a cinema technique, first, in a debate between André Bazin and Jean Mitry, then within the history of painting, and then in the work of different filmmakers, notably Welles, Griffith, Dreyer, Stroheim, Renoir. Reflecting on these depth of field images, he notes that through contraction of the background, these images are sometimes linked to attempts at recalling something in the past, and through expansion of the background, a complementary sign of a "sheet of the past" is placed under scrutiny. Thus, Deleuze maintains (with reference to examples from "Citizen Kane") that rather than being a spatial effect, depth of field in this way becomes a function of temporalization, inserting the viewer into a direct time-image. For additional examples of the direct time-image, he describes aberration in tracking shots by Visconti and their inherent "invitation" to recollecting the past (of others), but not one's own memories; and Robbe-Grillet and Renais's "Marienbad" also provides another case of the disconnection from space and, through aberrant movement, a shift into a direct time-image.

He then turns to the "flat image" that causes an experience of time in a pure state, particularly in Dreyer (who was a founder of the flat image), but also in Ozu (notably his still life). This consideration of cases of an indeterminate direct time-image, exploring a past prior to any precise memory, leads Deleuze to the emergence of pure optical and sound situations, a "clairvoyant cinema" (*cinéma de voyant*). Deleuze had previously considered this cinema as a "cinema of strollers" in any spaces whatever (*cinéma de balade*), in which movement depends on Time itself. Deleuze explains how certain cinema effects differ in this new cinema, notably the direct time-image in relation to decor, in Rossellini's Italian neo-realist films. However, he proposes the American musical comedy as truly developing decors that have their own value and causing dancers to emerge within these pure optical and sound situations, that is, the rhythmic relations of time-image. Considering films by Stanley Donen, Deleuze contrasts dance styles and rhythms with these time-images between Fred Astaire and Gene Kelly. Deleuze closes on the importance of non-localizable links, evident in dance cinema, between pure optical and sound situations and world movements, that is, direct time-images or rhythms creating circuits, across

different planes, of actual images linked to virtual images. Hence, the question for the next session is to determine just what these virtual images are as they connect to the actual image through non-localizable links. [Note that Deleuze begins the class by emphasizing that due to national holidays on May 1 and May 8, the next class will take place two weeks later, much to his annoyance.]

### **Cinema 3.18 – May 15, 1984**

Returning after two holidays falling on successive Tuesdays, Deleuze continues with exploring facets of the direct time-image in cinema, turning now to the special conditions of what he calls the crystal-image, that is, the means to grasp a direct time-image in person, “a bit of time in a pure state”. He draws upon scientific concepts, notably crystallography, defining the crystal-image as something consolidated from two images between which an exchange is necessarily produced, creation of a crystal circuit, through which the actual becomes virtual while the virtual simultaneously becomes actual, thus a crystal-image as a time seed in which time is visible. In order to establish a solid basis for developing these hypotheses, Deleuze returns to the sensorimotor situation of the movement-image with its characteristics, always connecting within Euclidean space to an indirect time-image, while also linking as actual to a particular spatial mode, known as “hodological space” (cf. *The Time-Image* chapter 6). In light of this review, Deleuze turns to the other side, non-sensorimotor situation, cut off from sensorimotor extensions, the actual not being linked to another actual, or limit situations in which one experiences a state of clairvoyance, *voyance* (cf. *The Time-Image* chapter 3).

Then, to examine different ways in which the pure optical and sound situation is realized, Deleuze considers different examples, notably manifestations of “pure description”, e.g., use of decors in musical comedy (Stanley Donen), use of exteriors as in Italian Neo-Realism and French New Wave. Moreover, different types of space emerge for the pure optical and sound situation, notably of disconnected parts and jump cuts (Resnais, Antonioni, Cassavetes). He also points to the possibility of linking images in a circuit between actual and virtual images, and he maintains what the non-extended situation connects with is the recollection-image, “a virtuality in the process of becoming actual,” as well as different levels of descriptions. Here, Deleuze draws from Bergson’s term “attentive recognition” to outline the circuit process between actual and virtual coalescing a consolidation of levels of recollection. Some examples of these reveal different manifestation of this process, from Marcel Carné’s “Le Jour se lève”, revealing the process of a virtuality attempting to be actualized as a function of an actual present. Deleuze insists that this process of the recollection-image is not adequately displayed through the flashback, and with reference to films by Mankiewicz, he suggests how the filmmaker employs fundamental bifurcations of time in the recollection-image. As an alternative response to explain the virtual-actual circuit process, Deleuze then shifts toward the important role in this process of the dream-image, drawing from Bergson’s explanations of sleep and dreaming, and then from different cinema sources (notably René Clair, Buñuel, Harry Hathaway, Buster Keaton). Deleuze concludes by promising to continue to explore the actual-virtual circuit and then to enter fully into the crystal-image in the following class.

### **Cinema 3.19 – May 22, 1984**

Deleuze commences by summarizing earlier key points, notably the shift toward the actual image ceasing its linkage with other actual images and entering into a circuit with the virtual image, forming a consolidated coalescence of actual image and virtual image, giving rise to a “seer” (*voyant*) and creating in this way a “description”. Here, an avenue for inquiry arises: just what is this virtual aspect, this virtual image? He reviews the three conclusions developed in the previous session during which he relied on key insights from Bergson: that the recollection-image, not being a virtual image, is unable to furnish virtuality as it is precisely in the process of being actualized, and likewise the dream-image cannot furnish this. Seeking an even wider frame than recollection and dream, Deleuze considers the world and universe as horizon of virtuality, a movement from being-in-the-world to a “societizing” (*mondanisation*) giving rise to states of estrangement or enchantment (*féerie*), but similarly, this horizon cannot furnish the virtual. In discussing the third possible hypothesis, Deleuze draws from films by René Clair and Murnau, as well as (once again) from musical comedy (Donen, Minelli), particularly the décor and the dance styles, to suggest the shift from sensorimotor linkage to pure optical and sound situation.

So, rather than expanding outward, he focuses on the inner circuit to find the coalescence between actual image and virtual image. Deleuze again calls on Bergson to help grasp this coalescence, as the objective coexistence of present and past, subjective coexistence of perception and recollection, and contemporaneity of both. Emphasizing the status of pathological states, such as with paramnesia or others, where recollection is strictly contemporaneous with the present that it once was, Bergson develops this image as mirror reflection, which Deleuze argues is a coalescence between an actual and *its own* virtual image, called a crystal-image, the site of an actual-virtual exchange. Deleuze describes its different facets, and to develop its 360-degree effect, he refers to different filmmakers (Losey, Max Ophuls). Then, he begins to offer additional elements to the crystal-image definition, which becomes the site of exchange between the first pair, virtual-actual; the second pair, clear-opaque; and the third pair, seed-milieu. While Deleuze states that this hypothesis of three dimensions as his stopping point, he continues this hypothesis thanks to an invited male speaker, Jouanny (first or last name not indicated), who considers precise aspects of crystallography, notably the variability of the crystal’s properties (anisotropy), the ambiguity of fluidity for a crystal, and aspects of the process of crystal germination and crystallization. These comments allow Deleuze to propose considering in the next session both the spatial aspects of the crystal image as well as a possible non-chronological time.

### **Cinema 3.20 – May 29, 1984**

Having proposed the hypothesis of different facets of the crystal-image in the previous session with the help of an invited lecturer, Jouanny, Deleuze begins with an explanation of the process of developing a concept by translating or transducing from scientific fields (a statement of methodology that outlines the key terminology of *What Is Philosophy?*). Deleuze then asks the guest presenter, Jouanny, to discuss the specific question: if one were to try forming a concept named “crystal-image” as philosophical concept, what could we draw from crystallography? Despite many inaudible moments in the presentation, Jouanny’s fills in numerous aspects of the crystal-image for Deleuze’s further development, suggesting two axes, a light-color axis and a



space axis, with the crystal-image always participating as dual facets of coalescence. Deleuze indicates that he would prefer three axes and, suggesting a film by Welles (*The Immortal Story*) as fulfilling these aspects (cf. *The Time-Image*, ch. 4), he concludes that of the three pairs of circuits that he proposed in the previous session – actual-virtual, clear-opaque, seed-milieu --, only the latter constitutes a viable axis. Deleuze evokes at length the example of a Polish filmmaker, Krzysztof Zanussi, to render more concrete the different axes he has discerned. Through Zanussi's film "Illumination," Deleuze illustrates the clear-opaque circuit within the dramatic importance of actors, also considering the circus track in Tod Browning's "Freaks," and other circuits in films by Hitchcock and Kon Ichikawa.

Then, Deleuze proposes a third site for circuits, that of the boat, first in paintings by Turner, and in literature, within major novels by Melville as well as in his novella, "Benito Cereno", which also links to the germ-milieu pair. Returning to cinema, Deleuze maintains that this pair is illustrated by Fellini's "And The Ship Sails On", and in different, indeed opposing ways, in Herzog's "Heart of Glass" and Tarkovski's "The Mirror". This leads Deleuze to spatial considerations within geometry, notably Riemann spaces where the interconnection of its spatial parts remains undetermined, then evoking different filmmakers in this regard (Resnais, Ozu, Antonioni, Bresson). In a recapitulative segment, Deleuze summarizes the arc of the yearlong analysis: whereas action occurs within the movement-image corresponding to an indirect representation of Time, one "sees" within the crystal image, that of the pure optical and sound image corresponding to a direct presentation of time. In this way, we see Time in its very foundation, and here Deleuze summarizes four states of the crystal-image, evoking Ophuls as cinematographic exemplar as well as Renoir for acting, and Fellini for the germinal facets of Rome, a multiplicity of entries into the crystal-image, all requiring additional reflection in the final two sessions of the year.

### **Cinema 3.21 – June 5, 1984**

Having begun studying examples of the crystal-image and ending the previous session on Fellini's forms of entry (into Rome) in his films, Deleuze continues identifying "regimes of crystal-images", reviewing several already identified (the perfect crystal-image, Ophuls; the cracked crystal-image, Renoir), developing the third one more fully (the germinal crystal-image, Fellini). In this regime, the signs of Time are reversed: in contrast to Renoir's cinema, in which salvation is situated along the gallop of passing presents while the conserved pasts fall into the crystal, in Fellini's cinema the gallop of passing presents leads to death while the conserved pasts are those leading toward salvation through the refrain. Then, introducing a fourth regime (the crystal-image in decomposition, Visconti), Deleuze likens Visconti's conception of "mondanité" (worldliness) to Proust's, that is, a world outside the laws of nature and God, but one that is also a "pure crystal". Yet, this world in decomposition is not one of creators, but of aristocrats imbued with knowledge of art which, ironically, separates them from any possibility of creation. Moreover, Deleuze suggests that History in Visconti's films, while not itself being in decomposition, nonetheless accelerates the crystal's decomposition process.

Then, having completed discussing the crystal-image's elements as well as the steps through which it proceeds, Deleuze moves to a third topic, what is it that one "sees" within the crystal? A direct time-image reveals itself in this crystal, a bit of Time in a pure state, insofar as it simultaneously causes the whole present to pass while conserving the whole past, that is, Time's essence. This leads to the hypothesis of two direct time-images, one founded on the present, the other on the past. Deleuze considers each of these figures in detail, starting with the conserved past, insisting that it has nothing to do with a recollection-image; returning to Bergson's schema of the inverted cone, he argues that Time is the coexistence of all one's sheets (*nappes*) of the past, but each section of this past has a particular limit, one's actual present. To consider this coexistence of virtual sheets of past (as distinguished from recollection-images) as the first figure of the direct time-image, Deleuze draws first on films by Resnais (notably, "Je t'aime, je t'aime"). Then, emphasizing how these sheets of the past emerge from paradoxical spaces – paradoxical since their characteristics are fundamentally temporal --, Deleuze draws chronologically from Welles through his use of depth of field as a temporal factor (from "Citizen Kane" to "A Touch of Evil") to reveal Time's perpetual state of crisis. Deleuze concludes by suggesting that projective geometry, that is, depth of field, explains choppy, brief montage, and that shadow is introduced through depth of field as a correlate of projective geometry.

### **Cinema 3.22 – June 12, 1984**

Deleuze indicates that he had hoped to have a guest speaker start the session (an American friend of Georges Comtesse knowledgeable in science fiction). Instead, Deleuze begins to summarize the two forms of direct time-image, the presents that pass while the pasts are conserved, as well as the projective geometry discussed at the end of the previous session. Once again, several examples support these aspects, notably Robbe-Grillet, and he defines the two formulations of the direct time-image as coexistences, simultaneity of deactualized points of presents (present of present, present of past, present of future), and coexistence of sheets of virtual past. Deleuze again evokes Welles's cinema in which the "center" is transformed in a manner comparable to what occurs in seventeenth century Classic and Baroque thought and art. As for the sheets of virtual past without centers, Deleuze returns to Resnais's and Welles's preoccupations across their films.

After a brief and somewhat awkward intervention by the invited guest, Deleuze turns to a list of end-of-year conclusions (not in the order in which the topics were considered):

- 1) drawing from logic and literary criticism, the distinction between organic description and crystalline descriptions, or pure optical and sound descriptions, with frequent reference to Robbe-Grillet's theory of description.
- 2) relations between the real and the imaginary, that is, opposing two regimes of real and imaginary, on one hand, organic relations between these terms, opposed to indiscernible relations between the terms, the opposition in which the crystal-image properly speaking is located, and leading Deleuze to define a "philosophy of the crystal".
- 3) organic or spatial narrations (those of sensorimotor linkages) as distinct from crystalline narrations, the former referring to hodological space and abstract space, the latter referring to a kind of pre-hodological space, or as "space of passion", which Deleuze links to modern films with passion as theme – a space of disparate yet adjoining aggregates. Here Deleuze links eight kinds of this space to different filmmakers considered during seminars 2 and 3.

4) one of the main focal points of the current seminar, the regime of an indirect time-image devolving from movement, and a crystalline regime of a paradoxical direct time-image devolving from anomalies.

5) truthful narration (linked to organic descriptions, organic narration, hodological and Euclidean spaces) and the falsifying narration (linked to the direct time-image) which points to the crisis that disturbs truth. Deleuze insists that movement did not place truth into question, but rather Time, and that through these five points, two great regimes of the image are detailed, especially in their intersections.

Deleuze also points out that in each case, two regimes are distinguished, but that they constantly impinge on one another, notably as an artist might dabble in one regime but also in the other as well. In any event, these artists do not “apply” ready-made devices, but seek to develop what each has on hand. To illustrate these aspects of creative originality, and notably of the powers of the false linked to description and narration, Deleuze points to several film examples (Varda’s “Documenteur”, Robbe-Grillet’s “L’Homme qui ment”, Welles’s “F for Fake”). Deleuze also indicates how Nietzsche endowed falsity with the power of the false, a power through which “the falsifier” emerges (in contrast to “the liar”). Here, Deleuze recalls the two texts studied earlier in the seminar, Melville’s *The Confidence-Man* and Nietzsche’s “Zarathustra”, book IV, and indicates that abolishing the world of appearances is something attained by the filmmaker Fritz Lang, followed by Welles. Deleuze also points to Nietzsche’s will to power which is power of the false but, at its highest degree, is a creative force to create truth, just like narration as power of the false, just like the task of philosophy.