Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries : Charles J. Stivale

Cinema and Thought, October 30, 1984 to June 18, 1985

(26 Sessions)

As he starts the fourth year of his reflections on relations between cinema and philosophy, Deleuze explains that the method of thought has two aspects, temporal and spatial, presupposing an implicit image of thought, one that is variable, with history. He proposes the chronotope, as space-time, as the implicit image of thought, one riddled with philosophical cries, and that the problematic of this fourth seminar on cinema will be precisely the theme of "what is philosophy?", undertaken from the perspective of this encounter between the image of thought and the cinematographic image.

Cinema 4.1 - October 30, 1984
To introduce the new teaching year, Deleuze outlines what has already occurred: whereas during the first two years (1981-83), his focus was predominantly on the movement-image, the third year was on the time-image. The fourth and final year will be on the topic “what is philosophy?”, but on the level of an encounter between cinema and philosophy. Hence, Deleuze searches for “cries” in philosophical discourse, of which he provides some examples, and then returns to the intersection of philosophy and cinema with a long review of pioneers of the cinematographic image and theory, with critical references to Serge Daney and Louis Schefer. He also considers the intersection of linguistically inspired semiology (notably, by Christian Metz), as well as thinkers (Elie Faure, Paul Virilio) who see linkages of the State and cinema, war and cinema, propaganda, and Hollywood. He also reflects on ways in which cinema at once offers a site from which thinkers can emerge and way that cinema provides movement-image to thought, particularly the “automatism” in early cinema to which he devotes a full hour, considering philosophical and psychological precedents, artistic examples, concluding with several particular film examples (notably, Pasolini and Bresson). This development constitutes the first part of this year’s program outline, which continues in session 2, and both of these sessions follow to a great extent the material that Deleuze develops in chapter 7 of The Time-Image, “Thought and Cinema.”

Cinema 4.2 - November 6, 1984
Having started laying out the year’s program in the previous session, Deleuze continues this opening by considering cinema as art of the masses, then by asking: why did cinema from its very start consider itself in relation to thought? Deleuze’s reflections throughout this session focus on the automatic nature of the cinematographic image and its connections to unconscious and subconscious mechanisms of thought and psychological automatism. Deleuze considers origins of this automatism, returning to Spinoza and Leibniz for “spiritual automatism”, seeking at once its genetic and geometric definitions and deriving an axiomatic resulting from these. Deleuze links this development to Valéry’s Monsieur Teste and to Heidegger for the insistence
impelling spiritual automatism through a kind of shock. Deleuze thus provides numerous examples from cinema and literature, and then proposes as a second aspect of the Seminar’s goal to study the mutations in the image of thought and the consequences resulting from this within the cinema-thought relationship. He begins outlining series of four mutations, notably in the need for a body as well as for a brain, and then traces these summarily through a number of filmic examples, and then to several philosophical examples, notably in Hume and Kant. He concludes that cinema would be an attempt to return us to a belief in the world, despite humans having seemingly been stripped of means to react, through new means of resistance and revolt. Deleuze concludes by confessing his need to return to this question of belief in the world more fully. Much of this development corresponds to section 2 of *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.

**Cinema 4.3 - November 13, 1984**

Stating his dissatisfaction with how he presented some of the material in part of the previous session, Deleuze returns to clarify a number of points already considered: the description of the image of thought as chronotope or space-time, as a way of saying that any method of thinking, insofar as it guides the procedure for thinking, has both a spatial and a temporal aspect. Deleuze develops the two aspects of the method in greater detail, as it presents an “order of reasons”, hence in temporal fashion (example: Descartes). The method also presents a spatial aspect fulfilled through its own methodical distribution implying a determination of goals, specifically that of truth, sought through three different methods, by Plato, Descartes and Kant, that Deleuze examines. Then he proposes to return to the double automatism of thought and the cinematographic image, but to a long query by Georges Comtesse about other aspects of the previous session, Deleuze responds in dialogue, noting the rupture that occurred in cinema between pre-World War II and post-war. He then returns to the four mutations within the image of thought and of cinema, the first being the substitution of knowledge by belief, tracing the model of knowledge previously held by the image of thought, through several stages and philosophers. With Kant, this leads to a rupture of man and the world, a rupture of the sensorimotor link. Referring to the previous year’s study, Deleuze points to this rupture seen through three forms: pure optical and sound situations, indifferent events, and empty or disconnected spaces. He draws on a number of authors here (notably Rossellini and Godard), suggesting that cinema is capable of reintroducing a belief in the world, in life in the world, especially believing in the body, through a kind of cinema of bodies. With reference to Artaud, Deleuze considers the second mutation of thought as “giving oneself a body”, necessarily invoking Spinoza, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as well as numerous filmmakers, to conclude that bodily postures are genetic elements of belief, hence leading to promotion of cinema of attitudes of the body. To conclude, Deleuze warns that the next session will require introducing some mathematics to the discussion. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.

**Cinema 4.4 - November 20, 1984**

Deleuze picks up the two conjoined points previously developed – the substitution of belief for knowledge and the need to seek the body’s position – which led to the possibility through cinema
of believing in the world. Deleuze notes the body’s fragility, indeed its fatigue, as well as its replacement with prostheses, and then proceeds to the third mutation, thought that comes from the outside. Clearly, Blanchot and Foucault are the models of this mode of reflection, for whom this also means: what is thinking itself about? Deleuze proceeds through the classical model of knowledge, then through the history of thought (Hume) and linguistics (Jakobson) on to the All (le Tout) as thought of the inside (Hegel). He returns to Foucault and Blanchot in order to study diverse facets of this Outside of thought, linked to a diverse array of writers, thinkers, and filmmakers. Deleuze enumerates its three key traits at length, with considerable discussion of Blanchot’s *Infinite Conversation*, linking this to cinema (Godard especially, Antonioni, De Sica). Deleuze concludes the third mutation, thought of the Outside, with its linkage of four notions (idea of process; of essential rapport of thought with an unthought; of a primary interstice; and of bodily fatigue and power of the Outside which is also the direct presentation of time). This force passes through the body and through its fatigue which, as the next session reveal, links directly to mathematics. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.

**Cinema 4.5 - November 27, 1984**

As this session seems to start in mid-discussion by Deleuze of a geometrical drawing on the board, and also as the session’s length (97 minutes) is short by one-third compared to usual sessions, it is likely that the opening cassette for this session is missing. Later in the session, Deleuze indicates that he is in the process of retracing the mutations detailed previously, so examining the isosceles triangle -- with the purpose of showing the fundamental paradox, of a gap occurring within a seemingly complete straight line – would seem what occurs in the missing opening section. He discusses the mathematician Richard Dedekind’s research on the problem of the continuous, the infinity of breaks and gaps in the line, irrational breaks (as developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7). He then links this to a comparison of pre-World War II and post-war cinema: whereas (following Eisenstein) pre-war cinema worked greatly through breaks of a rational type (e.g. continuity errors), new characteristics emerge in post-war cinema that Deleuze reiterates as the goal of the seminar’s study, notably irrational breaks (such as continuity errors for themselves). Deleuze associates these cinematographic traits to those located in Blanchot and Foucault – thought of the Outside, the interstice. Deleuze first discusses Eisenstein in some detail on rational breaks, then shifts to post-war examples (Bresson, Godard, Resnais) and completes discussion of the third mutation (thought of the Outside) and shifts to the fourth mutation, “give me a brain!” and (developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8) cinema of the brain with numerous filmmakers. So, for the next session, Deleuze proposes to consider the pre-war and post-war developments in the scientific conception of the brain, and asks the participants to review their discussion of the three mutations – belief, body, and the Outside – in order to understand their intersection with the fourth mutation, the brain.

**Cinema 4.6 – December 11, 1984**

As Deleuze indicated in the previous session, he devotes himself entirely to discussing diverse facets of the brain, a theme through which he completes the first portion of the year’s content (as developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8). He begins by discussing three viewpoints (biological,
experiential, brain as cinema) from which brain transformation has occurred, and starts the biological, scientific review by opposing a so-called classic point of view to a so-called modern one. In the former, he discusses the classical, arborescent model of the brain with numerous theoretical references (notably Jakobson on aphasia) emphasizing complications posed by this model. Then, from the lived, experiential point of view, with reference to Simondon, Deleuze considers, the levels of interiority and exteriority in the human body, leading Deleuze to the hypothesis that processes of organic integration and differentiation are strictly inseparable from distinctions between interior and exterior milieus. With Simondon, Deleuze considers the brain’s topological structure, particularly questions of outside-inside, and this leads Deleuze to the “brain as cinema” viewpoint since the brain would function as the co-presence of outside and inside, empty and full, past and future, these terms relating particularly to cinematography. Deleuze then explores in considerable detail different facets of the brain topography (with reference to Simondon and Changeux). He then considers the lines of research that might help understand cerebral linkages, and he describes four such lines undertaken by Markov; within cosmobiology; by Prigogine and Stengers; and by the cybernetician Pierre Vendryes. This leads to the final question of how transmission occurs within the brain, answered by: relinkages in independent series. This answer leads him finally to consider cinema no longer as linkages but relinkages of independent series.

Cinema 4.7 – December 18, 1984

For the year-end session, Deleuze develops three specific aspects of the program: first, he completes the discussion of the brain, particularly with examples of what Deleuze calls cinema of the brain, notably Eisenstein and sci-fi (developed in _The Time-Image_, chapter 8). Deleuze returns to certain points discussed regarding brain functions and linkages, particularly what he called “relinkages” with their own integrity, from which he describes three cinematographic concepts that are interconnected: the white or black screen and its varieties; the irrational break or cut; and the relinked parceling (morcelage). On the third concept, he comments at length about Andrei Biely’s (or Bely) novel _Petersburg_, that unfolds in a brain-cosmos (or noosphere) and describes its “system of echoes” with Resnais’s noospheres (“Muriel”, “Providence”, “Je t’aime, je t’aime”). He also calls this cinema as being quite close to painting, distinguishing between two tendencies, Kandinsky and Klee, and he also connects this with American experimental films (Brakhage, Landow). Insisting that the participants keep this “trinity” of concepts in mind for the return in the new year, Deleuze then provides a recap of the material covered thus far: first, the simple departure point of cinematographic image’s specific characteristic, being automatic, hence thought and automatism, at once psychological and spiritual; second, cinema’s evolution toward a new spiritual automatism (e.g. Syberberg), and this image’s evolution in terms of thought’s relations with thought itself unfolds following ten specific points developed throughout the first seven sessions. Finally, following a break, Deleuze discusses with students (for 45 minutes) what his expectations are moving forward, stating that after thirty years teaching, he has found a simple approach, not student exposés, but rather Deleuze interviewing specific students on specific topics for which they’d have prepared in advance. Several students offer different topics and paths, from which Deleuze draws some valid
suggestions, including a long intervention by Georges Comtesse to whom Deleuze responds (in the final five minutes) with his usual generosity, but also with particular frankness.

**Cinema 4.8 – January 8, 1985**

To start what he calls the “second trimester”, Deleuze evokes the previous session’s point by point recap for his goals of connecting thought to cinema, starting with an essay by Eisenstein on this very topic, which will then lead toward considering how to conceive of a cinema-language and its relations with the thought-image. Deleuze points to Eisenstein’s questions on movement and montage that he proposes to examine in detail. First, he emphasizes how the cinematographic image is analogical as a function of modulating its own object, and after contrasting Pasolini’s semiology to Eco and Christian Metz, he distinguishes the cinematographic image from the analogical image. Returning to Eisenstein, Deleuze contrasts the pictorial image in painting to the cinematographic image, insisting that an image creating its own motion is one also creating a shock to thought, that Eisenstein attributes to oppositions of movement-images. After returning to some philosophical basics (notably Aristotle’s classification of oppositions, then Tarde’s 19th-century classification), Deleuze considers Eisenstein’s view of the movement-image, leading to Eisenstein’s discovery of harmonics in the cinematographic image. After linking this to a reflection on synesthesia (notably in Merleau-Ponty), Deleuze returns to Eisenstein’s list of five oppositions, revealing a passage from a visual percept (I see) to a physiological percept (I feel) and on to the concept (I think), with these linking to five forms of montage. Deleuze follows Eisenstein as he explains various composition techniques that allow him to communicate these effects, and then considers several film examples (from Eisenstein, Buster Keaton, Renoir). He finally summarizes the development examined, from the percept-image to the clear concept through the sensory shock, then from the confused concept to affect-images reintroducing an affective shock, together creating a complete circuit. All of this is part of the creative domain, a topic for subsequent reflection. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.

**Cinema 4.9 – January 15, 1985**

Having begun the “second trimester” by considering Eisenstein’s five oppositions and conceptions of sensory shock, Deleuze reviews the moments of this previous analysis of the thought-image relations for Eisenstein (corresponding to the development in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7). After reviewing the two movements in these relations, Deleuze moves on to the third plane in Eisenstein, the identity of image and concept or “Nature and man”. Then, after contrasting other ways of conceptualizing this rapport (e.g. Eisenstein’s dispute with Griffith and with Stalinists), he reviews key points derived from Eisenstein (relations of images with a whole; relations with a thought that can only be depicted via subconscious images; sensorimotor relations between man, nature and thought), leading Deleuze to ask “what comes next?” Here, Deleuze outlines three forms of rupture: a sensorimotor rupture; rupture with the theme of nature, cinema’s object defined as artificiality; and rupture with metaphor (literality or nothing, with reference to Robbe-Grillet). He pursues this rupture with references to Duras and Godard, to which he adds a fourth, the collapse of interior monologue. With cinema moving from classic
structures, Deleuze reflects on how cinema might have become “serial,” and compares this to developments in serial music (a discussion to which Richard Pinhas contributes). Here, Deleuze draws characteristics from Robbe-Grillet, irrational cuts opposed to harmonies, unlinking opposed to tonal center, and relinking of both sides of the irrational cut opposed to linkage as a center’s function. Deleuze considers the serial image’s traits in Godard, and he derives a series of categories -- the imaginary, fear, commerce, and music – and asks participants to consider in the next session what the connection is between these categories.

Cinema 4.10 – January 22, 1985
This session in some ways breaks from class as usual with Deleuze proposing to converse at length with an invited participant, musicologist Pascale Criton. As a result, first, the development that preceded this session (notably, on serial traits in cinema) is suspended to some extent, and second, Deleuze’s comments are barely audible since, after the first ten minutes, he exchanges seats with Criton and thus moves away from the microphone. After outlining three key topics for questions, Deleuze asks Criton to comment on these areas from a musicological perspective. Following her responses, Deleuze seems to summarize what he has gleaned from her remarks and entertains additional questions from students. Then, with nearly an hour left in class, he returns to his regular seat and comments at length on Godard’s cinema, with some assistance from Georges Comtesse. He emphasizes the Godardian categories detailed in the previous session, his serial method, and offers a particular example of theatricalization with an actual philosopher, Brice Parain, in “Vivre sa vie”. He then connects the serialization of daily life to Kantian distinctions of constitutive and reflective terms in judgment and offers an extended example from jurisprudence (the taxi driver’s dispute regarding smokers) to link up categories and generalities and begin to develop a method for constructing series. Much of this development corresponds to The Time-Image, chapter 8.

Cinema 4.11 – January 29, 1985
Deleuze continues from the previous session’s discussions (with Pascale Criton and other participants) by studying the serial approach, providing precise definitions of terms (series, genre, category), situating the irrational cut in this structure, and distinguishing horizontal serial constructions from vertical ones. He chooses Godard’s “Pierrot le fou” to exemplify the horizontal, locates a shift in “Sauve qui peut (la vie)”, then moving into “Passion” and “Prénom, Carmen”, Deleuze finds various modes of vertical construction (a generalized serialism). Deleuze draws several larger conclusions in light of the Eisenstein-Godard comparison, and draws a parallel between Hegel’s phenomenology and logic, on one hand, and figures of consciousness/series of images and concept moments/categories, on the other. Regarding figures of consciousness, attitudes and categories, he refers at length to a post-Hegelian philosopher, Eric Weil, to whom Deleuze connects an article on Godard by Serge Daney, and through these, Deleuze introduces the concept of distinct forms of discourse, at once in philosophy and cinema. Attitude, he maintains, gives to the image a possibility of being serialized, while what gives categorical or coherent discursive value to something is the gesture (geste). In order to reflect on the two couples, images/categories and attitudes/gesture, Deleuze cites four exemplary texts, one
by Brecht, two by Barthes, and the fourth, by filmmaker Raymonde Carasco, a commentary on Barthes’s *L’obvie et l’obtus*, and Deleuze mentions that he’ll be interviewing Carasco at the next session. As Deleuze comments on Barthes’s essay “Le troisième sens” (The Third Sense), he draws upon different examples from Eisenstein, and finishes with a reference to Carasco’s essay, “L’image-cinéma qu’aïmait Roland Barthes” (The cinema-image that Barthes loved), suggesting what in both Barthes and Carasco’s commentary he does not grasp, hence the need for the next session’s discussion/interview. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.

**Cinema 4.12 – February 5, 1985**

Reviewing earlier key points, Deleuze recalls his use of Godard’s cinema as a key exemplar particularly of horizontal and vertical constructions of image series, and then considers the succession of attitudes or gestures as a material definition of the content of the series. Deleuze proposes considering the attitude-gesture link by separating the lived (le vécu) from story or action and recalls Barthes’s commentary on the senses of “obvious” (obvie) and “obtuse” (obtus), linking the latter to gesture’s definition. He then outlines four questions arising from this connection, especially given Raymonde Carasco’s interpretation of Barthes. Deleuze invites Carasco as a guest participant to “converse” with him about these questions (for 48 minutes). As in the 22 January 1985 session, Deleuze places himself away from the microphone during the discussion, rendering his remarks mostly unintelligible. Carasco maintains that the sense of “obtuse” passes through writing (écriture) or poetic art. She attempts to explain how this “sense” emerges in Barthes’s reflections on the frame (photogramme) while also developing a cinematographic conception of frames through montage. She reflects on the importance of a rhythm concept for understanding poetics of cinema which she links to a global mental film image or totality in different filmmakers and also to Blanchot’s sense of images’ duplicity. Returning to his seat, Deleuze reviews his understanding of Carasco’s responses and then considers the gesture in Godard in terms of theatricalization, noting how one masks or disguises oneself as a kind of passage, in light of the obvious-obtuse distinction, a kind of fabulation. In this regard, he refers to Quebec filmmaker Pierre Perrault and his “cinema of the living”, concluding that the people pass through fabulation, which then leads him to reflect on political cinema, third world cinema, emphasizing Godard’s key role inspiring the former, the latter developed through Jean Rouch’s ethnographic approach. Deleuze concludes this reflection on “cinema of attitudes and gestures” as well as politics by emphasizing their links to fabulation, and for next time, Deleuze suggests as an important philosophical touchstone Bergson who defined a “fabulating function”, to which he links the French New Wave. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.

**Cinema 4.13 – February 26, 1985**

While indicating that there remains material to discuss from the previous session (before the three-week break), Deleuze outlines what the seminar’s next section will entail, notably to consider the shift in what is readable and visual from the silent era into classic and then modern cinema eras. He then returns to his “arbitrary comparison” between Eisenstein (representing classical cinema) and Godard (representing modern). For the former, Deleuze chooses
“Alexander Nevsky” to examine what he calls “tonal cinema”, but also emphasizes distinguishing “cinema of truth” from the real-fiction opposition. As for Godard, Deleuze makes a quick comparison (announced at the end of session 9) between two successive films, “Sauve qui peut (la vie)” and “Prénom Carmen”, to distinguish the shift from tonal to serial approaches. He also picks up the previous emphasis on attitudes and gestures within the series, offers four examples (Carmelo Bene; French New Wave and post-New Wave; “feminine cinema”; and so-called “direct cinema”, notably Cassavetes), and then reintroduces the “power of fabulation” evident in the cinema of Perrault and Rouch. Then, at the start of part 3, Deleuze changes direction entirely away from the previous topics and shifts into what will probably be part of the seminar’s next section, on languages and “langue”, semiology cinema, stating that for a session and a half, the focus will be “a series of commonplaces on linguistics.” Before doing so, he returns to the history of philosophy, considering at length the intersection of Kant with Christian Metz’s semiotics, the extent to which Metz might be considered Kantian. The session ends, quite abruptly, with Deleuze emphasizing the importance of the notion of the tribunal in Kant’s philosophy. Much of this development corresponds to The Time-Image, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.14 – March 5, 1985
Although this session is shorter than usual (total length of 92 minutes), Deleuze develops initially a long review of the previous session (without returning to the discussion of Kant vis-à-vis Christian Metz, and to material in The Time-Image, chapter 2), and then studies at length Metz’s idea, « le cinéma, langage sans langue » (cinema, language without “langue”). Deleuze defines the distinction between the key terms, starting with “langue” by pointing to a number of ways in which linguists (notably Martinet) have defined this. He also considers if specific speech acts can be called cinematographic, and if so, if then can be classified. The answer is “no” to cinema as “langue,” but finally yes to cinema as language on the condition that the cinematographic image can be reduced to a non-linguistic, analogous statement, and if this statement can be governed by syntagmatic and paradigmatic rules, conditions that lead to discussion for another session on: what are properly cinematographic syntagma and paradigms, and what is (for Metz) the Grand Syntagmatic?

Cinema 4.15 – March 12, 1985
Having previously initiated a study of semiocriticism, notably within Christian Metz’s perspective (notably, in The Time-Image, chapter 2), Deleuze returns with a detailed examination inspired by the question with which the last session ended, “what are properly cinematographic syntagma and paradigms, and what is the Grand Syntagmatic?” Recalling the three basic elements of Metz’s semiocriticism, he re-emphasizes the distinction of a cinematographic language, rather than a “langue”, existing through a double articulation, signifying units or monemes and distinctive units or phonemes. As Deleuze develops this exposé, however, different students’ questions force him to start over from the previous session’s development. After some quick summarizing, Deleuze moves into Metz’s Grand Syntagmatic, with its eight autonomous segments that Deleuze outlines, and then he explains why a Grand Paradigmatic would be infinite, hence impossible. Deleuze notes Metz’s movement away from Hollywood’s “cinema of narration” toward “New Wave”, notably in Godard’s “Pierrot le fou,” but ironically
maintaining that this cinema is absolutely narrative as well. Deleuze notes also Robbe-Grillet’s fidelity to Metz, and with the term “dys-narrative”, the outcome that the paradigm wins over the syntagma in this cinema. Then, Deleuze develops the “codes” that work through the cinema image, detailing five (or six) codes of which the code(s) of montage seem all-encompassing. With this outline in place, Deleuze moves forward slowly to explain the sources of his misgivings (troubles) about Metz’s perspective, first, regarding narration as so-called “fact”; second, regarding the cinematographic image as an analogic statement, where he proposes to continue the discussion in the next session. Much of the later development corresponds to The Time-Image, chapter 6.

Cinema 4.16 – March 19, 1985

Having outlined aspects of Christian Metz’s semiocriticism in the previous session, Deleuze continues by explaining his misgivings about three key facts, the first -- the so-called “fact of narration” -- having already been explained. While Deleuze attempts continuing his explanation of misgivings, students’ questions, as in the previous session, cause him to develop a number of digressive responses, one notably on the Palestinians and the concept of a “people to come,” another on “direct cinema”, notably by Pierre Perrault and Jean Rouch. On the latter filmmaker, Deleuze and Georges Comtesse engage in a particularly pointed exchange (at approximately minute 79 of the recording). Deleuze then continues with the second misgiving, the cinematographic image supposedly being assimilable to a statement through analogy, to which Deleuze responds that movement within the image renders it indiscernible as well as its object. Here he evokes Pasolini’s theories as well as the theory of dual articulations, and he then returns to the movement-image to counter Metz’s semio-critical perspective on the image. He also returns to the previous discussions of cinema as language, not “langue”, drawing from Pasolini as well as Eisenstein. Then, he moves directly toward different linguistic perspectives, finally coming to Hjelmslev who allows him to conclude that cinema is the non-linguistically formed matter that is a correlate to any language or “langue”. Then he turns to the “strange linguistics” of Gustave Guillaume and his concept of a word’s “signified of power” (signifié de puissance), his “processes” to distinguish the particular and the general in signification. Deleuze seeks a clearer sense of the “matter” developed from Hjelmslev and, with Pasolini, considers cinema as a “lingue” of reality” linked not to paradigms or syntagma, but solely to a signified of power. Deleuze indicates that these are the points to which he will return in the next session. Much of the later development corresponds to The Time-Image, chapter 10.

Cinema 4.17 – March 26, 1985

First addressing several topical questions (including how to react to institutional racism in France, implicitly in light of the growth of SOS’s Racisme’s responses to the Front national popularity and aggressions), then listening to an amusing musical interlude (Strauss’s “Also Sprach Zarathustra”), Deleuze announces that the class will complete a “difficult part” and then proceed to an easier part. In the first of these, he continues with the previous session’s linguistic intersections, notably Gustave Guillaume and Hjelmslev, reviewing the former’s concept of “signified of power” (particularization) linked to the “signified of facts” (generalization), and then outlining Guillaume’s distinctions on other parts of speech. All of these correspond to
“processes of thought-movement”, with verbs producing processes of “incidence” and “decadence”. After noting the difficulties that Guillaume’s views posed for established linguistics, Deleuze argues that Guillaume’s was a system of differential-inclusive oppositions with significant consequences subsequently for semiology and post-structuralist linguistics (e.g. Todorov, Ducrot, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva), bringing Deleuze back to Christian Metz’s cinematographic semio-criticism. Reviewing previously developed key points, Deleuze argues for an “anti-semiological semiotics”, one developing a Bergsonian process of thought-movement. As a coda to this analysis, Deleuze reflects on the role of interior monologue, notably in early Soviet cinema (developed in The Time-Image, chapter 7), and announces that after the Easter break, several participants (e.g. Giorgio Passerone, Eric Alliez) would intervene directly to discuss a number of these points. Finally, Deleuze turns toward the session’s “easy part” consisting of an extended review of the cinematographic statement (énoncé) as it develops through the three key stages previously employed: silent cinema (with reference to Soviet, American, and French examples), spoken cinema part 1 (pre-World War II, notably in comedies in American cinema), and post-War cinema (notably, Renais, Duras, the Straubs). Deleuze concludes by drawing from Benveniste’s distinction of story plane (corresponding to the historical visual image) and discourse plane (non-historical visual image), and how these can be understood in terms of the passage from readable and visible silent cinema into the intertwining of these within the phases of spoken cinema. This question, what spoken cinema brings to the readable and visible that is new, will be the starting point after the Easter break. Much of the later development corresponds to The Time-Image, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.18 – April 16, 1985

This session is no doubt one of the most peculiar of this (or any seminar) since Deleuze must contend early in the session with an intrusive female student who disrupts the class after engaging in a confrontational and quasi-amorous dialogue with Deleuze. After this disruption, the session is predominantly a review of the same key points discussed before Easter break, notably a confrontation of vying linguistic perspectives in order to understand cinematographic language as well as what Deleuze argues are speech acts in cinema. This review (corresponding directly to The Time-Image, chapter 9 part 1) proceeds again through the “seen” and “read” aspects of silent films (the latter aspect through captioned frames) about which Deleuze reintroduces Benveniste’s corresponding terms, story (récit) and discourse. He studies ways in which these aspects are interlinked within different cinema traditions, notably Soviet cinema, and then he asks what occurs when speech is no longer read but heard. Then, Deleuze begins to develop the speech act as auditory element as well as visual, asking how the spoken components cause one to see something visual and how the visual image renders itself readable. Here, Deleuze returns to linguistic terms, notably Benveniste’s use of “shifters”, and to explore these with films with speech acts circulating between unlinked persons as rumors, Deleuze undertakes a lengthy analysis of Lang’s “M” continuing to the end of the session. Deleuze identifies speech act movement as a kind of wave form, the propagation or opposition or innovation of “waves of belief and desire”. At this point, Deleuze relates a discussion on interactionist sociology (e.g. Tarde, Robert Park, Simmel) in order to emphasize the interactions occurring within the wave movements in “M”, but pointing to other forms besides rumors, notably urban strolling and
conversations. To develop these aspects of sociability and interaction, Deleuze reintroduces (from the end of the previous session) collaboration and degradation as interactive modes, examined respectively in “M” and Murnau’s “The Last Man” as well as Sternberg’s “The Blue Angel”. Deleuze concludes by insisting on the extent to which the early speaking films introduce an auditory component into the visual image.

It is useful to note that this 16 April 1985 lecture order varies from the lecture's corresponding transcript on Web Deleuze and the Paris 8 sites where the version posted reverses sections 1 and 2. On the Deleuze Seminars, we have transposed the version's order: part 1 now starts after Easter break (and contains the intrusive intervention by a student) and ends on the topic of “le parlant”; part 2 starts on “le parlant” and ends on discussion of Simmel; part 3 start with the discussion of Simmel and ends with Deleuze dismissing class.

**Cinema 4.19 – April 23, 1985**

After allowing the previous class’s intrusive student to present her assignment (a definition of “speech acts”, omitted from the recording), Deleuze continues on this very topic, planning to develop a classification of cinematographic speech acts, and as usual, he steps back to review some earlier bases for understanding these, notably from silent films into the two stages of spoken films. Deleuze reemphasizes how the “read” aspect of film viewing shifted toward the “heard”, but that these tended to weave together rather than one replacing the other. Yet, the “heard” aspect causes new sorts of visions within the visual image, notably the rise of speech acts. As a way to forecast what he will consider in coming lectures, Deleuze derives from Kant two terms with Greek etymology, “autonomy” and “heautonomy”, to indicate that after World War II, sound and the visual become two autonomous components of a one and same audiovisual image (with reference to Rossellini and Godard), followed then by “heautonomous” images (with reference to the Straubs, Duras, Syberberg), the complex relation developed previously of incommensurability, the irrational point and relinkages. Then, after a lengthy discussion with students, Deleuze addresses the interactional nature of images, returning to the linguistic bases of interactions (with Benveniste) and speech acts, notably conversations, rumors, strolling, reading popular news items, that is, the zigzag movement of such acts (with reference to Lang’s “M”). After reviewing different traits of such movement, Deleuze enters the classification proper, toward three categories. He devotes the rest of the session entirely to the first type, interactional speech acts, and the different poles (notably, in American comedy e.g. Hawks, Capra, Marx Brothers), relating to how Nathalie Sarraute develops aspects of conversations and sub-conversations. Deleuze also notes how such speech can emerge as bifurcations, as in Mankiewicz’s cinema (e.g. “People Will Talk”, “Suddenly Last Summer”). Then, he concludes this first part by summarizing the spoken component’s three properties: to cause visions (“elle fait voir”), to be seen itself, and itself to see. Finally, referring to Michel Chion, Deleuze moves toward the “voice that sees”, i.e. toward the second category, the reflexive speech act, for the next session. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

**Cinema 4.20 – April 30, 1985**

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After forecasting how he will approach the second phase in the next session, Deleuze considers what it means, within the first (pre-World War II) stage of spoken films, for the sound component to gain its autonomy, by what operative means, specifically, noises, voices (phonatory element, words and speech act), and music. Deleuze addresses each, noting different sub-divisions of noises and voices depending on the style, and indicates how music develops a sound framing and a sound continuum, the sound elements remaining undifferentiated. Deleuze relates this continuum to the existence of the out-of-field (hors-champ) as a dependency of the visual image, leading to a series of distinctions: an absolute out-of-field from a relative out-of-field, the latter being termed an “aside” (à-côté); a broader global transformation, a “Whole-that-changes” distinct from simple movement in space, developing a temporal change; voices off in relation to voices “in”, linked to two categories of speech acts, interactive and reflexive. To examine different facets of such speech acts and voices, Deleuze draws on Michel Chion’s analysis of Lang’s “The Testament of Dr. Mabuse”, and then shifts to musical elements as a special facet of the sound continuum. Deleuze enters into an extended conversation, with frequent participant Pascal Auger, on different moments in the sound, music and visual image intersection, and with references to different cinema critics’ work in this area. Deleuze also draws on the work of several musicians, leading him back to the term the Whole-that-changes. Deleuze closes the session by turning toward Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* and the conception of music developed there. He includes in this exposé a link to Schopenhauer and Wagner and considers Wagner’s *Parsifal* in order to confirm the distinction of levels of the Whole, indirect representation in the visual image, direct presentation in music. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

**Cinema 4.21– May 7, 1985**

Deleuze begins by asserting that, in the previous session, things went off track since he had hoped to leave time for students’ interventions. Hence, he begins this session with one brief student presentation on sound framing (*cadrage sonore*), and then as he forecast in the previous session, he takes up the second phase of spoken cinema. He examines how the sound component gains its own framing distinct from visual framing, then proposes to offer two hypotheses, one “strong” and one “weak”. The first is: with the new image regime after World War II, the idea of a specific sound framing emerges increasingly, linked to specific technical operations that Deleuze details. Deleuze moves forward examining numerous facets of sound framing with certain musicians who were directly involved, but as is often the case, student questions and comments intervene to impede Deleuze’s progress: the role of animated films (especially from Disney) in this development; the role of stereo versus monaural sound for this framing. Then, in the second phase, the disappearance of an out-of-field (hors-champ) occurs, replaced with an interstice between visual and sound framings, and here Deleuze invokes a number of critics and filmmakers to ponder different facets, including frontal projection and digital imagery. He also proposes different manifestations of automata in various national cinema tradition, and then as he directs his attention to cinema music’s transformation through a general and varied treatment of all sound components, Deleuze selects from a number of French filmmakers, ending with a long,

**Cinema 4.22– May 14, 1985**

Noting that the earlier discussion of cinematographic speech acts has been suspended for several sessions, Deleuze continues it by reminding the participants of his operative hypothesis, that the modern visual image is no longer defined through the inclusion of an out-of field (hors-champ), that is, an exteriority in relation to the seen image and filled with sound elements. In fact, both visual images and sound images have gained their autonomy, or “heaunomy”, meaning the existence of a tear or an interstice between sound image and visual image, arising as an interstice arises between a sound framing and a visual framing. Relying on film theorist Béla Balázs’s work regarding the first stage of speaking cinema, Deleuze wonders if one can speaking equally of sound framing and sound montage, as well as of the role of technical advances might be in this possibility, and of the possible transformation of cinema music itself in this process. As Deleuze later defines this class his “technical session”, he then invites Dominique Vaillant to join the conversation, and during her intervention on sound framing, numerous participants intervene, particularly Richard Pinhas, on related topics that include: relation of sound mixing to sound framing and montage; how these effects occurs in the Straubs’s films; the use of filtering devices in recording; the role of stereo vis-à-vis monaural; spatial positioning, depth of field, and sound blocks; and the use of harmonizers. In the third section, Deleuze asks Pascale Criton to respond to the two previous interventions, but several questions as well as Pinhas’s very technical explanations seem to cause some differences of perspective, even disagreements, that bring the session to a close with Deleuze somewhat flustered with how the session unfolded. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

**Cinema 4.23 – May 21, 1985**

With the seminar’s focus henceforth on the second phase of spoken cinema, Deleuze rapidly reviews the bases on which, from silent film through the first spoken phase, this argument proceeds. Following review of previous sessions, Deleuze emphasizes the importance of music to the autonomous status of the sound image and framing in relation to the visual image, and to consider these relations, he reviews the status of sound as subordinate to the visual image during the first stage of spoken cinema and recalls having identified two kinds of speech acts, interactional and reflexive. The “thunderclap” comes, however, with the conclusion that the sound image itself maintains its autonomy, itself becoming image. Then, suggesting the existence of a third type of speech act, Deleuze reexamines the technique of indirect free style, examining this in Rohmer and Bresson, in order to determine how the speech act is expressed when the sound element becomes an autonomous image, and then to ponder what such a speech would consist of. As an act of fabulation, this speech act is linked to the lie (examples from Robbe-Grillet, Rohmer, Jean Rouch, Pierre Perrault, Pasolini) and then, asking how the speech act as fabulation can create the event, Deleuze returns to the concept in modern cinema of any-space-whatever (*espace quelconque*) emerging in numerous styles and filmmakers that Deleuze enumerates. As the sound image becomes autonomous, the visual image becomes telluric, tectonic (examples from Antonioni, Pasolini, and the Straubs). Deleuze concludes that
when the sound image and visual image become “heautonomous”, i.e. respectively autonomous in relation to one another, the sound image refers to a new type of speech act (the act of fabulation), while the visual image creates the event while also referring to a new kind of space, telluric space, tectonic space, geological space, buried within the event. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

It is useful to note that this 21 May 1985 version's order varies from the transcript of the corresponding lecture with this date on Web Deleuze and the Paris 8 sites. There, the version reverses sections 2 and 3, whereas the version order followed on the Deleuze Seminars has transposed this order so that part 3 starts with discussion of Charles Péguy (where part 2 ends) and ends with Deleuze dismissing the class.

**Cinema 4.24 – May 28, 1985**

In this session, Deleuze prepares for the end of the Seminar on cinema as he proposes to spend the two following, final sessions with students’ questions. In this session, he considers what he calls the disjunction between the visual and sound, specifically discussing works by the Straubs and Marguerite Duras. Deleuze also discusses certain film aspects with Raymonde Carasco and other participants. During the final segment, he comments on Blanchot “Parler, ce n’est pas voir” (*Infinite Conversation*), considering the unspeakable (indicible) and seeking a comparable value for the visual. Then, summarizing the Seminar’s thematics, Deleuze returns to the basic question “is an image of thought to be expected from cinema, and if so, what kind?” He returns to an overview, the pre-World War II movement-image distinguished from the post-war time-image. After reviewing characteristics of the image of thought corresponding to the former, he contrasts four characteristics of the latter: topological organization of a non-symmetrical and non-totalizable outside and inside; re linkage of images through irrational cuts; what Deleuze calls “heautonomy” both of sound and the visual images entering into an original, free indirect relation; and thought understood as a common limit of speaking and seeing, that is, at the edges of the unspeakable, the invisible, and the unthinkable. He then provides a list of filmmakers and names the kind of limits that they attain: the unequivocal in Welles; the inexplicable in Robbe-Grillet; the incommensurable in Godard; the impossible in Duras; the irrational in Syberberg; and for the Straubs, Deleuze admits having forgotten the term (“the irreconcilable,” *The Time-Image*, p. 278) and that he has slid into momentary amnesia. Hence, the need for questions and additional discussion in the two remaining sessions. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 10.

**Cinema 4.25 – June 4, 1985**

As Deleuze indicates from the start of this penultimate session of the 1984-85 year, he opens up the discussion to the participants in order to consider, after four years of studying this vast topic, their reactions and questions concerning all that has preceded. Some topics discussed are: instances of immanence and transcendence and silence (Duras, “India Song”); Syberberg, Hitler and the treatment of the dead; Kracauer, expressionist cinema and the rise of Hitler; Benjamin, the art of mass production and reproduction; Leni Riefensthal, the film “Nuremberg” and movement-image; Virilio, Goebbels in rivalry with Hollywood; Syberberg, frontal projection and
transparency as powers of cinema; two distinctions of the automata, and three types, with reference to French cinema (Gance, Renoir); Kubrick and the great computer (“2001”). Midway through the session, both Georges Comtesse and Raymonde Carasco makes significant interventions, and Carasco’s provides a much-needed recap of her own participation in several years of the cinema seminars. The latter part of the session is a recap of discussion on automates, movement-image and time-image, and the numerous aspects associated with these two concepts.

**Cinema 4.26 – June 18, 1985**

Just as in the preceding session, Deleuze devotes the final meeting of the year to students’ questions. He discusses several issues regarding enunciation and linguistics; the Bergsonian and linguistic perspective of Gustave Guillaume as well as on Bergson and Hjelmslev; space as pure potentiality of the event; examples of numerous filmmakers that reveal various aspects of concepts previously considered; the possible subject for the 1985-86 seminar, and Deleuze’s description of the “supreme subject for my life, which would be to do a course on “what is philosophy?”; the act of fabulation; and cinema and politics.