Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries: Charles J. Stivale

Cinema and Thought, October 30, 1984 to June 18, 1985

(26 Sessions)

As he starts the fourth year of his reflections on relations between cinema and philosophy, Deleuze explains that the method of thought has two aspects, temporal and spatial, presupposing an implicit image of thought, one that is variable, with history. He proposes the chronotope, as space-time, as the implicit image of thought, one riddled with philosophical cries, and that the problematic of this fourth seminar on cinema will be precisely the theme of "what is philosophy?', undertaken from the perspective of this encounter between the image of thought and the cinematographic image.

Cinema 4.1 - October 30, 1984

Deleuze begins by explaining how new university policy regarding classroom scheduling may force the seminar once again to find a new space. In the meantime, to introduce the new teaching year, Deleuze outlines what has already occurred: whereas during the first two years (1981-83), his focus was predominantly on the movement-image, the third year was on the time-image. The fourth and final year will be on the topic "what is philosophy?", but on the level of an encounter between cinema and philosophy, that is, the thought-image. Deleuze outlines the basic methodology, adopted in the previous seminar, of sometimes focusing exclusively on philosophical concepts, but always coming back to the main theme. Hence, Deleuze proposes a basic aspect of thinking, the existence of a basic "image of thought", an aspect of any philosophical method, characterized as a spatio-temporal continuum, or "chronotope" which is delimited by philosophical "cries" that envelop the implicit image of thought. After providing some examples, both of "cries of reason" (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz) and "cries of unreason" (Dostoyevsky, Lev Shestov), Deleuze concludes this opening section indicating that "the rest comes next year", meaning (it seems) that the 85-86 seminar topic will be "What Is Philosophy?", apparently not yet having settled on the seminar on Foucault (who died four months before this opening seminar).

Deleuze then returns to the intersection of philosophy and cinema, asking about the possible encounter between the image of thought and the cinematographic image, suggesting this question is the basis on which the year-long seminar will proceed. To begin, he undertakes a long review of pioneers of the cinematographic image and theory (Eisenstein, Gance, Epstein), with critical references to Serge Daney and Louis Schefer. These pioneers suggested that cinema helped inspire a new image of thought, from four points of view – quantitative, qualitative, relational, and modal – that Deleuze outlines. As modern sources that belittled the perspectives of these pioneers, he considers the intersection of linguistically inspired semiology in cinema (notably, by Christian Metz), as well as linkages of the State and cinema, war and cinema, propaganda, and Hollywood (linkages scrutinized by Elie Faure, Paul Virilio, and Daney). In contrast, Godard

also offers Deleuze an example of a filmmaker translating thought through cinema, and despite the collapse of belief in the pioneers' ambitions in cinema, this example indicates the new alliance between thought and cinema following World War II.

He then reflects on ways in which cinema emerged particularly through the "automatism" of the movement-image in early cinema, a topic to which he devotes a full hour. He considers early examples among the film pioneers, then shifts toward thought itself, examining different psychological and artistic precedents (Pierre Janet; Clérambault; Surrealists' automatic writing, Joycean interior monologue), and proposes several particular cinema examples (notably, Eisenstein, Welles, Resnais). To this development of psychological or mental automatism corresponds a parallel path, the logical order of thoughts flowing into thinking and consciousness. Deleuze concludes with examples along this path, notably the "spiritual automaton" (from Spinoza), Paul Valéry's *Monsieur Teste* as well as, in cinema, Pasolini and Bresson, where Deleuze will continue in the next session. Hence, Deleuze provides here the first part of this year's program outline, which continues in session 2, and both of these sessions follow to a great extent the material that Deleuze develops in *The Time-Image.* chapter 7, "Thought and Cinema."

Cinema 4.2 - November 6, 1984

Having started laying out the year's program in the previous session, Deleuze continues this opening by returning key points from session one, notably the importance of the cinema pioneers' ambitions – cinema as a new kind of thought; cinema as art of the masses; and cinema as universal language – and how these ambitions have been reduced to historical remnants of a naïve past. Deleuze considers the extent to which this derision might itself constitute an inadequate analysis. Hence the need in this Seminar, on one hand, to examine precisely the linguistic question as it relates to "universal language" and, on the other hand, to determine the extent to which a new relationship between thought and cinema has come to replace the earlier ambition toward "new thought". And to develop a response to the question why cinema from its very start considered itself to have a fundamental relationship to thought, Deleuze focuses on the different facets of the automatic nature of the cinematographic image, notably its connections to unconscious and subconscious mechanisms of thought and psychological automatism. Furthermore, in studying the origins of this automatism, he returns to Spinoza and Leibniz for the development of a logical or "spiritual" automatism, seeking at once its genetic and geometric definitions and deriving an axiomatic resulting from these. Deleuze links this development to Valéry's *Monsieur Teste* and to Heidegger for the insistence impelling spiritual automatism through a kind of thought-shock, a *noochoc*, and in this way, Deleuze derives two types of automata – psychic and spiritual -- corresponding to the image of thought.

Then, with reference to reflections on depth of field from Alexandre Astruc, Deleuze shifts toward numerous examples from cinema and literature, thus proposing as a second aspect of the Seminar's goal: to study the mutations in the image of thought and the consequences resulting from this within the cinema-thought relationship. He begins by outlining a series of four mutations: first, the substitution of belief for knowledge (*le savoir*) (about which Deleuze

references Kant); second, with reference to authors of "thought of the Outside", substitution of an outside for an intimate sense or an inside (hence, rupture between thought and an intimate sense); third, reversal of relations between thought and the body (with particular reference to Kierkegaard); and fourth, mutation of our relations with the brain. On this basis, he traces the four types summarily through a number of cinema examples (notably, Cassavetes, Godard, Akerman, Eustache, Doillon, Garrel, for "body cinema"; Kubrick, Resnais, for "brain cinema").

After giving a general outline of the four mutations, which he illustrates by a list of four pairs of philosophical examples (Pascal and Hume; Kant and Fichte; Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; Charles Renouvier and Jules Lequier), he then limits himself to Hume and Kant as initial detailed examples. This examination leads to a discussion of the linkage in philosophy up to the 17th century between knowledge and belief, in contrast to which he presents the contemporary breakdown of our belief in the world. He illustrates this breakdown, at once internal and external, by referring to the revolution in the interior monologue created by Dos Passos, and in order to conclude that cinema would be an attempt to return us to a belief in the world, he refers to Godard's for whom the world itself is "cinéma". Deleuze, with Godard, proposes that it's perhaps cinema that will provide some possibility for believing in the lost link between humans and the world. Deleuze offers as example a filmmaker, Rossellini, who lived this example and who demanded from art an ethics, that is, a way to create a link between humans and this world. This link would occur through a "cinema of belief", not a "cinema of knowledge", starting with the image of humans cut off from the world, but then responding to the demand for a new link between humans and the world, through new means of resistance and revolt. Deleuze concludes by admitting the necessity for him to return to this question of belief in the world more fully. Much of this development corresponds to section 2 of *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.

Cinema 4.3 - November 13, 1984

Stating his dissatisfaction with how he presented some of the material in part of the previous session, Deleuze returns to clarify a number of points already considered: the description of the image of thought as chronotope or space-time, as a way of saying that any method of thinking, insofar as it guides the procedure for thinking, has both a spatial and a temporal aspect. Deleuze develops the two aspects of the method in greater detail, as it presents an "order of reasons", hence in temporal fashion (example: Descartes). The method also presents a spatial aspect fulfilled through its own methodical distribution implying a determination of goals, specifically that of truth, sought through three different methods, by Plato, Descartes and Kant, that Deleuze examines.

Then he proposes to return to the double automatism of thought and the cinematographic image, but to a precise intervention by Georges Comtesse about some aspects of the previous session, Deleuze responds succinctly and then summarizes the group project already underway, tracing conditions for the rupture that occurred in cinema between pre-World War II and post-war. As in the previous session, he returns to analyzing four mutations on both levels, the image of thought and of cinema. The first mutation is substitution of knowledge by belief, for which Deleuze traces the stages of the model of "knowledge" (*connaissance*) previously held by the image of

thought, developed by several philosophers and artists (notably, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Claudel). With Kant, this model results in a rupture of humans and the world from the point of view of knowledge, a rupture of the sensorimotor link.

Moreover, this rupture creates the modern circumstance of humans losing the world, losing belief in this world, all the more so given that the world is created increasingly by humans. Referring to the previous year's study, Deleuze points to this rupture seen through three forms: pure optical and sound situations, indifferent events, and empty or disconnected spaces. He draws on a number of authors to illustrate this rupture (notably Rossellini and Godard), suggesting that cinema is capable of reintroducing a belief in the world, in life in the world, especially believing in the body, through a kind of cinema of bodies. With reference to Artaud, Deleuze considers the second mutation of thought as "giving oneself a body", necessarily invoking Spinoza, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as well as numerous filmmakers. He also draws from Brecht's notion of *gestus* to show the links of bodily postures between each other. He concludes that bodily postures are genetic elements of belief, hence leading to promotion of cinema of attitudes of the body, but that the ceremonial or daily version of the *gestus* in certain experimental films risks eliminating it altogether. Deleuze will thus explore the conditions of the *gestus* as truly forms of linkage of parts of the body. He also alerts participants in conclusion that the next session will require introducing some mathematics to the discussion. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.

Cinema 4.4 - November 20, 1984

Deleuze picks up the two conjoined points previously developed, the substitution of belief for knowledge and the need to seek the body's position, which led to the possibility through cinema of believing in this world. What reasons might there be for believing in this world? Deleuze answers that this mean believing in *life* in this world, that is, in the body itself. Deleuze notes the body's fragility, indeed its fatigue, but rather then being bodies in movement, the body is one of time, a time-body, with an embedded splinter allowing the body to believe in the world, inscribed in time.

Deleuze then proceeds to the third mutation, thought that comes from the outside. Clearly, Blanchot and Foucault are the models of this mode of reflection, for whom this also meant: what is thinking itself about? For Foucault, Deleuze argues that this meant reflecting on historical objects without in any way diminishing the philosophical import of his work, and also that Foucault shared with Blanchot the belief that thinking's purpose is an exercise of the outside. Proceeding through the classical model of knowledge, Deleuze defines its two axes, and then he moves through the history of thought (Hume) and linguistics (Jakobson) on to the concept as All [le Tout], that is, as thought of the inside (Hegel), which Deleuze defines as the dialectic of the interior and exterior, determining the consciousness of self or the interior sense of the concept. Hence the reversal he searches in returning to Foucault and Blanchot for whom thought comes from the outside, constituting the first trait of the third mutation that Deleuze traces in the session. He considers Blanchot's attraction to a Jaspers's concept of "processes" to explain a type of schizophrenia that Deleuze associates with Hölderlin and Artaud, and that the novelist

Jean Cayrol described as the "Lazarus-like hero" of the post-World War II era. Thus, the "process", Deleuze says, is the force of the outside insofar as it causes to return from the dead, and mode of thought, he argues, that conforms both to Blanchot and Foucault, a "thought of the outside". After considering succinctly how this thought emerges in Foucault's *The Order of Things* from the background of classical representation and knowledge, Deleuze enumerates and develops at length its second and third key traits (these being: an outside having nothing to do with the exterior word; an outside as unthinkable, residing at the deepest level of thought; and the emergence of interstices or the interval). Whereas the Foucault discussion illustrated the second trait, the third trait's aspects are evident in the extensive discussion of Blanchot's *Infinite Conversation* in which types of interstices emerge: first, the gap over which two images must leap to close the gap; second, the interstice manifesting itself in itself and subordinating any association; and third, the interstice between "speaking" and "seeing".

The interstice in particular leads Deleuze to link this mutation to cinema through "montage" which, pre-World War II, assured associations, whereas after World War II, something explodes, images varying within different sorts of interstices, liberating the interstices (some examples with Garrel, Resnais, Godard, Bresson as Godard's inspiration), and Godard's insight points to the importance of sound as well as image within not just montage, but "mixage". Moreover, the interstices between frames come to eliminate out-of-field as a function of association of images. Finally, Deleuze returns to Blanchot's *Infinite Conversation,* considering the opening dialogue between two fatigued interlocutors that reveals the force of the outside that reveals the unthought within thought, and through the fatigue itself, develops an "incommunicable" between interlocutors, the interstice, the force of the outside itself (some examples with Antonioni). Deleuze concludes the third mutation, thought of the Outside, with its linkage of four notions (the idea of "process"; of essential rapport of thought with an unthought; of a primary interstice; and of bodily fatigue and power of the Outside which is also the direct presentation of time). This force passes through the body and through its fatigue which, as the next session reveals, links directly to mathematics. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.

Cinema 4.5 - November 27, 1984

As this session starts in mid-discussion -- with Deleuze drawing on the board, apparently having already examined "the history of Pythagoras's theorem" -- and also as the session's length (97 minutes) is short by one-third compared to usual sessions, it is likely that the opening cassette for the session is missing. Deleuze's purpose here is to retrace the mutations detailed previously; hence the isosceles triangle example is meant to illustrate the fundamental paradox of gaps occurring within a seemingly unbroken straight line (as continuation of the missing Pythagorean theorem discussion). He discusses the mathematician Richard Dedekind's research on the problem of the continuous, the infinity of breaks and gaps in the line, and irrational breaks (as developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7), then links this to the situations of pre-World War II and post-war cinema: whereas (following Eisenstein) pre-war cinema worked greatly through breaks of a rational type (e.g., false continuities within a series of images), new characteristics emerging in post-war cinema reinforce the seminar's foci, notably the use of irrational breaks

(notably, false continuities for themselves, without relation to series of images), for example, in Philippe Garrel's cinema. Deleuze associates these cinematographic traits to those located previously in Blanchot and Foucault, that is, the thought of the Outside, the interstice or interval, and then he examines this parallel, first discussing Eisenstein in great detail on rational breaks (notably, his *The Non-Indifferent Nature*), then shifting to post-war types of irrational breaks (in Bresson, Godard, Resnais). Completing discussion of the third mutation (thought of the Outside), he then moves toward the fourth mutation, "give me a brain!", with a triple inspiration for consideration: cerebral models, our lived relation with the brain, and the possibility of a modern cinema of the brain. Here Deleuze briefly proposes different filmmakers of such a cinema mode (as developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8), e.g., Kubrick and Resnais. Thus, for the next session, Deleuze proposes to consider the pre-war and post-war developments in the scientific conception of the brain and asks the participants to review their discussion of the three mutations – belief, body, and the Outside – in order to understand the intersection of these with the fourth mutation, the brain.

Cinema 4.6 – December 11, 1984

Having missed a session due to illness, Deleuze devotes himself entirely to discussing diverse facets of the brain, a theme through which he completes the first portion of the year's content (as developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8). He begins by discussing three viewpoints (on brain biology; on lived relations with the brain; on the brain as cinema) from which brain transformations have occurred, and starts the biological, scientific review by opposing a so-called classic point of view to a so-called modern one. In the former, he discusses the model with two axes, an axis of concepts and one of the association of images, and the circulation of knowledge between them. From the lived, experiential perspective, he considers the classical, arborescent model of the brain with numerous theoretical references (most notably, Jakobson on types of aphasia) that allow Deleuze to raise complications posed by this model.

Then, shifting to the lived, experiential point of view, Deleuze again emphasizes the arborescent model with which people experience life, but links this to another model from a classic perspective, that of interior and exterior milieus. Drawing on details from Simodon's *L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* regarding the levels of interiority and exteriority in the human body, Deleuze considers the hypothesis that processes of organic integration and differentiation are strictly inseparable from distinctions between interior and exterior milieus, the latter always being relative as related to the integration-differentiation axis. Also, with Simondon, Deleuze considers the brain's topological structure, particularly questions of outside-inside, a reflection that links to the earlier discussion of thought of the Outside. Linked to this intersection is the complementary sensorimotor axis about which Deleuze presents a detailed explanation of the brain topography (notably, the neuron-dendrite-axon linkage within the brain) as means of discussing the classical understanding of the "cut" or "gap" within the linkage and (with reference to Simondon and Changeux) how this understanding shifted toward a model of the brain as a topological space with probabilistic linkages between irrational cut-points.

After the break, Deleuze then outlines four lines of research that might help understand cerebral linkages: building from the probabilistic linkages already discussed, he considers the mathematical concept of Markov chains and the study of semi-accidental phenomena and mixtures of dependence and uncertainty. With the concept of Markov chains still in mind, he considers a second research line, within cosmobiology, specifically the possibility of understanding the amplified fluctuation of enzymes and proteins from the perspective of the genesis of life, again by considering the aspects of semi-accidental phenomena and linkages. The third line of research follows on the previous points, to consider these kinds of fluctuations from perspectives developed by Prigogine and Stengers, notably the thresholds at which the amplified fluctuations can be maintained in an orderly fashion. Finally, referring to work by the cybernetician Pierre Vendryes, again Deleuze raises the problem of the constitution of an internal milieu as an amplified fluctuation allowing the living creature, and even the brain (through hypotheses) to enter into aleatory relations with an external milieu. This leads to the final question of how transmission occurs within the brain, with Deleuze's answer: through relinkages in independent series, an answer through which he suggests finally the possibility of understanding cinema no longer as linkages but relinkages of independent series.

Cinema 4.7 – December 18, 1984

For the year-end session, Deleuze continues developing from the previous week three specific aspects considered: first, he completes the discussion of the brain with several key points (also developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8): first, the emphasis placed on the possibility of a topological structure of the brain for which Euclidean space cannot account; second, the manner in which sensorimotor linkages occurring as semi-random phenomena or relinked parceling (*morcelage*), with linkages manifesting particularly as irrational cut-points. Based on these insights, he describes an additional key point, the interconnections between three cinematographic (and indeed philosophical) concepts: the white or black screen and its varieties; the irrational break or cut; and the relinked parceling (*morcelage*). On the third concept, he comments at length about Andrei Biely's (or Bely's) novel *Petersburg* that unfolds in a brain-cosmos (or noosphere) and then describes its "system of echoes" with Resnais's noospheres (in "Muriel", "Providence", "Je t'aime, je t'aime"). Besides considering this cinema to be quite close to painting (distinguishing between two tendencies, Kandinsky and Klee), he also connects this with American experimental films and its different teachniques (Tony Conrad, Brakhage, George Landow).

Insisting that the participants keep this "trinity" of concepts in mind for the return in the new year, Deleuze then provides a recap of the material covered to date: first, the simple departure point of cinematographic image's specific characteristic, being automatic, hence thought and automatism, at once psychological and spiritual; second, cinema's evolution toward a new spiritual automatism (e.g., German Expressionism, Lang, Kubrick, Bresson, Syberberg), and this cinematographic image's evolution in terms of thought itself unfolds following ten specific points developed throughout the first seven sessions (summary list provided below), as well as associated bibliographic and cinematographic references.

Finally, following a break, Deleuze discusses with students (for 45 minutes) what his expectations are moving forward, intending for them to follow a simple approach, not with students presenting exposés, but rather Deleuze interviewing specific students on specific topics for which they will prepare in advance. Several students attempt to suggest different topics, from which Deleuze draws some valid suggestions. He then contends with a long intervention by Georges Comtesse to whom Deleuze responds (in the final five minutes) with his usual generosity concerning the points raised, but also with particular frankness concerning the manner in which they were presented.

Ten-point recapitulation of sessions 1-7: 1/ Rupture between pre-WW II and post-war cinema; 2/ Post-war sensorimotor rupture; 3/ Post-war indiscernibility between imaginary and real (crystal-image); 4/ Movement-image yields to indirect image of time; 5/ Direct image of time only occurring within interplay of true and false; 6/ Hence, the power of the false, at any price, also yields function of returning belief to the world -- it is here, Deleuze says, that the previous seminar intersects with the current one --; 7/ Emergence of a change of regime of thought, noosign, along two axes alongside emergence of thought of the Outside; 8/ Force of the Outside occurs in irrational cuts and interstices; 9/ The unthought of within thought revealed as the body; 10/ Emergence of cinema of the brain.

Cinema 4.8 – January 8, 1985

To start the second trimester, Deleuze evokes the previous session's point by point recap for his goals of connecting thought to cinema, starting with an essay by Eisenstein on this very topic, which will then lead toward considering how to conceive of a cinema-language and its relations with the thought-image. Deleuze proposes to examine in detail Eisenstein's questions on movement and montage, first emphasizing how the cinematographic image is analogical as a function of modulating its own object. After contrasting Pasolini's semiology to that of Eco and Christian Metz, he distinguishes the cinematographic image from the analogical image. Returning to Eisenstein, Deleuze contrasts the pictorial image in painting to the cinematographic image, insisting that an image creating its own motion is one also creating a shock to thought, a *noochoc,* that Eisenstein attributes to oppositions of movement-images.

By establishing some detailed philosophical bases (first, Aristotle's classification of oppositions, then Tarde's 19th-century mode classification), Deleuze can better consider Eisenstein's view of the movement-image, leading to Eisenstein's discovery of harmonics in the cinematographic image. After linking this to a reflection on synesthesia (notably in Merleau-Ponty), Deleuze returns to Eisenstein's list of five oppositions, revealing a passage from a visual percept (I see) to a physiological percept (I feel) and on to the concept (I think), with these linking to five forms of montage. Deleuze follows Eisenstein as he explains various composition techniques that allow him to communicate these effects, and then considers several film examples (from Eisenstein, Buster Keaton, Renoir). He finally summarizes the development examined, from the percept-image to the clear concept through the sensory shock, then from the confused concept to affect-images reintroducing an affective shock, together creating a complete circuit. All of this is part of the creative domain, a topic for subsequent reflection. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.

Cinema 4.9 – January 15, 1985

Having begun the "second trimester" by considering Eisenstein's five oppositions and conceptions of sensory shock, Deleuze reviews the moments of this previous analysis of the thought-image relations for Eisenstein (corresponding to the development in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7). After reviewing the two movements in these relations, Deleuze moves on to the third plane in Eisenstein, the identity of image and concept or "Nature and man". Then, after contrasting other ways of conceptualizing this rapport (e.g., Eisenstein's dispute with Griffith and with Stalinists), he reviews key points derived from Eisenstein (relations of images with a Whole; relations with a thought that can only be depicted via subconscious images constituting interior monologue; sensorimotor relations between man, nature and thought), leading Deleuze to ask, "what comes next?" in the post WW II era.

Here, Deleuze reviews the three forms of rupture: a sensorimotor rupture; rupture with the theme of nature, cinema's object defined as artificiality; and rupture with metaphor (literality or nothing, with reference to Robbe-Grillet and Duras) and the importance of the Sublime in this latter rupture. This rupture is best illustrated in films by Duras and Godard, to which Deleuze adds a fourth series of rupture in figurative language: the rise of artificiality, the function of literality, and the collapse of interior monologue. With cinema moving beyond classic structures, Deleuze reflects on different aspect of "artifice", citing as influence the cinema effects in John Dos Passos's fiction. The shift toward plurilingualism is accompanied, notably in Godard, with cinema becoming "serial," and just as Deleuze noted in Eisenstein how his "structural cinema" perpetually made musical references, so too this "serial cinema" might link to so-called "serial" or atonal music.

Deleuze's question, "is it possible to construct a concept of seriality specific to the cinematographic image?" directs the discussion toward a comparison with serial music, a shift to which Richard Pinhas contributes. Here, Deleuze draws characteristics from Robbe-Grillet (but also from serial music): irrational cuts opposed to harmonies, unlinking opposed to tonal center, and relinking of both sides of the irrational cut opposed to linkage as a center's function. To address how such images might be attained, Deleuze turns to examples from Godard's cinema, and particularly how, by creating successive series of images as unlinked, relinked and literal as well as by using irrational cuts through false continuities, the series created for each film are situated within a genre or a category. Deleuze traces different Godardian genres, notably "aesthetic" (films with traits from theatre, musical comedy, cinema, painting, music), graphic forms, singularized characters (intellectuals in interviews, characters in clown-like performance, and anonymous samples), psychic faculties. Yet, Deleuze insists that for each film, new categories must emerge, and so he concludes the session by asking participants to consider in the next session what the connections might exist between categories invented by Godard.

Cinema 4.10 – January 22, 1985

This session breaks with the forward momentum of the seminar as Deleuze proposies to converse at length with an invited participant, musicologist Pascale Criton. As a result, first, the development that preceded this session (notably, on serial traits in cinema) is initially suspended

for the sake of the discussion/interview, only then to be repeated in considerable detail, presumably in light of the completed discussion/interview. to some extent. Second, for approximately 90 minutes, Deleuze's comments are audible only with difficulty since he exchanges seats with Criton and thus moves away from the microphone. After outlining three key topics for questions, Deleuze asks Criton to comment on these areas from a musicological perspective, and she provides considerable confirmation to most of Deleuze's analysis regarding pre- and post-World War II cinema developments. Following her responses, Deleuze seems to summarize what he has gleaned from her remarks and entertains additional questions from students (most of this brief discussion away from the microphone is inaudible).

Then, with nearly an hour left in class, he returns to his regular seat and comments at length on Godard's cinema, with some assistance from Georges Comtesse. He emphasizes the Godardian categories detailed in the previous session, reviewing Godard's development of categories and employing a serial method, and offers a particular use of the interview with an actual philosopher, Brice Parain, in "Vivre sa vie". He then connects the serialization of daily life to Kantian distinctions of constitutive and reflective terms in judgment and offers an extended example from the domain of law, and particularly his oft cited example of jurisprudence, the taxi driver's dispute regarding smokers. The purpose of this is to show how a series is derived from a sequence of images reflected within a genre serving as limit to the extent that the images, rather than belong to the genre, tend towards it along an assigned vector. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.

Cinema 4.11 – January 29, 1985

Deleuze continues from the previous session's discussions (with Pascale Criton and other participants) by studying the serial method, providing precise definitions of terms (series, genre, category), situating the irrational cut in this structure, and distinguishing horizontal serial constructions from vertical ones. He chooses Godard's "Pierrot le fou", "Vivre sa vie" and "Sauve qui peut (la vie)" to exemplify aspects of the horizontal, then moving into "Passion" and "Prénom, Carmen", Deleuze finds various modes of vertical construction (a generalized serialism). Deleuze also examines where in the early Godard films such a vertical, generalized serialism might have appeared, notably in "Le Mépris".

After drawing several larger conclusions in light of the previous sessions' Eisenstein-Godard comparison, Deleuze proposes a parallel between Hegel's phenomenology and logic, on one hand, and figures of consciousness/series of images and concept moments/categories, on the other. Regarding figures of consciousness, attitudes and categories, he refers at length to a post-Hegelian philosopher, Eric Weil, through which Deleuze concludes that attitudes are reflected through coherent discourse, that is, through categories. In light of this analysis, Deleuze connects an article by Serge Daney on Godard's manner of employing discourse in his films, by creating a non-judgmental balancing between statements, and thus Deleuze introduces the concept of distinct forms of discourse, at once in philosophy and cinema. Attitude, he maintains, gives to the image a possibility of being serialized, while it is the gesture (*geste* or *gestus*) that endows something with categorical or coherent discursive value.

To reflect on these two conceptual couplets, images/categories and attitudes/gesture, Deleuze cites four exemplary texts, one by Brecht, two by Barthes, and the fourth, by filmmaker Raymonde Carasco, a commentary on Barthes's essay in *L'obvie et l'obtus*, "Le troisième sens". These texts set up the next session in which, Deleuze announces, Carasco will participate in a second "interview". Deleuze begins with a detailed review of the very brief yet (according to Deleuze) influential Brecht text, "Musique et *gestus*", creating the theatrical dichotomy of "dramatic theater" (opposed by Brecht) and "epic theater" (action opposed to *gestus*, favored by Brecht). As Deleuze then comments on Barthes's essay "Le troisième sens", he draws upon different examples from Eisenstein, and finishes by presenting Carasco's essay, "L'image-cinéma qu'aimait Roland Barthes" (The cinema-image that Barthes loved), underscoring that he not only cannot grasp Barthes's key points, but that Carasco's commentary on Barthes also eludes him. Hence the need for the next session's discussion/interview, about which one senses in advance that Carasco is quite wary. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.

Cinema 4.12 – February 5, 1985

Reviewing earlier key points, Deleuze recalls his use of Godard's cinema as a key exemplar particularly of horizontal and vertical constructions of image series, and then considers the succession of attitudes or gestures as a material definition of the content of the series. Deleuze proposes considering the attitude-gesture link as being separate at once from the lived (*le vécu*) and from story or action. He then recalls Barthes's commentary on the senses of "obvious" (*obvie*) and "obtuse" (*obtus*), linking the latter to gesture's definition. He then outlines four questions arising from this connection, especially given Raymonde Carasco's interpretation of Barthes. Deleuze invites Carasco as a guest participant to "converse" with him about these questions (for 48 minutes). As in the 22 January 1985 session, Deleuze places himself away from the microphone during the discussion, often rendering his remarks unintelligible. Carasco gives precise responses to the questions already posed by Deleuze, maintaining that the sense of "obtuse" passes through writing (*écriture*) or poetic art. She attempts to explain how this "sense" emerges in Barthes's reflections on the frame or still (*photogramme*) while also developing a cinematographic conception of frames through montage. To Deleuze's questions about her own essay that goes beyond Barthes's positions, she indicates that she wrote it well before Deleuze's seminar on the time-image, such that she would revise several details proposed therein. She nonetheless reflects on the importance of a rhythm concept for understanding poetics of cinema which she links to a global mental film image or totality in different filmmakers and also to Blanchot's sense of images' duplicity.

Returning to his seat, following Carasco's responses, Deleuze reflects on two of Barthes's examples, considering the types of "masks" revealed by characters within in the photo stills selected by Barthes. For Deleuze, these stills serve as a way of teasing out an understanding of the "obtuse" as a kind of limit, noting how one masks or disguises oneself as a kind of passage, in light of the obvious-obtuse distinction, a passage from a "before" to an "after", but not within a chronological time. To explore this understanding as a kind of fabulation, he refers to Quebec filmmaker Pierre Perrault and his "cinema of the living", concluding that "the people" pass

through fabulation. This insight first leads Deleuze then to reflect at length on political cinema, third world cinema, the latter developed through Jean Rouch's ethnographic approach. He then returns to Godard in light of Rouch, that is, to what Deleuze calls a "cinema of attitudes and gestures", moving from attitude to *gestus* as in Godard's forms of theatricalization, and also a cinema of politics which has inherent links to the kind of fabulation that Deleuze emphasizes. For next session (after winter break), Deleuze suggests Bergson, who defined a "fabulating function", as being an important philosophical reference point, to whom Deleuze links the French New Wave. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 6 and 8.

Cinema 4.13 – February 26, 1985

While indicating that there remains material to discuss from the previous, pre-winter break session, Deleuze outlines what the seminar's next section will entail, notably to consider, first, the relations between cinema, language and "langue", from early conceptions to more contemporary ones; second, the relations of cinema with "speech acts", particularly in terms of its possible audio-visual or simply sound aspects; third, cinema's complex relation with other kinds of sound effects (music among others), and their own relations with one another. Then, Deleuze outlines as second aspect regarding "talking" films, the shift of cinematic sound in terms of what is readable, audible and visual, from the silent era into the classic era and then modern cinema era.

He then returns to his "arbitrary comparison" between Eisenstein (representing classical cinema) and Godard (representing modern). For the former, Deleuze chooses "Alexander Nevsky" to examine what he calls "tonal cinema" (borrowing musical terminology), but also emphasizes distinguishing "cinema of truth" from the real-fiction opposition and discerning the traits of the movement-image previously studied at length (in previous seminars). As for Godard, Deleuze makes a quick comparison (announced at the end of session 9) between two successive films, "Sauve qui peut (la vie)" and "Prénom Carmen", to distinguish the shift from tonal to "serial" approaches. He also details the previous emphasis on attitudes and gestures within the series, offering four examples (Carmelo Bene's brief cinema career; French New Wave and post-New Wave, or the "cinema of bodies"; "feminine cinema"; and so-called "direct cinema", notably Cassavetes), and then insists on the importance of a passage from attitudes to *gestus*, that is, the "power of fabulation" evident in the cinema of Perrault and Rouch.

Then, at the start of part 3, Deleuze changes direction toward what will constitute the focus of the seminar's next session, on languages and language system (*langue*), semiology cinema, stating that for a session and a half, the focus will be "a series of commonplaces on linguistics." Before doing so, he returns to the history of philosophy, considering the extent to which Christian Metz might be considered Kantian, hence requiring Deleuze to summarize concisely the intersection of Kant with Metz's semiotics, particularly regarding the analysis of cinema in terms of conditions of possibility and rules of use based specific facts. The session ends, quite abruptly in mid-sentence, with Deleuze emphasizing the importance of the notion of conditions of possibility in Kant's philosophy, which he will need to examine in Metz's semiotics. Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9, but also with references to chapter 2.

Cinema 4.14 – March 5, 1985

While this session's length seems truncated (92 minutes recording time), we have no clear indication of a missing cassette. In any event, Deleuze initially develops a long review of the previous session (primarily to material in *The Time-Image*, chapter 2), and then studies at length Christian Metz's idea, « le cinéma, langage sans langue » (cinema, language without language system), emphasizing the importance of this perspective for semiocritical approaches to cinema. He outlines three levels of analysis to be pursued, but also a knot of problems located at each level, and he concludes that the only way to proceed is by understanding more clearly different facets of the terms paradigm and syntagma. Deleuze approaches distinctions between key terms, starting with "langue" (language system), by pointing to a number of ways in which linguists (notably Martinet) have defined this, notably as a double articulation system (monemes and phonemes.

However, Deleuze points out that this question, "what is a *langue* (language system)?", is a precritical, Platonist question, seeking an essential characteristic. So, he shifts towards Metz's perspective, no longer considering cinema at the level of *langue*. Rather, the question shifts toward "to what rules of use do units of *langue* correspond?", hence seeking the subjective language rules, that is, syntagmatic and paradigmatic rules. After briefly examining specifics of these two poles, Deleuze situates Metz's perspective, that is, if specific speech acts can be called cinematographic, how these might be classified. Whereas the answer is "no" to cinema as *langue,* the answer is "yes" to cinema as language on the condition that the cinematographic image can be reduced to a non-linguistic, analogous statement, hence a shift toward a Kantian perspective of rules of use and not essence. Finally, if this statement can be governed by syntagmatic and paradigmatic rules, this indicates conditions needing discussion in another session, specifically on: what are properly cinematographic syntagma and paradigms, and what is (for Metz) the Grand Syntagmatic?

Cinema 4.15 – March 12, 1985

Having previously initiated a study of semiocriticism, notably within Christian Metz's perspective (notably, in *The Time-Image*, chapter 2), Deleuze returns with a detailed examination inspired by the question with which the last session ended, "what are properly cinematographic syntagma and paradigms, and what is the Grand Syntagmatic?" Recalling the three basic elements of Metz's semiocriticism, he re-emphasizes the distinction of a cinematographic language, rather than a "langue" (or language system), existing through a double articulation, signifying units or monemes and distinctive units or phonemes, with rules of use according to syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. As Deleuze develops this exposé, however, different students' questions force him to spend time (approximately 25 minutes) reviewing the steps outlined in the previous session's development.

After a rapid but concise review, Deleuze moves into Metz's Grand Syntagmatic, with its eight autonomous segments that Deleuze outlines, and then, explaining that a Grand Paradigmatic would be infinite, hence impossible, he notes Metz's movement away from Hollywood's

"cinema of narration" toward "New Wave", notably in Godard's "Pierrot le fou," and yet ironically maintaining that this cinema is absolutely narrative as well. Deleuze notes also Robbe-Grillet's fidelity to Metz, and with Robbe-Grillet's term "dys-narrative", the outcome that the paradigm wins over the syntagma in this cinema. Then, Deleuze develops the "codes" that work through the cinema image, detailing five (or six) codes of which the code(s) of montage seem all-encompassing. This outline prepares Deleuze to being explaining the sources of his misgivings (*troubles*) about Metz's perspective, first, regarding narration as so-called "fact" and the complete elimination of movement; second, regarding the cinematographic image as an analogical statement or image, the misgiving that he proposes to develop in the next session. Much of the later development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 6.

Cinema 4.16 – March 19, 1985

Deleuze continues outlining aspects of Christian Metz's semiocriticism, having started in the previous session, explaining his misgivings about three key aspects, the first -- the so-called "fact of narration" -- having already been explained. Deleuze reiterates his explanation of misgivings, suggesting that whereas the semiocritical perspective insists on narration as the fundamental "fact", it is movement that is the "immediate given" of the cinematographic image, from which narration is one result. He reminds the participants of work from the first seminars, notably that the movement-image implies intervals of movement and that the image's immediate given is movement insofar as it relates to this interval. Here, Deleuze offers a clear and succinct summary of the sensorimotor scheme in relation to the movement-image and its three types of images, perception-image, action-image and affection-image previously analyzed extensively, both in Cinema seminars 1 and 2 (1981-83) and in *The Movement-Image.* Moreover, whereas the semiocritics attribute changes in post-World War II cinema to a structural mutation in the classical structure, Deleuze again refers to previous analyses and insists on these changes being the result of the image's shift toward being a direct presentation of time, considered extensively in Cinema seminar 3 (1983-84).

However, one student's question causes Deleuze to diverge into several digressive directions, first on "cinema of truth", notably by Pierre Perrault and Jean Rouch, then on the Palestinians and the concept of a "people to come." Then, with reference to films by Jean Rouch, Georges Comtesse makes a brief intervention, leading to an extremely pointed exchange with Deleuze (at approximately minute 79), inciting Deleuze's exasperation toward Comtesse that has grown throughout this seminar, and leading to an early break in the session.

Deleuze then returns to begin explaining the second misgiving, the cinematographic image supposedly being assimilable to a statement through analogy. To this, Deleuze responds that movement within the image renders it indiscernible as well as its object, here evoking Pasolini's approach to the double articulation and various critiques made of his approach. Deleuze then returns first to the movement-image to counter Metz's semiocritical perspective on the image, and then to the previous discussions of cinema as language, not "langue", drawing from Pasolini as well as Eisenstein, particularly on how this relates to interior monologue. But in order then to dive deeply into the senses of "langue" itself, he moves toward different linguistic perspectives, notably developing Hjelmslev's thought which allows him to conclude that cinema is the non-

linguistically formed matter that is a correlate to any language or "langue". Deleuze then turns to the "strange linguistics" of Gustave Guillaume and his concept of a word's "signified of power" (*signifié de puissance*) which, while being unchangeable, depends on its use in discourse to endow the word with a specific "signified of effect". Not only do these distinctions, says Deleuze, correspond to Hjelmslev's distinctions, they also allow Guillaume to develop "processes" for distinguishing the particular and the general in signification. The importance of Guillaume's distinctions for Deleuze's development is that whereas, for example, the indefinite article "un" has particularization as movement for its signified of power, the definite article "le" has generalization as movement of thought for its signified of power. All of this is meant to Deleuze toward a clearer sense of the concept of "matter" developed from Hjelmslev, and with Pasolini, toward understanding cinema as a "'langue' of reality" linked not to paradigms or syntagma, but solely to a signified of power. Deleuze indicates that these are the points to which he will return in the next session. Much of the later development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 10.

Cinema 4.17 – March 26, 1985

First addressing several topical questions (including how to react to institutional racism in France, implicitly in light of the growth of SOS's Racisme's responses to the Front national popularity and aggressions), then listening to an amusing musical interlude (the opening of Strauss's "Also Sprach Zarathustra"), Deleuze announces that the class will complete a "difficult part" and then proceed to an easier part, that is, make a transition from the linguistic and semio-critical review that he had already undertaken toward discussion of the intersection between visual and sound elements.

In the first of these parts, he continues considering the previous session's linguistic intersections, notably Gustave Guillaume and Hjelmslev, reviewing the former's concept of "signified of power" (particularization) linked to the "signified of facts" (generalization), and then outlining Guillaume's distinctions on other parts of speech. All of these correspond to "processes of thought-movement", with verbs producing processes of "chrono-genesis". After noting the objections that Guillaume's views raised among established linguistics, Deleuze argues that Guillaume's was a system of differential-inclusive oppositions with significant subsequent consequences for semiology and post-structuralist linguistics (e.g., Todorov, Ducrot, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva), bringing Deleuze back to Christian Metz's cinematographic semio-criticism. Deleuze presents the bases for his own doubts about three key points of semiology's take on cinema: narration taken as a focal "fact" of cinema, the cinema image assimilated to the status of statement, temporal processes bearing no traits of language of language systems but constituted rather as a non-linguistically formed material. Deleuze argues for "pure semiotics" operating with images, signs, and non-language processes determining these images and signs, creating something "utterable" (*énoncable*). This "anti-semiological semiotics" is one developing a Bergsonian process of thought-movement on which instantaneous views are obtained. This allows Deleuze to make the shift toward the second phase of analysis, to study what a properly cinematographic image is and what its relation is with non-language processes both in silent and sound films. But as a coda to the first phase of analysis, Deleuze returns to the initial question of how early filmmakers assimilated cinema to interior monologue, notably in early Soviet cinema

(developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7). He then announces that after the Easter break, several participants (e.g., Giorgio Passerone, Eric Alliez) would (or should) intervene directly to discuss a number of these points.

Deleuze then turns toward the session's "easy part", proposing (in coming sessions) to review the development of the cinematographic statement (*énoncé*) through the three key stages previously outlined: silent cinema (with reference to Soviet, American, and French examples), spoken cinema part 1 (pre-World War II, notably in comedies in American cinema), and post-War cinema (notably, Renais, Duras, the Straubs). He starts here with the silent era and develops successive visual facets, at once seen in images and read in intertitles and by other means. Deleuze concludes by drawing from Benveniste's distinction of story plane (corresponding to the historical visual image) and discourse plane (non-historical visual image), and how these can be understood in terms of the passage from readable and visible silent cinema into the intertwining of these within the phases of spoken cinema. This question, what spoken cinema brings to the readable and visible that is new, will be the starting point after the Easter break. Much of the later section's development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.18 – April 16, 1985

This session is no doubt one of the most peculiar of this (or any seminar) since Deleuze must contend early in the session with an intrusive female student who disrupts the class by engaging in a confrontational and quasi-amorous dialogue with Deleuze, whose experience with many different sorts of interventions at Vincennes leads him to handle the exchange with extreme delicacy. After this disruption, the session is predominantly a review of many key points discussed before Easter break, notably a confrontation of vying linguistic perspectives in order to understand cinematographic language as well as what Deleuze argues are speech acts in cinema. This review (corresponding directly to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9 part 1) proceeds again through the "seen" and "read" aspects of silent films, the latter aspect through captioned frames, about which Deleuze reintroduces Benveniste's corresponding terms, story (*récit*) and discourse. He studies ways in which these aspects are interlinked within different cinema traditions, notably Soviet cinema but also burlesque.

Then, asking what occurs when speech is no longer read but heard, Deleuze rejects the simple answer that the image becomes audiovisual, and he anticipates future discussion of post-World War II cinema by reflecting on television's impact on filmmakers as a means for their work to become audiovisual. He thus begins to consider speech and, more specifically, the speech act as an auditory element as well as visual, considering how spoken components cause one to see something visual and how the visual image renders itself readable. This "something" Deleuze calls "interactions", and in this light, he returns to Benveniste's perspectives, notably his use of "shifters", and to explore films with speech acts circulating between unlinked persons as rumors, Deleuze undertakes a detailed analysis of Lang's "M". Deleuze identifies the movement of speech acts as a kind of wave form, the propagation or opposition or innovation of "waves of belief and desire". To this point, Deleuze relates a discussion on interactionist sociology (e.g., Tarde, Robert Park, Simmel) in order to emphasize the interactions occurring within the wave

movements in "M", but pointing to other forms besides rumors, notably urban strolling and conversations.

Having developed these aspects of interactionist sociology (notably from Simmel) as forms of sociability, Deleuze reintroduces (from the end of the previous session) the themes of collaboration and degradation as interactive modes, examined respectively in Einstein's "Strike" as well as "M", then Murnau's "The Last Man" as well as Sternberg's "The Blue Angel". Through the comparison between silent films ("Strike", "The Last Man") and first phase speaking films ("M", "The Blue Angel"), Deleuze insists that the speech act, as an auditory component of the visual image, causes an interaction to be seen in the visual image, and no longer a linkage of action-reaction, as occurred in silent films. By concluding with this emphasis on the introduction of an auditory component into the visual image in early speaking films, Deleuze establishes aspects of the auditory relationship with the image, at once visible and readable, as a focus for most of the remaining sessions.

We must note that the 16 April 1985 session transcript order presented here varies significantly from the session's transcripts on the Web Deleuze and Paris 8 sites where the version posted reverses sections 1 and 2. We have transposed the version's order to follow the recording: part 1 now starts after Easter break (and contains the awkward intervention by a student) and ends on the topic of "le parlant"; part 2 starts on "le parlant" and ends on discussion of Simmel; part 3 starts with discussion of Simmel and ends with Deleuze dismissing class.

Cinema 4.19 – April 23, 1985

After allowing the previous class's impromptu student presenter to follow-up with her assignment (a definition of "speech acts", omitted from the recording), Deleuze continues on this very topic, planning to develop a classification of cinematographic speech acts. As usual, he steps back to review some earlier bases for understanding these, notably from silent films into the two stages of spoken films. Deleuze reemphasizes how the "readable" aspect of film viewing shifted toward the "hearable", but that these tended to weave together rather than one replacing the other. Yet, the "hearable" aspect causes new sorts of visions within the visual image, notably the rise of speech acts. In the first phase of speaking cinema, the speech act remains dependent on the visual image, but following World War II, in the second or modern phase, the sound component gains its autonomy, loses its dependence on the visual image, and thereby eliminating the "out-of-field" aspect. Deleuze reiterates a point made in the previous session, that this autonomy is due in large part to the growth of television, such that cinema's autonomous element becomes fully audiovisual, that is, dual autonomy of the sound component and of the visual component for the same image.

As a way to forecast what he will consider in coming lectures, Deleuze derives from Kant two terms with Greek etymology, "autonomy" and "heautonomy", to indicate that after World War II, sound and the visual become two autonomous components of a one and same audiovisual image (with reference to the pedagogy of Rossellini and Godard), followed then by "heautonomous" images (with reference to the Straubs, Duras, Syberberg), the complex relation developed previously of incommensurability, the irrational point and relinkages. Then, after a

lengthy discussion with students, Deleuze addresses the interactional nature of images, returning to the linguistic bases of interactions (with Benveniste), but then distinguishing "persons" between which speech acts are engaged (for Benveniste) from speech acts as "interactions", notably conversations, rumors, strolling, reading popular news items, that is, the zigzag movement of such acts among an interactive aggregate (with reference to Lang's "M").

After reviewing different traits of such movement, Deleuze enters the classification proper, toward three categories. He devotes the rest of the session entirely to the first type, interactional speech acts, and the different poles (notably, in American comedy, e.g., Hawks, Capra, Lubitsch), linked how conversations and sub-conversations (proposed by Nathalie Sarraute) develop throughout these films a direct representation of conversation with its madness, the sub-conversation of its hostilities, and discourse and its democratic aspects. Indicating that these kinds of speech acts fall under the category of "interactive," Deleuze moves toward another aspect of this first type of speech act that involves time and is evident as bifurcations in Mankiewicz's cinema (e.g., "People Will Talk", "Suddenly Last Summer"). But he argues that these bifurcations suggest a second kind of speech act, an "off" speech act that is inserted into the visual image through a circulation between one speech act hidden behind another. Then, he concludes this first part by summarizing the spoken component's three properties: to cause visions ("elle fait voir") as interactions and bifurcations; to be seen itself, like voice itself becoming visible in space (exemplified in Walsh's "The Enforcer" and Hitchcock's "The Man Who Knew Too Much" and the song "Que sera, sera"); and itself to see, as suggested by Michel Chion, the "voice that sees all, knows all", i.e., moving toward the second category, the reflexive speech act, for development in the next session. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 9 & 10.

Cinema 4.20 – April 30, 1985

Deleuze starts by forecasting how he will approach the second phase of the sound-image relationship in the final month of the seminar, providing details of three key points to be considered. Then, he returns to the pre-World War II stage of spoken films, Deleuze reflecting on what it means for the sound component to gain its autonomy and by what operative means, specifically, noises, voices (phonatory element, words and speech act), and music. Deleuze addresses each, noting different sub-divisions of noises and voices depending on the style, and indicates how music develops a sound framing and a sound continuum, the sound elements remaining undifferentiated. Deleuze relates this continuum to the existence of the out-of-field (*hors-champ*), insisting that it exists as a dependency of the visual image. This leads him to a series of distinctions: an absolute out-of-field and a relative out-of-field, the latter being termed an "aside" (à-côté); a broader global transformation, a "Whole-that-changes" distinct from simple movement in space, developing a temporal change; voices "off" in relation to voices "in", linked to two categories of speech acts, interactive and reflexive.

To examine different facets of such speech acts and voices, Deleuze draws on Michel Chion's analysis of Lang's "The Testament of Dr. Mabuse", and then shifts to musical elements as a special facet of the sound continuum linked to the visual image. Deleuze refers to the role of

music as exterior to the film in the silent period, as a kind of figurative or programmatic music (that Deleuze, calls a "relation of external correspondence"). However, music's shift in the first speaking period was no longer to be subjugated by the visual image, that is, to open itself to new possibilities. Thanks to Deleuze's extended conversation (alas, only partially audible) with frequent participant Pascal Auger on different moments in the sound, music and visual image intersection, and with references to different cinema critics' work in this area, Deleuze indicates the importance of the "relation of internal correspondence", or vibration as infinitesimal element of visual movement in common with musical movement. Deleuze also draws on the work of several musicians, leading him back to the term the Whole-that-changes.

Deleuze closes the session by turning toward Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and the conception of music developed therein. He includes in this exposé a link to Schopenhauer and Wagner and considers Wagner's *Parsifal* in order to confirm the distinction of levels of the Whole, indirect representation in the visual image and direct presentation in music. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.21– May 7, 1985

Deleuze begins by asserting that, in the previous session, things went off track since he had hoped to leave time for students' interventions but had also entirely lost his focus on the topic of sound framing (*cadrage sonore*). Hence, he begins this session with questions on sound framing, maintaining that if sound framing occurs, it must by understood (just as with visual framing) in terms of time and no longer space. But this is a very recent conception of framing (since post World War II) and therefore the topic of montage frequently overtakes this new conception.

Then, in taking up the second phase of spoken cinema, Deleuze examines how the sound component gains its own framing quite distinct from visual framing, proposing two hypotheses, one "strong" and one "weak". The first is: with the new image regime after World War II, the idea of a specific sound framing emerges increasingly through specific technological operations that Deleuze details. Deleuze moves forward examining numerous facets of sound framing with certain musicians who were directly involved, but as is often the case, student questions and comments intervene to impede Deleuze's progress: the role of animated films (especially from Disney) in this development; the role of stereo versus monaural sound for this framing. Then, in the second phase, the disappearance of an out-of-field (*hors-champ*) occurs, replaced with an interstice between visual and sound framings, and here Deleuze invokes a number of critics and filmmakers to ponder different facets, including frontal projection and digital imagery. He also proposes different manifestations of automata in various national cinema traditions and discusses issues of framing in comparison to issues of abstract expressionism. He reaches a momentary conclusion by suggesting that by whatever means, sound framing served as a means for cinema authors to beckon the future.

Furthermore, by insisting that this marked a shift toward an "heautonomy", that is, the autonomy of two kinds of images, sound framing and visual framing, the regime of back and forth shifting between these types of images, Deleuze begins to define more precisely each type of image or framing. He draws examples from several filmmakers (Rohmer's "Claire's Knee"; Resnais's

"Last Year in Marienbad"), and suggests that, on one hand, the sound image is a speech act as fabulation or founding act of the event, and on the other hand, the visual images now are "any-space-whatsoever," that is, empty, disconnected, disoriented spaces that might also be described as stratigraphic and, indeed, archeological. To explore different examples of spatial layers, he again points to different works by Resnais, but these serve to introduce a long, sequential review of films by the "Straubs" (Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet), with different ways of examining not just spatial layering, but also how each layers buries something else, not necessarily revealed. In so doing, Deleuze demonstrates the impact of Cézanne on these concepts, and then considers how these images, rather than lacking any relations, attain an incommensurable, irrational, free indirect relation. Hence, by means of works by the Straubs, Deleuze undertakes an "irrational circuit", starting with how they extract a pure speech act from an environment, and more precisely, speech acts ripped from materials that resist, but also resistance arising from the speech acts themselves. After this circuit of the sound image, Deleuze shifts to the visual image, that is, empty, geological and telluric spaces, and he argues that the visual image's role is to bury what the speech act ripped out to be expressed. He compares this burying, this weighing down within the Straub's visual image to Cézanne's "stubborn geometry and geological foundation", and then provides examples of the circuit between the telluric image and the sound images, both maintaining at once their "heautonomy" and their indirect, irrational and incommensurable relationship. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.22– May 14, 1985

Noting that the previous discussion of cinematographic speech acts is suspended for this session on more technical and technological matters, Deleuze reminds the participants nonetheless of his operative hypothesis, that the modern visual image is no longer defined through the inclusion of an out-of-field (*hors-champ*), that is, an exteriority in relation to the seen image and filled with sound elements. In fact, both visual images and sound images have gained their autonomy, or "heautonomy", meaning the existence of a cut or an interstice between sound image and visual image, arising as an interstice arises between a sound framing and a visual framing. Relying on film theorist Béla Balázs's work regarding the first stage of speaking cinema, Deleuze wonders if one can speak equally of sound framing and sound montage, as well as what the role of technical advances might be in this alternative, and of the possible transformation of cinema music itself in this process.

Thus defining this class as his "technical session", Deleuze invites Dominique Villain to join the conversation, and during her intervention on sound framing, numerous participants intervene, particularly Richard Pinhas, on related topics that include: relation of sound mixing to sound framing and montage; how these effects occurs in the Straubs' films; the use of filtering devices in recording; the role of stereo vis-à-vis monaural; spatial positioning, depth of field, and sound blocks; and the use of harmonizers. Following an extended intervention by Pinhas on details of sound technology (microphones, filters, stereo), Deleuze asks Pascale Criton in the third section to respond to the two previous interventions, but several questions as well as Pinhas's particular objection create notable differences of perspective, even disagreements. The session closes on a

sense of disagreement, with Deleuze somewhat flustered about how the session unfolded. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

Cinema 4.23 – May 21, 1985

With the technical session completed in the previous session, and with the seminar's focus henceforth on the second phase of spoken cinema, Deleuze rapidly reviews the bases on which this argument proceeds, from silent film through the first spoken phase. Following review of previous sessions, Deleuze emphasizes the importance of music to the autonomous status of the sound image and framing in relation to the visual image. To consider these relations, he reviews the status of sound as subordinate to the visual image during the first stage of spoken cinema and recalls having identified two kinds of speech acts, interactional and reflexive. The "thunderclap" comes, however, with the conclusion that the sound image itself maintains its autonomy, itself becoming image.

Then, suggesting the existence of a third type of speech act, Deleuze reexamines the technique of indirect free style, with reference to Rohmer and Bresson, in order to determine how the speech act is expressed when the sound element becomes an autonomous image, and then to ponder what such a speech act would consist of. As an act of fabulation, this speech act is linked to the lie (examples from Robbe-Grillet, Rohmer, Jean Rouch, Pierre Perrault, Pasolini). Then, asking how the speech act as fabulation can create the event, Deleuze returns to the concept in modern cinema of any-space-whatsoever (*espace quelconque*) emerging in numerous styles and filmmakers that Deleuze enumerates. As the sound image becomes autonomous, the visual image becomes telluric, tectonic (examples from Antonioni, Pasolini, and the Straubs). Deleuze concludes that when the sound image and visual image become "heautonomous", i.e., respectively autonomous in relation to one another, the sound image refers to a new type of speech act (the act of fabulation), and the visual image creates the event while also referring to a new kind of space, telluric space, tectonic space, geological space, buried within the event. Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.

Let us note that this transcript version's order varies from the transcript of the corresponding session on Web Deleuze and the Paris 8 sites, where the transcripts sections 2 and 3 are reversed. The version here followed follows the recording's order, with part 3 connecting with discussion of Charles Péguy at the end of part 2 and ending with Deleuze dismissing the class.

Cinema 4.24 – May 28, 1985

Deleuze prepares for the end of the Cinema seminars by proposing to spend the two following, final sessions responding to students' questions. Then he picks up from the previous session by considering what he calls the disjunction between the visual and sound image, and he gives three examples of the sound-visual "héautonomy", works by Marguerite Duras, the Straubs, and Syberberg, describing the kinds of layering occurring within certain films and between films, and also the kind of broken circuit evident in the films' irrational cuts, with the speech act ripped forth while the visual image buries the event beneath the stratigraphic levels. After indicating certain commonalities between these filmmakers' works, Deleuze emphasizes their differences, notably in speech acts (the act of resistance for the Straubs; the act of love for Duras, or entire

moral desire), in the visual image (dryness and the telluric image for the Straubs; dampness, liquid and the oceanographic image for Duras), and in the sound-visual relationship (resistance as political phenomenon of class struggle for the Straubs; for Duras, a class of violence of all the world's excluded people). Deleuze also discusses issues of lighting in the Straub's films with Raymonde Carasco and Dominique Villain. Then, as Deleuze indicated at the start, he suspends the cinema discussion after the break in order to discuss Blanchot's essay "Speaking is not seeing" ["Parler, ce n'est pas voir"], a chapter in *The Infinite Conversation*, as way to consider the unspeakable (*indicible*), the speech act attaining the limit of speech and corresponding to the act of resistance for the Straubs, the act of love for Duras. For a comparable value for the visual image, Deleuze with Blanchot contrasts the daily experience of sight, "vision", with the superior experience of the visual at its limit, in the absolute invisible or "voyance" (illuminated vision). And the limits that each faculty reaches, sight and sound, reaches a common limit, flipside of one another, inside and outside to each other.

Finally, summarizing the seminars' global thematics, Deleuze states the basic question "is an image of thought to be expected from cinema, and if so, what kind?" and returns to an overview, specifically the manner in which the pre-World War II movement-image is distinguished from the post-war time-image. After reviewing characteristics of the image of thought corresponding to the earlier period, he contrasts four characteristics of the modern era: topological organization of a non-symmetrical and non-totalizable outside and inside; relinkage of images through irrational cuts; what Deleuze calls "heautonomy" both of sound and the visual images entering into an original, free indirect relation; and thought understood as a common limit of speaking and seeing, that is, at the edges of the unspeakable, the invisible, and the unthinkable. He then provides a list of filmmakers and names the kind of limits that they attain: the unevocable in Welles; the inexplicable in Robbe-Grillet; the incommensurable in Godard; the impossible in Duras; the irrational in Syberberg; and for the Straubs, Deleuze admits having forgotten the term ("the irreconcilable," *The Time-Image*, p. 278) and that he has slid into momentary amnesia. Hence, the need for questions and additional discussion in the two remaining sessions. Deleuze concludes this session with particular finality by affirming, "I believe I've finished everything I had to say about cinema, so there you have it, I'm done with cinema". Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 10.

Cinema 4.25 – June 4, 1985

As Deleuze indicates from the start of this penultimate session of the 1984-85 year, after four years of studying this vast topic, he opens up the discussion to the participants in order to consider their reactions and questions concerning all that has preceded. The session roughly divides into three sets of comments followed by Deleuze's remarks: first, Georges Comtesse makes an extended intervention on instances of immanence (Deleuze's interpretation) and transcendence and silence (Comtesse's emphasis) in Duras, particularly "India Song", to which Deleuze responds not only quite affirmatively in substance, marking both their differences and points of agreement, but also symbolically. That is, this is Comtesse's first intervention of any length since Deleuze very severely rebuked him for his manner of presenting his comments

(session 16, 19 March 1985). Hence, Deleuze signals to all that there is not discord, that all is well going forward.

Second, Raymond Carasco makes an important intervention, first responding quickly to certain points made by Comtesse that particularly concern her, and second, reflecting, as a filmmaker, academic and cinema scholar, how she understands the import of the four seminars and particularly the conceptual framework articulated by Deleuze. In light of her comments about details regarding the material considered in the current year, Deleuze directs his self-professed obsession, how Syberberg dealt differently with his different film subjects, most notably, the ambiguities in his treatment of Hitler. Then Deleuze list three important works for him – by Kracauer, Benjamin, et Syberberg – in order to trace the arc of reflection on the German soul in German cinema, the rise of the art of mass reproduction, and with reference to Daney and Virilio, Leni Riefensthal's role in developing this tendency as well as Goebbels's rivalry with Hollywood. With Syberberg, this project is to flip the old movement-image around to crush Hitler via the shift to the time-image, that is, dissociation of sound and the visual. Deleuze completes this reflection by considering the "stupidest sentence about cinema", that the cinematographic image is in the present, and notably how Robbe-Grillet manipulated this thought for his own ends.

The third part of the session arises from a student's series of questions (unfortunately barely audible) on the topic of automata as well as the relation between year three and year four, an intervention that Deleuze summarizes as revealing that the student, while understanding each course element, had not grasped the whole. Deleuze presents a forty-minute summary of the conceptual evolution of year 3 into and through year 4, that is, from the movement-image to the different manifestations of the time-image (the latter most clearly summarizes in session 24). He reviews the two distinctions of the automata (spiritual and psychic), and three types (clockwork-type, motor-type, informational and cybernetic). He then traces the development of automata with reference to French cinema for the earlier types (Gance, Renoir), then to Kubrick and the great computer ("2001") for the extrinsic form of cybernetic machine, and to psychological automata (with reference to Bresson and Resnais), the machine defined by speech acts. Then, Deleuze explains the student's difficulty by possibly not having fully understood the nature of the "cut" between movement-image and time-image, and Deleuze provides a point-by-point review of differences between these two key concepts, passing through the collapse of the sensorimotor schema; the rise of the pure optical-sound situation; the merging of actual and virtual images and emergence of the crystal-image, that is, the time seed; the indirect representation of time, subordinate to movement; time as simultaneity or coexistence, that is, a direct representation of time, and also through series of time; the distinction of the commensurability and the regime of rational cuts under the movement-image, and incommensurability and regime of irrational cuts under the time-image; the emergence in the latter regime of the dissociation of visual and sound images, that is speech acts and stratigraphic layers in contact with the theme of inside and outside. Deleuze concludes the session by reminding the participants that he will be available in two weeks for a supplementary discussion session.

Cinema 4.26 – June 18, 1985

Having completed the preceding session with a remarkable summary of the key points of
seminars Cinema 3 and 4, Deleuze offers a supplemental meeting to students' questions, and as
such, the direction it takes depends naturally on the nature of the questions. The first question, on
the concept of the "utterable" (*l'énonçable*), proposed in session 17, in relation to another
concept, the act of fabulation. Deleuze's approximately ninety-minute response returns him to
discussing questions of linguistics, particularly regarding concepts of signification of Hjelmslev
and Gustave Guillaume. From the former, Deleuze draws on the extra-linguistic
"matter"/"material" (*matière)* specific to language, and from the latter, the concept of a signified
of power which Deleuze identifies with "meaning" (*sens*), specifically the sense of a proposition.
Here the linguists intersect with Bergson, notably how the sign operates a "cut" or "point of
view" within sense as a kind of pre-linguistic material. At this point, Deleuze defines the
"utterable" as sense, or Hjelmslev's "matter", or Guillaume's "signified of power", and the
enunciable is a correlate of language, much as cinema is neither language or speech. Cinema,
Deleuze argues, is the representation of the utterable, either as movement-image or time-image,
but particularly as process of temporalization.

Then, Deleuze points out that experimental cinema developed the enunciable as any-spaces-
whatever, that is, the pure potentiality of the event, and this perspective shifts Deleuze's focus to
develop questions of the proposition and the event with barely implicit reference to *Logic of
Sense* (particularly the third series, on the proposition). He juxtaposes the Stoics' concept of the
"expressible" (which is their third signifying "instance", that is, sense, cf. *Logic of Sense*, series
6, on placing into series). As he did for the linguistic concepts, Deleuze links the proposition and
sense to cinema since, for him only through the cinema image – movement-image, time-image –,
does the signified of power, or sense, or matter directly emerge as structure of movement or
process of temporalization. The shift that occurs from interior monologue to indirect free
discourse emerges most fully in the types of experimental cinema that Deleuze finds most
important, specifically, Third-World cinema by Jean Rouch, Pierre Perrault, Glauber Rocha, all
of which explicitly develop a cinema of "the people to come", hence a political cinema to which
Deleuze associates, in a different way, films by Resnais and the Straubs.

The session's final part focuses loosely on possible topics for the 1985-86 seminar, since
Deleuze maintains, first, that he has finished with cinema, and second, that "the supreme subject
for my life, which would be to do a course on 'what is philosophy?' is not within his grasp the
following fall. Hence, students propose possible topics that might be included in a seminar
structured almost as *à la carte*, different foci such as the notion of opposition in philosophy, from
Aristotle onward; temporality; Blanchot and Foucault; light in relation to color and to music; a
return to Syberberg in relation to concepts from Blanchot; irrationalism in philosophy; a close
reading of *Thus Spake Zarathustra's* book 4. This process speculation leads Deleuze to return
finally to reflections on forms of political cinema (developed in *The Time-Image,* chapter 8),

specifically on "acts of fabulation" in cinema and in art related to the notion of "the people are missing" and the concomitant need to fabulate as a process of self-invention as a "movement".