

Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries : Charles J. Stivale

Foucault, October 22, 1985- June 3, 1986

26 sessions

After Michel Foucault's death from AIDS on June 25, 1984, Deleuze decided to devote an entire year of his seminar to a study of Foucault's writings. Deleuze analyzes in detail what he took to be the three "axes" of Foucault's thought: knowledge, power, and subjectivation, hence the tripartite organization of the year's seminar, parts of which contributed to the publication of Deleuze's book *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986), with the subsequent English translation by Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

Session 1, Part I: Knowledge (Historical Formations), October 22, 1985

To introduce the first axis of Foucault's thought, historical formations, Deleuze draws from his articles on Foucault, on *The Archeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punishment*, the first two chapters of the Foucault book corresponding, respectively, to "A New Archivist" [*Critique* 274 (1970)] and "A New Cartographer" [*Critique* 343 (1975)]. Deleuze here provides an overview of the initial segment to prepare the detailed analysis. Following a bibliographical overview of Foucault's writing, Deleuze points to Foucault's first axis on the discipline of the archives, i.e., of historical formations, that Foucault approaches from the perspectives of "seeing" (*le voir*) and "speaking" (*le parler*). Deleuze adds several other dyads to these: the lesson of things and the lesson of grammar (that "seeing" is not "saying"), also the drawing and the text, and a third theme, the visible and the statable, i.e., visibilities and statements. Moreover, since "seeing" and "speaking" are conditions specific to each period (*époque*) which make behaviors and mentalities possible, Deleuze reviews how Foucault's perspective on "seeing" and "speaking" developed from unreason (*déraison*) in the seventeenth century to disciplinary techniques in the eighteenth century. Deleuze emphasizes that, for Foucault, a statement regime is called a "discursivity" linked to types of evidence, as well as to non-discursive formations, distinctions that connect in turn, through the works Raymond Roussel, to a kind of "making seen", first, in machines or mechanical processes, then in the linguistic process or the statable regime. Foucault also insists on the irreducibility of the statement and visibility, proceeding along two tracks, descriptions and statements, with the primacy given to statements over visibilities. Deleuze emphasizes Foucault's debt to Maurice Blanchot (cf. *The Infinite Conversation*) and his statement "seeing is not speaking" as well as his term for the disjunction as "non-relation". The four theses from Foucault that Deleuze defines here provide the seminar's agenda: to understand how historical formations are constituted through the combination of regimes of statements and fields of visibility. Moreover, these forms, statements and visibilities, also constitute knowledge as the procedure without which truth has no existence.

Session 2, Part I: Historical Formations, October 29, 1985

Reviewing previous key points, Deleuze argues that the first axis consists of the historical *a priori* and strata as composed of stable forms of the visible and the storable, offering the example of Herman Melville's novel, *Pierre; or, The Ambiguities*, to consider the shift from strata to unstratified elements of visibilities. The opening recap is summarized with the questions: what do you say, what do you see, and what do you make seen? Then, with a second aspect corresponding to the question, what is knowledge? , Deleuze shifts from strata to interstrata, in Foucault from phenomenology toward epistemology, examining knowledge as a discursive and non-discursive practice, truth as the relationship between discursive and non-discursive practices, and the rules for different types of statements. Deleuze examines how the objects of statements take on myriad aspects depending on the regime (e.g. the hospital or prison regime). As the political aspects of speaking and the visible matter to Deleuze, he comments on recent and contemporary examples of this axis, notably the "twisted vitalism" of the Holocaust, medicine without doctors or patients (*malades*). Reading from 'The History of Sexuality' I, Deleuze examines the intersection of contemporary threats of death (death sentence, nuclear war) with management of life, examples showing how Foucault's method brings forth the supposedly hidden statements existing in plain sight.

Session 3, Part I: Historical Formations, November 5, 1985

After the usual recap of previous key points, Deleuze considers the work by Krafft-Ebing and his *Psychopathia Sexualis*, to which Deleuze contrasts Foucault's perspective, also emphasizing the emergence of statements in government and in schools. Then, Deleuze considers the very method of extracting statements, i.e., necessarily by constituting a corpus to unlock the patterns that define statements, but in a fashion that is depersonalized (to the extent possible). Deleuze likens this to Gabriel Tarde's microsociology and finds examples in Foucault's "Lives of Infamous Men" and in the *History of Madness*. The method consisting of determining the sites of power [*les foyers de pouvoir*] around which the words, sentences and propositions are organized, Deleuze argues that Foucault's method for these sites leads him to identify "singularities" as constitutive of a corpus, thereby designating a "there is" of language. Linking this gathering of language to historical formations (e.g. the Classical age, and Nietzsche and Mallarmé, also works by Blanchot), Deleuze says that for Foucault, the "there is" of language is an "anonymous murmur", discovered by breaking open language and statements to the corpus of visibility, the being-light of each period. For Foucault, this glimmering of visibilities emerges in the work of Raymond Roussel, poetry constituted as knowledge (*savoir*).

Session 4, Part I: Historical Formations, November 12, 1985

Having previously considered the flip side of the question "what is a statement?" by examining visibilities, Deleuze insists on the importance of determining the corpus of knowledge, the criteria resting in power which is thus immanent to knowledge. So Foucault seeks the sites of power and of resistance to power in the 19th century, with experience always conditioned and gridded by power relations. Such relations are discussed, says Deleuze, in Foucault's essay "The Lives of Infamous Men" (*La vie des hommes infâmes*), after which, in Foucault's last books, he seeks to "cross the line". Remaining within this reflection on knowledge-power through the constitution of one's corpus, Deleuze also reflects on how Foucault examined visibilities, how

for Foucault, the “one sees” is light while the “one speaks” is language. Exploring how these distinctions emerge in *The Birth of the Clinic*, Deleuze then pursues them with examples from different regimes of visibility, notably figures of light for the painters Robert Delaunay and Paul Cézanne. Deleuze then delineates four levels of difference between statements and the group of words, sentences and propositions: first, the inherent mixture of systems in speech; second, the necessary choice to be made within this multiplicity, with Foucault’s own position regarding the subject being that statements have no author, but an “author function”, also emphasizing the example of free indirect discourse as a means of short-circuiting subject positions. Deleuze indicates that the statement refers to variable subject positions, all ordered according to a “one speaks”. As the session ends, Deleuze indicates a third level, within the proposition, referring to a state of affairs to which he will return in the next session.

Session 5, Part I: Historical Formations, November 19, 1985

Lasting over 3 hours, Deleuze provides a thorough review of previously covered material: statements distinct from words, sentences and propositions; intermixing of language systems (cf. Proust); rules of passage between levels of statements. Deleuze then defines different aspects of the statement: its “primitive function” and its “derivative function”, the latter with three facets, the “author function” (vs. the subject of enunciation), the unassignable “one”, the “one speaks” as the being of language. To clarify these distinctions, Deleuze considers examples from Beckett and Fitzgerald, and also from Sartre on the dream and perception, i.e., the discursive object being the world that surrounds a statement, the object at the limit of the vector field, with the discursive concept located at the intersection of the heterogeneous systems through which the statement passes. Continuing the recap, Deleuze summarizes the two main topics outlined to date, namely, the question of the archive (seeing and speaking, the visible and the storable) and the importance of constructing a corpus of words, sentences and propositions in a particular formation. The previous session’s discussion about light falling and language gathering is linked to painting (cf. Cézanne, Van Gogh and Gauguin), and concerning the being of language, Deleuze considers the medical statement as a regime of light, of visibility, with knowledge located at the conjunction of seeing and speaking. He then shifts the gap between seeing and speaking or, with Blanchot’s term, the “non-relation” between these (cf. *The Order of Things*), then the primacy of the statement over the visible (cf. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*), and then conquests, seizures, captures of the statement by the visible and struggle for release of the statement from the visible (cf. *This is Not a Pipe*). Deleuze then considers Foucault’s neo-Kantianism in Foucault, first distinguishing the point of view of God, for which there is no given, and the point of view of infinity, distinct from finite thought. Outlining Kant’s view, Deleuze relates these to Foucault’s perception (in the three kinds of texts identified earlier) of the gap between seeing and speaking as well as to the problem of knowledge when confronted with this gap, with both Kant and Foucault resorting to a third party’s intervention into this gap, with Foucault offering “mysterious art that will bring together statements and visibilities through a non-relation”.

Session 6, Part I: Historical Formations, November 26, 1985

Deleuze opens where he just ended: if knowledge interlinks the visible and the storable, this occurs as both heterogeneous and with the “non-relation”, suggesting that a gap exists between the visible and the storable, which Foucault demonstrates humorously (cf. *This Is Not a Pipe*),

logically (cf. *Birth of the Clinic*), and historically (cf. *The History of Madness* and *Discipline and Punish*). Deleuze identifies four confrontations as a function of this fundamental heterogeneity of the visible and the statable: 1) with Kant, and his concepts of receptivity and spontaneity; 2) with Blanchot's statement "speaking is not seeing"; 3) with cinema's fundamental gap between audio and the visual; 4) with Raymond Roussel's works. Deleuze first returns to Kant's introduction of finitude as original and not derived from an original infinite, then indicating Foucault extension of this (cf. *The Order of Things*). Then detailing Foucault's three rapprochements with Blanchot (Blanchot's notion of the Outside; the impersonal "one speaks" and even "one dies"; third, from *The Infinite Conversation*, "speaking is not seeing"), Deleuze examines the latter, distinguishing two exercises of speech, one "empirical" (about what can be seen), another "higher" (about the unseen, that can only be spoken), i.e. silence. While for Blanchot, seeing either slips into the purely underdetermined or is preparatory for exercising speech, Foucault gives form to the visible, crossing the gap between the two forms, particularly through cinema. Referring to work undertaken in the Cinema seminars (cf. the new use of speech Syberberg, the Straubs, Duras, Mankeiwicz, and Ozu), Deleuze reviews their different ways of establishing a relationship between speaking and seeing, particularly through empty space. Finally, the Foucault-Roussel confrontation awaits the next session.

Session 7, Part I: Historical Formations, December 10, 1985

First reminding participants that discussion still focuses on the two irreducible forms (the form of the visible and the form of the statable), Deleuze presents Foucault's admiration for Raymond Roussel's work which, for Foucault, reveals a veritable battle between the visible and the statable. Deleuze indicates how, for the statable and the visible, there exists the condition (the "there is" of language, and light of the visible) and the conditioned (*le conditionné*) (the statement itself, and scintillation), and Foucault emphasizes the gap between the "there is" of language and the statements disseminated in language, into which the visible can seep. After the Foucault-Roussel examination, Deleuze reaches some conclusions: the first axis of Foucault's thought is "knowledge" (*savoir*), with two parts for which Deleuze examines two kinds of dualism, from Descartes to Kant, through Spinoza and Bergson. A third kind interests Foucault, the one inscribed in speech, a preparatory stage of multiplicity and pure pluralism. Deleuze indicates some bases of multiplicity in mathematics, then emphasizing that the parts of knowledge are interwoven in the strata of historical formations. Hence, Deleuze suggests that the reconciliation of mutual captures of the forms can occur only in the dimension constituted by relations of power, requiring that he explain why power is the second axis. He concludes that even if power is silent and blind, it nonetheless constructs seeing and speaking, and Deleuze explores how we are made to speak through power, that is, "spotlighting" as an operation of power. Given Foucault's interest in "lives of infamous men", Deleuze provides three definitions of "infamy": classical (e.g., Gilles de Rais), baroque (cf. Borges), and modern (e.g. power "spotlighting" the individual). With the "spotlight" on the "ordinary man" (cf. Foucault's example in *lettres de cachet*), Deleuze concludes by outlining the three requirements between power and knowledge, particularly the primacy of power over knowledge.

Session 8, Part I: Historical Formations, December 17, 1985

Shifting now to the discussion of power, Deleuze examines a particular passage in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault's choice of a statement example, AZERT (QUERTY equivalent on French keyboards). Deleuze emphasizes key points on the as a condition of designating and as neither banal nor original, but regular, a regularity implying "facultative rules" of enunciation and an emission of singularities that Deleuze demonstrates with several drawings in order to introduce the key term, a *series* of regular points, with all statements being serial. Elaborating the linkages between enunciation and singularities with reference to different mathematical perspectives (cf. Albert Lautman, Henri Poincaré), Deleuze shows that the statement is a function, and that for Foucault, a linkage exists between the emission of singularities and "rapports de force", i.e., force relations, in short, knowledge as integrating force relations between things, people, letters, shadow and light, between everything. Deleuze then indicates that Foucault's method of singularities, developed in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, was applicable to other domains: for the aesthetic domain, Deleuze takes Mallarmé's poem, "A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance", to apply this method, concerning chance and singular points. For the social domain, the confession and related terms (sacrament, guilt) imply an envelope of singularities relating to the concept of "pastoral power" in contrast to royal power (cf. *Confessions of the Flesh*). Given Foucault's shift of emphasis in his final books, Deleuze offers examples from Foucault, the constellation of singularities in the formation of psychiatry and of pathological anatomy. Linking these relations back to the knowledge series, to light as the integration of singular points, the verbal series and the luminous series, Deleuze draws from Velázquez's *Las Meninas* and Roussel, arguing that the two series can be interlaced as an instances arising from another dimension, and he also insists that the Foucault-Blanchot intersection emerges within the three notions: the neutral or the "one"; the singular; and the multiple opposing the same, hence, the force relations and singularities constituting the bases for the knowledge power-system.

Session 9, Part II: Power, January 7, 1986

Part II of the seminar focuses on power, the second axis of Foucault's thought, starting with Deleuze's review as well as with key terms: historical formations or strata of statements and visibilities; the intertwining of the latter, also as language and light, yet remaining heterogenous, constantly battling, occurring via a "non-relation", but a relation between the forms occurring due to the dimension of power. While knowledge is formal and stratified, power is informal and unstratified, with a boundary like a curve regularizing relations between singular points, with knowledge relations linked to power relations, the latter thus understood as relations of forces. Deleuze notes three aspects of these relations and their heterogeneity and joins Foucault to Kant through heterogeneity and reciprocal presupposition, but while quickly observing that Foucault needed to add a third axis (part III of the seminar), he remains focused on the first two axes. With no systematic account of the principles of power in Foucault, Deleuze pursues these principles by understanding power as practice, which is how, Deleuze says, Foucault approached all historical problems, linking his published works to his interviews. Situating *Discipline and Punish* within ongoing European leftist debates of the 1960s-70s, and to Foucault's activism in the GIP (Prisons Information Group), Deleuze considers three practical problems: the new types of struggles (concerning power), the role of the intellectual (concerning knowledge), and the meaning of "to be subject", with Deleuze selecting different examples of ruptures (e.g., in Yugoslavia, in Italy, and France). Besides the transversal type of engagement, Foucault also

proposed the “specific intellectual”, influenced by American types of “new subjectivities”, the subject defined as a small incarnation of singularities. Hence, the three practices (struggles, intellectuals, subjectivities) form the linkage between historical formations and the here-now. Deleuze then seeks principles, first being: do not seek large aggregates, but rather microphysics, corpuscles in contrast to the wave, distinctions that Foucault links to Durkheim versus Gabriel Tarde (Foucault tending toward the latter). After outlining Foucault’s denunciation of six postulates of classical theories of power, Deleuze leaves the last one for the next session, the linkage made between the State and law.

Session 10, Part II: Power, January 14, 1986

Following Georges Comtesse’s intervention (the first 17 minutes) on the panopticon in Foucault, Deleuze returns to his outline of principles gleaned from reading theories on power and denounced by Foucault: 1) membership (*appartenance*) and class property, 2) the localization of power in the State apparatus, 3) subordination and infrastructure, 4) essence or attribute, dominant-dominated, and 5) modality, violence and ideology. Before continuing to the sixth postulate, Deleuze dissects the difference in nature between macro- and microphysics, and then the sixth postulate concerns power conceived as a function of law, contrasting the big, molar opposition law-illegality. With Foucault’s second term, “illegalism”, this micro-level term suggests that ways of getting around the law which, in fact, are within the law, requiring jurisprudence. Deleuze then considers power as the relations of forces, with a force always being subject to another force, already a multiplicity. Deleuze relates this latter term to Greek atomism and then to Nietzsche’s philosophy of force and reflects on the relation of force with force as it relates to categories of power for Foucault, the relation of forces as incitation. Deleuze situates an important list of categories in *Discipline and Punish* (part 3, chapter 1) and concludes that the material of force is the power of the force to be affected, and its function is the power to affect other forces. As an example, Deleuze examines the definitions of the Panopticon as it appears in *Discipline and Punish*, which yields the term “diagram” with three definitions and contrasts the diagram and power strategy (micro-structures) with the archive and knowledge strata (macro-structures). With Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality I*, Deleuze adds biopolitics to political economy, and with Pierre Boulez’s music (the smooth and striated spaces distinction), he outlines the diagram of sovereignty distinguished from the diagram of discipline. The importance of pastoral power as a new strategy helps support a claim of a multiplicity of diagrams with that every social formation referring to several diagrams, all diagrams being unstable and fluid, whereas the social formations are in relative equilibrium.

Session 11, Part II: Power, January 21, 1986

After a brief consideration of Foucault’s relationship with cinema in terms of his problem of the visible and the storable (cf. René Allio’s film on Pierre Rivière), Deleuze returns to power as presented in a diagram exposing a relation of forces, distinguishing characteristics of power in contrast to knowledge, and how power reveals active as well as reactive affects. Addressing the plurality of forces, Deleuze returns to the example of the rise of pastoral power, then to the diagram of power with two different definitions, and to diagrams in different societies, hence indicating mutations from one diagram to another. Deleuze raises the question of origins of a diagram with different responses (the Outside, the dice throw as emission of singularities), and

such relinkages of diagrams correspond to “Markov chains”, but also to Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and “the iron hand of necessity” shaking the cup of chance. As regards the diagram, Deleuze describes it as informal, non-stratified, perpetually mutating, abstract without being general, and in fact, virtual yet real, then provides details of how mathematical concepts correspond the knowledge-power distinctions. Moreover, since institutions are forms that integrate micro-relations of power, Foucault resuscitates the word “government” to designate relations of forces most generally, discussing how institutions as molar agencies actualize and integrate molecular relations of forces (cf. *Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality*). As an example of molecular sexuality, Deleuze considers how Proust describes sexuality in *Sodom and Gomorrah* through numerous variables of the body and pleasures.

Session 12, Part II: Power, January 28, 1986

Over three hours, this session begins with a discussion response to a student question on the topic of subjectivities, and to situate Foucault’s thought, Deleuze provides a broad, European context of Leftist practices in relation to the events that become known as “1968”, particularly the constitution of new forms of struggle -- transversal and no longer centralized -- and production of a new subjectivity. Deleuze then returns to the topic of power, social forms or institutions, and power’s actualization or integration, and with reference distinctions that Foucault creates about power-knowledge, Deleuze indicates that in two specific texts, Foucault develops five aspects of the actualization of relations of forces. He then distinguishes how the concept of dualism works in this context, force as inseparable from a double power: power to affect, power to be affected, every force affecting and being affected by another, a dualism, completely subordinated to the multiplicity of forces. To address a final problem of the dual poles -- hard segmentarity versus the power diagram’s supple segmentarity, Deleuze illustrates this with examples from cinema (cf. Rossellini’s “Europe ‘51”), to show Foucault’s method for exploring the social field, determining a concrete apparatus’s degree of affinity with the general diagram, the state of forces in the social field. Looking at the disciplinary diagram (*Discipline and Punish*), Deleuze concludes that stratified formations and diagrams are like two poles, and ultimately the concrete forms never cease to climb toward one, to descend toward the other, concluding the session with a series of examples of material techniques and social technologies as points of collective apparatuses.

Session 13, Part II: Power, February 25, 1986

After a month break, Deleuze recaps the previous discussion on Foucault’s approach to power-knowledge relations, concluding that all the aspects detailed are linked together, power constituting a microphysics, fluid and evanescent relationships, the object of a strategy, a cartographic matter; knowledge constituting a macrophysics, stable relations, the object of stratification, an archival matter. But he also insists that this does not prevent a mutual presupposition between the two, with a primacy of power over knowledge, with the actualization of relations of forces or of power consisting in two simultaneous operations, and actualizing must also being differentiating following divergent pathways. This implicit chasm between the stable and the visible (Blanchot’s “non-relation), seeing and speaking as two fundamental lines of differentiation contrast with the two powers of force, the power of spontaneity and the power of receptivity, actualized in two differentiated forms. Deleuze then proceeds to consider, with

Kant, the coadaptation between the form of spontaneity, the concept, and the form of receptivity, space-time, and translating this in terms of immanence in response to a student's question, Deleuze observes that power and knowledge are each in the other, and in this precise instance, the immanent cause will be a cause which the effect actualizes, i.e., integrates and differentiates at the same time. Responding to another student, Deleuze briefly considers a possible relationship between Foucault and Artaud, then turns to forms of exteriority, how this relates to the emission of singularities, and also responds regarding the dualism of dominating and being dominated, notably the "open self" and singularities as well as the outside (le Dehors) and forces, the thought of the Outside, as well as the Open (cf. Blanchot, Heidegger, Rilke and Bergson). He further maintains that the diagram plunges into the outside, that every diagram is a distribution of singularities that is incarnated in the formation, thus coming from the outside, a series of re-linkages where the givens are as if reset, a new roll of the dice. Deleuze traces the three stages of this process, and within the diagram, Deleuze notes strange, floating singularities uncovering three aspects, the power to affect, the power to be affected, and the power to resist. Deleuze indicates for consideration the primacy of resistance in relation to what it resists, and hence, in going beyond power, he reaches the terrible line of the outside (cf. Melville and Michaux), which implies the power to transform the diagram, leading Foucault's theme of the "death of man", notably to the final chapter of *The Order of Things*.

Session 14, Part II: Power, March 4, 1986

Deleuze continues discussing power with Foucault's *The Order of Things* by rejecting the uproar that Foucault's supposed "death of man" sentiment raised and reconsidering the previous session's discussion of the diagrammatic mutation of forces and concomitant changing of forms. Following the appendix to Deleuze's book on Foucault (titled "On the Death of Man and Superman"), Deleuze proposes three great phases, first, details on the Classical Age, with a contrast between perspectives of Pascal (and "two infinities") and Spinoza (finding a third infinity, much admired by Leibniz). He then takes up the formations developed by Foucault, notably political economy, philology and biology, but understood in the Classical Age as wealth, general grammar, and natural history. Hence, this era is one of order, with man situated in a place on the corresponding table, with the God-form as that which provides order. Second, in the eighteenth-century, the shift occurs bringing man into contact with different forces of the outside, and for man in the nineteenth century, now conscious of his finitude, his component force enters into relations with external forces of this finitude, hence not his own, but which he proceeds to make his own, notably life, work, language, the triple root of finitude. Tracing these three formations, Deleuze observes that whereas these forms correspond, for example, to watchmaking and to carbon, i.e., to energetic machines, the subsequent age of the man-made machine is the age of silicon. So, Deleuze returns to the "God is dead" statement as a truism, the "man-form" replaced the "God-form", but what interests Nietzsche, Deleuze argues, is what will replace the "man-form", leading to the age of the Overman, i.e., toward possible forms beyond the second one, the "man-form". Deleuze asks, for the next meeting, what would the new forces constitute other than man?

Session 15, Part II: Power, March 11, 1986

Deleuze continues examining how Foucault traces three “ages” in *The Order of Things* (begun in the previous session), seeking to address the distinction between life as infinite and life in its finitude. Thus, in the Classical Age, these are the forces of elevation to the infinite (cf. Pascalian anxiety, which Deleuze calls a thought of unfolding (*le dépli*), and he offers the handy formulation: “force in man + forces of elevation to the infinite yield as composite the ‘God-form’”. Then, continuing to the next “age”, the nineteenth century, with the triple forces of finitude in life, language and labor, that is, a thought of re-folding (*repli*), Deleuze again notes that the Kantian revolution inspired Foucault to see the nineteenth-century transformation as replacement of the originary infinity with a constitutive finitude, man first encountering the exterior forces of finitude (life, language, labor), and then making finitude his own. The rest of the session is devoted to tracing how these two moments are developed in the successive formations on specific issues: questions of life (Jussieu, Lamarck, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Cuvier, and Darwin), questions of death (Bichat), labor (Adam Smith, Marx and Engels, and David Ricardo) and grammar and philology (Bopp and Schlegel). Each formation corresponds to developments of pleating and folding, leading Deleuze finally to consider a third formation (with Nietzsche, the figure of the Overman), with the “death of man” question which, for Foucault, simply means that the “man-form” is no longer comprehensible to contemporaries, an age of genetic code, cybernetic machines, the revenge and rise of silicon, with which the forces of man now enter into contact, unleashing an “unlimited finite”. Concluding with the poetic vision of Rimbaud’s “Letter of the Seer”, Deleuze suggests that this formation’s “Overman” is charged with rocks, animals, and literature.

Session 16, Part II: Power, March 18, 1986

Having detailed Foucault’s three successive historical formations from *The Order of Things*, Deleuze indicates their correspondence to “geological movements of thought” to which he assigns different terms, unfolding (*dépli*) for the “God-form” (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries), re-folding (*repli*) for the “man-form” (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries), and the super- or overfold (*surpli*) for the Overman (*Surhomme*, end of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries). After again addressing Foucault’s take on the theme of the “death of man”, i.e., the disappearance of the “man-form”, Deleuze focuses mainly on the third form, the overfold, but traces each of its traits back through each successive formation. In the first formation, he emphasizes the relation with the forces of elevation to the infinite, the orders of infinities; then, in the second formation, man’s engagement with the forces of the outside, the three forces of finitude in labor, life and language; then, why the “man-form” envelops death (of the form). Dwelling at length over the precariousness of the “man-form” and the coextensivity of life and death, Deleuze considers whether, despite the forms of violence that man inflicts all around him, there might be a new form liberating man from such violence, hence a return to the age of the overfold. However, after parenthetically discussing how Foucault limited himself to European formations, he cites *The Order of Things* at length to discuss the “man-form” and the power of reuniting (*rassemblement*) language in the being of language, the anonymous murmur, and the perpetual return of language to itself, examples of which abound: Mallarmé’s concept of “the Book”; Artaud’s “writing for aphasics”; Burroughs’s “cut-ups” and “fold-ins”; Roussel’s proliferating expression; Brisset’s decompositions; Péguy’s repetitions; Céline’s creation of kinds of syntax; e. e. cummings’s ungrammatical formations. Deleuze asks, in conclusion, whether modern literature can be an operation reuniting language in order then to stretch it to its

limit, syntactical invention approaching the agrammatical, something that Foucault discusses for language but not for labor and life, a disparity to be queried next time.

Session 17, Part II: Power, March 25, 1986

After reviewing the previous overview of formations, Deleuze suggests that the “man-form” was at its peak when language was dispersed; that is, as language gathers itself (*se rassemble*) through the action of new forces, the “man-form” is destined to disappear, as language attains its being in literature, as entirely distinct from linguistics. He then returns to his question about why Foucault does not treat similarly the other two forms of finitude, life and labor, and speculating on how this “reuniting” (*rassemblement*) would function for labor and biology, Deleuze provides hypotheses on why Foucault does not make this explicit correlation himself, with Georges Comtesse providing a complementary perspective. Then, Deleuze turns to constitutive force in the third formation: the first is the decoupling (*décrochage*) of literature from linguistics; second, biology’s decoupling from the raw (*brut*) being of life, implying the discovery of genetic codes, for which Deleuze considers how molecular biology currently examines different evolutionary schemas; third, a brute being of labor is prefigured in the shift toward digital machines, labor confronted with its own outside, and the revenge of silicon over carbon. Facing these triple forces, The “Overman” enters into relations with new forces, that Deleuze calls an “overfold” (*surpli*), and then, to describe the Overman’s efforts, Deleuze draws from Rimbaud’s “Letter of the Seer” (also evoked in the final paragraph of *Foucault*), detailing different characteristics of the Overman/Seer’s efforts. Despite reaching the end of the power-knowledge relation, Deleuze will still consider how this new formation implicates questions of law and rights, particularly as related to the possible liberation of life, labor and language.

Session 18, Part II: Power, April 8, 1986

Addressing issues of rights as related to power-knowledge, Deleuze develops what will become much of the extremely terse argument published in “Postscript on Control Societies” (1990). With Foucault’s conception of three forms, God, “man” and Overman, these are the expression of determinable relations of forces, with the Overman arising when forces in “man” liberate a being of life, a being of language, and a being of labor in “man” himself, relating these to contemporary relations between life and machine, the revenge of silicon over carbon, “man” releasing the forces of silicon. However, reviewing the three juridical formations that emerge in Foucault’s analysis, Deleuze suggests that Foucault’s method, applied in his work to limited eras as well as to European culture, could well be extended to other eras and cultures. Then, Deleuze examines the three juridical forms in the successive eras, specifically how three formations of sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics produce three very different subjects of the law. As for biopolitics, Deleuze argues that it appears when the law begins to manage life, with biopolitics operating, in contrast to discipline, on any number of open multiplicities. Moreover, Deleuze develops in this third form the power of “control” (derived from William Burroughs), with numerous ramifications, and he reflects on why, for Foucault, the prison ceased to be an effective form of punishment, arguing that Foucault’s emphasis on biopolitics led him to emphasize the “living being”, no longer the man or the person. Deleuze concludes that the passage from civil rights to social rights is one of the most important moments in the history of rights (cf. François Ewald).

Session 19, Part II: Power, April 15, 1986

Starting the session with a brief profile of William S. Burroughs, notably his book *Naked Lunch*, then recalling the previous reflection on formations of powers and rights, Deleuze examines regimes of images, notably regarding Foucault's three pictorial interventions (on Velasquez, Manet, René Magritte). With help from Serge Daney's *La Rampe*, Deleuze pursues the possibility of linking regimes of images to formations, i.e., sovereignty, discipline and control: Velasquez's "Las Meninas" linked to the sovereign image. With the second regime of images emerging following World War II (cf. Alain Resnais) as a pedagogy of perception, a third regime was a mannerism of the image, via television programs, radio, but also regimes of control of the image by the image (cf. Coppola, Syberberg, and New Wave as a passage from second to third). Deleuze then reviews the seminar's previous steps yet raises the question of why diagrammatic mutations arise from one historical formation to another, within a social field that is inherently strategic, a combat between affecting forces and affected forces, occurring at singular points of forces acting on each other. Foucault's "evolution" through his works serves to clarify this: within a year of introducing the mutation of the diagram (*Discipline and Punish*), Foucault proposed the importance of points of resistance (*The History of Sexuality I*), from the political anatomy of the body to the biopolitics of populations, and here Deleuze derives a third singularity or point of resistance, a third form of affect, as a counter-power, hence the vitalism in Foucault's work, that power invests life while life turns back against power. Deleuze maintains that from *The Archeology of Knowledge* onward (1969), Foucault was developing his perspectives on power through practice (cf. the Prison Information Group), but he also imagines Foucault's inner crisis, whether to remain on the side of power or to find the means to "cross the line". For Deleuze, this theme of "crossing the line" is fundamental, and he constructs three possible interventions regarding "crossing the line": a desperate one, with no way to cross the line; a moderate one, that crossing the line, while possible, may lead to a new formation that is no better than previously; and an extreme one, to cross the line and leave the side of power, hence Blanchot's "the line of the outside", that tears the void apart, that overturns death (cf. *The History of Sexuality II: The Use of Pleasure*).

Session 20, Part III: Subjectification, April 22, 1986

With the seminar here commencing discussion of subjectification, the third axis of Foucault's thought (cf. Deleuze's *Foucault*, chapter 5), Deleuze connects Foucault's thought to Blanchot's concept of "the Outside" (*The Infinite Conversation*), hence his third dimension as an encounter with an absolute Outside, Blanchot's "the impossible", a "non-relationship", yet that also entails points of resistance in the diagram, about which Blanchot speaks in terms of "one dies" (*on meurt*), not personal death but death coextensive with life, in fact, a double death of the "I" and the "one". Deleuze concludes that however close this line of the Outside moves toward death, we have to accept that it will pull back toward life, a kind of peristaltic movement that Deleuze depicts graphically (cf. the image in *Foucault* of the line and its foldings). Reflecting on how the inside is the double of the outside, Deleuze concludes that the inside is the fold (*pli*) of the Outside and, with Blanchot, that thought comes from the Outside. Deleuze draws on Michaux to suggest that the fold is like the eye of the hurricane, where we can live and breathe, and that for Foucault, the invention of the formation of the fold goes back to the Greeks. Deleuze points to other artists as thinkers of the fold: Artaud's *The Letters to Jacques Rivière*; Raymond Roussel,

the double and the doubling (*doublure*); Pierre Boulez's compositions (cf. *Pli selon pli*); Melville and Ahab's line of the Outside. Linking these approaches to Heidegger's reflections on thinking, inflected by Foucault as a hallucinatory powerlessness through the theme of the double, of doubling inherent to a fold, Deleuze returns (with Foucault) to the Greeks, their diagram of folding force onto itself, and Deleuze proposes different paths through the fold in works by Roussel and Leiris for the next session.

Session 21, Part III: Subjectification, April 29, 1986

Returning to discussion of thought that comes from the Outside (*dehors*), Deleuze describes the line of the Outside's action as to fold, thus situating the unthought (*l'impensé*) inside thought, and the relationship with the Outside, as absolute, i.e., Blanchot's "non-relationship". Deleuze emphasizes that what is folded in the fold is unfolding, distinguishing between relative exercises of memory, i.e., to overcome forgetting, and absolute exercises, notably the Greeks' search for truth through unveiling, entailing two structures of time as well. A student's question requires that Deleuze review the Outside as developed in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, but then he develops the fold's product as subjectivity (cf. *The Order of Things*), and then insists that in this third formation, the different modes of folding will be subjectification, Foucault's focus in his final books. Deleuze also shows how, for Foucault, the statement repeats singularities that it actualizes, and gradually Deleuze shows how the line of the outside for Foucault is not a line of death, but a line of life, to which he links Michaux's reflections on life in the folds as well as Michel Leiris's surrounding himself with folds. Deleuze's development is here suspended due to an answer to another student's question, with Deleuze considering how the ancient sages expressed themselves first through poetry, and then the subsequent development of wisdom in three directions: 1) the philosophical direction (from Hegel to Heidegger); 2) the historical direction in the school of French Hellenists, and the appearance of a new space of the thought; and 3) the political direction and Foucault's *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Use of Pleasure (L'usage des plaisirs)*. Focusing solely on the concept of the first direction, Deleuze then cites French philosopher Jean Beaufret's discussion of the verb "to be" (*être*) as the word around which all Greek language folds. To this, Deleuze links Hegel's response, and Deleuze closes this session, first, by insisting on Heidegger's disagreement with Hegel, and second, with a lengthy reference to Ernest Renan on the "Greek miracle".

Session 22, Part III: Subjectification, May 6, 1986

Still situated within the "subjectification" chapter in the *Foucault* book, this session moves from discussion of the Greeks toward complementary perspectives in Nietzsche, closing on subjectification and the fold (cf. *The Use of Pleasure*). Starting not just regarding Foucault's turn to the Greeks but also with the historical response to this question of why philosophy and Greece, Deleuze links this question to reflections within German philosophy (notably, Hegel and Heidegger). Here Deleuze emphasizes that for the Greeks, there were new relations of forces between free men, and that only free men could govern free men, but only the one capable of self-governing was able to rise to governing others (*enkrateia*, or power of the self). Deleuze maintains that for Foucault, this self-governing is the third axis of thought, force folding itself onto itself and affecting itself as a subjectification or doubling of force. Finally, distinct from the axis of knowledge or of power, the third axis is the bending of the relationship of forces or

subjectification. Deleuze insists that subjectification as the production of a subjectivity takes place with four foldings that we live in, make and remake: first, the fold surrounding a determinable material part of ourselves; second, the fold as the rule according to which a fold is made; third, the fold concerning the relationship of myself with the truth (and vice versa); fourth, Finally, the fold as the interiority of waiting (*attente*). Deleuze insists that an urgent question of sexuality's role in all this finds an immediate answer, that it is in sexuality that the relationship to the self is actualized. Providing details on this actualization in three forms of relationship (simple, composite, and cleft or doubled), Deleuze also traces the conundrum of the optional rules of self-governance being appropriated into constraining, constitutive rules of knowledge and power, concluding that through new folds taking shape, new forms of resistance can emerge. Hence a final question for the next session, what mode of subjectification can we hope for today and now?

Session 23, Part III: Subjectification, May 13, 1986

Deleuze invites Félix Guattari to present what will be his last major intervention in Deleuze's seminars (here newly transcribed and updated). After outlining key points of the previous session, Deleuze again returns to Foucault's 1984 interview with Rabinow and Dreyfus which constitutes for Deleuze Foucault's close-to-final statements on these key points, which Deleuze systematically links to different schools of Marxist thinkers (Frankfurt School, Sartre, Lukacs, Gramsci, Tronti). Then, Foucault's reflections on subjectification turn to Christianity, hence the link to the posthumous *Confessions of the Flesh*, with Deleuze gradually moving forward historically toward contemporary forms of subjectification and three problems regarding today's relationships of power, new forms of resistance and struggle, and relationships between these power relations and forms of resistance, with the question of what new forms of knowledge are at a given time, and how these relate to changes in the intellectual's role, as well as new forms of subjectification for women and for men. Here Guattari intervenes, first on how May '68 connects with Foucault's reflections on subjectification, then on the importance of the mutations in the psychiatry movement, a linkage between pre-'68 politics and shifts in subjectification and social networks as transversality. With Deleuze and Guattari in dialogue as well as with students, Guattari responds about current modes of subjectification (cf. *Les Années d'hiver* [The Winter Years]), on links of these to Foucault's perspectives on subjectification and problems of forces as diverse forms of becoming. Following on Guattari's remarks, Deleuze returns to problems raised in Michaux's texts on opening new perceptual fields, and Guattari responds with reflections on international forms of subjectification -- European, Japan, Brazil, Italy. Deleuze relates these comments to Foucault's discovery, in the third axis of subjectification, of points of resistance, openings of potentialities in the social field.

Session 24, Part III: Subjectification, May 20, 1986

Featuring an intervention by Éric Alliez, this session's transcription has now been reconstituted nearly in its entirety, with a new translation (no longer the "inaudible" status indicated on Paris 8 and WebDeleuze). Alliez discusses forms of subjectification in the context of contemporary Italian Marxism, opening with broader references (to Antonio Negri, notably) regarding *Operaismo*, or Workerism, and then tracing what Alliez calls three phases of development from post-World War II onward. Alliez focuses on Marx's term "real subsumption" that Negri

discusses as having an impact on, among other matters, possibilities for resistance and constitution of subjectivity, leading into what Alliez considers a third moment. After his remarks, Deleuze continues developing the strange diagram located in the final chapter of Deleuze's *Foucault* with detailed descriptions of the drawing's facets (minimally presented in the book) including the importance of "crossing the line". Foucault's shift – to cross the line – corresponds to his three problems, the third being "what is the mode of my subjectification?", which Deleuze argues is linked to an even more fundamental question for Foucault, "what does it mean to think?" For the knowledge-being, says Deleuze, this is the space between speaking and seeing; then, for the power-being, thinking is at once "to emit singularities" and "to roll the dice"; and then, for the self-being, it is "to constitute a space within" coextensive with the Outside line of the fold. Sketching the diagram (for nearly an hour), Deleuze introduces texts by Melville, Faulkner and Michaux to show how the strata interact between knowledge and force, how singularities (affect, resistance, force relations) are emitted, and how they are connected to the line of the Outside. While the speed of thinking in Spinoza's Book V of *Ethics* is linked to this, Deleuze insists conversely on the need for a "slow being" in the zone of subjectification. In response to students' question, Deleuze examines this graph in contrast to Blanchot's perspectives on the line of the Outside, and concerning possible links between the strata and the Outside, Deleuze summarizes his interpretation of Foucault's thought throughout the year, also reflecting on the place of time within the framework he has presented: that through the coextensivity of inside with the Outside, the inside condenses every past and the Outside ushers in every future, hence a properly Foucauldian temporality.

Session 25, Part III: Subjectification, May 27, 1986

As the first of two "optional" end-of-semester sessions, here we have the "music session", with an important focus on Pierre Boulez's *Pli selon pli* (with two recorded parts played during the session and commentary from an unnamed seminar participant). After the considerable development of "line of the fold" in the Foucault seminar as well as in the *Foucault* book, Deleuze is here well advanced in preparing his analysis of the fold, and indeed, Boulez's work and title, derived from Mallarmé's poetry, will play a key, if somewhat understated role in Deleuze's final seminar and next book, both on the fold and on Leibniz and the Baroque. Starting on what he meant previously by "interpretation" as related to the seminar on Foucault, Deleuze asserts that we have to draw the lines as the signature of philosophical concepts, hence indicating already his larger project, *What Is Philosophy?* However, with the session's main focus on linking the concept of the fold and unfolding (*le dépli*) as an artistic gesture (cf. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Mallarmé), Deleuze asks the unnamed presenter to offer selections from Pierre Boulez's composition *Pli selon pli*, which incorporates selected Mallarmé poems, and to which Deleuze provides a reading of one of these poems. For Deleuze, this presentation provides evidence of thought's relationship with art, particularly with the fold, not just in Mallarmé's poetry (to which Deleuze refers in considerable detail). Deleuze also draws on the English essayist Thomas de Quincey and his book *Revolt of the Tartars* for additional support on this relationship. However, given the abrupt ending of the session, it is possible that the complete recording is missing.

Session 26, Part III: Subjectification, June 3, 1986

The final seminar session is based on questions posed to Deleuze by students in advance, mostly on the fold, subjectification, the line of the Outside, and tracing and crossing the line. Proposing a number of specific writers whose works offer reflections on discovering the line of the Outside (cf. Melville, Michaux, Van Gogh, Gauguin, D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller), Deleuze also examines Foucault's 1981 conversation with filmmaker Werner Schroeter as a way to consider processes of subjectification in the contrast between passion and love. Deleuze also anticipates *What Is Philosophy?* with his reflection on philosophy as the creation of concepts, percepts and affects, and through an extended intervention by Georges Comtesse, Deleuze considers the alternate genealogy in Foucault proposed by Comtesse concerning "uses of pleasure" and the ethics of sexual practice. Other topics include: the relation of the fold and the line of the Outside with phenomenology; the relation of processes of subjectification with power; how Romantic subjectivity was inflected by power; possible thwarting of power's attempts to plug lines of flight; and habits within processes of subjectification as these relate to the creative process, with Deleuze concluding by affirming that no power can impede this creativity.