

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986

Part III: Subjectification

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Part 1

... I'll mention something else that is more related to our work. I referred very, very briefly on another occasion to an author named André Haudricourt [*spells out name*].¹ Perhaps you remember what it was in relation to, it was, it was in relation to... based on the following idea, where we were asking ourselves, all right, man can be thought in lots of forms, and the form "man" is just one of these forms among others. And we saw how, in Foucault, for example, Foucault proposed a definition of the classical age where man was thought in the form "God" and not at all in the form "man." And then another period where man was thought in a specific "man" form, and then we could very well imagine a formation in the future where man would be thought in still other forms. And there we very briefly alluded to formations, to broader historical formations, than the period Foucault limited himself to, namely from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century in Europe. And I have always pointed out that Foucault, very prudently, never considered himself qualified to speak about so-called Eastern civilizations, or even ones from the very distant past. And I just left like that, but it would in fact be interesting to extend the project to Eastern formations or older formations, for example feudalism or else the Romans, the Greeks – we are currently sensing that, for the Greeks, Foucault did this himself, at the end.

And I mentioned Haudricourt because he is a case... he is an extremely rich thinker, relatively little known, which is all his own fault, and I was saying: when it comes to Eastern formations, maybe he could be of great help... And it was in relation to that that I alluded to him briefly. Then some of you asked me to say a bit more about this author, but Haudricourt is not a philosopher by training and not even an ethnologist, not even a linguist, even though he did a great deal of work on ethnology and linguistics. He was an agronomist. An agricultural engineer. If nothing else we can say that agronomy has given two essential authors to modern thought, namely Haudricourt and [Alain] Robbe-Grillet. There are lots of disciplines that can't boast of such a contribution.

And if Haudricourt is not well... if he is little known among non-specialists, it is because he never wanted to write books, or writing books wasn't something that interested him very much, and the substance of his work is scattered in articles about fifteen pages long. That didn't stop

him from having an impact on everyone. He had an impact on everyone, the whole of French ethnology, and I'm not saying it derives from Haudricourt, the whole of ethno-linguistics is... well... doesn't depend on Haudricourt, but he was one of the first to... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

So, I'll signal for those who are interested in this author, who want to delve into it for themselves, that the journal *La Pensée* did a special issue on him, number 171 of *La Pensée*, October 1973. A fundamental work, one of the rare books, was written in collaboration with Louis Hédin. Haudricourt and Hédin [*he spells out the name*], 1943, *Homme et Plantes Cultivées*, published by Gallimard.² And in the end, if I try to give... in the issue of *La Pensée*, you will find a bibliography, a limited bibliography for that matter, a partial bibliography of Haudricourt. But one of the most beautiful, most striking articles, is 15 pages that are... at once very rigorous, completely outrageous, very curious... A very bizarre article around 15 pages long... you'll find it in the journal *L'Homme*, 1962... and it precisely concerns the problem that I brought up in passing. The article is called: "Domestication of animals, cultivation of plants and treatment of others."³ That's a beautiful title. He explains that philosophies of transcendence are inseparable from sheep [*Laughter*]. So, like that, said like that – that is what he literally says⁴ – said like that, it doesn't sound serious. If you read the article, you'll see that it is extraordinarily serious. On the other hand, philosophies of immanence, which he uses to characterize the East, are linked to the cultivation of rice and not rearing sheep.

What could that mean? How is that of interest to us? It could answer, it could help us, help us answer the question, for example: in certain Eastern civilizations, Oceania and China in particular, what form is man thought in? Because Haudricourt's whole theme – I am grossly simplifying – is that the West essentially established itself on the basis of a particular mode, that of sheepherding. Mediterranean sheepherding. Whereas a whole section of the East – Oceania in particular, and also China – established itself on the basis of an entirely different mode, that of the garden. The Eastern garden, as distinct – you can see the agronomist in him – the Eastern garden as opposed to Mediterranean sheepherding. What does that mean? It isn't simply, it isn't... he doesn't mean, obviously, that it is simply – though this is part of it – but he doesn't mean: livestock / farming. He means something else, because even on the level of agriculture you find the same difference, in his view.⁵ He says: take "the noble gesture of the sower."⁶ Or else the reaper. That's Western. It is what he calls a direct and "massal" treatment.⁷ "The noble gesture of the sower." That's the signature of the West: the noble gesture of the sower.

And then what does the reaper, in the West, do? Well, he takes a clump of wheat, and he cuts the clump. All of that is a massal treatment. In the East... yes, "massal," in the sense of mass, processing *en masse*. In the East, it's very different, because he takes the examples of the yam, of rice, and this time it is an individuating process, an individual process, which is based... he goes so far as to say: a cloning process, ultimately, what are called clones in agronomy. They are almost pure lines and they... they are transplanted, for example. There is a difference in style between transplanting in the soil and the gesture of the sower, a difference in technique which engages the body itself, the mind itself. And the Eastern harvester, he breaks up the soil around the... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

So, it is interesting both on the level of... how shall we put it... of production and harvesting, there is a radical difference between the two forms of agriculture. There is also a radical difference when it comes to livestock. Why? Because, given the style of processing, given the special agriculture in the East, this difference between the agriculture of the West and that of the East, the West ends up with a very considerable technological advantage, namely that it was quite quickly able to resolve the problem of the coexistence of livestock and agriculture. Whereas in the East, the issue of the coexistence of livestock and agriculture and the competing needs of livestock and agriculture caused considerable problems. We can see it clearly on the level of the most important animals in Oceania, and China as well, the pig, not sheep anymore, where the pig has to be penned up so it doesn't compete with, which is to say doesn't steal the human food. Or else, in other areas, the raising of livestock is assigned to nomads, in another space.

That explains a lot of things, two traits for example: the non-meat-based diet in the East, and the role of rice – I am saying everything very quickly, it's so you are tempted to read Haudricourt – non-meat-based diet and not using draught animals. And that is one of the fundamental reasons why the West has the upper hand over the East in the movement of history, during a given period... [*Interruption of the recording*] [12:40]

Part 2

... It is like two styles, one must intervene, including the way man thinks himself. I can say that man thinks himself in his agriculture, Western man thinks himself in his agriculture, and in his livestock-raising, in a certain way, in what form? It is very curious that Western man thought himself in the form of the shepherd, or the sower, which is similar. The sower is the shepherd of seeds. The political model, take Plato's political model, Plato's political model is the shepherd of men. The political leader is the shepherd of men. It would never occur to Plato to say that he is the gardener of men. I would say that the "livestock" form has had a determining influence on the Western formations for thinking man. The "gardening" form, which for its part is a plant-based form and has a certain relationship with plants, plants as a pure lineage, the plant as something transplanted, implies a completely different way of thinking man.

So Haudricourt develops an idea that Western philosophies of transcendence are connected to this, hence his sensational leap: transcendence and sheep. Whereas the philosophies of immanence, the philosophies of the East, are connected to this completely different situation. So maybe we can better understand, at this point, how... I will just suggest that in certain – we mustn't generalize – that in certain Eastern formations, it is plant-related forms, gardener-related forms that enable man to be thought. So much so that the question "man thought in animal forms or man thought in plant forms?" would not at all be a matter of facile or superficially philosophical formulas, they would involve formulas that imply very precise studies on the degree of civilization; exactly like the more recent formations that Foucault spoke of, when he said: well yes, in the classical age man is thought in the form "God," there can be forms, formations where man is thought in the form "plant," on the condition that we say what type of plant, what relationship with the plant, etcetera. So, if some of you are that interested in this... go and look... go and look at Haudricourt. That's the problem with publishing... For example, the works, all of those the articles by Haudricourt haven't been republished... And you know why

they haven't been collected? Because he is a man of genius, but it is obvious that it would have a print run of 5000 copies. So, you'll have to run all around the library to read some Haudricourt. Fine.

All right. Now we'll continue and last time we really started looking at what seemed to us to be the third axis of Foucault's thought, and we made a start, we will stay on this point and try to get our bearings in a set of thinkers where Foucault is almost the last comer, a sort of set: Heidegger, Blanchot, Foucault. Are there any questions on where we were last time? Well, I am trying, I am trying as best I can. I would just like to give you some reference points, I don't claim to follow Heidegger's texts to the letter, because we will look at the direct confrontation between Heidegger and Foucault later and in relation to another point. I am trying to evoke a common atmosphere. It is not very easy, it is as though all three – Heidegger, Blanchot, Foucault – were circling around a common theme, but each one taking it in a particular direction. I was almost saying... I would like to stress three aspects. And please tell me as I go along... interrupt me if something needs to be made clearer.

I am saying: the first aspect that I tried to develop the last time was that thinking comes from the outside. But what does that mean, "thinking comes from the outside"? What is this outside? We saw that this outside can be presented as more distant than any form of exteriority. That's the essential thing. This outside is the distant, it is absolute distance.

Already you can see, you can see at this point, the legitimacy of someone who might say: but what does "distant" mean? This is where I invite you again to go along with the exercise. There was no occasion, once again, there was no occasion for discussion: either it already shocks you, repels you, means nothing, the idea of a distant more distant than any external world. I suppose we're divided into two groups: for half of you, it doesn't mean anything, they're just words, for the other half, yes, it resonates, it resonates just a little. That means that, once again, a distant more distant than any form of exteriority, any external world, that means: not somewhere you can reach by travelling. However much you cross the seas... etcetera. It is a distant that moves as you move towards it. The outside is more distant than any external world. So those for whom this means nothing, I think that is entirely respectable. That means... that means something else will mean something to them. All it means is that Heidegger, Blanchot, Foucault, at least this aspect of them, isn't for them, which is not at all a bad thing, it is not at all a bad thing. But I'm saying, once again, it is not something... you understand what I mean when I say all the time: "it is not an occasion for discussion." If it is just words, go and look somewhere else, where it is not just words. You will find it, you will find your own authors.

But anyway... We proceed this way because... You understand that all the reasons they give fall within this basic proposition: an outside more distant than any external world. But precisely because the outside is more distant than any external world, it is closer than any internal world. It is this sort of identity – but can we speak of identity? – this sort of identity of the most distant and the most close. If the distant is absolute, it is also... if it is the absolutely distant, it is also the infinitely close. And all the closer for its distance. It is the line of the outside. The line of the outside is this state of the outside as more distant than any external world and by the same token closer than any internal world. So much so that I can say: the line of the outside runs through me,

I am the being of the distant and it is no doubt because of my proximity that I am the being of the distant.

And the analysis of this line of the outside, as both more distant than any external world and closer than any internal world, I was telling you that one of the most beautiful approximations – because you can only approach or move away from it and no doubt the more you approach it the more you move away from it, etc., in this sort of unity of the close and the distant – I was telling you that the most beautiful pages are found in Blanchot, when he tries to define the “one dies” [*on meurt*] and it is no accident that this line of the outside can only guide a “one” and not a person. It is the “one dies” that you will find analyzed in Blanchot’s book *L’Espace littéraire*, page 104 [102 Eng] and page 160 [154 Eng].⁸ All right. That’s our first point. On this level, what difference is there, and is there a difference, between poetry and philosophy? I don’t know. There is no need for the question... or rather, the question is posed, it is just set there... There is no need to answer it... Let’s move on a little... This first... This first proposition, I can’t even call it a proposition, it is really... the outside, because it is the most distant, is also the closest.

The second proposition is: the outside folds, the line of the outside folds. And you can see what this adds that is new, it is no longer the theme of the outside, it is the theme of the fold. It folds. And what is this fold? Well, the outside folds, and, in folding, provokes thought. The outside is what prompts thought. This was already included in the first proposition, in what we did last time. The outside is what provokes thought, what prompts thought. All the more reason for me to reiterate, restate my warning: it is not a form of exteriority, it is not an external world. It is the most distant. This is what prompts thought, this absolutely distant. This is what prompts thought, this is what provokes thought.

And then this line of the outside folds and, in folding, puts the unthought inside thought. What forces thought folds and, in folding, puts the unthought in thought. The outside is the most distant, it is what forces us to think. The unthought is the closest, the closest of thought. Thought is held in the fundamental relationship with what makes it think – the outside, the most distant – no less than in its relationship with the unthought, which is like the inside of thought. The outside folds and, in folding, constitutes an inside. In a certain way the inside of thought is coextensive with the outside. The outside as what provokes thought, the inside as the unthought in thought. And Heidegger’s formula emerges: the most thought-provoking thing is that we are still not thinking.

Thought, insofar as it is in a fundamental relationship with the outside, is at the same time in a fundamental relationship with the unthought that constitutes its inside. The unthought is not what is outside thought, it is what is inside thought in so far as thought stems from the outside under the condition of the fold. The outside, once again, the line of the outside, folds in a way that it constitutes the unthought in thought. The most thought-provoking thing is that we are still not thinking. So much so that you see, at this second level -- we are still being carried along, this is like a sort of daydream; let’s keep being carried along to try to understand what these thinkers mean -- the outside is not an exterior because an exterior is always relative. The outside is the absolute. And yet we have a relationship with the outside, yes, thought has a relationship with the outside, but, as Blanchot says, this relationship is the absolute relationship, or if you prefer, this relationship is a non-relationship, Blanchot says. So, just as the absolute outside exceeds all

exteriority, because any exteriority is necessarily still relative, the unthought or the inside is an absolute inside which exceeds any interior milieu, an inside that is deeper than any interiority, because the outside was more distant than any exteriority. That's what the unthought is. The unthought in thought is this inside that is deeper than any interiority, and thus identical, in a certain way, with the outside that is more distant than any exteriority.

You will tell me – and one of you gave me an interesting note – you will tell me: but that's not exactly what Heidegger is saying, when Heidegger says, “the most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking time is that we are not yet thinking.” A beautiful formula, it's his special style, the grand Heideggerian style. The most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking. This formula, which opens Heidegger's book *What is called thinking?*, people say to me: but it is really about the “we are not yet thinking.” It doesn't bother me, I keep dreaming... It is obvious, if Heidegger's words resonate for you... Once again, you can very well say: these are just words, they don't mean anything to me. But if it means something to you, you should also sense that the “not yet” doesn't mean that a time might come when we would think. For the simple reason that thinking is always thinking in the mode of “we are not yet thinking” – why? Because it is always thinking in the mode of “thought comes from the outside,” which is to say thought is already there. And the “already there” and the “not yet” are not specific moments in time, but coexistent structures of temporality. They are structures... thought is thus temporality, to the extent that it is forever thought that doesn't yet think and it is thought that doesn't yet think because it is thought that thinks the already there. What does that mean?

Heidegger grumbled a lot about people misinterpreting him. In particular – if I can make an allusion, for those who have read him a little – to the frequently recurring pair in his work: “unveiling–veiling.” And Heidegger says to us: above all, don't think that when I refer to an unveiling that would be the truth, don't think that this means that the truth is no longer veiled. Unveiling is not an operation that is the opposite of the veil or veiling. What is it then? What is unveiled – he says it so much better than me and so much more poetically, but this is because he feels at home in this way of thinking, so he has everything... in this way of thinking – to unveil is to unveil the thing *as veiled*. It isn't to remove the veil. On the contrary, it is about unveiling the thing *as veiled*, and forever and essentially veiled. It would be too easy if... if we could eliminate, just like that, if things were eliminated... But no, everything remains, everything persists, and the veil persists, of course, the veil cannot even appear except in the operation of unveiling. I would even say, even if... to make some headway in what is... to try to make some headway in what is common to Heidegger, Blanchot and Foucault, don't think that the fold is the opposite of unfolding.

And you'll say to me: but we have been going along for multiple sessions on the understanding that the fold and the unfolding were two very, very different things. Well, yes, and that was valid on a certain level, I will come back to that, but now, we are approaching a shore where it might not be valid anymore. Not that it was false to differentiate the fold and the unfolding, that was true at a certain level. It was true on the level of forms, where the unfolding and the fold didn't present the same forms. But here we are no longer on the level of forms. Remember: we are at this third axis, which is beyond forms. But I am saying: what is folded in the fold? What is folded in the fold is the unfolding. What is unveiled in the unveiling? What is unveiled is not

what is behind the veil. What is unveiled in the unveiling is the veil, the veiling. Otherwise, we would not be in thought, we wouldn't be in the element of thought, we would be in the element of pure and simple experience, which is to say in the simple forms of relative exteriority and interiority. All form of exteriority is relatively exterior because it is also relatively interior. All form of interiority is relatively interior because it is relatively exterior. This is what we have seen. But the outside, the absolute outside, is beyond all form of exteriority, it is absolute. The absolute inside, deeper than any milieu, than any... milieu of interiority and any interior milieu, is also the absolute inside.

And on the level of an absolute exercise – and thought is an absolute exercise – it's not the same as for relative exercises. Let's take a relative exercise of memory. What happens in a relative exercise of memory? If I remember, I have overcome forgetting. It is a relative exercise of memory: if I remember, I overcome forgetting. To the point where I can say: either I forget, or I remember. In the same way I could say: it is either veiled or unveiled. It is either folded or unfolded. Okay. What would a superior exercise of memory be? Let's say, to use a word -- it doesn't matter whether it's a good choice – a technical word in philosophy... What is a transcendental exercise of memory as distinct from an empirical exercise, because after all we are close to Heidegger who, in all of this operation of thought, tells us: thinking is called memory, meaning absolute memory?

What is an absolute memory, or a transcendental memory? How is it distinct from empirical memory, ordinary memory? A famous theme in Plato, that of reminiscence, is a case of transcendental memory. Why? Because it consists in remembering something that was never present. Remembering something that was never present. Do you see? This is, by the same token, to remember something that is the object of a fundamental forgetting. Not an empirical forgetting like just before. If, just before, to remember was to overcome forgetting, it is because the forgetting was an accident. I look at someone and I say: "What's his name? I've forgotten his name." And then all of a sudden, a detail or an association of ideas gives me the name. All of that is empirical. I've already seen this person. But assuming this is also, again – continuing with my pedantic remarks – assuming this is something more than just words: I remember something I have never seen. That memory doesn't aim to overcome an accidental forgetting. It confronts a fundamental forgetting. And when I remember something, I have never seen, I don't conquer a fundamental forgetting, on the contrary. I discover memory as identical to this fundamental forgetting. Just as I was saying: when unveiling, I discover the unveiling as identical to the veiled state of what I unveil. In folding, I discover what is in the fold, and what is in the fold is the unfolding. Even more, I can say that the forgetting is the object of a so-called transcendental memory.

Why? It's because... we have seen this on another occasion, from the point of view of the empirical exercise of memory. What I remember is also what I can – meaning under other conditions – grasp in another way. If I remember my friend Pierre, it is because under other conditions I can see him and touch him. Under other conditions still I can imagine him. I remember taking my first communion with my friend Pierre. Okay. But I imagine him on the trip he is taking, and I go to meet him at the station when he comes back from his trip and I say "Hello Pierre" and I touch his hand. Okay. But in the transcendental exercise, it's not like that. In the transcendental exercise of memory, I only remember what? Something I can only remember.

What I remember, I can't perceive it, I can't imagine it. Memory is the sole means through which I can apprehend it. So, what is it, then? It's what can only be remembered. There is only one thing that can only be remembered: what is forgotten forever. Which is to say, in effect, that I only remember what I remember in the empirical exercise because I can grasp it in another way. But in the transcendental exercise, what I remember is that I cannot... it's what I cannot grasp in another way. I can only remember it. What can I only remember? The fundamentally forgotten. What can I only imagine? The unimaginable. What can I only say? The unsayable, etcetera. What can I only fold? The unfolding. In short, unveiling is not the end of veiling, it is the manifestation of the veil as such.

And when Heidegger put together his whole theory of truth as unveiling, he was very pained because lots of people at the beginning – at the beginning of his oeuvre, we're used to it now – interpreted it like this: the Greeks saw the truth... first state: the Greeks saw the truth; second state: we ourselves have forgotten it; third state – hence, we are not yet thinking – third state: we are finally going to think again, we're going to find it again. Obviously, nothing could be more opposed to Heidegger's conception, for whom the relationship of the Greeks to the truth is not a relationship of unveiling, but of unveiling-veiling. The Greeks unveil the truth because they grasp it as a veiled state. The veiled state of truth, that's what unveiling is. To the point where it's from the Greeks that we need to understand, and it is already from the Greeks that we need to understand, we are not thinking yet. And it will always be that way, and we will think in the double form of "what provokes thought is already there," the outside, and the unthought of the inside, "we are not thinking yet." Two co-existing structures of time, the already there and the not yet. This is the fundamental inequality of time with itself or the inequality of thought with itself. All right.

A student: Wouldn't there be two forms of memory in Proust?

Deleuze: No doubt, no doubt. So, even more so for the fact that in Proust... so yes... In effect, one can... What there would be is... The question both pleases me and bothers me, because... It bothers me because it's a completely different atmosphere, obviously, to Heidegger. Whereas the three I am talking about share a certain atmosphere, Heidegger, Blanchot... Proust is something else. But you certainly find there, in a completely different way to Heidegger, you certainly find there the absolute denunciation of... all *possibility* of thinking, the idea that thought is possible, that is even the reason why Proust hates philosophy, he thinks – wrongly, it seems to me, but I don't know – he thinks that philosophy is the exercise of a possibility of thinking. And he would completely subscribe to Heidegger's statement: the fact that we have the possibility of thinking doesn't yet mean we are capable of it. And what makes us capable of thinking according to Proust? It's not having the possibility, it's when something forces us to think.

Only, in Proust – this is where it has nothing to do with Heidegger – what forces us to think is not the line of the outside or, if you prefer, the revelation of Being, the revelation of Being as veiled, what forces us to think is... I think something in the realm of... and which acts in the external world as sign, as a sign. Which is to say, it's... it's the fact of being jealous, the fact of being in love, the fact of being, etc. So, in Proust, something from the outside has to force me to think, so much so that, for him, the secret of thought is more the affair of the jealous person, or someone like that, and not at all the affair of the philosopher. Something forces me to think. And

what do I think, at that moment, when I am forced to think? Well, yes, in a certain way I think something that is fundamentally unthinkable, which he calls... which he calls – using a word that we also find in Heidegger – a *terra incognita*. Yes. The only thing is that... it is nevertheless more dangerous to make a connection with Proust than to... because for other reasons besides this one... they are such different authors, and develop with so many concerns, but your comment is quite correct.

A student: [*Inaudible; regarding connections with Lacan*]

Deleuze: A philosophy like... ?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah yes, that would be very interesting... listen, I prefer... I mean: if I have already brought in alternative points of view... I think we could do it this way instead: when I have finished with Foucault, at that point we can go back to, I would like to have open sessions, where we could go back, where I would be very willing to speak for my own part about... But here I am so much in a problematic atmosphere, which – excuse me for talking about myself – which is not mine at all, that... that if I explain why... But maybe there are many of you who also... That's why I was saying to you, I was thinking above all of myself when I said: no doubt there are those among you for whom these words have no meaning... But then if we had to explain why these words have no meaning, and in relation to what other meaning these words have... So, personally I would prefer that we do that later. But that's something I would be completely willing to do... and to spend several sessions on it. But in this case, it already seems so complicated to me that if we had to... that we would never find our way back.

And so, what I just commented on, I would like... and on this point, if there are... But what I am saying is very, very general, it is thus this idea that it is through the movement of the fold... My first remark was focused on the outside and here my second remark is focused on the fold, which is to say the fold... once again, the outside folds and, to the extent that it folds, it supplies the unthought in thought. It puts the unthought in thought.

A student: [*Inaudible question; the question seems to concern Foucault's concept of "the archive"*]

Deleuze: There we are. At the point we're at, I'll say and say again, the question is very... very correct... I'll say and say again that we are very far from the atmosphere of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, for the simple reason that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* concerns the problem of knowledge, which is to say that of forms, and forms of exteriorities. And the word used most often by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is exteriority. That said, it is true that sometimes the word "outside" is used. For example, at the end where bizarrely the topic is death and there the word "outside" appears. Or else in other cases where Foucault poses the question: what does a statement actually reproduce? So there, we'll see it in a moment, we'll see in particular the passages in the *Archaeology* which discuss the "outside." But if your question is about the *Archeology* in general, I would say that there is an absolute difference between the archive, which is the organization of a form of exteriority, and what we are talking about now,

which is to say the outside and the line of the outside, which fundamentally has no form, is beyond any form of exteriority, it is by nature more distant than any form of exteriority. But, once again, your question is still correct because there are certain pages in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* where he already goes beyond the problem of the archive and poses a problem that, in my opinion, Foucault will not even be capable, for his own part, of posing clearly until much later, in the books that come after.

The third remark is no longer the outside folding and thereby putting the unthought in thought, which is to say constituting an inside that is coextensive with the outside, an inside that is deeper than any internal world, in the same way that the outside was more distant than any external world. But the third remark is that, in folding, the line of the outside produces – produces what? What is this inside that is deeper than any internal world? Let's give it its name, which, bizarrely, will also be valid for Heidegger, and call it subjectivity. Which thus commits us to saying that the fold is subjectification. The fold produces subjectivity. The being of the subject or subjectivity is the folding of the outside. But if it is the fold that produces subjectivity, how does it produce it? If the fold produces subjectivity, it produces it as the double of the outside. It produces it as the double of the outside. And not only, and we could say – and in this regard I allude to the whole end of *The Order of Things*, which is an extremely difficult text – we could say that the subject has doubles. And Foucault, sometimes, in particular, expresses it this way: there are doubles of the subject... [*Interruption of the recording*] [59:21]

Part 3

... interiorization of the outside. The double doesn't divide off from the one, it redoubles the other. The double isn't a reproduction of the same, but, on the contrary, a repetition of the different. The double isn't an emanation of the I or the self, it is the making-immanent of the non-self. In other words, the double is the fold of the outside. What is the outside? It is the oceanic line, I was saying. What is the inside as subjectivity? It is the boat, the vessel. What is their relationship? The boat is just the fold, the boat is just a folding of the sea... The boat is just the fold of the waves. In the interior of the exterior, *Madness and Civilization* said.⁹ In the interior of the exterior, which is to say, the interior is always the interior of the exterior. The inside is always the inside of the outside. The inside is the double.

So, I'm finishing these... Let me stress: it's so... it's very, very difficult, all of that, but not in the sense that... because, in a certain way, it calls on a non-logical understanding. Logical understanding, if you like, always operates within coordinates that aren't themselves logical in nature, that are of another nature. Concepts always come from elsewhere. Now, we have, for a long time – and I would just like to show that it wasn't at all contradictory – for a very long time we have been able to act as though it was true, for example, that the unfolding and the fold were different things. And indeed, we saw this, but on what level? If you remember, it was on the level of forms. It was on the level of forms. It was on the level of the forms of knowledge.

Where we are now, in the realm of the informal, this famous line of the outside, that's over, the fold and unfolding are absolutely not two different things anymore, to the point where all thought is the movement by which the unfolded is folded and revealed, manifested, in the fold. Hence, already at the end of *The Order of Things*, you perpetually find the words “fold” and

“unfolding,” which no longer behave at all like opposites. And so, at this level, I could very well say: well, in any case and in all formations, in all eras, to think has always meant to fold, the fold simply occurred at different places, was articulated in different ways. Sometimes the outside was folded as though on a properly infinite line. It was the infinite that constituted the line of the outside. Thought was folded according to the fold of the infinite. Sometimes, on the contrary, thought was constituted on or inside the folds of finitude, the triple fold of finitude: life, work, language, which constituted the doubles, the three doubles of man.

As a result, at this level, I would no longer say, as I said before: either you have the thought of the seventeenth century, which proceeds by unfolding things and words, or else, on the contrary, the thought of the nineteenth century, which folds on finitude. I would say: on this informal level, in any case, in all of the adventures of the outside, there is the line of the outside that folds, and what is folded is precisely the unfolding. In other words, there will no longer be an opposition between folding and unfolding, there will simply be different modes of folding. And what will the different modes of folding be? They will be modes of subjectification. There is not just one subjectification. You can see there that if history picks something up, it is on the level of: how does the line of the outside fold? It folds in order to constitute – once again, if I sum everything up – the line of the outside folds to constitute an inside that is deeper than any interior world. In folding, it constitutes the unthought in thought. In folding, it produces subjectivity. And it produces subjectivity as a double, a double of the outside, because it is the fold of the outside. Okay.

But the fold doesn’t occur at the same place on the line of the outside. There is no reason to think that the modes of subjectification for the Greeks, which is to say the folding of the line, happens in the same way as for the Christians, or in the East, or, if there are modes of subjectification in the East. So perhaps you get the sense that the modes of subjectification are what Foucault discovers in the last two books we know of, *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*.

So, I have: the outside... what I wanted to explain now, for the moment, is the interconnection between the three notions, but it is a sort of lyrical interconnection for once, a sort of interconnection that might be called poetic between the three notions: the outside, the fold, the double. The outside, the fold, the double. So, good, let’s try, let’s try to make it not less poetic but more... tangible, more understandable, even if it turns into pure comedy. Let’s try to explain: the outside... And let’s go back, then, since the question has just been raised, let’s go back to the problem of the statement in Foucault. That could make it all a bit more concrete. I’m going, I’m going quite quickly here, but depending on your questions, I could... Let’s take two phrases, perhaps through this you’re going to understand and... anyway.

Let’s take two phrases. Phrase 1 – I’ll start again with the same example – *les bandes du vieux billard* [the rails of the old billiards table]. *Les bandes du vieux billard*. Phrase 2: *les bandes du vieux pillard* [the hordes of the old pillager]. I give myself phrase 1, but I set it aside. I call it the phrase of the outside, like that, the one I’m talking about, I call it the phrase of the outside. What happens between the first phrase and the second phrase? *Les bandes du vieux billard*, *les bandes du vieux pillard*. I can highlight the existence of a snag [*accroc*]. What am I calling a “snag”? What I am calling a snag is this little hole that can be filled by either “b” or “p.” In one case it makes “*billard*” [billiards table], in the other case it makes “*pillard*” [pillager]. I can fold phrase

1 onto phrase 2. If I fold phrase 1 onto phrase 2, I have to invent a story that, starting from phrase 2, will lead me back to phrase 1. You see, a *billard* [billiards table] has *bandes* [rails]. A *pillard* [pillager], in a completely different sense, has *bandes* [hordes]. So, I fold phrase 1 onto phrase 2 in such a way that phrase 2 has to lead me back to phrase 1.¹⁰

Third remark and last remark, because... I can complete, I can complete the method, which is still rudimentary. You see, I am saying: first stage of the method, I fold phrase 1 onto phrase 2, thanks to the snag. Then I refine the method, which is to say, for each term, I will... I will extend each of the two terms in the statement to terms that, independently of any snag, can have two meanings. For example, *queue*. *Queue* is connected to *billard*, in the sense of *queue de billard* [billiards cue]. *Queue* is connected to *pillard*, if the pillager, during one of his pillages, seizes a dress with a train. You can see how bizarre it is becoming. That's life. [laughter] The pillager grabs a dress with a train and puts on the dress with a train, a dress with a train that forms a long *queue* [tail]. All right. *Bande* was also a word of this type. The *bandes* [rails] of the *billard* [billiards table] and then the *bandes*, in the sense of hordes, of the *pillard* [pillager]. And I can also associate other words in the same way as for *queue*. And even, sometimes, by... by distancing myself... by standing back from the two statements: *palmier*. *Palmier*. The *palmier* [palm tree] can be a tree that grows on the island of the old pillager, but the *palmier* [pastry] can also be a pastry that I eat while playing billiards. I can keep going *ad infinitum*. What is that? It is the emission of doubles. And my method – which I am hugely simplifying – my method proceeds by: folding one statement onto the other by way of a snag, and secondly, emission and proliferation of doubles. Those of you who know will have no trouble recognizing the method, the famous method of the poet Raymond Roussel. Folding and emanation of doubles.

And I have already told you that Foucault wrote a book on Raymond Roussel, on the specific technique used by Raymond Roussel, I will remind you, we have a document, that's why I didn't go back to it in my commentary, I will leave it to you to discover, my commentary brought out quite different aspects from those that... those in relation to which Roussel presented his method. You will find the method, what Roussel calls "his method," in Raymond Roussel's book, *How I Wrote Certain of My Books*, and you can read what Roussel says, it is very beautiful. And I spoke to you – but here I really must go back to it – I spoke to you about a text of Roussel's called *Chiquenaude*. The story of the *bandes du vieux billard* or *pillard* is in a book of Roussel's called *Impressions of Africa*... In *Chiquenaude*, we find two statements... two apparently very different statements... where is it, I've forgotten... *Les vers*, yes... I don't remember very well, see for yourselves or else... *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce*... *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce* Forban talon rouge [the verses of the understudy in the play *The Red-Heeled Pirate*]. Imagine a play called *Forban talon rouge*, which is to say the *forban* [pirate] *au talon rouge* [with red heels]. What is *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce* Forban talon rouge? Broadly, it is: the play *Forban talon rouge* is already not being performed for the first time, it is already being repeated. Not only is it repeated, but there is an understudy – a *doublure* – the lead actor is sick and an understudy takes his place. In this scenario I would say: *les vers prononcé par la doublure* [the verses pronounced by the understudy], *les vers de la doublure* [the verses of the understudy], because it is a play in verse – *les vers de la doublure dans la pièce Forban Talon Rouge* [the verses of the understudy in the play *The Red-Heeled Pirate*]. That's proposition, that's statement 1.

Statement 2: *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge* [The worms in the lining of the fabric of the strong red pants]. You'll tell me this is all very silly, but... it is about knowing whether we speak in a different way, maybe we always speak like that. Right. *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge*: it's that the character in the play with red pants was... was taken to task by a fairy. These red pants protected him from any blows, from any sword blows. But the wicked fairy, who wanted to destroy this invulnerability, cleverly sowed a piece of cloth into the red pants, a flimsy piece which didn't guarantee any invulnerability, why? Because it was riddled with moth worms. You see. That's a typical case. I fold the first sentence – *Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce* Forban Talon Rouge – onto the second – *Les pièces de la doublure*... This time, *doublure* [lining] no longer refers to the actor who replaces the lead actor, it refers the piece of fabric used to fix the tear. *Pièce de la doublure*... No, *les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge* [the worms in the lining in the fabric of the strong red pants]. As long as sentence 2 leads me back, in the form of a double and a *doublure*, to sentence 1. Which leads Foucault to say, in a very beautiful commentary on Roussel, it's... where is this very beautiful commentary... This is how he summarizes *Chiquenaude*, I have given a summary myself – however muddled it might have seemed to you – I made it very clear so that... I left out all sorts of details.

Here is how Foucault summarizes it on page 37 [pp. 27–28] of his *Raymond Roussel*:¹¹ “One evening a music-hall comedy is being performed, but it's not opening night (it's the repetition of the reproduction). The spectator who is going to narrate the play has composed a poem which will be recited several times on stage by one of the characters. But the famous actor who has the part falls ill: an understudy will replace him. Thus, the play begins with “*les vers de la doublure dans la pièce de Forban talon rouge*” (“*the verses of the understudy in the play of The Red-Heeled Pirate*”). This Mephisto twice removed appears on stage and recites the poem referred to above: a vainglorious ballad in which he boasts of being protected from harm by a piece of magical scarlet clothing that no sword can pierce. In love with a beautiful girl, one night he disguises himself – a new imitation – as her lover, a highwayman and inveterate duelist. The bandit's protective genie, his clever alter-ego, discovers the devil's plan in the reflections of a magic mirror which unmasks the impersonator by repeating his image” – it's a whole system of duplication at every moment – “he then takes the magical garment and sews inside it a lining made from a piece of moth-eaten material the same color, a flawed lining. When the bandit returns to challenge the devil to a duel, confronting his double played by an understudy, he has no trouble piercing the formerly invulnerable material with his blade, now separated and severed from its power by an imitation, to be exact, ‘*les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge*’ (the worms in the lining in the material of the strong red pants).” I fold 1 onto 2, 2 emits a swarm of doubles, which take me back to 1. So, you have this whole movement: the phrase of the outside, the fold of the phrase of the outside, the emission. Okay.

I want to say, and I would like, here, to stress, again, my hypothesis: the relationships between Foucault and Heidegger are very complex. But once again, why does he attach so much importance to Roussel, to Raymond Roussel? It's because he finds in him something like his own path, specific to Foucault. He finds in him his own way of reinterpreting Heidegger by way of the most unexpected author. It is very odd. It is a movement, in fact, where... it reminds me of something. If you like... because it gives me the impression, it makes me feel I have a better understanding of Foucault. I went through very similar experience myself. I had an experience,

namely that when I read Heidegger, the first time I read Heidegger, I said something to myself, I said to myself... I felt like I was having a revelation because I said to myself: this is very odd, this reminds me... this reminds me of something.

And when I really looked, well yes, of course, word for word it reminds me of Alfred Jarry. It's Ubu, of course, it's Ubu! And I said that with infinite respect and admiration because Jarry struck me as a very great author. And when I said "it's true to the letter," I mean something very specific, namely that Jarry wrote a book – I would like you to read it, because we'll come back to it, that's why I am already mentioning it now, I would like some of you to read it or re-read it – the *Gestes et opinions du docteur Faustroll*,¹² in which Jarry presents a bizarre discipline that he calls pataphysics. And this word took off and Jarry's pataphysics has become... one of those things you don't really know what to do with... Is it a joke...? Is it a work of genius? Is it both at the same time? Is it... well... What is this... such a text? With Heidegger we can be sure that it is serious... with Jarry, there's always some doubt. I would say the same for Roussel, you know, there's always some doubt, this method, "*les vers de la doublure*..." Should we be chuckling? Should we not be chuckling? Should we...? What should we do? We don't know, we feel uncomfortable. And Ubu, *Ubu Roi*, should we laugh? Should we not laugh? Should we...? It's fine, it is... there is no reason why philosophy shouldn't have these sorts of effects. Should we laugh? I don't know.

And so, pataphysics, personally I found that hugely interesting because I said to myself: what an admirable discipline pataphysics is. How does Jarry define it? He devotes a chapter of *Doctor Faustroll* to the definition of pataphysics, and there's something admirable there. You'll see for yourselves. I'm quoting almost by heart, later we'll go back to the text word by word. Pataphysics is about forming a discipline that consists in rising above and beyond [*remonter au-delà*] metaphysics. Jarry says that etymologically, pataphysics is – it is very interesting because he is right – etymologically, it is beyond metaphysics, it is to metaphysics what metaphysics is to physics. All right.

Rising above and beyond metaphysics was like the... is like – how should I put it? – the lesson, the first lesson we get when reading Heidegger. So that seems surprising, because... And the derivation of pataphysics is impeccable Greek, Doctor Faustroll makes no mistake. Pataphysics is indeed this rising above and beyond metaphysics. You'll tell me: that's not enough, but Faustroll asks: how does this rising above come about? And Faustroll's response is very rigorous, it happens through an unveiling of the being of the phenomenon. What is the being of the phenomenon? Well, it is when you see a watch that isn't round. Generally, you see a watch that isn't round because you see it from the front. But it is the art of exceptions, it is the watch seen, perhaps, from unusual angles, but what is an unusual angle?

The revelation of the being of the phenomenon, in any case, is at the base of pataphysics. All right. I say to myself: the overcoming of metaphysics in Heidegger is very precisely based on, explicitly, the unveiling of the being of the phenomenon. Can we take the parallel even further? We will see because I would like to go back to this text. Here I'll just say: I like the fact that Foucault had a kind of encounter... he had obviously read Heidegger, and he said to himself, in a certain way: Roussel will be of use to me. Why? Why does he feel this need to take a detour via Roussel? -- It's complicated – Perhaps to better distinguish his own thought from Heidegger's?

For myself, well... if I was going to make a detour, I would do it via Jarry. It's not the same thing, but it's a similar movement. It's via Jarry that... I would do a sort of... If I was going attack Heidegger from behind. But it necessary to attack him from behind? Why, after all? Why would you want to do such a thing? But anyway, this is all in order to say: I am stating the brute fact that this whole matter of the double and doubling [*doublure*] in Foucault is inspired by Roussel – not at all in a literary way, because I am convinced that Foucault, for his part, lived the problem of the double, the problem of doubles, to an enormous extent. But what interests me is precisely that he takes the path via Roussel, why? Because it is a sure way of allowing him to give an original inflection to Heideggerian themes. By going via Roussel, he will be able to give Heidegger's themes an inflection that is properly his own. That is exactly my hypothesis on the importance of this book, *Raymond Roussel*. And so, I come back to this, in effect, as a final confirmation. In all of the examples I have given up to now, it was: one statement reproduces another, one statement folds onto another and the other statement is like the double of the first. You see, once again I found my themes of the outside, the fold and the double.

But is it always like that? I'm going to jump to the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, and these are pages we have already seen, so I can go quite quickly. In the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault tells us precisely: it is very often the case that one statement repeats another. And it is obvious that there is a nod here to Raymond Roussel, without it being said. One statement very often repeats another statement, and he poses the question: but what happens when a statement doesn't repeat another one? What happens? Well, when it doesn't repeat another one, it repeats something else. It repeats something other than a statement. But why the word repetition? You remember what we saw: a statement supposes an emission of singularities. I won't go back over that because these are things we covered in the first and second semesters. A statement supposes emissions of singularities. Let's say, for example, to stay with something very simple, phonemes – a phoneme being assimilable to a singularity. The statement can't be conflated with a simple emission of singularities. It is as though the statement is analogous to a curve, the path of a curve that passes through the neighborhood of the singularities. And indeed, a statement can't be conflated with the phonemes it actualizes. So, the statement is conflated with the curve that passes through the neighborhood.

I would say then that a statement repeats something else. What is this "something else"? Foucault tells us: "*something else*," page 117 [89 Eng],¹³ "*'something else' (which may be strangely similar to it, and almost identical[...])*" Similar and almost identical, why? You will remember, in effect, that the singularities actualized in the statement are progressively actualized in the statement to the point where, literally, the process of integration, the way the statement integrates these singularities is, literally, an imperceptible process. When the statement doesn't reproduce, doesn't repeat, another statement, it still repeats. What does it repeat? It repeats something else. It repeats the singularities it actualizes. It repeats the singularities it integrates. What comes first is the something else, we always come back to the same theme: the other or the outside. The fold of the other and of... or of the outside... and the product that results from the fold of a double. The statement is the double of the singularities whose curve it constitutes.

As a result, everything we saw, then, in the first and second semesters, on this complex relationship, for example, between the letters on the keyboard of the machine and the statement that says: "Azert is the sequence of letters, A Z E R T is the sequence of letters, on French

machines,” etc., this whole relationship allows us to return again to the themes of the outside, the fold of the outside and the production of doubles. In that form, where I go back to my point of departure, it will be for you to say whether... whether all of that means something to you, fortunately we are reaching the end, which is to say that now it will become simpler, clearer... All at once: the outside – first proposition – just the outside. Second proposition: folds.

Third proposition: in folding, produces the double. So, what does that mean? That is our question. You remember, we discovered the line of the outside. We discovered the line of the outside – so I’m coming back to my point of departure, on the third axis in Foucault – we discovered the line of the outside and we said: yes, it is beyond the forms of exteriority, which is to say of knowledge, and even beyond the relationships of force, which is to say power. And we came up against the question: how do we know it is not simply death, the void and the unbreathable – Blanchot’s “one dies” [*on meurt*]? How and under what conditions could the line of the outside become a line of life, which doesn’t fall into the void, which doesn’t fall into the unbreathable, which doesn’t fall into death? It was precisely this, this was the problem of the third axis. How can the line of the outside... yes... not be bound to death? How, beyond power and knowledge, could there be anything else but death? And we saw how Foucault recognized this sort of impasse in his thought after *The Will to Knowledge*.

Now we have the beginning of an answer, a hypothesis. If the line of the outside folds – and there you can sense that, perhaps thanks to Roussel, Foucault can use a Heideggerian notion, that of the fold, but in a completely different context and in a completely different way – if the line of the outside folds, perhaps it will form a subjectivity, perhaps it will create for itself a subjectification that can escape death – whether for a long time or not for a long time, that’s a different matter – and in relation to which the line of the outside will be a line of life. It is enough for the line of the outside to fold. But what does that mean and why and how would it fold? Well, we saw, but we saw it in comical linguistic exercises, the comical linguistic exercises of Raymond Roussel, for example; we need something more. And, once again – this is what I wanted to say, this is what I am coming back to – because at this level, the problem is the most burning one for Foucault, such that Foucault feels the need, literally, to cool it down. It is because it is a problem of life and death: either I stay eternally on the side of power, or else I cross the line – you remember, it was this great text taken from the article “The Life of Infamous Men” – either I am condemned to stay on the side of power, or I will find the way to cross the line.

Yes, but what is this line if not the line of death? What else is there besides the void, what is there on the other side of the line besides the void and the unbreathable? All right. Foucault replies in an indeterminate manner – is Foucault joking? Is Foucault doing philosophy or is he making a joke? We just have to fold the line, like Raymond Roussel did. And remember that we are at a level where the fold and the unfolding are no longer opposed. In any case, the inside is always the inside of the outside. But that doesn’t mean that when the line of the outside folds, I can’t have two attitudes. The interior is always the interior of the exterior, but I can have two attitudes in the fold, the life in the folds, once again the name of a marvelous collection of poems by [Henri] Michaux, *Life in the Folds*. To live is to live in the folds. There as well we will see what that means, we don’t yet know what that means, but there are two ways: I live in the folds by spreading them apart, or else I live in the folds by arranging myself inside them, covering

myself with them. If I spread them out, I undo the fold of the line. In contrast, if I surround myself with them, no doubt I never stop making and re-making folds.

And here is what Foucault says to us, in a very curious page of *Raymond Roussel*... [Pause; *Deleuze looks for the page*] I will read it, because I don't think there is anything else that... for you to feel exactly how significant the problem is for... [the gap is from Deleuze] Foucault mentions that one of the contemporary authors that has been the most influenced by Raymond Roussel and whose work, to a large extent, derives from Roussel, even though it has an originality all of its own, is Michel Leiris. Michel Leiris, who also has a body of work as... an ethnologist, a poet, a philosopher, one of those strange authors of... of that generation. And Leiris, in effect, was engaged in what appears to be the same type of word play as Roussel's. Two are particularly famous because they appear in Leiris's titles, it's *Glossaire j'y serre mes gloses*¹⁴ ... [Interruption of the recording] [1:46:20]

Part 4

... in the folds of this line and he looks for life there as absolute memory. We will hold on to that, absolute memory, because I will need it – page 28 [p. 21 Eng]: “These same folds Roussel parts with a studied gesture to find the stifling hollowness”... “These same folds Roussel parts with a studied gesture to find the stifling hollowness, the inexorable absence of being, which he disposes of imperiously... Leiris experiences the fullness of this moment as an inexhaustible truth... the same expanse that Roussel's narratives cross as if on a tightrope above the void.” Here we absolutely find the problem that I'll permit myself to call a passionate problem. The passionate problem is always this: okay, let's say that our only chance is to fold the line of the outside. To find what? To find a moment of rest, to snatch it away from death. The only way of snatching the line of the outside from the death it carries towards is to fold it and live in the folds. But then there is always the temptation: to spread the folds. To spread out the folds in order to return to the unbreathable, and this is Roussel and the strange death of Roussel. Or else, no less boldly, but more prudently, like Leiris, to surround oneself with folds. Surround oneself with folds to continue to live and breathe.

It is really... But what did – I can say this very, very... with lots of respect for Foucault – what happened for him? Was there a moment – if it is not just metaphorical, and I will try to show that it is not exactly metaphorical – what happened for him? Did he, at some moment, really spread the folds the way Roussel did, whereas, for a long time, he had managed to live, in a certain way, like Leiris? What happens? All right. I am saying that this problem is so “life or death” that, for me, Foucault's last books don't really pose a problem. It was urgent to find, even if it seemed to be a step backwards, it was urgent to find the conditions under which the problem could be posed coldly, in a cold, intelligible, way, I would say almost in a conceptual way, because, in everything we have done today, there would not be any... [the gap is from Deleuze], it was necessary, regardless of the price. And the price was almost pointed out by Heidegger.

So, let's begin, let's begin by taking on the Greeks. If they are the ones who invented the fold, as Heidegger thinks, if the Greeks are defined by the fact that they were the ones who invented the fold of being, if it was the Greeks who folded being – what does that mean? What does that mean in Heidegger? Let's imagine! We are proceeding in the dark, in... If the Greeks really did this,

this prodigious thing, if it starts with them, let's go and have a look at the Greeks. And Foucault is ready then to embark on an adventure that he never... [*the gap is from Deleuze*], namely to examine a long period, a long length of time, someone who had only ever examined short, and deliberately short, periods, he is ready to occupy a long period that fulfills the conditions of necessity for the problem to be cold. Namely: from the Greeks to the present day, what happened in the ways of folding, which is to say the ways of constituting a subjectivity? To fold is to constitute subjectivity.

There are a thousand ways of constituting it, certainly the Greeks did not constitute it in the same way as us, but if it is true that the Greeks were the first to constitute one, which is to say to fold being, how was it done? We have to, okay, we have to accept to begin, to begin again with the Greeks, to see what happened there at a given moment and so we have to accept another confrontation with Heidegger, since Heidegger credited the Greeks with being the first and ultimately the only ones to fold being.

So, to fold being, to fold being.... it is time for this to stop being a... We have to start again from zero. Start again from zero, seemingly, namely: in what way is philosophy – which was the question posed by Heidegger, but perhaps not only by him – in what way is philosophy a Greek thing? Why is philosophy said to be a Greek thing? Does that mean that folding being and being a philosopher are the same thing? Does that mean that the philosopher is the one who folds being? That would be a strange thing. Folding being is a funny kind of occupation. What does that mean? Why is philosophy a Greek thing and is it true that it is a Greek thing? Take a little break... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:52:51]

... You can surely see where we are at. Perhaps you see where we are at. I'll just say here, to conclude this part... Assuming that folding the line of the outside means something, that meaning would be this: on the one hand, or both, to turn it away from death and make it produce a subjectivity. To surround oneself with folds.

All right, this is where we are... this problem, in effect, which in a certain way is very intense before we've even understood... We precisely need the conditions, a little distance, that allows us to understand what it is about. Hence this sort of starting again from zero with the Greeks, because for Foucault it will be the site of confrontation *par excellence*, the site of confrontation with Heidegger. So, today, but I... it was almost... when I say "deliberate," I go too far, but that doesn't bother me, you mustn't be bothered by it either. Everything we've done was really very, very obscure, because I was only looking for one thing, which was to make you aware of a movement, a movement that seems to me to be shared between Heidegger, Blanchot and Foucault, but which you sensed was oriented in a certain way.

And as someone, just before, very rightly brought to my attention, understand that here again – I am not at all intending to disparage Heidegger – but the exercises, Heidegger's etymological exercises, which make up some of the greatest pages of Heidegger, and the impossibility of thinking this philosophy, Heideggerian philosophy, independently of these etymological gymnastics... everyone who has opened a book by Heidegger has witnessed these wonderful etymologies that infuriate the Hellenists, but why? The Hellenists disclaim them, but these first play-exercises of Heidegger's, are they not like the equivalent of what Roussel's linguistic

exercise could be? Namely the exercises where a statement folds onto another statement in such a way that the other statement releases doubles. To the point where, in this regard, I could say... a sort of equation to make it clearer for you: Foucault on Roussel = Heidegger on the etymological exercises of... of Heidegger. Heidegger's etymological exercises are something akin to Roussel's *Impressions of Africa*. And it is inseparable from his philosophical language.

All that I am trying to say, every which way, is that the *Raymond Roussel* book is really an integral part of Foucault's philosophical oeuvre. And just as there is an aspect – I'm not saying this is Roussel's last word – just as there is a "huge joke" side of Roussel, a verbal joke, a joke... linguistics raised to the level of a great joke, there is in Heidegger a sort of German humor, which may not have the same signs as the perhaps too-French humor of Roussel, there is a sort of German humor... which is expressed in this sort of necessity of folding, folding words on words in such a way that you force a word to release doubles. And, later, I'm saying, we will be led to see... but I am saying it now... since we will be led to examine some of Heidegger's etymological exercises, perhaps you will remember at that point that Foucault looks for the equivalent in his relationship with Roussel.

So, on all of this, once again, which is a complete mess, but that's fine for me, it's fine that it is such a mess, because I would not claim to give a class on Heidegger, my intention is something else entirely. My intention, once again, was to give you a feeling, and not an analysis, a feeling of what "fold of being" means, that's it. If I have given that to you – we haven't finished – so I will try to speak more using concepts but... that's what I am looking for.

Right, are there any comments to make on this whole part of our session today, things we need to go back to in the future or maybe some of you who find it radically inadequate or even radically incomprehensible...?

A student: Can I say something?

Deleuze: Of course, of course.

The student: If I have understood... and first, I've done research into everything of yours [*Laughter; pause*] ... if I've understood something, it's that you even seem to have the outside as given.

Deleuze: Yes?

The student: And Deleuze is a philosopher...

Deleuze: Yes, that's a yes.

The student: And that's why you were talking about Heidegger, Blanchot, and Foucault, and that's also why you've taken us through Foucault, you take us all the way to the Greeks. And you said that the outside is the most distant, and it is the most immediate, [*Pause*] and this outside, this outside which is distant and the most immediate has an inside, and this inside is the inside of the outside. And the outside folds itself because the [*indistinct word due to a cough*]. [120:00]

And afterwards, you spoke of Roussel, and it was both by chance and not by chance that you spoke of yourself and of Foucault, by posing a question of the experience of resemblance, and he through Roussel and you through Jarry, and you, you were saying that you may have arrived at the same things, the same results, Foucault [*indistinct word*] from Roussel through verbal linguistic games, and it's the same thing that you found in Jarry.

So, what I want to say is that you speak to us of the outside and you speak to us of the Greeks, therefore you speak of the [*indistinct word*], you speak of the topical, and you speak of linguistics, and you speak of the verbal. Now it seems to me that there is all the same... first of all, I believe, if you allow me to speak like this, vaguely, but why do you follow [121:00] the line of Foucault and perhaps [*indistinct words*] ... random words (*mots quelconques*), I understand, is pretending to take on a huge job? And I don't say that to flatter you or to speak for the sake of speaking. So, there is, to come back, there is the verbal which marks the outside, and there is the topical, the topical, of a certain experience among the Greeks, and the verbal is philosophy.

So, let me tell you that I can't understand all this, and I don't grasp it, and yet I maintain a kind of intuition telling myself that if really the outside is to feel through the verbal, first of all, would I not have the right to say that the true verbal is poetry, and if it is to make a body feel topically, [122:00] on any earth for oneself [*par soi*], why [*pourquoi, he corrects himself*], sorry, why is it a thought to say that this land is a Greek land? And why say that the Greeks are the first? Why say that their philosophy is the first? Because I have [a sense of] why everything is first and always second perhaps to [*indistinct words*]. But that's why I think that poetry, how to say this, is already older, older than philosophy. So, help me understand all this and tell me how I can manage with this outside, these two nouns, these two nouns in the intersection of the verbal and the topical. But the topic for me is the desert, and the verbal is poetry. So, I doubt that philosophy can give us this outside, and I still doubt that the Greek land can [123:00] make us feel this outside. So, I chose poetry and desert. [*Pause*]

Deleuze: Perfect. Perfect because that anticipates, in effect, all of that is perfectly opposed... but that almost had a connection, because that gets into, that already gets into... what does this reply mean? The Greeks, the Greeks... The Greeks were the first and the first to what? Well, that's where, almost... I think all I have to do now is respond to the questions you have just asked, so it will be up to you, after this whole new section, to say if there is an answer there or if there is not an answer. I think, and I also ask the question because it doesn't seem obvious to me... Where does the question of a privileged relationship – let's say “privileged” for the moment – a privileged relationship between the Greeks and philosophy come from? Where does this question come from? It seems to me that it is fair to say, when it comes to situating it, but in the sense you just said, that it is German question. And that it is a question that can be very precisely situated, which came into being with German Romanticism. It came into being under very special conditions that affect Romanticism.

And that's why, in my opinion, the first place we find this question, fundamentally, is in Hegel. It's Hegel. And if Heidegger, for his part, has given it such a form that for us today it is linked to Heidegger, no, the first moment of this question arose with Hegel, the grand form of this question at least. There were predecessors. But if, later on, authors as different as Nietzsche and Heidegger take up the question: “Why the Greeks and philosophy? Why is philosophy a Greek

thing?,” it’s... it’s Hegel who, no doubt, raised, gave the question its first form, its first categorical form and its first categorical answer: there is no philosophy outside of the Greeks. They are the ones who invented philosophy.

So, the question “why,” there... Why, first of all, does it come from German Romanticism? I would like to put forward a hypothesis. I would say that Romanticism is profoundly connected to the notion of territory and loss of territory. Romanticism really, it seems to me, establishes itself on new bases, which are the territory and loss of territory. Is it linked to the great nationalist movements, the aftermath of the French revolution? All of that, no doubt, there are historical reasons. And what does that mean? Territory and loss of territory. There was a year when we were looking at music, I focused a great deal on the lied and the deepest content of the lied is, it seemed to me, *Adieu, I’m leaving! Adieu, I’m leaving!* Or else, which amounts to the same thing, *I’m coming back!* [laughter] Leaving the territory, returning to the territory, that is an eminently Romantic affair. And why? Because, at the same time as it discovers the territory, Romanticism is the deepest thought which discovers the relationship and non-coincidence of the territory with the land. Why leave the territory? To confront the forces of the land. That is a question that is tied to a very specific point in time... It is German Romanticism.

For my own part, I would say: the Classicists cannot know this question. Classicists know milieux, they are interested in milieux, they are not interested in territories. Classicism is not a problem of territory, they are interested in milieux and, based on that, in creation. The great problem of Romanticism is territory and foundation. It is not creation anymore, it is foundation, it is not milieux any more, it is territories. *Adieu, I’m leaving and in my heart, I will carry...* And the territory is always, how would I put it, in a state of imbalance in relation to the land. How do we get back to the land? Even if it means the land takes me back to the territory. The interplay between territory and land is a highly Romantic problem, it is even, for my part, how I would define Romanticism.

And what we have to understand in this matter is that the territory communicates with the land, but the point where the territory communicates with the land is precisely the sacred point of the territory. Where the territory communicates with the land, there is the sacred. And how do the Germans experience themselves in their emerging nationalism? We Germans, we have the territory, we discovered the territory. The territory is German, which is to say territory is ultimately a German thing, territory is essentially German. But the land, for its part, is Greek. Hence in German Romanticism, this sort of... what can appear to be a sort of nostalgia, a surprising nostalgia for the Greek world. But nostalgia really in the sense of a return to, a return to the Greeks, because the Greeks, the land, for its part, is Greek. Which is no doubt to say that that the Greeks followed in the opposite direction a path that the Germans followed in the other direction, in the opposite direction.

All right, what does that mean? Let’s try to move forward. I am saying that the question, “Why does philosophy appear with the Greeks?” ... firstly, we have to be very careful, what does that mean? Philosophy appeared with the Greeks, that means something like, on the simplest level, yes, that other formations don’t have any word like “philosophy.” Because it is a funny sort of word. The philosopher – I can at least say what it isn’t – it is not the sage, it is not the *sophos*. Much more, the philosopher is built and appears on the destruction of the *sophos*. It is when

there are no more sages that the philosophers appear. And this race that appears, this philosopher race, they are described, as it is translated, as the friends of wisdom [*sagesse*], but not as sages. The Greeks were familiar with the existence of sages, so much so that I am beginning, very inadequately, to answer your question. The Greeks were familiar with sages, they even give us the list of their sages. Solon, for example, is described as a sage. He is not described as a philosopher. Other social formations were familiar with sages. But this strange thing, you see, the group of the friends of wisdom, this is something very particular, what could that mean? The friends of wisdom who took the place of the sages. We have to assume that *philos* must mean something very particular. *Philos*.

The question is thus not: “What is wisdom?”; the real question of philosophy is “What is it to be *philos*?” And, in so being, to destroy wisdom, destroy the old image of the sages. Perhaps, as you were saying, the sages are the first poetry. How did the sages express themselves? In poems. The language of the sage is a poetic language. All right, perhaps, but when people say, “the Greeks invented philosophy,” there is no misunderstanding: they certainly did not invent the wisdom that came before them. And even in Archaic Greece, there are sages. And it is when there are no more sages that this society of the friends of wisdom appears. So how do we explain that? What are these friends of wisdom? What do they say to us? If I put it in a very abbreviated way, there are three directions, in my opinion, that we will need to examine closely. Three directions. Three kinds of responses, I’m talking about serious responses... Three kinds of serious response have been given.

I would say that the first one is properly philosophical, and it goes from Hegel to Heidegger. Even more, there may be surprises. Just as there are surprises, perhaps, when we see that, from a certain point of view, Raymond Roussel can be useful to us in a Heideggerian matter, maybe there will also be an occasion to realize that a forgotten but marvelous author, a French author who is part of post-Romanticism, namely Ernest Renan, has written pages, which have generated endless *baccalauréat* topics, on the Greek miracle, on what he calls the Greek miracle, and that if we refer to Renan’s texts, we have the joy of experiencing wonderful surprises on the nature of this miracle. I would say a first... a first line of descent that gives a philosophical response to this question.

There is a second line that I would no longer call philosophical, but historical, which started very early and which has resulted in a series of particularly striking books from the contemporary French Hellenist school. It doesn’t start with them, but I will focus above all on how it has been expressed in current times, and it is above all [Marcel] Détienne [*spells out name*], in a book published by Maspero, *Les maîtres de vérité*,¹⁵ where, there as well, he takes up your problem so well that the question Détienne poses is: the truth, which in Greek is called *alètheia*, was for a long time the property of poetic and magical language or, if you prefer, the language of wisdom. What happens such that, in Greece, and what is the history of the word *alètheia* such that, in Greece, at a certain moment and under certain conditions, it becomes philosophical language, which is entirely different from poetic or magical language? And the response, the great tendency of the historical school, is to explain that such a link between Greece and philosophy implies a very particular space. The formation of a space that the Greeks created at a particular given moment of their history, a space that is both physical or geographical and social, and which made a new mode of thought possible: philosophy. Apart from Détienne, there is Jean-

Pierre Vernant in two books... I don't remember very well... *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, published by Maspero as well, and from the Presses Universitaires [de France], I think, *Les origines de la pensée chez les Grecs*.¹⁶ Also [Pierre] Vidal-Naquet¹⁷ wrote a book titled *Clisthène* that analyzes very closely the appearance of new space.

Third, a third direction which seeks the originality of the Greeks and the reason for which they invented philosophy, in a third way, which is a properly political way. I say that this way culminates with Foucault in *The Use of Pleasures* [1984]. The three paths are not mutually exclusive. They have both relations of rivalry and relations of complementarity, of interpenetration, of rivalry. It seems surprising to me all the same that neither Vernant nor Detienne attach the slightest importance to Heidegger's research. And there, once again, they really consider Heidegger's etymological exercises as silliness [*pitrerie*]. At the same time, there is constant interpenetration, for how can we fail to see the points on which Detienne's theses about Greek *alètheia*, that is, the truth, coincide with really major points in Heidegger's theses which existed previously? How can we not also see that Heidegger alludes to forms of specifically Greek space, finally that Foucault, with his political conception, relies on contemporary historians? So, these are ultimately quite abstract distinctions.

But what I would like, there are reasons all the same to distinguish these three directions, even if they very often intersect. And I would like to start here very gently with the first. Why did the Greeks invent philosophy, if we accept that? Which does not mean, once again, to invent wisdom. They invent philosophy on the rubble of wisdom. The answer of the first, the answer of the philosophical current starting from Hegel consists in telling us: it's in Greece, and at a certain moment, it's in Greece that being is revealed. It is in Greece that being is revealed. So, you have to be patient because this is not easy. Why is it... Everything happens as if the Greeks arranged their territory in such a way that being could reveal itself. Ah, what, what could that be, arranging one's territory in such a way that being reveals itself? It's a nice idea, but anyway yes, what did they do?

Well, here it is, an example of Heidegger's exercise in etymological acrobatics, why historians don't like it, and you will see, you will sense that historians, with their method, only rediscover what Heidegger discovered. So, we don't get out of this, really, but after all, it's always joyful when we don't get out of it. Because Heidegger tells us fine, the Outside or the open, what is it? The Outside or the open. What is the first act of planning a territory? It is to create a free and open space. In other words, to overcome the forest. Overcoming the forest, making a free space, that's called clearing. Making a clearing, that what it was. Let's suppose that's what the Greeks' first act was. They made a clearing, they knew how to clear the land.

Here, suddenly, I'm creating a parenthesis; this reminds me of a text by a historian, that is to tell you how much, by a great historian who was called [Denys] Lombard.¹⁸ Lombard said the West has gone and based its victory on the Orient, its technical superiority over the Orient, it founded it on this: because it was able to clear the land, while the Orient was the object of deforestation, deforestation being catastrophic. And Lombard defined the West, that is, what came from the Greeks, by: clearing-openings, forest-openings, the clearing system, that is, forest-clearing. And he said, in history, the forest-clearing prevailed over the desert-oasis. See, it's quite close to Haudricourt's stuff, trying to... The desert-oasis, it's perhaps the site of the wise.

But forest-clearing presupposes the strong organization of those who are nothing more than the society of friends of wisdom. What does he mean, what does that mean, all that? It means that, of course, philosophy is light, and light is said in German *Licht*, *Licht*, you see -- I pronounce, I pronounce spontaneously, so... L-I-C-H-T -- there you go, light. The famous Greek light. But no light falls from the sky because the Greek *Licht* depends on what? It depends on a *Lichtung*, on some *lichten*. And what is *lichten*, *lichten*, *Lichtung*? It's the clearing. It's the clearing. *Lichten* is to lighten, it's to open up a free space, as much for shadow as for light, that is, to constitute a territory, to build a space that can be visited by light.

You see, what comes first in relation to Greek light is the clearing. In the clearing, the light arrives, the light arises, the light is revealed, that is, if you prefer, it's the same, being is revealed. See that there are already references to data on space, a space, a Greek space, but even more reference to linguistic data. It's because at that moment -- we'll see what moment it is -- at that moment, Greek is the only language in which the verb "to be" is isolated. As a result, it becomes the key to the interpretation of the entire Greek language. "The sky is blue", what we call -- that machine is going crazy there -- what we call "the sentence with the verb 'to be'", "the sentence with the verb 'to be'". This is the characteristic of the Greeks. I would say, in the same way and in the same movement, they open a clearing in which the light appears, and they fold all of their language onto the verb "to be", that is, on the attributive proposition, "the sky is blue".

And then, supposedly clever people, Heidegger will say, reproach the Greeks for having conceived the categories of thought from their own Greek language, their own. But what these clever ones reproach the Greeks for, it is obvious, the Greeks have every reason to congratulate themselves for it. They are the only ones doing this. Why? Because there are so many languages; most languages do not have this device of the verb "to be", and those who have it do not have this privilege, this folding of all language onto the verb "to be". And I'll read something so that you understand better; I'll read one of the best disciples and more than a disciple of Heidegger, namely Jean Beaufret.¹⁹ Here, he is asked the question "why say that Greece is privileged?", so kind of like your question. Why speak of a privilege of Greece? "There are even much older civilizations. Do we not give in to the temptation to make the Greeks the privileged holders of the source, of the source? from the source. Beaufret's response: "Heidegger said, being speaks everywhere" -- I'll read slowly because it's important -- "Heidegger said, being speaks everywhere, continuously, through all languages. The source is everywhere, indeterminate, as much Chinese, Arab, as Indian" -- this is what Heidegger said -- "No one has the monopoly of the source. But there we have the Greek episode" ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:32:26]

Part 5

"... and on the basis of something that is properly Greek and unheard-of: the *difference* between being and the being." We'll see this later. The movement upstream, the return to the source "can be carried out anywhere and even in languages with the feature of not having the verb 'to be', but being, itself, is not universal", "Being, itself..." What is properly Greek? It is to have unveiled the source as being. "Being, itself, is not universal, its name is Greek and no one would dream of forcing people to be Greeks! In the whole of the history -- only the Germans experience themselves as Greeks -- "in the whole of the history of philosophy, only Heidegger" -- this is Beaufret speaking -- "in the whole of the history of philosophy, only Heidegger has had a sense

of the original limitation of what philosophy is concerned with throughout.” It is interesting because, you see, with Heidegger, Heidegger never says, as the classical philosophers do, that philosophy is universal, not even in principle, he doesn’t say that; he says it is fundamentally linked to the Greek singularity.

Why? Beaufret continues: “In Greek, not only does the verb ‘to be’ exist, but it exists to the point of being itself the basis of all verb forms.” In other words, there is not just being, being folds. I can’t think of a better... of a better, if you like, approach to Heidegger’s idea, the fold of being, than that. “In Greek, not only does the verb ‘to be’ exist in Greek, but it exists to the point of itself being the basis of all verb forms. Greek, in effect, is in the prime position for what linguists call a sentence with the verb ‘to be.’”²⁰ When Aristotle gives an example, he always chooses a sentence with the verb ‘to be’, which he considers to be the canonical form of the sentence itself, ‘whose special feature is the relationship between the predicate and the subject, when to be or not to be applies there.’” This is the predicate formula, the predicate sentence, the sky is blue. The sky, the copula... the predicate. The copula being. It is Greek that makes the verb ‘to be’ the copula on which all of the Greek language folds.

“Given that, how can we be surprised that the question that is posed for the Greeks is essentially the question of being... When we say ‘snow is white’, for example, this is how being comes to philosophy. Philosophy is, in some ways, a regional event” – that is very interesting, because -- “The Greeks never claimed its universality. They didn’t interpret their language as being a means of expression, a means of communication. To speak Greek was above all to behave in the Greek manner, in the manner of someone for whom all sentences would be sentences with the verb ‘to be.’” So, in a sense, nothing more is needed. All I am saying is this conception where philosophy is fundamentally linked to the singularity of language, of a Greek language and space. Once again, opening space, which is to say, clearing the way, making a clearing, so that being appears, harvesting the being that appears by folding the whole of language on the verb ‘to be.’ So that’s how... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

But what did Hegel say? If we accept that Hegel is the first very great philosopher to have posed the question “Why is philosophy a Greek thing?”, he does it in his book precisely called *History of Philosophy*. And what does he tell us in his *History of Philosophy*? I am simplifying enormously, because otherwise we wouldn’t have the time, all of that... The Greeks, the first ones, or, at least, not the sages, but the first ones who were called philosophers, were those who had an immediate revelation of being. Now I know very well, don’t mix it all together, Heidegger profoundly disagrees with Hegel, all of that, but we have to see that their disagreement comes on top of this shared ground: what defines philosophy as a Greek thing is that it is in Greece that being *qua* being appears. It is as though it appears twice, it appears two times simultaneously: it appears in the space of the clearing, and it appears in the verb, in the verb, in the copula, of the verb sentence. The snow is white, the sky is blue, etcetera. And Hegel adds – this is where the difference with Heidegger appears – Hegel adds: but for the Greeks, being is the object of an apparition or an immediate revelation. So much so that the second great moment of philosophy will be the discovery of the subject as thinker of being [*pensant l’être*]. And this will be... at that moment philosophy will become *reflection*. And the hero of this philosophy is no longer Parmenides, the hero of this philosophy is Descartes.

And Hegel says: but this is still abstract, because being has to stop being immediate, and being stopped being immediate in the second period, when it was mediated by the reflection of the subject, but it is not enough for being to stop being immediate, the subject must not subsist, must not be an abstract subject, it must become concrete. Now Descartes' "I think" is still the abstract subject, it has to become concrete, and it will only become concrete when it discovers that it is not enough to reflect on being, being must reflect itself in the subject, which is to say there has to be a concrete subjectification. And this concrete subjectification, which is claimed in what Hegel considers to be the final moment of philosophy, and by which he defines the self-movement of the dialectic, this third moment is Hegel himself.

You can see that at the same time it is very different, because what Heidegger wants to maintain as a knot of Greek singularities – hence his insistence that “there is not first of all a veiled state that is then unveiled,” I am going back over all of these themes, perhaps you can understand it better... What Hegel presents as the three successive moments of the universal, Heidegger is very concerned to present, on the contrary, as three simultaneous singularities of the non-universal, of the regional, namely the Greeks. And in that way, only the Greeks are capable of giving a land to the German territory, hence the privileged relationship, the privileged relationship of Germany, as the country of philosophy, with the Greeks. Germany is the territory of philosophy, but the land of philosophy is Greece. I don't want to expand on all of that... you see...

But I will just add: if you read... if you read Renan... Renan's story is a curious one, this text that I'm sure some of you don't know... I could ask how many know it... and how many of those who know it know it purely from school... It is a text taken from *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*,²¹ and he talks about the Greek miracle. But there's something about Renan talking about the Greek miracle that... that is amusing. What is amusing about it, for those who are familiar with Renan? Renan is a man, an immense thinker, in my view, in the second half of the nineteenth century, but who is famous for his interest in – what? He was interested in the Jews, the Middle East and Christianity. You wouldn't really say he was interested in the Greeks. He was interested in the Romans, because of the relationships between the Romans and the Christians. He wasn't really interested in the Greeks. So, the fact that he suddenly starts going on about the Greek miracle, like: “I thought there was one miracle, the Christian one, but there's one that is even more important, the Greek miracle,” you ask yourself, what has gotten into him? What has gotten into Renan? Fortunately, we are reassured, because... The text is very odd, he says: there is a Greek miracle, which is light, the light arrives. And he says: I was wrong because of this, I was wrong – he does this sort of amazing auto-critique – I was wrong, I thought it would be found among the Jews and the Christians, but the Greeks... and... and he performs a grand invocation of the Goddess, which is terrific... it is the text called *Prayer on the Acropolis*.

There... Renan is Breton. [*Laughter*] If you look at the organization of the text – he is a great artist, after all, he is a very great writer – he doesn't just put things together any old way. If you look at the organization, you see already that the *Prayer on the Acropolis* is surrounded by, followed by, texts on Brittany and the forests of Brittany and the genius of the Breton people. *Prayer on the Acropolis* becomes more and more surprising, what is it doing here in this history of the Bretons, of Brittany and...? It is very odd. Then you re-read the text, and you realize that the Greek miracle is terrific, sure, but my God is it wearisome. It is wearisome and it can only

exist as the object of a forgetting. You may not believe me, because the text is, here again, so... I'm saying... You see, you can find everything around Heidegger. [Laughter] There was Roussel, there was maybe Jarry, now there is Renan. But we will... Usually, I say to you, be careful, so we need to be careful, yes, we need to be very careful, but even so, the whole end...

“Wisdom!” – this is in his invocation – “Wisdom! Thou whom Jupiter begot after withdrawing into himself” – don’t blame me, it’s all here [laughter] – “Wisdom! Thou whom Jupiter begot after withdrawing into himself, after breathing deeply”... Okay, next it’s... “Thou smilest at my simplicity. Yes, weariness...” He explains that all of that is unbelievably wearisome, the Greeks are unbelievably wearisome. They are perfect, they are miraculous, but so wearisome! “Thou smilest at my simplicity. Yes, weariness. We are corrupt; what is to be done? I will go further, O orthodox Goddess, and confide to you the inmost depravation of my heart. Reason and common sense are not all-satisfying. There is poetry in the frozen Strymon and in the intoxication of the Thracian.” – that’s for you – “The time will come when thy disciples will be regarded as the disciples of ennui. The world is greater than thou dost suppose. If thou hadst seen the Polar snows and the mysteries of the austral firmament thy forehead, O Goddess, ever so calm, would be less serene; thy head would be larger and would embrace more varied kinds of beauty. [...] A vast...” – so it is not just about weariness anymore, it goes on – “A vast stream called Oblivion hurries us downward towards a nameless abyss. Thou art the only true God, O Abyss! the tears of all nations are true tears; the dreams of all wise men comprise a parcel of truth [...]. The Gods pass away like men”, etc.

From weariness to forgetting, return to the forest, as though the Greek light, the Greek miracle, was strictly inseparable from the forest it was conquered on. Which is to say: whether the forest of Heidegger – a great woodsman above all else – or Renan’s forest, the Breton forest. Even so, here there is... Now, if I am trying to say, yes, in what sense... All right, if I try to sum up: the Greeks have a privileged relationship with philosophy, and inaugurate philosophy, to the extent that they overturn the old wisdom in favor of something else. What was the old wisdom? We don’t know yet, I am not claiming that I have said what it is. They overturn the old wisdom in favor of something else, I have just said what this “something else” is: opening the space, folding language onto the verb ‘to be’, to the point where being manifests itself in this space and expresses itself in this language. There we are. I am saying that: from Hegel to Heidegger, this is the response... this is the philosophical response.

Next time we will see the historical response, the response of the historians. [End of the session] [2:49:39]

Notes

¹ The reference to Haudricourt took place in session 18 of this seminar.

² *L’homme et les plantes cultivées* – Man and Cultivated Plants.

³ “Domestication des animaux, culture des plantes et traitement d’autrui” in *L’Homme*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1962), pp. 40–50.

⁴ “Is it absurd to wonder whether the gods who command, the morals that order, the philosophies that transcend, have not something to do with the sheep” (“*Est-il absurde de se demander si les dieux qui commandent, les morales*”).

qui ordonnent, les philosophies qui transcendent n'auraient pas quelque chose à voir avec le mouton," "Domestication..." p. 50.]

⁵ The arguments that follow are drawn from Haudricourt's "Nature et culture dans la civilisation de l'igname: l'origine des clones et des clans", *L'Homme*, vol. 4, no 1, 1964, pp. 93-104.

⁶ "Nature et culture..." p. 94. "Le geste auguste du semeur" is a well-known line/image from Victor Hugo's poem "Saison des semailles. Le soir" ("Sowing Season. Evening"). The phrase is inside quotation marks in Haudricourt's text.

⁷ This term seems to be from Deleuze, as it does not appear in Haudricourt.

⁸ Blanchot, 1969; *The Space of Literature*, trans. Ann Smock (University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

⁹ *Madness and Civilization*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Tavistock, 1985), p. 11.

¹⁰ This example from Roussel is often used by Deleuze, notably in *Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles J. Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (1969; New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 38-39; new ed. (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 41. See also sessions 14, 15 and 16 in the Cinema seminar 4, March 5, 12 and 19, 1985, and session 7 in the current seminar, December 12, 1985.

¹¹ *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, trans. Charles Ruas (Doubleday and Co, 1986).

Translator's note: Two changes have been made to the quoted translated text. The title of the play "Red Claw the Pirate" has been changed to "The Red-Heeled Pirate," as we know that Deleuze reads "talon" as "heel" rather than "claw" from his discussion of the same text in another seminar. The "moth holes in the lining" has been changed to "the worms" (the moth larvae) in the lining. "Worms" is the literal translation of "vers," and we know the moth larvae are still in the fabric from Roussel's story, as the hatched moths fly out of the fabric at the end of the play.

¹² *Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll*, trans. Simon Watson Taylor (Boston: Exact Change, 1996).

¹³ *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books 1972).

¹⁴ 2014; apocryphal edition, which mixes in a single set the different "glosses" invented by Leiris and published during his lifetime in a few collections.

¹⁵ *Les Maîtres de vérité en Grèce archaïque* (Paris : Maspero, 1967) ; *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Zone Books 1996).

¹⁶ Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks* [1965], trans Janet Lloyd and Jeff Fort (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); *The Origin of Greek Thought*, trans. not specified (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1984).

¹⁷ From this point to the start of the fifth section, the six following paragraphs are newly translated (as of March 2022) as they are omitted from the French transcript of section 4 posted on the Paris 8 and the WebDeleuze sites.

¹⁸ We identify this researcher as Denys Lombard since he did research in the area of East and Southwest Asia; yet another researcher, Maurice Lombard, Denys's father, did research in the field of medieval Islam and medieval economics.

¹⁹ "Libre propos de Jean Beaufret recueillis par Frédéric de Towarnicki" in Thierry de Croix, Jean-Marc Tisserant, and Michel Waldberg (eds), *Eternité*, Issue 1 (Éditions de La Différence, 1985), p. 92.

²⁰ "Phrase à verbe être", concept used by Émile Benveniste.

²¹ Ernest Renan, *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (1883); *Recollections of my youth*, translator not specified (London: Chapman and Hall, 1897).