

Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries: Charles J. Stivale

Cinema: The Classification of Signs and Time, November 2, 1982 to June 7, 1983

(23 Sessions)

In the second year of Deleuze's consideration of cinema and philosophy, he commences the year by explaining that whereas he usually changes topics from one year to the next, he feels compelled to continue with the current topic and, in fact, to undertake a process of "philosophy in the manner of cows, rumination... I want entirely and truly to repeat myself, to start over by repeating myself." Hence, the 82-83 Seminar consists in once again taking up Bergson's theses on perception, but now with greater emphasis on the aspects of classification of images and signs drawn from C.S. Peirce. This allows Deleuze to continue the shift from considering the movement-image, that dominated early 20th century cinema, toward a greater understanding of the post-World War II emphasis on the time-image.

Cinema 2.1 - November 2, 1982

In starting this new seminar, Deleuze first explains why it will remain focused, as a "rumination", on many of the topics and concepts discussed in 1981-82. Then he proposes a method (ultimately unworkable) to reduce the number of students attending each session, a proposal that generates students' questions and objections. Deleuze then returns to Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (with material developed more concisely in *The Movement-Image* chapter 4), recounting the process through which he (with Bergson) derives the three kinds of images previously analyzed, thereby establishing the genesis of the organizational framework for his cinema analysis. Following responses to students' questions, Deleuze asks them to read for the next time Beckett's "Film" as a "practical exercise for confirming the previous development regarding the perception-image, action-image and affection-image.

Cinema 2.2 - November 23, 1982

As a relaunch session for this seminar (following an unexplained three-week break), Deleuze outlines several related themes (problems of movement and time; light and its relations with shadow as revealed in Goethe's *Theory of Colors*), with particular emphases on the concepts of "innovation" and modernity (cf. Charles Péguy's *Clio*) and on a general classification of images signs (cf. C.S. Peirce). Deleuze also summarizes three global research directions, and then proceeds through a careful genesis of the movement-image and its universal variation (as developed in chapter 5 of *The Movement-Image*), linking these effects briefly to Beckett's "Film" and to the experimental cinema of Michael Snow. Deleuze then returns to different facets of light, detailing particularly the Bergson-Einstein confrontation on relativity, and proposes to continue considering the movement-image system in terms of light in the following class.

Cinema 2.3 - November 30, 1982

Before approaching Peirce's classifications, Deleuze reflects on Bergson's development of his conception of movement, plane of immanence and blocs of space-time, laying the groundwork for his much-desired classification of signs and images. Using several illustrations (cf. *The Movement-Image* p. 228), Deleuze defines four types of images and, in the process, develops the context for returning to the detailed analysis of Beckett's "Film". In this light, Deleuze concludes that a fifth type of image exists, the indirect time-image, and also a possible sixth type, the direct time-image, the latter being the ultimate goal for the current seminar.

Cinema 2.4 – December 7, 1982

After answering questions from students and then reviewing the six types of images previously outlined, Deleuze draws upon Bergson again to continue the classification process, but then suggests that with Bergson's usefulness now over, the focus will be Peirce's theory of signs, notably the three categories in Peirce's system (Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness and their intersection with images and signs). Commencing with Secondness (the coupling of force-resistance or action-reaction), Deleuze introduces at once the problem of individuation and the category of the real and then, regarding Firstness, he establishes its characteristics and links it to the affection-image and pure affect. Also emphasizing the importance of the event as concept, Deleuze links these categories to Blanchot and Péguy, with Thirdness remaining to be linked to these first two categories in the next session.

Cinema 2.5 – December 14, 1982

Continuing with Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Deleuze for each the "modality", the "quantity", and the "act of mind", especially for the different aspects of Thirdness. After engaging in some parenthetical discussions (e.g., on the problem of the relation and the derivation of a logic of relations from the Empiricists, as well as on processes of the mind, with reference to Bergson's *Mind-Energy* and *Matter and Memory*), Deleuze links these perspectives to conical theory (also derived from Bergson) and then reconnects these perspectives to Peirce's categories, particularly to the characteristics of Thirdness. These theoretical intersections provide the basis for "practical exercises" with cinematographic examples linked to Peirce's categories, on one hand, with burlesque or slapstick, on the other hand, with types of actors and styles.

Cinema 2.6 – December 21, 1982

With the previous outline of Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness fully linked to types of images, Deleuze now reflects on how an image becomes a sign. Following Peirce's terminology of the sign – "representamen", object, interpretant – linked to the three categories, Deleuze specifies nine classes of signs. Deleuze then enhances Peirce's categories, particularly regarding Thirdness and adds a "zero degree" (Zerone) or the perception-image, with Firstness then linked to the affection-image, Secondness to the action-image, and Thirdness to be determined. After deriving successive definitions of the sign, Deleuze offers several examples, first in light of the quality or power within the affection-image as regards faciality,

and he undertakes a parallel list of signs as a sign of composition of the affection-image. In terms of the face's two poles, Deleuze multiplies this list into facializing contour and the aggregate of discontinuous features (hence "contour icons" and "feature icons"), and as signs of genesis, he identifies the any-space-whatever (*espace quelconque*), with two types as well ("qualisign of deconnection", "qualisign of vacuity"). The session (and year) ends with the new graph's outline, to be taken up following Christmas break.

Cinema 2.7 – January 11, 1983

Calling this return to his analysis of Peirce's three categories and the nine classes of signs a "blackboard session" (hence, numerous gaps in the recording), Deleuze lays out the links between the categories and previously identified images. With at least two signs of composition (with two poles) per image, this proliferation of four signs per image type serves to expand an open list of approximately twenty types of signs. Referring to Beckett's "Film" and Pasolini's cinema theory, Deleuze proposes signs for the perception-image (as the category of Zeroness); then for the affection-image (as the category of Firstness, of the face and faciality). With this image's sign of composition defined, the recording stops before Deleuze can address the sign of genesis (although in the previous session, Deleuze had proposed two kinds of "qualisign"). While the session ends, in fact, with a one-minute fragment that actually corresponds to the first part of session 6, listeners and readers of session 8 must rely on Deleuze's usual recap in the next session for any lost final details.

Cinema 2.8 – January 18, 1983

Continuing with another "blackboard session" and developing the table of images and signs, Deleuze starts a precise recap as possible of the five-fold organization table outlined so far: the perception-image as Zeroness; the affection-image as Firstness; the impulse-image as the intermediate passage from 1 to 2; the action-image as Secondness; the mental image as Thirdness, which creates a passage toward something else rather than closing off the aggregate. Then, distinguishing between action-image and impulse-image, Deleuze explores different facets of artistic Naturalism as distinct from Realism, insisting that the impulse is an energy that grasps hold of pieces as in forms of cinema of terror, but also in the literary Naturalism of Zola. After a lengthy development, Deleuze derives for the impulse-image the sign of composition (fetish) and sign of genesis (symptom), and then turns to the signs of the action-image, with its exemplary model in American film prior to World War II, designating the signs of composition (the synsign or englobing, and binomial), but holding off on the sign of genesis until the next session, as well as the action-image's relation to historical films.

Cinema 2.9 – January 25, 1983

Deleuze continues with the classification table, and after a brief review, he indicates the need for a separate entry for the action-image, that is, dividing it into two different aspects, devoting the entire session to deriving the sign of genesis (the impression, or *empreinte*) for the large (1st) action-image. He thus reviews the conception of history revealed in American pre-World War II cinema (e.g., D.W. Griffith, John Ford, Howard Hawks) as well as Sergei Eisenstein. Deleuze develops at length two of three aspects of his conception of history, drawing from Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, the monumental conception, antique conception, and ethical conception. Providing cinematic exemplars for the first two (e.g., Griffith's "Intolerance", DeMille's

“Samson and Delilah”, Eisenstein’s understanding of Griffith’s use of montage), Deleuze then considers other historical conceptions, considering how the Soviet model of dialectical montage, was reflected by the American-influenced Eisenstein. The American historical conception concerns the “American dream” in pre-World War II cinema and its collapse post-World War II. With the impression (*empreinte*) filling another square of table, Deleuze proposes to complete it at the next session.

Cinema 2.10 – February 1, 1983

Remaining with the first version of the action-image “large form”, Deleuze to defines this action-image’s signs of composition (synsign and binomial) and the sign of genesis (the impression) Deleuze examines how the gap between the composition signs is bridged to provide the satisfactory mutation corresponding to the impregnation (or impression) of power within the hero who then detonates that energy into action. Deleuze then approaches the second form of the action-image, characterized as an action that unveils a situation not yet revealed, with signs of composition (the two kinds of index) and the sign of genesis (the vector). Deleuze derives examples of different manifestations of this “small form” from Lubitsch (“Design for Living”), Chaplin (the Charlot series), Howard Hawks, Anthony Mann, with Werner Herzog’s revealing the connection of both types of action-image forms. Deleuze will complete the classification following winter break.

Cinema 2.11 – February 22, 1983

Continuing the complex classification grid, Deleuze considers signs of the action-image (notably, the synsign, binomial and vector), and he compares two kinds of movement-image and space, the breath-space in Kurosawa and the vector-space in Mizoguchi. Needing to develop an additional column for the grid, Deleuze turns from Secondness in the action-image toward an intermediate image preceding the mental image of Thirdness. After an imaginary dialogue between Vertov and Eisenstein about their conceptual differences on the dialectic, Deleuze emphasizes Eisenstein’s development of a transformational form associated with a “montage of attractions”, to which Deleuze attributes the sign of “figure” in Eisenstein’s “third image”. Then, Deleuze focuses on the three representations in Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*, notably Ideas and the symbol, and particularly Kant’s concept of the “schema” as a way of understanding, first, the direct exposition of a concept and the indirect presentation. Deleuze argues that Kant’s “Ideas” (concepts without direct presentation within experience) are represented by the term “symbol”, for which Deleuze substitutes “figure” (for the table), to which he plans to join two other terms in the following session.

Cinema 2.12 – March 1, 1983

Picking up the discussion of Eisenstein from the previous session, Deleuze considers different uses of “figures” in Eisenstein, then in Godard and Truffaut, and then shifts gears entirely to reconsider the term “figure” from the rhetorical perspective, summarizing the complex web of “figures” outlined in the classic text by Fontanier. This examination of four types of “figures” yields three kinds of signs for the previously identified category of “transformation image” (between Secondness and Thirdness). Deleuze identifies the first three figures as “indirect figures of thought” preparing the path toward a “direct figure of thought”, the mental image, i.e., the inclusion of a third aspect (hence, Thirdness). Hence, Deleuze links the mental image to

another concept, the “relation” as a “thought object” (*objet de pensée*), considering Hitchcock’s cinema insofar as he is the inventor of this image form. The reflection on the relation allows Deleuze to complete the classification table, specifically the “mental image” as Thirdness. At session’s end, Deleuze suggests that the mental image actually implies a mutation requiring, once again, that the seminar start from the beginning with yet another classification table.

Cinema 2.13 – March 8, 1983

With 21 types of signs for the movement-image (or its mirror, the light-image) in place, Deleuze responds to questions, one about the classification’s static nature and clarifying the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness (with reference again to the Marx Brothers), as well as offering a detailed definition of Goethe’s theory of color. After an intervention by Georges Comtesse (on Eisenstein’s “montage of attraction”), Deleuze explains the two laws of the dialectic as related to Eisenstein’s conception of cinema. Then, Deleuze first takes up the category of mental image which opens the sensorimotor system to another kind of image altogether, then shifts the focus on the aggregate of movement-images toward montage through which, he concludes, one obtains necessarily indirect images of time (“chronosigns”) and necessarily indirect figures of thought (“noosigns”). Deleuze asks that the participants read Pascal’s text on the wager as a way of engaging with his reflection on the indirect figures of thought. [NB: Whereas this session’s second part in the transcripts provided both by Paris 8 and WebDeleuze actually repeats segment 2 from session 3 (November 30, 1982), our transcription is newly completed based on the session’s recording.]

Cinema 2.14 – March 15, 1983

Instead of addressing Pascal’s text on the wager, Deleuze opens with a question-answer period which finally encompasses the entire session. The first part develops Pascal Auger’s question, about how the classifications correspond to experimental cinema, to which Deleuze again links Kurosawa’s cinema (with additional comments from Georges Comtesse). Deleuze returns then to the table of classifications to define indirect figures of time that can be derived from movement-images and that will be produced via montage through an aggregate of movement-images. Deleuze’s review of the philosophical history of time and the measure of movement in the Greeks leads him to suggest how these considerations are located in celestial movements and the astronomical eternal return. However, from the session’s mid-point forward, Deleuze is increasingly challenged by several students: by a first student on this astronomical model; then, on Descartes by Georges Comtesse; then, by the first student objecting to Deleuze’s response to Comtesse. Following these exchanges, Deleuze responds substantively by introducing the “instant” as a here-now element of time in relation to the interval of movement, thereby distinguishing an interval between two presents, a present defined through the interval and the instant defined as a limit. Alas, Deleuze seems overwhelmed by the cascade of objections and sums things up in his final voice-off comment, “they were really nasty today”.

Cinema 2.15 – March 22, 1983

Having distinguished two aspects of time in the previous session, Deleuze considers movement in its extension in order to draw from it two complementary yet distinct indirect images of time. Deleuze turns to the concept of mathematical sublime in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*,

particularly to the measure as disproportionate (*démesuré*), to link forms of evaluation to the two aspects of time. Then, returning to the cinema framework, Deleuze discusses the Cartesianism of the pre-World War II French school of cinema (Gance, L'Herbier, Epstein, Grémillon, Vigo), particularly the efforts to derive the figures of the indirect time-image. After exploring how aspects of these figures manifest in works by different artists (the Delaunays, Fernand Léger, Olivier Messiaen, Paul Klee) and directors (Gance, L'Herbier), Deleuze introduces the complementary topic, the study of intensive movement, with Medieval distinctions between three types of cause (transitive, emanative, and immanent) as causes of God. Based on this rapid review, he speculates on what might be the corresponding figures of the order of time, and to trace this perspective's foundations, Deleuze introduces (for the next class) the work of Jakob Böhme and underscores its direct influence on German Romanticism and his eventual influence on cinema.

Cinema 2.16 – April 12, 1983

Continuing to shift toward establishing foundations of the time-image, Deleuze first summarizes previous key points, and distinguishing the cinema image from the photo image, Deleuze likens the latter to a “luminous mold” (form imposed on matter), the former (with reference to Simondon) to a temporal molding of light, or “modulation”. Here Deleuze poses the problem for the rest of the seminar: what are the conditions necessary for deriving direct time-images? The “chronosign” leads the alternate sign system, with the “cinechrony” as a first indirect figure of time obtained through composition of movement-images, with two facets, the “interval” and the “immense” (time taken as a whole of past-future), and “chronochrony” as a second indirect figure, called images of time through composition of “modulation-images” or intensive movement, with its own signs (time as “order” and time as “instant”) corresponding, to Kant's “dynamic sublime”. Development of this Kantian concept occupies the rest of the session, but Deleuze returns to Gance's cinema of the mathematical sublime, yet also emphasizing the expression of the dynamic sublime in his texts and linking the former to the soul of movement and the latter to the soul of light, thus to the intersection of future and past. By reintroducing the perspectives of Jakob Böhme on soul and light, Deleuze develops four steps of this crucial intersection for the intensive movement of time.

Cinema 2.17 – April 19, 1983

After a quick recap, Deleuze develops the time-image, recalling the movement-image's composition as extensive movement and intensive movement, the movement-image as light-movement, eliciting another kind of indirect image of time, movement as intensity. Deleuze then recounts “adventure tales”, first of intensity, then of light-image's intimacy with the soul, shifts that produce successive steps: light's invisible diffusion as “Gründ” or foundation; the cause of light's visibility from beyond this foundation, an “Ur Gründ” (linked by Deleuze to the neo-Platonists and to Jakob Böhme); light's first condition for manifestation, the “Ab Gründ”, separated from its foundation; a point of equilibrium that marks a point of opacity, darkness and light in balance, an “Un Gründ”. Deleuze traces of successive traits of the “appearance” of light and form: striations (cf. German film Expressionism); degrees of chiaroscuro (cf. Murnau); degrees of “contour”; and color's appearance inseparable from intensity as light. Referring to successive colors and mixtures that slowly emerge from black-white, Deleuze traces the stage of the spirit of evil insofar as it expresses God's anger, through colors' intensification, saturation

and attenuation. Through this emergence, Deleuze shows (with Goethe) how color transforming into purple exceeds and burns nature, expressing God's anger and suggests that this infinite working within the finite is the intensified "instant", with a final step (the equivalency of red and the dynamic sublime) to be considered next.

Cinema 2.18 – April 26, 1983

While Deleuze lays out some very specific goals for this session, among which is to review Kant's theory of the sublime, the session transforms into the "story of red" (as Deleuze begins by saying) and ending with his own self-evaluation, "I was really off the mark (*con*) today." Following a recap of the four steps of the light-image developed in the previous session, which ended with the emergence of red upon red, or God's fury and that of Apocalypse, Deleuze wonders how this "red upon red" might also be at once choleric and peaceful, even elevating the hypersensitive being's self-awareness. As the basis of the development's fifth step, with reference both to Goethe's *Theory of Colors* and to Kant's theory of the dynamic sublime, Deleuze argues for red as the operation of this sublime and foundation of the totality, justifying these perspectives through a lengthy discussion of the chromatic wheel, at once for the derivation of colors (with references to Messiaen and Kandinsky) and for founding the indirect image of time working through light, with its four characteristics. Turning to Proust's *Time Regained* to contrast the interior of time (and the open aspect of time) with the locus one occupies in space and time, Deleuze enters more fully into our experience of time both in terms of the Whole and in terms of the interval and instant. He links the final paragraph of *Time Regained* to the sublime, as developed in the cinema of Dovzhenko and Eisenstein, in order to trace the path of the infinite distance that one acquires within time's interior.

Cinema 2.19 – May 3, 1983

After Georges Comtesse provides a counter-perspective on "lost time," Deleuze responds by developing the interiority of time, reflecting supporting perspectives drawn from Leibniz, Péguy, and Bergson. Moreover, to another Comtesse question, Deleuze contrasts narrative point of view in Balzac and Proust, returning after 90 minutes of such responses to the dual aspects of the indirect image of time. Deleuze designates a first type of the image's chronosigns as the "dynamic sublime", i.e. the interval as variable present, the qualitative leap between instants; then, a second type as the interior of time or mathematical sublime, i.e. the Whole of time. Beyond these chronosigns, Deleuze outlines the corresponding indirect figures of thought, or "noosigns", asking what does a "manner of thinking" mean? Thinking is then conceived as a battle with shadows preventing thought, having the figure for perpetual recommencement of the thought battle in the "counterbrand" (*contremarque*). Given the dialectic nature of the thought-battle, Deleuze broaches Hegel in some detail, to whom Deleuze opposes the "heads or tails" noosign, the alternative espoused by Pascal, with both Hegel's and Pascal's views to be developed in the next session.

Cinema 2.20 – May 17, 1983

Deleuze pursues discussion of the history of "figures of thought", here explaining how the problem of such figures might, in fact, be considered as the problem of what is philosophy. After posing basic principles for thought in itself to think the possible (principles of identity, of non-contradiction, and of the excluded third) as well as to think the real (principles of causality and of

finality), Deleuze emphasizes successive “great moments” in philosophy: Descartes and the importance of the Cogito; Leibniz’s reformulation of the principle of identity; Kant’s discovery of “synthetic judgments” (in contrast to Leibniz’s “analytic judgments”), then post-Kantian philosophers’ definition of synthetic identity (Fichte and Schelling); and Hegel taking literally the principle of non-contradiction. Then distinguishing the dialectic of Ancient Greece with modern dialectics (the former as a struggle with tumult and chaos in order to invent a spiritual life with its own forms), Deleuze argues that this notion emerges in modern times through Romanticism (e.g., Novalis, Hölderlin) then in Expressionism, through the cry, providing some privileged examples. Then asking, what other paths might exist to reconcile thought and the “existing”, Deleuze describes “either-or” thought as the player’s or gambler’s thought. Deleuze here prepares the next session by indicating several examples: in cinema, Dreyer and Bresson; in philosophy, Pascal the Catholic, Kierkegaard the reformist, and Sartre the atheist (a philosophy of choice, with choice as occurring between different modes of existence); and in literature, the numerous choices of Proust’s narrator, to which Deleuze links Pascal’s text on the wager.

Cinema 2.21 – May 24, 1983

With a possible title of “the choice”, the session follows artists and thinkers of the “alternative” or “either-or” lineage of thought: the Pascalian lineage of “the wager” (e.g., Kierkegaard; several now little studied 19th century thinkers, notably Charles Renouvier and Jules Lequier). Deleuze asks: what kind of figure does this lineage of thought take on through its different phases? After considering Pascal development of “orderings” (*classements*) and its link to “either-or” thinking, Deleuze provides a parallel analysis on how this thinking leads directly to contemporary approaches to organization of cases and practices within jurisprudence. Then, he turns to “either-or” thinking in filmmakers (e.g., Dreyer and Bresson; the Expressionists) and emphasizes that the orderings occur based on “modes of existence”. He draws examples of these from different fields and authors: conic sections in Pascal; the ordering of “young ladies in flower” in Proust, concluding that a subjective point of view connects to modes of existence of the persons making the choice (cf., Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Sartre). Deleuze’s examples move toward the Sartrean analysis of choice, which indicates some justifiable situations of no choice as well as the category of “bad faith”. In terms of a mode of existence, Deleuze discusses in Sartrean terms the French people’s “choices” during the Nazi Occupation, then turns to Pascal’s famous “wager” which, in fact, consists in the alternative of two modes of existence, one of the man of faith, the other of the atheist. The next session, he suggests, will take up the case of the deliberate choice of evil or the devil (cf. these reflections succinctly included in *The Movement-Image*, part 3 of chapter 7).

Cinema 2.22 – May 31, 1983

Still discussing the “mysteriously religious aspect” of philosophers of alternative thinking or choice, Deleuze first considers different shades of alternation within Dreyer’s and Bresson’s films, i.e., “men of white” (the “pious” according to Pascal); “men of gray” (the uncertain, not choosing); “men of black” (opting for evil); “men of true choice” (those who choose); and “the ass” (incapable of choosing). Shifting from choice to action, these thinkers and artists jumped to alternatives of modes of existence, and with true choice establishing a relation with God, Deleuze here evokes a Russian philosopher, Lev Shestov who, like Kierkegaard, established the opposition of two types of thinking, public versus private (e.g., Job and Abraham in their private

relationship with God). With this choice rendering an “in-between” (*entre-deux*), neither incertitude nor hesitation, Deleuze points to the “women’s trilogy” in Dreyer (“Ordet”, “Day of Wrath”, “Gertrud”), then turns to Charles Péguy for his links to Bergson as the latter’s disciple. Péguy’s writing concern at once the problem of faith and the aesthetic problem, notably a stylistics of repetition (cf. *Clio*). Péguy’s Bergsonism corresponds in Deleuze’s reading to previous discussions of the dual aspects of the event, its actualization and its potentialization, corresponding to the Bergsonian dual components of duration which provide a long-awaited encounter with the direct image of time.

Cinema 2.23 – June 7, 1983

Deleuze starts the Seminar’s final session with an overview of the year’s arguments, then returns to Bergson and certain illustrations in *Matter and Memory*. With the goal of developing a full classification of images and signs, Deleuze started from movement-images and light-images, assigning centers of indetermination, and yielding three types of images: perception-image, action-image, between which is an affection-image. Then, the images’ composition yielded an indirect image of time as well as indirect figures of thought. Deleuze extracts from Bergson a parallel to the plane of the movement-image in the memory-image, i.e., the importance of recollections, linked to the Bergsonian apparatus of memory. Deleuze reaches a direct image of time in the coexistence of past with present, or (borrowing from Guattari) the “crystal of time”. By adapting the time crystal to the Bergsonian framework as the folding back of the present, Deleuze derives a direct figure of thought, plunging into deeper levels of reality through a circuit process, examples of which come from Fellini (“Amarcord”) and Rossellini (“Europe ‘51”, “Stromboli”). Finally, Deleuze reorganizes Bergson’s illustrations so that the direct time-image reveals at once regions of being and regions of thought, a thought-being or being of thought, aspects clearly requiring two more Seminars on cinema to explore fully.

C2.16

En poursuivant l'établissement des fondements de l'image-temps, Deleuze résume d'abord les points clés précédents, et distinguant l'image de cinéma de l'image photo, Deleuze compare cette dernière à un « moule lumineux » (forme imposée à la matière), et la première (avec référence à Simondon) à un moulage temporel de la lumière, ou « modulation ». Deleuze pose ici le problème pour la suite du séminaire : quelles sont les conditions nécessaires pour dériver des images temporelles directes ? Le « chronosigne » est en tête du système de signes alternatifs, avec la « cinéchronie » comme première figure indirecte du temps obtenue par composition d'images-mouvements, à deux facettes, « l'intervalle » et « l'immense » (le temps pris dans son ensemble). passé-futur), et la « chronochronie » comme seconde figure indirecte, appelée images du temps par composition d'« images-modulation » ou mouvement intensif, avec ses signes propres (le temps comme « ordre » et le temps comme « instant ») correspondant, au « sublime dynamique » de Kant. Le développement de ce concept kantien occupe le reste de la séance, mais Deleuze revient au cinéma du sublime mathématique de Gance, tout en soulignant également l'expression du sublime dynamique dans ses textes et en liant le premier sublime à l'âme du mouvement et le second à l'âme de lumière, donc à l'intersection du futur et du passé. En réintroduisant les perspectives de Jakob Böhme sur l'âme et la lumière, Deleuze développe quatre étapes de cette intersection cruciale pour le mouvement intensif du temps.