Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on

Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

April-May 1980

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Lecture 01, 15 April 1980

Translation and supplementary additions from transcript completed from the YouTube audio,[1] Charles J. Stivale[2]

Part 1

So, as I told you, we are going to be involved for a short while in a series on Leibniz. And my goal is very simple: for those who don't know him very much at all, I want to try to present and to have you love this author, to inspire in you a sort of desire to read his works. For specific texts to read, I advised you to look at one of the three little pamphlets that I mentioned the last time.

Let me point out that there is a working instrument in order to start reading Leibniz, an incomparable research instrument. This is the life work, a very modest work, but a very profound one. It is by a woman philosopher named Madame [Lucy] Prenant, who had long ago published selected excerpts by Leibniz.[3] Usually a collection of excerpts is of doubtful value, but this one is a work of art, for a very simple reason: Leibniz had writing techniques which no doubt were rather frequent during his era, that is, the 18th century, the very start of 18th century, but that he pushed to an extraordinary extent. Of course, like all philosophers, he wrote huge books. But one might almost be tempted to say that these huge books did not constitute the essential part of his works, since what was essential was in the correspondence and in quite tiny memoirs. Leibniz's great texts often ran 4 or 5, 10 pages, or were in letters. He wrote to some extent in all languages and in some ways was the first great German philosopher. He constitutes the arrival in Europe of German philosophy. His influence was immediate on the German Romantic philosophers in the 19th century; moreover, it continued – and is still continuing now -- particularly with Nietzsche.

So, I am asking a very general question because, no doubt for me, Leibniz is a philosopher who best helps us understand a possible answer to this question: what is philosophy? Or rather, what does a philosopher do? What does philosophy grapple with? If you think that definitions like search for the true or search for wisdom are not adequate, is there a philosophical activity? I want to say very quickly how I recognize a philosopher in his activity. I would say that for a philosopher, one can only confront these activities as a function of what they create and of their mode of creation. One must ask, what does a woodworker create? What does a musician create? For me, a philosopher is someone very simple, someone who creates concepts. This obviously implies many things, namely that the concept is something to be created, that the concept is the product [*terme*] of a creation.

But I would say, at the extreme, if someone were to ask me what a scientist is, I see no possibility of defining science if we do not indicate something that is created by and in science. And, it happens that what is created by and in science, I'm not completely sure what it is, but not

concepts properly speaking. What is created in art, art, the domain that is most familiar to us because the concept of creation, correctly or incorrectly, has been much more linked to art than to science or to philosophy, -- perhaps there isn't so much reason for this – if I am asked, "what does a painter create?" he creates lines and colors. That suggests that lines and colors are not givens but are the product [*terme*] of a creation. What is it that's a given? Let's assume, for example, that what is given, I'd say, at the extreme, could always be called a flow. Flows are what are givens, and creation consists in dividing [*découper*], organizing, connecting flows in such a way that a creation is drawn or made around certain singularities extracted from flows.

Well, I would say that a concept is not at all something that is a given. Moreover, a concept is not the same thing as thought: one can very well think without concepts, and even everyone who does not do philosophy still thinks, I believe, they think quite completely, but they do not think via concepts, if you accept the idea of a concept as the product [*terme*] of an activity or of an original creation.

I would say that the concept is a system of singularities appropriated [*prélevé*] from a thought flow. A philosopher is someone who invents concepts. Is he an intellectual? No, in my opinion. For a concept as system of singularities appropriated from a thought flow, a thought flow that can be thought of as continuous. I can speak of a thought flow since there has been a thought flow since, I don't know, since prehistoric man, the thinker, Rodin, and then the first tiny spark of thought, well, this is the start of a flow; just as there is a biological flow, there is a vital flow, there is a flow of thought. So the philosopher is the one who would know or who would propose to create concepts appropriated from the flow of universal thought. Imagine the universal thought flow as a kind of interior monologue, the interior monologue of everyone who thinks. Philosophy arises with the action that consists of creating concepts. For me, there are as many creations in the invention of a concept as in the creation by a great painter or musician. For a great musician, one can also conceive of a continuous acoustic flow – perhaps that is only an idea, but it matters little if this idea is justified -- that traverses the world and that even encompasses silence. What is a musician? A musician is someone who creates, for example, and who appropriates something from this flow that we will call what? You already sense that there is creation. Can I say that he/she creates notes? Perhaps. But are notes really what music is involved in, or rather aggregates of notes? What will be all a sound, a musician's new sound? You indeed sense that it is not simply a question of the system of notes, do-re-mi-fa-sol. Well, I am saying it's the same thing for philosophy; it isn't simply about creating sounds; it is a matter of creating concepts.

And it is not a question of defining philosophy by some sort of search for the truth, for a very simple reason: this is that truth is always subordinate to the system of concepts of which one disposes. What is the importance of philosophers for non-philosophers? It is that although non-philosophers don't know it, or pretend not to be interested, whether they like it or not, they think through concepts which have proper names.

I recognize Kant's name not by his life, but by a certain type of concepts signed Kant, exactly as I recognize a great painter not by his life, but by a certain tonality, a certain line, that are signed by this proper name. Henceforth, one can very well conceive of being the disciple of a philosopher. If you are situated so that you say that such and such a philosopher signed the concepts for which you feel a need, then you become Kantian, Leibnizian, etc.

All this, I would just like to make you feel the stupidity of the ordinary remark which comes from the flow of non-philosophical thought according to which philosophy is a strange thing because the philosophers never agree with each other. And here the situation of philosophy is contrasted with the situation of science, which is at least twice as stupid since scientists do not agree with each other more and that does not at all mean that they are arguing. It is indeed inevitable that two great philosophers might not agree with each other to the extent that each creates a system of concepts that serves as his point of reference. Thus, that isn't the only thing to be judged. But I have just said that these disciples, whether globally or locally -- one can very well be a disciple only locally, only on one point or another, [for] philosophy is detachable; you can indeed select a particular point, if one has to – so you can very well be a disciple of a philosopher to the extent that you consider that you personally need this type of concepts. Concepts are spiritual signatures, but that does not mean it's in one's head because concepts are also ways of living – creating a concept is necessarily staking a position, and to do so is not through choice or reflections; the philosopher reflects no more than does the painter or musician. Reflection only occurs through [*inaudible word*]. Things are defined or activities are defined by a creative dimension and not by a reflexive dimension. So, to the question, "what does the philosopher create?", it's concepts, and concepts do not pre-exist.

Henceforth, what does it mean to say: to need this or that concept? I wonder… – This is a kind of introduction; you are going to see why I feel the need to say all this in order to get to Leibniz -- in some ways, I tell myself that concepts are such living things, that they really are things with four paws, that move, really. It's like a color, like a sound, it's like… It's something else, but it's at the same level of creation. Well, I tell myself in this way, it seems to me that concepts really are such living things that they are not unrelated – only, one would have to create a theory, that is, a concept in order to account for what identity is -- unrelated to something that would, however, appear the farthest from the concept, namely the scream [*le cri*].

In some ways, the philosopher is not someone who sings, but someone who screams. And what does he/she scream? Each time that you need to scream, -- this isn't always from pain; it could be from anger, it could be… -- I think that you are not far from a kind of call of philosophy. What would it mean for the concept to be a kind of scream or a kind of form of scream? That's what it means to need a concept; to need a concept means having something to scream! What can one have to scream? It could be many things, many things. So, what would the scream be?... You think, well, I'm not going there, it's just so that… One can scream, in fact; that can be "ou-you-you" [*Deleuze attempts to wail*]. There you don't have a concept. Precisely to find the concept of that scream, there you are perhaps doing philosophy. But so, fine, to cry, one can scream thousands of things. Imagine someone who screams: "Well really, all that must have some kind reason to be." It's a very simple scream. In my definition, the concept is the form of the scream, we immediately see a series of philosophers who would say, "yes, yes"! I am thinking of some philosophers, precisely, philosophers of passion, philosophers of pathos, in contrast from philosophers of logos. For example, Kierkegaard based his entire philosophy on some fundamental screams.

But Leibniz comes from the great rationalist tradition, and no doubt, no philosopher, even Hegel, has taken rationalism this far. What can the rationalist's scream be? I do not believe that the rationalist is someone seeking an ideal, nor an idealist, as they say. [The rationalist] is someone

who screams as much as others; just that his screams are not the same. What can a man who believes in reason scream? There is only one thing he can scream: No matter what happens or what he observes, it has to be for a reason. And it is very simple. [Pause] But that's the scream signed Leibniz; you will tell me, you don't have to be smart to say that. If we live at a certain level, to see why everything will depend on a crazy creation of concepts that will express this scream at all levels: there must be a reason for all of this, wars that occur, children who die, etc., etc. All of this has to have a reason. It's a scream as passionate as the scream that consists in saying, nothing has a reason, everything is absurd. That's another scream. It is as a function of your cries that you are a philosopher.

So, fine, imagine Leibniz. So, with all that is happening here, there is something frightening. He is the philosopher of order, and moreover, of order and policing, in the sense… in every sense of the word "policing." In the first sense of the word "policing" especially, namely, good organization, the regulated organization of the city. This is a philosophy of order. He only thinks in terms of order. In one sense, today we'd say that he is extremely reactionary, he's a friend of order. But very oddly in this taste for order and to establish this order, he yields to the most insane, the craziest creation of concepts that we have ever witnessed in philosophy. Disheveled concepts, the most exuberant concepts, the most disordered, the most complex in order to justify what is. Very strange. Each thing must have a reason. Fine.

In fact, there are two kinds of philosopher; if you accept this first definition by which philosophy is the activity consisting of creating concepts, there are all kinds of philosophers, but there are perhaps two poles: there are those who engage in a creation – and one has no advantage over the other – there are those who engage in a very sober creation of concepts; they create concepts on the level of a particular singularity well distinguished from another, and I dream finally of a kind of quantification of philosophers in which they would be quantified according to the number of concepts they have signed or invented. If I say: Descartes! That's the philosopher type with a very sober creation of concepts. The history of the cogito, historically one can always find an entire tradition, precursors, but that doesn't prevent there being something signed Descartes in the cogito concept, notably (a proposition can express a concept) the proposition: "I think therefore I am," to the extent that it has a very odd, very astonishing sense, it's a truly new concept. It's the discovery of subjectivity, of thinking subjectivity. It's signed Descartes.

So, we could always look in St. Augustine's works, if there were something that had prepared to so; of course, there is a history of concepts, but that doesn't prevent it from being signed Descartes. It's not that we've made rather quick work of Descartes, but that we could assign to him five or six concepts, an enormous feat to have invented six concepts, but it's a very sober creation. And then there are others like that, some sober philosophers, and then there are exasperated philosophers, and [*indistinct word*] philosophers. For them, each concept covers an aggregate of singularities, and then they always need to have others, always other concepts. One witnesses a mad creation of concepts. The typical example is Leibniz. He never finished creating something new. It's all this that I would like to explain to you.

And to explain him, I'll say quickly, just so you have some reference points, that he's a German philosopher. He is the first philosopher to reflect about this, about the possibilities, the power of the German language as regards the concept, as regards philosophy, how German is an eminently

conceptual language, and it's not by chance that it can also be a great language of the scream. Multiple activities, he attends to all, a very great mathematician, great physics scholar, very good jurist, many political activities, always in the service of order. He does not stop; he does not stop. He goes out to see people; he is very suspicious [*louche*]. If needed, he claims that he didn't go see them; there is a Leibniz-Spinoza visit (Spinoza being the anti-Leibniz); there is a famous visit by Leibniz to Spinoza during which Leibniz is made to read some manuscripts, and one imagines Spinoza very exasperated, wondering what this guy wants. [*Laughter*] Following that, when Spinoza is attacked, Leibniz said that he never went to see him, that it's not true; when it's proven that he indeed did go visit him, [Leibniz] says that it was to monitor [*surveiller*] him. [*Laughter*] Abominable, he is abominable. There we are; this isn't the only example. It's not because he is abominable that there is this crazy creation. His dates, nonetheless, his dates: 1646-1716. So, that's a long life, straddling plenty of things.

So, there we are; in the end, he had a kind of very strange humor. I see only Leibniz in this way, having this diabolical humor that consists in this, and that belongs to his style. I'll try to explain that his system is rather like a pyramid. Leibniz's great system has several levels. None of these levels is false, these levels symbolize with each other, and Leibniz is the first great philosopher to conceive of activity and thought as a vast symbolization.

So, all these levels symbolize, but they are all more or less close to what we could provisionally call the absolute. And that is part and parcel of his very body of work. I mean that, you recall that lots of things are in letters or, in that period, lots of things are directed in writing to one group or another. Depending on Leibniz's correspondent or on the public to which he addressed himself, he presented his whole system at a particular level. Imagine that his system is made of levels more or less tightened or more or less relaxed; in order to explain something to someone, he goes to situate himself on a particular level of his system. Let us assume that the someone in question was suspected by Leibniz of having a mediocre intelligence: very well, he is delighted, he situates himself on one of the lowest levels of his system, and if he addresses someone of higher intelligence, he jumps to a higher level. As these levels belong implicitly to Leibniz's own texts, that creates a great problem of commentary. In fact, it's a rather complicated case because, in my opinion, one can never rely on a Leibniz text if one has not first discerned the level of the system to which this text corresponds.

For example, there are texts in which Leibniz explains what, according to him, is the union of soul and body, fine, and it's to one particular correspondent; to another correspondent, he will explain that there is no problem in the union of soul and body since the real problem is that of the relation of souls to one another. The two things are not at all contradictory, it's two levels of the system. The result is that if one does not evaluate the level of a Leibniz text, then one will get the impression that he constantly contradicts himself, when in fact, he does not contradict himself at all.

So, I would already like to start with the most… with a madman's idea; since this is quite complicated, I would almost like to propose, Leibniz is a very difficult philosopher. I would like to give titles to each part of what I have to propose to you. So, the first part, my principal number 1, I would call "a strange kind of thought" [*une drôle de pensée*]. Why do I call it "a strange kind of thought"? Well, because among Leibniz's texts, there is a small one that Leibniz himself calls

"a strange kind of thought." Thus, I am authorized by the author himself. And since Leibniz dreamed a lot about… he imagined, he has a whole science-fiction side that is absolutely amazing, all the time he imagined institutions. In this little "strange kind of thought" text, he invents a very disturbing institution – I find this to be a very charming text -- that would be as follows: an academy of games would be necessary. At that era, as well as with Pascal, certain other mathematicians, and Leibniz himself, there developed a great theory of games and probabilities. Leibniz is one of the great founders of game theory. He was impassioned by mathematical game problems; he must have been quite a games player himself. He imagined this academy of games as necessarily being at the same time – why at the same time? Recall this because we will have to come back to it -- depending on the point of view in which one is situated to see this institution, or to participate in it – this would be at the same time a section of the academy of sciences, a zoological and botanical garden, a universal exposition, a casino where one gambled, and an enterprise of police control. That's not bad if he creates all that, a casino. So, he explains, he establishes this little institution; he calls that "a strange kind of thought." A very lovely text.

Assume that I am relating a story to you. This story consists in taking up one of the central points of Leibniz's philosophy, and I tell it to you as if it were the description of another world, and there I also number the principal propositions that go into forming a strange kind of thought. And I am saying, little a) – it's very important for me to number this to make it very clear. So these are aspects of this "strange kind of thought" that I am going to relate to you now, at the center of Leibniz's philosophy.

Little a) We all know that, up to here, Leibniz has created nothing. I would say he only contemplates the thought flow. The thought flow, eternally, carries forth, brings with it a famous principle that has a very special characteristic because it is one of the only principles about which one can be certain, and at the same time one can not see at all what it offers to us. It is certain, it is clear, but it is empty. This famous principle is the principle of identity. The principle of identity has a classical formula – indeed, it's not Leibniz who invented it – there's a classical formula: A is A. So, fine, that's clear; that is certain. If I say blue is blue or God is God – with this, I am not saying that God exists – God, in parentheses (if it exists) is God, blue is blue, the triangle is a triangle, in one sense, I am within the sure, I am within certainty. Only there we are, what does that cause me to think? Am I thinking something when I say A is A, or am I not thinking? [*Pause*] Let us nonetheless try to say what results from A is A, this well-known principle, certainly, this principle of identity. [*Pause*]

How is it presented? It is presented in the form of a reciprocal proposition. A is A means: subject A, verb to be, A attribute or predicate. There is a reciprocity of subject and predicate. Blue is blue, a triangle is a triangle, or I could say: the triangle has three angles; three angles or triangle is the same thing. So. there we have some empty and certain propositions. Is that all? An identical proposition is a proposition such that the attribute or the predicate is the same as the subject and reciprocates with the subject. Is that all? This would still be weak in speaking about the principle of identity were we to leave it there.

No, I see that there is a second case just a bit more complex, notably that the principle of identity can determine propositions which are not simply reciprocal propositions. There is no longer

simply reciprocity of the predicate with the subject and subject with the predicate. Suppose that I say: "The triangle has tree sides," this is not the same thing as saying, "The triangle has three angles." "The triangle has three angles" is an identical proposition because it is reciprocal. "The triangle has three sides" is a little different, it is not a reciprocal proposition. There is no identity of subject and predicate. In fact, "three sides" is not the same thing as "three angles". And nonetheless, there is a supposed logical necessity. This logical necessity is that you cannot conceptualize three angles composing a single figure without this figure also having three sides. I would say, there is no reciprocity; what is there? There is inclusion. Three sides are included in the triangle. Inherence or inclusion. – It's words that constitute logic, vocabulary; as in all activities, there's a terminology. If you haven't familiarized yourself with this terminology, I think you cannot understand sufficiently. --

Likewise, if I say that matter is matter, matter is matter, this is an identical proposition in the form of a reciprocal proposition. The subject is identical to the predicate. If I say that matter is in extension [*étendue*], this is again an identical proposition. Why? Because I cannot think of the concept matter without already introducing an extension. Extension is in matter. This is not a reciprocal proposition; this is even less a reciprocal proposition since, inversely, perhaps, perhaps – this is not moving us forward – but perhaps, I really can think of extension without anything filling it in, that is, without matter. This is therefore not a reciprocal proposition, but it is a proposition of inclusion; when I say "matter is in extension," this is an identical proposition by inclusion. Do you follow me? If you understand that, you've already understood a lot.

I would say therefore that there are two kinds of identical propositions: there are reciprocal propositions in which the subject and predicate are one and same, and propositions of inherence or inclusion in which the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. Do you follow me? No, I am asking you a question to be certain that you've fully understood.

If I say, "this page has a front side and a back side," -- ok let's leave that, I withdraw my example…

A woman student: I have a question.

Deleuze: Already. Ah…

The woman student: [*Inaudible remarks; these concern the triangle example*]

Deleuze: If it [the figure] is open; obviously, if it's open… So, you are adding "closed". That's not an objection.

The woman student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, I was hinting at the definition of the triangle and of three angles constituting a closed figure, with three sides. So, you are adding that; it's not an objection. It's complementary. Fine, do you see that?

Henceforth, if I am looking for a more interesting statement of the identity principle represented by A is A, it's an empty form. If I am looking for a statement of the principle of identity, I would say in Leibnizian fashion, the identity principle is stated as follows: every analytical proposition is true; every analytical proposition is true. [*Pause*] Every analytical proposition is true.

What does analytical mean? According to what we have just seen, here we have a very strict definition of "analytic"; according to the examples we have just seen, an analytical proposition is one in which either the predicate or the attribute is identical with the subject, for example, "the triangle is triangular," reciprocal proposition, or proposition of inclusion such as "the triangle has three sides." The predicate is contained in the subject to the point that when you have conceived of the subject, the predicate was already there. So, you need to have an analysis; it's enough for you to have an analysis in order to find the predicate in the subject. There we are, fine. Up to this point, Leibniz as original thinker has yet to emerge.

Little b) Leibniz emerges. [*Laughter*] He arises in the form, once again, of this very bizarre scream. This very bizarre scream, there I am going to give it a more complex expression than I did earlier. This very bizarre scream, it means that Leibniz – so, at the same time, if you will, what I am doing here is only pre-philosophy. One cannot say that there's any philosophy in all this. It's the ground on which an extremely prodigious philosophy will be constructed -- Leibniz arrives and says: Ok, the identity principle gives us a certain model. Why a certain model? We saw this. In its very statement [*énoncé*], an analytical proposition is true, if you attribute to a subject something that constitutes a unity [*ne fait qu'un*] with the subject itself, or that overlaps with or is already contained in the subject. You risk nothing in being wrong. Thus, every analytical proposition is true.

Leibniz's stroke of pre-philosophical genius is to say: well then, let's consider reciprocity! If any proposition – and here, something absolutely new and nonetheless very simple starts there -- this had to be thought. And what does it mean to say, "it had to be thought through"? It means that one absolutely needed it, it means it related to something quite urgent for him. What is the reciprocity of the identity principle in its complex statement, "every analytical proposition is true"? Reciprocity poses many more problems. Leibniz emerges and says: couldn't one also say, and inversely, every true proposition is analytical?

If it is true that the identity principle gives us a model of truth, why are we stumped by the following difficulty, specifically: it is true, but it doesn't cause us to think anything. The identity principle will force us to think something; it is going to be reversed, be turned around. You will tell me that turning A is A around yields A is A. Yes and no. That yields A is A in the formal formulation which prevents the reversal of the principle. But in the philosophical formulation, which still amounts to exactly the same thing, "every analytical proposition is a true proposition", if you reverse the principle: "every true proposition is necessarily analytical," what does that mean? Each time that you formulate a true proposition, it must be analytical -- and this is where there is the scream! – it has to be, whether you want it or not, and this is already the official seal, Leibniz's signature, it has to be, you'll have no choice, it has to be analytical, it has to be analytical, that is, several thing: it has to be reducible to a proposition of attribution or of predication, S is T, subject is [*unclear word*], "the sky is blue," and not only does it have to be reducible to a judgment of predication or attribution, "the sky is blue", but it has to be analytical,

that is, the predicate must be either reciprocal with the subject or contained in the subject, contained in the concept of the subject. [*Pause*]

Does that go without saying? You sense already that he is getting himself into a strange undertaking [*drôle de truc*]; it's quite fine to say that, "it has to be", [but] he has to get himself out of this, and it is not by preference that he says that, rather he needs it. But he undertakes an impossible task; in fact, he needs some totally crazy concepts in order to complete this task that he is in the process of giving himself, a very simple task that consists in, and there, we don't… that consists in saying: fine, if every analytical proposition is true, well then, I'll select an expression: every true proposition certainly must be analytical. That is, in fact, I mean, this does not go without saying, this does not go without saying at all that every judgment is already reducible to a judgment of attribution. It's not going to be easy to show. Among his virtues, Leibniz is one of the greatest logicians; he throws himself into formal logic, into a combinatory, as he calls it himself, into a combinatory analysis that is fantastic. Fine.

Why doesn't it go without saying? Here we have some types of judgement. [*Pause*] "The box of matches is on the table," I'd say that this is a judgment, you know? "On the table" is what? It's a spatial determination. I could say that the matchbox is "here." "Here," what's that? I'd say that it's a judgment of localization. Again, I am repeating some very, very simple things, but they always have been fundamental problems in logic. It's only to suggest that in appearance, all judgments do not have as form predication or attribution. When I say, "the sky is blue," I have a subject, sky, and an attribute, blue. [*Pause*] When I say, "the sky is up there" or "I am here," is "here" – spatial localization – assimilable to a predicate? Can I formally link the judgment "I am here" to a judgment of the kind "I have brown hair" [*je suis brun*] or "I am blond" [*je suis blond*]? It's not certain that spatial localization is a quality, not certain at all. [*Pause*]

If I say, another example, if I say "2 + 2 = 4", it's a judgment that we ordinarily call a relational judgment. Or if I say, "Pierre is smaller than Paul," "Pierre is smaller than Paul," this is a relation between two terms, Pierre and Paul. No doubt I orient this relation onto Pierre: if I say, "Pierre is smaller than Paul," I can say "Paul is larger than Pierre." Fine. Where is the subject, where is the predicate? Can I treat – that's exactly the problem that has disturbed philosophy since its beginnings; here again, Leibniz's not the one who invented this; we'll see what he invents; but since the beginning, ever since there was logic, they have wondered to what extent the judgment of attribution could be considered as the universal form of any possible judgment, or rather one case of judgment among others -- "Pierre is smaller than Paul," can I treat "smaller than Paul" like an attribute of Pierre? It's not certain. So, I am saying nothing more because we'd get sidetracked. This is not at all obvious. Perhaps we have to distinguish very different types of judgment from each other, notably: relational judgment, judgment of spatio-temporal localization, judgment of attribution, and still many more. What other ones? For example, judgments of existence. If I say, "God exists," can I formally translate it in the form of "God is existent," existent [*Interruption of the recording*] [45:56] [*The following text is provided by Web Deleuze*: being an attribute? Can I say that God exists is a judgment of the same form as "God is all-powerful"? Undoubtedly not, since I can only say "God is all-powerful" by adding "yes, if he exists". Does God exist? Is existence an attribute? *End of added text*] Not certain.

Part 2

So you see that by proposing the idea that every true proposition must be in one way or another an analytical proposition, that is, identical, Leibniz already gives himself a very hard task; he commits himself to showing in what way all propositions can be linked to the judgment of attribution, notably propositions that state relations, that state existences, that state localizations, and that, at the outside, exist, are in relation with, can be translated as the equivalent of attribute of the subject. Fine. In your mind there must be arising the idea of an infinite task. Fine, so let's continue.

Here we are; let us assume that Leibniz achieves it: what world is going to emerge from it? What very bizarre world? What kind of world is it in which I can say "every true proposition is analytical"? You recall certainly – we can no longer understand anything without that -- that *analytical* is a proposition in which the predicate is identical to the subject or else is included in the subject. That kind of world is going to be pretty strange. For the moment, I am finishing this little b) by saying, well then, what is the reciprocity of the principle of identity?

The identity principle is thus, any true proposition is analytical; no, shit, the reverse, any analytical proposition is true. Leibniz says that another principle is necessary, another principle is necessary, it's reciprocity: every true proposition is necessarily analytical. He will give to it a very beautiful name – the expression already existed, but it was never used in this extension – he will call it the principle of sufficient reason. Why "of sufficient reason"? Why does he believe himself fully immersed in his very own scream? *Everything must surely have a reason*. It's because the principle of sufficient reason must be expressed or can be expressed as follows – this would be another formulation but it would be the same thing --: whatever happens to a subject, be it determinations of space and time, of relation, event, whatever happens to a subject, what happens, that is, what one says of it with truth, everything that is said of a subject must be contained in the notion of the subject. Everything that happens to a subject must already be contained in the notion of the subject.

Obviously, the notion of "notion" is going to be essential. It is necessary for "blue" to be contained in the notion of sky. Why is this the principle of sufficient reason? Because if it is this way, each thing has a reason, each thing has a reason, reason is precisely the very notion insofar as it contains all that happens to the corresponding subject. Henceforth, henceforth, everything has a reason. Reason equals the notion of the subject insofar as this notion contains everything said with truth about this subject. [*Pause*]

Here we have the principle of sufficient reason which is therefore just the reciprocal of the identity principle. Here we have my first question; I am not trying to work all that out; notice that he has tasks that he is facing, he has lots to do; he has to justify all that. He justifies precisely by creating his system. So, I am just asking, rather than looking for abstract justifications, what bizarre world is going to be born from all that? A very bizarre world, a world with very strange colors if I return to my metaphor of painting, which will result in a painting signed Leibniz. Every true proposition must be analytical, that is, once again, everything that you say with truth about a subject must be contained in the notion of the subject. You sense, you sense that this is already getting crazy; he's got a lifetime of work ahead of him because that implies a certain

theory of the notion. What does that mean, the notion of a subject? It's signed Leibniz, the notion of a subject. No one spoke of a notion of a subject. That's very, very odd as notions go. That implies a concept of a concept, a very special idea of the notion. Just as there is a Hegelian conception of the concept, there is a Leibnizian conception of the concept. Fine, let's wait.

[c)] Again, my problem is what world is going to emerge, and in this little c), I would like to begin to show that, from this point, Leibniz is going to create some hallucinatory concepts, truly hallucinatory. Indeed, this isn't wrong; this is truly a hallucinatory world. If you want to think about relations between philosophy and madness, for example, there are some very weak pages, it seems to me, some very weak pages by Freud on the intimate relation of metaphysics with delirium. This is a very interesting subject, but I believe that one can only grasp the positivity of these relations through a theory of the concept, and notably, the direction that I would like to take would be the relationship of the concept with the scream, well yes, I tell myself, there is indeed something there. I would like to make you feel this presence of a kind of conceptual madness in Leibniz's universe as we are going to see it be born. For this little c), fine, whether you like it or not, one has to… So, this is a gentle violence, let yourself go. It is not a question of arguing. Understand the stupidity of people who say "why is he saying all that because made a whole… [he made] a comment"; understand the stupidity of objections.

I will add a parenthesis to complicate things. If you are learned, you know that there is a philosopher after Leibniz who said that truth is one of synthetic judgments. It's Kant. He is opposed to Leibniz. Ok! How does that concern us? It's Kant. This is not to say that they do not agree with each other. When I say that, even if I don't explain myself, I credit Kant for having invented a new concept which is synthetic judgment. This concept had to be invented, and it was Kant who did so. To say, "he doesn't agree with Leibniz," philosophers contradict one another is a feeble statement; it's like saying that Velasquez did not agree with Giotto, right! It's a non-sense, not even true, it's nonsensical. It means nothing. So, let's return to this bizarre world that ought to commit [*inaudible words*].

Every true proposition must be analytical, that is, such that it attributes something to a subject and that the attribute must be contained in the notion of the subject. Let us consider an example. What does that mean? I am not asking myself if it is true, I ask myself: what does that mean? Let us take an example of a true proposition. A true proposition can be an elementary one concerning an event that took place. There, that's true. Let's take Leibniz's own examples; no matter if you believe in these things or not: "*Caesar crossed the Rubicon*", he crossed the Rubicon, Caesar. It's a proposition. It is true or we have strong reasons to assume it's true. Or else, "Adam sinned"; there we have a highly true proposition. "Adam sinned"; what do you mean by that? Well, yes, he sinned. [*Pause*] There we are. "Alexander did this or that."

You see that all these propositions chosen by Leibniz as fundamental examples are event related [*événementielles*] propositions, so he does not give himself an easy task. He is going to tell us this: since this proposition is true, it is necessary, whether you want it or not, this is still his scream, it is necessary that the predicate "crossed the Rubicon" – in parentheses, we immediately react; an objection arises, but we have to hold these objections in; we have to wait for the moment that he provides an answer to this objection; "crossing the Rubicon" is a predicate; we indeed see that in "the sky is blue", blue at the extreme is a predicate; fine, and yet we'll still

have to see, but it appears to be a predicate; but "crossing the Rubicon", that's a predicate; [whether] it's an attribute of the same type as "the sky is blue", that's not certain. Fine, so we're told – it is necessary for "crossing the Rubicon" to be an attribute or a predicate of the subject Caesar; this attribute must indeed be -- if the proposition is true, and it is true -- this predicate must be contained in the notion of Caesar, not in Caesar himself, but in the notion of Caesar, if in the proposition, it would not be true.

Good, we start off from there. This is a very simple idea. The notion of the subject contains everything that happens to a subject, that is, everything that is said about the subject with truth. So, "Adam sinned", sinned at a particular moment belongs to the notion of Adam. That gives one pause, right? Crossing the Rubicon belongs to the notion of Caesar, very good. I would say that there, Leibniz proposes one of his first great concepts, the concept of inherence. Everything that is said with truth about something is inherent to the notion of this something. So, this is the first aspect of sufficient reason, it's the development of sufficient reason. Fine. Only here we are, we can no longer stop, and when we say that, listen to me closely.

Little d), and I would precisely like these headings to be very, very simple so that you don't lose the thread. You are indeed grasping the idea: the notion of Caesar must encompass, contain everything that happens to Caesar, that is, everything that you attribute to him with truth. Little d), Leibniz says, there we are, I've begun, I can no longer stop, and that is also a philosopher's scream, don't stop this. When one has started into the domain of the concept, we cannot stop, except for certain ones, except for the careful one, except for the sober philosophers.

In the domain of screams – I would like to create a painting of the cries of philosophy – in the domain of screams, there is a famous scream from Aristotle, the great Aristotle who, let us note, exerted an extremely strong influence over Leibniz, at one point proposed in the *Metaphysics* a very beautiful expression: "it is indeed necessary to stop", it is indeed necessary to stop; it's even more beautiful in Greek, so I'll say it for those who have studied some Greek, *ananké mê stênai, ananké mê stênai*. This is a great scream. "It is indeed necessary to stop," This is the philosopher facing the chasm of the interconnection of concepts, "it is indeed necessary to stop somewhere." Leibniz could care less, he does not stop, he does not stop; that's how it is; he feels the need. There are people who feel the need to stop who are no less brilliant. There are others who never stop. So, why can't he stop? Because come back to the proposition little c), we have our little c) here; everything that you attribute to a subject must be contained in the notion of this subject. But what you attribute with truth to any subject whatsoever in the world, whether this be Caesar, any subject [*unclear words*], it suffices that you attribute to it a single thing with truth in order for you to notice with fright that, from that moment on, you are forced to cram into the notion of the subject not only the thing that you attribute to it with truth, but the totality of the world.

Why? By virtue of a principle that is not at all the same one, which is the well-known principle that is not at all the same – here, we will see that later -- as that of sufficient reason; by virtue of a much duller principle which is the simple principle of causality. For in the end, the causality principle stretches to infinity, that's its very characteristic. And this is a very special infinity since, in fact, it stretches to the indefinite. Specifically, the causality principle states that every thing has a cause, which is very different from every thing has a reason. Reason and cause are not the same. If there are two words, that's because these are not the same thing; a cause is not a

reason. [*Pause*] Every thing has a cause, fine, agreed. But the cause is a thing, and in its turn, it has a cause, etc. etc. I can do the same thing in the opposite direction, [*Pause*] namely every cause has an effect and then this effect is, in its turn, the cause of effects. This is therefore an indefinite series of causes and effects.

What difference is there between sufficient reason and cause? We understand very well. Cause is never sufficient. One must say that the causality principle poses a necessary cause, but never a sufficient one. We must distinguish between necessary cause and sufficient reason. What distinguishes them in all evidence is that the cause of a thing is always something else. [*Pause*] A thing's cause is always something else. The cause of A is B, the cause of B is C, etc.…. An indefinite series of causes. Sufficient reason is not at all something else than the thing. The sufficient reason of a thing is not something else than the thing, we saw this; it's the notion of the thing. Thus, sufficient reason expresses the relation of the thing with its own notion whereas cause expresses the relations of the thing with something else. There we are, this is crystal clear… Yes?

A student: So, if I understood this, [*inaudible question*]

Deleuze: … that the principle of identity is empty? Well yes, it's going to expand… Absolutely, this isn't over yet.

So, little d) [*Deleuze's ordering; he seems to continue the same point here*] If you say that a particular event is encompassed in the notion of Caesar, "crossing the Rubicon" is encompassed in the notion of Caesar. You can't stop yourself in which sense? From cause to cause and effect to effect, it's at that moment the totality of the world that must be encompassed in the notion of a particular subject. That becomes very odd, there's the world passing by inside each subject, or each notion of subject. In fact, crossing the Rubicon has a cause; this cause itself has multiple causes, from cause to cause, into cause from cause and into cause from cause from cause. It's the whole series of the world that passes there, at least the antecedent series. And moreover, crossing the Rubicon has effects. If I limit myself to the largest ones, [there's] the commencement of a Roman empire. The Roman Empire in its turn has effects, we follow directly from the Roman Empire. In it turn, the Roman Empire has effects. We are directly answerable to these effects, we who are children of the Roman Empire. From cause to cause and effect to effect, you cannot say a particular event is encompassed in the notion of a particular subject without saying that, henceforth, the entire world is encompassed in the notion of a particular subject.

A student: Don't you get the impression that you are doing precisely the opposite of what Henri Bergson did, when is spoke about [*inaudible*], for example?

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes ... but you have to ask yourself ... Henri Bergson is not a philosopher with the same breadth as Leibniz, but one has to ask, on the other hand, when Henri Bergson does something, based on what system of concepts is he doing it? And he has a very simple system of concepts; he is one of the most succinct philosophers in the world. The conceptual framework scheme is very, very simple in Henri Bergson. You have to understand that he is not Leibnizian; he is not Leibnizian. But, there, I am speaking out of I don't know what hope that some of you will find yourself Leibnizian, well, [*several indistinct words*] from your own preference, from

your own preference [*à votre goût*]. But "your preference" does not mean tastes and colors like that; it's your scream, based on what you need. And here, there's a characteristic that's not eternal, but that's indeed a trans-historical characteristic of philosophy. Leibniz's concepts, quite certainly, it's necessary for there to be a contemporary Leibnizian. What does it mean to be Leibnizian in 1980? Well, there certainly are some; or rather, it's possible they exist. Well, I believe that it's impossible to find an answer [to] why and how someone today could be Leibnizian, in what manner of rebirth, etc.

So, little d), that's where we are. In conformity with the principle of sufficient reason, if you have stated that what happens to a particular subject and what personally concerns it, what you attribute for it with truth, having blue eyes, having blond hair, crossing the Rubicon, etc., belongs to the notion of the subject, that is, is encompassed in this notion of the subject; you cannot stop, one must say that this subject contains the whole world. It is no longer the concept of inherence or inclusion that corresponded to our little c); it's the concept of expression which, in Leibniz's work, is a fantastic concept and that he expresses in the form: the notion of the subject expresses the totality of the world; the notion of the subject expresses the totality of the world [*Pause*] because, finally, a bit more must be said about this.

This is beginning to get crazy because, at that point, "the notion of the subject expresses the totality of the world", fine, agree, here we have Caesar expressing the totality of the world because, you see, his property, his very own "crossing the Rubicon" stretches to infinity backward and forward by the double interplay of causes and effects. But then, it is time to speak for ourselves, and it matters little what happens to us and the importance of what happens to us. We must say that each of us, or at least it is each notion of the subject that contains or expresses the totality of the world. That is, each of you, me, expresses or contains the totality of the world. Just like Caesar, no more, no less. That gets complicated; why does this get complicated? Because at that point, A great danger: if each individual notion, if each notion of the subject expresses the totality of the world, that means that there is only a single subject, a universal subject, and the you, me, Caesar, would only be appearances of this universal subject. It would be quite possible to say: there would be a single subject that would express the world.

Why would that be disastrous? Why couldn't Leibniz say that? Why is it that once one enters into concepts, you now, there are choices? There are moments of choices, and then there are moments when one has no choices, [so] he can't say that. He absolutely cannot say that. It would mean repudiating himself. Why? Because all that he had done before with the principle of sufficient reason, everything we have seen, all the preceding paragraphs, all these headings, a, b, c, d, in what direction were they going? They were going into an extraordinary thing if one were to be speaking abstractly. In my opinion, this was the first great reconciliation of the concept and the individual. Leibniz was in the process of constructing a concept of the concept such that the concept and the individual were finally becoming adequate to one another. [*Pause*]

You'll ask me why? That the concept might extend into the individual, why is this new? It's new because never had anyone dared that, or at least, it was done quite timidly when an author was risking that. Why? Because for everyone, what is the concept? It is defined by the order of generality. There is a concept when there is a representation which is applied to several things. But identifying the concept and the individual with each other, never had that been done, never.

Never had a voice reverberated in the domain of thought to say that the concept and the individual were the same thing. What had always been distinguished was an order of the concept that referred to a generality and an order of the individual that referred to a singularity.

Even more, it was always considered as going without saying that the individual as such was not comprehensible via the concept. It was always understood that the proper name was not a concept. Indeed, "dog" is certainly a concept, but "Fido" is not a concept. There is certainly a dogness about all dogs, as certain logicians say in a splendid language, but there is no Fido-ness about all Fidos. Leibniz is the first to say that concepts are proper names, that is, that concepts are individual notions. There is a concept of the individual as such.

So, you see that Leibniz cannot – [*Pause*] he cannot, he has no choice here – he cannot fall back on the solution: since every true proposition is analytical; the world is thus contained in a single and same subject which would be a universal subject. He cannot since his principle of sufficient reason implied that what was contained in a subject – thus what was true, what was attributable to a subject – was contained in a subject as an individual subject. [*Pause*] So, he cannot give himself a kind of universal mind. He has to remain fixed on the singularity, on the individual as such. And in fact, this will be one of the truly original points for Leibniz; this is the perpetual expression in his works: substance – for him, there's no difference between substance and subject for him; for other philosophers, there is a difference, but for him, there is a difference, but for him there is none – substance is individual.

So, the question, the urgent question in my sub-category d) since he blocked the path for invoking a universal spirit/mind in which the world will be included … other philosophers will invoke a universal mind. There is even a very short, very lovely text by Leibniz entitled "Considerations on universal mind," in which he goes on to show in what way there is indeed a universal mind, God, but that does not prevent substance from being individual. Thus, irreducibility of individual substances.

So, what is it that distinguishes…? Since each substance expressed the world, or rather, as he says, each substantial notion, each notion of a subject – the notion of Caesar, the notion of etc. -- since each one expresses the world, you express the world, in all times, do you grasp this? We notice that this isn't over; in fact, he has a lifetime of work because everyone objects to this. So what? So what? And the objection he encounters immediately is: but what about freedom? If everything that happens to Caesar is encompassed in the individual notion of Caesar, if the entire world is encompassed in the universal notion of Caesar, then Caesar crossing the Rubicon merely acts to unroll [*dérouler*] – an odd word, which occurs all the time in Leibniz's works; in Latin, it's quite lovely: *devolvere,* unroll, or explicate, you see? These are very rich words; explicate, unroll, *devolvere, explicare,* what is this? Literally, this means to unfold [*déplier*]; *explicare,* that had always meant something very, very simple. It's to unfold; you unfold a rug. A rug is rolled up, you unfold it; you explicate it. It's the same thing: explicate, develop, unfold/unroll. So, crossing the Rubicon, the event of crossing the Rubicon, only acts to unroll something that was encompassed eternally in the notion of Caesar. You see that this is quite a real problem.

Caesar crossed the Rubicon in a particular year; so there, it's true, crossing in a particular year. But whether he crosses the Rubicon in a particular year, it was encompassed for all time in his individual notion. Fine, where is this individual notion? It is eternal. There is an eternal truth of dated events. So, how about freedom? What do you do with freedom? Everyone jumps on him. Freedom is very dangerous under a Christian regime. What do you do with freedom? So, Leibniz will write a little work, "On freedom," in which he explains what freedom is. Freedom is going to be a pretty funny thing for him. But we'll leave that aside for the moment.

What distinguishes one subject from another? That point, we can't leave aside for the moment; otherwise our current gets cut off. What is going to distinguish you from Caesar since each one of you expresses the totality of the world, present, past, and future? It's odd, this concept of expression. Well, there we are, it's there that he proposes a very rich notion.

So here, I must create a little e), a little e) since this is a new concept. So, he says, what distinguishes an individual substance from another is not very difficult. To some extent, it has to be irreducible. It's that each one, each subject, for each individual notion, each notion of subject has to encompass this totality of the world, has to express this total world, but from a certain point of view, and there begins a philosophy that we have to call by its name, "perspectivism". And it's not inconsiderable. You will tell me: what is more banal than the expression "a point of view", than "my point of view"? There you have it: creating philosophy, I believe, that's it. If philosophy means creating concepts, what does "create concepts" mean? Generally speaking, I believe that it's these banal formulations. Great philosophers each have banal formulations, or in relation to which they are winking. A wink from a philosopher is, at the extreme, means taking a banal formulation and having a ball [*se marrer*]; you have no idea what I'm going to put inside it. One hears that constantly; ah, you understand, from my point of view, from my point of view, well then, I'd to this. That doesn't go very far.

To create a theory of point of view, what does that imply? Could that be done at any time at all? Is it by chance that it's Leibniz who created the first great theory of point of view at a particular moment? At the moment in which the same Leibniz created a particularly fruitful geometry topic, called projective geometry. Is it by chance that it's out of an era in which are elaborated, in architecture as in painting, all sorts of techniques of perspective, [*Pause*] and a thousand other things? But, we retain simply these two domains that symbolize with that: architecture-painting and perspective in painting on one hand, and on the other hand, projective geometry.

Understand what Leibniz wants to achieve with them. He is going to say that each individual notion expresses the totality of the world, yes, but from a certain point of view. What does that mean? Philosophically, this is not just nothing; as much as it's of little import banally, pre-philosophically, it's simply impossible henceforth for him to stop. That commits him to showing that what constitutes the individual notion as individual is point of view. And that therefore, point of view is deeper than whoever places himself there. At the basis of each individual notion, there has to be a point of view that defines the individual notion. If you prefer, the subject is second in relation to the point of view. And after all, to say that is not a piece of cake, it's not inconsiderable.

He established a philosophy that will find its name in the works of another philosopher who stretches out his hand to Leibniz across the centuries, specifically Nietzsche, when Nietzsche will say: my philosophy is a perspectivism. So, you understand that this does not at all mean perspectivism; you already understand the extent to which that can become idiotic; it becomes idiotic or it becomes truly banal to whine oneself to death if that consists in saying, ah well, everything is relative to the subject. "Everything is relative to the subject," well, no one needs a philosopher to say that; no, that's just not right, saying everything is relative. Everyone says it; people can say it, why not? It belongs to propositions that hurt no one since it is meaningless. Fine, people can always say that, one has to, one has to talk, one has to say something, one has to engage in conversation. One can be led to say that everything is relative, that everything depends on a viewpoint. So long as I take the formulation as signifying everything depends on the subject, I've said nothing; I've chatted, as they say, I have answered; I have held up my end of the conversation.

If we are doing philosophy, there are always setbacks in philosophy. Where Leibniz finds himself, it's not that point of view refers to the subject; it's point of view that is defined by the deepest subject. So, we cannot define point of view by the subject. It's the subject that must be defined in its irreducible character, that is, singular character, in its singularity, in its own individuality – it's the subject that refers to a point of view. What creates me, making me = me, is a point of view on the world. Leibniz cannot stop. He has to go all the way to a theory of point of view such that the subject is constituted by the point of view and not the point of view constituted by the subject.

Consider that, at that point, we can make some comparisons with this, perhaps rather arbitrary, but still, I don't really know. Several centuries later, well into the nineteenth century, one of the greatest famous American novelists, named Henry James, conceptualized the novel and renewed its techniques through a perspectivism, through a mobilization of points of view, there too in James's works, it's not points of view that are explained by the subjects, it's the opposite, subjects that are explained through points of view.

An analysis of points of view as sufficient reason of subjects, that's the sufficient reason of the subject. The individual notion is the point of view under which the individual expresses the world. It's beautiful and it's even poetic. Why is this poetic?

[*Interruption, comments from a student about the merits of point of view in police novels*]

Deleuze: Why not? Which police novels?

The student: I don't know. [*Inaudible name*], for example.

Deleuze: Yes, but it's James who…

The student: Ah, yes, fine, [*Inaudible comments*] … It's connected to a point of view; everything is a technique of point of view.

Deleuze: Yes, agreed.

The student: You are saying, “yes, agree”, but [*Inaudible*].

Deleuze: But understand, there are quite a number of novels that have subsequently been created in the form of the point of view of several characters around the same event. This often leads to some extremely mediocre novels. What difference is there between these weak novels and a novel by James? I believe it has to do in part with this; it’s because James – and here, this is not at all abstract, Henry James has sufficient techniques in order for there to be no subject; what becomes one subject or another is the one who is determined to be in a particular point of view. It’s the point of view that explains the subject and not the opposite.

And why is this very poetic? Here’s what Leibniz tells us, [*Deleuze reads and comments while reading*] This is a beautiful text [*Discourse of Metaphysics*]: “Every substance” -- understand “Every individual substance”, since substance is individual for Leibniz – “Every substance” -- that is, Caesar, but you as well, each of you -- “Every substance is like an entire world” – in fact, it expresses the entire world; so, every substance contains it – “is like an entire world and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe” – each substance is a mirror of the entire universe – therefore, “each substance is like an entire world and like a mirror of God or of the entire world that [each substance] expresses in its own way” – you see the individuation, “in its own way”, “each one in its own way,”; so this is where occurs the very beautiful metaphor that will be such a success, that will have a great legacy – “kind of like a very city” – an architectural metaphor” – “kind of like a very city is diversely represented depending on the different situations of someone looking at it” – you see, it’s so much the point of view that creates the subject that one has to comment on Leibniz’s words literally; he shifts from the plural to the singular, “someone looking at it,” “someone looking at it” truly changes the subjectivity depending on the changes of point of view; it’s like a city that “is diversely represented depending on the different situations of someone looking at it”; so, in the flow of this, he continues splendidly – “In this way, the universe is seemingly multiplied as many times as there are substances” – in fact, if each one expresses a universe and from its points of view, there is, at the extreme, a multiplication of universes according to the aggregate of all points of view -- “In this way, the universe is seemingly multiplied as many times as there are substances, and the glory of God is redoubled equally by as many completely different representations of his/her/its image.” Here, he is speaking like a cardinal. It’s not a village priest who would say these kinds of things; it’s a cardinal -- “One can even say that every substance bears in some ways the characteristic of infinite wisdom and of all God’s power, and limits as much as it is able to.” Yes, this is quite evident. This is certain.

So, in all this little point e), I maintain that the new concept of point of view is deeper than even the concept of the individual and of individual substance. It is point of view which will define essence, individual essence. One must believe that to each individual notion corresponds a point of view. But understand, that gets complicated because this point of view would valid [*vaudrait*] from birth to death for an individual. What would define us is a certain point of view on the world. Fine.

I was saying that Nietzsche will return to this idea and will draw from what he himself called his “perspectivism,” and he stated that he is following Leibniz on this. He was very, very familiar with Leibniz. He didn’t like him, but that’s what grabbed him. So, he said he was following

Leibniz on this. Earlier, I pointed out that the metaphor of the city considered from several points of view is located, is a great idea from the Renaissance, the theory of point of view. Notably, we discover that there's a very, very interesting, very odd author, a cardinal, named cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, a very great Renaissance philosopher, and this philosopher created a theory -- Leibniz knew him very well; he had read [Nicholas of Cusa] extensively – and in [Nicholas of Cusa's] works, he goes farther in this metaphor; he referred to a portrait, a Baroque, Mannerist portrait of a pope from that era. You know, the kind of portraits that changed according to the point of view, but this kind of portrait, I recall that during the era of Italian fascism, there were these all through Italy, there was a very odd portrait: there was a portrait that when looked at directly from the front – here again, we still see these; they belong to gadgets – looking at it directly, it represented Mussolini; from the right side, it represented his son-in-law, and if one stood to the left, it represented the king. You see? This is the method of points of view.[4]

The analysis of points of view in mathematics, also, this indicates the extent to which point of view is much more important than merely subjective; it's the sufficient reason of the subjective [*Interruption of the recording*] [92:15]; *the following text is provided from Web Deleuze*: – and it's again Leibniz who caused this chapter of mathematics to make considerable progress under the name of analysis situs [*aka topology*] (*end of the added text*)] --,

Part 3

… and it is evident that it is connected to projective geometry. Otherwise, this is not at all about saying that everything is subject, on the contrary. There is a kind of essentiality, of objectity of the subject, and objectity is the point of view.

Fine, given this, we haven't said what these points of view were. This is a review of a very, very bizarre world. And in the end, I have to take it in small [*indistinct word,* steps?] because the metaphor… ah, no, I'll continue anyway. My point of view, the point of view, we must nevertheless develop it exactly.

A student: [*He requests the reference of the Leibniz text Deleuze read*]

Deleuze: *Discourse of Metaphysics,* paragraph 7… no, not 7… ah, 9… All this is quite enjoyable.

Fine, so what does that mean concretely, everyone expresses the world, yes, but from his own point of view? This is becoming quite bizarre; Leibniz did not retreat from the strangest concepts. Because here we are, here is what that means, each subject expresses the world from a certain point of view. Understand, I can no longer even say "from his own point of view." If I said, "from his own point of view," I would make this depend on a pre-established point of view. And it's the opposite, it's the subject that depends on the point of view. So, I can say, each subject expresses the world from a point of view, from a determined point of view. But what determines this point of view?

And here we find how the great Leibniz is going to get himself out of this. He is going to tell us, understand, each of us, whether it's Caesar or you yourself, each of us expresses the totality of the world, only he expresses it obscurely and confusedly. [*Pause*] "Obscurely and confusedly" means what in Leibniz's vocabulary? That means that the totality of the world is really in the individual, but in the form of the concept that Leibniz creates, in the form of minute perceptions. And what are these minute perceptions? Here we have something very bizarre. I am continuing my analogies. Is it by chance that Leibniz is one of the inventors of so-called differential calculus? These are infinitely minute perceptions, in other words, unconscious perceptions. The totality of the world is in me in the guise of unconscious perceptions. Very, very strange. Fine. I express the entire world, but obscurely, confusedly, like a… -- he constantly appeals to this beautiful expression -- like a distant sound [*rumeur*], like a roar [*clameur*]. Right? So, fine. And then, what does that produce?

What is a point of view? We're not making progress. Yes, we are, we're making progress. Why I was referring to differential calculus, we'll see; later, we'll see in detail why this is linked to differential calculus, but notice that the little perceptions of the unconscious is like differentials of consciousness, it's minute perceptions without consciousness. For conscious perceptions, Lebiniz uses another word: apperception. Apperception – [*Deleuze spells out l apostrophe a*] – apperception, perceiving [*l'aperception, apercevoir*], is conscious perception, and minute perception is the differential of consciousness which is not given in consciousness. Fine. There we are. I express the totality of the world obscurely and confusedly, but this is true for all individuals. So, what distinguished a point of view from another point of view? On the other hand, there is a small portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, and each subject, each individual has his/her own minute portion, but "his/her own", in what sense? "His/her own", [It's] in this very precise sense: that this portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, all other subjects express it as well, but confusedly and obscurely.

What defines my point of view is like a kind of, how to say this? A projector it's a projector that, in the murmur of the obscure and confused world, carves out a limited zone of clear and distinct expression. However stupid you might be, however insignificant we all may be, we have our own little thing. Take the vilest vermin, it has its little world: it does not express much clearly and distinctly, but it has its little portion. So, if you allow me all the comparisons and even those that are the most arbitrary, well the, we see that Beckett's characters are individuals. There we are, everything is confused, everything is a murmur [*rumeurs*], they understand nothing, they are in tattered beings [*loques*]; fine, there is the great murmur [*rumeur*] of the world. That's all; no, it's not all. However pathetic they may be in their garbage can, they have their very own little zone. What the great Molloy calls "my properties", he has a little hook, this is Beckett nonetheless, he has a little hook, he is indeed unable to move, he no longer gets up, he has his little hook, and he draws in his tiny properties, four or five pieces, my properties. This is the clear and distinct zone that he expresses, that he expresses in the world. We are all the same. So, our zone has a greater or lesser size, and even then, it's not certain, it's not the same; it's never the same. What is it that determines the point of view? Now I can almost define point of view according to Leibniz. I would say it's the proportion of the region of the world expressed clearly and distinctly by an individual in relation to the totality of the world expressed obscurely and confusedly. This is perfect; he should have said this. That's what point of view is.

To make this comprehensible, I return to the metaphor of that thing – why are words constantly eluding me? – projectors, Leibniz's projectors. Leibniz has a metaphor that he constantly returns to and that is quite beautiful. He says, there you are, you are very close to the sea, and you listen to the sound of the sea, and you hear the sound of a wave. I hear the sound of a wave, that is, I have an apperception: I distinguish a wave, the sound of a wave. And Leibniz says: you would not hear the wave if you did not have a minute unconscious perception of the sound of each drop of water that slides one over and through the other and that creates the object of minute perceptions. You see, how [*indistinct word*] this is. There is the murmur [*rumeur*] of all the drops of water, and you have your little zone of clarity, you clearly and distinctly grasp one partial result from this infinity of drops, one partial result of this infinity of drops, of this infinity of murmuring, and from it, you create your own little world; you create from this your very own property.

Beckett's hero in his garbage bin, what does the garbage bin delineate, where he lowers himself more and more until he puts [*indistinct word*] on his head and then, what do we have? He goes all the way; he would maintain all the way, but getting narrower and smaller, he will maintain his little area of clear and distinct expression. He cannot do otherwise. He moans; he would like to be done with this. So, on the contrary, a hero of progress, you understand, heroes of progress never stop expanding their area of clear and distinct expression. And I can say at least what this point of view is. Fine.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You'll see how that occurs… you'll see. It's more and more beautiful. So, each one, well, like that, understand? Yes, you are points of view, I am a point of view, all that. Each one has his/her own little zone. So, what happens, in fact, when ... to conceive of that, already you have to conceive of that full of ... it has to elicit all kinds of your own circumstances [*présentations*]. For example, I have my little zone of expression area that is clear and distinct. There are, for example, people who don't understand anything about what I'm saying, right? [*Laughter*] Fine. And conversely, me too, there are people who can talk to me, they can tell me things, and for me, what are they saying, what ...? Nothing, I understand nothing in what they're saying. I say, it's nice outside, it's nice today. He says, what? What is happening? On the other hand, people, each of us is like that; there is a number of friends who have a common language. Fine, it's marvelous [*c'est la fete*] when there's someone with whom we share a common language. When you are choosing courses, when you take courses, what does that mean? That means something very simple: it means that there is a minimum of at least virtual language in common with the guy you are going to listen to. Otherwise, you'll go look for another, and you'll have no peace until you find him. What does that mean? Well, it's not complicated.

Each individual notion has its point of view, that is, from this point of view, it extracts from the aggregate of the world that it expresses a determined portion of clear and distinct expression. Given two individual substances, given two individuals, you have two cases: either their zones do not communicate in the least, and create no symbols with one another – there aren't merely direction communications, one can conceive of there being analogies, -- and in that moment, they have nothing to say to each other; or it's like two circles that overlap: there is a little common zone; so, there one can do something together. Yes, yes, there are large expanses [*pans*]

that are not at all shared. You see, these are therefore all kinds of circles; they are clear and distinct zones of expression for which some intersect, and others remain outside one another.

As a result, in fact, Leibniz thus can say quite forcefully that there are not two identical individual substances, because there are no… there are no two individual substances that have the same point of view or exactly the same clear and distinct zone of expression. And finally, Leibniz's stroke of genius to complete this conception of point of view: what is it that will define the clear and distinct zone of expression that I have? I express the totality of the world, but I only express clearly and distinctly a reduced portion of it, a finite portion. What I express clearly and distinctly, and here, this is like a deduction of the notion, what I express clearly and distinctly, Leibniz tells us, is what relates to [*qui a trait à*] my body. This is the first time that the body notion intervenes. We will see why; we will see how; we will see what this body means, but what relates to my body, what I express clearly and distinctly is that which concerns my body, that which affects my body.

So, it's inevitable that I do not express clearly and distinctly the crossing of the Rubicon -- that concerned Caesar's body. That doesn't concern my body. So, out of devotion, I can go place my feet into Caesar's feet, that is, cross the Rubicon, but in the end, my crossing the Rubicon won't create the Roman Empire. [*Laughter*] That would be a way of… That would be if I were to paint Caesar in the act of crossing the Rubicon. It's in the domain of images. But, on the other hand, there is something that concerns my body and that only I express clearly and distinctly, against the backdrop of the murmur that covers the entire universe. This is beautiful, right? – Are you completely worn out? --

Little f) and we'll stop there; little f) this is going to be the final great concept of this strange world. It's that… [*Interruption in the classroom; Deleuze says:* No, no, no] It's that, it's that… understand –

[*Deleuze speaks in a low voice to someone nearby him, then says:*] What time is it?... One twenty-five?

A woman student: Twelve twenty-five. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: So, understand, in this tale of the city, there is still a problem because, in the end – this is just a final effort – because the city is seen from different points of view, fine. The stroller traverses the city and sees it from different points of view. Very good. These points of view preexist the subject who is placed there; that's very well, in a pinch. At that point, the secret of the point of view is mathematical; it's geometric. This is a geometrical aspect [*un géométral*], and it's not a psychological aspect [*un psychologique*], or obviously, at least, it's a psycho-geometrical aspect. [*Pause*] Leibniz is a man of notions, not a man of psychology, but that doesn't prevent that, in a certain way, I can say, and even everything urges me to say that the city exists outside points of view. But in my story of the expressed world, in the way we started off, there was a problem from which we started off: the world has no existence outside the points of view that express it – that express it [*Deleuze emphasizes the direct object "it",* l apostrophe] -- the world does not exist in itself. The world is uniquely the expressed – here is what one must say, and Leibniz says it often – the world is the expressed common for all individual substances,

but the expressed does not exist outside that which expresses it, outside *that which* expresses it, outside that which expresses [*apostrophe l*] it. [*Pause*] So, these are other things than gazes onto the city.

In fact, the entire world is contained, the entire world is contained in each individual notion, but it exists only in this inclusion. It has no existence outside. It's in this sense that Leibniz will be, and not incorrectly, placed alongside the idealists: there is no world in itself, the world exists only in the individual substances that express it. It's the expressed common to all individual substances. This is going to be a tough problem. It's the expressed of all individual substances, but the expressed does not exist outside the substances that express it. You see? What distinguishes these substances? It's that they all express the same world, but they don't express the same clear and distinct portion. That's how it works out; it's like a chess game. – Leibniz never stops comparing the world to a chess game; this belongs to his game theory. – Fine, so the world does not exist. Understand, this is an expression such that what it expresses does not exist outside what expresses it. This is the complication of the concept of expression for Leibniz.

Fine, so, what will be the outcome of this final difficulty? [*Pause*] See, it is still necessary for all individual notions to express the same world. Fine; this world does not exist outside the individual notions that express it. Fine, but they do not express different worlds. They express clearly and distinctly different portions of the world, but they express the same world. So, it's odd, it's odd because by virtue of the principle of identity – through this, we find our start – by virtue of the principle of identity, I could say that [*Pause*] the principle of identity allows me to determine what is contradictory, that is, what is impossible, what is impossible once we state that the principle of identity is A is A; what is impossible is A is not A. That's contradictory. Example: the squared circle. A squared circle is a circle that is not a circle. The principle of identity reminds me that a circle is a circle. [*Pause*]

So, starting from the principle of identity, I can have a criterion of contradiction. [*Pause*] 2 + 2 equals 5; I can demonstrate according to Leibniz – there are many other authors that think the this isn't the domain of demonstration – but according to Leibniz, I can demonstrate that 2 + 2 cannot make 5; I can demonstrate that a circle cannot be squared. Whereas, on the level of sufficient reason, such as we have just followed it through all sorts of levels, it's much more complicated. Why? Because Adam non-sinner, Caesar not crossing the Rubicon, is not like the squared circle. Adam non-sinner is not contradictory. Caesar not crossing the Rubicon is not contradictory. Feel how he's going to try to save freedom, once he has placed himself in a bad situation in order to save it. This is not at all contradictory; this is not at all impossible: Adam could have not sinned; Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon, whereas a circle cannot be squared; in this, there is no freedom.

Fine, again he's stuck; again Leibniz has to find another concept and, of all his crazy concepts, this will undoubtedly be the craziest. Adam could have not sinned, so in other words, the truths administered [*régies*] by the principle of sufficient reason are not the same type as the truths administered by the principle of identity; why? Because the truths administered by the principle of identity are such that their contradictory status [*leur contradictoire*] is impossible, whereas the truths administered by the principle of sufficient reason have a possible contradictory status: Adam non-sinner is possible.

It's even all that distinguishes, according to Leibniz, the truths called truths of essence and truths of existence. The truths called of existence are such that their contradictory status is possible. So, how is Leibniz going to get out of this new and final difficulty? Adam could have not sinned, so how is he going to be able to maintain at once that all that Adam did, sinning, or Caesar, crossing the Rubicon, all that Adam did, namely sinning, is contained forever in his individual notion, and nonetheless Adam non-sinner was possible? He seems stuck; once again, these are delicious, these moments in a system because here, from this perspective, philosophers are somewhat like cats: it's in the moments when they are stuck that they free themselves, or like fish, conceptually these are strange things: it's the concept becoming a fish. Well, yes.

He is going to tell us, he's going to recount the following thing: that Adam non-sinner is perfectly possible in itself, like Caesar not having crossed the Rubicon, or else like you, finally, choose, for each thing, all that is possible, but there we are, what is not contradictory, what is it? Why didn't that happen? That did not happen because it's possible in itself, but it's incompossible. That is when he created the very strange logical concept of compossibility. On the level of existences, it is not enough for a thing to be possible in order to exist; one must also know with what it is compossible. Compossible means "being possible with," compossibility.

Compossible, in other words, with what isn't Adam non-sinner compossible, whereas he is possible in himself? He is incompossible with the world that exists. In other words, Adam could have not sinned, yes, provided that there was another world. You see that [with] the inclusion of the world in the individual notion, and the fact that something else is possible, he reconciles the world with the notion of compossibility, Adam non-sinner belongs to another world. This other world could have been possible. That's not the one which was chosen. Adam non-sinner could have been possible, but this world was not chosen. It is incompossible with the existing world. It is only incompossible with other possible worlds that have not passed into existence.

That's odd. So, you see that gets complicated in the end. And so, the world that passes into existence, what is it? Why is it that world rather than another one? Leibniz explains what is, as he would have it, the creation of worlds by God, and we see well how this is a theory of games: God, in his understanding [*entendement*], conceives an infinity of possible worlds, only these possible worlds are not compossible with each other, and necessarily so since it's God who chooses the best. He chooses the best of possible worlds. And it happens that the best of possible worlds implicates Adam as sinner. Why? Why? That's going to be awful [*affreux*]. What is interesting logically is the creation of a proper concept of compossiblity to designate a more limited logical sphere than that of logical possibility. In order to exist, it is not enough for something to be possible, this thing must also be compossible with others that constitute the real world.

So, on that level, there is almost a mystery in remaining on… but you must understand it with everything that precedes. In a famous expression from *Monadology*, Leibniz says that individual notions have neither doors nor windows; this is a beautiful expression, with neither doors nor windows. That comes to correct the metaphor of the city and of the point of view onto the city. No doors or windows means that they are closed, that there is no opening. Why? Because there is no exterior. The world that individual notions express is interior, it is included in individual notions. So, individual notions have no doors or windows, everything is contained in each one,

and yet there is a world common to all, [*Pause*] there is a world common to all individual notions: it's what each individual notion includes, to wit the totality of the world, the notion includes it necessarily as a form in which what it expresses is compossible with what the others express.

As a result, this is a marvel, this strange world. It's a world in which there is no direct communication between subjects. Between Caesar and you, between you and me, between me and you, there is no direct communication, and as we'd say today, each individual notion is programmed in such a way that what it expresses forms a common world with what the other expresses. It's one of the last concepts from Leibniz, one of the strangest, that he will call pre-established harmony. Pre-established, it's absolutely a programmed harmony. This is the idea, another very beautiful metaphor that we find again in another context in Spinoza, the spiritual automaton, and at the same time, it's the grand age of automatons at this end of the seventeenth century. Each individual notion is like a spiritual automaton, that is, what it expresses is interior to it, it's without doors or windows; it is programmed in such a way that, quite simply, what it expresses is in compossibility with what the other expresses. So, there are indeed other possible worlds, only they are incompossible with our own.

So here I am summing up: it's uniquely this that I have done today; it was uniquely a description of the world of Leibniz, and even only one part of this world. Thus, the following notions have been successively laid out: first, sufficient reason, a properly Leibnizian concept; second, inherence and inclusion, or inclusion; third, expression or point of view; [*Pause*] and fourth, I don't know what any more, … finally, incompossibility. So, we will continue the next time, but above all, the next time, try to see if there are things that we have to go back over, you will let me know.[5] [*End of the session*] [2 :03 :37]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

Lecture 02, 22 April 1980

Original transcription and augmented version, based on the YouTube,[6] Charles J. Stivale[7]

Part 1

The last time, as we agreed, we had begun a series of studies on Leibniz that should be conceived as an introduction to a reading -- yours, eventually yours -- of Leibniz. So, to introduce a numerical clarification, I relied on numbering the paragraphs so that everything did not get mixed up. The last time, we created our very simple first paragraph which was a kind of presentation of concepts or of a certain number of Leibniz's principal concepts. Yes, as background to all this, there was a corresponding problem for Leibniz, but obviously much more general: namely, I remind you, what precisely does it mean to do philosophy. Starting from a very simple notion: to do philosophy is to create concepts, just as doing painting is to create lines and colors. Doing philosophy is creating concepts because concepts are not something that pre-exists, not something that is given ready made. In this sense, we must define philosophy through an activity of creation: creation of concepts. And this definition seemed to us perfectly suitable for Leibniz who, in fact, in an apparently fundamentally rationalist philosophy, is engaged in a kind of exuberant creation of unusual concepts of which there are few such examples in the history of philosophy, very few examples.

And in all this first part, in which I tried to cause a certain number of concepts signed Leibniz to emerge, in fact, if once again concepts are the object of a creation, then one must say that these concepts are signed. There is a signature, not that the signature establishes a link between the concept and the individual that creates it, the philosopher who creates it, it's much more: the concepts themselves are signatures. Fine, so, the entire first paragraph caused a certain number of properly Leibnizian concepts to emerge. The two principal ones that we discerned in the course of the previous meeting, and here, I'll won't be taking them up again because you will understand yourself, those who weren't here, these were *inclusion* and *compossibility.* There are all kinds of things that are included in certain things or enveloped in certain things. *Inclusion, envelopment.*[8] Then, the completely different, very bizarre concept of compossibility: there are things which are possible in themselves, but that are not compossible with another. There we are, we discerned all these concepts.

Today, I would like to give a title to this second paragraph, this second inquiry on Leibniz; I would like to give the title, "Substance, World, and Continuity" [*Deleuze repeats this*]. If we manage to state what all that is, we'll then see for the rest. The purpose of this second paragraph, its intention, is to analyze more precisely these two major concepts of Leibniz: Inclusion and Compossibility, what does that mean?

In fact, it's at the point where we ended the last time, we found ourselves faced with two problems, we found ourselves facing two Leibnizian problems. The first is that of inclusion. In what sense? We saw that if a proposition were true, it was necessary in one way or another – but I already insist on this "in one way or another" – in one way or another the predicate or attribute had to be contained or included not – although we could state it like this in a quick way -- not in the subject, but in the notion of the subject. [*Pause*] If a proposition is true, the predicate must be included in the notion of the subject. Let's allow ourselves the freedom to accept that and, as Leibniz says, and if I say at that point Adam sinned, the sin, the sinner, had to be contained or included in the individual notion of Adam. Everything that happens, everything that can be attributed, everything that is predicated – this is a philosophy of predication – everything that is predicated about a subject must be contained in the notion of the subject. Faced with such a strange proposition -- about which I tried the last time to indicate certain reasons why Leibniz supports and proposes this, we'll come back to this later, so for those who weren't here the last time, this is isn't terribly important; you know, we'll come back to them in some ways – here, if one accepts this kind of Leibnizian gamble, one finds oneself immediately faced with problems.

Specifically if any given event that concerns a specific individual notion, for example, Adam, or Caesar -- Caesar crossed the Rubicon, it is necessary that crossing the Rubicon be encompassed, contained, included in the individual notion of Caesar – fine, great, O.K., I suppose, we are quite ready to yes, to support Leibniz. But if we say that, fine, once again, I indeed wish to insist that we cannot stop: if a single thing is contained in the individual notion of Caesar, like "crossing the Rubicon," then it is quite necessary that, from effect to cause and from cause to effect, the totality of the world be included in this individual notion since, in fact, "crossing the Rubicon" itself has a cause that must also be contained in the individual notion, etc. etc., etc., to infinity, both ascending and descending. At that point, the entire Roman empire which, generally speaking, results from the crossing of the Rubicon, the rise of the Roman Empire, as well as all the consequences of the Roman Empire -- in one way or another, all of this must be included in the individual notion of Caesar such that every individual notion will be inflated by the totality of the world that it expresses. It expresses the totality of the world. There we see the proposition becoming stranger and stranger.

And for us, there are always delicious moments in the history of philosophy, and one of the most delicious of these came at the far extreme of reason -- that is, when reason or rationalism, pushed all the way to the end of its consequences, engendered and coincided with a kind of delirium that was a delirium of madness. At that moment, we witness this parade, this kind of procession, a parade, these betrothals, in which the same thing that is the most rational, in which the most rational is pushed to the far end of reason is also delirium, but delirium of the purest madness. Thus, each individual notion – you, me, Caesar, no matter, none… here, at this level, there is no… it's not because this is an historical personage, not us, that's not it – this is valid for every individual notion. If it is true that the predicate is in the notion of the subject, included in the notion of the subject, each individual notion must express the totality of the world, and the totality of the world must be included in each notion. We saw that this led Leibniz to an extraordinary theory that is the first great theory in philosophy, the first great theory of perspective or point of view since each individual notion will be said to express and contain the world; yes, but from a certain point of view which is deeper, notably it is subjectivity that refers to the notion of point of view and not the notion of point of view that refers to subjectivity. This

is going to have many consequences on philosophy, starting with the echo that this would have for Nietzsche in the creation of a so-called perspectivist philosophy.

So, so, so, look, so then, the first problem is this: this first problem that I am now seeking, fine, in saying that the predicate is contained in the subject, as we saw the last time, we assume that this brought up all sorts of difficulties, specifically: can relations be reduced to predicates, can events be considered as predicates, etc., etc.? But let us accept that anyway. Whether the predicate is contained in the subject, I understand this at the extreme, that is even quickly understood, independently of the question of knowing if it's true or false. But once again, this question is entirely devoid of meaning since truth or falsity has no relation to a system of concepts. So, one first has to understand Leibniz's concepts, and once we've understood them, I believe that there's not chance of going wrong. These are simply a strange set of concepts. We can find Leibniz to be wrong only starting from a different set of conceptual coordinates from Leibniz's own concepts, that goes without saying.

So, so, do you understand? To say that a true proposition is one for which the attribute is contained in the subject, we see quite well what that can mean, on what level? We indeed see what that might mean on the level of truths that we are going to call precisely truths of essences. Truths of essences, of the kind, for example, whether they're metaphysical truths, what Leibniz calls metaphysical truths, concerning God, for example, or else to speak about things that will appeal to you more, mathematical truths. If I say 2+2=4, I can imagine -- there is quite a bit to discuss about that -- but I immediately understand what Leibniz meant, always independently of the question of whether he is right or wrong; we already have enough trouble knowing what someone is saying that if, on top of that, we wonder if he is wrong or if he is right, you understand, then there is no end to it, that makes no sense.

So, each of us understand well what the means. 2 + 2 = 4 is an analytical proposition. I remind you that an analytical proposition is a proposition for which the predicate is contained in the subject or in the notion of the subject, specifically it is an identical proposition or is reducible to the identical. *Identity of the predicate with the subject.* In fact, I can demonstrate, Leibniz tells us, I can demonstrate through a series of finite procedures, a finite number of procedures or operations, I can demonstrate that [*Pause*] 4, by virtue of its definition, and 2 + 2, by virtue of their definition, are identical. [*Pause*] Fine. Can I really demonstrate it, and in what way? Leibniz, the great mathematician, tells us that he can prove this. Fine. I do not pose the problem of how, etc. Once again, what interests me is that, generally we understand what that means: the predicate is encompassed in the subject, that means that, as a result of a finite set of operations, I can demonstrate the identity of one and the other.

Leibniz selects an example in a text, a little text called "On Freedom." He proceeds to demonstrate that every number divisible by twelve is by this fact divisible by six. Every duodecimal number, as he says, every duodecimal number is sextuple. Notice that in the logistics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, you will again find proofs of this type that, notably, made Russell famous. Leibniz's proof is very convincing: he first demonstrates that every number divisible by twelve, that divisible by twelve – and there, he proves this very well – that divisible by twelve equals, is identical to those divisible by two, multiplied by two, multiplied by three. It's not difficult. Every number divisible by twelve equals divisible by two [multiplied by]

three. On the other hand, he proves that the number divisible by six is identical to that divisible by two multiplied by three. It's not easy to prove all that; that takes a lot of time, that takes… [*Deleuze does not finish this*]

In that way, what did he reveal? He revealed an inclusion since two multiplied by three is contained in two multiplied by two multiplied by three. You'll tell me, this is nothing. Fine, this is still an example that helps us understand on the level of mathematical truths that we can say that the corresponding proposition is analytical or identical, that is, the predicate is contained in the subject, namely, I can make – understand what that means; that literally means that I can make into an aggregate, into a series of determinate operations – here, I insist on this, a finite series of determinate operations – [*Pause*] I can demonstrate the identity of the predicate with the subject, or I can – which in the end comes down to the same thing -- cause an inclusion of the predicate in the subject to emerge. And that boils down to the same thing. I can display this inclusion, I can show it. Either I can demonstrate identity, or I can show inclusion.

He showed the inclusion when he showed, for example, which is not an identity -- a pure identity, that would be: any number divisible by twelve is divisible by twelve, but you see there, we are in another case of truth of essence: any number divisible by twelve is divisible by six -- this time he does not limit himself at proving an identity, he shows an inclusion resulting from a series of procedures, of limited, finite, well determined operations, one and then another, in this case, there are three. There we are, that's what truths of essence are. I can say that the analysis, the inclusion of the predicate in the subject is proven by analysis and that this analysis responds to the condition of being finite, that is, it only includes a limited number of operations, of well determined operations. Right? You'll tell me… I don't know what you'll tell me, but finally, this is necessary, believe me; trust me on this, saying that it's necessary for me to insist on all that.

But when I say that Adam sinned, or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, what is that? That no longer refers to a truth of essence, it's specifically dated, Caesar crossed the Rubicon here and now, with reference to existence, since Caesar crossed the Rubicon only if he existed. [*Pause*] Then, this occurs here and now, 2 + 2 = 4, or each thing divisible by twelve is divisible by six, that occurs here and now, in all time and in all places. Thus, there are grounds entirely to distinguish truths of that we'll call of existence, to distinguish them from truths of essence.

The truth of the proposition "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" or "Adam sinned" is not the same type as 2 + 2 = 4. And yet, by virtue of the principles we saw the last time, and we saw that there were strong reasons that pushed Leibniz to say that, no less for truths of existence than for truths of essence, the predicate must be in the subject and included in the notion of the subject; included therefore for all eternity in the notion of the subject, including for all eternity that Adam will sin in a particular place at a particular time. This is a truth of existence. I am saying, no less than for truths of essence, for truths of existence, the predicate must be contained in the subject. Granted, but no less, that does not mean in the same way. And in fact, as we've seen, and this is our problem, here we have the difficulty that we've wanted to isolate, it's what difference, what great initial difference is there between truth of essence and truth of existence? Well, we sense it immediately; we are already capable finally of understanding it, of understanding a first great difference. Namely, for the truths of existence, Leibniz tells us, you know, that even there, the predicate is contained in the subject. The "sinner" must be contained in the individual notion of

Adam, just look: as if the sinner is contained in the individual notion of Adam, it's the entire world that is contained in the individual notion of Adam; if we follow the causes back and if we track down the effects, as it's the entire world, you understand that the proposition "Adam sinned" must be an analytical proposition, namely, the predicate “sinner” is contained in the subject, only in that case, the analysis is infinite. The analysis extends to infinity.

So, we ask ourselves, is Leibniz in the process of trying to pull something on us? We can’t exclude anything. Analysis extends to infinity, what could that even mean? In other words, that seems to mean this: in order to demonstrate the identity of "sinner" and "Adam," or the identity of "who crossed the Rubicon", “crossing the Rubicon,” and "Caesar," this time an infinite series of operations is required. It goes without saying that we aren't capable of that, or it appears that we aren't. Are we capable of making an infinite analysis? Here already we have Leibniz’s answer: yes, any proposition is analytical, only the propositions of existence refer to an infinite analysis. Is this that kind of word? Is a way to get oneself out of this? Really, is that a way of trying to pull something on us? In real life, then, infinite analysis, I’ll never manage that, I can’t. But Leibniz is quite formal: [no], you, us, men, are not able to do so. Thus, in order to situate ourselves in the domain of truths of existence, we have to wait for the experience. Fine, one must wait for the experience, but then why does he present this whole story that he just said about analytical truths, about analytical propositions? So, he adds: yes, but infinite analysis, on the other hand, not only is possible, but created in the understanding of God.

Does it suit us knowing that God, he who is without limits, he who is infinite, can undertake infinite analysis? We're happy, we're happy for him, but at first glance, we’ve reached the point where we ask ourselves, what is he in the process of talking about? I emphasize only that here we have our initial difficulty is: what is infinite analysis? [*Pause*] Any proposition is analytical, only there is an entire domain of our propositions that refers to an infinite analysis. So, what is an infinite analysis? So, we are hopeful: if Leibniz is one of the great creators of differential calculus or of infinitesimal analysis, undoubtedly this is in mathematics, and he always distinguished philosophical truths and mathematical truths, and so it's not a question for us of mixing up everything. But it's impossible to think that, when he discovers a certain idea of infinite analysis in metaphysics, that there aren't certain echoes in relation to a certain type of calculus that he himself invented, notably the calculus of infinitesimal analysis.

So, there is my initial difficulty: when analysis extends to infinity, what is it that… what type or what is the mode of inclusion of the predicate in the subject? In what way is "sinner" contained in the notion of Adam, once it is stated that the identity of sinner and Adam can appear only in an infinite analysis? So, what does infinite analysis mean, then, when it seems that there is analysis only under conditions of a well-determined finitude? How can analysis extend to infinity? [*Pause*] So, there we are. That's a tough problem.

Second problem, second problem: notice that already I just distinguished a first difference between truths of essence and truths of existence. I’ll sum this up: *In truths of essence, the analysis is finite; in truths of existence, the analysis is infinite.* That is not the only one, for there is a second difference. The second difference is between a truth of essence and a truth of existence according to Leibniz, it’s that *a truth of essence is such that its contradictory is impossible,* that is, it is impossible for 2 and 2 not to make 4. Why? For the simple reason that I

can prove the identity of 4 and of 2 + 2 through a series of finite procedures. Thus 2 + 2 = 5 can be proven to be contradictory and impossible whereas Adam non sinner, Adam who might not have sinned, I therefore seize the contradictory of sinner, non-sinner. Adam non-sinner, this is possible. The proof is that, following the great criterion of classical logic -- and from this perspective Leibniz remains entirely within classical logic -- I can think nothing when I say 2 + 2 = 5, I cannot think the impossible, no more than I think whatever it might be according to this logic when I say squared circle. I cannot think 2 + 2 = 5, but I can very well think of an Adam who might not have sinned.

Truths of existence are called contingent truths. Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon. We saw at the last meeting that this was the answer, in this regard, a splendid on from Leibniz, that registers this second difference between truths of existence and truths of essence, and his answer will be, yes, certainly, Adam could have not sinned, Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon, etc., etc. Adam non-sinner was possible. [*Pause*] Only here it is: this was not compossible with the existing world. An Adam non sinner enveloped another world. This world was possible in itself, it would have been possible, this world was possible, a world in which Adam – understand what Adam means: it means the first man – a world in which the first man might not have sinned is a logically possible world, only it is not compossible with our world. That is, God chose – here we are going to see a very unusual notion by Leibniz, that will be choice – in a Leibnizian perspective, God chose a world such that Adam sinned. In other words, Adam non-sinner implied another world; this world was possible, but it was not compossible with ours.

So, why did God choose this world in which Adam sins and that is the source of all our unhappiness? Well, then, Leibniz goes on to explain it. But what I mean is that, so understand that at this level, the notion of compossibility becomes very strange: what is this relation, what is this relation of compossibility? What is going to make me say that two things are compossible and that two other things are incompossible? For example, if Adam hadn't sinned, that Adam non-sinner belongs to another world than ours, but suddenly Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon either. You'll tell me, that makes no difference. That would have been another possible world. Both are not compossible. What is this very unusual relation of compossibility?

Understand that perhaps this is the same question as what is infinite analysis, but it does not have the same outline [*aspect*]. And here we can derive a dream from this, we can derive a dream from this, so we can have this dream, we can have it on several levels. Imagine this: you dream, and a kind of wizard is there who makes you enter a palace; are you following me? This palace... – so, I am insisting because, otherwise, you won't listen to me: I am only in the process of relating a famous text by Leibniz for which I'll provide the reference later, a very beautiful text which is the dream of Apollodorus; he invents a dream at random -- here we have Apollodorus going to see a goddess, and this goddess leads him into the palace, and looking more closely, this palace is composed of several palaces. Leibniz loved that, boxes containing boxes. In a really beautiful text what we are going to read, he explained, we'll see, he explained that in the water, there are many fish and that in the fish, there is water, and in the water of these fish, there are little fish of fish. It's always infinite analysis. The image of the labyrinth hounds him. He never stops talking about the labyrinth of continuity, the labyrinth of continuity.

Fine, so there we are, he is led toward a palace, and I realize that this palace is composed of palaces, and it has the form of a pyramid, the point up above, and it is endless. And I notice that each section of the pyramid constitutes a palace. Then, I look closer and, there inside, it's exactly like aquariums piled on each other; I come closer, and in these aquariums, there are thousands of little fish. And I look closer, and this is strange, [*Pause*] in the highest section of my pyramid, closest to the point, I see a character who is doing something. Right underneath, I see the same character who is doing something else in another location. Even underneath him, notice, as if all sorts of theatrical productions were playing, and yet completely different ones were playing simultaneously, in each of the palaces, with characters that have common segments. Where does that come from, these common segments? This is a famous text, a huge book by Leibniz called *Theodicy*, namely, God's justice, divine justice.

And there we are, at each level, you understand, what he means is that at each level, this is a possible world. God chose to bring into existence the extreme world closest to the point of the pyramid. How was he guided in making that choice? We shall see, we must not hurry since this will be a tough problem, what the criteria are for God's choice. But once we've said that he chose a particular world, this world implicated Adam sinner; in another world, either one can imagine Adam sinning, all that is simultaneous; in this version of the dream, everything is simultaneous: there is Adam sinning, but sinning in an entirely different way. [One can] imagine a variant, these are variants, so there, these are very interesting variants, or else one can conceive of not sinning at all. Each time there is a world; all these worlds are unfolding simultaneously. something else. Each of them is possible. They are incompossible with one another, only one can pass into existence.

And all of them attempt with all their strength to pass into existence. The vision that Leibniz proposes of the creation of the world by God becomes very stimulating. There are all these worlds that are in God's understanding, and each of which on its own presses forward pretending to pass from the possible into the existent. They have a weight of reality, as a function of their essences. As a function of the essences they contain, they tend to pass into existence. And this is not possible. Why? Because all these worlds are possible, each for itself, but they are not compossible with each other. Hence, existence is like a barricade (*barrage*). A single combination will pass through. Which one? You already sense Leibniz's splendid response: it will be the best one! What does "the best one" mean? Perhaps not the best one by virtue of a moral theory, but by virtue of a theory of games. And it's not by chance that here as well, Leibniz is one of the founders of statistics and of the calculus of games. Fine, so then, all that will get more complicated.

So then, what can we derive from this? What is this relation of compossibility? I just want to point out that a famous author today is Leibnizian. As concerns the question, what is this about then? As I was saying the last time, what does it mean for someone, for example, in 1980 to be able to say "I am Leibnizian", or if he doesn't say it, it's all the same since we all know it. So, what can that mean? What can it mean for someone today to say "I am Hegelian" or "I'm Spinozist"? I think that always means two things, one not very interesting and one very, very interesting. If I return to what I was saying the last time rather quickly about the relation of the philosophical concept with the scream, I said that, to some extent, the concept is precisely in a special relationship with the scream.

So, then, I am saying, there is an uninteresting way to be Leibnizian or to be Spinozist today, almost by job necessity; fine, there are people working on an author, but in fact, that settles nothing. I don't mean that this is bad because working on an author assumes that there are reasons, why this author rather than another, why does this particular one, why does this particular commentator feel at ease commenting about one philosopher rather than another? But there is another way of being or of making use of a philosopher. Fine, these are guys… This time, it's almost non-professional. And what I find amazing for philosophy is when a non-philosopher discovers a kind of familiarity that I can no longer call conceptual, but immediately seizes upon a kind of familiarity between his very own screams and the concepts of the philosopher. He doesn't need to be a philosopher for that. He could be, though; he could be a philosopher. For example, I am thinking of a letter late in Nietzsche's life, Nietzsche who, nonetheless, had read Spinoza early on and who says, in this letter, he says, "I just re-read Spinoza, I can't get over it! I can't get over it! I've finally understood, I've understood. This is my guy. I have never had a relation with a philosopher like the one I have had with Spinoza."

And that interests me all the more when it's from non-philosophers. When a novelist like the British novelist [D.H.] Lawrence expresses in a few words the way Spinoza overwhelmed him completely, there we have something interesting because he doesn't become a philosopher over that, thank God. What did he grasp? What does that mean? When Kleist discovers himself, he stumbles across Kant, he literally can't get over it. What is happening here? What is that kind of communication? I mean that this kind of communication, if it can occur between a great poet or a great literary writer and a philosopher, it can occur as well, it seems to be, between someone without much cultural background (*inculte*) and a philosopher. I believe that Spinoza shook up many readers, for example, with limited cultural background. It's very odd.

So, I am saying, let's consider… since we are talking about Leibniz, what could all this mean? There's an author who is well known today, an Argentinean, named Borges – how is that pronounced in … [French]? [*A student answers him*] Borges? … between the two, it's not pronounced either one way or the other -- anyway, you see that this author is, after all, an extremely learned author who read widely. But having read widely, you see his outlines, there we have him always talking about two things: the book that does not exist [end of the tape: that should be treated as a book that exists, that is going to be written and told as an existing book, and the labyrinth. He has no trouble showing that they are the same thing, that the non-existent book that exist and the labyrinth are the same. And, I am saying something obvious here: throughout his entire works, Borges is fundamentally and deeply Leibnizian. It's true in all his writing, but yet again, I take an example that I refer to you because this gives Borges a [modern] aspect, a kind of police tale.] He loved police stories, Borges, but so did Leibniz. In a book by Borges titled *Ficciones*, you find there is a short story called, a lovely title, "The Garden of Forking Paths," a beautiful text. So, I'll quickly read a few passages; I'll summarize the story: we have a Chinese spy… You'll see, you can, you recall, keep in mind the dream from earlier, the dream from the *Theodicy*, the famous dream from the *Theodicy*.[9]

Well, there you go, this time, it's a Chinese spy working for the Germans. [*Pause*]… -- No, I'm wrong. It's not that one. [*Laughter*]… Is that the one? Ah, no, no, I don't know anymore ... Yes, yes, yes, yes, it's this one. Yes -- So a Chinese spy who works for the Germans. He is pursued by an Irishman who wants to do him in. – You're following me, right? - He knows he's done for.

Why does he know this? You know, we are interested in this because it was foreordained, it was foreordained. Fine. It's inscribed in his individual notion that the Irishman will do him in. He tells himself, "oh well, I can save maybe ten minutes, fifteen minutes, two hours, a day, but that's it." He runs away, and he arrives at a house. Someone opens the door for him and says, "Well, what a coincidence, I'm a Sinologist." So, he comes in, and the Chinese spy says to him, "But, you know, my great ancestor, you must know him, my great Chinese ancestor is the one who is famous both for building a maze that has never been found and for having written an infinite book that's never been found". You see, this is Borges's perpetual theme, the infinite book and the labyrinth, and I'm adding, the infinite book and the labyrinth of continuity. There we are.

So, they talk, they talk, and the Sinologist explains to him, saying, "I've understood what your ancestor wanted to do. No one has found the labyrinth; no one has seen the book, but I've understood this quite well." [*Deleuze quotes Borges and reads*] "I thought of a maze of mazes, of a sinuous, ever-growing labyrinth, which would take in both past and future and would somehow involve the stars" (*Ficciones* p. 94). Fine, we can see, there is no need really to try too hard. This is the same signature; it's signed Borges, but it's signed Leibniz as well; but I can find sentences exactly like that in the *Theodicy*. It is "The Garden of the Forking Paths".

So, what is "The Garden of Forking Paths"? Well, [*Pause; Deleuze prepares to read again*]: "The book is a shapeless mass of contradictory rough drafts. I examined it once upon a time. The hero dies in the third chapter, while in the fourth he is alive" (*Ficciones*, p. 96) [*Pause*] "I received a letter fragment" -- the Sinologist is still speaking; according to this fragment, [which] was written by the old philosopher -- "'I leave to various futures, but not to all, my garden of forking paths.' I had no sooner reader this than I understood. understood almost immediately. 'The Garden of Forking Paths' was the chaotic novel itself [of the old Chinese man]. The phrase 'to various futures'" – "'I leave to various futures, [but not to all], my garden of forking paths'" -- "the phrase ' to various futures, [but not to all]' suggested the idea of the bifurcating in time, not in space. Rereading the whole work confirmed this theory. In all fiction" --- this is the essential passage -- "In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives, he chooses one at the expense of others." -- For example, if someone dies, well, he dies; we adopt, we choose this hypothesis. -- "In [the fiction of] the almost unfathomable Ts'ui Pên" -- he is the Chinese ancestor -- "he chooses – simultaneously – all of them" -- he adopts them all simultaneously -- "He thus *creates* various futures, various times which start others that will also in their turn branch out and bifurcate … This is the cause of the contradictions in the novel. Fang, let us say," [*Deleuze repeats to himself*] "Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at his door. Fang makes up his mind to kill him" – in parentheses, this is the same situation as the one the story is in the process of the process of telling -- "Fang makes up his mind to kill him. Naturally, there are various possible outcomes: [*Deleuze says* "colon"] Fang can kill the intruder; the intruder can kill Fang; both can be saved; both can die, and so on, and so on. In [the great] Ts'ui Pên's work, all the possible solutions occur; each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations" (*Ficciones*, p. 98).

Fine. This is absolutely Leibniz's world; the is the world of compossibilities. But is this really so astonishing, after all? The idea of the Chinese philosopher being involved with the labyrinth is an idea of Leibniz's contemporaries, appearing in mid-17th century. There is a famous text by a philosopher contemporary with Leibniz, namely Malebranche that is a discussion with the

Chinese philosopher, with some very odd things in it.[10] Leibniz also quotes Confucius quite often, he quoted him a lot; he's fascinated by the Orient. Whereas Borges imitates all that, he really made a kind of copy that conformed to Leibniz's thought with an essential difference; notice the difference between Borges and Leibniz, and there's only one: for Leibniz – but I'm afraid that it might be Borges who is right – for Leibniz, all the different worlds, all the different worlds in which sometimes Adam is sinning in one way, sometimes sinning in another way, sometimes not sinning at all, etc., this entire infinity of worlds exclude… [*End of the cassette; the following text is from the Web Deleuze recording*] each other, they are incompossible with each other, such that they conserve a very classical principle of disjunction: it's either this world or some other one. Whereas Borges places all these incompossible series in the same world, allowing a multiplication of effects. Leibniz would never have allowed incompossibles to belong to a single world.

Part 2

Why? I am just stating – *end of Web Deleuze text*] our two difficulties: the first one is: "what is an infinite analysis?", and the second is how do our two labyrinths, the labyrinth of infinite analysis and the labyrinth of compossibility, "what is this relationship of incompossibility?" since, once again, most of the commentators on Leibniz, to my knowledge in any case, in the long run attempt, in a more or less complicated way, to link compossibility in a simple principle of contradiction. They conclude finally that there would be a contradiction between Adam non sinner and our world. But Leibniz's evidence (*la lettre*) already appears to us, the evidence of what he is writing, such that this would not be possible. It's not possible since, once again, Adam non sinner is not contradictory, is not contradictory in itself and the relation of compossibility is absolutely irreducible to the simple relation of logical possibility. So, trying to discover a simple logical contradiction would be once again to situate truths of existence within truths of essence. Here, I don't think one can… Henceforth it's going to be very difficult to define compossibility.

So, we are still remaining within this paragraph on substance, the world, and continuity, I would like to ask the question, what is infinite analysis? I ask you here, today I am asking you to remain extremely patient. All this will then become clearer because I am returning to a topic I mentioned at the last meeting, namely: one has to be extremely wary of Leibniz's texts because these texts are always adapted to correspondents, to a given audience, and if I again take up his dream, I must change it, and a variant of the dream, even within the same world, would result in levels of clarity or obscurity such that the world might be presented from one point of view or another. As a result, for Leibniz's texts, we have to know, once again, to whom he addresses them in order to be able to judge them.

Here is a first kind of text by Leibniz in which he tells us that, in any proposition, the predicate is contained in the subject. Only it is contained either in act -- actually -- or virtually. The predicate is always contained in the notion of the subject, but this inherence, this inclusion, this inherence is either actual or virtual. Notice that we would like to say that all this works fine. Let us agree that in a proposition of existence of the type Adam sinned, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the inclusion is only virtual, specifically sinner is contained in the notion of Adam, but is only virtually contained. Fine.

Second kind of text: the infinite analysis in which sinner is contained in the notion of Adam is an indefinite analysis, [*Pause*] it's indefinite, that is, I can move back from sinner to another term, then to another term, etc., exactly as if I then have "Adam sinned" would be of the type 1 = 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8, etc., etc., etc., etc., to infinity. This would result in a certain status: I would say that infinite analysis is virtual analysis, an analysis that goes toward the indefinite. There are texts by Leibniz saying that, notably in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, but in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz presents and proposes the totality of his system for use by people with little philosophical background.

I choose another text that thus seems to contradict the first. In a text reserved for a more use, the text, "On Freedom," Leibniz uses the word "virtual," but quite strangely; it's not regarding – and here I am committed to this text because it allows us at least to denounce false interpretations – for he uses the word "virtual", but he does not use this word regarding truths of existence; he uses it regarding truths of essence. This text is already sufficient for me to say that it is not possible for the distinction truths of essence-truths of existence to be reduced to saying that in truths of existence, inclusion would only be virtual, since virtual inclusion is one case of truths of essence. In fact, you recall that truths of essence refer to two cases, there are two cases of truths of essence: the pure and simple identity in which we demonstrate the identity of the predicate and the subject, and the discovery of an inclusion of the type – I've given an example -- every number divisible by 12 is divisible by 6; I demonstrate or show the inclusion of 2 multiplied by 2 multiplied by 3… no, 2 multiplied by 2 within 2 multiplied by 2 multiplied by 3, I demonstrate the inclusion in the wake of an operation, a series of finite operation. And it is for the latter case that Leibniz says: I have discovered a virtual identity. Thus, it is not enough to say that infinite analysis is virtual.

Can we say that this is an indefinite analysis? No, because an indefinite analysis would be the same as saying that it's an analysis that is infinite only through my lack of knowledge, that is, I cannot reach the end of it. Henceforth, God himself then, God with his understanding, the understanding of God, God would reach the end. Is that it, that it does not have a limited consciousness, isn't subordinate to limited conditions of consciousness? Is that what Leibniz meant? The answer is formal: here again, no, it's not possible for Leibniz to mean that because the indefinite never existed in his thinking. I believe that here, there are notions that are incompatible, anachronistic. Indefinite is not one of Leibniz's gimmicks [*trucs*]. Nothing in Leibniz's texts can be interpreted starting from the notion of the indefinite. [*Pause*]

What is the indefinite, rigorously defined? What differences are there between *indefinite* and *infinite*? The indefinite is the fact – I am providing a very weighty definition, it seems to me, but that attempts to be rigorous – it's the fact that I must always pass from one term to another term, always, without stopping, but without the following term at which I arrive pre-existing. It is my own procedure that consists in causing creation. If I say 1 = 1/4 + 1/8, etc. .., we must not believe that this "etc." pre-exists, it's my procedure that makes it appear each time, that is, the indefinite exists in a procedure through which I never stop pushing back the limit that I confront. Nothing pre-exists. It's what Kant will express later; to my knowledge, Kant will be the first philosopher to give a status to the indefinite, and this status will be precisely that the indefinite refers to an aggregate that is not separable from the successive synthesis that runs through it, it's not

separable from the successive synthesis that runs through it, that is, the terms of the indefinite series do not pre-exist the synthesis that goes from one term to another. Fine.

Leibniz is not familiar with that, and moreover, to him, the indefinite seems purely conventional or symbolic – why? Because if there is something… If we try to say, what creates the family resemblance of 17th century philosophers, there is an author who stated this quite well when he devoted himself… He didn't spend much time on it, but it was [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty has a beautiful expression; He wrote a small text on 17th century classical philosophies, so-called classical philosophies,[11] and he tried to characterize them in a lively way, and said that what is so incredible in these philosophers, and about which this was kept entirely, completely secret, is an innocent way of thinking starting from and as a function of the infinite. That's what the classical century is, an innocent way of thinking starting from the infinite. I would ask, why does this phrase by Merleau-Ponty seem very, very intelligent? Because this is much more intelligent than to tell us that it's an era in which philosophy is still confused with theology, because it's stupid to say that. One must say that if philosophy is still confused with theology in the 17th century, it's precisely because philosophy is not separable at that time from an innocent way of thinking as a function of infinity.

And what is the infinite? What differences are there between the infinite and the indefinite? It's this: the indefinite is virtual; in fact, the following term does not exist prior to my procedure having constituted it. It's of the virtual. What does that mean? *The infinite is actual, there is no infinite except in act.* So, there can be all sorts of infinites. Think of Pascal. [*Deleuze makes a brief, indistinct comment aside*] It's a century that, precisely due to having an innocent way of thinking as a function of the infinite, will not stop distinguishing orders of infinities, and the thought of orders of infinity is fundamental throughout the 17th century. And they'll have to wait a long time; It will fall back on our heads, this thought, it will fall back onto us at the end of the 19th and 20th centuries precisely with the theory of so-called infinite aggregates. With infinite sets, we rediscover something that worked, but from the bottom – we discover it on other bases, fine – but something is discovered that works in the depths of at the basis of classical philosophy, notably the distinction of orders of infinities.

And who are the great names in this research on orders of infinites? These are some great names in Classical philosophy, this obviously includes Pascal, it's obviously Pascal. It's Spinoza with a fundamental text that is the famous letter on infinity in which he distinguished all sorts of orders of infinity,[12] and it's Leibniz who would subordinate an entire mathematical apparatus to the analysis of the infinite and orders of infinities. Specifically, in what sense can we say that an order of infinities is greater than another? What does that mean, an infinite that is greater than another infinite, etc., etc.? An innocent way of thinking starting from the infinite, but not at all in a confused way since all sorts of distinctions are introduced.

And I am saying, Leibniz's analysis, in the case of truths of existence, it's obviously infinite. It is not indefinite. Thus, when he uses the words virtual, when he uses more of them, there is a formal text, there is a formal text that supports this interpretation that I am trying to sketch, it's a text taken from "On Freedom" in which Leibniz says exactly this: "When it is a matter of analyzing the inclusion of the predicate sinner in the individual notion Adam, [*Pause*] God certainly" – here, I'm quoting by heart, almost by heart, from Leibniz – "God certainly sees, not

the end of the resolution, but the end that does not take place." Thus, in other words, even for God there is no end to this analysis.

So, you will tell me that it's indefinite even for God? No, it's not indefinite since all the terms of the analysis are given. If it were indefinite, all the terms would not be given, they would be given little by little, they would be given in a way that I pass from a to b, from b to c, etc. They would not be given in a pre-existing manner. In other words, in an infinite analysis, we reach what result? You have a passage of infinitely small elements one to another, you pass from an infinitely small element to another infinitely small element, the infinity of infinitely small elements being given. Of such an infinity, we will say that it is actual, not virtual, since the totality of infinitely small elements is given. You will say to me, well then, we can then reach the end! No, by its nature, you cannot reach the end since it's an infinite aggregate. The totality of elements is given, and you pass from one element to another, and thus you have an infinite aggregate of infinitely small elements. You pass from one element to another: you perform an infinite analysis, that is, an analysis without end, neither for you nor for God.

So, in what way does this analysis… and what do you see if you perform this analysis if you are God? Let us assume that there is only God that can do it, you make yourself the indefinite because your understanding is limited, but as for God, he makes infinity. He does not see the end of the analysis since there is no end of the analysis, but he performs the analysis. Furthermore, all the elements of the analysis are given to him in an actual infinity. You see? So that means that sinner is connected to Adam. Notice how simple this becomes. Sinner is an element; I am calling sinner an element. It is connected to the individual notion of Adam by an infinity of other elements actually given. Fine, agreed, it's precisely the entire existing world, specifically all this whole compossible world that has passed into existence. So, we are reaching something here; have just a bit more patience, and everything will become quite clear.

So, follow me: what does that mean, “I’m performing the analysis”? I pass from what to what? I pass from Adam sinner to Eve temptress – this is another element -- from Eve temptress to the evil serpent, to the apple, fine, all these are my elements. Well, well, well, good. It's an infinite analysis, and it's this infinite analysis that shows the inclusion of sinner in the individual notion Adam. It appears we’re not moving forward. What does that mean, the infinitely small element? Why is sin an infinitely small element? Why is the apple an infinitely small element? Why is crossing the Rubicon an infinitely small element? You understand? What does that mean, an infinitely small element? There are no infinitely small elements. So, what does that mean, an infinitely small element? An infinitely small element means obviously -- we don't need to say it, we’ve understood everything -- it means an infinitely small relation between two elements. It is a question of relations, not a question of elements.

In other words, an infinitely small relation between elements, what can that be? What have we achieved in saying that it is not a question of infinitely small elements, but of infinitely small relations between two elements? And you understand that if I speak to someone who has no idea, for example, of differential calculus, you can tell him it's infinitely small elements. Leibniz was right. If it's someone who has a very vague knowledge, I can tell him, oh well, no, you understand, right? Notice, I’m creating simultaneity here as well. Ah, no for you, you have to, you must not understand an infinitely small element; you have to understand infinitely small

relations between elements, between finite elements. If it's someone who is very knowledgeable in differential calculus, I can perhaps tell him something else.

So, where have we reached? Infinite analysis that goes on to demonstrate the inclusion of the predicate in the subject at the level of truths of existence, does not proceed by the demonstration of an identity. It does not proceed by… so here, we have reached something: it does not proceed by the demonstration of an identity, even a virtual one. That's not it. Leibniz expresses himself in this way so that he can get away when someone doesn't understand what he means. But, then, in another drawer, he has another expression to give you: so, what is it? Identity governs truths of essence, but does not govern truths of existence; all the time he says the opposite, but that has no importance. Ask yourself to whom he says it. So then, what is it? What interests him at the level of truths of existence is not identity of the predicate and the subject, it's rather that one passes from one predicate to another, from one to another, and again on from one to another, etc.... from the point of view of an infinite analysis, that is, from the maximum of continuity. In other words, it's identity that governs truths of essence, but it's continuity that governs truths of existence.

And what is the world, a world? A world is defined by its continuity. What separates two incompossible worlds? It's the fact that there is discontinuity between the two worlds. What defines a compossible world? It's the continuity of which it is capable. What defines the best of worlds? It's the most continuous world, and God chooses. The criterion of God's choice will be continuity, namely, of all the worlds incompossible with each other and possible in themselves, God will cause to pass into existence the one that realizes the maximum of continuity. Fine. Why is Adam's sin included in the world that has the maximum of continuity? We have to believe that Adam's sin is a formidable connection, that it's a connection that assures continuities of series. Why, for example, is there a direct connection between Adam's sin and the Incarnation and the Redemption by Christ? So, here, there are something like series that are going to begin to fit into each other across the differences of time and space; there are series that are going to interlock very, very strangely.

In other words, in the case of truths of essence, I demonstrated an identity in which I revealed an inclusion; in the case of truths of existence, I am going to witness a continuity assured by the infinitely small relations between two elements. Two elements will be in continuity when I will be able to assign an infinitely small relation between these two elements. You will ask me, how are you going to do that, assign an infinitely small relation between two elements? What does that mean then, an infinitely small relation? One has to… I have passed from the idea of an infinitely small element to the infinitely small relation between two elements, [but] that's not adequate, an infinitely small relation. We must not abandon Leibniz. What does that mean, an infinitely small relation between two elements? It doesn't mean anything. A greater effort is required.

That means, let's assume, that means a difference; since there are two elements, there is a difference between the two elements: between Adam's sin and Eve's temptation, there is a difference, granted, there is a difference. Only, there we are, what is the formula of the continuity? What is continuity? Continuity would be, and we could define it as the act of a difference in so far as it tends to disappear. *Continuity is an evanescent difference* (*différence évanouissante*). Notice, this is a new concept from Leibniz, the evanescent difference.

What does it mean that there is continuity between the seduction by Eve and Adam's sin? It means that the difference between the two is an evanescent difference, a difference that tends to disappear. So, you'll tell me, that's not working out so well; we're reconnected with what? Here, there is a new concept, evanescent difference. So I would say that, for the moment, before the final effort that we have to furnish today, that *truths of essence are governed by the principle of identity, truths of existence are governed by the law of continuity, or evanescent differences,* and that comes down to the same. Thus between sinner and Adam, you will never be able to demonstrate a logical identity, but you will be able to demonstrate -- and the word demonstration will change meaning --, you will be able to demonstrate a continuity, that is, one or several evanescent differences. [*Pause*] If we succeed in understanding this just a small bit, we succeed in everything. We have succeeded in approaching the first problem, what infinite analysis is. An infinite analysis is an analysis of the continuity (*continu*) operating through evanescent differences. [*Pause*]

Having considered this, retain all of it in a corner of your mind, and what remains is: what does this mean, continuity, evanescent differences? All of you sense that, in fact, this refers to a certain symbolic, a symbolic of differential calculus or of infinitesimal analysis. But it's at the same time – here, this is precisely the case of a creation taking place twice, simultaneously – it's at the same time that Newton and Leibniz bring forth differential calculus. And the interpretation of differential calculus by the categories of evanescent differences is Leibniz's very own. In Newton's works, the interpretation of calculus, whereas both of them, truly here, invent it at the same time, the logical and theoretical armature is very different in Leibniz's works from Newton's, and the theme of the infinitely tiny difference conceived as… or at least, the differential conceived as evanescent difference, this is properly belonging to Leibniz, and Leibniz is enormously committed to this, and there is a great polemic between Newtonians and Leibniz.

So, our question here becomes narrower: what is this tale of evanescent difference? -- Does anyone have any chalk? I feel an urgent need for chalk, a little nub of chalk [*Inaudible replies*] There is some there? Ah good, good, good. I was hoping at the same time that you'd say there wasn't any! [*Laughter*]… And does anyone have an eraser? [*Various noises*] If there's no eraser, I cannot… Ah good, we have everything. -- So, listen up. You see this small symbol – I am speaking here really for those people who… You don't need to know anything, at all, at all, at all. So here is this little symbol that you have encountered in the dictionary. [*Pause; Deleuze speaks to someone nearby him*] Well, no, I'm in favor; I'm in favor; if you've all had enough and are leaving, I'd prefer that you do so all at once, in a group… [*A student:* How about a break? Five minutes?] You are tired, before… So, I am staying up here like this… [*Laughter*]

A minute more before we rest; I am simply saying, what does differential calculus mean, this calculus that pretends to handle the infinitely small? You will say to me: today, today, today, what's going on? Differential equations today are fundamental. There is no physics without differential equations. Even physics as a science, it existed to some extent in the seventeenth century, and from the Middle Ages, because there were antecedents of differential calculus; there was a kind of equivalent, there was calculations through exhaustion. But scientific physics only came to exist through calculation through exhaustion and through differential calculus. Today, there are so many problems because – oh, there aren't any more, I really don't know --

Mathematically, today, differential calculus has purged itself of any consideration of the infinite, quite simple, but this occurred quite late, this occurred at the end of the 19th century, the kind of axiomatic status of differential calculus in which it is absolutely no longer a question of the infinite. But that occurred at the same time, and that's not so useful for me because, since mathematics discovers the problem of the infinite in set theory, one cannot say that this is entirely resolved.

But if I place myself at the time of Leibniz, what's that like? How is differential calculus useful? To understand this well, there are some things that one must at all costs know, because even if you know nothing in mathematics, put yourself in the place of a mathematician – it's very difficult for him -- what is he going to do when he finds himself faced with the magnitude and quantities of different powers, and equations whose variables are to different powers, I mean an equation of the ax2 + y type? Ax2 + y, [*Deleuze draws with the chalk*] you have a quantity to the second power and a quantity to the first power. How does one compare them? It's rather hard. All of you know the story of commensurables and non-commensurable quantities. Then, in the 17th century, the quantities of different powers received a neighboring term, incomparable quantities. How does one compare a quantity at the second power with a quantity at the first power? There's no way to do it. The whole theory of equations collides in the 17th century with this problem that is a most fundamental one, even in the simplest algebra: what is differential calculus good for? Why did he invent it? What were they doing, these inventors, Newton, Leibniz?

Differential calculus allows you to proceed directly to compare quantities raised to different powers. Moreover, it is used only for that. There is no differential calculus applies to quantities at the same power. Differential calculus – there is no need to understand anything of this in order to recall this and even to intuit this -- differential calculus finds its level of application when you are faced with incomparables, that is, faced with quantities raised to different powers. Why? You have… I come back to my example, ax2+y; let us assume that by various means, you extract delta x and delta y, dx and dy. dx is the differential of x, dy is the differential of y. You see? What is that? We will define it verbally, conventionally; we will say that dx or dy is the infinitely small quantity assumed to be added or subtracted from x or from y. Now there is an invention! The infinitely small quantity, that is, it's the smallest variation of the quantity considered. And whatever you say, if you say, ah good, so it's the ten millionth, it's still even smaller. As we say, it is unassignable; one must not try to assign it, it's unassignable. By convention, it's unassignable. You'll ask me, so what is that, dx = what? Well, dx = 0; dy = what? dx = 0 in x, in relation to x; it's the smallest quantity, right, from which x might vary, and that equals 0. dy = 0 in relation to y. Understand?

The notion of evanescent difference is beginning to take shape. It's a variation or a difference, dx or dy; it is smaller than any given or attributable [*donnable*] quantity. It's the evanescent difference, smaller than any attributable quantity. There we are, it's a mathematical symbol; fine, they have other symbols. In a sense, it's crazy, in a sense it's operational. It's operational for what since it's equal to 0? Here is what is formidable in the symbolism of differential calculus: dx=0 in relation to x, the smallest difference, the smallest increase of which the quantity x or the unassignable quantity y might be capable, inferior to any given quantity; it's infinitely small.

Fine, agreed, dx = 0 in relation to an x, dy = 0 in relation to a y; only, miracle! dy over dx is not equal to zero, and furthermore: dy over dx has a perfectly expressible finite quantity. These are relative, uniquely relative. dx is nothing in relation to y, dy is nothing in relation to y, but then dy/dx is something. A stupefying, admirable, and great mathematical discovery. Good, why is that? How is this something? It's surely something because you recall the example that we started from, ax2 + y, ax2 + by, let's say, ax2 + by + c, for example, you have two powers from which you have two incomparable quantities: y2 and x. If you consider the differential relation, this is why the differential has no sense; there are only differential relations. The differential, by its nature, is dx or dy, it's 0, completely unassignable. But the relation dy over dx is not 0; it is determined, it is determinable. [*Pause*]

So, the relation dy over dx gives you the means to compare two incomparable quantities that were raised to different powers since it operates a depotentialization, as is said, a depotentialization of quantities. [*Pause*] So, it gives you a direct means to confront incomparable quantities raised to different powers. From that moment on, all mathematics, all algebra, all physics will be inscribed in the symbolism of differential calculus.[13] There are no equations in physics that are not a differential equation. It's with differential calculus, it's odd, it's with differential calculus, which is the most artificial symbolism that exists, because it consists in putting zeros into relation, it consists in putting absolute zeros into relation in such a way that the relation of these absolute zeros is undetermined and is distinguished from zero.

Well then, well then, when you have access to such a marvel, it's very odd because a completely artificial symbol, dx or dy, is precisely made possible, this kind of co-penetration of physical reality and mathematical calculus. That is, we cannot get out of this simply by saying that it's a simple convention. For it's in the conditions of this convention that the physical reality and mathematical calculus, each of them, become adequate to the point that phenomena of heat, phenomena of heat when they are discovered in the 19th century, can only be so within a set of differential equations.

There we are, so we reach the final point, the simplest: we have to show how this works. Fortunately, there is a small text by Leibniz – not difficult for us, so we can understand everything – called, taken from Leibniz's *Mathematical Writings* – so I have preferred choosing a text which was not philosophical – it's three page, a small three-page note called "Justification of the calculus of infinitesimals" – that is, differential calculus -- "Justification of the calculus of infinitesimals through the calculus of ordinary algebra." So here, I have to explain [this] to you because you will understand everything. It's not that this is the basis of differential calculus; it's indeed the case that Leibniz would like to show that differential calculus, well then, in a certain way, it inevitably already had functioned before being discovered, and that it couldn't occur otherwise, that couldn't occur otherwise even at the level of the most ordinary algebra.

So how will he show this? -- You want a bit of a break before this effort, or else…? A little break?... [*Someone asks a reference question*] What? oh, là, là, *Mathematical Writings*, vol. IV, p. 104, Gerhardt edition, the grand Leibniz edition; it's obviously created by a German. It encompasses a great number of volume, and it's the Gerhardt edition [*Deleuze spells out the name*]… So, it's *Mathematical Writings*, vol. IV, p. 104 … [*Noises from the students*], 104. Fine, let's take a small break. [*Interruption of the recording*][14]

And so, and so,… [*Sound of chairs and students*] [*Deleuze's voice is heard at a distance from his chair, situated in front of the blackboard; hence, there is a pause, several indistinct comments between Deleuze and some students*] So, you see, you see, you understand… Here is a straight line [*Laughter*] which is perpendicular to the ground; I name it – I have to maintain the same letters he uses; this is his drawing – I name it X, ok? A-X. I assign two points that I name large A and large X. This isn't very complicated… [*Some indistinct comments by Deleuze*] There we are, I have two points, I've assigned two points. I consider another straight line… [*Pause*] that I call – what does he say? – well yes, it's E=Y; I assign two points E and Y, [*Some indistinct comments by Deleuze*] [*Pause*] From the E-Y line, I draw starting from a point that I name precisely [*indistinct word*] a perpendicular line, to A-X; the same thing, [*Pause*] I draw the perpendicular line, to A-X; you see? [*Pause*] Understood? [*Some indistinct comments by Deleuze*] I call E-A [*Pause*], I call E-A, yes, I call the point of encounter of two straight lines, I call it large C, I call it C, the segment A-C.

I call … [*Some indistinct comments by Deleuze*] I call X, the segment A-X. There we have all I have, I am writing C-E. I am quite aware that the two triangles – a rectangle, [*indistinct word*], a perpendicular, a right angle – that these two triangles are the similar. So, I can write C-E = [*indistinct word*] [*Laughter*]… small y. So, [*Deleuze talks to himself while adding letters to the drawing*] So, C-X, this is X minus C… I mean, X minus C over y [*Deleuze repeats this formula*], X minus C over y = C over [*indistinct word*] by virtue of the similarity of the two triangles.

So, it's quite simple. Assume now that E-Y is displaced while remaining parallel to itself [*Deleuze repeats this phrase*] [*Pause*] What's going to occur? It's easy: I can say as well that large E and large C tend to coincide in A, or that small e and small c tend to diminish more and more. [*Pause*] There we are. At the extreme, at the extreme, I no longer have anything but that figure: E has fallen into A… E, X, Y… e and c have diminished to infinity; large E and large C coincide in A. At that point, what happens? What happens is that c has diminished to infinity to the point that C coincides with A; in other words, X minus C = X, in this case. [*Pause*] When E and C coincide with A, I can write X minus C = X… [*End of the cassette*] [92:54]

Part 3

… [*Deleuze talks to himself at the board, indistinctly*] [*Pause*] C = 0, E = 0. So, I can write 0 over 0 = X over Y. [*Pause*] And nonetheless, these are not absolute zeros, as he says. Why? Because if they were absolute zeros, then x would be equal to y, and x is not equal to y, neither in one case, nor in the other, since it would be contrary to the very givens of the construction of the problem. You have the point in the rectangle, x is not equal to y. To the extent that, for this case, you can write x over y = c over e, c and e are zeros. Like he says in his language, these are nothings, but they are not absolute nothings; they are nothings respectively; specifically, these are nothings, but that conserve the relational difference. Thus, c does not become equal to e since it remains proportional to x over y, and x is not equal to y. Fine, it's quite simple. It's what is called a justification, if you will, conforming to the title, it's a justification of the old differential calculus, and the interest of this very simple text is that it's a justification through the easiest or most ordinary algebra, that is, this justification puts nothing into question about the specificity of differential calculus.

So, the text is quite beautiful; I'll read it slowly since you have already understood: [*As Deleuze reads, he comments on nearly each of the opening sentences*]: "Thus, in the present case," – so in the present case, that is, if the line, if the oblique tends toward A in its displacement – "So in the present case, there will be x minus c = x." – So, it coincides in A, and you have x minus c = x since c has cancelled itself – "You have x minus c = x; let us assume that this case" -- where there is a single triangle -- "is included under the general rule" -- where there were two triangles, you see? This is a pure supposition; that's how it was, a conventional hypothesis -- "let us assume that this case is included under the general rule, and nonetheless c and e" – small c and small e – "will not at all be absolute nothings [*Deleuze repeats these words*] since together they maintain the reason of [large] Cx to [large] Xy" – that is, the reason of Cx, that is x [*indistinct word*] to y – "or that which is between the entire sine or radius and between the tangent that corresponds to the angle in c" – this is more difficult [*here, Deleuze reads quite rapidly*] "We have assumed this angle always to remain the same. For if [small] c and [small] e were absolutely nothings in this calculus reduced to the case of coincidence of points [large] C, [large] E and [large] A, as one nothing has the same value as the other, then c and e would be equal" – if small c and small e, listen closely, as a function of the figure, if small c and small e were absolutely nothings in this reduced calculation for the case of coincidence of the points [large] C, [large] E and [large] A – "once it's stated that one nothing equals the other" – one nothing equals another nothing – "small e would equal, and the equation or analogy x over y = C over E would make x over y = 0 over 0 = 1, that is, we would have x = y which would be totally absurd since we have" – on this point, some water has fallen on my page, so I no longer know what we have, so I can't read – "So, so, small c and small e…" – again, there's a cut; that's how manuscripts are, what can you do? [*Deleuze makes several noises to himself while looking to find a spot to continue reading*]

Here we are: "So we find in algebraic calculus the traces of the transcendent calculus of differences (i.e. differential calculus), and its same singularities that some scholars have fretted about, and even algebraic calculus could not do without it if it must conserve its advantages of which one of the most considerable is the generality that it must maintain so that it can encompass all cases." – And the text goes on. In the end, it's not going to furnish many explanations. -- "It's exactly in this way that I can consider that rest [*repos*] is an infinitely small movement" – rest is an infinitely small movement – "or that the circle is the limit of an infinite series of polygons the sides of which increase to infinity."

What is there to compare in all these examples? We have to consider the case in which there is a single triangle as the extreme case of – so here, this becomes very, very important – as the extreme case of two similar triangles opposed at the vertex. So, in this regard, the text is crystal clear. What Leibniz demonstrated in this text – he does not say it formally, but this seems obvious to me – what he demonstrated in this text is how and in what circumstances a triangle can be considered as the extreme case of two similar triangles opposed at the vertex. Perhaps you sense that here, we are perhaps in the process of giving to "virtual" the sense that we were looking for in order to arrange the aggregate of Leibniz's texts. I could say that in the case of my second figure in which there is only one triangle, the other triangle is there, but it is only there virtually. It's there virtually since a contains virtually e and c distinct from a. Why do e and c remain distinct from a when they no longer exist? e and c remain distinct from a for a very simple reason: it's that they intervene in a relation with it, continue to exist when the terms have

vanished. [*Pause*] It's in this same way that rest will be considered as a special case of a movement, specifically an infinitely small movement. In my second figure, xy, I would say, the triangle… I would say – I am both choosing terms that exist there from Leibniz, but borrowing from another text – I would say that it's not at all the triangle large C, large E, large A; it's not at all the case that the triangle has disappeared in the common sense of the word, but we have to say both that it has become unassignable, -- this is odd, this notion of unassignable -- and however that it is perfectly determined since in this case, c=0, e=0, but c/e is not equal to zero. c/e is a perfectly determined relation equal to x/y. Thus, it is determinable and determined, but it is unassignable. Likewise, rest is a perfectly determined movement, but it's an unassignable movement. Likewise, the circle is an unassignable polygon, yet perfectly determined.

You see what virtual means, once again. I would say, virtual no longer means at all the indefinite, and in this, all Leibniz's texts can be revived [*récupérés*]. He undertook a diabolical operation: he took the word virtual, without saying anything -- it's his right – without saying anything, he gave it a new meaning, completely rigorous, only he will not say it, he wouldn't say it in his texts. That no longer meant going toward the indefinite; rather, it meant unassignable, yet also determined. And that seems to me a conception of the *virtual* that is both quite new and very rigorous. Yet the technique and concepts were required so that this rather mysterious expression might acquire a meaning at the beginning: unassignable yet determined. And once again, it's unassignable since c became equal to zero, and since e became equal to zero. So, it's unassignable. And yet it's completely determined since c over e, specifically 0 over 0 is not equal to zero, nor to 1, it's equal to x over y. You see? Here I find moreover that he really had a professor-like genius, because in fact, proof that he won his bet, he was able, for example, to succeed in explaining to someone who never did anything but elementary algebra what differential calculus is. He assumed no a priori notion of differential calculus, and differential calculus, let me emphasize, would be something quite different, something quite different to manipulate.

And what do I draw from this for myself? All that we needed, we didn't need much more, was that the idea that there is a continuity in the world, that nonetheless takes on a starkly more concrete sense. It is no longer a matter of simply saying -- and here, it seems that there are too many commentators on Leibniz who make more theological pronouncements than Leibniz requires: they are content to say, well yes, infinite analysis is in God's understanding. -- And it is true, it is true according to the letter of his texts, this is within God's understanding. But it happens we have the artifice, with differential calculus, it happens that we have the artifice not to make ourselves equal to God's understanding -- that's impossible of course -- but differential calculus gives us an artifice so that we can operate a well-founded approximation of what happens in God's understanding. What happens in God's understanding so that we can approach it thanks to this symbolism of differential calculus, since after all, God also operates by the symbolic, not the same way, but it operates through symbols? certainly. Well, this approximation of continuity is what? It's so the maximum of continuity is assured when a case is given, the extreme case or [*Pause*]… the extreme case or the contrary can be considered from a certain point of view as included in the case first defined.

You define the movement, it matters little, you define the polygon, it matters little, you consider the extreme case or the contrary: rest, the circle that is stripped of any angle. Continuity is the

institution of the path according to which, or following which the extrinsic case -- rest contrary to movement, the circle contrary to the polygon, whatever you want – the extrinsic case can be – so here, everything should become clear for you as if in a bolt of lightning – I would say, literally, there is continuity when the extrinsic case can be considered as included in the notion of the intrinsic case. He simply just showed how and why. You find exactly the expression of predication: the predicate is included in the subject.

The extrinsic case, once again, understand well. I call "general, intrinsic case" the concept of movement that encompasses all movements. In relation to this first case, I call "extrinsic case" rest or the circle in relation to all the polygons, or the unique triangle in relation to all the triangles combined. I undertake to construct a differential concept that implies precisely all the differential symbolism, I undertake to construct a concept that both corresponds to the general intrinsic case and which still includes the extrinsic case. I would say here, if I succeed in that, I can say that in all truth, rest is an infinitely small movement, just as I say that my unique triangle is the opposition of two similar triangles opposed at the vertex, simply, by which one of the two triangles has become unassignable. At that moment, there is continuity from the circle to the polygon and from the polygon to the circle, there is continuity from rest to movement, there is continuity from two similar triangles opposed at the vertex to a single triangle.

A parenthesis: all geometry, and here, believe me, especially since, as regards the State, I don't know if you recall, I referred to this, I didn't spend much time on it, I should have done so because it would be… When during the 19th century, in the mid-19th century, a very great mathematician named [Jean-Victor] Poncelet will produce, will preside over projective geometry in its most modern sense, he is directly Leibnizian.[15] Projective geometry is entirely based precisely on what is called, what Poncelet and his contemporaries called an axiom of continuity according to which, quite simply, if you take, for example, an arc of a circle cut at two points by a right angle, if you cause the right angle to recede, there is a moment at which it no longer touches the arc of the circle except at one point, it's the tangent, and a moment at which it leaves the circle, no longer touching it at any point. Poncelet's axiom of continuity claims the possibility, once again, of treating the case of the tangent as an extreme case, specifically it's not that one of the points has disappeared; it's that both points are still there, but virtual, and when they all leave, it's not that the two points have disappeared, they are still there, but both are virtual. This is the axiom of continuity that precisely allows any system of projection, any so-called projective system. Fine, here, mathematics will emerge from this, they will maintain that integrally -- it's a very formidable kind of technique.

Here, they have acquired the means -- but you see therefore the point at which we can almost complete our difficult problem; it's funny anyhow. Well, I don't know if you are going to be able to sense this, but there is something desperately comical in all that, but that will not bother Leibniz at all, not at all. It seems to me, there again, that commentators, they get blocked by… but it's wrong for me to say this, in any case, I really don't know, it's very odd, very, very odd. – For from the start, we sink into a domain in which it's a question of showing that the truths of existence are not the same thing as truths of essence or mathematical truths. And to show it, either it's with very general propositions full of genius in Leibniz's works, but that leave us like that, God's understanding, infinite analysis, and then what does that amount to? And finally, when it's a question of showing in what way truths of existence are irreducible to mathematical

truths, when it's a question of showing it concretely, all that is convincing in what Leibniz says is mathematical. It's funny, no? [*Silence, suppressed laughter*]

So, what does he have? But you understand, if you understand this, you will have understood how, what he would reply. There we are, a professional objector would say to Leibniz – everything had been said to him besides; what Leibniz had to endure! – an objector would arrive and say to him, oh, but Leibniz, are you losing it? (*ça ne va pas, la tête?*) You announce to us, you talk to us of the irreducibility of truths of existence, and you can define this irreducibility concretely only by using purely mathematical notions. So, here's what would Leibniz answer. He would reply – this would depend on his mood – [*Laughter*] he would reply, understand well, because this is normal because it's quite difficult: here we have Leibniz saying often, in all sorts of texts, people have always had me saying that differential calculus designated a reality. He states, I never said that; differential calculus is a convention; simply, as he says, it's a well-established convention. It's a notion that's already not convenient. So, Leibniz is enormously committed – and here, all Leibniz's texts have been quite precise on this -- differential calculus being only a symbolic system, and not describing a reality, but describing a way of treating reality.

What does that mean, a well-established convention? It's not in relation to reality that it's a convention, but in relation to mathematics. I mean, that's the misinterpretation not to make. First of all, convention. Differential calculus is a convention, it's symbolism, but in relation to what? It's symbolism in relation to mathematical reality, not at all in relation to real reality. It's in relation to mathematical truth that the differential system, that differential calculus is a fiction. He also used the expression "well-established fiction." It's a well-established fiction in relation to the mathematical reality. In other words, differential calculus mobilizes concepts that cannot be justified from the point of view of classical algebra, that's obvious, or from the point of view of arithmetic, that's obvious. Quantities that are not nothing and that equal zero, it's arithmetical nonsense. So, it has neither arithmetic reality, nor algebraic reality. It's a fiction.

So, in my opinion, it does not mean at all that differential calculus does not designate anything real; he would have said so. It means that differential calculus is irreducible to mathematical reality. It's therefore a fiction in this sense, but precisely in so far as it's a fiction, it can cause us to think of what exists [*l'existant*], insofar as it's a fiction in relation to mathematical reality. It can cause us to think of what is irreducible to mathematical reality, namely what exists [*l'existant*] in its reality. In other words, differential calculus is a kind of union of mathematics and what exists [*l'existant*], specifically it's the symbolic of what exists [*l'existant*], and it's because it's a well-established fiction in relation to mathematical truth that it is henceforth a basic and real means of exploration of the reality of existence. [*Pause*] Henceforth, you see what the word "evanescent" means, since it was my point of [departure]. "Evanescent difference" is when the relation continues whereas the terms of the relation have disappeared. The relation c over e whereas large C and large E have disappeared, that is, coincide with A. You have therefore constructed a continuity through differential calculus.

And here, Leibniz becomes much stronger in order to tell us: there we are, understand that in God's understanding – here then, he can really recreate theology with [*indistinct word*] – he can tell us, understand, in God's understanding, between the predicate sinner and the notion of

Adam, well, there is a continuity. There is a continuity by evanescent difference to the point that when it created the world, God was only doing calculus [*ne fait que calculer*]. And what a calculus! Obviously not an arithmetical calculus, [Leibniz] has no need to say this. So, on this point, he will oscillate as well; he will oscillate between two explanations.

In short, God created the world by calculating. There is a famous expression by Leibniz, in Latin; in Latin it's prettier; it's much prettier, but in French, you prefer it in French, it's not so bad: God calculates, the world is created; God calculates, the world is created. There we are, admire the necessity, I believe, of mixing up everything in philosophy if you sufficiently like philosophy. The idea as God as player – and this is painful in the texts sometimes because there are too many mixtures (*mélanges*) -- the idea of God as player [*joueur*] can be found everywhere. If you say, "God created the world by playing/gambling", everyone says that. It's not very interesting, fine; one can always say it, but that's been said constantly. And it doesn't even mean the same thing. When someone tells you, "The world is only one of God's games", "God created the world by playing/gambling", you must not let him/her go, someone offering to you such an important secret. You must not let him/her go; you have to ask, "But which game?" Games do not resemble one another.

There is a famous text by Heraclitus; so here, we can still discuss this because when it's small segments of sentences, then it is a question of the child player who really constitutes the world. He plays, at what? What do the Greeks and Greek children play? What do they play? So, there are editions that say, "backgammon" (*au tric-trac*); there are other editions of Heraclitus that say "at palace", "palace", it's another game, fine. They can say that, but Leibniz would not say that. What is he saying when he says "God…" – What time is it? [*A student answers*] One o'clock? Oh, là, là! You must be beat! Well, I'm almost done – Leibniz wouldn't say that.

When he gives his explanation of games, he chooses two explanations. – You are going to see why this concludes our work today – He proposes… He had found lots of stuff (*trucs*) in an area, a small, yet completely complicated area of mathematics. The area of mathematics is the problems of paving, sitting astride mathematics and architecture. The problems of paving are not insignificant, these problems; this ought to be of interest to everyone, the problems of paving. A surface being given, with what shape is one to fill it completely? Moreover, then, there's a more complicated problem: if you take a rectangular surface and you want to tile it with circles, you do not fill it completely. With squares, do you fill it completely? That depends on the measurement. With rectangles? With equal or unequal rectangles? The problem gets more complicated: if you suppose two shapes, which of them combine to fill a space completely? If you want to pave with circles, with which other shape will you fill in the empty spaces? That's very interesting; one can plan these things ahead, there are formulae, there are lots and lots of things. Or you agree not to fill everything; you see that it's quite connected to the problem of continuity. But, if you decide not to fill it all, in what cases and with which shapes and which combination of different shapes will you succeed in filling the maximum possible? That puts incommensurables into play and puts incomparables into play, all that. That's [Leibniz's] passion, the problems of paving.[16]

When Leibniz says that God causes to exist and chooses the best of possible worlds, we have seen what he was in the process of… There, we will see that later because it's so complicated, but already we have, we're getting ahead; we understand Leibniz before he has spoken now

because what is he in the process of saying, the best of possible worlds? That was the crisis of Leibnizianism, that was the reversal, the generalized anti-Leibnizianism of the 18th century. They could not stand the tale of the best of possible worlds. Voltaire and all of them were correct, Voltaire was right. That is, they had arrived with a philosophical requirement that obviously was not fulfilled by Leibniz, notably from the political point of view. So, they could not forgive Leibniz.

But Leibniz, if one launches oneself into a pious approach, what did Leibniz mean by the world that exists is the best of possible worlds? He meant something very simple: as there are several worlds possible, they are simply not compossible with each other; God chooses the best, and the best is what? It's not the one in which suffering is the least. Rationalist optimism is at the same time an infinite cruelty, it's not at all a world in which no one suffers; it's the world that realizes the maximum of continuities. It's obvious, it's obvious that the circle, if I dare use a non-human metaphor, it's obvious that the circle suffers when it is no more than an affection of the polygon. This is even a word from mathematicians, an "affection". When rest is no more than an affection of movement, imagine the suffering of rest. Simply it's the best of worlds because it the one that realizes the maximum of continuity. Other worlds were possible, but they would have realized less continuity. This world is the most beautiful, the best, the most beautiful, the best, yes, the best and the most beautiful, the most harmonious, etc., uniquely under the weight of this pitiless phrase: because it realizes the most continuity possible. So, if that occurs at the price of your flesh and blood, it matters little.

And what complicates everything is that, as God is not only just, that is, pursuing the maximum of continuity, but as he is at the same time quite capricious [*d'une coquetterie*], he wants to vary the world. So, in reality, it's the world that realizes the maximum of continuity, but God hides this, it hides this continuity. It shelters it [the continuity]. He shoves a segment that should be in continuity with that other one, well, the segment should be in continuity, that he places elsewhere. Why? To hide his tracks. We run no risk of making sense of this, ourselves, but this occurs at our expense (*sur notre dos*), this best of worlds. You see? Obviously, the 18th century does not receive Leibniz's story very favorably at all. But, in fact, it's the world of continuity. So, you see, the problems of paving express quite well this choice of the best world: the best of worlds will be the one in which shapes and forms will fill the maximum of space-time while leaving the least emptiness.

Second explanation by Leibniz, and there he is even stronger still: the chess game. Such that between Heraclitus's phrase that alludes to a Greek game and Leibniz's allusion to chess, there is all the difference that there is between the two games at the same moment in which the common formula "God plays" could make us believe that it's a kind of beatitude. For how does Leibniz conceive of chess? Very simple: the chess board is a space, the pieces are notions. What is the best move in chess, or the best combination of moves? You know, in all chess problems, you have bifurcations, as the other [Borges] would say, "The Garden of Forking Paths." Well, the best move or combination of moves is the one that results in a determinate number of pieces with determinate values holding or occupying the maximum space, the total space being contained on the chess board. One has to place the bishop, the knight, the… Queen, one's pawns in such a way that they command the maximum space, so that the other is… [*Deleuze does not finish this thought*]

And in the end, what doesn’t work in all that? Why are these only metaphors? Here as well there is a kind of principle of continuity: the maximum of continuity. What does not work well in these two metaphors, as much in the metaphor of paving as in the metaphor of chess? In both cases, you have reference to a receptacle. The two things are presented as if the possible worlds were competing to be embodied in a determinate receptacle. In the case of paving, it's the surface to be paved; in the case of chess, it's the chess board. But in the conditions of the creation of the world, there is no a priori receptacle.

We have to say, therefore, that the world that passes into existence is the one that realizes in itself the maximum of continuity, that is, which contains the greatest quantity of reality or of essence. I cannot speak of existence since there will come into existence the world that contains not the greatest quantity of existence, but the greatest quantity of essence from the point of view of continuity. And, in fact, continuity is precisely the means of obtaining the maximum quantity of reality. Do you understand?

So, there you have a very, very beautiful vision, as philosophy. In this second paragraph, I believe that I have answered the first question, namely, what is infinite analysis? I have not yet answered the question: what is compossibility. There we are. [2:08:04]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

Lecture 03, 29 April 1980

Translation and supplementary additions from transcript completed from the YouTube video,[17] Charles J. Stivale[18]

Part 1

So, today, our task is to look at some amusing and recreative, but also quite delicate, things. So, I need to have your complete attention for an extended period. First, I have just learned that one of you would like to ask a question on something. So, what is this little question?

A student: The question is when became known, at the end of the 19th century, infinitesimal calculus becomes known in France and in Europe in a general way, a certain number of objections were raised which related to this, that this calculation admittedly made it possible to solve in a simpler way a certain number of geometry problems, for example, to find the tangent of certain curves, the parabola, for example, but that this calculus was very suspicious because it made a certain [*inaudible word*] and quantity, it had no geometric existence and had only a virtual existence. To which the partisans of infinitesimal calculus, Leibniz supporters, the people like [*two indistinct names*] answer that what matters, it is not the quantity dx which was effectively an evanescent quantity (*quantité évanouissante***)** with respect to x, or dy with respect to y, but what mattered was the relation of dy to dx. So, the question I would like to ask is: do you see a relationship between this way of looking at a relation that involves unqualified variables, abstract variables? Did you say three months ago about axiomatization and differential calculus as resting on a function, that is, a functional relation which equally bears not on variables, but on relations between variables which in these relations are not qualified [*indistinct words*]. Is this clear?

Deleuze: The question is very clear, very clear. [*Pause*]

The student: If you like, I have the answer.

Deleuze: Ah, fine! [*Laughter*] Ah, fine! Ah, fine! So then, go ahead and answer first. [*Pause*] I have feeling that it won't be the same as mine. We could answer simultaneously, each with a sentence, as you like, as you like. [*Pause*] So, you can answer so no one can say your answer isn't correct. So, you go ahead.

The student: The answer is that I would say that, to a certain extent, yes, but what intervenes with what you have called axiomatic [*indistinct words*], something intervenes which does not intervene in infinitesimal calculus [*indistinct words*], which will be the identification or fusion of two things, the condition and the function, and which operate independently at the end of the 18th century, that for several authors [*indistinct words*], for two authors, [*indistinct words*], that status of the function as condition for Kant, despite what he says about there being as many

categories as there are judgments in understanding (*l'entendement*), and on the other hand, for Cuvier, the conception of function or the set of [*indistinct words*] as a condition for the existence of an element. That is to say, contrary to what has been said, Cuvier never believed that, never said that there are four planes in [*indistinct words*]; he always said that there is an abstract plane, this diversity between four modes [*indistinct words*], and this abstract plane is what is said about the function, unlike another plane that was [*indistinct words*] around the same time by other [*indistinct words*]. [4: 00] To me, it seems that there is something missing in infinitesimal calculus for that really to be a functional axiomatic, for that really to bear on variables [*indistinct words*], on relations between variables, this something that is missing being the fusion of [*sneezing blocks words*] as in transcendental philosophy, the function as unity [*indistinct words*], on the condition of experience. For this experience to be possible, for this experience to be possible, one must admit that there is this transcendental aspect which is defined by [*indistinct words*] and by a table of functions. [*Pause*] Is that clear?

Deleuze: Very clear, very clear, very clear. But your answer seems to me much broader than the question, because your answer consists in creating a very complex or mixed up concept of functions. On the concept of function itself, it's very difficult because in your answer, you have at once a logical function of judgment in the Kantian manner, a certain biological function in the manner of Cuvier and the Naturalists, and with implicitly adding the underlying mathematical function. So that creates a very odd concept.

The student: [*Inaudible answer*]

Deleuze: Why not? Why not? [*Deleuze says this in a doubtful tone*] …

The student: [*Several inaudible words*]

Deleuze: As for the question itself, I would say this. [*Pause*] You understand, it seems to me that one cannot say that at the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, there were people for whom differential calculus is something artificial and others for whom it represents, in the general sense of representing, something real. We cannot say that because the division, it seems to me, is not there. It isn't there; I am choosing a simple example, someone who believes, leaving this entirely vague, someone who really believes in differential calculus like Leibniz. Leibniz never stopped saying that differential calculus is pure artifice, that it's a symbolic system. So, on this point, everyone is in strict agreement. Where the disagreement begins is in understanding what a symbolic system is, but as for the irreducibility – this, I attempted to say at the last meeting – as for the irreducibility of differential signs to any mathematical reality, that is, to geometrical, arithmetical and algebraic reality, everyone agrees.

Where a difference arises is when some people think that, henceforth, differential calculus is only a convention, a rather suspect one, and others think that its artificial character in relation to mathematical reality, on the contrary, allows it to be adequate to certain aspects of physical reality. Agreed?

The student: That really has some very important consequences because, here … [*The comments are rather difficult to quote precisely; in general, the student indicates that Leibniz's perspective*

in the end, over two centuries, blocked the possibility of thinking of the concept of the infinite in a more open way than according to infinitesimal calculus. The student cites several examples and models from a more current perspective in mathematics.]

Deleuze: One can imagine what Leibniz would say if he heard that, because Leibniz never – I am also stating a detail that seems to be a pure fact – Leibniz never thought that his infinitesimal analysis, his differential calculus, as he conceived them, sufficed to exhaust the domain of the infinite such as he, Leibniz, conceived it. For example, even at the level of calculus, there's what Leibniz calls – we will consider this a bit today -- calculus of the minimum and of the maximum which does not at all depend on differential calculus. So, differential calculus for Leibniz corresponds to a certain order of infinity. When you demand an qualitative infinity or the possibility of a qualitative infinity by saying the Leibniz shut the door on such an analysis, that seems to be entirely incorrect, this since if it is true that a qualitative infinity cannot be grasped, in fact, by differential calculus, Leibniz is, on the other hand, so conscious of it that he initiates other modes of calculus relative to other orders of infinity. And a second comment that seems to be to be purely a fact, what eliminated this direction of the qualitative infinity, or even simply of actual infinity stated baldly, Leibniz wasn't the one who blocked it off. According to the very examples that you cited, [Spinoza's] "Letter to Meyer", the history of the cone and the circle, the history of everything that could be called the history of the minimum and maximum, in all this history, what blocked this direction, for its own benefit and more, was the Kantian revolution. This was what imposed a certain conception of the indefinite and directed the most absolute critique of actual infinity. This was Kant's fault, what you are saying; this is not at all Leibniz's fault.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: … for the reason that has just been stated, the diabolical character of differential calculus. How can an artifice, how can a convention at the same time be what will allow us to penetrate the secrets of nature itself?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Obviously not! Obviously not!

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You understand, it seems to me, one has to, in order to understand these problems, once again, it's not that I feel myself in such disagreement with what you are saying; it's that this immediately acquired a very, how to say this, a very abstract dimension, what you are saying. It seems to me that this is correct, not wrong, what you are saying. But we cannot understand this if we do not see at the same time what practical problem this underlies. So, when you ask the question, "what would [Girard] Desargues have said?", a geometrist-mathematician who therefore preceded Leibniz, and who precedes the discovery of differential calculus, what would Desargues have said? First of all, differential calculus.

And historically, I expect this kind of question because there is no moment when there is no differential calculus and then the moment when it appears. When there isn't…

The student: [*He interrupts Deleuze; inaudible*]

Deleuze: When there is no differential calculus, they have a calculus that is used for the same thing, without the symbolic perfection, and that has existed since the Greeks.

The student: [*He continues to make comments while interrupting Deleuze; Deleuze answers him with a very low voice, but the student continues*] … found the tangent of the parabola according to the Leibniz method, but I am persuaded that for Desargues, Pascal or [Philippe de] Lahire, it might have been possible to solve the same problem according to the Greek method by describing relations… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No. [*Pause*] No. [*Pause*]. No. No, no, no. [*The student continues, but Deleuze interrupts him*] With what method? Listen, you are in the process of saying nonsense [*n'importe quoi*]. The geometry problems are very simple. You have two types of problem in the end, at this period, whether it's in the Middle Ages, or with the Greeks. There are two kinds of problems, the problems in which it's a question of finding so-called straight lines and so-called rectilinear surfaces. Classical geometry and algebra were sufficient. You have problems and you get the necessary equations; this is what is called, Leibniz speaks of this, if you will, it's Euclidean geometry. Euclid, Apollonius, an entire direction of geometry. Geometry never stopped being found, already with the Greeks, then in the Middle Ages, also because that gets more and more complicated, confronting a type of problem of another sort: it's when one must find and determine curves and curvilinear surfaces. Where all geometrists are in agreement is in the fact that classical methods of geometry and algebra no longer sufficed.

So, the Greeks, already who are going to deal with these problems, have to invent a special method; this is what has been maintained under the name of the method by exhaustion, this method of exhaustion that enables the determination of curves and curvilinear surfaces in so far as they yield equations of variable degrees, and infinite at the extreme, an infinity of varying degrees in the equation. It's those problems that are going to make necessary and inspire the discovery of differential calculus and the way in which differential calculus takes up where the old method by exhaustion left off. If you already connect a mathematical system, a mathematical symbolism to a theory, if you don't connect it to the problem for which it is created, then at that point, you can no longer understand anything. That's why I insist enormously on the following point: differential calculus makes sense only if you have and if you place yourself before an equation in which the terms are raised to different powers. It is not a question of… If you didn't have equations whose terms are of different powers, of the x squared y, if you don't have that, then it's nonsensical to speak of differential calculus. It's not even a question of this symbolism being created; that would be non-sensical, that would be non-sensical.

And it's very fine to consider the theory that corresponds to a symbolism, or is implied by a symbolism, but you must also completely consider the practice. What practice? When you refer to Desargues, it's obvious that what does Desargues need and in relation to what? In fact, he already needs a symbolism that he is required to create. It's because the method of exhaustion is

not adequate for him. This is precisely for problems of stone carving, in general, problems of rounding off, problems of vaulting, how to make a vault from these? There is an entire practice there. And infinitesimal analysis, one can't understand anything if one doesn't see that precisely – this is why I am insisting enormously on this point – that all physical equations are by nature differential equations. A physical phenomenon can only be studied, and here, Leibniz will be very firm, you understand, because Leibniz's entire topic will be: Descartes only had geometry and algebra, and what Descartes himself had invented under the name of analytical geometry, but however far he went in that invention, it gave him at most the means to grasp figures and movement, and yet, figures and movement, of a rectilinear kind.

And with the aggregate of natural phenomena being, after all, phenomena of the curvilinear type, that doesn't work at all. Descartes remained stuck on figures and movement. Leibniz will translate: it's the same thing to say that nature proceeds in a curvilinear manner or to say that, beyond figures and movement, there is something, namely, the domain of forces, and on the very level of the laws of movement, Leibniz is going to change everything, thanks precisely to differential calculus. When he eventually says – we will see this later – when he says that what is conserved is not mv, not mass and velocity, but it's mv2, to understand nothing but that when this topic is discovered, the only difference in the formula being the extension of v to the second power. This is made possible by differential calculus because differential calculus allows the comparison of powers and of rejects [*rejets*]. So, that that point, one must not even say, why didn't Descartes see that what was conserved was mv2? Why did he believe that it was mv? Obviously, Descartes didn't have the technical means to say mv2. It wasn't possible. From the point of view of language, both of geometry and of arithmetic and of algebra, mv2 is pure and simple non-sense.

So, today, everything changes. With what we know in science today, we can always explain that what is conserved is mv2 without appealing to any infinitesimal analysis. That happens in high school texts, but to prove it, and for the formula to make any sense, for the formula to be anything other than non-sense, an entire apparatus of differential calculus is required. But, then, there we are. Fine.

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible intervention, from* 20 :45-23 :20] [*At the beginning, Deleuze tells him:* Ah, right, I forgot that.]

Deleuze: Listen, why not? Why not? But I kind of have to make the same demand that I made earlier. While you create a very interesting theoretical framework, you need to acknowledge that it's a fact, in the domain of differential calculus and the axiomatic, the fact on which I need to insist, on an historical fact, which is this: differential calculus and the axiomatic certainly have a point of encounter, but this is one of perfect exclusion. I mean that, historically, what's called, what certain historians of mathematics call the rigorous status of differential calculus arises quite belatedly. The rigorous status of differential calculus, what does that mean? It means that everything that is convention or at least, everything, no, let's say, let's keep the very vague word "convention," is expelled from differential calculus. And what is convention even for Leibniz, what is artifice in differential calculus? What artifice is, is an entire aggregate of things: the idea of a becoming, the idea of a limit of becoming, the idea of a tendency to approach the limit, all these are considered by mathematicians to be absolutely metaphysical notions. The idea that

there is a quantitative becoming, the idea that there is a limit of this becoming, the idea that an infinity of small quantities tends toward the limit, all these are considered as absolutely impure notions, thus as really non-axiomatic or non-axiomatizable.

So, from the start, I tell myself, whether in Leibniz's work or in Newton's and the work of his successors, the idea of differential calculus is inseparable and not separated from a set of notions judged not to be rigorous or scientific, and they themselves are quite prepared to recognize it. So, what happened? It happens that at the end of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth century, differential calculus or infinitesimal analysis is said to receive a rigorously scientific status, but at what price? We hunt for any reference to the idea of infinity; we hunt for any reference to the idea of limit; we hunt for any reference to the idea of tendency toward the limit. Who does that? That is, an interpretation and a rather strange status of calculus will be given because it stops operating with ordinary quantities, and its interpretation will be purely ordinal. Henceforth, that becomes a mode of exploring the finite, the finite as such. The entire interpretation of calculus is changed. It's a great mathematician, [Karl] Weierstrass, who did that, but it came rather late, to the point that, in an axiomatic then… He creates an axiomatic of calculus, but at what price? He transforms it completely. To the point that, today, when we do differential calculus, there is no reference to the notions of infinity, of limit and of tendency of approaching the limit, no longer any reference to those things. There is a static interpretation. There is no longer any dynamism in differential calculus, but a static and ordinal interpretation of calculus. This is Weierstrass's great victory, a static and ordinal interpretation of calculus. For those who might be interested in this, you'll find there is a book that, at the end, includes appendices, there's an entire appendix at the back of the book, on the way in which current interpretation of differential calculus does without any reference to notions of infinity or of the infinitely small. This is [Jules] Vuillemin's book, *La philosophie de l'algèbre*.[19]

So, it seems to me that his fact is very important for us because it must certainly show us that the differential relations… -- Moreover, here, even before the axiomatization, all mathematicians agreed in saying that differential calculus, interpreted as a method for exploring the infinite, was an impure convention. And once again, I never stop saying this, Leibniz was the first to say that, but only, we still have to know then what the symbolic value is. But, from the point of view and in the new sense that the axiomatic gives to the symbolic, if this whole domain, this whole impure domain is expelled, I can then really say, the axiomatic, axiomatic relations and differential relations, well no. They absolutely have to… I recall a mathematician from the 19th century, for example, who again says, this is an expression that… He says, yes, differential calculus has always been a Gothic hypothesis, a Gothic hypothesis. There is no greater insult for a mathematician, a Gothic hypothesis, and on this point, until calculus receives… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

And in this sense, I am saying, there is an opposition, there is an opposition between differential relations such as they are interpreted at the end of the 19th century, and the requirements of an axiomatic. So, that does not prevent, in fact… why? Because infinity has completely changed its sense, its nature, and in the end, calculus is completely expelled. So, what you are saying is quite possible, but on the condition, almost that you manage to show, it seems to me, that point on which rests the opposition between an aggregate of axiomatic relations and differential relations.

So, I indeed, indeed, I just have here a vague idea, but finally… If you will, it seems to me that a differential relation of the type dy over dx is such that one extracts it from x and y. Fine. At the same time, dy is nothing in relation to y, it's an infinitely small quantity; dx is nothing in relation to x, it's an infinitely small quantity in relation to x. On the other hand, dy over dx is something, but it is something completely different from y over x. For example, if y over x – as you stated it very well – if y over x designates a curve, dy over dx designates a tangent. And what's more, it's not just any tangent. Fine.

I would say therefore that the differential relation is such that it no longer signifies anything concrete, it signifies nothing concrete in relation to what it's derived from, that is, in relation to x and to y, but it signifies something else concrete (*autre chose de concret*), and that is how it assures passage to the limits. It assures something else concrete, namely a z.

The previous student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Certainly not. Oh, don't complicate things. I am not saying that this is necessarily [*indistinct word*]. [*Pause*] Understand? It's exactly as if I said that differential calculus is completely abstract in relation to a determination of the type a over b, but on the other hand, it determines a c. Whereas the axiomatic relation, no. The axiomatic relation is completely formal from all points of view, from all points of view. If it is formal in relation to a and b, it does not determine a c that would be concrete for it. So, it doesn't assure a passage at all. This would be the whole classical opposition between genesis and structure. The axiomatic is really the structure common to a plurality of domains, a structure common to a multiplicity of domains. Differential calculus, in the old style… [*Deleuze is interrupted*]

The student: [*Inaudible; Deleuze answers while he speaks:* Agreed, agreed.]

Deleuze: … a bit like, but the difference is more important than the similarity, it seems to me. [*Pause*] Fine, so let's go on. [*Pause*]

Well then, well then, well then, the last time, you perhaps recall, we were considering my second topic heading, and this second heading dealt with "Substance, World, and Compossibility." And we had seen the first part of this great heading. And in the first part, I tried to say, what does Leibniz call infinite analysis? And the answer was this – our answer, but we did a lot of searching – our answer was this: infinite analysis concerns this or else it fulfills the following condition: it appears to the extent that continuity and small differences or vanishing differences are substituted for identity. It's when we proceed by continuity and vanishing differences that analysis becomes properly infinite analysis. So, we tried to explain why, and I won't go back over that.

And I arrive at the second aspect of the question; henceforth, notice, there would be infinite analysis and there would be material for infinite analysis when I find myself faced with a domain that is no longer directly governed by the identical, by identity, but a domain that is governed by continuity and vanishing differences. We reach a relatively clear answer.

Hence the second aspect of the problem: what is compossibility? What does it mean for two things to be compossible or non-compossible? And there, we indeed see what that problem is connected to. Yet again, Leibniz tells us that Adam non-sinner, an Adam who might not have sinned, is possible in itself, but not compossible with the existing world. So, he makes a claim for a relation of compossibility that he invents, and you sense that it's entirely linked to the idea of infinite analysis. Fine, but one would have to prove this, one would have to… Why? Where is the problem? The problem is that the incompossible, at first glance, cannot be the contradictory; it is not the same thing as the contradictory. [*Pause*] In fact, and however, and however, it's complicated because, once again, you maintain the example. Adam non-sinner is incompossible with the existing world; another world would be required. Fine. I see only three possible solutions; if we say that, I only see three possible solutions for trying to characterize the notion of incompossibility.

First solution: we'll say that, one way or another, incompossibility has to imply a kind of logical contradiction. In a pinch, you'll grant me that, it's necessary, yes, that means a contradiction would have to exist finally between Adam non-sinner and the existing world. [*Pause*] Can we indeed follow this path? Yes, at first glance, you can still grant me this, you can still grant me this, a contradiction would exist between Adam non-sinner and the existing world, only we could identify this contradiction only to infinity; it would be an infinite contradiction. Whereas there is a finite contradiction between circle and square, there is only an infinite contradiction between Adam non-sinner and the world. We can still say that.

Certain texts by Leibniz move in this direction. But, yet again, we know already that we have to be careful about the levels of Leibniz's texts. In fact, everything we said previously implied that compossibility and incompossibility are truly an original relation, irreducible to identity and contradiction. Contradictory identity. Furthermore, we saw that infinite analysis, in accordance with our first part, we saw that infinite analysis was not an analysis that discovered the identical as a result of an infinite series of steps. In fact, the whole outcome the last time was that, far from discovering the identical at the end of a series, at the end of an infinite series – already, that means nothing; it's non-sense -- at the limit of an infinite series of steps, far from proceeding in this way, infinite analysis substituted the point of view of continuity for that of identity. So, it's another domain than the identity/contradiction domain.

Another solution – but then, I will state this rapidly because certain of Leibniz's texts suggest it as well -- it's that all this is beyond our understanding because our understanding is finite, and henceforth, compossibility, this time, would be an original relation, but we could not know what its roots are. The roots of this relationship would elude us. The basis of this relationship would elude us. Fine. Of course, neither of the two directions can satisfy us. So, it's very simple. We demand a specificity of the relation of compossibility and incompossibility, a proper nature for this relation, which is linked at the same time to the nature of the infinite analysis, that is, to all that we have seen previously on the continuous and vanishing differences.

And I wonder -- and this is where I wanted to start from – we wonder which way to go? What is he going to provide us with? But it gets interesting, he invents a new type of relation, the compossible and the incompossible. It gets very rich because he can ... you see, henceforth, the whole range of objections, criticisms that he can give himself in relation to earlier philosophies.

He said, oh yes, the others, what did they grasp? Some of them believed that everything was necessary; others saw that there was the possible and the necessary; but Leibniz says, I am bringing you a new domain. There is not solely the possible, the necessary and the real. There is the compossible and the incompossible. He was attempting to cover an entire region of being.

Discovering that, for a philosopher what does that mean? That implies at least that he is not satisfied to tell us, I don't know where that comes from. He can say it without a text, ah well yes, that's beyond our understanding; he can say this as if in passing. But he indeed has to take this on once and for all. So there, what bothers me is that… Here is the hypothesis that I'd like to suggest: that, on one hand, Leibniz is a busy man because he writes in all directions, all over the place, he does not publish at all or very little during his life. Leibniz has everything there, all the elements, all the material, all the details to give a relatively precise answer to this problem. Necessarily so since he's the one who invented it, so it's him who has the solution. So, what happened for him not to have put all of it together? What's the cause of that?

Here's the hypothesis I'd like to suggest; I am stating it, I'm trying to hurry it up because we have to proceed in proper order given that, once again, this story is so delicate and amusing. I think that what will provide an answer to this problem, at once about infinite analysis and about compossibility, is a very curious theory that Leibniz was no doubt, perhaps, the first to introduce into philosophy, that we could call the theory of singularities. For Leibniz's work, the theory of singularities, which is scattered, which is everywhere – I cannot cite a single book where it's doesn't exist… it's everywhere, it's everywhere -- one even risks reading pages by Leibniz without seeing that one is fully in the midst of it, that's how discreet he is or how much he inhabits it at certain moments.

The theory of singularities appears to me to have two poles for Leibniz, and one would have to say that it's a mathematical-psychological theory, hence, you see, our purpose today, our work today that would be, if I try to enumerate fully, that would be: what is a singularity on the mathematical level? What is this strange notion, singularity, singularity for mathematicians? [*Pause*] And what does Leibniz manage to create in all this? What does he create in all that? Is it true that he creates the first great theory of singularities in mathematics? Second question: what is then that's something absolutely new, the Leibnizian psychological theory of singularities, of psychological singularities? [*Pause*]

And the last question – so that gives us three questions for today, that's a lot – the last question: to what extent does the mathematical-psychological theory of singularities, as sketched out by Leibniz, help us answer the question: what is the compossible, what is the incompossible, and definitively, what is infinite analysis? [*Pause*] There we are. Well then, that's all that I'd like for us to do.

For, in fact then, I begin with the first point. What is this mathematical notion of singularity? And what makes it interesting, and why did it disappear? It seems to me, it's too bad… we'd have to see; it's often like that at times in philosophy: there is something that emerges at one moment and will be abandoned. It seems to me that this is the very beautiful case of a theory that was really more than outlined by Leibniz, and then there was no follow-up, as if there was a

chance there, and then… Is there a way today to come back to it? Wouldn't it be interesting for us, and why would that be interesting?

I am saying here that I am still divided about two things in philosophy: the idea that philosophy does not require a special kind of knowledge, that really, in this sense, anyone is open to philosophy, and at the same time, that one can do philosophy only if one is sensitive to a certain terminology of philosophy, and that you can always create it -- good terminology is by nature always created, but you cannot create it by doing just anything. That's why, in my view, what does not exists, although apparently that exists, a dictionary of philosophy would be a very, very important thing – I believe that it's very difficult to create philosophy if you don't know what terms like these are: categories, concept, idea, a priori, a posteriori, exactly like one cannot do mathematics if one does not know what a, b, x, y, etc., variables, constants, equations are; there is a minimum. And I notice that, perpetually, logic… But don't be concerned; at the same time, you can learn it bit by bit. It's just that you will not create philosophy if you do not attach importance to those points.

Singular, where does that come from? The singular has always existed in a certain logical vocabulary. Only, in what sort of relation is the singular? That's already interesting; that's something for you to consider. "Singular" designates through difference from and, at the same time, in relation to "universal." Why do I feel compelled to say that? Because there is another pair of notions, there is a doublet, there are a couple of notions, it's "particular" that is stated with reference to what? Which is stated in relation to "general." If you confuse everything, you will employ "particular" and "singular" as equivalent, "general" and "universal" as equivalent. At that point, it's not bad, it's not bad, it's not difficult, all that, but one must reflect on the singular and the universal. These are in relation with each other; the particular and the general are in relation. What is a judgment of singularity? It's not the same thing as a judgment called particular, nor the same thing as a judgment called general.

There we have it, generally, no matter; I am not developing this because that's not what concerns me. I am only saying, formally, "singular" was thought, in classical logic, with reference to "universal." And that does not necessarily exhaust a notion: when mathematicians use the expression "singularity," with what do they place it into relation? Here, we must be guided by words… [*Interruption of the recording*] [46:39]

Part 2

[*Text furnished by Web Deleuze*]: There is indeed a philosophical etymology, or even a philosophical philology. "Singular" in mathematics is distinct from or opposed to] "regular." The singular is what is outside the rule. Fine, we don't seem to be saying much of anything. There is another pair of notions used by mathematicians, and here, in contrast to what I just said, but for some obvious reasons, I am going to confuse them: it's "remarkable" and "ordinary." [*Pause*] You have "singular"-"regular", "remarkable"-"ordinary". These are not entirely the same thing since mathematicians tell us that there are remarkable singularities and singularities that aren't remarkable. But for us, out of convenience, grant me that because Leibniz does not yet make this distinction between the non-remarkable singular and the remarkable singular. Leibniz uses "singular," "remarkable," and "notable" as equivalents, such that when you find the word

"notable" in Leibniz in a text, even quite rapid, tell yourself that necessarily there's a wink, that it does not at all mean "well-known". When he says something is "notable", he enlarges, he literally enlarges the word with an unusual meaning. You will ask me, why doesn't he warn us? If he warned us from the start, this style would not exist; warning is not what concerns him. When he talks about a notable perception, tell yourself that he is in the process of saying something.

What interest does this have for us? You have to understand this: it's that mathematics already represents a turning point in relation to logic. The mathematical use of the concept "singularity" orients singularity in relation to the ordinary or the regular, and no longer in relation to the universal. We are invited to distinguish what is singular and what is ordinary or regular. What interest does this have for us? Understand, if someone tells me one day, suppose someone – we might wonder, who could say that? – but suppose someone tells me: philosophy isn't doing too well because the theory of truth in thought has always been wrong. We've always been wrong because, above all, we've always asked what in thought was true, what was false. And, you know, suppose there is this anonymous voice, filtered through my own, that's not what matters; in thought, it's not the true and the false that matter, it's the singular and the ordinary.

What is singular, what is remarkable, what is notable in a thought? Or what is ordinary, and what does it mean that there would be something ordinary? I think of someone who had nothing to do with mathematics, who came much later, who was called Kierkegaard and who, much later, would say that philosophy has always ignored the importance of a category, that of the interesting! What is the interesting? [*Pause*] Suddenly, it's perhaps not true that philosophy ignored it. There is at least a philosophical-mathematical concept of singularity that perhaps has something interesting to tell us about the concept of "interesting." Fine, it's precisely that.

This great mathematical discovery is that singularity is no longer thought in relation to the universal, but is thought, rather, in relation to the ordinary or to the regular. The singular is what exceeds the ordinary and the regular. You will tell me, that does not go very far. Yes, it does. Saying this already takes us a great distance since saying it indicates that, henceforth, we wish to make singularity into a philosophical concept, even if it means finding reasons to do so in a favorable domain, namely mathematics.

And in which case does mathematics speak to us of the singular and the ordinary? [*Pause*] The answer is simple, immediately – I am saying some very, very simple things on purpose -- concerning certain points plotted on a curve. Not necessarily on a curve, we will see later, but notably, concerning certain points plotted on a curve or placed onto a curve, or else, let's say, generally concerning any figure. A figure can be said quite naturally, I believe that it's necessary, but one can say that a figure includes singular points and others that are regular or ordinary. Why a figure? Because a figure is something determined! So the singular and the ordinary would belong to the determination, and indeed, that would be interesting! You see that by dint of saying nothing and marking time, we make a lot of progress. Why not define determination in general? It's very difficult to define determination in general. I tell myself, hey, can't we define determination in general by saying that it's a combination of singular and ordinary, and every determination would be like that? Fine, perhaps, right?

But then, in what… We are going very, very slowly. I take a very simple figure: a square. [*Pause*] Your very legitimate requirement would be to ask me: what are the singular points of a square? Not difficult, there are four singular points in a square, there are four. [*Pause*] You see, the four vertices a, b, c, d. [*Pause*] Fine, we are going to try to define a notion, to define singularity, but we remain with examples so that, really… Here, we are making a childish inquiry; I insist on this: we are talking mathematics, but we don't know a word of it. We only know that a square has four sides, so there are four singular points that I can call, to use a more complicated term, that are the *extremum, extremum.* There are four *extremum*. – You are going to see why; I am acting like a clown in saying this because I need this term; you are going to see why -- These points are those marking precisely that a straight line is finite (*finie*), and that another begins, with a different orientation, at 90 degrees. What will the ordinary points be? This will be the infinity of points that compose each side of the square; but the four extremities will be what are called singular points. [*Pause*] All ok? Fine.

[Here's a] question: How many singular points do you give to a cube? [*Pause*] I see your vexed amazement! [*Laughter*] [*Someone responds, inaudibly*] There we are! Very good! – I am disappointed; I was hoping you'd tell me twelve! [*Laughter*] -- There are eight singular points in a cube. There we are, if you have already understood that, you've understood a great deal. That is what we call singular points in the most elementary geometry: points that mark the extremity of a straight line. You sense that this is only a start.

I would therefore oppose singular points and ordinary points. [*Pause*] An effort: A curve. [*Pause*] Ah, good, a curve, a rectilinear figure – here is my question, and through it, we come back to a comments made earlier, about what was said in the introduction – a rectilinear figure, perhaps, we'd have to reflect, but perhaps can I say a rectilinear figure that singular points are necessarily the *extremum*? Maybe not; you'll have to see; let us assume that at first sight, I can say something like that. For a curve, it's ruined. Let's take the simplest example: an arc of a circle -- There, I've had enough of the blackboard, so here I will just draw figures in the air; you can follow me fine -- I make an arc of a circle, like that; so, that depends on where I would place the ordinate, concave, as you wish, concave or convex. Underneath, I make a second arc, convex if the other is concave, concave if the other is convex. You see? You see, right? [*Laughter*] Both meet one another at a point. Underneath I trace a straight line that, in accordance with the order of things – I'll drag myself to the blackboard I you wish, but it's really a pain -- I call the ordinate. I am tracing the ordinate. [*Deleuze turns to the blackboard*] I draw my lines perpendicular to the ordinate, you see. … [*Pause while Deleuze moves to the board; laughter from students*] There's no chalk! There's no chalk! … Oh, là, là… [*Pause*]

So, I'm writing it very small, eh? I'm happy to make a drawing, but on condition that [*inaudible because of the voices*] [*Pause*] It's not bad, eh? [Deleuze draws while commenting] A-B, X-Y, you see? Understood? A-B there, X-Y there, there, there, there. [*Pause*] A-B, A-B, A-B, in relation -- follow me closely -- A-B, where is it? It's at the encounter point between the two circles meet, the two arcs on the ordinate. A-B, this is the longest segment in relation to this arc, and it is the shortest in relation to the other. [*Pause*] Understand? Excellent. [*Pause*] Second point: this is the shortest or the longest, as you wish. It all depends on whether you took the concave arc or the convex arc. [*Pause*] Second characteristic: this is the only one that is unique, this is the only segment that is unique. It's simple, you can't say that, but it's interesting.

Here I have to indicate, just so I won't appear to be wasting your time, that this is Leibniz's example, in a text with the exquisite title, "Tentamen anagogicum",[20] a tiny little work seven pages which is a master work, and which means in Latin "analogical essays."

So, I am saying two things: Segment ab thus has two characteristics: it's the only segment raised from the ordinate to be unique. Each of the others has, as Leibniz says, a double, its little twin, he even says this. In fact, xy has its mirror, its image in x'y', and you can get closer through vanishing differences of ab, there is only ab that remains unique, without twin. Second point: ab can also be considered a maximum or a minimum, [*Pause*] maximum in relation to one of the arcs of the circle, minimum in relation to the other. Ouf, you've understood it all. I'd say that ab is a singularity.

Why have I introduced this example? To complicate matters a bit. I have introduced the example of the simplest curve: an arc of a circle. In what way have I complicated this a bit? Because what I showed was that a singular point is not necessarily connected, is not limited to the *extremum*. It can very well be in the middle, and in that case, it is in the middle. And it's either a minimum or a maximum, or both at once. Hence the importance, perhaps you sense this, of a calculus that Leibniz will contribute to extending quite far, that he will call calculus of, in Latin as well, of *maximis* and of *minimis*, calculus of maximums and minimums, and then still today, this calculus has an immense importance, for example, in phenomena of symmetry, in physical and optical phenomena. In optical phenomena, calculus of maximums and minimums has a very, very great importance. I would say there we have a singular point; my point A is a singular point; all the others are ordinary or regular. They are ordinary and regular in two ways: [*Pause*] first, they are below the maximum and above the minimum, and second, they exist doubly. Thus, we can clarify somewhat this notion of ordinary. It's another case. I started off from the square, there, and we are in arcs of the circle. It's another case; it's a singularity of another case.

A new effort: take a complex curve. A complex curve will be what? Here as well, this does not have to concern very, very difficult things. What will we call singularities? It has singularities; a complex curve is defined by its singularities. What are the singularities of a complex curve, in simplest terms? In simplest terms, these are neighboring points of which – hey, this is excellent! By saying some very simple and some very dim things, you understand? We are in the process of gathering lots of things as regards construction of a mathematico-philosophical concept – neighborhood, a singular point has a neighborhood. No matter how little you are familiar with mathematics, you know that the notion of neighborhood is very different from contiguity, is a key notion, for example, in the whole extremely rich domain of mathematics, namely, of topology, and it's the notion of singularity that is able to help us understand what neighborhood is. Thus, in the neighborhood of a singularity, something changes, that is, the curve grows, or it decreases. [*Pause*] A curve has moments… You see, I am not creating the drawing; [the curve] grows or it decreases. These points of growth or decrease; I will call them singularities. The ordinary is what? It's the series, that which is between – you see, we're making progress – the ordinary is what is between two singularities; that goes from the neighborhood of one singularity the neighborhood of another singularity, of the ordinary or the regular. This seems essential to me.

Understand? This domain is completely, in relation to classical philosophy, completely … fine. I've already said too much about it; I will take advantage in order to say, suddenly, why? Henceforth, we grasp some of these relations, some very strange nuptials: isn't "classical" philosophy's fate relatively linked, and inversely, to geometry, arithmetic, and classical algebra, that is, to rectilinear figures? You will tell me that rectilinear figures already include singular points, agreed, but understand, once I discovered and constructed the mathematical notion of singularity, I can say that it was already there in the simplest rectilinear figures. Never would the simplest rectilinear figures have given me a consistent occasion, a real necessity to construct the notion of singularity. It's simply on the level of complex curves that this becomes necessary. Once I found it on the level of complex curves, now there, yes, I back up and can say: ah, it was already an arc of a circle, it was already in a simple figure like the rectilinear square, but before you couldn't.

The student in math [*from the start of the session*]: [*Brief inaudible comment*]

Deleuze [*in a rasping voice*] … Spare me (*Pitié*)… My God… He broke me since… [*Laughter*] You know, speaking is a fragile thing; speaking is a fragile thing. [*Pause; Deleuze's voice is almost at the level of a whisper; the class is extremely silent*] Yes, in the end, one might as well answer that with the method of exhaustion and apply the method of exhaustion which was a pre-differential method. [*Pause*] No, it's… I don't know any more.

The student: [*Inaudible; he tries to continue speaking but Deleuze stops him, yelling at him*]

Deleuze [*yelling*]: Ah, spare me, spare me, spare me. [*Pitié, pitié, pitié*] Ah, no, listen, I'll let you talk for an hour when you want, but not now… Oh, là, là… This is a hole [in memory] [*Pause while Deleuze seems to regroup himself somewhat; someone says something to him, and he answers*] Ah, no, ah, no, it's what's in my head…

Fine, listen. I will read to you a small, late text by a well-known mathematician named [Henri] Poincaré that deals extensively with this topic of the theory of singularities that will be developed during the entire eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In scientific works, since there are two kinds of undertaking by Poincaré, logical and philosophical projects, and mathematical ones since he is above all a mathematician, there is an essay by Poincaré on differential equations. I am reading just a part of it because his essay addresses the kinds of singular points in a curve referring to a function or to a differential equation. He tells us that there are four kinds of singular points, four kinds of singular points; they're very important, the names he will attribute to them: first, crests [*cols*], crests, a geographical term, crest. These are points through which two curves defined by the equation pass, and only two. Here, the differential equation is such that, in the neighborhood of this point, the equation is going to define or going to cause two curves and only two to pass; the crest, through which pass two curves defined by the equation, and solely two. That's one kind of singularity.

The second type of singularity: knots, knots, in which an infinity of curves defined by the equation come to intersect. The third type of singularity: thresholds [*foyers*], around which these curves turn while drawing closer to them in the form of a spiral. [*Pause*] Finally, the fourth type of singularity: centers, around which curves appear in the form of a closed circle, centers around

which curves appear in the form of a closed circle. And Poincaré explains in the sequel to the essay that, according to him, one great merit of mathematics is to have pushed the theory of singularities into relationship with the theory of functions or of differential equations.

Why do I quote this example from Poincaré? It's because already, you could find equivalent notions in Leibniz's works. Here an already very curious terrain appears, with crests, thresholds, centers, truly like a kind, we don't know what to say, a kind of astrology of mathematical geography. I am presenting this example because, you see that we went from the simplest to the most complex; I mean, on the level of a simple square, of a rectilinear figure, singularities were *extremum*; on the level of a simple curve, you have singularities that are even easier to determine, for which the principle of determination was easy. The singularity was the unique case that had no twin, or else was the case in which the maximum and minimum were identified. There you have more and more complex singularities when you move into more complex curves. Therefore, it's as if the domain of singularities is infinite, strictly speaking.

What is the formula going to be? Here I request that we go quickly because you will see how this is constructed. I am returning to the topic from earlier. As long as you are dealing with problems considered as rectilinear, that is, in which it's a question of determining right angles or rectilinear surfaces, you don't need differential calculus. You need differential calculus when you find yourself faced with the task of determining curves and curvilinear surfaces. What does that mean? This is not by chance. It's that the singularity – it's the only thing that I am saying about differential calculus -- in what way is the singularity linked to differential calculus? It's that the singular point is the point in the neighborhood of which the differential relation dy/dx changes its sign. For example: vertex, vertex relative to a curve before it decreases, before it descends, so you will say that the differential relation changes its sign. It changes its sign at this spot, but to what extent? Here, it's very well explained in all the textbooks: to the extent that it becomes equal; in the neighborhood of this point, it becomes equal to zero or to infinity. It's the theme of the minimum and of the maximum that you again find there. No matter.

I just want to say, here is the aggregate. This whole aggregate that I've just tried to present with this aggravating outpouring consists in saying: look at the kind of relationship that we have between singular and ordinary, such that you are going to define the singular as a function of curvilinear problems in relation to differential calculus, and in this tension or this opposition between singular point and ordinary point, or singular point and regular point. That's it, let's say, this is what mathematicians provide us with as basic material, and yet again if it is true that in certain cases, in the simplest cases, the singular is the extremity, in other simple cases, it's the maximum or the minimum or even both at once. Singularities there develop more and more complex relations on the level of more and more complex curves.

There we are, let's assume that there is nothing else; I retain the following formula: a singularity is a point in the neighborhood of which – this is, almost, yes, what one must retain – a singularity plotted or moved onto a curve, or determined on a curve, is point in the neighborhood of which the differential relation changes its sign, and the singularity, the singular point's characteristic is to extend itself (*se prolonger*) over the whole series of ordinary points that depend on it all the way to the neighborhood of the subsequent singularity. So, I maintain that the theory of

singularities is inseparable from a theory or an activity or a technique of extension.[21] So, understand, this is going to create a great step forward for us.

Wouldn't these be henceforth a possible definition, or elements for a possible definition of continuity? It wouldn't be easy to define continuity especially in relation with points. I'd say that continuity or the continuous – I'm saying this casually, to have… -- continuity or the continuous is the extension of a remarkable point onto a series of ordinaries, of a singular point onto a series of ordinaries, all the way into the neighborhood of the subsequent singularity. Suddenly I'm very pleased! I'm extremely pleased because, at last, I have a kind of definition, even if it doesn't satisfy us, even if we're forced to revise it, I have an initial hypothetical definition of what the continuous is. And notice that it's all the more bizarre since, in order to reach this definition of the continuous, I used what apparently introduces a discontinuity, notably a singularity in which something changes. And rather than being the opposite, it's the discontinuity that provides me with this approximate definition. As long as I can extend a singularity, it's continuous. Good, so here we are. That's all for the mathematical domain.

I pass to the other domain because, while pretending that there is no relation, and you certainly sense that for Leibniz, things don't work that way, that there are obviously relations between the two domains. This time, it's the psychological domain. [*Pause*] And Leibniz tells us, in the end, he tells us something already very odd. He says, well yes, everyone, we all know that we have perceptions, that for example, I see red, it's qualitative, I see red; I hear the sound of sea, a theme that returns constantly in his works, I hear the sound of the sea; seated on the beach, I hear the sound of the sea. And then, I see red, and there we are, all that, and these are perceptions. Moreover, he says, we should reserve a special name for them, we'll see why, because they are conscious. This is perception endowed with consciousness, perception endowed with consciousness, that is, perception perceived as such by an "I"; we call it apperception, like a-perceiving (*apercevoir*). For, in fact, this is *perception* that I perceive. So, let's reserve a special name for it, apperception; apperception signifies a conscious perception.

And Leibniz tells us the following, which at first glance nonetheless seem very strange, very… One tells oneself, why not, but why? There really have to – and again, this is the cry, so this is the cry that animates the concept -- henceforth there really have to be unconscious perceptions that we don't perceive. These unconscious perceptions that we do not perceive will be called "small perceptions", small perception; we don't perceive them. You understand that this is very important because these are unconscious perceptions. Why is this necessary? Why necessary?

Oddly, Leibniz will give us two reasons; and these are two reasons, you see, that goes so much without saying, but I would like to do the same thing here, to state for singularities some things so obvious that… Sometimes in texts, he gives them together, but in fact, there are two reasons: it's that we perceive our apperceptions, our conscious perceptions, these are always global. What we perceive is always a whole, whether this whole is relative, whether it is changing. What we grasp through conscious perception is relative totalities. And it is really necessary that parts exist since there is a whole, and that's a line of reasoning that Leibniz constantly follows: there has to be something simple if there is something composite; he raises this into a grand principle; and still, it doesn't go without saying; do you understand what he means? He means that there is no indefinite, and that goes so little without saying that it implies the actual infinite. There has to be

something simple since there is something composite. There are people who will think that everything is composite to infinity, and they will be partisans of the indefinite, but for other reasons, Leibniz thinks that the infinite is actual, so he indeed has to say that. Henceforth, we have to, since we perceive the global noise of the waves when we are seated on the beach, we have to have small perceptions of each wave, as he says in summary form, and moreover, of each drop, each drop of water. You will ask me, why? It's a kind of logical requirement, and we shall see what he means.

The same line of reasoning, and here I insist, on the level of the whole and the parts, he pursues it on the level, this time, not by invoking a principle of totality, but a principle of causality: what we perceive is always an effect, so there have to be causes. These causes themselves have to be perceived; otherwise the effect would not be perceived. In this case, the tiny drops are no longer the parts that make up the wave, nor the waves the parts that make up the sea, but they intervene as causes that produce an effect. You will tell me that there is no great difference here, but let me point out simply that in all of Leibniz's texts, there are always two distinct arguments that he is perpetually trying to make coexist: an argument based on causality and an argument based on parts, not the same thing. A cause-effect relation and part-whole relation. These cannot at all be entirely the same; we are going to see the problems. Fine.

So, this is how our conscious perceptions bathe in a flow of small perceptions, of unconscious small perceptions. What can that mean? On one hand, this has to be this way, this has to be this way logically, in accordance with the requirement of principles, but the great moments occur when experience comes to confirm the requirement of great principles. When the coincidence, the very beautiful coincidence of principles and experience occurs, philosophy knows its moment of happiness, even if it's personally the misfortune of the philosopher. And at that moment, the philosopher says: everything is fine, as it should be. So it is necessary for experience to show me that under certain conditions of disorganization in my consciousness, small perceptions force open the door of my consciousness and invade me. When my consciousness relaxes, I am thus invaded by small perceptions that do not become for all that conscious perceptions; they do not become apperceptions since they only invade my consciousness when my consciousness is disorganized.

At that moment, a flow of small perceptions invades me, unconscious small perceptions. It's not that they stop being unconscious, but it's me who ceases being conscious. But I live them, there is an unconscious lived experience. I do not represent them, I do not perceive them, but they are there, they swarm in these cases. I receive a huge blow on the head: dizziness is an example that recurs constantly in Leibniz's work. I get dizzy, I faint, and a flow of small unconscious perceptions arrives: a buzz, a buzz in my head. These texts by Leibniz, obviously, refer to texts that they cannot be aware of, but it's rather the reverse. Rousseau knew Leibniz, Rousseau who will undergo the cruel experience of fainting after having received a huge blow, and he relates his recovery – it's the same thing, fainting or emerging from fainting -- and the swarming of small perceptions. It's a very famous text by Rousseau in *The Reveries of a Solitary Stroller*, which is the return to consciousness, so this kind of swarming there, something like an itching of small perceptions. Fine.

Leibniz says “dizziness”, fine; let’s look, let’s look, we’re looking for what is called, or what some called at the end of the 19th century, experiences of thought. Experiences of thought, we don’t even need to pursue this, thank God; we know what it’s like, so through thought, we look for the kind of experience that corresponds to the principle: fainting. Leibniz goes much further; he asks himself: wouldn’t that be death? So, that will pose problems for theology. Leibniz’s hypothesis is that death would be that, death, that is, it would be the state of a living person who would not cease living; that is, death would be catalepsy, straight out of Edgar Poe, [*Laughter*] one is simply reduced to small perceptions.

And yet again, understand well, it’s not that they invade my consciousness, but it’s my consciousness that is extended, that loses all of its own power, that becomes diluted because it loses self-consciousness, but very strangely it becomes an infinitely tiny consciousness of small unconscious perceptions. This would be death. Very good, that it then; you cannot think… One mustn’t be contrary; one must agree, but that creates a load of problems. In other words, death is nothing other than an envelopment, perceptions cease being developed into conscious perceptions, they are enveloped into an infinity of small perceptions. Or yet again, he says, sleep without dreaming; sleep without dreaming is this kind, there are lots of small perceptions. Fine. Let’s continue some examples.

Do we have to say that only about perception? No. And there, once again, appears Leibniz’s genius. There is a Leibnizian psychology, a psychology with Leibniz’s name on it. That was one of the first great theories of the unconscious notably. I have already said almost enough about it for you to understand the difference and extent to which it’s a conception of the unconscious that has absolutely nothing to do with Freud’s. All this to say, to say to Freud’s great advantage, how much innovation one finds in Freud: it’s obviously not the hypothesis of an unconscious that has been proposed by very numerous authors, but it’s the way in which Freud conceived the unconscious. It’s obviously not at all the same way in which Leibniz conceives the unconscious. And, in the lineage from Freud, some very strange phenomena will be found, returning to a Leibnizian conception, but I will talk about that later.

Before we reach that point, understand that he simply cannot say that about perception since, in fact, according to Leibniz, the soul has two fundamental faculties: conscious apperception which is therefore composed of small unconscious perceptions, and what he calls "appetition", appetite, desire. And we are composed of desires and perceptions. And appetition is conscious appetite. If perceptions are made, if global perceptions are made up of an infinity of small perceptions, appetitions or gross appetites as is said, gross appetites are made up of an infinity of small appetitions. And appetitions are vectors corresponding to small perceptions, and that becomes a very strange unconscious with all these small appetitions and these small perceptions, the drop of the sea to which the droplet corresponds, to which a small appetition corresponds for someone who is thirsty. And when I say, "my God, I’m thirsty, I’m thirsty," when I say that, what am I doing? I grossly express a global outcome; ah, I grossly express a global outcome. And when I say, “I am hungry, I am hungry”, I grossly express a global outcome; a global outcome of what? Of thousands of small perceptions working within me, and thousands of small appetitions that crisscross me. Ah, you will ask, how is that? What does that mean?

I'll jump again across the centuries. In the beginning of the twentieth century, a great, great Spanish biologist fell into oblivion; his name was [Ramon] Turro [y Darder]. He wrote a book translated in French with the title: *The Origins of Knowledge*,[22] translated into French in 1914, and this book is extraordinary. Turro was greatly involved with considering hunger – how is this name pronounced in Spanish; it's written T-u-r-r-o… How?... Anyway, I don't know -- Turro said that when we say "I am hungry" – in my view, in my view, really, Turro's background was entirely in biology; I don't think that he read Leibniz; in any case, Turro isn't… and this is all the more interesting because his texts could have been signed [Leibniz]… and it's great when, without any direct influence, there is across a distance of centuries a page, and we might say, hey, we might say, what is someone's actuality, meaning that two centuries later, someone writes a book in an entirely different domain, and we say, my God, it's signed Leibniz, it's Leibniz who has visited us, who has reawakened there, really, it's strange --.

For Turro said that when one says, "I am hungry," it's not going well there, because it's really a global outcome, what he called a global sensation. Since, in the end, he says, he uses these concepts: global hunger and small specific hungers. He said that hunger as a global phenomenon is an effect, a statistical effect. What is… [*Interruption of the recording*] [93:12] [*The BNF recording omits the whole text of the following paragraph; we benefit from the text furnished by Web Deleuze*]

Part 3

[What is] hunger composed of as a global substance? Of thousands of tiny hungers: salt hunger, protein substance hunger, grease hunger, mineral salts hunger, etc. . . . When I say, "I'm hungry," I am literally undertaking, says Turro, the integral or the integration of these thousands of small specific hungers. The small differentials are differentials of conscious perception; conscious perception is the integration of small perceptions. Fine. You see that the thousand small appetitions are the thousand specific hungers. And Turro continues since there is still something strange on the animal level: how does an animal know what it has to have? The animal sees sensible qualities, it leaps forward and eats it, they all eat small qualities. The cow eats green, not grass, although it does not eat just any green since it recognizes the grass green and only eats grass green. The carnivore does not eat proteins, it eats something it saw, without seeing the proteins. The problem of instinct on the simplest level is: how does one explain that animals eat more or less anything that suits them? In fact, animals eat during a meal the quantity of fat, of salt, of proteins necessary for the balance of their internal milieu. And their internal milieu is what? It's the milieu of all the small perceptions and small appetitions. What a strange communication between consciousness and the unconscious. Each species eats more or less what it needs, except for tragic or comic errors that enemies of instinct always invoke: cats, for example, who go eat precisely what will poison them, but quite rarely. That's what the problem of instinct is. [*Return to BNF recording*]

This Leibnizian psychology invokes small appetitions that invest small perceptions; the small appetition makes the psychic investment of the small perception, and what world does that create? We never cease passing from one small perception to another, even without knowing it. Our consciousness remains there at global perceptions and gross appetites, "I am hungry," but when I say, "I am hungry," in fact, there are all sorts of passages, metamorphoses. My little salt

hunger that passes into another little hunger, a little protein hunger; a little protein hunger that passes into a little fat hunger, or everything mixed up, quite heterogeneously. And children who are dirt eaters, what do you think of that? By what miracle do they eat dirt when they need the vitamin that the earth contains? There we have the problem of instinct. It's odd. These are monsters, we could say about children who eat dirt; yes indeed, they are monsters! But God even made monsters in harmony. There we are, there we are.

So then, what is the status of psychic unconscious life? It happened that Leibniz encountered the thinking – I don't think that they met because the other one was dying – the thinking of an English philosopher, named [John] Locke, and Locke had written a book called *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Leibniz had been very interested in Locke, especially when he discovered that Locke was wrong in everything. [*Laughter*] And he had fun preparing a huge book that he called *New Essays on Human Understanding* in which, chapter by chapter, he reviewed and showed that Locke was an idiot. He was wrong, but still it was a great critique of Locke. And then he didn't publish it because it was quite honest for him, he had a very moral reaction, because Locke had died in the meantime. He told himself, to publish anyway – notice, I am saying this because, today, things don't work that way anymore [*Laughter*] – to publish a book against some guy who is either ill or dead, who just dies, that's not good, there's something awful in that. So, he had a huge book; his huge book was completely finished, and he put it aside, he didn't publish it, he wasn't afflicted by it, he still sent it to some friends, [*Laughter*] you just can't be perfect, right?

And I mention all this because Locke, in his best pages, constructs a concept for which I will use the English word, because I'm constrained and force to do so -- and as a result, you aren't going to understand what the concept is – it's the concept of "uneasiness." [*Pause*] That's not bad… [*One student, then another repeat the word to the others*] He has a Pakistan accent so it's not any better than mine… "Uneasy", "uneasy" … "Uneasy", what is that? And Leibniz is very clever here because he say "uneasy", which means, to summarize, it's unease (*malaise*), a state of unease, it's unease, being ill at ease. And "uneasiness", it's a state of unease. And Locke tries to explain that it's the great principle of psychic life. You see that it's very interesting. Why is this interesting? Because this removes us from the banalities about the search for pleasure or for happiness. Locke says something; he says, generally, well yes, the search for pleasure, that someone seeks his pleasure, it's quite possible to seek one's pleasure, one's happiness, it's something else. Perhaps it's possible, but that's not all; there is a kind of anxiety (*inquiétude*) for a living person, anxiety. This is an anxiety, you see, it's not distress either. He doesn't say it's distress. Anxiety is a concept. He proposes the psychological concept of anxiety. One is neither thirsting for pleasure, nor for happiness, nor distressed; that's not it, no. He seems to feel that that's not it. He thinks that we are, above all, anxious. We can't sit still, we move around.

And in a wonderful text Leibniz says, you see, that we can always try to translate this concept, but Leibniz says, there is something, no, finally, it's very difficult to translate because that works well in English, this word works well in English, and an Englishman immediately sees what it is. Ah, I would say it's someone who can't sit still. For us, we'd say that someone is nervous, nervous, that's what "uneasy" would be. Good, that's possible, what does that mean? You see how he borrows the concept from Locke and he is going to transform it: this unease of the living, what is it? It's not at all the unhappiness of the living person. Rather, it's when he is immobile,

when he has his conscious perception well framed, it all swarms: small perceptions and small appetites, small appetitions invest the fluid small perceptions, fluid perceptions and fluid appetites ceaselessly move, and that's it. So, of course, if there is a God, and Leibniz is persuaded that God exists, this uneasiness is so little a kind of unhappiness that it is just the same as the tendency to develop the maximum perception. And the development of the maximum perception will define a kind of psychic continuity. We again find the great theme of continuity, that is, an indefinite progress of consciousness. [*Pause*]

So, he combines that, simply, how is unhappiness possible? There can always be unfortunate encounters. He says, it's like when a stone is likely to fall: it is likely to fall along a path that is the right path, for example, and then it can meet a rock that crumbles it or splits it apart. It's really an accident connected to the law of the greatest slope. That doesn't prevent the law of the greatest slope from being the best. We can see what he means.

So, there we have an unconscious defined by small perceptions, and small perceptions are at once infinitely small perceptions and the differentials of conscious perception. And small appetites are at once unconscious appetites and differentials of conscious appetition. You see? There is a genesis of psychic life starting from differentials of consciousness. Hence the Leibnizian unconscious is the set of differentials of consciousness. It's the infinite totality of differentials of consciousness. There is a genesis of consciousness. So, I am saying, this is an unconscious. The idea of differentials of consciousness is fundamental: the drop of water and the appetite for the drop of water, specific small hungers, the world of fainting. All of that makes for a very odd world.

I am going to open a very quick parenthesis. So, what, that unconscious, that unconscious, you will find it in philosophy; it has a very long history in philosophy. Overall, we can say that in fact, it's the discovery and the theorizing of a properly differential unconscious. You see that this unconscious has many links – this is why I was saying a psycho-mathematical domain – it has many links to infinitesimal analysis. Just as there are differentials for a curve, there are differentials for consciousness. The two domains, the psychic domain and the mathematical domain, project symbols. [*Pause*] So, fine, I am saying, if I look for the lineage – in my view, whatever they are, there are always predecessors -- but it's Leibniz who proposed this great idea, the first great theory of this differential unconscious, and from there it never stopped. That will not stop; there is a very long tradition of this differential conception of the unconscious based on small perceptions and small appetitions. It culminates notably in a very great author who, strangely, has always been poorly understood in France, from whom we've only retained some very rudimentary things, namely a very strange German post-Romantic named [Gustav] Fechner who is a disciple of Leibniz and who developed the conception of differential unconscious.

I am saying, we say, well then, Freud, "what was Freud's contribution?", it's obviously a non-sense. It's obvious that the unconscious was already a very well-constructed notion before Freud. But what is also obvious is that Freud broke with this conception of the differential unconscious. And why? If I am trying to state this quite superficially, it's not that, for Freud, there were no unconscious perceptions, [but] there were also unconscious perceptions, there are also unconscious desires. You recall that for Freud, there is the idea both that representation can be

unconscious, and in another sense, affect also can be unconscious. That corresponds to perception and appetition.

But Freud's innovation is that he conceived the unconscious in a relation -- and here, I am saying something very elementary to underscore a huge, huge difference -- he conceived of the unconscious in a conflictual or oppositional relationship with consciousness, and not in a differential relationship. This is completely different from conceiving of an unconscious that expresses differentials of consciousness or conceiving of an unconscious that expresses a force that is opposed to consciousness and that enters into conflict with it. In other words, for Leibniz, there is a relationship between consciousness and the unconscious, a relation of difference to vanishing differences, whereas for Freud, there is a relation of opposition of forces. I could say, in fact, that the unconscious attracts representations, it tears them from consciousness, and it's really like two forces like that [*Deleuze makes a gesture of opposition*]. I could say that, philosophically, Freud depends on Kant and Hegel, that's obvious. Those who explicitly oriented the unconscious, and who explicitly oriented it in the direction of a conflict of will, and no longer of differential of perception, were from the school of Schopenhauer that Freud knew very well and that descended from Kant. So, there is no basis for not safeguarding Freud's complete originality, except that in fact, Freud received his preparation in certain philosophical theories of the unconscious, but certainly not in the Leibnizian strain; it would be a Schopenhauerian strain. But anyway, there we are.

So, to finish with this finally, because… I would like to say this: fine, we have this outline. Our conscious perception is composed of an infinity of small perceptions. Our conscious appetite is composed of an infinity of small appetites. What does that mean? But this is completely different. Leibniz is in the process of preparing a very strange operation; we have an urge to protest; and if we didn't hold ourselves back, we would protest immediately. We could say to him, well fine, perception has causes, for example, my perception of green, or of any color, that implies all sorts of physical vibrations. And these physical vibrations are not themselves perceived. Even though there might be an infinity of elementary causes in a conscious perception, by what right does Leibniz conclude from this that these elementary causes are themselves objects of infinitely small perceptions? Why? And what does he mean when he says that our conscious perception is composed of an infinity of small perceptions, exactly like perception of the sound of the sea is composed of the perception of every drop of water? It's still… yes.

And well, if you look at his texts closely, it's very odd because these texts say two different things, one of which is manifestly expressed like that, by simplification and the other expresses Leibniz's true thought. In fact, I am coming back to my topic. You can organize these texts, the aggregate of Leibniz's texts on small perception, into two headings: some are under the part-whole heading, and in that case, it means that conscious perception is always perception of a whole, this perception of a whole assuming not only infinitely small parts, but assuming that these infinitely small parts are perceived. [*Pause*] Hence the formula: conscious perception is made of small perceptions, and I am saying that, in this case, "is made of" is the same as "to be composed of", "to be composed of", and Leibniz expresses himself in this way quite often.

I select a text that I'll quote, like that, but there are a lot of them [*Pause; Deleuze looks through the text*]: "Otherwise we would not sense the whole at all" -- If there were not all these small perceptions, we would have no consciousness at all. I am not making this up here; he only says that – "The organs of sense operate a totalization of small perceptions." The eye, for example, is what contracts, what totalizes an infinity of small vibrations, and henceforth composes with these tiny vibrations a global quality that I call green, or that I call red, or what I call… Here the text is clear, it's a question of the whole-parts relationship.

But when Leibniz really wants to say… And understand, this isn't a way of being suspicious. When Leibniz wants to move rapidly, when he wants to make himself understood quickly, he has every interest in speaking like that, but when he really wants to explain things, -- here, yes, this would be the opposition between making himself understood and explicating – when he wants to make himself understood, he says that; when he really wants to explicate, he says something else, he says that conscious perception is derived from small perceptions. It's not the same thing, "is composed of" and "is derived from". In one case, you have the Whole-Parts relationship, in the other, you have a relationship of a completely different nature.

So, what different nature? The relation of derivation: that refers us to infinitesimal analysis, what we call a derivative. That also brings us back to infinitesimal calculus: conscious perception derives from the infinity of small perceptions. At that point, I would no longer say that the organs of sense totalize. Notice that the mathematical notion of integral links the two: the integral is what derives from, and the integral is also what operates an integration, a kind of totalization, but precisely, this is a very special kind of totalization; it's not a totalization through additions; it's a very special type of totalization. So here, this gets interesting. We can say without risk of error that although Leibniz doesn't indicate it, it's even the second texts that have the final word. When Leibniz tells us, there is something that conscious perception is composed of small perceptions, this is not his true thinking. We have every reason to say this; I just explained this. On the contrary, his true thinking is that conscious perception derives from small perceptions. What does "derive from" mean?

Well, you recall the text that I just read about the whole. Here is an completely different text by Leibniz: "Otherwise" – this was "otherwise", we wouldn't perceive the whole – this is a different text: [*Pause; Deleuze looks in the text while humming*] "Perception of light or of color that we perceive" -- that is, conscious perception – "is composed of a quantity of small perceptions that we do not perceive, and a noise that we do not perceive but to which we give no attention becomes a-perceptible" -- i.e. passes into the state of conscious perception – "becomes a-perceptible through a tiny addition or augmentation."

Ahhh… you understand? Here, we take this literally: he doesn't say "through a totalization"; [*Pause*] we no longer pass from small perceptions into conscious perception via totalization as the first version of the text suggested; we pass from small perceptions into global conscious perception via a tiny addition. We realize, suddenly, we thought we understood, and now we no longer understand a thing. A tiny addition is the addition of a small perception; so, we pass from small perceptions into global conscious perception via a small perception? [*Pause; Deleuze gives an exasperates sigh*] We tell ourselves that this isn't right. [*Another exasperated sigh*] Suddenly, we tend to fall back on the other version of the text, at least that one was clearer. It was clearer,

but it was insufficient. Sufficient texts are sufficient, but we no longer understand anything in them.

A wonderful situation, except if we recall or if we chance to encounter an adjoining text in which Leibniz tells us: "We must consider that we think a quantity of things all at once – it seems, for him, -- “we have to consider that we that we think a quantity of things all at once, but we pay attention only to thoughts that are the most distinguished”. Fine, you will tell me, so… and so… [*Pause; Deleuze looks in the text*] and so… we continue, and we come upon another little fragment.

« For what is remarkable must be composed of parts that are not remarkable” – aahh – “For what is remarkable must be composed of parts that are not remarkable” -- there, Leibniz is in the process of mixing up everything, but on purpose, on purpose. Excellent! We who are no longer innocent, we can situate the word "remarkable”, and we know that each time – once again, I am certain that I’m correct – each time that he uses "notable", "remarkable", "distinguished", it’s in a very technical sense, and at the same time, he creates a muddle everywhere, understand? He accomplished a diabolical master stroke. For the very idea that there is something clear and distinct, ever since Descartes, was an idea that circulated all over. Leibniz slides in his little "distinguished" in the preceding text: “but we pay attention only to thoughts that are the most distinguished”. He might have said, we pay attention only to the clear and to the distinct; he didn’t say that; he said: “we pay attention only to thoughts that are the most distinguished”. Understand "the distinguished”, “the notable”, “the remarkable”, “the singular”, there we are.

So, what does that mean? “We pass from small unconscious perceptions to global conscious perception through a tiny addition”, well yes, obviously. This is not just any tiny addition. That would be stupid if he meant through addition, through an equally unconscious perception, equally small perception. However, if he means something else, then he contradicts himself. For he can not say, in fact, we pass into conscious perception through the addition of a perception that would itself be conscious. So, what does he mean? He means that your small perceptions form a series of ordinaries or a series called regular: all the tiny drops of water, elementary perceptions, infinitesimal perceptions.

How do you pass into the global perception of the sound of the sea? First answer, if I summarize everything; first answer: via globalization-totalization. Commentator’s answer, that is, you and me: fine, it’s easy to say, easy to say, it’s fine. So, myself, I would never think of raising an objection to you. I cannot say that doesn’t work. You have to like an author just enough to know that he’s not mistaken, that if he speaks like that, he has the right to proceed quickly.

Second answer: I pass via a tiny addition. This cannot be the addition of an ordinary or regular small perception, nor can it be the addition of a conscious perception since at that point, consciousness would be presupposed. The answer is that I reach a neighborhood of a remarkable point, so I do not operate a totalization, but rather a singularization. This is through singularization. It’s when the series of tiny perceived drops of water approaches or enters into the neighborhood of a singular point, a remarkable point, that perception becomes conscious. It’s a completely different vision because at that moment, all objections, a great part of the objections made to the idea of a differential unconscious falls away. But you will ask me, what does that

mean? That doesn't mean anything. What does that mean? [*Pause*] There we are, have you understood? [*Pause*] Yes, what does that mean? It seems that we are not getting out of this, and at the same time, we are already out; it's the simplest thing. What does that mean?

So, here arrive the texts by Leibniz that appear the most complete. You recall what we are bringing with us from the start, in fact, the idea that with small elements, this is a manner of speaking because what is differential are not elements, and here, you are fully correct to remind us of this earlier; but we can express it in this way through commodity, and it's simpler to say this. In fact, what is differential in relations? What is differential is not dx in relation to an x, because dx in relation to an x is nothing. What is differential is not a dy in relation to a y because dy in relation to a y is nothing. What is differential is, and what works within the infinitely small, is dy over dx, it's the relation.

But what relation? You recall that on the level of singular points, the differential relation changes its sign. That's excellent! Leibniz is in the process of impregnating Freud without knowing it. On the level of the singularity, there are increases or decreases, the differential relation changes it sign, that is, the sign is inverted. In this case of perception, which is the differential relation? Why is it that these are not elements, but indeed relations? What we must see is that, in fact, what determines a relation is precisely a relationship between physical elements and my body. So, you have dy-dx. It's the relation of physical excitation to my biological body. That's the differential relation of perception. So, we will no longer say, at that level, you understand, we can no longer speak exactly of small perceptions. We will speak of the differential relation between physical excitation and the biological [*Pause*] state by assimilating it frankly to dy over dx, it matters little, by frankly assimilating it to dy over dx.

And perception becomes conscious when the differential relation corresponds to a singularity, that is, changes its sign. In other words, for example, when excitation gets sufficiently closer, [*Pause*] I would say that, literally to make like Leibniz – he wouldn't say this -- it's the molecule of water closest to my body that is going to define the minute increase through which the infinity of small perceptions becomes conscious perception. It's no longer a relation of whole-parts at all; it's a relation of derivation. It's the differential relation between that which excites and my biological body that is going to permit the definition of the singularity's neighborhood. Notice in which sense Leibniz could say that inversions of signs, that is, passages from consciousness to the unconscious and from the unconscious to consciousness, the inversions of signs refer to a differential unconscious and not to an unconscious of opposition.

Think about when I alluded to Freud's posterity, in Jung, for example, with the great Freud-Jung rupture, I am not at all saying that's all there is in Jung because it's such a mixture, Jung, but Jung has an entire Leibnizian side, and besides, Jung knows Leibniz well, and what he reintroduces, to Freud's greatest anger -- and it's in this that Freud judges that Jung absolutely betrayed psychoanalysis -- is an unconscious of the differential type. And he owes that to whom? He owes it to the tradition of German Romanticism; the unconscious of the German Romantics is closely linked also to the unconscious of Leibniz.

So see, I was able to provide a rigorous meaning to Leibniz's very statement: we pass from small perceptions to unconscious perception through addition of something notable, that is, when the

series of ordinaries reaches the neighborhood of the following singularity, such that psychic life, just like the mathematical curve, will be subject to a law which is that of the composition of the continuous. And why is the continuous the object of a composition? There is composition of the continuous since the continuous is a product: the product of the act by which a singularity is extended into the neighborhood of another singularity. And that this works not only upon the universe of the mathematical symbol, but also upon the universe of perception, of consciousness, and of the unconscious, and from this point onward, we have but one question: what are the compossible and incompossible? These derive directly from all this. [*Pause*] What time is it? [*Inaudible answer*] Fine, so I will end on this. There we are. Can you go on some more? Because if you are done, it would be better to stop… You can? Well, I don't know what you're feeling… [*ce que vous avez…*]

There we are, we possess the formula for compossibility, we possess it. Suppose that I say this: you have a singularity. Now I can say: you take the simplest case; I return to my example of the square with its four singularities. You take a singularity, [*Pause*] and you trace… you take a singularity, this singular point, it's a point; you take it as the center of a circle. Are you following me? I am no longer doing the drawing. You take is as the center of a circle. Which circle? All the way into the neighborhood of the other singularity. In other words, you take [point] A, you take large A, in the square ABCD, you take large A as center of a circle that stops within the periphery in the neighborhood of singularity B. [With] B, you do the same thing: you take, you trace a circle that stops in the neighborhood of the singularity A and you trace another circle that stops in the neighborhood of singularity C. You see, these circles intersect. [*Pause*]

So, you go on like that constructing, from one singularity to the next, what you will be able to call a continuity. The simplest case of a continuity is a straight line, but there is also precisely a continuity of non-straight lines. Into what? You see, you have your system of circles that intersect, you will say that there is continuity when [*Pause*] the values of two ordinary series, those of A to B, those of B to A, coincide. When there is a coincidence of values of two ordinary series encompassed in the two circles, you have a continuity. So, you can construct a continuity made from continuity. You can construct a continuity of continuity. The square would be a continuity of continuity. If the series of ordinaries that derive from singularities diverge, then you have a discontinuity. Fine, that becomes quite simple.

You will say that a world is constituted by a continuity of continuity, first definition. A world is constituted by a continuity of continuity, it's the composition of the continuous. A discontinuity is defined when the series of ordinaries or regulars deriving from two points diverge. Third definition: the existing world is the best? Why? Because it's the world that assures the maximum of continuity. Fourth definition: what is the compossible? An aggregate of composed continuities. Final definition: what is the incompossible? When the series diverge, when you can no longer compose the continuity of this world with the continuity of this other world. Divergence in the series of ordinaries that depend on singularities: at that moment, it can no longer belong to the same world.

You have a law of composition of the continuous that is, really, I'm returning here, psycho-mathematical. Why isn't that evident? Why is all this exploration of the unconscious necessary? Why isn't that evident? Because, yet again, God is perverse. God's perversity lies in having

chosen the world that implicates the maximum of continuity – you see, calculus of the maximum – he/she chose the world and caused to pass into being, into existence the world that implied the maximum of continuity. Only, here we are, he composed the chosen world in this form, only he/she dispersed the continuities since these are continuities of continuities. God dispersed them.

What does that mean? It seems that there are, says Leibniz, in our world, it seems that there are discontinuities, leaps, ruptures as he says with an admirable term, it seems that there are musical descents (*chutes de musique*), there are musical descents. But in fact, there are none. It's simply that, for example, it seems there is a gap… or to some among us, it seems – on the contrary, there are certain people to whom it seems there is not – but to some among us, it seems that there is a gap between man and animal, a rupture. This is necessary because God, with his/her extreme malice, conceived of the world to be chosen in the form of the maximum of continuity, so there are all sorts of intermediary degrees between animal and man, but God held back from making these visible to us. If the need arose, God placed them on other planets of our world. Why? Because finally, it was good, it was good for us to be able to believe in the excellence of our domination of nature. If we had seen all the transitions between the worst animal and us, we would have been less vain.

So, this vanity is still quite good because it allows man to establish his power over nature. In the end, it's not a perversity of God; it's that God never ceased breaking continuities that God had constructed. Why? In order to introduce variety in the chosen world, in order to hide the whole system of tiny differences, of vanishing differences. So, God proposed to our sensory organs and to our feeble thinking, presented on the contrary a very divided world. We spend our time saying that animals have no soul, as Descartes would say, or else that they do not speak, or else all of that. But not at all, not at all: there are all sorts of transitions, there are always all sorts of tiny differences, etc.

So, you see, the definition at which we've arrived, and where I want to stop, here we grasp something, a specific relation that is compossibility or incompossibility. I would say yet again that compossibility is when series of ordinaries converge, series of regular points that derive from two singularities and when their values coincide, otherwise there is discontinuity. In one case, you have the definition of compossibility, in the other case, the definition of incompossibility. Question, once again: why did God choose this world rather than another, when another was possible? Leibniz's answer which, in my view, becomes splendid: it's because it is the world that mathematically implicates the maximum of continuity, and it's uniquely in this sense that it is the best, that is the best of possible worlds.

There we are, finally, I'd just like you to retain this: everything is constructed around what? If you will, that's what a concept is; it becomes very, very… You see? A concept is always a complex. A concept is always something very complex. We can situate our session today under the sign of the concept of singularity. And the concept of singularity has all sorts of languages that intersect within it. A concept is always, literally, polyvocal; it is necessarily polyvocal since you can grasp the concept of singularity only through a minimum of mathematical apparatuses: singular points in opposition to ordinary or regular points, on the level of thought experiences of a psychological type: what is dizziness, what is a murmur, what is a hum, etc. [*Pause*] And on

the level of philosophy as concept, in Leibniz's case, the construction of this relation of compossibility.

And the three will have to… It's not a mathematical philosophy, no more than mathematics becomes philosophy, but in a philosophical concept, there are all sorts of different orders that necessarily symbolize. And already here, I would say, it's true for any philosophical concept that it is a philosophical concept that it has a philosophical heading, it has a mathematical heading, and it has a heading for an experience of thought. And it's true of all concepts, it's true for all.

So, I believe that it was a great day for philosophy when someone brought this odd couple to general attention, and that's what I call a creation in philosophy. I call it this "odd couple"; I mean, well yes, when Leibniz proposed this topic – you know, the singular, there precisely is the act of creation -- when Leibniz tells us, you know, the singular, think about this well, there is no reason for you simply to oppose it to the universal. It's much more interesting if you listen a bit to what mathematicians say, who for their own reasons think, on the contrary, of "singular" not in relation to "universal," but in relation to "ordinary" or "regular." So, Leibniz isn't doing mathematics at that point.

I would say that his inspiration is mathematical, and he goes on to create a philosophical theory, notably a whole conception of truth that is radically new since it's going to consist in saying: don't pay too much attention to the matter of true and false; you don't ask in your thinking what is true and what is false, because what is true and what is false in your thinking always results from something that is much deeper. What matters in thinking is what is remarkable, these are remarkable points and ordinary points. Both are necessary: if you only have singular points in thinking, you have no method of extension, it's worthless; if you have only ordinary points, it's in your interest to think something else, it's all the same, all that. And the more you believe yourself [to be] remarkable (special), the less you think of remarkable points, necessarily, necessarily.

In other words, the thought of the singular is the most modest thought in the world. It's there that the thinker necessarily becomes modest, because the thinker is the extension onto the series of ordinaries, and thought itself explodes in the element of singularity, and the element of singularity is the concept. There we are. [*End of session*] [2:17:37]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

Lecture 04, 06 May 1980

Translation and supplements to transcript based on YouTube video[23], Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

Deleuze: So, first point: I believe that Georges Comtesse wanted to speak about a rather strange text, but there are a lot of strange texts by Leibniz, where Leibniz… But I don't want to say what it is ahead of him… So, go ahead.

[Georges Comtesse, a faithful regular attendee at Deleuze's seminars, reads some excerpts from a book not by Leibniz, but in which Leibniz provided some comments, entitled *Treatise on a few points about the religion of the Chinese by the reverend father Nicolas Longobardi* (1701), 0:25-9:50]

Deleuze: That's very good. I would like to say that he provided a very fine account, it seems to me. I would like to say only two relatively insignificant things in relation to what Comtesse has said. The first is a rather frequent theme during that era, at the end of the seventeenth century: a type of confrontation between Christian thought and Chinese thought. For example, there is a text by Malebranche that is rather odd, a conversation… the title is something I can't remember, something like "Conversation of a Christian philosopher and a Chinese philosopher", in which he creates a kind of dialogue, with very comparable themes to what you said about Leibniz.

So, I ask myself, what makes this so urgent? Certainly, there is all kind of information at the end of the seventeenth century showing that there already was a great Orient-Occident confrontation. So, one has to understand historically and geographically why philosophy at the end of the seventeenth century marks a turning point in this confrontation.

But on the other hand, there is an anecdotal reason, a properly philosophical reason that adds an additional interest to this confrontation for philosophers at the end of the seventeenth century. In the end, it's the great absence in this kind of text because as an aspect of a confrontation with Chinese thought, either to condemn it, or – as you showed well was the case for Leibniz – to appropriate something from it, the great absence from within this text is the name not cited, obviously that of Spinoza. What they want to show, in the end, and starting with the Jesuits, is that Spinoza does not think like a European, like an Occidental, but thinks like a Chinese, which is a grave accusation.

So all that on the theme, matter, atheism, etc., it's directly aimed against Chinese philosophy, it's a mask behind or under which Spinozism is being denounced which in that ear has a very great influence in Europe and is considered the most dangerous form of thought. So there is a whole settling of scores with Spinoza who is assimilated to a completely exoteric thought, you understand. In fact, everything is centered on life-matter relations. Is there a life-matter that is sufficient, and what does atheism mean?

So, what I have for today, what I would like to do goes somewhat in this direction. We'll see. What I'd like to do… The last time, we ended with this question, one that's very funny, very important, very funny, very important, very funny, very important: what is compossibility and what is incompossibility? What are these two relationships, the relationship of compossibility and incompossibility? How do we define them?

We saw that these questions created all kinds of problems and led us necessarily to the exercise, however cursory, of infinitesimal analysis. Today, I would like to create a third major rubric that would consist in showing the extent to which Leibniz organizes in a new manner and even creates some genuine principles. Creating principles is not a fashionable task of late. This third major introductory chapter for a possible reading of Leibniz is one I will call: Deduction of principles, precisely because principles are objects of a special kind of deduction, a philosophical deduction, which does not go without saying.

There is such a rich abundance of principles in Leibniz's work. He constantly invokes principles while giving them, when necessary, names that did not previously exist. In order to situate oneself within his principles, one has to discover the progression (*cheminement*) of Leibnizian deduction.

The first principle that Leibniz creates with a rapid justification is the principle of identity. It is the minimum, the minimum that he offers himself. What is the principle of identity? Every principle is a reason. A is A. A thing is a thing, it is what a thing is. I have already moved forward slightly. A thing is what it is, this is better than A is A. Why? Because it shows that it [the thing] is the region governed by the principle of identity. If the principle of identity can be expressed in the form: a thing is what it is, this is because identity consists in manifesting the proper identity between the thing and what the thing is.

If identity governs the relationship between the thing and what the thing is, namely what thing is identical to the thing, and the thing is identical to what it is, I can say: what is the thing? What the thing is, everyone has called it the essence of the thing. I would say that the principle of identity is the rule of essences or, what comes down to the same thing, the rule of the possible. In fact, the impossible is contradictory. The possible is the identical so that, to the extent that the principle of identity is a reason, a ratio, then which ratio? It is the ratio of essences or, as the Latins used to say, or the Middle Age terminology long before: *ratio essendi*. I choose that as a typical example because I think that it is very difficult to do philosophy if you do not have a kind of terminological certainty. Never tell yourself that you can do without it, but also never tell yourself that it is difficult to acquire. It is exactly the same as scales on the piano. If you do not

know rather precisely the rigor of concepts, that is, the sense of major notions, then it is very difficult. One has to approach that like an exercise. It is normal for philosophers to have their own scales; it is their mental piano. One must change the tune of the categories. The history of philosophy can only be created by philosophers, yet alas, it has fallen into the hands of philosophy professors, and that's not good because they have turned philosophy into examination material and not material for study, or for scales.

Each time that I speak of a principle according to Leibniz, I am going to give it two formulations: a vulgar formulation and a scholarly one. This is a beautiful procedure on the level of principles, the necessary relation between pre-philosophy and philosophy, this relationship of exteriority in which philosophy needs a pre-philosophy.

The vulgar formulation of the principle of identity: the thing is what the thing is, the identity of the thing and of its essence. You already see, in the vulgar formulation, that there are lots of things implied. The scholarly formulation of the principle of identity: every analytical proposition is true. What is an analytical proposition? It is a proposition in which the predicate and the subject are identical. An analytical proposition is true, A is A, is true. By going into the detail of Leibniz's formulae, one can even complete the scholarly formulation: every analytical proposition is true in two cases: either by reciprocity or by inclusion.

An example of a proposition of reciprocity: the triangle has three angles. Having three angles is what the triangle is. Second case: inclusion: the triangle has three sides. In fact, a closed figure having three angles envelops, includes, implies having three sides. We will say that analytical propositions of reciprocity are objects of intuition, and we will say that analytical propositions of inclusion are objects of demonstration.

Thus, the principle of identity, the rule of essences, or of the possible, *ratio essendi*: what question does it answer? To what cry does the principle of identity respond? The pathetic cry that constantly appears in Leibniz's works, corresponding to the principle of identity, why is there something rather than nothing? It is the cry of the *ratio essendi*, of the reason for being (*raison d'être*). If there were no identity, no identity conceived as identity of the thing and what the thing is, then there would be nothing.

Second principle: principle of sufficient reason.

This refers us back to the whole domain that we located as being the domain of existences. The ratio corresponding to the principle of sufficient reason is no longer the *ratio essendi*, the reason of essences or the reason for being, it is now the *ratio existendi*, the reason for existing. It is no longer the question: why something rather than nothing, since the principle of identity assured us that there was something, namely the identical. It is no longer: why something rather than nothing, but rather it is why this rather than that?

What would its vulgar formulation be? We saw that every thing has a reason. Indeed, every thing must have a reason. What would the scholarly formulation be? You see that we apparently are completely outside the principle of identity. Why? Because the principle of identity concerns the identity of the thing and what it is, but it does not state whether the thing exists. The fact that the

thing exists or does not exist is completely different from what it is. I can always define what a thing is independently of the question of knowing if it exists or not. For example, I know that the unicorn does not exist, but I can state what a unicorn is. Thus, a principle is indeed necessary that makes us think of the existent (*l'existant*). So just how does a principle, that appears to us as vague as "everything has a reason," make us think of the existent? It is precisely the scholarly formulation that will explain it to us. We find this scholarly formulation in Leibniz's works in the following statement: every predication (predication means the activity of judgment that attributes something to a subject; when I say "the sky is blue," I attribute blue to sky, and I operate a predication), every predication has a basis (*fondement*) in the nature of things. It is the *ratio existendi*.

Let us try to understand better how every predication has a basis in the nature of things. This means: everything said about a thing, the entirety of what is said about a thing, is the predication concerning this thing. Everything said about a thing is encompassed, contained, included in the notion of the thing. This is the principle of sufficient reason. You see that the formula which appeared innocent a short while ago - every predication has a basis in the nature of things, taking it literally - becomes much stranger: everything said about a thing must be encompassed, contained, included in the notion of the thing. So, what is everything said about a thing? First, it is the essence. In fact, the essence is said about the thing. Only one finds at that level that there would be no difference between sufficient reason and identity. And this is normal since sufficient reason includes all the properties (*tout l'acquis*) of the principle of identity but is going to add something to it: what is said about a thing is not only the essence of the thing, it is the entirety of the affections, of the events that refer or belong to the thing.

Thus, not only will the essence be contained in the notion of the thing, but the slightest of events, of affections concerning the thing as well, that is, what is attributed truthfully to the thing, is going to be contained in the notion of the thing.

We have seen this: crossing the Rubicon, whether one likes it or not, must be contained in the notion of Caesar. Events, affections of the type "loving" and "hating" must be contained in the notion of that subject feeling these affections. In other words, each individual notion -- and the existent is precisely the object, the correlate of an individual notion -- each individual notion expresses the world. That is what the principle of sufficient reason is. Everything has a reason means that everything that happens to something must be contained forever in the individual notion of the thing.

The definitive formulation of the principle of sufficient reason is quite simple: every true proposition is analytical, every true proposition, for example, every proposition that consists in attributing to something an event that really occurred and that concerns the something. So if it is indeed true, the event must be encompassed in the notion of the thing.

What is this domain? It is the domain of infinite analysis whereas, on the contrary, at the level of the principle of identity, we were only dealing with finite analyses. There will be an infinite analytical relationship between the event and the individual notion that encompasses the event. In short, the principle of sufficient reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity. Only, what

has occurred in the reciprocal? The reciprocal has taken over a radically new domain, the domain of existences. It was sufficient merely to reciprocate, to reverse the formula of identity in order to obtain the formula of sufficient reason; it was enough to reciprocate the formula of identity that concerns essences in order to obtain a new principle, the principle of sufficient reason concerning existences. You will tell me that this was not complicated. Yet it was enormously complicated, so why? The reciprocal, this reciprocation was only possible if one were able to extend the analysis to infinity. So the notion, the concept of infinite analysis is an absolutely original notion. Does that consist in saying that this takes place uniquely in the understanding *(l'entendement*) of God, which is infinite? Certainly not. This implies an entire technique, the technique of differential analysis or infinitesimal calculus.

Third principle: is it true that the reciprocal of the reciprocal would yield the first? It is not certain. Everything depends, there are so many viewpoints. Let us try to vary the formulation of the principle of sufficient reason. For sufficient reason, where I left things was saying that everything that happens to a thing must be encompassed, included in the notion of the thing, which implies infinite analysis. In other words, for everything that happens or for every thing, there is a concept. I had insisted on this, that what matters is not at all a manner for Leibniz to hearken back to a famous principle. On the contrary, he does not want that at all; this would be the principle of causality. When Leibniz says that everything has a reason, this does not at all mean that everything has a cause. Saying everything has a cause signifies a refers to b, b refers to c, etc. ... Everything has a reason means that one must account for reason in causality itself, namely that everything has a reason means that the relationship that a maintains with b must be encompassed in one way or another in the notion of a. Just like the relationship that b maintains with c must be encompassed one way or another in the notion of b. Thus, the principle of sufficient reason goes beyond the principle of causality. It is in this sense that the principle of causality states only the necessary cause, but not the sufficient reason. Causes are only necessities that themselves refer to and presuppose sufficient reasons.

Thus, I can state the principle of sufficient reason in the following way: for every thing there is a concept that takes account both of the thing and of its relations with other things, including its causes and its effects.

For every thing, there is a concept, and that does not go without saying. Lots of people will think that existence indeed consists of not having a concept. For every thing there is a concept, so what would the reciprocal be? Understand that the reciprocal does not at all have the same meaning. In Aristotle's work, there is a treatise of ancient logic that deals solely with the table of opposites. What is the contradictory, the contrary, the subaltern, etc. ...? You cannot say the contradictory when it is the contrary, you cannot just say anything. Here I use the word reciprocal without specifying. When I say for every thing there is a concept (yet again, this is not at all certain), assume that you grant me that. In this, I cannot escape the reciprocal. What is the reciprocal?

For a theory of the concept, we would have to start again from the bird song. The great difference between cries and songs -- cries of alarm, of hunger, and then bird songs. And we can explain acoustically what the difference is between cries and songs. In the same way, on the level of thought, there are cries of thought and songs of thought (*chants de pensée*). How does one

distinguish these cries and these songs? One cannot understand how a philosophy as song or a philosophical song develops if one does not refer it to coordinates that are kinds of cries, continuous cries. These cries and songs are complex.

If I return to music, the example that I recall again and again is the two great operas of [Alban] Berg; there are two great death cries, the cry of Marie [in *Wozzeck*] and the cry of Lulu.[24] When one dies, one does not sing, and yet there is someone who sings over the deceased, the mourner. The one who loses the loved one sings. Or cries, I do not know. In *Wozzeck*, it is a si-, it is a siren. When you put sirens into music, you are placing a cry there. It is strange. And the two cries are not the same type, even acoustically: there is a cry that flits upward and there is a cry that skims along the earth. And then there is the song (or chant). Lulu's great woman friend sings death. It is fantastic. It is signed Berg. I would say that the signature of a great philosopher is the same. When a philosopher is great, although he writes very abstract pages, these are abstract only because you did not know how to locate the moment in which he raises a cry. There is a cry underneath, a cry that is horrible.

Let us return to the song of sufficient reason. Everything has a reason is a song. It is a melody, we could harmonize, a harmony of concepts. But underneath there would be rhythmic cries: no, no, no. I return to my chanted formulation of the principle of sufficient reason. One can sing off key in philosophy. People who sing off key in philosophy know it very well, but it [philosophy] is completely dead. They can talk interminably. The song of sufficient reason: for every thing there is a concept. What is the reciprocal ? In music, one would speak of retrograde series. Let us look for the reciprocal of "every thing has a concept." The reciprocal is: for every concept there is one thing alone.

Why is this the reciprocal of "for every thing a concept"? Suppose that a concept had two things that corresponded to it. There is a thing that has no concept and, in that case, sufficient reason is ruined (*foutue*). I cannot say "for every thing a concept". As soon as I have said "for every thing a concept," I have necessarily said that a concept had necessarily one thing alone, since if a concept has two things, there is something that has no concept, and therefore I already could no longer say "for every thing a concept." Thus, the true reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz will be stated like this: for every concept, one thing alone. It is a reciprocal in a very funny sense. But in this case of reciprocation, sufficient reason and the other principle, notably "for every thing, a concept" and "for every concept, one thing alone," I cannot say one without saying the other. Reciprocation is absolutely necessary. If I do not recognize the second, I destroy the first.

When I said that sufficient reason was the reciprocal of the principle of identity, it was not in the same sense since, if you recall the proposition of the principle of identity -- namely, every analytical proposition is true – I reciprocate and I obtain sufficient reason, namely, every true proposition is analytical: here, there is no necessity. I can say that every analytical proposition is true without, through this, that any true proposition only being analytical. I could very well say that there are true propositions that are something other than analytical. Thus, when Leibniz created his reciprocation of identity, he accomplished a master stroke. He accomplished this

master stroke because he had the means to accomplish, that is, he let out a cry. He had himself created an entire method of infinite analysis. Otherwise, he could not have done so.

Whereas in the case of the passage from sufficient reason to the third principle that I have yet to baptize, there reciprocation is absolutely necessary. It had to be discovered. What does it mean that for every concept there is a thing and only one thing? Here it gets strange, you have to understand. It means that there are no two absolutely identical things, or every difference is conceptual in the last instance. If you have two things, there must be two concepts, otherwise there would not be two things. Does that mean that there are no two absolutely identical things as far as the concept goes? It means that there are no two identical drops of water, no two identical leaves. In this, Leibniz is perfect, he gets delirious with this principle. He says that obviously you, you believe that two drops of water are identical, but this is because you do not go far enough in your analysis. They cannot have the same concept. Here this is very odd because all of classical logic tends to tell us rather that the concept, by its very nature, encompasses an infinite plurality of things.

The concept of drops of water is applicable to all drops of water. Leibniz says, of course, if you have blocked off analysis of the concept at a certain point, at a finite moment; but if you push the analysis forward, there will be a moment in which the concepts are no longer the same. This is why the ewe recognizes its lamb, one of Leibniz's examples: how does the ewe recognize its little lamb? They [Eux] think it is via the concept. A little lamb does not have the same concept as the same individual concept, and it is in this manner that the concept extends to the individual, another little lamb. What is this principle? There is but a single thing; there is necessarily one thing per concept and only one. Leibniz names it the principle of indiscernibles. We can state it this way: there is one thing and only one thing per concept, or every difference is conceptual in the final instance.

There is only conceptual difference. In other words, if you assign a difference between two things, there is necessarily a difference in the concept. Leibniz names this the principle of indiscernibles. And if I make it correspond to a ratio, what is this? You sense correctly that it consists in saying that we only gain knowledge through the concept. In other words, the principle of indiscernibles seems to me to correspond to the third ratio, the ratio as *ratio cognoscendi*, the reason as reason for knowing (*raison de connaître*).

Let us look at the consequences of such a principle. If this principle of indiscernibles were true, namely that every difference is conceptual, there would be no difference except the conceptual. Here Leibniz asks us to accept something that is quite huge. Let us proceed in order: what other kind of difference is there other than conceptual? We see it immediately: there are numerical differences. For example, I say a drop of water, two drops, three drops. I distinguish the drops by the number alone (solo numero, *that Deleuze translates as par le nombre seulement*). I count the elements of a set (*ensemble*), one two three four, I neglect their individuality, I distinguish them by the number. This constitutes a first type of very classic distinction, the numerical distinction. Second type of distinction: I say, "take this chair"; some obliging person takes a chair, and I say, "not that one, but this one." This time, it is a spatio-temporal distinction of the here-now type. The thing that is here at a particular moment, and this other thing that is there at a particular

moment. Finally, there are distinctions of figure and of movement: roof that has three angles, or something else. I would say that these are distinctions by extension and movement. Extension and movement.

Understand that this commits Leibniz to a strange undertaking, merely with his principle of indiscernibles. He has to show that all these types of non-conceptual distinctions - and in fact, all of these distinctions are non-conceptual since two things can be distinguished by the number even though they have the same concept. You focus on the concept of a drop of water, and you say: first drop, second drop. It is the same concept. There is the first and there is the second. There is one that is here, and another that is there. There is one that goes fast, and another that goes slowly. We have now nearly completed the set of non-conceptual distinctions.

Leibniz arrives and calmly tells us, no no. These are pure appearances, that is, these are only provisional ways of expressing a difference of another nature, and this difference is always conceptual. If there are two drops of water, they do not have the same concept. What of any great import does this mean? It is very important in problems of individuation. It is very well known, for example, that Descartes tells us that bodies are distinguished from one another by figure and by movement. Lots of thinkers have appreciated that. Notice that in the Cartesian formula, what is conserved in movement (mv) (the product of mass times movement) depends strictly on a vision of the world in which bodies are distinguished by the figure and movement. What does Leibniz commit himself to when he tells us no? It is absolutely necessary that to all these non-conceptual differences there correspond conceptual differences; they only cause it to be imperfectly translated. All non-conceptual differences only cause a basic conceptual difference to be imperfectly translated. Leibniz commits himself to a task of physics. He has to find a reason for which a body is either in a particular number, or in a particular here and now, or has a particular figure and a particular velocity. He will translate that quite well in his critique of Descartes when he says that velocity is a pure relative. Descartes was wrong; he took something that was purely relative for a principle. It is therefore necessary that figure and movement be surpassed (*se dépassent*) toward something deeper. This means something quite enormous for philosophy in the seventeenth century.

Specifically, that there is no extended substance or that extent (*l'étendue*) cannot be a substance. That extent is a pure phenomenon. That it refers to something deeper. That there is no concept of extent, that the concept is of another nature. It is therefore necessary that figure and movement find their reason in something deeper. Henceforth, extent has no sufficiency. It is not by chance that this is precisely what makes a new physics, he completely recreates the physics of forces. He opposes force, on one hand, to figure and extent, on the other, figure and extent being only manifestations of force. It is force that is the true concept. There is no concept of extent because the true concept is force. Force is the reason of figure and movement in extent.

Hence the importance of this operation that appeared purely technical when he said that what is conserved in movement is not mv, but mv2. Squaring velocity is the translation of the concept of force, which is to say that everything changes. It is physics that corresponds to the principle of

indiscernibles. There are no two similar or identical forces, and forces are the true concepts that must take account of or justify everything that is figure or movement in extent.

Force is not a movement; it is the reason for movement. Hence the complete renewal of the physics of forces, and also of geometry, of kinematics (*de la cinématique*). Everything passes through this, merely by the squaring of velocity. Mv2 is a formula of forces, not a formula of movement. You see that this is essential.

To sum up generally, I can also say that figure and movement must move forward toward force. Number must move forward toward the concept. Space and time must also move forward toward the concept.

But this is how a fourth principle develops quite slowly, one that Leibniz names the law of continuity. Why did he say law? That is a problem. When Leibniz speaks of continuity that he considers to be a fundamental principle and one of his very own great discoveries, he no longer uses the term "principle," but uses the term "law." We have to explain that. If I look for a vulgar formulation of the law of continuity, it is quite simple: nature does not skip over anything (*la nature ne fait pas de saut*). There is no discontinuity. But there are two scholarly formulations. If two causes get as close as one would like, to the point of only differing by a difference decreasing to infinity, the effects must differ in like manner. I immediately say what Leibniz is thinking about because he has it in for Descartes so much. What are we told in the laws of the communication of movement? Here are two cases: two bodies of the same mass and velocity meet each other; one of the two bodies has a greater mass or a greater velocity, so it carries off the other. Leibniz says that this cannot be. Why? You have two states of the cause. First state of the cause: two bodies of the same mass and velocity. Second state of the cause: two bodies of different masses.

Leibniz says that you can cause difference to decrease to infinity, you can act so these two states approach one another in the causes. And we are told that the two effects are completely different: in one case, there is a repulsion (*rebondissement*) of the two bodies, in the other case, the second body is dragged off by the first, in the direction of the first. There is a discontinuity in the effect whereas one can conceive of a continuity in the causes. It is in a continuous manner that we can pass from different masses to equal masses. Thus, it is not possible for there to be discontinuity in the acts (*faits*) if there is possible continuity in the cause. That leads him again into a whole, very important physical study of movement that will be centered on the substitution of a physics of forces for a physics of movement. I was citing this to refresh our memory.

But the other scholarly formulation of the same principle, and you will understand that it is the same thing as the preceding one: in a given case, the concept of the case ends in the opposite case. This is the pure statement of continuity. Example: a given case is movement, the concept of movement ends in the opposite case, that is, in rest. Rest is infinitely small movement. This is what we saw from the infinitesimal principle of continuity. Or I might say that the last possible scholarly formulation of continuity is: a given singularity extends itself into a whole series of ordinaries all the way to the neighborhood of the following singularity. This time it is the law of the composition of the continuous. We worked on that the last time.

But right when we thought we had finished, there arises a very important problem. Something impels me to say that, between principle three and principle four, there is a contradiction, that is, between the principle of indiscernibles and the principle of continuity, there is a contradiction. First question: in what way is there a contradiction? Second question: the fact is that Leibniz never considered there to be the slightest contradiction. Here we are in that situation of liking and profoundly admiring a philosopher, yet of being disturbed because some texts seem contradictory to us, and he did not even see what we might tell him. Where would the contradiction be if there was one? I return to the principle of indiscernibles, every difference is conceptual, there are no two things having the same concept. At the limit, I might say that to every thing corresponds a determined difference, not only determined but assignable in the concept. The difference is not only determined or determinable, it is assignable in the very concept. There are no two drops of water having the same concept, that is, the difference one-two must be encompassed in the concept. It must be assigned in the concept. Thus every difference is an assignable difference in the concept. What does the principle of continuity tell us? It tells us that things proceed by vanishing differences, infinitely small differences, that is unassignable differences.

That gets really awful. Can one say that every thing proceeds by unassignable difference and say at the same time that every difference is assigned and must be assigned in the concept? Ah! Doesn't Leibniz contradict himself? We can move forward a small bit by looking at the ratio of the principle of continuity since I found a ratio for each of the first three principles. Identity is the reason of essence or *ratio essendi*, sufficient reason is the reason of existence or the *ratio existendi*, the indiscernibles are the reason for knowing or the *ratio cognoscendi*, and the principle of continuity is the *ratio fiendi*, that is, the reason for becoming. Things become through continuity. Movement becomes rest, rest becomes movement, etc. The polygon becomes a circle by multiplying its sides, etc. This is a very different reason for becoming from the reasons of being or of existing. The *ratio fiendi* needed a principle, and it is the principle of continuity.

How do we reconcile continuity and indiscernibles? Moreover, we have to show that the way in which we will reconcile them must take account of this at the same time: that Leibniz was right to see no contradiction at all between them. In this we have the experience of thought. I return to the proposition: each individual notion expresses the whole world. Adam expresses the world, Caesar expresses the world, each of you expresses the world. This formula is very strange. Concepts in philosophy are not a single word. A great philosophical concept is a complex, a proposition, or a prepositional function. One would have to do exercises in philosophical grammar. Philosophical grammar would consist of this: with a given concept, find the verb. If you have not found the verb, you have not rendered the verb dynamic, you cannot live it. The concept is always subject to a movement, a movement of thought. A single thing counts: movement. When you do philosophy, you are looking only at movement, only it is a particular kind of movement, the movement of thought. What is the verb? Sometimes the philosopher states it explicitly, sometimes he does not state it. Is Leibniz going to state it? In each individual notion that expresses the world, there is a verb, this is expressing. But what does that mean? It means two things at once, as if two movements coexisted.

Leibniz tells us at the same time: God does not create Adam the sinner, but creates the world in which Adam sinned. God does not create Caesar crossing the Rubicon, but creates the world in which Caesar crosses the Rubicon. Thus, what God creates is the world and not the individual notions that express the world. Second proposition by Leibniz: the world exists only in the individual notions that express it. If you privilege one individual notion over the other . . . If you accept that, what results is like two readings or two complementary and simultaneous ways of understanding, but two understandings of what? You can consider the world, but yet again the world does not exist in itself, it exists only in the notions that express it. But you can make this abstraction, you consider the world. How do you consider it? You consider it as a complex curve. A complex curve has singular points and ordinary points. A singular point extends itself into the ordinary points that depend on it all the way to the neighborhood of another singularity, etc. etc. . . . and you compose the curve in a continuous manner like that, by extending singularities into series of ordinaries.

For Leibniz, that is what the world is. The continuous world is the distribution of singularities and regularities, or singularities and ordinaries that constitute precisely the aggregate chosen by God, that is, the set that unites the maximum of continuity. If you remain in this vision, the world is governed by the law of continuity since continuity is precisely this composition of singulars insofar as they extend into the series of ordinaries that depend on them. You have your world that is literally laid out in the form of a curve in which singularities and regularities are distributed. This is the first point of view that is completely subject to the law of continuity.

Only here we are, this world does not exist in itself, it exists only in the individual notions that express this world. That means that an individual notion, a monad, that each one encompasses a small determined number of singularities. It encloses a small number of singularities. It is the small number of singularities. … You recall that individual notions or monads are points of view on the world. It is not the subject that explains the point of view, it is the point of view that explains the subject. Hence the need to ask oneself, what is this point of view?

A point of view is defined by this: a small number of singularities drawn from the curve of the world. This is what is at the basis of an individual notion. What makes the difference between you and me is that you, on this kind of fictional curve, are constructed around such and such singularities and me around such and such singularities. And what you call individuality is a complex of singularities insofar as they form a point of view.[25]

[85 :00] There are two states of the world. It has a developed, unrolled state, and it has an enveloped, rolled up state – a rolled up state of the world, an enveloped state of the world: it’s the world such that it’s in each individual notion that expresses it. Developed state of the world, as all individual notions express the same world, you can always develop the world in order to consider it abstractly in itself, like this curve endowed with singularities. In that case, you will be speaking about the world.

I would say that in light of this, [86:00] the world is an aggregate of compossible individual notions insofar as they are developed, and the individual notion is the world insofar as it's enveloped in the points of view that express it. The world develops the individual notions; the individual notions envelop the world. Envelop, develop; roll up, unroll. An individual notion is the world rolled up from a certain point of view. The world is the aggregate of unrolled individual notions.

To envelop, to develop. Here we have the dynamic verbs that I have been seeking. [87:00] To roll up, to unroll. When logic proposes to us, yet again the concept or the doublet, two concepts… to implicate, to explicate, you understand? *Implicare, explicare,* in Latin, it's precisely *involvere, devolvere*. To implicate is to envelop, to roll into; to explicate is to unroll, to develop. The world develops an aggregate of individual notions; the individual notions envelop the world.

It's the dynamism and the coexistence of envelopment and development that is going to provide all the underlying movements, like geological movements, that run through Leibniz's philosophy. [88:00] So, did he invent them? No, there is a whole tradition, a tradition going back to the neo-Platonists that create a kind of amazing mise en scène, the degrees of envelopment and development in the world, the sense in which the seed envelops the tree, the sense in which the tree develops the germ. (In this sense), all sorts of problems arise that are not only problems of logic.

And certainly, just as Ariadne did things too well, there is a third concept that is rather pretty. In order to translate the simultaneity of the two movements of envelopment and development – the world that develops notions, the notions that envelop the world – a term is very necessary… What is there above the world and its subject, the world that develops the subjects, and the subjects that envelop the world? There's always God; there's always this story of God [89:00] since it's a philosophy that is linked so much to a certain theology. But God is not a point of view; it's not a subject; it's not even the world. God creates the world, as we know, and in creating the world, he creates subjects, or vice versa. But you see, subject and world are completely correlative because one is in the developed state what the other is in the enveloped state. That's what's so great, understand? The subject is in the enveloped state what the world is in the developed state. It's so beautiful!

Moreover, from this you also grasp how continuity and the indiscernibles … there is no contradiction. The law of continuity is the law of development, and the indiscernibles are the principle of envelopment. [90:00] If you look at what this expression applies to, "Everything distinguishes itself through the concept; every difference is conceptual," it's obviously to the state of enveloped things in subjects. On the contrary, the evanescent differences are the state of the world insofar as they are developed such that there is no contradiction. Difference, yes, is evanescent and unassignable to the point of view of the development of the subject in the world; it is assignable and conceptual to the point of view of the envelopment of the world in the subject.

So, God, what does it do since… it's neither enveloped, nor developed, God. What is it? There's a lovely word, created by philosophers prior to Leibniz: God is the great complicator. [91:00] It does not implicate, and it does not explicate; it does not envelop, and it does not develop; it complicates. Superb definition of God: the universal complication. So, what is it, to complicate? It's to maintain the mutual simultaneity and immanence of envelopment and development. If I say that that guy's complicated, what does that mean? *Complicare*, it's a very beautiful word. It complicates… And complicating is not necessarily a weakness; to complicate is really the equivalent of understanding, but understanding in the strong sense of the term. In fact, I was thinking that there was a doublet, but there's a triplet: to complicate, to explicate, to implicate.

God complicates the subjects in the world. In all of Renaissance philosophy, [92:00] complication is going to undergo development; it will be one of the most beautiful concepts of Renaissance philosophy, notably in two philosophers that Leibniz knows admirably, Nicolas de Cusa, and the great Italian philosopher, [Giordano] Bruno, who died burned to death, who dies complicated by fire. [*Laughter*] The movement through which someone was burned to death, it diminishes, then… So that's complication; God is fire. There you are. God complicates.

So you see, we have found the dynamism, and in then [we ask], why is continuity a law? It's very simple: continuity [*inaudible*]. The world develops, responding solely to phenomena; it's only a phenomenon. [93 :00] It's the apparition; it's not the thing. The thing is the subject; it's the subject that envelops the world. If you develop the world, it's as if you went to the world of pure apparitions, of pure phenomena. So, continuity will be the principle of all the laws of phenomena, whereas the indiscernibles will be the principle of all reasons of the thing or the subject.

Finally, the fifth principle – we've just reconciled the third and fourth [principles]. With the fifth one, I am stopping to leave it for the next time. But finally, because the fifth principle has so many aspects that it's valid for an infinity of principles, the aggregate [94:00] of what Leibniz presents as the principles of finality. And what is the *ratio* of the principles of finality? This refers to the last *ratio*; there are five *ratios* that have crossed through philosophy since philosophy has existed: it's the *ratio agenda*, that is, the reason for acting (*raison de faire*). You have the list of five reasons that you have to learn by heart: reason for being, reason for existing, reason for knowing, reason for becoming, and reason for acting (*raison d'être, raison d'exister, raison de connaître, raison de devenir, et raison de faire*).

Good, so we will see. This is what remains to do, this story, but have you had enough? Ah yes, indeed!... So I close finally on this, because only… what I am going do at the start of our next meeting. [95:00]

Understand the problem: what I would like is for you to think about this from now until the next time. What it is: as we will begin, we find ourselves facing a privileged example for our understanding of philosophy. I have indicated that after all, these five principles from Leibniz don't go without saying. Imagine a philosopher – and this philosopher existed shortly after

Leibniz – who really does not agree with these principles. I choose the example of Kant. He does not agree on two fundamental points that I will explain: here we really need to proceed in a very technical manner. Kant is the one who says, first, no, every proposition is not analytic. There are synthetic propositions, and it's in this very way that there is knowledge. One person says white, the other one says black. Second Kantian proposition [96:00]: no, every difference is not conceptual. But a certain number of determinations, notably the number lets time pass, are irreducible to concepts. So, it's a double negation by Kant that creates a great rupture with Leibniz after having been Kantian for quite a long time. This is his great rupture: he negates the principle of sufficient reason, and he negates the principle of indiscernibles.

The next time, we will find ourselves facing a privileged case, that I insist on in order to attempt to deal with this stupid notion about the status of philosophy, when we are told : on one hand, philosopher spend their time saying the same thing, which doesn't keep them from getting into fights, because it's a question of words ; on the other hand, which comes down entirely to the same thing, we are told that philosophers never stop telling us the contrary, to one another; they fight among themselves. What I want to ask the next time is about this privileged Leibniz-Kant example: what does the Leibniz-Kant opposition mean? Is this an opposition? What's going on? What are the conditions of these propositions? You see, I am organizing four propositions, two for Leibniz, two for Kant, and I'd like to comment on them as a function of my real project, which is what are concepts in philosophy? Take a proposition from Leibniz: every proposition is analytic; Kant's anti-proposition is: no, there is knowledge only beginning with synthetic propositions. [98:00] Second proposition from Leibniz: every difference, in the final instance, is conceptual; second Kant anti-proposition: no, there are non-conceptual differences without which there would be no knowledge, such as numerical differences, spatio-temporal differences, etc. So, starting from this privileged example, what can this common expression mean, that two philosophers do not agree. So think about it. It's obvious they don't agree, and it can even be logically proved; it's a proposition devoid of meaning.

There we are; I bless you. [*End of the session*] [1:38:45]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

Lecture 05, 20 May 1980

Translation and supplements based on YouTube video,[26] **Charles J. Stivale**[27]

Part 1

Today, I am going to end with a very general problem, but that will serve as conclusion for this introduction to Leibniz, and then all this will be done. And the other two times, I'd like – because this was asked of me in passing – I'd like [to do] a type of session – already as if on vacation, eh? – a kind of limited session. I am saying this first so that, if you come, you might know already what to expect, because that might not work, but it could work, in which several of you asked me – what both annoyed me and pleased me greatly – they asked me about the possibility of doing a sort of summary session on both my own work over several year, specifically how, for example, I now consider, how I now consider *Anti-Oedipus,* so there we are. So, obviously, that's only possible if I maintain the necessary and desirable modesty, and on the other hand, well, fine… So, that will take the form both of what I think about all that, and then with you posing questions that arise, all the questions you like. And no, it would be rather interesting, if you come, that you would have questions, in fact, because *Anti-Oedipus* is something that's already 10 years old. So, in the meantime, I'd like for those who have been coming for several years – without excluding the others – but coming here, who'd like to say – I'd don't know, coming four, five years – I'm writing on this particular topic, what was I expecting from this. It's good that you speak as well because there are questions on matters that might already outline what we could undertake next year, and that would be completely… So, that would be, the two sessions would be a kind of working reflection, eh? There we are.

So then, I would like to finish these meetings on Leibniz by presenting the problem that I indicated I want to consider. So, in order really to treat this problem, one would need, one would need a year, so, these are just conclusions I'd like to draw as a function of an example. I am returning to a question that I asked from the start, specifically: what does this image mean, that good sense often creates about philosophy, once we admit that good sense and philosophy often have had delicate relations, relations of rivalry, of hate, of provocation, of polemics. What does this image mean that good sense sometimes produces about philosophy, as a kind of locus of discussion in which philosophers are fundamentally not in agreement? In that case, I was saying, you understand, an opposition arises between creativity in art or truth in science and a kind of philosophical atmosphere in which people argue, they uphold theses, they fight among themselves, whereas at least in science, they know what they are considering, and in art there is a creation that escapes criteria for arguing. So, it's this idea, of course, that everyone can consider as having lost validity, the conception of philosophy in which philosophers confront one another, saying some very, very different things. Notice that "good sense" holds the same, almost

reversed conception. We are told as well that all philosophers never stop repeating the same thing, they all agree, or all hold opposite views.

It's precisely in relation to Leibniz that I would like to select some very precise examples. What does it mean that two philosophies do not agree? What could that possibly mean? Because finally, I am just stating that if we speak about polemics, once again, polemics like a certain state of things that runs through certain disciplines, I do not find that there are more polemics in philosophy than there are in science or in art. So, it's this role, what does it mean for one philosopher to criticize another philosopher? What is the function of critique? Fine, I believe that one should proceed very carefully and choose exactly what Leibniz offers us, Fine, he offers us the opportunity of choosing a very, very precise example. The example that I'd like to select is: what does the opposition between Kant and Leibniz mean, once we have said that it was a fundamental opposition in the history of philosophy, as if all sorts of things resulted from this? And what does it mean for Kant to undertake a critique of Leibniz?

And here as well, so that we proceed in an orderly fashion, I would like to number what I want to tell you. Well then, to commit to reflecting on what a philosophical argument or critique might be, I believe that it is first, it implies an initial task: to localize the oppositions. And I am not saying that there are only two; by saying that there are two oppositions, I am limiting myself to two fundamental oppositions from the point of view of knowledge. From other points of view, this would be even more complicated, but here, from the point of view of knowledge, and from the theory of knowledge, I see two fundamental oppositions between Leibniz and Kant that function then like thesis and antithesis.

So again, one would have to… It isn't enough to localize oppositions because already, a task, if we today give ourselves the task of commenting on philosophical opposition, well, I would say, when we manage to trace the great philosophical oppositions, on the level of the concepts used by particular philosophers, we also have almost to evaluate their relations to these oppositions, namely they [the oppositions] are not of equal value. Perhaps one does happen to have greater weight than another; perhaps there is a more decisive one. If you fail to organize the oppositions, I think that you are no longer able to understand what the subject is in a polemic. Thus, I start off by numbering: first opposition between Leibniz and Kant, from the point of view of knowledge. I will let Leibniz speak. Hence, you can imagine a dialogue of the dead in which the dead are having an argument.

A Leibnizian proposition: all propositions are analytical, and knowledge can proceed only by analytical propositions. You recall that we call "analytical proposition" a proposition in which one of the two terms of the proposition is contained in the concept of the other. Fine, you already see, if we remain here, this is a philosophical formula: every proposition is analytical, and knowledge proceeds via analytical propositions. I am saying, we should almost sense already that there is no point in arguing at this level. Why? Because there is already something implied, specifically that there is a certain model of knowledge. What is presupposed – things are presupposed, yes, and in the sciences as well, there are also presuppositions; in painting as well, in art as well, there are presuppositions -- what is presupposed is, it seems to me exactly this: a certain idea of knowledge, specifically knowing is discovering what is included in the concept. Knowing it discovering what is included in the concept; we can already hold onto this. It's a

definition of knowledge. This is a definition; I find it entirely interesting as a definition, but well then, I ask myself, why? Why would that be knowing? We are pleased! We are pleased to have a definition of knowledge, but why this one rather than something else?

From the other side, Kant arises and says: there are synthetic propositions. You see what a synthetic proposition is. We will call it, it's enough to trace it from an analytical proposition; we will call a synthetic proposition a proposition in which one of the terms is not contained in the concept of the other. Kant arrives and asks us: so, is this a cry? Isn't this a cry? Is this a proposition? Against Leibniz, he tells us, "no"; what he says after is "no"; there are synthetic propositions, and that knowledge exists only through synthetic propositions. The opposition seems perfect. [*Pause*]

Fine; at this point, a thousand questions assail me. What are they going to argue about? What would that mean to argue, to argue about who is right, who is right about what? Is this provable? Are we in the domain of what might be called decidable propositions? I am saying simply that already the Kantian definition must interest you because, if you consider it closely, it also implies a certain conception of knowledge, and it happens that this conception of knowledge is very different from Leibniz's. When one says that knowledge only proceeds through synthetic propositions, that is, a proposition such that one of its terms is not contained in the concept of the other, there is therefore a synthesis between the two terms, [*Pause*] someone who says this can no longer base knowledge on the Leibnizian conception. He can no longer accept the idea that knowing would be to discover what is included in the concept. He will tell us, on the contrary, you know that to know is not at all to discover what is included in a concept, that knowledge necessarily means leaving behind one concept in order to affirm something else. We call "synthesis" the act through which one leaves a concept behind in order to attribute to it or to affirm something else.

In other words, what is it to know? It's not to have a concept; it's always to go beyond the concept. In other words, knowing is to go beyond (*connaître, c'est dépasser*); knowing is to go beyond, it's passing on to something else. Understand all that is in play here. In the first conception, to know is to have a concept and discover what is contained in the concept. I would say about that knowledge that it is based on a particular model which is one of passion or of perception. To know is finally to perceive something, even if it's something mental, something spiritual; to know is to apprehend; to know is a passive model of knowledge, even if many activities depend on it. In the other case, to the contrary, knowing means going beyond; it's going beyond the concept for; it means leaving the concept behind in order to affirm something else. Here, on the contrary, it's a conception in which knowledge is brought back to an appropriate model. Fine, all kinds of things come into play when the model of know of knowledge is decentered to this extent.

But then, I return therefore to my two propositions, Leibniz's proposition, Kant's proposition. What is there to be done with them? Let us suppose here that we are like referees. We find ourselves faced with these two propositions, and I suppose here we then ask: what do I choose? It's like being in a game; what do I bet on, on Leibniz or on Kant? One still has to ask a load of questions in the question, and we haven't finished. First when I ask, is it decidable, can I decide which proposition seems to me even [*word unclear*]? What would that mean? It could mean that

it's a question of fact. One has to find the facts that allow one to say that one or the other is right. Good, let's try. Obviously, it's not that. Propositions that are to some extent philosophical propositions aren't justifiable on the basis of a verification of facts. But if we understand why, already this will be… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*].

That is why philosophy has always distinguished two questions, and this is rather important, it seems to me, and Kant especially, for example, will take up this distinction again. This distinction is classic, and it was formulated in Latin in the form: *quid facti*, what is derived from fact (*qu'en est-il du fait*), and *quid juris*, what is derived from principle (*qu'en est-il du droit*). And if philosophy is concerned with principle, it is precisely because it poses questions that are called *de jure* questions (*questions de droit*). What does it mean that my two paradoxical propositions, my two opposed propositions, Leibniz's proposition and Kant's proposition, are not justifiable on the basis of a factual response? It means something quite simple: it means that in fact, there is no problem, in fact, there's no problem because all the time we encounter phenomena that are phenomena of synthesis.

Indeed, in my simplest judgments, I pass my time operating syntheses. I say, for example, that this straight line is white. It is quite obvious when I say, "this straight line is white," that with this, I am affirming about a straight line something that is not contained in the concept of straight line. Why? Every straight line is not white. That this straight line is white is obviously an encounter in the experience; I could not have made such a statement beforehand, I couldn't say it beforehand, I couldn't say this line will be white, unless I had the firm intention of tracing that [*unclear words*]. But then, I encounter in experience straight lines that are white, period, that's it. It's a synthesis, and we call this kind of synthesis *a posteriori*, *a posteriori* meaning that which is given in experience, [*Pause*] or which is encountered in experience.

Why doesn't this take care of that? So, I would say, obviously there are syntheses of fact – this straight line is white – why doesn't that resolve the problem? That doesn't resolve the problem for a very simple reason: this "straight line is white" does not constitute knowledge. It constitutes what we can call a protocol of experience because I can state on a particular day, at a particular hour that I encounters a straight line that is white. Let's say that we call this a protocol of experience. Knowledge is something else; knowledge is something other than tracing protocols of experience.

So fine, when does one know? – Here, I am remaining in some very, very classical things; it's like a terminology lesson -- one knows when a proposition bases its claim in a principle (*se réclame d'un droit*). What defines a proposition's principle is the universal and the necessary. When I say that a straight line is the shortest path from one point to another, I maintain a proposition of principle (*une proposition de droit*). Why? Because I don't need to measure each straight line to know that, if it's straight, it's the shortest path. Every straight line, beforehand, *a priori*, that is, independently of experience, is the shortest path from one point to another, otherwise it would not be a straight line.

Thus, I would say that the proposition, "a straight line is the shortest path," constitutes indeed a proposition of knowledge. I do not await experience to discover that a straight line is the shortest path; to the contrary, I determine the experience since the shortest path from one point to another

is my way of tracing a straight line experientially. Any straight line is necessarily the shortest path; I can say, any straight line is necessarily the shortest path from one point to another. That is, this is a proposition of knowledge and not a proposition of protocol. So, let us take this proposition – I would say, it's an a priori proposition, and a priori, this will be uniquely independent from experience.

And I ask myself, fine, in this, are we going to be able finally to pose the question of separation, of division between Leibniz and Kant, specifically is it an analytical proposition or is it a synthetic proposition? [*Pause*]

Kant says something very simple: it's necessarily, a priori, a synthetic proposition, it's an a priori synthetic proposition -- Why? Because when you say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another, you are leaving obviously behind the concept "straight line." Ah, hey, this is really odd. Isn't it the content in a straight line to be the shortest path from one point to another? It goes without saying that Leibniz would say that it is the content in "straight line." Kant says no. So, there, we are in the process of tightening up our proposition. He says no. The shortest path from one point to another is not contained in the straight line. The concept "straight line", according to the Euclidian definition is: line *ex aequo* in all of its points. You won't draw from this the shortest path between one point and another. You have to leave the concept behind to affirm something else about it. We're not convinced. [*Pause*] Let's keep looking.

Why… What is… One cannot provide reasons, you understand, every time one says something. So what reason does he have? We'd have to interrupt him at that point. Why are you saying that, Kant? Why can't you find, by digging, by analyzing the concept of a straight line, why can't you find the shortest path from one point to another? Kant would answer, I suppose, think about this a bit: the shortest path from one point to another is, overall, a concept – maybe it's not one, but this to speak simply – it's a concept which that implies what? Which implies a comparison. A comparison of what? The comparison of the shortest line, the line determined as the shortest path from one point to another, with other lines that are what lines? Which are obviously lines that are either broken lines or curvilinear lines, that is, curves. [*Pause*]

Ah, ok, that ought to provide some clarity. I cannot say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another without implying a comparison, the relation of the straight line to curvilinear lines, to curved lines. For Kant, it suffices to say that a synthesis lies therein; you are forced to leave the "straight line" concept in order to reach the "curved line" concept, and it's in the relation of straight lines to curved lines that you say the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. It's a synthesis, thus knowledge is a synthetic operation. Fine, fine.

What would Leibniz answer? Would he be disturbed by that? No. First of all, he would not be bothered. We have seen enough of Leibniz. He would say that obviously, obviously, you have to keep in mind the "curved line" concept when you say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. Of course, one recalls this, but Leibniz is the creator of a differential calculus through which the straight line is going to be considered as the limit of curves. There is a process to the limit. [*Pause*] Hence Leibniz's theme: it's an analytical relation, simply it's an infinite analysis. The straight line is the limit [*Pause*] of the curve, just as rest is the limit of movement, etc.

Does this move us forward? We aren't moving forward much because we notice that this becomes inextricable. So, either one can no longer resolve this, or they mean the same thing. [If] they say the same thing, what would this be? It would mean that, after all, what Leibniz calls infinite analysis is the same thing as what Kant calls finite synthesis. [*Pause*] Suddenly, it's only a question of words. Philosophers debate, they debate, but this is nothing more than a question of words. One calls infinite analysis what the other one calls finite synthesis. There's no reason for creating a… If this serves them, then there's no… As for continuing, this is not our concern since if, in the end, they agree, what are they agreeing about. They agree in order, it is said, at that point, they agree in order to establish a difference in nature, one of them between finite analysis and infinite analysis, the other between analysis and synthesis. It comes down to the same thing: what Leibniz calls infinite analysis; Kant will call finite synthesis.

You see, hence the idea of good sense that, simultaneously, a philosophical dispute is inextricable since we cannot decide who is right, and at the same time, knowing who is right is without any importance since they both say the same thing. [*Pause*] Good sense can conclude just as well: the only good philosophy is me. [*Pause*] Tragic situation. Because if good sense achieves the goals of philosophy, better than philosophy itself does it, then there is no reason to wear yourself out doing philosophy. Aaaah, so?

It goes without saying that we no longer have anything to do with this first stage. [*Pause*] I am saying, let's look for a kind of bifurcation because this whole story, infinite analysis or finite synthesis, is this as arbitrary as it seems? Isn't this opposition, this first great opposition between Leibniz and Kant, even if it now seems obvious to us, isn't this because, in fact, this opposition moves well beyond itself toward a deeper opposition, and if we don't see the deeper opposition, we can understand nothing. Hence our question: what would this second, deeper opposition be? [*Pause*]

I believe that our earlier sessions on Leibniz here have given us, here as well, the means to answer. We saw that there was a great Leibnizian proposition, called the principle of indiscernibles, notably that any difference, in the final instance, is conceptual. Any difference is in the concept. Any difference is conceptual. If two things differ, they cannot simply differ by number, by figure, by movement, etc., etc.; their concept must not be the same. Every difference is conceptual.

Notice how this proposition is truly the presupposition of Leibniz's preceding proposition. If he is right on this point, if every difference is conceptual, it is quite obvious that it's by analyzing concepts that we know, since knowing is knowing through differences. Thus, if every difference, in the final instance, is conceptual, the analysis of the concept will make us know the difference and will therefore cause us quite simply to know. Fine. We see into which task this drew Leibniz, an extremely advanced mathematical task, which consisted in showing the differences between figures, the differences between numbers, etc., referring to differences in the concepts.

So, what is Kant's proposition in opposition to this second Leibnizian proposition? Here, this is also going to be something pretty odd (*un drôle de truc*). – And I'd like for you to learn something even about the necessity for you to, I don't know, when you read philosophy, this is why I insist… I'd like, I'd this to be very, very scholarly. – I am saying that Kant offers us a very

strange proposition, very strange. He says, you know, if you look closely at the world as it's presented to you, you will see that it is composed of at least two sorts of irreducible determinations. [*Pause*] What are these irreducible determinations? You have conceptual determinations that always correspond to what a thing is; I can even say that a concept is the representation of what the thing is. So, you have determinations of that sort; I am saying, for example, the lion is an animal that roars; that's a conceptual determination.

And then you have another kind of determination altogether. Kant proposes his great thing (*son grand truc*): he says that it's no longer at all conceptual determinations, but spatio-temporal determinations. What are these spatio-temporal determinations? It's the fact that the thing is here and now, that it is to the right or to the left, that it occupies in one way or another a certain kind of space, that it describes a space, that it lasts a certain time. And so, however far you push the analysis of concepts, you will never arrive at this domain of spatio-temporal determinations by analyzing concepts. Although you might – so here, you see the second opposition to Leibniz – although you might go to infinity, although you might push your analysis of the concept to infinity, you will never find a determination in the concept that takes this into account for you: that this thing is on the right or on the left. Fine.

What does he mean? He selects examples for himself that initially seem very, extremely convincing. He says, here we are, consider two hands, two hands. It is well known that, fine, you can think of two hands, even… -- It's not true, in fact, but once again, the question isn't… "what is this…?", you are perhaps going to understand the difference between "what is this in fact?" and "what is this in principle?". -- Each of us knows that one's own two hands, your little hands, don't each have exactly the same traits, for example, the same distribution of pores, the same outline of traits. Agreed. Leibniz wins. Fine, score one point, that's good for me – Come on, we have to imagine this as if they were in a casino, so one point for one, one point for the other. – A point for Leibniz; that's good for him. In fact, there are no two hands that are identical. He says, well then, I've said this all along; it's my famous principle of indiscernibles. If there are two things, they must differ through the concept. You can always assign a difference through the concept, in which two things are not the same.

Kant says, it is indeed possible in fact, but it doesn't matter, it's a remark of no importance, no interest. Well, this is odd. Already appearing, and this is perhaps not the only discipline, is the expression "it has no interest". "You say that? no interest", you know. Once again, to try to remove from our minds whether the discussions are true and false. Discussions never go through the true and the false. My question is never: do you say is true or do you say is false? My question is: does this have any interest at all or is it an irrelevant platitude, and who will say it. And I think about that because science, when scientists enter into controversies as deep as [*unclear words*] what is thrown at one's head, once again, when mathematicians do not agree, obviously, he doesn't blame another mathematician for making a mistake in his proof anyhow. They know just enough math not to talk nonsense; moreover, mathematicians don't even provide proofs, and it's still true today. There are guys who come up with propositions, and then they sketch a bit of a proof, and they drop the rest which has no interest, which is not interesting, really.

What is important? What is it? Does the proposition from which I'm making a theorem, or a proposition, or an axiom, or whatever, does that have any interest at all? What is a madman? A madman is not a question of fact, it is also a question of *quid juris*. This is not someone who is saying the false things. There are lots of mathematicians who are inventing completely crazy theories. Why are they crazy? Are they crazy because they are false or contradictory? No, generally, they are determined by the fact that they handle an enormous mathematical conceptual apparatus, for example, for propositions devoid of any interest, of any interest. There is a beautiful text by [Henri] Poincaré in which there is, precisely about a thesis, he says about a thesis of a mathematician of his time, well yes, why not? Mathematically, it's without interest. Okay.

I believe that in philosophy, it is the same. You have whole books of philosophy in which one wonders why this is done. That's not wrong, [but] it has no interest, none, none. You have to say, okay, fine. So, what's annoying is that there are surely people who find some kind of interest in it, starting with the person who wrote the book. So there, in fact, what does mean at this polemical level? One very quickly gets unpleasant; there is no longer even a point of arguing if ... if you have to say to someone, "it has absolutely no interest", of course, that is very offensive; that gets uncomfortable, you understand. If I could at least tell him, "that's false." It gets tricky there, having no interest.

We reach another story: Kant would dare to tell Leibniz, well, all that, what you are saying about the two hands with their differences of pores has no interest since you can conceive *quid juris*, "what is this by right", by right but not in fact, you can conceive of two hands belonging to the same person, having exactly the same distribution of pores, the same outline of traits. This is not logically contradictory, even if it does not exist in fact, it's not logically contradictory. Well then, says Kant, there is something nonetheless that is very odd: however far you push your analysis, these two hands are identical. And admire the fact that they cannot be superposed.

What does that mean? This is a famous paradox, the paradox of non-superposable symmetrical objects. Imagine: you have your two absolutely identical hands, you cut them off, you cut them off in order for them to have a radical degree of mobility, so that the are no longer held by your arms. Let them get cut off, fine, you can still do that [*Deleuze demonstrates*], you can do that, you cannot cause them to coincide; you cannot superpose them. Why can't you superpose them? It's simple. You're not going to superpose them; why? The Kantian clap of thunder sounds, and Kant harnesses a god, so it's quite simple because there is a right and a left; they can be absolutely identical in everything else, there is still one that is the right hand and the other the left hand.

That means what if there is one that is the right hand and one that is the left hand? We see what that means: that there is a spatial determination irreducible to the order of the concept. The concept of your two hands can be strictly, absolutely identical; [but] however far you push the analysis, there will still be one of them that is my right hand and one that is my left hand. You cannot cause them to be superposed. You can do this, you can do that [*Deleuze demonstrates*], and why can't you cause them to be superposed? It's simple. Under what condition can you cause two figures to be superposed? This is well known: on the condition of having access to a dimension supplementary to that of the figures since one has to make a figure turn within the

supplementary dimension. It's because there is a third dimension of space that you can cause two flat figures to be superposed. You could cause two volumes to be superposed if you have access to a fourth dimension. [If] you don't have access to a fourth dimension, they will not be superposed. There is an irreducibility in the order of space. The same thing holds for time: there is an irreducibility in the order of time. Thus, however far you push the analysis of conceptual differences, an order of difference will always remain outside of the concepts and the conceptual differences. This will be spatio-temporal differences. [*Pause*]

So, let's come back here. Doesn't Kant again gain the stronger position? [*Interruption of the BNF recording; the following text is furnished by WebDeleuze*] [39:12] Let's go back to the straight line. [Regarding] the idea of synthesis, we are going to recognize that it was not a matter of mere words for Leibniz. [*Return to BNF recording*]

Part 2

If we stopped at the analysis-synthesis difference, we didn't have the means of finding in what way this is something other than a discussion of terms. Here, we are in the process of discovering the extent to which this is something more than a discussion of terms. What is Kant in the process of saying? Kant is saying: however far you go in your analysis, you will have an irreducible order of time and space, irreducible to the order of the concept. In other words, space and time are not concepts. There are two sorts of determinations: determinations of concepts and spatio-temporal determinations. [*Pause*]

So, the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. What does Kant mean when he says this is a synthetic proposition? What he means is, this is a luminous idea; what he means is this: the straight line is indeed a conceptual determination, but the shortest path from one point to another is not a conceptual determination, but a spatio-temporal determination. The two are irreducible. You will never be able to deduce one from the other. There is a synthesis between them. And what is knowing? Knowing is creating the synthesis of conceptual determinations and spatio-temporal determinations. There we have what he discovers; it's very odd. And so, he is in the process of tearing space and time from the concept; he is in the process of tearing space and time from the logical concept. Is it by chance that he himself will name this operation Aesthetics? [*Pause*] I mean, even on the most superficial level of aesthetics, that is, the best-known, the theory of art, won't this liberation of space and time in relation to logical concepts be the basis of any discipline called aesthetics? [*Pause*]

As a result, you see now how it is that, at this second level, Kant would define synthesis. He would say that synthesis is the act through which I leave behind all concepts in order to affirm something irreducible to concepts. Knowing is creating a synthesis because it necessarily means leaving behind all concepts in order to affirm something extra-conceptual in it. The straight line, concept, I leave it behind, it's the shortest path from one point to another; from this, I affirm a spatio-temporal, extra-conceptual determination. At that point, I am creating a synthesis.

What is the difference between this second Kantian proposition and the first? Here, just admire, because all that is very poetic; admire the progress Kant made. Kant's first definition – when he was saying that knowing means operating through synthesis – this is issuing synthetic

propositions, Kant's first proposition amounted to saying this: knowing means leaving behind a concept in order to affirm about it something that was not contained in it. [*Pause*] Fine, this is already quite interesting. But at this level, I could not know if he was right because Leibniz arrived and said, but no, there is always a possibility of an infinite analysis that I stop because I myself am not infinite. But, in the name of an infinite analysis, what I affirm about a concept will always be contained in the concept. So, there is no means to resolve this.

A second, deeper level: we take a step forward, but we cannot take two steps at once. Kant no longer tells us that knowing means leaving a concept behind in order to affirm something that would be like another concept. Rather knowing means leaving one concept in order to leave behind all concepts, and to affirm something about it that is irreducible to the order of the concept in general. This is another proposition; it's a much more interesting proposition. [*Pause*] Fine.

So, once again, we move onward (*on rebondit*). If you have understood this, we are perhaps reaching something important concerning comprehension. Once again, what I mean is for this to be like, if you accept, like practical concepts for comprehending philosophy entirely in general. So, it matters little if I've chosen a particularly boring example, the straight line. This is valid for any proposition in philosophy.

But at this level, I come back to my question about good sense: is this decidable? One of them tells us that every difference is conceptual in the final instance, and therefore you can affirm nothing about a concept that might go outside the order of the concept in general; the other one tells us that there are two kinds of differences, conceptual differences and spatio-temporal differences such that knowing necessarily means leaving behind the concept in order to affirm something about it that is irreducible to all concepts in general, specifically something that concerns space and time. [*Pause*] So, is it yes or no, really?

At this point, what do we realize? Well, we realize that we haven't left all that behind because we realize that Kant, quietly – and he wasn't obligated to say it, even since he could only say it a hundred pages later – Kant can only maintain the proposition he just suggested about the irreducibility of spatio-temporal determinations in relation to conceptual determination, he can only affirm that, this irreducibility, because he dealt a master stroke (*coup de force*). And once again, what interests me is this, the philosopher who delivers a master stroke in concepts, that is, if it's really a concept. For his proposition to make sense, that is, to have any interest whatever, because in all this, I am looking for what the interest is, he had to change radically the traditional definition of space and time, it's important. You might ask me, why is it important? Perhaps for our way of living because perhaps he sensed something changing. I mean that it's important as much on the level of science as that of philosophy, and as that of daily life.

What does that mean, to manage to say that space and time are not at all what you believed? That's where Kant has arrived, at the risk of being a great philosopher. What did he do -- and here, that's my third point --? So, we have already seen two stages of the Kant-Leibniz opposition; we arrive at a third stage. This opposition is stripped of any interest if we do not see that the Leibnizian propositions and the Kantian propositions are distributed in two completely different space-times. In other words, it's not even the same space-time about which Leibniz said

– so, notice why it's undecidable! I cannot answer by yes or by no – it's not the same space-time about which Leibniz said: all of these determinations of space and time are reducible to conceptual determinations, and this other space-time about which Kant told us: the determinations of space-time are absolutely irreducible to the order of the concept. This is what we have to show in a simple way, even at the risk of cutting out the practical consequences; we will perhaps come back to these, the practical consequences. But take note that this is a moment in which thought reels (*vacille*). Where am I going? What am I going to do? What experience do I have of space-time? Why am I myself going to be Leibnizian or Kantian, or yet neither one nor the other? So, I mean, this unfolds strongly by virtue of arguments that are thrown about, all that; it occurs underneath, it occurs in the more interesting undergrounds.

For a very, very long time, a long time – but why? Again, we haven't finished retreating by asking why after the last why – for a very, very long time, space was defined as, to some extent, the order of coexistences, or the order of simultaneities, [*Pause*] and time was defined as the order of successions. And is it by chance that Leibniz is the one who pushes this very ancient conception to its limit, all the way to a kind of absolute formulation? For Leibniz adds, and he states it formally: space is the order of possible coexistences and time is the order of possible successions. By adding "possible," why does he push this to the absolute? Because it refers to his entire theory of compossibility and of the world. Thus, he captures in this way the old conception of space and time, and he uses it for his own system.

At first glance, that seems rather good. In fact, it's always delicate when someone tells, define space, define time, and if I don't say even by reflex, well yes, not a problem, that space is the order of successions and space is the order of coexistences -- that's nonetheless a little bit of something (*c'est quand même un petit quelque chose*); it's worth… it's worth [*unclear words*] [*Pause*] – So, what bothers Kant? For me, this is found in his most beautiful pages. I'd like for you to sense, the most beautiful pages, it's when a philosopher arrives with, literally, huge stones (*pierres*) and then he begins to take a notion that seems to go without saying, and says, well no, not at all, discovering that it's "good sense", the blandest "good sense" that creates astonishing paradoxes.

Kant says, but no, that this just won't do, and even over centuries and centuries, people were satisfied with this definition, which was entirely different from a definition; it's a way of living; Kant says a very, very simple thing. He says that, on the one hand, I cannot define space as the order of coexistences; on the other hand, I cannot define time as the order of successions. And why not? Because "coexistences," Kant says there – it's almost childish what he says – he says, after all, in the end, that belongs to time. Coexistence means, literally, at the same time; in other words, it's a modality of time. Time is a form in which not only that which succeeds something occurs, but that which is at the same time occurs as well. In other words, coexistence or simultaneity is a modality of time.

Notice that this is funny because here I am almost making a case against what I am trying to say. There's a danger, it's telling oneself then that everything is already in place. I am saying, nonetheless, at some far distant date and coming from entirely different problems, there will be a famous theory of relativity of which one of the fundamental aspects will be to think simultaneity in terms of time; I'm not at all saying that Kant invented relativity – that would be a bit of

nonsense devoid of any interest – I am saying that such an expression, from what we already found comprehensible in it, would not have had this comprehensible element if Kant hadn't been there centuries before, well, not many centuries before. But Kant certainly does not invent relativity, but he is the first one to tell us that simultaneity does not belong to space but belongs to time. So, that may not seem like much of anything, but I believe that it's really… If we are trying to explain what it is, it's already a revolution in the order of concepts.

In other words, Kant will say that time has three modalities: what lasts through time is called permanence; [*Pause*] what follows after something else within it is called succession; and what coexists within it, that is, what is at the same time and is called simultaneity or coexistence. Notice the conclusion immediately, the double conclusion: I cannot define time through the order of successions since succession is only a modality of time, and I have no reason to privilege this modality over the others. And another conclusion at the same time: I cannot define space through the order of coexistences since coexistence does not belong to space. [*Pause*]

So, I'd almost say against what I mean, if Kant had maintained the classical definition of time and space, order of coexistences and of successions, he couldn't have, or at least there wouldn't have been any interest in doing so, he couldn't have criticized Leibniz since if I define space through the order of coexistences and time through the order of successions, it goes without saying, whereas space and time refer in the final instance to that which follows something else and to that which coexists, that is, to something that one can enunciate within the order of the concept. So, there is no longer any difference between spatio-temporal differences and conceptual differences. [*Pause*] In fact, the order of successions receives its *raison d'être* from that which follows; the order of coexistences receives its *raison d'être* from that which coexists. At that point, it's conceptual difference that is the final word, over all differences.

But here we have Kant unable to say, no, no; he couldn't break with classical definitions, pushed to the absolute by Leibniz, if he didn't propose to us another conception of space and time. This conception – at once for us, and through this philosophy is interesting – it is, if you will, is the most unusual and the most familiar. If we take them as definitions, so how could he have reached that point? What is…? And you will see precisely the master stroke that this represents! It's an entirely new way of defining space and time. At the same time, this didn't occur just like that; it didn't just come into his head. Many things had to occur. At the same time, this something familiar for us, and so there… so it's very familiar. We can sense what he means even before understanding it. So you see he didn't allow himself to define space through the order of coexistence, and time through the order of successions.

He will say, there we are: what is space? Space is a form. Hey, it's a form. That's odd because that's the same… that's already been examined; why does he say the word "form"? That means that it's not a substance and that it does not refer to substances. When I say – I am still returning to this – when I say that space is the order of possible coexistences, the order of possible coexistences is clarified in the final instance by things that coexist. In other words, the spatial order must find its reason in the order of things that fill space. When Kant says that space is a form, that is, is not a substance, that means that it does not refer to things that fulfill it. It doesn't refer to things that occupy it or that fill it.

It's a form, and how must we define it? Well, here we are: he tells us that it's the form of exteriority. So, that gets strange: it's the form of exteriority? How do we understand this? It's the form through which everything that is exterior to us reaches us, OK, that's it, but that's not only this. It's also the form through which everything that is exterior to itself occurs. So, in this, he can again jump back into tradition. Tradition had always defined space as, in Latin, *partes extra partes*, one part of space is exterior to another part. But here we find that Kant takes what was only a characteristic of space in order to make it the essence of space. Space is the form of exteriority, that is, the form through which what is exterior to us reaches us, [*Pause*] and through which what remains exterior to itself occurs [*Pause*]. But just sense, I am saying, that must be for us at once very obscure, but also very familiar because a philosophical concept is that, a form of exteriority, so all that is odd. If there were no space, there would be no exteriority, fine.

Let's jump over to time. But we immediately sense that Kant is going to provide the symmetrical definition since he cannot define time through the order of succession any more than space through the order of coexistence. He hits us, and that becomes even more and more difficult, with time as the form of interiority. What does that mean? That means, first, that time is the form of that which happens to us as interior, interior to ourselves. But does that mean only that? Maybe not. Things are in time, perhaps; perhaps things are in time, but that implies that they have an interiority. There would be an interiority of things. Time is the manner in which the thing is interior to itself.

Good, so here as well, if we jump and make some connections, understand that much later, much later, there will be philosophies of time, and much later time will become the principal problem of philosophy. For a long time, things were not like that. If you take classical philosophy, certainly we can cite the philosophers greatly interested in the problem of time, of course. But why did they always seem so unusual? Why are the so-called "unforgettable" pages on time by Saint Augustine always shown to us? We cannot say that this is a fundamental problem, on time. What the principal problem of classical philosophy is, and we cannot look at all the problems, is the problem of extension (*étendue*), and notably what the relation is between thought and extent, once it is said that thought is not part of extension. And it is well known that so-called classical philosophy attaches a great importance to the corresponding problem, the union of thought and extension, under the particular term, in the particular relation of the union of soul and body. So it's: what is the relation of thought to that which appears most opaque to thought, specifically extension?

In a certain way, some people find the source of modern philosophy in a kind of change of problematic, in which thought commences to confront time and no longer extension. And in fact, in more recent philosophers, the problem of the union of the soul and the body is not raised all that much. Why? What are these huge displacements of problems? On the other hand, the problem of the relationship between thought and time has never ceased to cause difficulties for philosophy, as if the real thing that philosophy confronted was the form of time and not the form of space. Fine. Is it just like this now? No. Maybe not; maybe now, that's changed, it may be something else. But what is this kind of mutation existing in philosophical problems? It's obvious. So, you see? This is where I wanted to reach, finally, with some very simple terms. Here, there are no complicated terms.

Kant created this kind of little revolution. In fact, he ripped space and time from the order of the concept because he gave two absolutely new determinations of space and time, the form of exteriority and the form of interiority. A question that I don't even want to approach, because that would be too complicated, would be fine then, Leibniz is the end of the seventeenth century, start of the eighteenth, while Kant is the eighteenth century. There is not much time between them. What happened for this mutation to emerge in the conception of space and time? Obviously here, everything has to come into play: scientific mutations, so-called Newtonian science, and many other things as well, to simplify by saying Newton, so scientific data, political data. We cannot believe that when there was such a change in the order of concepts that nothing happened in the social order. Among other things, the French revolution occurred. Did it imply a new space-time? We don't know. What else? Mutations occurred in daily life. Perhaps man did not exist in the same relations with space and time. Fine, let us say that the order of philosophical concepts expressed these kinds of things in its own way, even if [this order] comes beforehand.

Here is where we have reached. You see? We've retreated twice. Once again, we started off from an initial Leibniz-Kant opposition, and we have said that it is undecidable. I cannot decide between the proposition "every proposition is analytical," and the other proposition in which knowledge proceeds by synthetic propositions. We had to step back. First step back, I have again two antithetical propositions: every determination is conceptual in the final instance, and the Kantian proposition: there are spatio-temporal determinations that are irreducible to the order of the concept. We had to step back again in order to discover a kind of presupposition, notably [that] the Leibniz-Kant opposition is valid only to the extent that we consider that space and time are not at all defined in the same way. [*Pause*] It's odd, this idea that space is, does it open us to an outside? Never would someone from the Classical period have said that. It is already a relation that would have to be called an existential relation with space. Space is the form of what comes to us from outside.

Literally, if you… If, for example, I look for the relationship between poetry and philosophy, what does that imply as space? It implies an open space obviously. If you define space as a milieu of exteriority, it is an open space, not an enclosed space (*espace bouclé*). Leibnizian space is an enclosed space, it's the order of successions… no, excuse me, it's the order of coexistences. Even infinite, it's a closed aggregate; it closes over itself. Here, Kant's form is, on the contrary, a form that open us up, opens us to what? To an x, it is the form of eruptions. It's the form of emergences, of entries, of emergences. It's a new space. It's not difficult to say that there's already, that there's already Romanticism in this, that it's already a Romantic space. It is an aesthetic space since it is emancipated from the logical order of the concept. It is a Romantic space because it is the space of eruptions. It is the space of opening, of the open (*l'ouvert*).

And when you discover in works of certain philosophers who came much later, like Heidegger, some great themes and great songs regarding what he calls "the Open", with a capital O, when you see that Heidegger perpetually claims himself to be linked to a great post-Romantic poets, to Rilke, who himself owes this notion of the Open to German Romanticism, you will have a kind of small lineage there, a true lineage of thought, from Kant to German Romanticism in which the lineage is very, very strong – all the German Romantics pass through Kant --, you will better understand why Heidegger feels the need to write a book about Kant. This is not for the pleasure

of doing history of philosophy, but earlier, it is going to base its entire interpretation of Kantism then by deeply valorizing the theme of the Open by saying that in the end it's Kant who invents the form of the Open. Obviously, he's the one who invents the form of the Open as philosophical concept. At the same time, poets invent it as a rhythmic value or as aesthetic value; at the same time, researchers are inventing it as a scientific space. All these mutations do not occur entirely at the same moment. This is very odd. Understand? So, that becomes very difficult to say who is right and who is wrong, or why? Because here, at the point I've reached, we almost would like to say, well then, yes, even better, Kant corresponds better. That better suits our way of being within space (*dans l'espace*), or of being toward space (*être à l'espace*). In the end, I am not within space (*within space*); I am toward space (*être à l'espace*). Space is my form of opening. [*Pause*]

So, while we wait, we are led to say, so about Leibniz, can we say that Leibniz has been left behind? That's just wrong, right? Was that old philosophy? Perhaps it is not that simple. I don't think that it's like that, and if, if it's always good to read and also [if] some people feel the need to read Leibniz, this is not how a bit of [*unclear word*] will be created.

So, I'll continue to a fourth point. We first have to continue about Kant in order to perceive what he brings that is entirely new. But here is what I mean already as a principle. It is perhaps at the farthest extreme of what is new that, in philosophy, occurs what we call "the return to" (*le retour à*). After all, it is never up to an author to push himself as far as he can. Why? Because it's already extremely tiring to have created something, you know, so that one never takes it all the way, right? It's others that force you to take it all the way, so let them take matters in hand because that's not so bad, it's fine. And it's not Kant who is going as far as is possible for Kant; it's not by chance that this leads to a race of philosophers known as post-Kantians who are the great philosophers of German Romanticism. And they are the ones who, having pushed Kant as far as possible, feel the need to create this strangest of things: undertaking a return to Leibniz. [*End of the WebDeleuze recording; the BNF recording continues*] This becomes funny, this tale with its zigzags, knots, kinds of spinning, breakouts. I mean that there are two ways of undertaking a return: there is the very, very vexing way, when something new is not desired; and there is another way of undertaking a return, when the reason for undertaking the return is discovered at the extreme point of what had just been returned to [*enormous noise of someone blowing his nose*]. [*Pause*] So, … yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question]*

Deleuze: Yes, we can say that perhaps, mmm yes [*Deleuze seems rather doubtful*]. What is bothering you? … They [*perhaps the post-Kantians*] say this; I always like to take literally what people say.

A student: [*Inaudible commentary*]

Deleuze: Okay, we can say that; we can say that they did not go to the end of Kant. They don't think of themselves that way. So, a rule, since discussions in philosophy are so complicated already, I think a rule is to take into account a bit what people say about what they are doing. Not that they are necessarily right. They say ... and on the other hand, who would have pushed Kant

all the way? Maybe no one, but if it's not them, I don't see who. They say that's what they want to do. They say, Kant did not go all the way with Kant himself. Kant took very badly, since he lived to a very old age, he took this kind of proposition very, very badly. He said, I don't need you to go all the way, [*Laughter*] so as a result, this just happened quickly, eh? Relations were turning sour. But you see, it wasn't just about temperament (*humeur*). So, finally, I place this in brackets, he went all the way. Let's say this is purely hypothetical.

So, let's try in a fourth point to see in what way there consists… because here, we only have a tiny seed of the changes brought by Kant in the definitions of space and time. Well then, second, second, so I am looking in my fourth point, I am looking for the deep changes that Kantian philosophy was to bring about both in relation to so-called Classical philosophy and in relation to Leibniz's philosophy.

I am saying, into the disorder, I am trying to organize this. So, we have seen a first change concerning space-time. It's already very important. I am saying there is a second change, a second change this time concerning a concept very, very well known for ages, the sense of which was singularly changed, namely the concept of phenomenon. And you are going to see why one results from the other. [*Pause*] For quite a long time, I mean, the phenomenon was opposed to what? And what did it mean, a phenomenon, when philosophers would speak of a phenomenon? For example, it's a word coming from Greek; Plato used it, in fact; it was already in Plato. Fine, phenomena. Very often phenomenon is translated as appearance, appearances. And appearances, let's say that it is the sensible (*le sensible*). Appearance is sensible. And appearance is distinguished from what? It forms a doublet, it forms a couple, it forms an opposition with the correlative notion of essence. Appearance is opposed to essence. And Platonism, perhaps not Platonism itself, but the Platonist tradition, will develop a duality of appearance and essence, sensible appearances and intelligible essences. A famous conception results from this that causes a problem throughout Antiquity: the conception of two worlds. Are there two worlds, the sensible world and the intelligible world? Are we prisoners**,** through our senses and through our bodies, are we prisoner of a world of appearances? Yes, there we are.

Kant uses the word "phenomenon," and strangely, the reader gets the impression that when he/she [the reader] tries to situate the old notion of appearances under the Kantian word, it doesn't work, it doesn't work. For finally, a philosopher is not required to complete his themes; it's the context that imposes this. And moreover, to be legible, one cannot be defining all the time. One cannot spend one's time doing that. And it's odd: isn't there going to be as important a revolution as for time and space, on the level of the phenomenon? When Kant uses the word "phenomenon," he loads it with a much more violent sense: it is not appearance that separates us from essence, it is apparition, that which appears insofar as it appears. You will tell me that this isn't all that much; I don't know if it's not all that much. Perhaps it's enormous. The phenomenon [*several unclear words*] in Kant's work is not appearance, but apparition. Apparition is the manifestation of that which appears insofar as it appears. Why is it immediately linked to the preceding revolution? Because when I say that what appears insofar as it appears, what does the "insofar" mean? It means that that which appears does so necessarily in space and time. This is immediately united to the preceding theses. "Phenomenon" means that which appears in space and in time. It no longer means sensible appearance, it no longer means sensible appearance; it means spatio-temporal apparition. You will say that this is perhaps linked; it's

perhaps linked, but in any case, it does not mean the same thing. We don't place the accent at all on the same thing when we say a sensible appearance or when we say a spatio-temporal apparition.

What reveals the extent to which this is not the same thing? It's if I look for the doublet with which apparition is in relation. We have seen that appearance is related to essence, appearance-essence, to the point that there are perhaps two worlds, the world of appearances and the world of essences. But apparition is related to what? It's odd. [*Pause*] Apparition is in relation, we are told, with "condition". Something that appears, appears under conditions that are the conditions of its apparition. Conditions are the making-appear (*faire apparaître*) of apparition. These are the conditions according to which what appears, appears. Apparition refers to the conditions of the apparition, just as appearance refers to essences. But it's not at all the same opposition, apparition-condition. Others will say that apparition refers to, and is nearly the same thing as, sense. The doublet is: apparition and sense of the apparition. [*Pause*]

So, the phenomenon is no longer thought as an appearance in relation to its essence, but as an apparition in relation to its condition or its sense. So, you will tell me, another thunderclap. Henceforth, there is no longer any problem about "are there two worlds?" There are not two worlds; resolutely, there is no longer only one world constituted by that which appears and the sense of that which appears. What appears no longer refers to essences that would be behind the appearance; that which appears refers to conditions that condition the apparition of what appears, conditions who condition the apparition of what appears *in this world*. In other words, essence yields to sense. The concept is no longer the essence of the thing, it is the sense of the apparition.

Understand that this is an entirely new concept in philosophy from which will unfold philosophy's determination under the name of a new discipline, that of phenomenology. Phenomenology will be the discipline that considers phenomena as apparitions, referring to conditions or to a sense, instead of considering them as appearances referring to essences. From this, phenomenology will take on as many senses as you want, but it will at least have this unity, specifically its first great moment will be with Kant who himself pretends to undertake a phenomenology, precisely because he changes the concept of the phenomenon, making it the object of a phenomenology instead of the object of a discipline of appearances.

The second, and finally, the first great moment in which phenomenology will be developed as an autonomous discipline will be in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a famous text. And the word is very peculiar, the second great moment, and *The Phenomenology of Spirit* being precisely the great book, the great book of philosophy, that announces the disappearance of the two worlds; there is no more than a single world, as stated by Hegel's beautiful expression is: behind the curtain, there is nothing to be seen, so behind the curtain, there is nothing to be seen; that's a beautiful poetic expression that a German Romantic was able to create, but which means, philosophically, that the phenomenon is not a mere appearance behind which an essence is located; the phenomenon is an apparition that refers to the conditions of its appearance (*appearance*). There is but one single world. That is perhaps the moment when philosophy breaks its final links to theology. And then phenomenology's second moment will be the one in which Husserl renews phenomenology through a theory of apparition and sense. He will invent a form of logic proper to phenomenology. So, there we are.

At the same time, I tell myself, these things are so complicated. This is not in order to add new things; it's really because it's so very complicated because, by dint of simplifying in order to try to find some types of great ruptures (*coupures*), we risk neglecting numerous things because things are obviously more complex than that. We don't want to break with everything; you know, it's quite fatiguing, all that. It's very wearing; it's perhaps as wearing as working at I don't know what. It's work on the concept and work… People, they get old; there are some that only invent concept when they're young. There are some who wait for when they're old. Generally, philosophers aren't very young. There are cases, the case, there's the exceptional case of Hume. He created his genius turn, his book of genius when he was twenty-five. After, he only did repetition, only simplified it because it was too complicated for people, so he simplified it. He found everything at twenty-five. It's the only case that I know of philosophical precocity… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:25:31]

Part 3

So then, it's tiring, all that. There really have to be younger philosophers who arrive and who push things in another direction.

So, how will, how will that come about? I am saying that it's still more complicated than that because I will offer you an extremely simple schema. Kant is the one who broke with the simple opposition between appearance and essence in order to establish a correlation [between] the apparition and conditions of apparition, or apparition-sense (*apparition-sens*). That's it; it's not false, it's not really, because separating oneself from something is very difficult. In a certain way, we have to introduce two little correctives in order to be honest. It's that Kant preserves something from the former opposition, notably there is in Kant a strange thing, the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself. Phenomenon-thing in itself, for Kant, preserves something from the former opposition. I am not saying that this coincides; it conserves something from the old phenomenon-essence opposition, appearance-essence. So, it's more complicated than I am saying. Simply, there is also the really innovative aspect of Kant is the conversion of another set of notions, apparition-conditions of the apparition. And the thing in itself is not at all a condition of apparition. It's something completely different. It's another concept.

And inversely, a second corrective, nonetheless: from Plato to Leibniz, we were not simply told that there are appearances and essences. We were certainly told entirely something else. Moreover, already with Plato there appears a very curious notion that he calls the well-founded appearance, that is, of course, appearance hides essence from us, but in some ways, [appearance] expresses it as well. And what is the relation between appearance and essence is a very, very complex one that Leibniz will try to push in a very strange direction, specifically: he will create from it a theory of symbolization? The Leibnizian theory of symbolization quite singularly prepares the Kantian revolution. The phenomenon symbolizes with essence. And precisely, this relation of symbolization is very, very odd; it's no longer that of appearance with essence. It's a very, very different relation. All this to tell you that it's always very, very complicated.

So, I am trying to continue in this way. So, there occurs a new upheaval at the level of the conception of the phenomenon. And notice just how it immediately links up with the disturbance

of space-time, finally I believe there is a fundamental upheaval at the level of subjectivity. [*Pause*] I'd just like to start with Kant. Have I tired you out? All that is very abstract. If you are tired, it might be better to take a five-minute break. [*Some indistinct words to student nearby him*] [*Pause*] Yes, shall I continue? [*Pause*] We're going to finish this quickly.

So, there as well, it's a very strange story. Because we have to determine when this notion of subjectivity takes off… as a philosophical concept. There you have what I'd like to say. In a perspective still of classical philosophy, pushed even by Leibniz all the way since, for the moment, I am based in the hypothesis that Leibniz will only push to the end and down the paths almost of genius and almost delirium the presuppositions of classical philosophy, and then I was saying earlier the opposite, that in Leibniz, there was already this kind of radical revolution. It's because I cannot state all the aspects at the same time; there can only by several aspects at the same time.

I am saying, from a perspective like that of Leibniz, one really has very little choice. These are philosophies of creation. What do these mean, philosophies of creation? Well then, that means that these are philosophies which are certainly quite independent from theology, but that have maintained a certain alliance, to the point that even atheists, if indeed they are that, will pass by way of God. Their resource will be to call God by something so bizarre, so bizarre, that they don't even get burned; that doesn't help anything, eh? That doesn't help anything, but it's like that when Lucien Febvre wrote a whole history book to try to mark when the word "atheist" emerged, when it appeared, and for example, it does not appear at the time of Rabelais, so that Rabelais was not an atheist, we feel that he is both right and completely wrong. Spinoza never stops talking about God; well, okay, he talks about God, he doesn't stop talking about God, but once again, God is a thing where one really has to say: tell me the face you give him, and I can tell if you believe in him or not because… good. [*Pause*] It doesn't function at the word level, God, because I can talk about God very well for a long time, eh? but there we are. [*Laughter*]

Well then, I am saying, they have this alliance, whether they are atheist or not atheist, they have this alliance with theology that results in their departing from God in a certain manner, that is, what? That is, their point of view is fundamentally creationist. And even philosophers who do something other than creationism, that is, who are not interested or who replace the concept of creation with something else, they fight against the concept of creation as a function of the concept of creation. In any event, the point that they start from is infinity. This is why, once again, I had already quoted it, that I find very, very fine Merleau-Ponty's phrase, who says: if we had to define classical philosophy, we would have to say that these philosophers had one manner, it was their secret that we have completely lost, we have lost it both because we are no longer capable of it and also because we no longer want it, [*a few indistinct words*] we no longer are able and we no longer want it any more.

But [philosophers] had an innocent manner; for them, there we no problems; this is their own thing in order to respect people. They were thinking starting from infinity, an innocent manner of thinking starting from infinity, and they gave themselves to infinity. For them, that created no problems, infinity. There was infinity. There was infinity everywhere; there was infinity in God, but there was also infinity in the world. That did not make them naïve because that allowed them to undertake things like infinitesimal analysis; that allowed them to do many things. An innocent

way of thinking starting from infinity means a world of creation. You will tell me this doesn't go without saying, but here, I am creating some leaps. [*Pause*] And what does that mean? That means that they could, furthermore, they could go very, very far in a certain direction. The discovery of subjectivity. They could go quite far; they couldn't go – so here, I am placing this in quotes to signal this – they couldn't go "all the way". Understand? These are the most beautiful moments of a theory, when a theory pushes its concepts onto a path in which… these are the moments of affliction, these are the most moving moments. We know this well, they cannot go very far; they cannot go all the way to the end of that direction because the entire concept blocks them from going in that direction. To push that direction all the way to the end, a completely different aggregate was necessary. In fact, why can't they go precisely all the way of a discovery of subjectivity? Nonetheless, they do go quite far.

The famous philosopher, Descartes, you know that he invents truly his own concept, signed Descartes, the famous "I think, therefore I am,", notably the discovery of subjectivity or the thinking subject, the discovery that thought refers to a subject. It doesn't go without saying that the idea refers to a subject. The idea of a thinking subject is very, very odd. I believe that a Greek – what I'm going to say is obvious – a Greek would not even have understood what that meant. He understands when he's told that the soul thinks, but the idea of a thinking subject… In any case, Descartes brings this forth; Leibniz will not forget it, for there is a Leibnizian subjectivity, not the same as Descartes's, but there is a Leibnizian subjectivity. With Descartes, generally, this was prepared beforehand, always by St. Augustine, but there is the discovery of subjectivity, and generally, we define modern philosophy with the discovery of subjectivity. It's not a good definition, but that doesn't matter, that doesn't matter, anything at all, it's possible to state.

So, so, why can't they go all the way to the end of the discovery of subjectivity? For a simple reason: it's that this subjectivity, however far they might go in their explorations, this subjectivity can only be posited as created, precisely because they have an innocent way of thinking starting from infinity. [*Pause*] It can only be thought as created, that is, the thinking subject, as finite subject, can be thought of as created. Created by whom? Created by God. Thought referring to the subject can only be thought as created: what does that mean? It means that the thinking subject is substance, the thinking subject is a thing. *Res*. It is not an extended thing, as Descartes says; *res cogitans* is a thinking thing. It is an unextended thing, ok, but it is a thing, a substance, *res* or substantial, and it has the status of created things, it is a created thing, a created substance. You see? Does that block them? You will tell me that it's not difficult; at that point, they had only to put the thinking subject in the place of God. [There's] no interest, no interest in exchanging places. In that event, one has to speak of an infinite thinking subject in relation to which finite thinking subjects would themselves be created substances. Nothing would be gained. That's not how one creates a revolution in concepts. Thus, if you will, their strength, their strength, specifically this innocent way of thinking according to infinity, leads them to the threshold of subjectivity and prevents them from crossing through. What a situation! [*Pause*]

So, what does Kant do? What contributes to his rupture with Descartes? When the Kantian cogito is mentioned, in what way is it not the same thing as the Cartesian cogito? It's simple; we're being told something very simple. We are being told, you know, that for Kant, the thinking subject is not a substance, not determined as a thinking thing. It is not determined by a thinking

thing, so it's what? [*Pause*] It is determined as what. A new Kantian thunderclap: it is going to be pure form. The thinking subject is pure form. Pure form of what? It's the form of the apparition of everything that appears. In other words, it is the condition of apparition of all that appears in space and in time. This is going to get annoying because to whatever Kant commits himself to finding a new relation of thought with space and time, it's going to be … [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*] Fine.

Pure form, empty form; with the "I think", there Kant becomes splendid. He goes so far as to say of the "I think" that it is the poorest thought. In fact, I can say "I think", I think nothing at all. Only, it is the condition of any thought about any one thing. "I think" is the condition of all thought about any one thing that appears in space and in time, but itself is an empty form that conditions every apparition. That becomes a very severe world, a desert world. From that movement onward Nietzsche's famous expression begins to become true, "the desert grows". In fact, what has disappeared is the world inhabited by the divine, the infinite, and it became the world of men. For in the end, what disappeared is the problem of creation; what disappeared, what was the problem of creation replaced with? In the place of a completely different problem that will be the problem of Romanticism, specifically the problem of foundation (*fondement*). It is no longer a question of knowing how the world was created, which implies innocent thought starting from infinity. Now there arises a clever thought, a puritanical thought, a desert-like thought, that wonders, once it's admitted that the world exists and that it appears, how to found it?

The question of creation has been rejected; it's considered to be a false problem, fully creating the joy of seventeenth-century philosophers. Now comes the era of foundation (*fondement*). Philosophy ceased taking God for a model. Leibniz speaks in a certain way, and that's the great innocence. The classical great innocence is speaking in God's place, and Leibniz pushed his genius all the way to the end of that. Here, really, if there is a philosopher who spoke the discourse of God, it was Leibniz. Now the model of the philosopher has become something very strange; it's not that this goes any better, right? He's become the hero, the foundational hero (*héros fondateur*). He is the one who founds within an existing world, not the one who creates the world. [*Pause*]

And what is foundational? What is foundational is that which conditions the condition of what appears in space and in time. Everything is linked there. Space-time, a change in the notion of space-time, a change in the notion of phenomenon, a change in the notion of subject. The thinking subject as pure form will only be the act of founding the world such as it appears and knowledge of the world such as it appears. This is an entirely new undertaking. I believe that it's something completely, completely new.

For those who have been taking this seminar, if you recall our work over the past several years, a year ago – that must have been last year or two years ago, I don't know -- I tried to distinguish the Classical artist from the Romantic artist, as generally, in this way, on the level of music. And for those… Once again, it's good sometimes to review material because, in my view, for five years we have really been working on topics that reverberate together. And all that I had been trying to find is that music shows well… I wasn't able to make any distinction between Classical

and Baroque. The Classical and the Baroque are strictly the same thing; the are two poles of the same enterprise. They're absolutely two correlates.

And I was saying that the Classical artist, it's not difficult; he is one who organizes milieus. He's the one who organizes and who, to some extent, is in the situation of God -- this is creation. The Classical artist never stops undertaking creation anew, by organizing milieus and by passing from one milieu to another, by never ceasing to pass from one milieu to another. He passes from water to earth, he separates the earth and the waters, exactly God's task in creation. That's what the innocence of the Classical artist is, and if there is Baroque, it is because in opening out (*la ventilation*) the milieu, there is the entire Baroque, of milieus, in the way of moving from one milieu to the other, the fish that comes out of the water, that leaps, the bird that dives into the water, etc. You have the strangest, the most unusual operations. The Classics are not typical of serenity at all. They confront the milieus; they confront the task of recreating the world, and they pose a kind of challenge to God: they are going to do just as much, and that is what the Classical artist is.

And then, I was saying, the Romantic is not that at all. To some extent, even at first glance, the Romantic would be less crazy, because he's not that at all. His problem is that of founding; it is no longer the problem of the world, I was saying, but one of the earth. It is no longer the problem of milieu, but one of territory. To leave one's territory, to move from one's territory in order to arrive, to find the center of the earth, that's what founding is; it's no longer creating. The Romantic artist renounced creating because he thinks that there is a much more heroic task, and this heroic task is foundation. And the whole Romantic artist then, at the extreme, musically he plays on the very deep gap between the territory and the earth, and no longer on this other gap between creation and milieus. It is no longer creation and milieu; it's: I am leaving my territory, farewell, I depart, I am going to the center of the earth. That's why Empedocles throwing himself into his volcano will be, in Greek legend, the character who most pleases the Romantic artist. He leaves his territory in order to hurl himself into the center of the earth. He undertakes the great operation of foundation, but the foundation, the base is in the bottomless (*le fondement est dans le sans fond*).

All post-Kantian philosophy from Schelling onward will be developed around this kind of abundant concept or the bottom, the fundament, the base, the bottomless. This will be a very beautiful philosophy; here, this is very Romantic. He was saying that if you really want to make correspondences in art, obviously, the *lied*, you certainly see, that is always what the *lied* is, the *lied* and the song-melody relation in the *lied*. It's exactly the tracing of a territory haunted by the hero, and the hero leaves, departs, always a song of departure. Where is he departing for? He doesn't depart for the heavens; he departs in order to find the center of the earth which is never in correspondence with the center of the territory. He deserts, he chooses a kind of line, the Romantic hero traces a very strange line. If you take Schubert, Schuman, the entire history of the *lied*, if you reach Mahler's *lieder*, that's it, that's it, Mahler, "The Song of the Earth" [by Mahler], that's it. The history of the *lied* establishes this tense opposition, which is the heroic opposition, which is that of the hero between the tune (*chansonnette*) about the territory and the great song of the earth. Mahler's words are splendid, when Mahler says, in order to create nature, it doesn't suffice for there to be a birdsong, a cowbell, a Viennese waltz, while all that is there,

all that is there. But as a kind of counterpoint, a musical correspondence, all that has to be carried away by the song of the earth. You see?

And if you will, it's almost, this musical doublet territory-earth, you sense it corresponds exactly to what in philosophy is the phenomenon-apparition and the condition of apparition. Moreover, to show that I am not exaggerating, I point out there in a preface to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, there is a very, very odd text, in which Kant distinguishes a relation to any concept. He says a concept has a domain or a territory; he gives the Latin words. It has a concept and a territory, and then it also has a domain… Non, yes, he doesn't say a domain or a territory; he distinguishes the territory, the domain and also something – [*Deleuze speaks very softly, saying he has to find the text*], yes, that's it. --

You understand, I'd like to finish this up because, there we are, this difference is enormous, because why do they abandon the point of view of creation? Why is the hero not someone who creates, but someone who founds, and with the stories that this opens to us, why isn't it the final word? After all, if there were a moment in which thought, in any case, Western thought was a bit tired of thinking itself and taking itself for God and of thinking in terms of creation, it is not enough to say that one is tired with all that. The seed must still be there. If some rich seeds arrive within a period, it's because the period itself works on concepts. There is a great work of concepts that cause us to say, ah, no, there is something that no longer suits us in these ways of thinking. But does art still suit us, this image of thought, heroic thought, this foundational thought, this thought that substitutes heroic fundament for divine creation? It's not certain that this suits us; do we still believe in it? See? The philosopher who had begun by taking himself for God, he took himself to be a kind of hero. Today, I believe that all that is finished. That doesn't mean that one doesn't remain Kantian. Here this question takes on its full meaning: what does it mean to be Kantian today? What does it mean being Leibnizian today?

Well then, understand the enormous importance of this substitution of the form of the ego by the thinking subject. I am saying, the thinking substance was still the point of view of God; it's that thinking substance is a finite substance, but created as a function of the infinite, created by God. Whereas when Kant tells us that the thinking subject is not a substance, is not a thing, he well understands a created thing, a form that conditions the apparition of all that appears in space and in time; that is, it is the form of founding. What is he in the process of doing? He institutes – but it's enough for him to say that in order for this to become crystal clear, I suppose; as an operation, that gets strange – he institutes and constitutes the finite ego (*le moi fini*) as first principle. Aaaah, he did that! Aaah. Doing that is frightening. For a guy from the XVIIth century, once it's said that this isn't a question of being burned or not because perhaps in the XVIIth century, perhaps the Church would have accepted more, everything would have been accepted by the Reform, that depends a lot on the Reform, this tale from Kant. Without the Reform, he couldn't have undertaken his thing; he wouldn't even have had an inkling about it, that's obvious.

The finite ego is the true fundament, whereas before, it was God that was the veritable creator. Thus, the first principle becomes finitude. But that's truly a revolution. For all the Classics, finitude is a consequence; finitude is the limitation of something infinite. The created world is finite, the Classics tell us, because it is limited. Well, then, no! It's not that! Finitude has become

constitutive. The finite ego founds the world and knowledge of the world because the finite ego is itself the constitutive founding of what appears. In other words, it is finitude that is the founding of the world. [*Pause*]

The relations of the infinite to the finite shift completely. It will no longer be, it will no longer be the infinite… [*Pause*] no! no! The finite will no longer be a limitation of the infinite; rather, the infinite will be a surpassing (*dépassement*) of the finite. Moreover, it is a property of the finite to surpass and go beyond itself. The notion of self-surpassing (*auto-dépassement*) begins to be developed in philosophy. This notion will in fact become poison. It will traverse all of Hegel and will reach into Nietzsche in order to be transformed in the Nietzschean form, "man must surpass himself by himself". The infinite is no longer separable from an act of surpassing finitude because only finitude can surpass itself. These were absolutely incomprehensible propositions for a Classical philosopher. [*Pause*] The entire dialectic, everything called dialectic is the operation of the infinite to be transformed therein, the infinite becoming and become the act through which finitude surpasses itself by constituting or by founding the world.

This is how the infinite is subordinated to the act of the finite. And is this possible? Well then, what results from this? There's a page that's very, very… One of the first philosophers who followed Kant and pretended to push farther that Kant through his own efforts, who named Fichte. And there is in Fichte a page that seems exemplary to me precisely for the Kantian polemic, Kant-Leibniz. Here is what Fichte tells us; he tells us this – if you've understood this, you will understand quite well; if you haven't understood, but since you are going to understand this you will understand everything [*Laughter*] – The great philosopher Fichte tells us: I can always say A is A; I can say A is A. You see immediately what the great Fichte is alluding to; he is alluding to the principle of identity. [*Pause*] But this is only a hypothetical proposition. There we are. Why? Because it presupposes, if there is A, if A is, if A is, A is A, but if there is nothing, A is not A. Fine.

You already see in what way it's very interesting what he says [*several unclear words*]; it's very interesting because, very sneakily, he is in the act of overthrowing the principle of identity. He says that the principle of identity is a hypothetical rule. Certainly he says "A is A", yes, but again on the condition that A exists. Hence, the great theme he proposes: to surpass hypothetical judgment going toward what he calls "thetic" judgment (*le jugement thétique*), the thetic judgment, going beyond hypothesis toward thesis. And he asks, why is it that A is A, if A does exist? Well then, because finally the proposition A is A is not at all a final principle or a first principle. It refers to something deeper, specifically: one must say that A is A because it is thought; A is A because A is thought. You'll tell me, fine, what precisely does that add? It's quite simple: he develops his thetic proposition A is A because it is thought, specifically, what founds the identity of the thing thought is the identity of the thinking subject. And the identity of the thinking subject is what? It's the identity of the finite ego.

Thus, the first principle is not A is A; it's ego equals ego (*moi égale moi*). German philosophy will encumber its books with the magic formula: ego equals ego, ego equals ego which will be developed through all the great German Romantics. And this "ego equals ego", why is this expression so bizarre? Notice that A is A surpasses itself toward the true expression of the principle which is not A is A, but which is "ego equals ego." And why is "ego equals ego" a very

different principle from A is A? Well then, because it is a synthetic identity. [*Pause*] Aaaah! As a result, we find the beginning. And why is this a synthetic identity? It's a synthetic identity because ego equals ego marks the identity of the ego that thinks itself as the condition of all that appears in space and in time, and [inaudible] that appears in space and in time itself. [*Pause*] In this there is a synthesis that is the synthesis of finitude, notably the thinking subject, primary ego, form of all that appears in space and time, must also appear in space and in time, that is, ego equals ego. And here we have the synthetic identity of the finite ego which replaces what? The infinite analytic identity of God. Aaaah, so you see? Understand, it's all this that's in question.

I will finish with two things; in fact, we aren't up to continuing any longer. First thing that I should have developed but that would take me three hours; this for your reflection. So what could it mean to be Leibnizian today? If all this is true, if… it's not difficult to understand. It's that Kant, what did he do? He absolutely created, but truly a kind of conceptual aggregate that can be said to go in a radically new direction. He doesn't say that there are no influences, that there aren't… He didn't do that all by himself, all that, but it's a conceptual reference grid. These are completely new philosophical conceptual coordinates. Once again, I believe it is not about raising questions in different languages, but in the same language: a Classic would not understand the propositions exactly. He doesn't have the means to understand it. How could he? He lacks the conceptual means; if you don't have the conceptual means and if you don't build the conceptual means yourself that give sense to what you are saying, what you are saying is nonsensical, it's that simple.

So, say what your concepts are before you speak. I mean, it's not necessary to speak, on the contrary; you should not say them when you speak because otherwise, it will be boredom. But if you are doing philosophy, let your task extend to the concepts you need, and if you do not find them ready-made, invent them; even don't wait for them to be ready-made. It would be better to find something already that has been created than to wait. So, hurry; this is your business. So, do you understand? But in the case of these new coordinates, once again, understand, the philosophical [*indistinct word*] is extremely [*unclear word*] all of this, you can't be attempting this all your life, not possible, that's not possible.

Fine, so then, Kant in one sense renews everything, but precisely, what he brings to light, there are absolutely all sorts of things that are not elucidated. An example of a thing that's not elucidated: what exact relation is there between the condition of the phenomenon and the phenomenon itself insofar as it appears? Good, so finally, I will review: the thinking ego, the finite ego, conditions [and] founds the phenomenal apparition. The phenomenon appears in space and in time. And all that works well together. How is this possible? What does this relation of conditioning mean? In other words, the "I think" is a form of knowledge that conditions the apparition of all that appears.

But how does that work? How is this possible? I mean, what is the relation between the conditioned and the condition? The apparition is the conditioned; the condition is the form of "I think." Kant is nonetheless quite annoyed. He says, well here, that this is a fact of reason. He who had so greatly demanded that the question be elevated to the state *quid juris*, now he invokes what he himself call a *factum*: the finite ego is so constituted that what appears for it, what appears to it, conforms to the conditions of the apparition such that its very own thought

determines it. And Kant will say that this agreement of the conditioned and the condition can only be explained by a harmony of our faculties, a harmony of our faculties, specifically our passive sensibility and our active thought.

Ah, so then, what does Kant do? You understand? It's pathetic; as a result of this splendid effort, he is in the process of sneaking God in behind our backs. What guarantees this harmony? He will say it himself: the idea of God. Ah, really? So, here we are moving forward. There's a need to… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

What will the post-Kantians do? I am summarizing enormously, but I am selecting a very, very precise point. The post-Kantians are philosophers who say above all that Kant is magnificent, he's inspired (*génial*), fine; but still, we cannot remain in an exterior relation of the condition and conditioned, of the conditioned and the condition, because if we remain in this relation of fact, specifically that there is a harmony between the conditioned and the condition and that's that, then we are obliged to resuscitate God as a guarantee of harmony. So, it's said, Kant still remains – and this is the great expression from the first post-Kantians – Kant still remains in a viewpoint which is that of exterior conditioning; he does not reach a true viewpoint of genesis. It would require showing how conditions of apparition are at the same time genetic elements of what appears.

So, at that point, what is necessary to show that? One has to take seriously one of the Kantian revolutions that Kant had completely left aside, notably that the infinite is truly the act of finitude insofar as it surpasses itself. Kant had not developed that because he was satisfied with a reduction of the infinite to the indefinite. We have to return to a strong conception of the infinite, but not in the manner of the Classics. One must return to a strong conception of the infinite by showing that the infinite is an infinite in the strong sense, but as such, it is the act of finitude insofar as it surpasses itself, and in so doing, it constitutes the world of apparitions. Fine, to do that, one must substitute the viewpoint of genesis for the viewpoint of the condition.

And doing that, understand, means returning to Leibniz, but on bases other than Leibniz's because at that point, all the elements to create a genesis such as the post-Kantians demand it, all the elements are virtually – not actually because Leibniz's problem was something else – they are virtually there in Leibniz. The idea of differentials of consciousness, at that point the "I think" of consciousness must bathe in an unconscious, and that there be an unconscious of thought as such; there must by an unconscious of thought as such, whereas the Classics would have said that there is simply God who goes beyond thought. Kant said that there is thought as a form of the finite ego. In this, one must almost assign an unconscious to thought which would contain the differentials of what appears in thought, in other words, which performs the genesis of the conditioned as a function of the condition. That will be Fichte's great task, and then taken up again by Hegel on other bases. You see henceforth that, at the limit, they can rediscover all of Leibniz.

And us, and us, and us? I am finishing on this point because it would really take too long then to give… What has happened since? What would it mean to do a history of philosophy? What happened? A lot took place. First, what have I not considered here? Enormous things. I am defining philosophy as an activity that consists in creating concepts. Fine, to create concepts is

very special mode of creation; it's as creative as art. There is creation, fine; the creation of concepts is very special. But like all things, the creation of concepts occurs in correspondence with other modes of creation. Fine, I've tried to outline, for example, German Romantic philosophy, of kinds of Romantic music; there are plenty of correspondences. We must especially not flatten this out, especially not. There we are; there's all that. There are all kinds of reasons why concepts are literally demanded, are needed.

In which sense do we need concepts? Understand, for me, in any case, a concept has nothing to do with ideology. A concept is not ideology, not at all, truly not. It's also material; a concept has a material existence; it has an existence as real as… It's like an animal with paws. We find new animals, so they have, hey… And there are strange kinds of butterflies, they're as huge as that, or else a crocodile with two jaws, all that, new animals; there are animals that disappear, there are new animals. Well then, concepts are spiritual animals (*bêtes spirituelles*), they're like flies. There are concepts of elephants, there are concepts of flies, there's all that. Fine, so, you understand?

So, take a great question: how do these kinds of appeals to concepts occur? In any case, a philosopher is someone who creates concepts, but at certain moments, what forces, what occurs that ancient concepts… ? So, that doesn't mean that old concepts are no longer useful. It means that they will only again be useful, they will be useful on the condition of literally being recharged, of being resituated within new conceptual coordinates. So, then, what occurs… ? What is a great philosopher? It's easy to recognize. It's someone who creates new concepts, so… And here, this greatly concerns feelings; there is a philosophical sensibility. The philosophical sensibility is equal to the pictorial and musical sensibility. There's a musical sensibility, there's a philosophical sensibility, and the philosophical sensibility is the art of evaluating, not at all the contradiction and the non-contradiction that exists between concepts; that has strictly no importance. It's the art of evaluating, and this is why, looking for a word that I used in previous years, it's seeking to evaluate the consistency of an aggregate of concepts. Do they have a consistency? Does that work? How does it function? Fine.

So, there is that; there is this whole problem. What are the relations between concepts, and through things other than concepts, under what influences are concepts created? In what relations with other creative disciplines? What does a painter do, what does... ? It goes without saying that philosophy does not have a history separate from the rest, and that it's odd, as a result, modern music, modern science, it is obvious that there is a modern philosophy although there are periods of desert, there are periods ... It's like all activities. So, there are times when it works, there are times… The emotion when a great book in philosophy comes out because it takes us out, we have the impression there… [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:12:00]

Part 4

… And today, it's obvious, I don't know, when I think about what I've just said, the model of the philosopher, if it is a little bit true, even the model of the philosopher or even of the Classical artist who, in a certain way, takes himself for God. It's nothing wrong, I mean, it's even very technical things. Obviously, a musician like Bach has a certain connection with God. I don't mean by virtue of his personal faith, [but] by virtue of this conception of music, including

conception, his practical conception. He makes music like God creates or is supposed to create a world, and technically it means something, technically it means something. I believe that it means precisely, the creation of sounding forms (*formes sonnantes*).

Obviously, a Romantic no longer created music the same way, and that doesn't mean he went beyond Bach; he didn't go beyond him. He did a thousand other things, and it was better for him to do something else. What do you think of a novelist -- I'll give an example to end this -- what do you think of a novelist who writes today like Balzac? It's shit. [*Laughter*] Shit. It's not that he has to write in a weird way; it's not that Balzac is out of date either. The only thing, the only thing that is outdated, is the person who continues to write like Balzac. Balzac is not out of date because he did not write like Balzac, precisely. [*Pause*]

So, fine, we can say, of course, not to kill in order to create because it can be very, dangerous, empty creations can be very dangerous. Obviously, I don't know, everything important occurring in the novel is precisely people who loved Balzac so much that, for them, there was not even a problem. They could no longer write like Balzac, and not that Balzac's writing is outdated… Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: Well, that only means that. How does he call himself a Marxist if he filtered out a set of concepts that were simply to be called Marxism? [*Pause*] Balzac is not Balzacian, yes, yes, yes, and that does not prevent being Balzacian from meaning something, being a Marxist from meaning something. It is when, depending on your sensitivity, in order to think or to feel, you need, you need a certain number of concepts or melodies or rhythms, which are signed Balzac or which, with all the more reason, are signed Marx. It goes without saying that in what is currently happening at the level of a social field, well, fine, there are many people who think that Marx no longer has anything, no longer has anything to teach them. Okay, that's their business. There are others who say to themselves that even when facing current banking mechanisms, economic mechanisms, we hardly risk understanding them if we do not use concepts, concepts signed Marx, and that if we do something new, well then, there will in any case be a revival of, just as there is this return to Leibniz that I was talking about, a revival of or return to Marx, a return to this or that.

So, I am saying, today, well, you understand, I believe that it's not that nothing, no one ever is outdated, no one ever, but the only ones who are outdated are those who don't surpass anything; I mean, the only ones who are outdated are the ones who create "in the manner of" (*faire du 'comme'*). Every time you speak, at your own peril, every time you create your little concept, even if it's a small bit of a concept, you cannot be surpassed. I mean, one is never surpassed in what one creates. We are always surpassed in what we do not create, by definition. So, fine, the body of novelists who write like Balzac, published in many copies, in the history of literature, is worth nothing, nothing; they will never write as well as Balzac. It would be preferable for them to do something else.

But what I mean, for us, what's going on? How has philosophy been constituted, let's say, recent philosophy, quite modern philosophy? We should ask the same kind of question. I believe this

happened, that the philosopher stopped thinking of himself as a founding hero, in the Romantic way. What was fundamental in what is called, generally speaking, modernity, for the sake of convenience, it was precisely this kind of bankruptcy of Romanticism on our behalf. Once again, that doesn't mean that Novalis, that Hölderlin are outdated. But they no longer work for us, Hölderlin, Novalis; they can no longer work for us and only fully work for us within the framework of our new coordinates. We can even give them some very, very strange profiles.

So, what happened was that we stopped thinking of ourselves as heroes too. So, [*a few indistinct words*], I don't know, what you take oneself to be depends on what you do later. But it seems obvious to me that the model of the philosopher is no longer at all ... and the model of the artist is no longer God at all insofar as it sets about creating the equivalent of a world; he is no longer the hero at all as he sets about founding a world. It has become something else again, it has become something else. And for the artist, the same. The artist is no longer at all… And for those who would be interested, I think it is good to make the link with other [seminar] years, for example, the texts, there is a small text by Klee, Paul Klee, *Theory of Modern Art*, which appeared in Livre de poche, in which Paul Klee, insofar as being painter, tries to say how he sees his difference even from previous paintings, and Klee admired the great painters of previous eras.

He says, here we are, this doesn't present itself quite in the same way for us. What does a painter mean today when he says, we can no longer paint ... we can no longer “go to the motif”? You know Cézanne’s expression, "go to the motif", taking his canvas and then ... In painting, this doesn't happen anymore. That interests me greatly because, you know, there's a kind of continuous flow that shrinks, that is one with history. And this flow, there are twists, stuff (*trucs*), some … eh? [*Deleuze does not finish*] So there is a moment when painting proceeds by “going to the motif”; it had not always proceeded that way. Cézanne's great phrase, "I'm going to the motif," he takes his easel out, and then his brush, and then he goes looking, searching for his apple, his sunset. He doesn't make copies, right? "Going to the motif" is not reproducing.

Today, well, a painter’s attitude, taking pictures, the pictures that show him working, the very beautiful pictures that show how ... [*Pause; Deleuze seems to be looking for his sentence*] I forget his name, well, how a painter, for example, paints while spreading his canvas out on the floor, eh? That’s not “going to the motif” there, [*a student reminds him of the name*] [Jackson] Pollock, yes, Pollock, the pictures of Pollock in his studio. This is a painting that no longer means anything to ethics; everything happens as if the flow no longer passes through that. There are painters for whom this has become a secondary activity. That doesn't mean Cézanne is outdated. Obviously, not, he isn’t outdated. It means that the coordinates of the painting have changed greatly. On the contrary, it makes Cézanne someone who is unmatched. But then, Klee says it very well, today, that the problems change in that way, fine.

I would say, yes, they said, I’ve been brought to this, how very happy it is to end on this point. Leibniz is infinite analysis. So, to present some truly [*Pause*] simplistic statements, Kant is the finite synthesis, he is the great synthesis of finitude. Okay, let's assume we're really in the age of synthesizer today. It is no longer either infinite analysis or finite synthesis. It’s, it’s something else. And if also, isn't the synthesizer, isn’t there any synthesizer in philosophy, which like a musical synthesizer, is a philosophical synthesizer? Hasn't that become our principle, [*a few indistinct words*]? What would that be, a synthetic thought, in this new sense? Okay, I don't

know, but you see, just as a painter can say, the artist is not in the same condition today in 1980 as he was in 1920, or as he was in 1700, what is obvious, the philosopher can no longer… So, it is obvious there, he can no longer, in his own way, "go to the motif", he can no longer sing the philosophical *lied*, he cannot no longer create his game of the song of the earth. No, that's not it; it's something else. It's something else, but what is it? [*Pause*]

There we have it! The end! [2:21:00]

Notes

[1] Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGSYIqypxs8

[2] We have to indicate that this translation (session 1) is based on a transcript that we have completely transformed from the text that has been available for some twenty years on Web Deleuze, since we have scrupulously followed here, without edits or unforeseen omissions, the audio recording available on several platforms (YouTube, Web Deleuze, Paris 8, and here on The Deleuze Seminars). We have therefore expanded the text of this first session on Leibniz by approximately *forty minutes*, that is, in addition to the approximate equivalent of about eighty minutes contained on the earlier transcript. We have benefitted, however, from Web Deleuze's alternate transcription in order to fill in two specific gaps that occurred when the recording was interrupted for cassette changes, at the end of parts 1 and 2.

[3] Lucy Prenant, ed. *G.W. Leibniz, Oeuvres choisies* (Paris : Garnier, 1940).

[4] Deleuze will return to the general topic of point of view and to this specific example in the longer Leibniz seminar, in the session of 18 November 1986.

[5] Deleuze will develop these concepts in chapter 2 (inherence, inclusion, point of view), chapter 4 (sufficient reason) and chapter 5 (incompossibility) of *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque* (*Le Pli*).

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLZKmW2t2uo

[7] We have to indicate that this translation (session 2) is based on a transcript that we have completely transformed from the text that has been available for some twenty years on Web Deleuze, since we have scrupulously followed here, without edits or unforeseen omissions, the audio recording available on several platforms (YouTube, Web Deleuze, Paris 8, and here on The Deleuze Seminars). We have therefore expanded the text of this second session on Leibniz by approximately *forty minutes*, that is, in addition to the approximate equivalent of about eighty minutes contained on the earlier transcript. We have benefitted, however, from Web Deleuze's alternate transcription in order to fill in two specific gaps that occurred when the recording was interrupted for cassette changes, at the end of parts 1 and 2.

[8] Part II of *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque* (*Le Pli*) is entitled, "Inclusions", composed of chapters 4, "Sufficient Reason," 5 "Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty," and 6 "What Is an Event?"

[9] In the session on Leibniz that takes place on 27 January 1987, Deleuze provides a detailed elaboration both of the example taken from the *Theodicy*, and the one taken from *Ficciones* by Borges.

[10] See session 5, 6 January 1987, in the second Leibniz seminar for a brief development of Malebranche's conversation.

[11] It is not entirely clear to which text by Merleau-Ponty Deleuze is referring here, perhaps one of the essays collected under the title *Eloge de la philosophie, Leçon inaugurale faite au Collège de France le jeudi 15 janvier 1953* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1953).

[12] Concerning this letter, see the session on Spinoza, 20 January 1981, as well as the 10 February 1981 session, and also, by Deleuze, see also *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, pp. 78-79.

[13] In the Web Deleuze transcript, one finds here the following notation: "Explanation by Deleuze on differential calculus, about 45 seconds".

[14] In the Web Deleuze transcript, one finds here the notation: "Explanation by Deleuze who draws on the board, with chalk: construction of triangles. 85:30 to 93:30". This text, disconnected as some parts are, is reproduced here.

[15] See also the discussion of projective geometry and of Poncelet during the preceding seminar 9, 26 February 1980.

[16] Deleuze returns to this same subject, of paving, during the eighth session on Leibniz in the second seminar, 27 January 1987.

[17] Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7baZ7Qlp_2Y&t=194s [Verified June 28, 2023]
[18] We have to indicate that this translation (session 3) is based on a transcript that we have completely transformed from the text that has been available for some twenty years on Web Deleuze, since we have scrupulously followed here, without edits or unforeseen omissions, the audio recording available on several platforms (YouTube, Web Deleuze, Paris 8, and here on The Deleuze Seminars). We have therefore expanded the text of this second session on Leibniz by approximately *forty minutes*, that is, in addition to the approximate equivalent of about ninety minutes contained on the earlier transcript. We have benefitted, however, from Web Deleuze's alternate transcription in order to fill in two specific gaps that occurred when the recording was interrupted for cassette changes, at the end of parts 1 and 2.
[19] Jules Vuillemin's, *La philosophie de l'algèbre* (Paris: PUF, 1960, 1962).
[20] The complete title is "Tentamen Anagogicum. Anagogical Essay on Research into Causes." See https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Essai_anagogique_dans_la_recherche_des_causes, for an image Leibniz's drawing within this small work.
[21] Deleuze will develop these reflections on perception, tiny perceptions, and differentials in chapter 7 of *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, cf. pp. 85-99; *Le Pli*, pp. 113-132.
[22] Ramon Turro y Darder, *Les origines de la connaissance* (1914 ; Paris : Hachette Livre-BNF, 2018).

[23] Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyd4sjEgU-c&t=718s [Verified June 28, 2023]
[24] Cf. "N as in Neurology" and "O as in Opera" in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*.
[25] End of the tape, for the Web Deleuze recording; the seminar including the additional 13 minutes on YouTube recording, referenced above.
[26] Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-OweD1YPeI
[27] The French transcript of this session 5, based on the YouTube video, currently has an extremely truncated version that remains available at the WebDeleuze site, omitting approximately 9600 word (or 11 manuscript pages). These omissions have been eliminated to the extent possible.