

Gilles Deleuze

Painting and the Question of Concepts

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Part 1

... So, I'll remind you that we only have today and next time, and we need to get to the problem of color today, and then next time talk only about that, concluding on that note. In the meantime, I would like you to keep in mind the general problem that we are trying to deal with.

I'll remind you of the general problem: it's a question of considering painting to be the act by which (the word doesn't matter), by which one transmits or reproduces a signal-space on the canvas.

And indeed, one never paints something, one paints... a painter always paints a space. S/he paints space-time, but a space nonetheless. So, to transmit or reproduce a signal-space on a canvas—how is that accomplished? Thanks to a kind of analysis... thanks to an attempt at logical analysis that we did previously, our response was: it is done via analogy. It's done via analogy.

But what does analogy mean? At the end of our analysis, we were able to conclude, or at least we came up with a solid hypothesis, that analogy in no way means similarity or resemblance. Analogy signifies a very specific operation which has several forms, which itself has numerous types, very different types that must be called modulations.

So, analogy occurs while modulating something. And we tried to analyze this concept of modulation. It is by modulating some "x" which is extremely variable, which can be extremely variable, that a painter transmits the signal-space.

As you recall, it is important that we consider the arbitrariness of certain signal-spaces, sign-spaces, and their corresponding types of modulations, since it was never about claiming to account for an entire history.

And the first signal-space that we considered was the Egyptian space. And we said, well let's see, it's quite simple: this Egyptian space is a space in which form and content are truly apprehended on the same plane. [*Pause*] This is the definition of space.

As a direct consequence, we asked what kind of modulation could convey this space, either on a surface, or at a shallow depth of, say, a bas-relief. And if you recall, our answer was very simple, which is why everything we did is coming full circle. Remember what we said, that it was indeed a type of modulation, a type of modulation that we had to—or that we might try to—specify as being the form of a mold, a mold modulation; this mold was defined as the geometric crystalline contour.

That's it. After that, we only saw one other type of space in its own right -- and we saw that plenty of things would have to occur between the two. But it's important to emphasize that as we consider other examples, which are really only snapshots, this space is neither an ordered succession nor total -- we saw that... what did we see? We saw this event that undoubtedly marks a kind of emergence of the Greek world, or the Greek space, and we could distinctly define this emergence as a remarkable event, namely, the distinction of planes. The plane of depth and the plane of form are distinct and separate from one another, and, of course, between the two...what happens? A new form of light.

And yet again it would seem completely false to say, as [Henri] Maldiney (the author that I invoked) does, that the Greek world was the world of light; it is not the world of light.¹ At the extreme, the Egyptian world would even more so be the world of light. All the while, note that what we discover about painting will end up serving us in philosophy. The Greek world is not the world of light. The same goes for the philosophic definition of the Greek world as the world of essences, which happens on occasion—it's not true. It would be much more likely for the Egyptian world to be the world of essences, whereby the individual figure that is surrounded by a contour, a geometric crystalline contour, defines a stable and separate essence. Separated from what? Separated from the world of phenomena, from accidents, from becoming.

But the Greeks are much closer to us. It is really interesting that what is attributed to the Greeks should be said about the Egyptians, in my opinion. It's not dire, but a kind of retraction should be made. It should be taken back a notch because what is striking is that already with the Greeks essence is not separable... is no longer separable from its manifestation in the world of phenomena. And in the same way, without saying that it's the same thing, but in the same way, light is subordinated to form. Light is subordinated to form, essence is no longer conceived as a stable and separate entity but is inseparable from phenomena. Something simple could be said: essence is no longer essential, it has become organic. That's obviously true of Aristotle, but it's already true of Plato, too.

And for me, what Plato makes "the Egyptian" say resounds across the entire Greek world. When the Egyptian in Plato's text says, "You Greeks are only children," that literally means: you have lost the secret of stable, isolated essences, you have separated stable, isolated individual essences. In a sense, you have lost the secret of light; in other words, the space where form and ground are on the same plane. And that's why the Greeks invent philosophy. Because, philosophy, if it has a meaning... it's very bad for any understanding of philosophy, and is even confusing, to combine it in any way with wisdom. Since, in "philosophy", there is indeed *philo* and *sophia*, and *sophia* is wisdom.

But what does philosophy mean? It means precisely that the philosopher is no longer a sage. The Egyptian is the sage. The philo-sopher, the one who is reduced to being nothing more than the friend of wisdom, with all the complexity of: what does *philo* mean in Greek? Notice the fall from *sophos* to *philo-sophos*.

The friend of wisdom? But what can that mean, the friend of wisdom? It means that he no longer even claims to be a sage. Translation: "You Greeks will never be anything but children", and you could say just as well: "You Greeks, you will never be anything but *philoï*, you are no longer sages, you are philosophers." What does that mean? You no longer reach essences, stable and separate essences; you reach essences insofar as they are already embodied in phenomena, in becoming, etc. And in a certain way, they are subordinated to the rhythm of becoming. [Pause]

So, yes, it really is a change, a change in terms of space, elements... it is a change in terms of time, and completely changes the conception of art. Essence became organic; in other words, an essence is seized the very moment it is embodied within the flux of phenomena. And any theory -- if I may insist while interjecting this philosophical parenthesis -- all those people who define the Platonic world as the world of Ideas with a capital "I", of separate Ideas, falls apart immediately. Because it is true that this feature exists in Plato -- ideas that are separated from the sensible -- but it's an homage to an old tradition that eludes him and which he knows very well eludes him. But Plato's problem does not at all concern the world of separate essences, or separate ideas; on the contrary, his problem concerns the world of participation, or to be more precise, ideas participate in the flux of the sensible, or the flux of the sensible participates in ideas. Thus, the world of essences has become organic.

Now, I started to define this space last time, and from the point of view of my concern about painting, I sought two kinds of correlation between Greek sculpture and painting -- and, again, they aren't chronological successions -- or something that was taken up again in so-called classical painting from the 16th century, as if there were a system of echoes between the space of the Greek world, on the one hand, and the space and world of the Renaissance, on the other. And I said that the Greek space and the Renaissance space will be defined by a distinction of planes. What will suffice in distinguishing this space from Egyptian space is its signaling, a signal-space that proceeds in a completely different way.

But it does not suffice to say that the planes are distinct. That would not sufficiently define the Greek space, nor would that distinguish it from future spaces, from the Byzantine space, from 20th century space, or from, I do not know what, from the 19th century, in any case. Yes, it should be added that this is a space where planes are distinguished from one another, and, thus, form and ground are not on the same plane. Yet, it is also a space where the foreground has determinate primacy. It is the foreground that is determinate. Why? Because the foreground receives the form. And of course, you can always find exceptions in Renaissance painting or in Greek art. I'm just saying, is it by chance when you discover an exception in Greek art -- but in my opinion you ought to find late exceptions -- is it by chance at that point that you can say and you have the immediate impression of the gestation of a new world, one which will cease to be the Greek world, the development of which is about to explode, and that will emerge with the Byzantine, say, for example, in Alexandrian art?

In any case, if you don't catch everything being said today, and especially next time, then you will need to provide some nuance. I don't have time to provide nuance. It doesn't always mean that in all cases, that's not what it means. But as a general rule, you have this space in the high-Greek and in the Renaissance where planes are distinct and have a primacy of the foreground; this foreground can be extraordinarily complex. I referenced the impressive curved foregrounds, like in Raphael, for example, where there is a curvature of the foreground. But the foreground is the site where form is determined, and form is determined in the foreground, on the foreground.

With that in mind, consider Egypt. There is something fundamental that changes, for example, in the status of the contour. It follows onward from there. If you consider a space, a space that is not planimetric this time, but instead has volume, it's the Greek cube, the Greek cube versus the Egyptian pyramid. If you give volume to a space where the volume is determined by the foreground, then you give form primacy at the same time. Form is determined in the foreground, and as you change the contour's status, remember something wonderful about the Egyptians—but all these spaces are wonders, and each one spectacular -- remember that among the wonders of Egyptian space was this: the contour's independence. The contour became autonomous with regard

to form and ground, and thereby became a crystalline contour. The contour is geometric crystalline. And indeed, it necessarily became independent since the contour is what related the form to the ground and the ground to the form on a single plane. So, it was completely necessary; it wasn't like that; it wasn't something additional, and it's a feature of this space to give the contour autonomy on the plane... the contour was thus geometric crystalline.

On the contrary, we'll jump to Greek space with its distinction between planes and the primacy of the foreground, where form comes first, and the contour afterward... what becomes of it? It becomes the self-determination of form in the foreground, on the foreground. The contour directly depends on the form. What does that mean, the contour directly depends on the form? And all of these notions are generated from one another, that's what we will call an organic contour. Once the contour depends on the form, losing its Egyptian independence, it becomes an organic contour. And from then on the essence is itself an organic essence. [Pause] Well, what does it mean that the essence, the contour, has become an organic contour? It is no longer a separate, isolated essence, isolated by the Egyptians' autonomous contour. From then onward, it is no longer even an individual essence.

What kind of essence is it? What does Greek art invent? It invents something like, I don't know what, the group, the harmony of the group. What does Renaissance painting invent? I said this last time, because I needed to, that there was a word that is kind of special, I said: [Greek art]² invents the collective line. Again, it is not reduced to that; you correct me every time. The collective line is, namely, the organic contour. That a flock of sheep has a line...that itself is a remarkable discovery. Understand that at the very least, we could say that, no, an Egyptian line will not necessarily work like that since its line is geometric crystalline. No, the line must be organic in order for the herd to have a line.

At this point, we are entering into an entire domain that is one of rhythm, because the collective line of a herd of sheep, and another type of collective line, the collective line of a cloud—what kind of relationship will they have? Which resonance do these two fall into? Collective lines are going to enter into harmonic relationships. For the Greeks, essence is no longer individual, precisely because it is no longer a separate essence. You see, everything is connected. I'd like for you to realize that everything is connected. The separate essence is no longer the group's individual essence. The line has become organic, it has become collective.

But you will tell me that there are a lot of men who are all alone or women who are all alone, for example in Greek statuary; yes, yes, there are a lot... that doesn't bother me, but before an objection is made, thank God; it shows that we are right, we have the answer to such an objection. So, there is no objection, ever, because, of course... what are these isolated, apparently isolated, figures? They are organisms. And also, what is it when there is a single organism, what is it? It's a collective line. Why is it a collective line? When we talk about beautiful Greek individuality, if you'd like, you can use all of Schopenhauer's texts as an example. No, I don't think so. Yet again, everything he says applies more to the Egyptians than to the Greeks. What he says applies to the Egyptian ground, which is still active among the Greeks.

But to the extent that the Greeks speak for themselves, they say something else. They say something else, and I'm coming back to my question: an organism is what unfolds... the Greek world is not the world of essences, it is of the world of the *organon*. I'm saying that in Greek because there is a series of famous texts by Aristotle that are collected under the title, *The Organon*. Just as in Aristotle, form -- there are indeed separate forms, in one final homage to the Egyptian world -- but in any case, in the so-called sublunar world -- well, Greek space is sublunar space -- in a sublunar

world, forms are strictly inseparable from matter, from whatever matter they inform, and the entire hierarchy of the Aristotelian world consists of types of forms that correlate with types of informed matter. That is truly Greek, it's not Egyptian.

So, yes, what did I mean to say? I'm still coming back to the organism, an organism, of course there's unity. I don't mean at all that it is a world of dispersion, but it is a world for which...there is no longer isolated unity; all unity is the unity of many. Unity is very strong there, but it is always the one of the many in the Greek world. There's always unity, there is never absolute unity. Once again, we can talk about the One with a capital 'O', the One in Plato. The One in Plato is ultimately pure transcendence; in other words, it is an homage to the Egyptian world.

But the Greeks seize their network, and this seized, spatial network is a kind of intermediary region between the impure and separate, and pure multiplicity. They seize all degrees of the One, all these degrees, all these variable degrees, all this gradation where the One, or form, falls more and more into matter, into all of these elevations where matter stretches more and more towards form. So, when it comes to an organism, it's a unit, but it is a unit of differentiated parts.

And from that point of view, I'm saying some extremely simple and rudimentary things, but if I take some basic examples... if you take a typical Renaissance painting and a typical 17th century painting... this is the way you can immediately tell—if only through a feeling, a confused feeling—you can tell that these paintings do not exactly belong to the same world, i.e. to the same space.

You can take all sorts of examples: a female nude, a nude; it's quite obvious that in nudes from the Renaissance and in Greek sculptures, you find the same thing, namely the organism asserted as a unit of a distinct multiplicity. And of course, organic parts are taken up into a system of echoes, but they are firmly distinct from one another. If you want to take the most beautiful example when you get home, take a Venus; try to consider Titian's Venus alongside Velasquez's Venus. Their approaches toward the nude are obvious. The body's volume is not at all rendered in the same way. Even that itself is beautiful. In the case of Titian, it is very clear to what extent the organic is really a unified multiplicity of differentiated parts. We will see that in the 17th century that with others, along with Velasquez, what is created is done so in a completely different way. The body ceases to be an organism; it is something else entirely.

So, I would say that even when there is representation of a single individual, it's an organic individual, i.e., it is a unit of multiplicity. So, it is still a collective line. It is simply a collective line with strong unity, while a herd of sheep is a collective line with weaker unity. It is not by chance that the philosophers of the same era were philosophers who spent their time creating a hierarchy of degrees of unity, who asked themselves, for example, something very interesting to ask oneself, something we will find in Leibniz's philosophy, what the hierarchy of degrees of unity is. That is, in what way does a pile of stones or a bundle of wooden branches, a flock of sheep, or an army, an animal colony, an organism, a consciousness, etc., represent degrees of unity of increasing strength on a hierarchical scale?

So, if that's what Greek space is, and if that's what it is—and what I'm saying is really basic, we'll complicate it later—you'll notice that I'm not introducing color yet... I can't, but that will come later -- I'm just saying that even though it's a space of light, it's a space of strong light, where light is subordinated to form. It's completely subordinated to the demands of form. In other words, what we are indeed saying is that it's a tactile-optical space. It is not at all an optical space, it is a tactile-optical space.

You'll recall that the Egyptian space—I'm not coming back to it right now—we defined it by following the Austrian author, Riegl...we defined it as a haptic space...and the eye had a strange function that I tried to define... the eye had a haptic function.³ The space that corresponds to everything we just saw is not haptic, it is tactile-optic. What does that mean? What is tactile? What does "tact" refer to? It refers to all of the optical effects that are in some way subordinated to the integrity of the form. And the integrity of the form is tactile within which form? The organic contour.

In other words, it is an optical space with a tactile referent. Yes, light, but it is necessary that it does not compromise the clarity of form. And what is the clarity of form? It is tactile clarity. It is what Wölfflin called absolute clarity in his book, which I quoted a lot last time.⁴ Even in the shadows, the contour maintains its straight lines, because the contour is tactile, while the shadows are optical. And still in Renaissance paintings you see something marvelous that doesn't arise from maladroitness, but on the contrary, from an astonishing stroke of skill, such that the contour, i.e., the tactile allusion, keeps its integrity throughout the play of shadows.

It is thus a very curious space, this optical space with a tactile referent, it almost needs to be said that it has a double tactile referent. On a certain level I would almost say (well I don't have the time; I will leave all this up to you to see for yourselves), it seems that the tactile reference is double; it is, in fact, the subordination of light to form, or what amounts to the same thing, the self-determination of form by an organic contour that is necessarily tactile. But why I am saying that it is a double reference? Because everything happens as if the eye were dominating on the plane of the real. It is an optical space, but things must be affirmed by means of the tactile. It is as if the hand followed the eye and affirmed the contour across the play of shadows. But on the plane, the ideal is almost the inverse. It is the eye that refers to ideal tactility. Why? What is regulating what's optical in this world, in this Greek world? We see quite clearly that it is the same thing that regulates the line, this collective line.⁵

What regulates the organic line? What regulates the organic line? I would say measure and number, measure and number, that is, rhythm. Why will measure and number, that is, rhythm, regulate the collective line or determine the form? You sense this: precisely because form must be grasped at the moment it is embodied in a material, [*Pause*] because form is always the unity of a multiplicity. [*Pause*] Measure and the number, that is, rhythm, will determine the collective line of the foreground, constitutive of form. What does that mean concretely? That's why throughout the 16th century, you have so many treatises on painting that are called or that sound like "Treatise on number and measure", [*Pause*] both in Italy and, for example, Dürer's texts, everywhere.

What does that mean for us? Let us return to Greek statuary. I select an example, a female couple, two figures side by side, a stele which represents two figures side by side, two women. What does the eye notice immediately, the optical eye? What... How is that Greek art? You see that it's Greek art because, for example – I'm not saying it's always like that – the two figures have a common measure, [*Pause*] that is, the two lateral planes. But in this common measure, there is a distribution of times, multiplicity of times for the same measure, that is, the rhythm: variation of the times for the same measure. What are times? Times in Greek rhythm, it's not by chance that... if the Greek idea is no longer Egyptian essence, but if it is really rhythm, that is, essence in the process of being incarnated in matter in motion, you sense that it is fundamentally rhythm.

And according to an article by [Émile] Benveniste, the Greeks have two words to designate the form: *skhêma* and *rhuthmos*. *Rhuthmos* means form; how does that happen? And Benveniste shows very well in his linguistic study of the word *rhuthmos* in Greek, he shows very well that if it means

form, it is not at all by chance. It means that *skhêma*, from which our word scheme, schema, emerged, *skhêma* is either isolated essence, here again a memory of the Egyptian world, or essence realized in a material, once and for all, it's done. [Pause] But *rhuthmos* is essence that never ceases to actualize itself and to modify itself according to the levels of its actualization. So, this form which is actualized and modified according to the levels of its actualization, see, the same measure but with variable times, that is *rhuthmos*. The Greeks will say of dance that a dance has a form; a dance does not have a *skhêma*, it has a *rhuthmos*. That is, here again we typically come back to the idea of a collective form, a collective form which has a measure, but a measure of time, but variable times. Well then, dance is, it's a state of essence for the Greeks. Very different, even at the level of dance, it would be necessary to compare this, it is very different from the so-called Egyptian hieratic position, a Greek dance, fine. [End of omitted paragraphs]

So then, so then, so then, what did I mean? Yes, number and measure... I am going to come back to my stele here: the two women side-by-side have the same measure as the two lateral planes. But your eye, let's say your eye starts at the bottom, as your eye goes up you'll see temporal variation within that measure. Why does time vary and go through thresholds, these thresholds that are marked by what? It's not difficult, by the strong beats (*temps forts*).⁶ Namely, the light reliefs. I can say that they're the same thing; the strong beats of the rhythm and the luminous reliefs of a sculpture are the foreground. That is what appears in the foreground. This time I am not talking about the lateral planes, I am talking about the foreground, the plane from a frontal point of view. You see, the luminous reliefs are flush with the foreground. They define the strong beats of a sculpture. And the shadows, strictly speaking, are the *times* for which the Greeks had an entire theory. The weak beats of the rhythm happen at the same time in music and sculpture. The shadows mark the weak beats of the background -- they [the Greeks] had more words for this wonder -- it is a space put into rhythm by the strong beats of the foreground and the weak beats of the background.

If you want to understand what Byzantium contributes here, and what revolution Byzantium brings about, it's necessary to... [Deleuze does not finish this sentence] Well, your eye does it on its own when you see a Greek sculpture... So then, and I am saying that the eye takes in the variation of beats from the bottom to the top, and not just between the strong and weak beats; it's the strong beats in the foreground that vary. With thresholds marked by what? By the knees... marked by organic joints. The knees, the groin, the waist, the top of the shoulders, the face. And again, it subdivides a lot. So, even within the same bar you'll have a double variation: a variation from the bottom to the top between the strong beats in the foreground, and a variation between the weak beats, a corresponding variation between weak beats in the background. What does that mean? I am summarizing... I am trying to summarize this tactile-optical space.

I'm picking my question back up again because we should not lose sight of this one; otherwise, we wouldn't be able to move forward. You'll recall that for any signal-space I have to find, or I had vaguely committed myself to finding, a principle of modulation. Well, yes, it's no longer Egyptian modulation via a geometrical crystalline mold; it's a great secondary type of modulation, which is going to become the modulation of the line, or more precisely, the modulation via what we called the internal mold -- I'm referring you back to this; I don't have the time to start over -- rhythmic modulation via an internal mold. You'll remember this notion that I borrowed from Buffon,⁷ since it seemed very enlightening to me... via an internal mold... this very strange kind of notion that Buffon constructs, which seems richer to me when applied to other domains than those to which Buffon applied it... there's a good reason for us to use it in the manner he used it... since Buffon constructed and used this paradoxical notion of the internal mold, which forces us to understand the reproduction of the organism.

It is a modulation via an internal mold, and what is an internal mold? It is the unit of a measure whose times are variable; in other words, it is a module about which I would say—but the formula as it is does not make any sense—but I'm using it to summarize everything... I would say that the Greek space is modulated quite differently than the Egyptian space. It is modulated via module, i.e., via an internal mold. So, this is the way to transmit or reproduce the tactile-optical space. This is the great organic world, and when an art critic like Worringer defines the classical world, the Greek world, he says that it is the world of organic representation, and when he explains what he means by organic presentation, we, of course, tend to understand that it is a form of art that has chosen the organism as its object, above all else. It chose the organism as its object.⁸ Alright, I can make a parenthetical comment, if it does not bother you... it is certainly very important that it chose the organism as its object; that's true, that's true. Long histories are required are needed here, such that painting ceases to be organic, since it was not always so... but it is really... it is not enough to just say that.

I am opening up a parenthesis—this history is very complicated—about the reason painting selects the organism as its object. If I attempt to make a little progress on what we have yet to do...and it's going to pose an enormous problem from the point of view of the colors, because, from the point of view of colors, where is the problem? How are the colors of an organism pictorially translated and reproduced? It's an awful problem. It's an awful European problem, and a typically European problem at that. It is important, why? It is the painters that are very...I think it was different before, especially regarding the nudes by Michelangelo... with the advent of the nude in painting, what happened? It's an awful technical problem. We will see how it will be solved, but one could say that this is a way to express the entire problem of painting. One way... but everything is there. How are the colors of a body, an organic body, reproduced? That's difficult. Without what... why... because whatever method you use in the West, given the nature of the Western organism [*Interruption of the recording*] [46:38]

Part 2

... the manner in which the problem of the organism is the problem of the color—and I am not saying that they merge forever, but they collide into each other—is an intense problem. The problem of the color is: how to handle color without producing a kind of grayness, of dull muddiness? The problem of the organism is: how to "render the organism" without falling into exactly the same dull muddiness?

Indeed, why does the organism pose this problem? Alas, especially the Western organism! Well, in other words we are pale and worse than pale: we are pale and red and if you mix all that, it makes muddiness; it is terrible! Why? Well, yes, there is a passage that I like very much in Goethe's *Theory of Colors*.⁹ He merely records; it is not a paradoxical opinion of his. He only records a pictorial problem, he says: "The nobler a being is", did I write it down? yes, I have it, I think, I prefer to read it because otherwise you will think that I am making it up, here! I'm rereading it to make sure and, yes: "the nobler a being is and the more elaborated the material nature within it is [...]"¹⁰ What does that mean? And again—I'm abbreviating in order to comment— "the nobler a being is and the more elaborated the material nature within it is," which means: is organized, meaning the nobler a being is, the higher up it is on the animal scale, the more it represents an organism, a differentiated organism. "The nobler a being is and the more elaborated the material nature within it is, the more its external envelop corresponds essentially to the internal."

I'm saying, I wanted to read it so that you see that I am not inventing it— obviously! I could have... it is on page 207 of the French translation of the *Theory of Colors* -- because, why does he say that? The more its envelope, the more a being is perfect, in fact, the more typological relations there are between the external envelope and the internal and the internal differentiations. Ah! Well! It's good that it is like that! A complex being on the organic scale. Good! What did he just say there? But let's read it again! The more its external envelope corresponds essentially to the interior": it is the exact same history of the interior mold in Buffon. The more noble a being is on the animal scale, i.e., complex, the less one will be able to reproduce it and the less it will be able to reproduce itself via an external mold, the more it will need an internal mold to reproduce itself and the less one will see isolatable elementary colors. Ah good! "The less one will see elementary isolatable colors": this is the very problem of the organism in its evolution. The painters who know this problem well, those who will call the problem by a term that, strangely, thinks alongside Christianity in Western painting: what they will call the "problem of the flesh".

How to render flesh? For a colorist, this is the problem of problems. Why? Because at every moment you risk coming close to the supreme danger: making something muddy! Muddy color! And Western painting is going to be there, you see! I am introducing things that will only become clear later on. Western painting was run through by this mission! How to get out of the muddy? And without a doubt, the same attempt had to be started over again. Consider the painters! Consider our Western painters! It is fascinating! It is as if each one had to start this kind of prolonged attempt over again.

That's what I was calling the danger of the diagram. When I said there are two dangers of the diagram, the diagram oscillates between a "muddling danger" instead of a diagram, you have more than a muddle, a muddling. And the other danger you have at the site of a diagram is a "pure code" or a code, but a diagram, an effective diagram, a fecund diagram is neither a muddling operation, nor a coding operation. But this is where we fall right into the danger of muddling.

How to prevent colors from becoming muddled when they are rendering the body? And I mean, consider the painters. It is very striking, even within a brief time frame. I'm starting over! I am starting my story over again, but everything happens as if destiny initially forced painters to flounder in the blackish colors. At the same time, I'm stepping back. Find the nuances yourselves, make the corrections yourselves. There are some painters who remain, but they no longer flounder. Black has been turned into something so extraordinary that it has become a color.

Well, these would be very special cases! They don't flounder, but how is it that many of them go through this experience where their reason is truly felt! Their reason is in question or their reason vacillates—this experience occasionally turns out very, very badly for these painters—at the moment that they discover and conquer what they were looking for all along, namely color, and at the very moment that we spectators, like idiots, remark once again that he has found it. It's fine! It's great! He found life. It's at this very moment that he kills himself! It's strange as well! and I don't want to say that these suicides are exclusively pictorial, but in any case, these suicides are also pictorial and are not suicides of a psychoanalytical nature. So, what happened?

I am making random references, but the greatest colorists of the seventeenth century, and once again, Van Gogh: he flounders within his history of chalk and charcoal for years and years. And following the trend: Oh! Color! Oh no, not that! Not that! That's for later, it is always for later in all Van Gogh's correspondence, it is fascinating! His calls to his brother: "Go get me the chalk, some chalk." Color? No, not color! And when he starts using color, it is earthy, as if by chance! For those who know Van Gogh, you know what I mean, it's the potato, earthiness in its pure state! And what

is going to happen in order for this fantastic conquest of color to take place? He rips color away from the earthy background of all colors! What happens? Could it be said that he is saved? It is at this moment that he kills himself.

There's a current exhibition that I beg you to go see: Nicolas de Staël, at the Grand Palais.¹¹ You enter and, well, as always, you enter! Well, what do you see? I'm not saying that the first paintings are not extraordinary! They are extraordinary! Extraordinary! It is a kind of science of brownish colors! Blackish! With arabesques. Then what happens? You see extraordinary paintings where something absolutely new emerges at once! Some really pale tints—they should be called tints—we will see later if the term is justified. Extraordinary! A whole extraordinary play, a whole pale regime of color! All the colors are there, but it is a pale regime of color. You arrive! You go into another room and there's a conquest of color, a frightening conquest of color! Then, it is almost painful not to conclude, not to say to oneself, well, yes, this is what he was searching for all along! I do not know, but what also happens? We want to say -- and the paintings are so joyful -- think, you will see small paintings of soccer players, for example, which are fantastic things, along with many others.

What happens? It's also at this moment that he kills himself, and what can happen? I just can't understand! Really! This is an occasion to say—we often quote a sentence that gives us the chills, where Lacan says: Well, yes! It's when things are better that we kill ourselves! [*Laughter*] Before... and seeing it as a kind of sign, that, yes, things were better! And well, in this case of pictorial experiment, it is! Yes! It is when it is going so much better on the canvas that the guy cracks. So! But this story... Cézanne, it's the same story; it should be shown every time—I'm almost forgetting the slides, you know—the purples and the purple period of stranglers. These paintings in the scene of strangulation are so strange! It's all purple. And there's the conquest of color in addition to that!¹² Manet! Oh, when he comes to impressionism! But he abandons the tints that are specifically referred to as earth tones in painting. Good! What is that? Good.

But my parenthetical developed, I just want to say! Let's go back to Goethe's text: the problem is that the more an organism is elaborated -- and for every theory and practice of painting from the Renaissance, this is the human organism -- the more the organism is elaborated, the more it needs an interior mold, that is, we will see less and less, and we will not see elementary isolatable colors. Hence the problem of how to paint the flesh! Precisely because flesh is not made and should not be made of elementary isolatable colors.

It becomes very interesting! How did they do it? This would once again be a way to pose the problem of color! Because one mixes! One mixes, well, okay! One mixes! But how does one do so without the mixture simply becoming earthy? And without making it all completely dull! Now, for mammals, Goethe's text is very interesting, because it says: there is only one case when, on the contrary, a mammal has very brilliant colors, isolated elementary colors, in fact. It is in inferior organisms! The fish, yes! It displays elementary isolatable colors. That! Yes! Birds display elementary isolatable colors! Goethe is quite annoyed because there is also a mammal, a superior mammal that displays exquisite elementary, isolatable colors. But he gets out of it by saying that there is only one! It is a monkey!

Now, the monkey may be a complex mammal, but it is like a caricature of a mammal! It is the caricature of the man; it is not noble, he says! And indeed, it is a problem concerning drills. Drills display exquisite color, so that's how you recognize them. See! It is red! It is blue! In a pure state! Exquisite colors! Good! You see! See! On the nose, as well! And on the buttocks. It is astounding! Quite so! Exquisite beasts that Goethe condemns precisely because they display these elementary isolatable colors. He goes so far as to say that the cow is better than the drill! [*Laughter*] He doesn't

even know what he's saying to the point that he believes in the superiority of the Western white man precisely because the cow is so dull! Compared to drills, compared to fish, compared to birds. Well, but this is the problem of the organism from the point of view of color. And this is ultimately another way of dealing [with color]. Good! But so what? What I wanted to say is this: we define classical Greek or Renaissance representation as organic representation.

Do you see what that means? It doesn't simply mean that the object itself is the organism! It means that within classical representation, the subject, i.e., the spectator, discovers the combined activity of her faculties. This is what the organic is, and Worringer explains it very well and avoids misinterpretation: it does not simply mean that the painter's preferred object is the human organism. It means that no matter what the painter's object happens to be, the spectator in front of a given work will sense the harmonious activity of her distinct faculties, beginning with the tactile and the eye, and the eye will refer to the tactile and the tactile will refer to the eye, in the form of optical-tactile spaces or this rhythmic modulation.

See! So, for the moment I have two signal-spaces and two types of modulation. I'm going to go very quickly to the third one and then we'll be able to get to... [*Gap by Deleuze*] The third one? I've talked about it a little bit, I could have talked about it a lot longer, but oh well.

This is the time when a space is born purely, or seemingly so, to a vector – it's never as precise as I'm stating it -- to an optical vector. And this is one of the key interests of Wölfflin's book, *Principles of Art History*.¹³ It centers on the transition from 16th to 17th century painting, and, yes, proceeded via an analysis of great examples. He demonstrates the conversion of space, and as a distant disciple of Riegl, Wölfflin creates a law out of his thesis that the transition from 16th to 17th century painting is typically a transition through optical-tactile space to a pure, optical space. And I have a feeling that we could have said the exact same thing! That doesn't mean that it is the same thing, except at the level of well-founded generalities. We could have said the exact same thing about the transition from Greek art to Byzantine art. And here also, it was precisely with other materials, other problems, other techniques, whatever you'd like! Considering all the differences from Greek art to Byzantine art, there was also a transition through the optical-tactile space into a pure optical space.

And this pure optical space, how we are going to define it? Well, by opposition, by strict and stark opposition to optical-tactile space. Exactly! Just as in Greek space, the planes are well distinguished, but in a certain way this time everything comes from the background! There is a primacy of the background, everything comes from the ground. Form emerges from the ground! The ground! It should be said that we don't know where it begins or where it ends. Therefore, we do not know where the form begins or where it ends either!

Why is that? Because the space of the ground was a space filled with light. Think, for example, about several of Vermeer's paintings where the foreground is in shadow and light comes from the ground. Or better yet! The ground is extremely dark, but the light from other planes arises from this dark ground! In any case they're variants, there is an infinity of variants. There is always a kind of primacy, the form will emerge from the ground, it is no longer determined on the foreground; it's as if it is pushed forth by the ground! It is an event. It's an epiphany! I would say that at the limit, it is no longer like it was with the Greeks, the essence no longer enters into a relation with the event, it's the event that "plays essence" in a sort of epiphany, which is the Byzantine epiphany. And so, [*there's an interruption near Deleuze*] – that's really nice! – and so, and so, this is the moment, and the only moment when we can say that, yes, light has become independent; in other words, it is form that depends on light, and light no longer depends on form.

A woman student: What if the form is light?

Deleuze: Who said that, in order to contradict me? [*Nervous laughter; Deleuze laughs*] If I were to say that the form is light...that doesn't seem to make much sense, because it's necessary that one be obtained from the other, technically speaking. We can say that in the end the form is light, but then we can say that about any and everything!

The student: But, no, is it not the case that anything goes if we are talking about colors?

Deleuze: Ok! Colors! I still haven't talked about colors!

The student: Substance is always obscure, it's unknowable; as a consequence, form as the logical opposite of substance, as color, is necessarily light.

Deleuze: That's true, that's very fair.

The student: There you go, Monsieur!

Deleuze: That's very fair. Ha! Ha! Thank you! [*Laughter*] Ha! Ha! Thank you! [*Pause*] Yeah, there you go. So, there you go! I have to get over it! I have to get over it. [*Laughter; interruption of the recording*] [1:08:38]

The previous student: If we look at the board!

Deleuze: Oh, they're [*the drawings*] still there! No! Those aren't the same.

Hidenobu Suzuki: Yes! But it has been redone.

Deleuze: Yes! Those aren't mine! I didn't do it! Ah yes!

The student: [*It seems as if she did two drawings during the break that she is going to explain*] Under capital 'A' I put that the substance, which is defined as an unknowable, and indicated by a small one [*While she is speaking, Deleuze and another student are speaking to one another and Deleuze says, "Oh my God! It's on the other side! Ah, yes!"*]. Then the shadow, which is a small two, since substance is defined as an unknowable, and it is something obscure, it is a shadow. Substance is opposed by form, which is its emanation, and that is called small three. And we place light in small four, in opposition to the shadow, and thus we have a kind of logical square, which allows us to say that one is to two what three is to four, namely, that substance is to shadow what form is to light, wherein we draw an equation, form=light, but we can do so in a totally different way. And we can say, and that's what I labelled 'B' from substance, and light, that form is to substance what reflection is to light, and we arrive at another equation via the same law, which is that one is to two what three is to four, thus we have equaled reflection twice. Then, all that one could say is that the big 'A' is post-Kantian, and that the big 'B' is pre-Kantian, that in [a few inaudible names] Spinoza, St. Thomas, etc., all substance can be assimilated to light. But this is very artificial, it doesn't mean anything. [*Laughter; a few inaudible words; she moves toward the blackboard and continues to speak, but sound from the others block her words*] ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:10:54]

Deleuze: Good, and so that's it, then? [*Pause, student noise*] Ah! I feel like there is going to be something else! [*Laughter*] No? We'd better not... Let's go, let's go, let's go ... Well then! Ah! Go ahead!

Georges Comtesse: Can we say about Byzantine painting, and I'm not at all familiar with 17th-century painting, but in an earlier course, you made a connection, can we say that this is a painting of the event, of the accident, for example. For example, I am thinking of these figures on lighted background. Can we say that this is painting of the encounter, on a space, with a glowing background? Can we say that we [*inaudible word*] somewhat that the Stoics had [*inaudible words*], or could we make a connection less [*inaudible word*], and could we consider the possibility that Stoic thought is a Greek attempt to distance themselves even more from Egypt?

Deleuze: Yes and no, and there is no reason to think that Egypt continues to be a reference such that everything is situated in relation to it. In this respect, it seems to me that in what you say there is indeed a parallel which has been especially well noted by one of the best critics of Byzantine painting, which is Georges Duthuit; Duthuit has highlighted the similarities between Neo-Alexandrian texts very well, on the one hand, which themselves depended on Stoic texts, i.e. on a Stoic Neo-Platonist tradition, and the Byzantine endeavor, on the other hand.¹⁴ If you'd like, it would be at a very, very precise level! In particular, a radically new conception of the limit begins with Stoicism, under oriental influences, in fact. We have seen it. It seems to me that we saw it in the first half of the year, regarding Spinoza, that the limit, the Greek limit, is really defined by the contour, with all the complexities of the contour.¹⁵ It's a very, very complicated notion, especially because, once again, for the Greeks, it's no longer the geometric contour exactly, it's actually an organic contour, even for geometric figures.

But with the Stoics, there is a conception of the limit that completely breaks with the contour. It is thus, as it were, a kind of fact. If you consider the Stoic texts, they are all the more interesting when they really erupt into the Greek world, something that is summarized very well in a text by an old... by an ancient Stoic who says: "Well! Yes! The limit it is not the geometric contour, the limit, he says, is, above all, the zone where some potentiality exerts itself, i.e., the entire zone where it exerts itself, it exerts itself more, and so on." What is this zone? He says: the model of limit it is not the sculptor who gives it to us in the sense of a contour or even a relief. What it gives to us is the germ of the plant; in other words, the germ "it is". This is a radical change of the verb "to be". "I am up to the point where I exert my potentiality." So, I am no longer within the contour of my limit, my limit has ceased to be a contour, my only limit is where my potentiality no longer exerts itself.

So, there is something fundamental that occurs here, which is the discovery of light. Because this is not at all a question of manipulating texts. This is all of Plotinus's texts on light. This is the same time that Plotinus discovers purely optical light. He makes light speak, Plotinus makes light explicitly say: "Where do I begin? Where do I end?" This is the negation of the contour in favor of a limit that will be defined specifically in painting through chiaroscuro, which implies this space, this spreading out of optical space, which is completely different from the optical-tactile space of the Greeks.

Or I'll take another example, which Wölfflin analyzes very, very well and draws a comparison to also. Let's take the example of nudes again, two nudes this time. but not from the point of view of color. He says that a Renaissance nude, a nude by Dürer, for example... what is it? What is it like? There! You truly find the line there, what I called the collective line or the organic line, that is, the limit of the body is actually drawn by a curved line, a continuous curve at the limit; even if it is interrupted at such and such a moment, it continues virtually. A continuous complex curve. Is this

what will come to define the contour? And the body, thus limited, thus limited by the organic line, is detached from the ground. But obviously, it does not leap up from the ground and it does not intend to leap up from the ground.

If you consider one of Rembrandt's nudes, even materially, you see something completely new that will become very important for the entire history of painting—I would say the same thing about portraits, if you were to consider a portrait from the 16th or 17th century. If you consider a Rembrandt nude, it becomes clear. You see that it is not at all composed by a curved line, yet there is a contour. You will tell me, yes, there is still a contour; we will see that this completely new kind of contour can no longer be determinate. It is not at all the self-determination of form anymore. Why? Why is this what you are showing? It is not even a complex and virtually continuous curve anymore. It is a succession, it is a very, very thin succession of flat features;¹⁶ it is a succession of flat features that, at the same point, are going to have... -- Ah yes! I see! That doesn't matter! Because you are introducing nuances -- For a long time there have been Rembrandts that function with curves... I'm not talking about... every time I say Rembrandt it's not a matter of some formula that Rembrandt uses. -- Let's consider certain Rembrandts that might give the impression of being particularly representative of a 17th century painting.

Alright! This kind of flat feature or broken line doesn't have the same function at all anymore; it no longer makes a contour at all! It indicates the way—it indicates almost everything and then everything, on the contrary, is redistributed as a function of the background. It indicates the way in which the body leaps up from the ground in a kind of structure that is perpendicular to the painting, and, thus, in this case, there is still a contour because there are continuous flat features, and again, they are not curved features; it is truly a succession of flat features that change direction every time. This really makes the body leap up of from the ground! The body is no longer on the ground, it leaps up from the ground.

And if you consider examples of portraits from the Renaissance, it is even clearer—this importance of the contour, the line of the nose, the line of the eyes, the line of the mouth; all of it really forms the lines of the contour. In a 17th century portrait, you are struck by this: just as I was saying earlier, the contour is transformed into a succession of flat features in certain Rembrandts, for example, and in many paintings from the 17th century, you are quite incapable of restoring a line from the contour of the face and from lines that would still be modular lines, in the sense in which I used the word "module" earlier! This time, on the contrary, the entire portrait...and it takes on an intense life at this moment...it is obvious! The entire portrait is organized by features, discontinuous features that are lifted from the whole.

You see! I would say: the double formula of the portrait or the body in the 17th century is, on the one hand: the curvilinear contour replaced by a succession of flat features changing direction, and the modular lines internal to the face replaced by discontinuous features lifted from the whole, which then indicate obviously -- these discontinuous features lifted from the whole -- typically indicate the play of shadow and light. As a result, in fact that in this space everything is oriented, everything is reoriented as a function of them—form must emerge from the ground, emerging from the ground; it can no longer define via a contour, via absolute clarity, as Wölfflin says. It can be defined only in terms of relative clarity. Discontinuous features lifted from the whole of the face, a flat feature that causes form to emerge from the ground. And it is a space that is actually a space of values, if you'd like; it is a space of value. It is a chiaroscuro space. And it is a space where light has actually ceased to depend on form.

So, this and only this... that is, as well as the space of Byzantium as this [17th-century] space, it is hallucinatory, the hallucinatory manner or even the character of these figures: that these figures leap up from the ground, and only this ground contains both the whiteness of bright light and the obscurity of blacks. And everything emerges from there. That is really what is conquered; what is conquered for art at that moment, really is a perpendicular structure.

Just as I was telling you about the 17th century, look: the theme of the encounter, how do the figures meet? The same goes for the 16th century: two figures that meet...and this is the heart of the problem in the 16th century regarding the collective line—two figures that meet in the foreground and all of art—and one of these aspects of art in the 16th century is the beauty of its foregrounds...because these foregrounds are not flat. Again, the example of Raphael always comes to my mind as one of the painters who pushed this kind of twisting and the effects of the foreground's twisting the farthest. Ah! But they obviously meet on the foreground because it's the foreground that distributes forms. And it is on the foreground that they are determined, hence the collective line is really the line of the foreground, however sinuous it is, however complex it is!

On the other hand, the 17th century encounter is organized in a completely different way: the figures come to the foreground but from the ground. And each has its own way of belonging to the ground. And when they arrive, two of them, for example, on the same foreground, they don't get there in the same way, they don't get there in the same way! Because they do not leap out of the ground in the same way. If they meet in the foreground, it's because their way of leaping has been harmonized, and the foreground itself remains full of holes! Punctured! By the perpendicular structure of their leap from the background and thus, in this respect, one of the painters who goes the furthest in this kind of perpendicular structure is Rubens, it seems to me!

So, I would say in closing, I should have spent much more time on all of this! But it is enough to grant me the principle. I would say for the optical space that it is a third type of modulation. The transmission of a pure optical space refers to a third type of modulation. Which will be what? We're touching upon it now: the modulation of light.

The modulation of light, and you can see it in other cases: when I defined Egyptian modulation via the "crystalline" mold. I defined Greek modulation by the "module", the "rhythmic module"! I obviously did not want to say that there is no light, etc., in Greek art. It does not yet reach the status of an independent component from the point of view of the effectuated modulation. But it is already there. It has already been attained. It is produced by the effectuated modulation. So, at this point, I think we're coming up against the last problem that remains and that I'd like to get into today, and which will be our topic next time.

This is a good problem, here it is: three spaces and three types of modulation confront us. [*Pause*] And, well, it's been established that I haven't had much of an opportunity to talk about color. I should explain why I haven't had the opportunity. Because, well, there would be an initial, quick schema that could be useful, which is obviously false, but that could be useful in organizing our research. That is, after all is said and done, that the modulation of color is very different, not only from the modulation of the line, but also from the modulation of light. So, in this sense, there may be a reason, there may be a reason for saving a place for it -- that's why we wouldn't have talked about it before -- there might be a reason to save a place for a colored signal-space, which would refer to a kind of modulation all its own.

You see this hypothesis; it would consist in saying that, of course, even if someone were to explain to me that the same painters are also great luminists and great colorists, and that may be, but that's

not even certain. It is said that they are often not the same. They aren't the same problems, in fact; thus, a painter can face two problems, but it is very possible that her fundamental problem is light, not color, and that she reaches the problem of color only insofar as it concerns and touches upon light, the inverse is also possible. So, my first hypothesis would be that...

A student: Monsieur, excuse me... [*Inaudible comments; Deleuze mutters "My God" in frustration*]

Deleuze: Anything is possible! Anything! It's true! I am excluding nothing here! Anything is possible! All solutions are possible. My first hypothesis is only that we might need a definition of a signal-space unique to color, which would correspond to a very particular type of modulation distinct from all the others that we've seen, including the modulation of light. What would it mean to modulate color? And to which space would this modulation refer? You see! That is it: the first hypothesis, and I'll try to confirm this hypothesis.

Well, in the history of Western painting there have been moments of great colorism; namely, when the problem of color was truly the fundamental problem. If I stick with... since I have been picking examples here and there, I'll stick with a famous period: impressionism. The Impressionists are fundamentally, and present themselves fundamentally as, colorists. Well, in what way does that pose problems other than the problems of light? Well, sometimes they have formulas that are a little derivative, a little simplistic, but just like the ones we use, which serve as great reference points. Van Gogh says, for example—Van Gogh, while invoking Delacroix, whom he claims to be the first great modern colorist, says: "What Rembrandt is to light, Delacroix is to color."¹⁷ Good! A simple formula. He says it just like that in a letter. Is it true? Is it not true? It doesn't matter! It's a point of reference.

What does it mean exactly? It strongly suggests that at the limit there is a space of color that is not the same as the space of light, and a modulation of color which is not the same as the modulation of light. So, what does that mean? Well, then, consider everything. Consider everything, what do I mean? I mean that it goes without saying that luminists, those whom we could call luminist painters, attain color, but they attain color through light. It goes without saying that the colorists attain light, but they attain light through color, and by color.

Here is a text about Cézanne which I find very curious; it is a text by Cézanne's contemporaries, they say: "It is by opposing (I'm reading slowly because there is nothing remarkable), it is by opposing warm and cool tones"—we saw this, didn't we? The warm and cool as the determination of color as color—"It is by opposing warm and cool tones, that is, warm yellow and cool blue, it is by opposing warm and cool tones that the colors that the painter, namely Cézanne, uses without a luminous quality by itself, without a luminous quality (no, I'm reading poorly)...without an absolute luminous quality in itself, without an absolute luminous quality in itself, manages to represent light and shadow."

This is an interesting text to me because at this point, at least at the end of the definition of Cézanne's painting, it strikes me as being a very apt definition: to attain light and all of the relationships between light and shadow via relationships of color...via relationships of color, without giving a luminous quality to colors that would be inherent to them in themselves. And even more! Cézanne will push us forward a little, because the further Cézanne goes, the more he discovers his colorist method and the more he calls it "modulation". There are wonderful texts by Cézanne: Modulate, modulate colors! He goes so far as to say—which is quite convenient for us—that one should not say "to model", and even more so, one should not say "to mold", one should say neither "to mold" nor "to model", and one should say "to modulate".

This is excellent for us, since we have been led earlier precisely to choose the mold, the relief, the module, etc. We have been led to consider them as cases of modulation. The real mystery of the process is modulation... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:33:15]

Part 3

... [Cézanne] deals with the same subject, or the same motif, with two completely different processes. The first case is a double painting, meaning two copies of the same motif, entitled, *Seated Peasant*. *Seated Peasant*: one in oil, the other in watercolor.¹⁸

In the second example, unfortunately, the two titles are different. It is a portrait of a lady in a morning jacket, obviously it's the same lady. The portrait of a lady in a morning jacket. Both are in oil. If you read Gowing's text on this point, I think it shows...it provides very strong evidence for this: the process is not the same!¹⁹ Why? Because the first seated peasant, the one painted in oil, is painted entirely through a modulation of light: local tone, local color, modulation of light, and chiaroscuro. The watercolor is painted in a completely different way.

You can sense it! It is painted in a colorist way, we're hanging on to our thing about "modulating light, modulating color". What does that mean exactly? If you understand, if only confusedly, it is what we just saw about modulating light, all this play of chiaroscuro and leaping up from the ground. To modulate color! What does it tell you? With the *Seated Peasant*, the second watercolor version, we see something very, very curious! We see that the relief is obtained through a juxtaposition of colored blots.

What do these colored blots end up being? Of course, here, these examples are not restrictive! Next, Gowing is going to show that this permeates all of Cézanne's work. What are these colored blots of rather small dimension? Perhaps this is an essential moment for the colorists: already, there's a pretty small dimension of colored blots.

Well! Gowing tries to show that there actually is a method here, a stunning method, which consists in substituting the contour, the tactile contour, and the optical relief in chiaroscuro with a third thing: this is precisely what Cézanne calls modulating color. A modulation from color, or by color, is going to replace the optical-tactile contour, i.e., the collective line, and is also going to replace the chiaroscuro relief: it is a succession, a juxtaposition of color blots, step by step in the order of the spectrum. -- I'm moving forward a bit; I just want to get this down! Because it is only next week when I will explain all of these very curious kinds of Cézanne's sequences in detail, which end up being a kind of revolution in color. -- Yes, it goes from one step to the next in the order of the spectrum, and at the limit it's a blot of such and such a color! We will see what that specifically means according to our schema from last time—a blot of such and such a color! A blot of such and such a color! Until it reaches a climax and the series goes back down: a double series that is progressive and regressive, revolving around the famous climax in Cézanne. And this is what ends up taking place, this kind of new relief, which is no longer a relief, but is actually a modulation via color.

Same thing for the lady in the morning jacket, it's very curious! Why is it important that he makes this discovery in the watercolor version of the *Seated Peasant*? It seems like it is in the watercolor that Cézanne started to find his groove, this new colorist method! And he extends that to oil afterwards. And on this point, you have a version in the example of the lady in the morning jacket! There! The lesser reproductions, even the reproductions in black, are fascinating in this respect!

Gowing's article has reproductions in black that are utterly fascinating: because there is a very clean version of it! Truly: the modulation of light, chiaroscuro and color are reduced to local tone, to local color, influenced simply by the light or modified by the light, and the other version of the lady in the morning jacket is absolutely different. You get the impression that it is another style entirely, even if it is the same painter, it is at the limit! There! It's in a modulation to color that you rediscover the sequence of juxtaposed blots up to a climax, and then the regressive series. So, I'll just say: even when it is the same, it seems more obvious to me that the modulation of color and the modulation of light are not at all the same thing.

But then, second remark! Consequently, one might risk concluding that the modulation of color has its own space, you see! Its sign-space! That's... So, we are going to have to define both this modulation and the signal-space that it transmits or that it reproduces. And we could do it, we will be forced to do it, for example, when taking the 19th century as an example right after the 17th century. We could even do a colorist sequence, which would be definitive for painting, that is—and we would rediscover the problem: how to paint a body? Which would begin with Delacroix, and here! I'm saying this now, because we would discover this problem—and a process, which is Delacroix's, and was perhaps already Turner's, by the way! A process that from that era onward would be called cross-hatching. Alright! Alright! To simplify—with the very corrections that you're bringing in—everything starts in this sequence, everything would start with Delacroix's cross-hatching. -- No, in a little while. I beg you, in a little while, otherwise I'll get lost --

The second time: and after all, I'm borrowing this from a really good book, so if you stumble upon it, read it! There is a post-impressionist, a neo-impressionist who is very well known, named Paul Signac,²⁰ Signac who wrote a book *From Eugène Delacroix to the Neo-Impressionists*, and it is very good!²¹ He develops this sequence: everything starts with Delacroix's hatching. Do you see how this is an answer to the question: how to paint the body? It's a great answer! Because, ultimately, Delacroix maintains the entire tradition he's developed from the earthy colors, only he is going to hatch the earthy colors from pure tones, he is going to do his famous hatching!

There we have a typical example, go ahead! Right there is a typical example! The decoration of Saint-Sulpice where bodies with earthy tints or muted tints are hatched with juxtaposed green or pink, with a small hatching, a green hatching, a pink hatching. This is a process of hatching for which Delacroix will be criticized at that time, or, rather, on the contrary, very admired and acclaimed, since one gets the impression that he extracts the color from the ground, from a kind of muddy sludge. Now, I would not say that this hatching process is the only one, but it is very significant because it will have its descendants.

Afterward, and it's not by chance, the impressionists will declare Delacroix as their leader. What happens next? You have the formation of sequences of colored blots on a completely different level from that of Delacroix, why? Because to arrive at these sequences of colored tints, of small colored units, what was necessary? It was necessary to truly break with what Delacroix had held fast, the earthy colors! Even the muted colors! We're going to see all of this better! But I'm already launching into it, and it will be as good as done! And their unity? It's not a hatching anymore! But it goes straight on from there! As Signac says very well, it is the famous "Impressionist comma". They paint with small commas. It is the Impressionist comma. Delacroix's hatching became an Impressionist comma because it can be deployed for its own sake.

And the comma is a very funny thing if you think about it! Because at the beginning of Impressionism, this famous comma is very ambiguous, then with Van Gogh it will generate, well, we can't even call it a comma anymore, it will be transformed into a point by Van Gogh! But he

borrowed it as a kind of pictorial process, Van Gogh borrowed it from the Impressionists. Eh, it's... they can do that— I don't know what I meant anymore— they [the Impressionists] can do that precisely because they have been freed from the problem of the earthy! From earthy color and the muted colors. They have been removed from their palette, it's compulsory! They have done something wonderful! A subtraction! An intense palette restriction, an intense palette restriction, because this is the cost for making color emerge in a form that we have yet to determine.

And in particular, they will have removed all of the so-called earthy colors, they have removed most of the earthy colors, the so-called earthy colors and they will not use and will condemn the muted colors. Except Signac—who claims to be, and he is right—who presents himself as a post-impressionist of the third moment. Going beyond Delacroix and beyond the impressionists, he says: “Yes, but there is something that is not right, that isn't right, their comma is still very strange, because it's up to you to decide: is it figurative, or is it already abstract? It's figurative because it's great for doing what the impressionists are so concerned with doing: making blades of grass, and what did they learn? What they learned, and what they learned from the English, in particular, from the English painters, is that grass is not made by making, by spreading out green or even by shading it, by playing on values. Grass is made with small touches of green, of tones, of different shades, and that is what makes grass!

See, we've gone so far beyond the collective line. It is more the collective line of a totality that would be the totality of grass. We have really penetrated the grass, the interiority of the grass, but now this little comma is, in a way, still figurative, but at the same time completely abstract! It works very well for making leaves, but making grass is already something else. And so! As Signac very curiously says, this story is still very curious, because these impressionists have absolutely rejected and removed the earthy.

So, we can say, and this is the basic impressionist idea: how to rip out, how to rip out brightness? How to rip out the bright tones from the mixture, from the earthy mixture, from the earthy color, from the immense mixture, from grayness? But in Signac's schema -- this schema is very scholastic, but since I find it very joyful and very philosophical, I'm citing him -- the first time: Delacroix keeps the earthy colors and extracts brightness from them, and he makes them bright by using a process of hatching. The second moment: the impressionists removed the earthy colors, they can therefore develop brightness in the form of brief sequences out of different tones.

But Signac says: it is not a matter of chance, because they use this extraordinary method to reconstitute the earthy. But he says: this is why it is so strange, they take the opposite path of Delacroix; Delacroix himself began with the earthy and exalted it with his process of cross-hatchings, he made them bright. The others do the opposite, they removed the earthy, they have a process for bright tones and immediate sequences of bright tones so as to reconstitute the impression of earthy or muted tones. And it is... and God knows that it is beautiful, while Signac seems to be saying that it's a shame! For us, our eye rejoices in it: the two great examples of the extreme in impressionism in this respect are the cathedrals, Monet's “cathedrals”, in fact where the grayness of stone is reconstituted by a process of small touches of pure tones, and “the boulevards” of Pissarro, the boulevards of Pissarro—those who have been to the recent Pissarro exhibition have seen these paintings of the late Pissarro, the boulevards—where his explicit objective is reproducing the sense of mud in the streets of a city like Paris, with bright tones. And it's incredible.

But Signac, he is not happy, why? Because he says it was not necessary to use this pure colorism, namely this release, this extraction, of the sequences of pure tones in order to create an impression of earthy and muted tones. What was needed? In comes the greatest colorist, according to Signac

(meaning, it is curious that he does not mention Cézanne in all this). But of course, he has his own interests: he is a close friend, Signac is a close friend of Seurat. What does Seurat do? Well, there is no more comma, it has become the famous “small point”. And the painting style known as pointillism.

See, from the hatching to the comma to the small point, you saw a succession of colorism; or put another way, the succession of small points—but that was already in Cézanne, not in the same way, it was not small points in Cézanne. But where the pure sequence of pure tones in the order of the spectrum, which comes to a climax, is going to define this is the modulation of color. At the same time, it is only a sequence because in the same era... so much of this painting world is rich, you see! I will try in vain, to place Gauguin and Van Gogh within this sequence, especially Gauguin for whom pointillism and Seurat seemed truly comical and uninteresting, and who gives color a whole other...it is as if my sequence eventually needs to take another branch into account, a differentiation, in the direction of Van Gogh—Gauguin.

Well, but what problems do I want to get to? I can always isolate a problem of pure colorism, that does change the fact that color has always belonged my previous spaces, even my previous worlds. I want to say: not only in the signal-space of the Egyptians, in the signal-space of the Greeks, and obviously in the signal-space of light, but Byzantium has both a colorist range and a luminous range. And it is necessary to say this about Byzantium, and I think that I already said it last time: Byzantium invents colorism at the same time that it invents luminism. And it is certainly not by the same means, such that Byzantium already has a double modulation, a modulation of color and you can see what is make possible by the mosaic, and not only a modulation of light, but the mosaic enables a modulation of fantastic color. That means: instead of the small blots, and, well, they are small ones, they are small tesseras; that really is astounding, as a possibility. And in the 17th century, there is an entire regime of color, no less than a regime of light.

As a result, my problem would be double, and we need to return to this exact question as quickly as possible next time: what are the regimes of colors that correspond, for example, to the Renaissance space and to the 17th century optical space? You see! Or what are the regimes of color that correspond to Greek art and Byzantine art? Since there is already a regime of color, I can just maintain—this is where it remains a little coherent, the entirety—I can just maintain that modulation is not done primarily via color, which is false for Byzantium and I think that there is a double modulation there, but it is still true that in the 17th century, in 17th century painting, the primary modulation was not one of color, it remains one of light.

So, it is necessary that, on the one hand, we define the regimes of the color and, on the other hand, —the two do not exclude each other anymore -- that we define a proper colorist space to which the modulation of color in a pure state would correspond, even if there are already regimes of color prior to this proper colorist space. See? Good!

So, I will give you something in closing that I will need to pick up on next time about the simple characteristics of colors, because I would like you to keep it in mind. For those who are interested, I'd ask you to take note and reflect about it a little bit, it's a question of terminology, since it takes great effort to try to combine the terminology for color. There would be four simple characteristics of colors, namely: there are two that depend on a factor called the “luminance factor”. Two characteristics that depend on the luminance factor of the color, and these two characteristics are light/dark. There are two characteristics that depend on the so-called “purity of color” factor. And these are saturated/washed-out.

What you get when you combine the two together — I just want you to remember this, so that you can make your own table accordingly, otherwise, we will not understand the terminology -- light / saturated, light / dark, and saturated / washed-out, are opposites! Light! What was I saying, light. The first case is light / saturated! This is what is called a bright tone. Light / washed-out: this is what is called a pale tone. Dark / saturated: this is what is called a deep tone. Dark / washed-out: this is called a muted tone.

That's it! You can create your own table with arrows and all that. But I need these four notions because, for me, my hypothesis will be: there are really like... there isn't only... there are four regimes of the color: a pale regime, a bright regime, and a muted regime, and a deep regime... and all of the colors can be extracted from each of these regimes, you can always recover one from a regime. ... Yes! what?

Anne Querrien: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Luminance is not the same thing as luminosity! It's not the same thing! Anyway! There will be some fringes that we won't be able to isolate. [*End of the session*] [1:58:00]

Notes

¹ Henri Maldiney (1912-2013), cited previously by Deleuze, *Espace, parole, regard* (Lausanne: Éditions l'Age d'homme, 1973).

² Deleuze uses the masculine pronoun “il” (translated as “it” in this case) when he says that “il invente la ligne collective”, indicating that it is Greek art (*l'art grec*, masculine) to which he is referring, as opposed to Renaissance painting (*la peinture de la Renaissance*, feminine), which would have been replaced by the pronoun “elle”...assuming he did not lose track of the antecedent.

³ Alois Riegl (1858-1905); on Riegl, see the two preceding sessions, May 12 and 19, 1981.

⁴ Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945); on Wölfflin, see the Leibniz and the Baroque seminar, sessions 1 and 2, October 28 and November 4. See also *The Movement-Image*, p. 230, note 1, and *The Time-Image*, p. 298, note 13, both with reference to *Principles of the History of Art* (London: Bell, 1932).

⁵ Here begin three paragraphs, approximately five minutes, omitted from the Paris 8 and WebDeleuze transcripts, newly restored and translated here.

⁶ Deleuze is using the particular vocabulary that emerges in Baroque music, used to describe the metrical nature of rhythm in the 17th century. *Temps forts*, which literally means “strong times” refers to the accented parts of the measure in Baroque rhythm and is translated as “strong beats” in English. *Temps faibles* (literally “weak times”), inversely, refers to the unaccented parts of the measure and is conventionally translated as “weak beats”. The English terminology for Baroque meter loses the explicitly temporal denotation found in the French terms.

⁷ Georges-Louis Leclerc, Count de Buffon (1707-1788). On Buffon, see Francis Bacon. *The Logic of Sensation*, ch. 14, note 20. The reference regarding modulating and molding is also to Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), pp. 41-42.

⁸ Wilhelm Worringer (1881-1965). Sur Worringer, see the Cinema 1 seminar, session 3, November 24, 1981; Cinema 3 seminar sessions 1 and 2, November 8 and 22, 1983; and the Leibniz and the Baroque seminar, session 14, April 7, 1987.

⁹ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Theory of Colors*, 1810. See session 6 for Deleuze's detailed development of this work.

¹⁰ Deleuze's French translation of §666 from Goethe's text diverges a bit from the English translation, and I have chosen to stay true to Deleuze's words in my translation of his lecture. However, the English translation can be found here: *Goethe's Theory of Colors*, translated by Charles Lock Eastlake, published by John Murray (London, 1840). The entirety of §666 reads as follows: “If in some animals portions appear variegated with positive colours, this of itself shows how far such creatures are removed from a perfect organisation; for, it may be said, the nobler a creature is, the more all the mere material of which he is composed, is disguised by being wrought together; the more essentially his surface corresponds with the internal organisation, the less can it exhibit the elementary colors. Where all tends to make up a perfect whole, any detached specific developments cannot take place.”

¹¹ Deleuze is referring to an exhibition of Nicolas de Staël's work that ran from May 22 to August 24, 1981, at the Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, Paris.

¹² See, for example, Paul Cézanne's *Strangled Woman* (1872), housed at the Musée d'Orsay in Paris.

¹³ Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945) published *Principles of Art History (Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe)* in 1915.

¹⁴ Deleuze cites Duthuit's *Le Feu des signes* (Geneva: Skira, 1962), in *Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation*, ch. 15, note 6.

¹⁵ On this reference, see the Spinoza seminar sessions 8, January 27, 1981, and especially session 11, February 17, 1981.

¹⁶ Deleuze differentiates between lines (*lignes*) and features (*traits*) in this part of the seminar while using the terms interchangeably. The French "*traits*" has multiple meanings in French that include "lines", "features", and "strokes" (as in brush strokes), and since his use of "*traits*" denotes both the features of a multiplicity as well as lines, I have rendered "*traits*" as "features" in English, while "lines" is a translation of the traditional "*lignes*" from French.

¹⁷ This citation is drawn from Van Gogh's letters, cited in *Conversations with Cézanne*, ed. Michel Doran, trans. Julie Lawrence Cochran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 88. See also *Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation*, ch. 15, note 4.

¹⁸ Paul Cézanne painted *Seated Peasant* between 1892-1896.

¹⁹ Lawrence Burnett Gowing (1918-1991); the article to which Deleuze refers is "Cézanne: The Logic of Organized Sensation," in *Conversations with Cézanne*, ed. Michel Doran, trans. Julie Lawrence Cochran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). On Gowing, see *Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation*, chapter 14, note 8, and chapter 15, note 16.

²⁰ Paul Signac (1863-1935).

²¹ Published in 1899 under the title, *D'Eugène Delacroix au néo-impressionisme*.