

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image**

**Lecture 02, [La Voix de Deleuze](#), 17 November 1981**

**Transcribed by Chloé Molina-Vée (Part 1, 1:12:10) and Lucie Marchadié (Part 2, 1:01:08), transcription augmented, Charles J. Stivale**

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### **Part 1**

*[The transcription begins in media res with Deleuze responding to an intervention made before the recording began]*

... as a characteristic, finally, of art, of art in general, in the end, of many forms of art, and you have opposed it to another reconstitution of the movement of which you claimed that these were two reconstitutions of different kinds, another reconstitution of the movement which consisted in reconstituting movement, no longer as a function of privileged instants, but as a function of any instants whatever, as a function of the any-instant-whatever (*l'instant quelconque*).

And that, I was saying, in fact, that is cinema, and before cinema, that's what the novel was, the relation of movement to any-instants-whatever and no longer to privileged instants. So, the objection he is making to me is -- it's not an objection, in fact, it's nonetheless ... -- it amounts to saying: we must not go so fast because after all, a man of cinema as important and as fundamental as Eisenstein, what is he doing if not a reconstitution of movement starting from privileged instants? See, it sounds like an objection, but since he never makes objections to me, thank goodness, that certainly must not be one. *[The participant's voice is heard, inaudible]* On the contrary, it's the invitation of a direction to be analyzed.

A second question that interests me here, but which would be more technical, is -- this is very strange -- if it's true that Bergson tends to define -- but we have not seen that clearly -- tends to define the Whole, the totality by the Open, whereas for most people, the Whole is, on the contrary, something closed, it's weird, it means something; you pronounce expressions like "Well, the Whole is not difficult, it is the Open". The question is, if it's true that Bergson says that, oddly there is someone else who said that as well, and it's Heidegger, and it's Rilke. There are some very beautiful poems by Rilke on the Open. And might there be a connection between the Bergsonian idea and Heidegger or Rilke or Hölderlin?

Fine, I just want to answer the second... the first question, or try to answer the first question because it refers to something that I can consider already finished, and that, indeed, that creates a problem. So, if we see an Eisenstein film, what is happening? But after all, indeed, this is movement; it is even among the most beautiful movements in cinema, but how can we not recognize that it is a reproduction, a reconstitution of movement as a function of privileged instants, and literally, as a function of crisis points? Okay, I am saying, this is only an objection

on the surface, I believe, because what is happening? When I said cinema is not defined simply by the reproduction of movement, that it is defined by this: there is cinema when the reproduction of movement results from an analysis of movement, fine, this amounts to saying, cinema exists when there is reproduction of movement as a function of any-instants-whatever.

Why? Because you only have an analysis of movement when the movement is not cut according to privileged instants but cut according to snapshots. The snapshot is an any-instant-whatever. With any given instant-whatever, so what does that mean in concrete terms? You indeed sense that an any-instant-whatever is, in fact, a relation, it is a relation between two instants; otherwise, it is an abstraction, an any-instant-whatever. We will say, what is an any-instant-whatever? It's not nothing, right, so what is it?

In fact, an any-instant-whatever is a perfectly concrete and determinable notion. If I say "any-instant-whatever" like that, this means an indeterminate instant, an equal instant (*instant égalique*). So how do you determine the any-instant-whatever? The any-instant-whatever is perfectly determined as the equidistance between two instants. So, you have equidistant instants. Henceforth, your analysis of movement deserves the name "analysis of movement" since it considers equidistant sections (*coupes*). At that moment, there is analysis of movement.

You see that these are not privileged moments here; you can concretely define and concretely distinguish the any-instant-whatever and the privileged instant. This is obviously not a privileged instant since the any-instant-whatever designates only the relation between two instants whose characteristic in no way meant to imply a vertex, a minimum or a maximum of movement or even a singularity of movement, but only being equidistant from the instant, from the other instant. Fine.

So, I am saying, and I believe I can maintain that if movement is not reproduced as a function of any-instants-whatever, that is, as a function of equidistant instants, there is no cinema nor a possibility of cinema. Fine. And that, it remains true for ... [*beginning of a comment by Claire Parnet*] ... literally, cinema insofar as being an assignable technique.

Claire Parnet: And video?

Deleuze: But on that, [*short answer from Parnet*] -- Oh video, it's not cinema -- But on that, [*short reply from Parnet, who says, "yes"*] On that ..., [*Pause*] that any-instants-whatever, that is, equidistant instants, are chosen so as to coincide with [*Pause*] privileged instants in the old way, that is perfectly possible. For those who remember Eisenstein's theses, think of the way he has -- it's even to a point where you say to yourself, but why is he insisting on this? -- on the numerical considerations of the golden ratio, not only in each image but in the succession of images, all its quantitative character of movement.

Yes, I would say about Eisenstein that he is completely, obviously, a man of cinema. That goes without saying. But one of his diabolical tricks is to restore an epic world and a tragic world. By restoring an epic world and a tragic world, I mean an epic world and a tragic world were indeed worlds that reconstituted movement but starting from privileged instants. Eisenstein creates cinema. Insofar as he creates cinema, he is like everyone else, that is, he can reconstitute

movement, and he must reconstitute movement only in this radically new way, as a function of equidistant instants, therefore of any-instants-whatever.

But what's astonishing about Eisenstein is that he uses the cinematographic method to restore a new epic and tragic world, that is, he calculates its equidistances in such a way that they resuscitate privileged moments. And here, you can always, but *the* process will still be to maintain equidistance according to the relations of the golden ratio, the golden section. Have I answered that? [*Reply*, "Yes indeed" *in the room*] There you go.

So, good, let's continue, let's continue. Last time, and I am insisting a lot on ... my need really to enumerate a lot what we are doing so that when we move forward ..., and then I am not saying it so that so many of you always come to class, but I am saying it so that fewer of you come. When you come, you must come all the time, ok?, you have to, because what I am doing this year is not divisible. So, it's a mistake for you to come to class in that way.

But you see, the last time we saw two Bergson theses on movement. And it was like a first chapter, to give it a convenient name. It was Bergson's theses on movement, if, knowing whether it can emerge for cinema. We saw two of them. I'll provide a recap when I finish what I want to do today. And we started considering Bergson's third thesis on movement.

His theses, once again, get complicated because they are not -- it's like everything, it's like always in philosophy; there is no particular page, on a particular page or at a certain moment that Bergson changes his thesis; all this coexists on the same pages, that it shifts from one level to another. -- His three theses on movement are like three levels of analysis of movement. And at the level of this third thesis, the most complex obviously, it becomes ... very difficult, perhaps much more interesting than the other theses. But precisely the other theses were necessary to arrive at the statement of this one.

And the statement of this one would consist in saying -- that's what I tried to do, to say last time - - [*Pause*] not only, if I really try to summarize it, not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration. So, I am going to state the extent to which this is a complex thesis because we have moved away from the most traditional, the best-known Bergsonism. The best-known Bergsonism is the one which puts movement and duration on one side, and space and instant on the other, and which tells us, you will not reconstitute movement with space traveled any more than you will reconstitute duration with instants. But here, you see, it's not about saying that anymore. It's not about contradicting that, but thanks to the first thesis, he moves on to a much more complex level of analysis.

What does it mean "in the same way that"? In the same way that the instant is an immobile section of movement, well, motion is a mobile section of duration. As a result here, this thesis, I told you, we could almost present it in the form of a so-called analogic relation, an analogic relation which we would state thus: instantaneous immobile section, instantaneous immobile section over movement in space equals movement in space over duration. [*Pause*] It's okay for him to say that; obviously he states this.

Here is a sentence that I will read slowly, taken from *Creative Evolution*: [Pause] "the displacements" -- I am reading slowly so that you follow well -- "the wholly superficial displacements of mass and molecules studied by physics and the chemistry would become" -- he puts in a conditional, he is very careful - "would become, by relation to the inner vital movement (which is transformation and no longer translation) what the position of a moving object is to the movement of that object in space", "would become, by relation to the inner vital movement (which is transformation and no longer translation) what the position of a moving object is to the movement of that object in space".<sup>1</sup> So, he explicitly offers us the analogy: "stationary position". [Interruption of the recording] [14:23]

Okay -- and I'm adding -- and that's not good; I'm adding, and that's not good; what does that mean, "and that's not good"? That means -- I'm focusing on Bergson, it's Bergson who concerns me -- it's not good for Bergson. For Bergson has not stopped saying and never will stop saying: you have no right to reconstitute movement with immobile sections. So, on the side of, first segment of my equation: this is not good. The second segment: "movement in space expresses duration", when I say, "what the immobile position is to movement, movement is to duration", so, the second term in my equation, which is: "movement in space expresses duration", not for Bergson, that's indeed right. Here, the affective coefficient says that this is indeed right, that's it. We have a feeling of the expression "that's good," namely "that's indeed right, and it works".

So, when I set up my analogic relation, there is at the same time an affective slippage from "it doesn't work" to "it works". Movement is indeed a mobile section of duration. As a result, our first problem is: what does this very curious Bergsonian thesis mean, because in the end, as much as we could be at ease, relatively, we knew all that in advance; that finally, well, the space traveled and movement were irreducible, all that, we knew all that. But now, he's telling us something quite different. And I doubt that what he said seemed so simple to us, but we were so happy to have understood ... -- One always must be wary of philosophers: when we are very happy to have understood, it means that what we have understood is a condition for understanding yet another thing that we have not understood. So ... I mean, these are always multi-level texts. -- So, my question now regarding this third thesis is: what can it indeed mean concretely, "movement in space is a mobile section of duration"?

Well, let's take it slowly. That means, in a certain way, that [Pause] movement, what is movement in space? [Pause] Movement in space, I would say, as is said, movement is essentially relative. What does it mean: "movement is relative"? It means that however strong you know what the motive is, you can still think of movement as purely relative; that is, that by which, that in relation to which a movement occurs, you can as well say or think that this is what moves in relation to the mobile object posed in its turn as immobile, the relativity of movement. You can say as well that you are moving relative to the landscape or that the landscape is moving relative to you. I'm not saying you can sense it like that, and in some cases, you sense it like that. But you can think so. Which amounts to saying what? [Coughing in the room] [Pause]

I would say of movement that it is fundamentally a relation between parts. [Pause] I am saying movement expresses duration. What does this mean? That's what we're trying to comment on, once again, in Bergson. What does "movement expresses duration" mean? Duration, what is it? It's what is changing. And in the end, Bergson never gave another definition to duration.

Duration is what changes; it's what is changing and what keeps changing. We are moving forward a bit.

What is change? For reasons that we will only understand later -- I must get ahead of myself in this analysis -- Bergson will show us that change is an affection of the Whole. Movement: a relation between parts; change: an affection of the Whole. Without understanding yet, I mean, without fully understanding where we are going -- we are going somewhere -- movement expresses duration, that is, a relation between parts expresses an affection of the Whole. Change is the affection of the Whole; movement is the relation between parts, fine. A movement expresses a change. Movement expresses duration, meaning that movement as a relation between parts expresses a change as affection of the Whole.

We have at least given a more detailed body to the Bergsonian thesis. Is this true? What can that mean? A movement, therefore, expresses a deeper change. What Bergson translates sometimes very harshly, very ... when he wants to suppress any successive order, he says, a translation ultimately expresses a transformation; transformation, deeper than translation, that is, movement as a relation between parts, there is transformation as a change of a Whole. [Pause]

Moreover, in a text from *Creative Evolution*, he will say: "beyond the mechanics of translation, we had to imagine a mechanics of transformation."<sup>2</sup> Good. [Pause] We should ... The more it gets complicated, the more the philosophy must suddenly be punctuated by very simple, very concrete spinoffs. That already sounds very complicated, very metaphysical. In fact, doesn't he mean something very simple too, which doesn't exclude itself, where the most complex really coincides with the simplest, in a kind of descent? Well yes, I think he means something very simple.

Movement, let's take examples of movement: I go out. I go out, I take my little walk. Second example: the bird flies away. Third example: I am running because I saw something to eat 10 meters away. Who will deny that all of this is movement? You certainly aren't going to deny that, right? But, furthermore, in fact, this is real movement. Because what do physicists talk to us about? If I am, for example, at the level of the physicists of the 17th century, what do they speak to us about? Billiard balls. That's my question.

You understand, when you want to progress, it depends on what progress you are aiming for, but you generally have to choose your examples well. I say: movement expresses duration, that is, movement as relation between parts expresses change as affection of the Whole. This is exactly the same, yet it's not the same mathematically -- feel this -- it's ... I can switch from one expression to another. From the expression, simple but difficult to understand, movement expresses duration, I moved on to -- trying a little better to define it -- to "movement as a relation between parts expresses a change as affection of the Whole". Yeah, so it's not obvious if ... it all depends on how I tailor my examples.

If I bring forth my billiard balls, it's movement. All the physics of communication of movement in the seventeenth century was created from examples of this type. Two moving bodies meet, what's going on? In what case does each of the two bounce off the other? In what case does one move the other along? According to what laws does one result in the other, etc.? So, these are

examples of movement, for and in what purpose? The example of movement is beautiful but with a specific purpose, [*Pause*] namely to make a quantitative science of movement and the communication of movement. So, it's no wonder we're addressing this type of movement. When I ask a completely different question, is movement in space expressing something of a different nature? It is very likely that more examples will be needed.

So, I'll keep going: I go out for my daily walk. Let's assume that I am a creature of habit (*un être d'habitude*). Even if ... At 5 o'clock, at 5 o'clock, Emmanuel Kant went out every day for his little walk. When night falls, the vampire flies away. The vampire gets up when night falls. What does all this mean? You can multiply the examples. It goes without saying that when it is a question of real movements and not of abstract movements already captured in artificial conditions like billiard balls, when it is a question of real movements, it expresses duration, in what sense? I don't go out just at any time, just casually; I don't translate in space in that way. What is it that literally produces my translation in space? When night falls, I go out. In other words, it is a change in the Whole.

You will tell me, what is this Whole? We're going very, very slowly. This is a change assignable as affection of a Whole, the Whole of the city, the Whole of the day (*journée*), the Whole of the countryside (*campagne*). It beckons me to translation to the point that my translation only expresses this change in the Whole. [*Pause*] This goes without saying. And even if I go out, if I take my little walk after having done good work, fine, same thing. It would be necessary to say: an assignable change in the Whole is like the sufficient reason for the movement of translation. That's what the release mechanism (*déclencheur*) is for movement.

The bird flies away – let's assume this is about migration – that's it, a concrete movement, a real movement. It is not the billiard balls in their isolated system, billiard balls that are supposed to move on their own, in the example of the pure physics of the communication of movement. The bird flies away and migrates, let's assume. It is quite obvious that migration as a movement of translation expresses a change in the Whole, namely a change of climate. [*Pause*]

I run ahead having seen food, being hungry; translation in space, which implies what? But it's exactly as if, between my hunger and food, -- I could almost assimilate them in terms of physics then, again to come back to physics, to a difference of potential -- a difference of potential was dug into a Whole, that is, into the set of my perceptual field. A difference in potential arose between my feeling of hunger, the perception of the food object. Movement in space finds its reason in this difference in potential since it offers itself precisely [*Pause*] a kind of equalization of potential in the sense that I absorb food. At that moment, another difference of potential will be dug into the Whole. I will have gone from one state of the Whole to another state of the Whole.

If you understand such simple examples, well, what happens? Ultimately, there is never a pure state of movement of translation in the world. Movements of translation, by nature, always express the changes of the Whole. [*Pause*] In other words, movements in space, movements of translation always refer to qualitative or evolutionary changes. That all seems very simple, but if I insist so much, it is to make you follow the kind of path of Bergsonian thought in this regard,

where precisely he emphasizes extremely simple things but without which we do not understand at all.

And there, I can almost say it, there, I can reintroduce something concrete into science. [Pause] And this time, it's the first time that I'm quoting a text from *Matter and Memory*: [Pause] "the question would no longer be...", chapter ... last chapter, chapter 4, "the question would no longer be how are produced in given parts of matter changes of position"<sup>3</sup> -- notice "in given parts of matter changes of position", but it is a question of knowing how a change of aspect is accomplished in the Whole, a change for which we would still need to determine the nature. [Pause] And, in the same chapter, an even clearer sentence, he finally tells us, even physicists must be well pleased..., must indeed invoke movements of the whirlpool type. Although they may break down movement to the extreme, they always end up with whirlpool movements. "Now the direction which [these movements] indicate is obvious; they show us, pervading concrete extensity, modifications, perturbations, changes of tension or of energy" -- this is what I called earlier differences of potential - "and nothing else", that is, you do not have a movement of translation that does not refer to a perturbation, a modification, a change in tension or energy.

You see, to say "movement expresses duration", or to say, which amounts to the same thing, "movement as a relation between parts expresses a change as affection of the Whole", see, it amounts exactly to saying any translation finds its reason in a perturbation, in a modification, in a change of tension or energy which affects the Whole or which affects a Whole. There you go, then, I have to be very, very... Why don't we feel it? Why do we feel it and believe in a kind of autonomy of movement in space? For a very simple reason, I believe, and one that Bergson analyzed very well. It's because, [Pause] it's for the same reason that, in the end, you always take immobile views, immobile sections on things.

In fact, I am ultimately dividing the world in two. I am distinguishing qualities and quantities. Quality, for example, is red, and I think red is something simple, that it is a simple sensation and, as a simple sensation, it is in my consciousness. Now, it is in the same way and it is at the same time that I attribute simple qualitative sensations to my consciousness, and that I attribute infinitely divisible quantitative determinations to the thing. I put qualities in my consciousness as something simple, and I refer to things as infinitely divisible movements. And it is on the basis of this dualism that I come close [to saying], well, yes, all that is qualitative; it is my consciousness; it is my qualitative sensation, and what returns to things, this is somewhat the universe, it's somewhat the universe of, uh, Cartesianism, and what returns to things is infinitely divisible movement. But in fact, this is not easy either. If I am questioning what a quality is, what is a quality?

A quality is a perturbation. A quality is a change of tension, it is a change of energy; a quality is a vibration or it's millions and trillions of vibrations. A quality may well exist in my consciousness as a simple sensation, but it exists in matter as a vibration and a way of vibrating. Red is one mode of vibration, blue is another. What then do we say about this movement? The light turns [37: 00] red. What is this movement that I express in the term "blushing"? Light turns red or, from red, it turns blue. These are variations of vibrations. This vibrational movement completely exceeds the duality between a supposedly simple sensation and a supposedly sufficient movement of translation. In fact, these are two abstracts: simple sensation and

supposedly sufficient movement. What is concrete, what is it? It is movement as finding its reason, as finding its principle of production, in what? In a change. It turns blue, it turns red, it changes from red to blue. Light changes from one color to another, etc., etc.

Fine, so, what have I been doing up to now? I've just tried to comment on, what can that mean, movement in space expresses duration. But nonetheless, I've gone too fast sometimes.

"Movement in space expresses duration", I have immediately transformed that into "movement as a relation between parts expresses a change as affection of the Whole". So, that could happen because that flowed on its own, but now we are going back a bit. How, what does that mean? So, did I have the right to introduce such complex concepts, and why?

I assume you'd grant me that, okay -- from that point of view, that doesn't mean you agree yourself, but you'll see later, you first have to understand -- let's assume that you grant me that, in fact, change expresses duration. *[Pause]* You say, yes in fact, when I go out at 5 o'clock in the evening, my translation refers to a change. But the duration is what changes. So, okay, up to there, that works. But how do we introduce these notions then, "movement as relation between parts expresses change as affection of a Whole"?

Here, we also have to trust Bergson, and that's very hard after all. You sense that everything he's getting at is a certain way of saying: you know, the Whole and the parts are two notions that are not on the same level. Fine. In other words, it is not by adding up the parts that we arrive at a Whole. Okay. As Bergson puts it, he wouldn't be the first or the last to say it; many authors have explained to us that the Whole and the parts are not on the same level. What will interest us, or what ought to interest us, is the manner in which, for him, this is not on the same level in which, there, I believe, Bergson is very unique. Because his idea is very simple; it consists in saying, "well, yes, it's not on the same plane, because the parts are always in space whereas the Whole is real time". And that is very new. As much as the idea that "the Whole is something other than the sum of its parts" is a very common idea, quite common, but the distribution of the two planes, of the parts and of the Whole in the form "the parts are space and the Whole is real time", that's very odd. Because what does he mean?

You remember, here -- I wouldn't want to go back over this too much -- that last time I tried to show why, according to Bergson, the Whole was not given. The Whole is not given, in fact. What is given? What is given, let's say, are objects. These objects, no doubt, can be parts, can be parts; parts of what? I would say, objects... You can still do calculations, you can always, for example, place an object into a system. Much later, we will see, but we have to wait, how important that is for cinema. You can still create a system. Moreover, you can always close a system. You set up a closed system, for example, what's on the table, and you decide not to consider the rest. *[Pause]* Notice, even if I was saying that is a Whole, what is not certain, say, a set is a qualified set: it is the set of objects that are on this table. Likewise, if I say the set of red objects, this is a qualified set. Qualified in what sense? In the sense that this set is defined by what it excludes, non-red objects. But, when I say, "the Whole" -- all red objects -- let's accept the idea that it has a sense, that this expression makes sense. All the objects that are on this table, again, let's accept that such an expression makes sense.



But if I say, “the Whole”, the Whole, period, does that make sense? It is quite obvious that the Whole is neither given nor even giveable. The set of objects that are on this table is given, the set of red objects is giveable. But the Whole? It is so little given or even giveable that many authors have thought that the expression "the Whole" was an empty concept or nonsense, [Pause] fine, that it was nonsense, that the expression "the Whole" made strictly no sense. [Pause]

In Bergson's works, this is very curious. He goes his way very... And we risk ending up as a Bergsonian before understanding how or why. Because he tells us more or less this: the Whole is not given, nor giveable, fine. Should I draw the conclusion that the Whole does not make sense? No. This means that it is not on the order of the given. Yes. So, on what order could it be? It is on the order of what occurs and does not cease occurring. You remember, that refers to things that we saw the last time, what occurs and does not cease occurring: that's duration. It's creating something new every moment. It is the next instant that continues the previous instant instead of reproducing it. It is the production of something new. The Whole, he will say, necessarily is neither given nor giveable. Once again, it's what occurs, that is, it is duration. It's what occurs; all that is very odd. Understand, he doesn't mean a more complicated thing; when he says, the Whole, it's the Open. The Whole is the Open.

And there are pages of Bergson, there too, you have to be careful; sometimes it feels like one page reminds you of a page from another author. And then, you realize that, in fact, it's just the opposite. I mean, there is a series, there is a metaphor that runs throughout the history of thought, namely, it is a metaphor that consists in relating one to another, the living and the Whole of the universe. And to say, yes, if the living thing looks like something, it is not something inanimate, it is not an object. If the living thing looks like something, you have to compare it, not to a dead object, you have to compare it to the Whole of the universe. This is the famous microcosm theory. The living thing is a microcosm, that is, a small world; it is not an object in the world, it is itself a small world. In other words, it has to be compared to the world, to the Whole.

And there, this is a thesis that has been around, that philosophers have developed a lot. These are ... [Noises near microphone, incomprehensible word] Until Bergson, how was that interpreted? This well-known thesis consisted in saying, just as the Whole is the most extensible totality, that is, the set of all the sets, that is, just as the Whole is closed onto itself, just as the Whole is absolute closure, the living thing is naturally closed onto itself. Of course, it's not completely closed; it is an image of the Whole.

Here Bergson takes up an old thesis: the living things as microcosm, that is, the living thing is not comparable to an object, it is comparable to the Whole. But he completely reverses this thesis. It's curious, eh, it's quite beautiful, the way in which he completely renews a very old theme, because you see, what he is going to say, if the living thing is comparable to the Whole, it is because the Whole, which occurs, that is, it is the Open, and the living thing is naturally open. What is it open to? Well, the characteristic of the living thing is to be open onto the Open. It is open onto the Whole, but the whole itself is the Open. [Pause]

And this is where Bergson offers, in *Creative Evolution*, an example that will serve us greatly later for cinema, so I am forced to read the page. [Pause] He explains that, of course, you can always close a system. See, I can always close a system. What does that amount to? Well, there

are certain things that I isolate. For example, I put such and such an object on the table, and then I say, that's all that interests me. You will tell me, this is isolation through thought, but I can also isolate better, I put them in a box. I isolate. Or else, I can empty out the box, I will have isolated even better. But since science is very interested in and with this constitution as a condition, I will not use the word "Whole" there, where I will no longer use it in the Bergsonian sense: constitution of a closed set or of a closed system.

And in fact, you can probably study a phenomenon, scientifically, only by relating it to a closed system. Why? Because you can only quantify it in that way; you can see what Bergson means. This is why science is quite unable to grasp the movement of translation as an expression of deeper change. Science, according to Bergson, can only study these phenomena by isolating them, that is, not by creating Wholes out of them, but by tearing them away from the Whole. To tear something from the Whole is to constitute a closed system, that is, a set. Here, we are finally trying to distinguish between the two concepts "set" and "Whole".

And why does science proceed like this? Because it can only quantify when it grasps a phenomenon, in relation to something which can then make an equation possible. What can make an equation possible? The only thing that can make an equation possible is a system of coordinates, abscissa and ordinate. Something has to serve in relation to a phenomenon, you have to have something that can serve as an abscissa and something that can serve as an ordinate. But one must not overdo it, that's obvious, that's obvious, obvious, obvious. What are the abscissa and the ordinate? These are mathematical terms, but why? There is no need to wonder why mathematics works in physics anyway.

These abscissas and ordinates are mathematical notions which immediately refer to what in physics? To a closed system. Henceforth, under the conditions in which you have established a closed system, by abscissa and ordinate, it's indeed forced to have cut off the movement of translation from what it refers to. So ... In a closed system, at the same time, what's going on? Well, time does not bite. Time does not bite; it is not real time as Bergson says. And yet, everyone knows that time bites even onto a closed system. Yes, because it is only closed practically. However strong its thread which connects it to a Whole, there is a thread which connects it to a Whole, and it is by this thread and it is only by this thread that real time bites onto the system. The system has to be open somewhere, however thin the opening, and it is through this opening that real time actually bites, has a hold onto the system.

Hence this famous page from Bergson, "Though our reasoning on isolated systems may imply that their history, past, present, and future, might be instantaneously unfurled like a fan," -- Everything is given; we act as if everything was given -- "this history, in point of fact, unfolds itself gradually, as if it occupied a duration like our own."<sup>4</sup> As if it occupied a similar duration to our own, that is, real time bites anyway.

And here is the famous example: "If I want to make myself a glass of sweetened water... If I want to make myself a glass of sweetened water, whatever I do, I have to wait for the sugar to dissolve."<sup>5</sup> This famous excerpt from Bergson is very curious because you have to admire something. "I'm getting ready..." and he says, "we have to wait for the sugar to dissolve." See what he means; the example fits very well what he means: I have my glass, I put in water and a

sugar. I have built an artificially closed system, the glass as a container, which isolates the water, and I put sugar into the water. Good. If the system were completely closed, well, there you have it, time would be like a sort of succession in which the next instant replicates the previous instant. That's not what it is. You have to wait for the sugar to dissolve.

What he is saying here is very odd because, well, the first reaction, yes, but what is he talking about? It is well known that with a teaspoon one can create ... Yes, it is true. What does it mean to "let the sugar dissolve"? It is a movement of translation. The particles of the lump of sugar, there, break apart, fall to the bottom; although you can stir it with your teaspoon, you will move time along, but you have to wait for the sugar to dissolve. That is, in a closed system, there is always an opening; sometimes time takes hold of the system.

As a result, from this point of view, you will say -- here, we are going to fall right back on Bergson's literal commentary -- you will be able to say: the movement of translation, the sugar particles which break apart from the piece -- this is movement of translation once again -- marks the passage from a first state of the Whole to a second state of the Whole, [Pause] that is, the passage from a state in which you have "sugar in water" to another state of the Whole where you have "sweetened water". Real time was necessary to move from one to the other.

Bergson doesn't ask for more. There has to be an opening that connects the artificially closed system, that is, the system is only artificially closed. But that it keeps a connection with the Open, sometimes in real time... you have to wait for the sugar to dissolve. All this to say what? The sense in which, finally, Bergson can treat as equivalent the notions of duration, of Whole, of *the* Whole and *a* Whole. On what condition finally? On the condition of indeed separating the two concepts of "set" and "Whole". What is the set? It seems to me, according to the letter of Bergsonism, one must say that "the set" is a joining of parts in an artificially closed system. [Pause] And it's quite true that movement of translation is a relation between parts. [Pause]

What is the "Whole"? The "Whole" is the Open; it is the relation of the system with the Open. That is, it is real time or duration. [Pause] "Duration" equals "Whole". By the same token, the complex expression from earlier should become clear: "movement as a relation between parts expresses a change as an affection of the Whole". [Pause] As a result, at the extreme ...

A student: [*Someone begins talking interrupting Deleuze*]

Deleuze: What? ... One second, you will speak later if there is ... At the extreme, what would our conclusion be, in order to try to see the entirety of this third Bergsonian thesis on movement? It would be like saying: listen, we have to distinguish three levels. We must distinguish three levels. There we are. I'm trying now, I'm trying to give you just enough data to understand this complicated thesis.

Three levels, which would be three levels of what? I am preparing what I still have to say today, apart, perhaps, I do not really know, but that is what will interest us later, perhaps three levels which belong to what must be called the image, but no matter. What would these three levels be? First level: objects in space, objects that are parts. [*Interruption of the recording*] [59: 35]

... But in contrast to logicians, he would say the "Whole" still has a meaning. Simply, it is not the set of all sets, the Whole, which is of duration, that is, of the Open or of change. [Pause]

Second level: movement, which is essentially relative to objects in space, movement of translation, which is relative to objects in space, but which relates these objects in space to duration, hence: movement in space expresses duration. [Pause] As a result now, it won't be enough for me to say, see how these three levels, I will not be satisfied... these three levels... I find exactly... At the level of objects and artificially closed sets, what are they? This is the equivalent of what he earlier called the immobile sections (*coupes immobiles*). This is the equivalent of instantaneous immobile sections. [Pause]

The "Whole", the third level, is the equivalent of duration, and I would ask, in what sense, the movement of translation, that is, the movement in space, in what sense movement in space expresses duration or does it express duration? Now, I can state it better: it expresses duration exactly to the extent that movement in space relates the objects between which it is established to duration, that is, to the Whole. Translation expresses a deeper perturbation.

See, this time around, I have a triadic distinction. Movement is what relates objects in space to duration and what relates duration to objects in space. Movement is what makes objects in space endure despite everything, however closed the artificial system in which I consider them may be. And at the same time, that's what results in duration concerning not only what is going on in me, but what is going on in things. So, movement in space, there, has the double, has the pivotal situation -- that's why it was level two -- of relating objects in space to the Whole, that is, to duration, and the Whole to objects in space. [Pause] So, it is exactly in this sense that movement in translation expresses change or duration.

Yeah. On one condition -- we are almost done, but not quite finished -- on one condition. It would only work, see, if my three levels are connected. My three levels must be communicating. The movement of translation must operate in such a way that, ceaselessly, the objects which can be detached in space are related to duration and duration related to the objects. In other words, nothing would work in the system if duration did not of itself have a strange power to divide and reunite and keep dividing and reuniting. It divides itself into so many sub-durations. It divides itself into as many rhythms, sub-durations, as there are objects in space concerned by movement, concerned by a particular movement, and conversely, these objects come together in one and the same duration. Duration never ceases to be... at every moment, the movement of dividing and reuniting.

And what is this? What is that? All these examples, we will need them; that is why I insist on the succession of examples. The glass of water there. Another example arises in a very strange book by Bergson, which has a long history, called *Duration and Simultaneity*. *Duration and Simultaneity*, I am saying here -- I'm open a parenthesis very quickly -- it is a very special book in all of Bergson's books, because it is a book in which Bergson claims to be confronting Einstein's theory of relativity, and he seems to criticize this theory of relativity. And this book is at once very disconcerting because one has the impression that something is not right, that it is not right. And then we are sometimes dazzled then as well by moments that work out

extraordinarily well. But overall, the tone is, "Well, Einstein didn't get it." What did Einstein not grasp, and that Bergson wants to know?

Is Bergson able to talk with Einstein scientifically, that is, about physics? Yes, no doubt. No doubt Bergson was very learned. He knew a lot about mathematics, physics, that's why it bothers me when people... What is wrong with *Duration and Simultaneity*, when it's interpreted regarding the insufficiency of Bergson's scientific data. I hardly believe it because... this scientific data, I think that... That's not how it has to go if something's doesn't work. And why is something not working?

It is because Bergson himself repudiated this book, refused any reprint during his lifetime. And it is even, it is even quite recently, that despite... Even in his will, he prohibited reprinting it, and then, it had been reprinted, fortunately. I find ... It is ... fortunately, and that creates a problem. This creates a moral problem that will occupy us. But it was reprinted, so this book is available.

And what is disturbing, in fact, is that we do not know very well, is this Bergson, critic of science, Bergson critic of Einstein, but there would even be a very weird side? We ... Notice that since the last session, we are better equipped to understand what he obviously wanted in *Duration and Simultaneity*. For him, it was not about criticizing relativity, not at all; that would be a crazy idea. What he wanted was quite different: to propose and create the metaphysics of relativity.

You remember his idea. There is a modern science that differs from ancient science. And the "modern science"- "ancient science" distinction is extremely easy to state: this is the story of privileged moments. Modern science is the relation of movement to an any-instant-whatever. Ancient science is the relation of movement to the privileged instant. And Bergson added, well this is strange. If modern science is indeed that, namely: grasping time as an independent variable, the metaphysics of that science has never been undertaken. For so-called modern metaphysics was finally grafted onto ancient metaphysics. It missed its big opportunity. Its great opportunity would have been to create the metaphysics that corresponded to that science, a new science, a new metaphysics. Since the modern world brought along a new science, the science that consisted of treating time as an independent variable, that is, to reconstitute movement from an any-instant-whatever, well then, a new metaphysics was needed, that is, a metaphysics of time and not of the eternal. That's what Bergson preferred, uh, claimed to do with duration, a metaphysics of real time instead of a metaphysics of the eternal.

So, it's normal that he confronts Einstein. Because the theory of relativity is... it's kind of a privileged moment in the evolution of modern science. For Bergson, it is not a question of criticizing the theory of relativity; it is a question of asking what metaphysics can correspond to a theory as new as the theory of relativity.

And it is in the context of such a book, we will see, and we will only be able to see why much later, it is in the context of such a book that Bergson tells us this. He says, you know, Einstein, he only tells us about the simultaneity of instants and ... and the theory of relativity is, in a way, a theory of simultaneity of the instant. When is it and in what sense can we say that two instants are simultaneous? But, says Bergson, never would we, never would we come to the idea of a

simultaneity of instants if there was something else first. And this is where he launched his idea: any simultaneity of instants first presupposes another type of simultaneity which is the simultaneity of flows. And Bergson brings forth the notion of simultaneity of flows. *[Pause]*

And with the simultaneity of flow, we have the example that he gives us which is as good, as precious to us, as we will see later, as a glass of sweetened water. He says there we are; I am, I am on the shore, I am on the shore, and there are flows, the flowing water. First flow: the passing water. Second flow: my inner life. Today we would say "inner life" (for those who wouldn't like it), today we would say (but it's exactly the same) a kind of internal monologue. But "monologue" is too much language; it is better, "inner life", my "inner life"; it's not that it's great, it's a flow. And then, a bird. A passing bird. Three flows. Why do you need at least three flows? Well then notice, it's a very variable figure, these three flows. For sometimes I grasp them as one, a kind of reverie there, in which the continuity of my inner life, the flow of water, and the crossing or the flight of the bird tend to be united in the same rhythm. Then, sometimes, I consider them as three.

Why do you always need three? Well, we always need three because there are always ... two flows being given, we need a third one to embody the possibility of their simultaneity or not, namely, the possibility that they are united in the same third or that they are divided. Possibility of joining or division. *[Interruption of the recording]* [72: 36]

## Part 2

... And this possibility of joining-division which belongs to the notion of flows, what does it depend on in the three flows of the flow of my inner life? It is my internal monologue which sometimes brings together the three flows including [the monologue] itself, sometimes dividing the three flows by grasping the other two as external to my inner life, to my duration. It is a kind of cogito of duration which would no longer be expressed in the form "I think", but "I endure", that, sometimes I bring together and sometimes I separate the flows in the same duration. In other words, it is through the intermediary of my consciousness that I have the power to grasp the flows, sometimes as one and sometimes as many. Why am I introducing this? Because here, then, we have the complete formula. If my duration is this capacity to divide, to subdivide into flows, or to unite the flows into one, you can indeed see how my consciousness is like the active element that causes the three levels, of what I call provisionally the image, to communicate. *[Pause]*

Remember, the three levels of the image are, again, objects taken in sets, that is, in artificially closed systems; *[Pause]* the Whole, on the other hand, [is] at the other end, as duration, as change, as perturbation, since the Whole can only be defined as a function of these perturbations. The Whole is fundamentally a passage; the Whole is fundamentally a change in tension, and precisely a change in tension cannot be localized. A change in tension, a difference in potential, is not localizable. What is localizable are the two terms between which the difference is established. But the very difference concerns a Whole. The Whole works through difference. It works through difference, this, the Whole, that is, the Open, the changing, duration.

Movement, third or rather second in between these, movement in space, movement of translation, I am saying that movement of translation relates objects to duration and relates duration to objects. When objects are related to duration, it is as if the flows were united in one; when duration, the Whole, are related to objects, it is as if, on the contrary, duration was divided into sub-durations, divided into distinct flows, and you have the perpetual movement through which the streams are divided and through which the flows come together. In other words, it is like my consciousness, in the most psychological sense possible, it is my psychological consciousness that guarantees ventilation for the three levels. As a result, I can say now, and it is not by chance, that just as I said the living has an affinity with the Whole, psychic systems, all the more so, have an affinity with the Whole.

As a result, at the very extreme of kind of very bizarre progressive manner, I could compose the living and, all the more so, psychic beings, I could compose them among themselves all the way to reaching a one and same duration which will be the Whole with a capital W. In any case, for the moment, we have just commented on this third thesis from Bergson, namely not only the instant is an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, a thesis which takes up the set since movement is a mobile section of duration. Yes, because it relates isolated or isolable objects to duration functioning as the Whole and relates duration functioning as the Whole to objects in which duration will be divided into sub-durations. [*Pause*]

So, what I would like to say before you take a break is, fine, well then, what do we have left? Well obviously, that assumes you followed all this, but I think it wasn't all that difficult.

What we have left now is to ask a question a bit ... we can take a bit of distance vis-à-vis Bergson, namely, ok: does all this have consequences -- well, I am schematizing my change of levels -- does that have consequences for the cinema, for the cinema image? After all, it is almost the demonstration (*épreuve*) of this subject as I would like to consider it this year. What does this mean? I'll say what topic we'd like to consider. But one cannot consider it if there is not already some evidence that this works. So that all depends on you.

The question I ask myself is: let us assume that the cinema image is the movement-image. What should be called a movement-image? Is it not this image made up of the three levels that we have just seen, of objects, movements, a Whole or a duration? And the movement-image would consist exactly in this: it relates objects, movement relates objects to duration and subdivides duration into as many sub-durations as there are objects, therefore communication between levels. [*Pause*]

Is that where we're at? Let us try to locate here one of the concepts, one of the very large cinematographic concepts. [*Pause*] What is it that we call framing (*cadrage*)? It would already be beneficial if we arrived at some very simple definitions; definitions are always far too complicated. What is the operation of framing in cinema? I would say, well, it's very simple: to frame is to constitute an artificially closed system. In other words, framing is [*Pause*] choosing and determining the objects and beings that will enter the shot -- we do not yet know what a shot is -- the objects that will enter into the shot are determined by the framing and henceforth deserve a special name, insofar they already fully belong to the cinema. We can call them, for

example, Pasolini suggests the name of cineme (*cinème*): [*Deleuze spells it*] C.I.N.E.M.E. He says, well yes, objects that are part of a shot, let's call them cinemes. The cineme -- perhaps this is dangerous; you sense that linguistics is not far away, that is, he wants to do something, he already wants to introduce a parallel -- So we need to be wary of "cineme", so anything, you can call them "kinoc-objects" ... "kinoc-objects", you can call them whatever, cinema-object, maybe. It is the framing that determines them. There we are. And there is nothing wrong with saying, well yes, the frame is a system; it means establishing an artificially closed system that the cinema needs. Already, at that point, everything may or may not fail, we will see.

A second thing, a second level: a relative movement is established between these objects, you will tell me ... I understand that the second level is ... I am creating an abstraction ... this is ... this is not, there is not first this and then ... but undoubtedly the objects were chosen only as a function of this movement already. But the determination of the relative movement between objects, what is it? The determination of movement, and what makes me speak of relative movement, but actually there are several movements. So, let's add: the determination of the relative movement made up between these movements, which is established between these movements, even if it means justifying it later, I would say, this is what I call a shot. For me, this has the advantage, in this mush of definitions of the shot, of introducing a proposed definition of the shot. It raises all kinds of difficulties, I will say it right away, but we can only deal with these later. So, let's assume for the moment... We will change everything if this doesn't work, but let's set as a reference point, as a guide, I thus propose as a definition of the shot: the determination of the relative movement composed between objects, which have been determined by framing.

The shot corresponds -- on an axis, if you like, if I look for a word -- to cutting (*découpage*). What is "cutting" in cinema? Well, cutting is determining the complex relative movement that will join the framed objects together and will be divided between the framed objects in such a way that what? Doubtless it will be necessary to add something to "in such a way that". Okay, also there is a third one, but then editing a novel, for example, editing a novel into a screenplay, what is that? I believe that it is quite precisely to cut this out, meaning a very simple thing, a very simple operation, very difficult to do, namely: to choose the complex movements which will correspond to a shot and then to another shot.

I am saying "in such a way", in such a way that what? Well, you have to choose the complex relative movement that constitutes the shot in such a way that it relates the set of the framed objects to what? To a Whole, that is, to a duration, a Whole, that is, to a duration. Well, fine, because cinema would fundamentally be concerned with duration in the Bergsonian sense? Perhaps, we don't know yet, but anyway... [*Pause*] But, the way in which the relative movement composed between objects, that is, a shot, relates through its movement to the Whole implies and goes through the relation of this shot with other shots. As a result, ... as a result [*Pause*] this third level as a cinematographic concept, namely the relation of the shot with a Whole that the movement in the present space in the shot is supposed to express, refers exactly to the concept of montage.



So, we would already have three cinematographic concepts that would correspond ... In short, I'm only doing here, I'm just ... I'm trying ... what would bother me is that this seems like an application ... – [Deleuze talks to someone nearby] You don't want it there, there is someone ... I think it's ... Your movement ... No, you are not near an outlet there? No ... Who is causing that then? ... Ah, maybe it's on the other side? ... There isn't someone leaning on something, right? -- You understand, I wouldn't want that to seem like an application, we'd have to ... it's something else in my mind, of course ... There we are then, even if it means creating applications, this is to... [Deleuze does not complete this]

I see someone who said that very oddly, who has... who is closest to what I'm trying to ... this is, I just quoted him, it's Pasolini. [For] Pasolini, what compromises everything is the way, but this is not the only time, it's the way linguistics strikes everywhere, so it struck there, and it's awful. When linguistics strikes, nothing grows back. [Laughter] So it's very simple; he is so obsessed with his history of linguistics and the application of linguistics in cinema that the purity of his schemas is compromised.

But if I try ... -- Pasolini's thought is very complex -- if I try to extract an aspect from it, I do not claim to give you the whole of Pasolini's thought, he is very sensitive to a kind of tripartite division of the image, where Pasolini tells us: well here we are, in the cinema image, I propose to you to distinguish cinemes, the shot, and the ideal sequence shot. [Pause] There you go. And he says: we can only understand cinema starting with these three concepts. Well, he thinks he's a linguist; in fact, he is Bergsonian, right?... there is nothing shameful, this is even better. Because, considering this word for word, how does he conceive of it?

For cinemes, it's relatively simple; once again, it is the determination of the objects that fit into a shot and they are determined by the framing. This is what he suggests calling cineme. So, where it changes, where it changes in a way that cannot suit us for the moment, we will have to see this whole cinema-language problem – but finally, this is, this is a problem, that we've already talked about too much... We must, we must stop on this point; we must let things rest -- because his idea is that, once it's said that certain linguists have discovered that there might be a so-called double articulation phenomenon in language, he wants to find the equivalent of double articulation in the cinema image. So, he said, the first articulation would be the shot and the second articulation would be the cinemes. As a result, he could write: shot over cineme equals the equivalent of moneme in linguistics over phoneme. This aspect, I am stating it for the moment, in any case, from the point of view we've reached, it does not interest us at all. What interests me a lot, however, is this first aspect of the image: objects determined by framing equal cinemes.

A third aspect. He says, and here all filmmakers have always said that -- I am thinking of texts by Eisenstein, which are also so impressive in this regard -- well, he says: "In the end, a film is worth nothing if there is not a Whole," the notion of totality in cinema. On this point, if filmmakers differ, if the great directors differ, it is because they really do not have the same way of realizing the Whole, neither of conceiving of it, nor of realizing it. But the idea of the Whole is this: there is always a totality which is united with the film, and which has a variable relation

with the images, but which never ties into a single image. Hence an entire school will say that totality is the act of montage.

So, there is a Whole. Let us assume there is a Whole. We can even conceive of this Whole as the Whole, the absolute Whole, the universal Whole. This is what Pasolini calls the ideal sequence shot. Ideal sequence shot, and he finally says this ideal sequence shot, you know ... what is it? It's cinematographic continuity as opposed to what? As opposed to the reality of the film. You see the cinematographic continuity, in fact, what exists are films. Cinematographic continuity through the films is by nature ideal. Why is the sequence shot ideal in Pasolini's sense? We'll see, that will pose all kinds of problems; indeed, as Pasolini says, he does not believe in the sequence shot; he does not do it himself, fine ... he does not do a sequence shot in the technical sense that we have not yet seen ... But you know, I guess, or many ... He's a filmmaker who does not at all go in the direction of exploring the sequence shot. But why doesn't he explore the sequence shot? It's because, for him, the sequence shot only merges with the cinematographic ideal, namely an infinite continuity, and he states it like that, and an infinite duration, infinite continuity and duration of reality. Here we cannot speak in more Bergsonian terms. As a result, he says, well yes, the sequence shot if it existed, well it wouldn't end. It would be the set; it would be the totality of cinema through all films. It would be the reproduction of continuity and of the infinity of the real, such that it is purely ideal.

So, what he criticizes, you see, what he criticizes in filmmakers of the sequence shot, what he criticizes in filmmakers of the sequence shot, who created sequence shots, is to have believed that the sequence shot might be realized as such, whereas it indicates an ideal continuity, an ideal continuity equal to all cinema. And he says: when we try to actualize the sequence shot by making a real sequence shot, what do we fall ... this is very curious, he says, that gets weakened because it is obviously false, but it is useful for him to say it: we are doing naturalism. When trying to make a sequence shot, the sequence shot is ideal. He says okay. But precisely, it is so much an ideal, it is so much the ideal continuity and the infinity of this ideal continuity that you will never be able to realize it. If you try to achieve a sequence shot, you fall into the flattest naturalism.

So, it doesn't matter if it's just his criticism, but he needs it, he needs to say that because what's his idea? It's that the ideal sequence shot cannot be achieved by sequence shots; it can only be achieved by shots, only by shots simple stated (*tout court*) ... only by shots simply stated referring to one another by, referring to one another through the intermediary of a montage. In other words, it is the montage of shots and not the real sequence shot, it is the montage of shots which alone is capable of achieving the ideal sequence shot. *[Pause]*

You see then, so we can see what he means. *[Pause]* So he has, he therefore has these three image levels: the cinemes, that is, the retained objects determined by framing; the mobile shot; *[Pause]* the montage through which each shot and all of the shots refer to the Whole, that is, to the ideal sequence shot. You see what he means; he has a text that strikes me as very interesting, he says: yes, the ideal sequence shot is an analytical continuity; it is the analytical continuity of cinema through all films. But we cannot achieve it. All efforts to achieve this directly fall into

naturalism and breed boredom, he says. And there he has things in his head ... and it is not, it is not, what he has in his head is... all the attempts to... all the attempts to... yes, an infinite Warhol-type sequence of shots.

So, good... In fact, the ideal analytical continuity of cinema through all films can only be achieved in a synthetic form, that is, a synthesis of shots brought about through montage. As a result, the continuity of a Whole in a film is fundamentally synthetic, whereas the continuity of cinema through all films, that is a pure ideal, a pure analytical ideal.

So, you see what sense I can say: in such a tripartite distinction operating in the image ... well, you have to say yes. You have the cut-out objects, cut out by the framing. You have the composed movement, relative to the objects, constitutive of the shot, and the relative movement relates the cinemes, that is, the objects, to the Whole, which Whole is divided into as many sub-durations as there are objects, which objects come together into a one and same duration which is that of the Whole. So, your trinity -- framing, shot or cutting, montage -- would translate these three aspects of the image.

And in this sense, we could say, yes, the movement-image, there you go, but suddenly, we would learn that not all image is like that, and no, that's what we are discovering, we have settled into a ... an image which is perhaps a very special type of image, that is, which is a properly cinematographic type of image and which is perhaps not the Whole of cinematographic images and may even be a kind, a special case of cinematographic image. What would the movement-image be? It would be the image as we have just defined it from the start. What should be called the movement-image would be an image such that movement would express duration therein, that is, a change in the Whole, in other words, where the plane would be a mobile section of duration. And being a mobile section of duration, understand well, being a mobile section of duration, it would relate the objects determined by the frame, they would relate them, these objects determined by the frame. to the Whole that endures, and it would relate the Whole that endures in objects. And so that's it, what we could call movement-image, with problems, all kinds of problems, all kinds of problems that would arise, namely, is properly specific cinema? I tell you right away that it seems to me that it is, but it would need to be proved. A different question: is this the only type of image specific to cinema? An answer that I think is obvious: no. There would be other things than movement-images in cinema.

Okay, good, good, but where we're at, that's where we're going to have to bring in examples then. What does it mean that in the cinematographic movement-image, movement expresses duration, that is, the movement in space expresses the affection of the Whole, a change or an affection of the Whole? Here we are, let's stop here. You take a break; I will resume in ten minutes, fifteen minutes. [*Pause; interruption of the recording*] [1:40:17]

Deleuze: I sense your quite legitimate fatigue. Here, I will give you some practical exercises to do.

A student: Ah, the perfect moment!

Deleuze: A whole series of practical exercises. So, we now have access to a developed expression, the developed expression of the movement-image. The movement-image is the image of a movement of translation which relates determined objects, implied through framing, to a Whole and which relates this Whole to the objects in which they are henceforth divided. You see, in this sense, the movement of translation translates a change as affection of a Whole. There we are.

So, we could almost dream of a series in which ... we would have to dream of a thing ... I do not think of inventing it, a thing, on the contrary ... a thing in which the cinematographic examples would play a role exactly, if you will, the same role as the musical examples when it comes to music. So, I will have a series of examples. I will quickly line up a series of examples and problems, and we'll return to that next time.

So, about this developed expression: objects, relative movements between objects, everything, a Whole or a duration, I say to myself, fine, we would have to look for ... We would have to look for something like shots since it is the shot which exposes movement, the movement which relates the objects to the Whole, and the Whole to the objects. We should look for a series of shots in which this appears very clearly at different levels. I tell myself: a movement of translation which expresses a duration ... I see, there you could, it would be up to each of you to ... I am quoting as if at random, these aren't ... I see a film by Wilder ... by William, I am told ... William Wilder: "Lost Week-end", in which there is ... [*A student intervenes on the attribution of the film to another filmmaker*]

A student: No, it's not the same ... Wilder, it's not the same.

Deleuze: It's not Billy, right ... it's not Billy? [103: 00] Is that Billy?

A student: No, no.

Another woman student: "The Lost Weekend" is by Billy Wilder.

Deleuze: Ah good, well you see, my first example ... but you will correct this yourself ... All my examples are false. [*Laughter*] Besides, maybe ... the shot isn't ... maybe ... I think it happens all the time ... I won't be the only one ... So good ... The film, you say it's "Lost Weekend" ...

The previous student: Billy Wilder, "Lost Weekend".

Deleuze: Are you sure? Are you sure? Where did you see that? [*Laughter; hubbub in the audience*] Okay, well, in this movie you have a walk. Well, just like we say the chase, it's very important in the cinema, the chase, well, I'm not sure because the chase is not really a good case, the chase is indeed a movement of translation in space, but it is not obvious, the duration that it expresses ... Perhaps, but finally the walk is much more ... for what concerns us, the walk is very interesting for cinema. This is the alcoholic's walk in the city. The alcoholic's walk in the city is a common theme in literature and film. There are unforgettable pages by Fitzgerald on this. Uh, well, but there is something astonishing here, it is Ray Milland; here, I am sure of the actor at least, he takes a walk there ... And it is really, as they say: he runs to its doom.<sup>6</sup>

The expression "he is running to his doom" is odd. Compare the expression "he's running to his doom" ... and then, when it's in images, what are they? Well, it is a matter of displacement in space truly expressing this duration of degradation, this duration of decomposition, [*Pause*] movement in space expressing change as affection of a Whole. It seems to me that this character's walk through the city, the alcoholic's walk, is a very, very good case. But a more current filmmaker who ... it seems to me to be Wenders. If you take ... [*Interruption of recording*] [1:45:22]

... Or to causing the Whole to move from a time when the two are apart to another time when the two are again going to be separated. So, on this path, it seems to me that there would be a lot of things to ... [*Deleuze does not finish*] [*Pause*]

In another case, movement no longer expresses a duration, but movement in space relates a set of artificially cut objects to a duration. Here I immediately make a comment. We must maintain the idea that objects are artificially cut out, and framing is really, it seems to me, the most artificial operation in cinema. But what defines good and bad framing? We should distinguish, we should almost lay down a sacred principle in cinema, a principle of utility. This is pragmatic, a pragmatic principle. You can have very unusual and even aesthetically marvelous framings, and it will be nothing but aesthetic, that is, nothing at all. When what? Framing is always constituting a certain number of objects in an artificially closed set. This is worthless, that is, this is a kind of aesthetics if this closed system remains closed; at that point, this is arbitrary. I tell myself, I tell myself, you can have other tastes in a lot of ... in a lot of surrealist films, fine, the unusual nature of the framing is absolutely nothing. You retain the most, if necessary, the most heterogeneous objects, you put them in a closed system, only there you are, the system is closed and does not open onto any duration.

So, the condition of framing is to establish a closed system, but to ensure that this closed system opens, on one side or the other, opens onto something that will function as a totality, once we've said that it is never the set of objects that defines the totality. That is: through this open side, there will be an operation of time which bites onto the system, otherwise time will slide over it, and you would have something that you could call poetic, but which is not even poetic.

So, I choose some examples, some famous framings, just to guide us here. Each of you has a thousand other examples. "Lulu" by Pabst, the large images at the end; Jack the Ripper, whose face is in certain positions, sometimes in close-ups, and Jack the Ripper's astonishing grin as if he were delivered; he smiles in front of Lulu who is so beautiful, and then Lulu's face which is really gripped ... anyway ... you see. And then, the knife, including which will provide an object for a close-up or for close-ups, the bread knife. There you have the two faces, the knife, the lamp that lights the knife. There we have a framing. You have determined the objects of the shot. [*Pause*] Obviously, such a framing constitutes a closed system but that works only to the extent that it opens such that real time bites onto the system, that is, that we pass from a first state of the Whole -- Lulu's confidence, the smile of Jack the Ripper -- through the intermediary of the knife, we pass on, there is a change in the Whole : the ripper's face closes in, he can no longer prevent

himself from staring at the knife, he is going to assassinate Lulu, at the end of a process of decomposition, decomposition of Lulu herself.

Another example of an artificially closed system which will determine the cinema image, the role of ... so let's go back to the glass of water, the glass of sweetened water, or whatever. The role of water glasses in the framing -- I am saying that it is not that the glass is more important than anything else but, since it is a good closed system - the famous use of water glasses, in particular by Hitchcock, in two big cases: the famous sequence, right, the famous image in which something is viewed through the glass of milk, and then the level of milk rises until it invades the whole screen . There we have a beautiful image; this is what we call a beautiful cinema image. Or the famous glass in ... what is it in? in "Suspicion", I hope ... is it by Hitchcock, "Suspicion"? *[Affirmative response from a student]* You see, for once, it's ... well, the famous glass that's supposed to be poisoned ... so there you have a closed system ... and then he goes up the stairs ... he brings the glass to his wife ... the woman's face, and then ... the glass, the close-up of the glass.

Here it seems to me, in which sense I would try to comment on the operations of framing as determination of a closed system, but on one condition: it's that the artificially closed system must in the same image be artificially closed and cease being closed, and to cease being closed insofar as it is brought back by the movement of the image, insofar as it is brought back by the movement to a duration, that is, to a Whole that changes.

A second remark, second order of comments. Obviously when, on the second level, I defined the shot as the determination of a complex relative movement between objects, this hearkened to all kinds, almost to a history of cinema that I am passing over. Because it is very certain that the notion -- I recall it quickly for the record, so that I do not get ... or that I'm not asked questions on this point -- that when the cinema has started with a stationary camera, the shot could not be understood spatially. I mean, it was either a far wide shot, or a close shot and even a closeup, or a middle shot and, for the camera to move, the shot had to be changed. These are the conditions at the very beginning. Cinema as art, in order to exist, passes, among other things, from the moment when the camera becomes mobile, that is, when the same shot in the new sense can unite several shots in the old sense.

I would say more simply, from the moment that the shot becomes a temporal and no longer spatial reality, ceases being ... yes, rather: that the shot ceases being a spatial cut in order to become a temporal process, at that moment, the shot can be defined, including when it is immobile, the shot can be defined by the complex movement, that is, either the movement operated by things and beings and not by the camera, or by the impeded movement which connects beings and framed objects between them. As a result, at this precise moment, the shot designates the operation by which movement relates objects to a Whole. Good. So, I'm indeed talking about the shot within a temporal cinematographic reality and not a spatial section.

But then what allows me to say henceforth, a shot is a movement-image, what makes it possible to end at such a moment or to begin at such a moment? What creates the unity of movement? At this level, we have no problem if you have understood me. The unity of movement is very

sufficiently determined by this, a movement does not ... or rather complex movements are one to the extent and exclusively to the extent that they relate objects between which they are established to a change in the Whole. So, the movement will be one or multiple, depending on whether or not it relates framed objects to the change in the Whole.

As a result, in the end, it might be very interesting to try to define the shot in this sense, in the sense of moving reality, in the sense of, yes, dynamic reality, and rather than spatial, of defining it by the way in which it ends. I am thinking about this because it's complicated there; I am going very quickly because I can't remember the texts enough, alas. These are texts here and there. You know the extent to which the film literature at the moment is still in bad shape, that is, it is greatly ... The best things are sometimes articles that are not collected [in volumes], etc. ... Well, it's disturbing ... But in the collection of the *Cahiers du cinema*, here and there I saw things that seemed very ... some texts by Alexandre Astruc, on the one hand, who, it seems to me, is one of the best writers on cinema there is ... Texts by Alexandre and texts by [Jacques] Rivette, in which in the course of a film review ... These are not at all reflective things about cinema; it's just in passing like that, reporting on a film, he considers the way one author or another finishes a shot. If you like, in fact, from my point of view, this is very good: defining the shot by how it ends and not by how it begins, this ultimately comes down to the same thing. But it's better. Why? If it is true that the unity of the shot is temporal, if it is true that what makes a movement one, that is, makes a shot, it is its power to relate framed objects to a change in the Whole; it is obviously the manner in which the shot ends that is determining.

And I remember there, very confusedly, Astruc saying, but then very quickly – this would be almost for the next time if you think about it, you'll find things for me at... -- He talks about Murnau's shots, and he says: it's curious, Murnau, it's ... the shots always end like a kind of murder. He's not talking about a murder taking place on the image. The shot goes toward death, but to a violent death. So fine, hey ... I don't even know what he means, but ... and I don't even know if he's saying that, he might be saying something else, it's complicated, I don't have the..., I no longer have the text. You see, but anyway let's suppose we can say that.

And then a lot of writers, Bazin for example, Bazin told him about how Rossellini's shots end. He was saying, that's great what Rossellini brought to cinema, and he was trying to say it, the Rossellini signature of how a shot ends. This time, it's not in a violent kind of death; there is not a violent death of the shot, there is a kind of extraordinary sobriety which is the Rossellini sobriety in which the shot is really reduced to ... In the end, with the purest movement, always searching, that's Rossellini's expression, always searching for the simplest and purest movement, between two movements, choosing the simplest and the purest, and bringing the shot to some kind of natural extinction. The shot itself is like it exhausted itself, that it has nothing more to say, so we move on to another shot. There this would be like a kind of natural death of the Rossellinian shot. In the end, I'm saying this very badly.

And then, I believe that Rivette is also led, and it seems to me that there is no concertation at all between the three of them, between these three film critics, Rivette himself, he was talking about the end, how the Mizoguchi shots end. So... this is very like ... because he's, he's one of the

filmmakers who makes the handling of camera mobility the most, the most complex. He has extremely complex movements. So, and it ends, there like ... with a kind of ... I hardly dare say it because it's getting too easy. The violent death of the shot in Murnau, the natural death and extinction in Rossellini, by a kind of suicide of the Mizoguchian shot, a kind of hara-kiri there, because, *noblesse oblige*, you see. So, I'm not saying that at all; there, it's not at all to the point, what I'm saying is very confused memories. This is to say that the question: how a man of cinema finishes his shots, would perhaps be decisive in understanding this function of the shot insofar as being a dynamic reality, that is, the shot as time and no longer spatial section.

Well, what ... Finally, final point, I mean on this story of the Whole. The shot, fine, it's supposed to express a change in the Whole, fine, [*Pause*] implied that the shot with other shots, not already by itself, but in that sense, it beckons to other shots. Since if the Whole is change, it will not stop changing, so a shot will not exhaust the change in the Whole. It is therefore the shot with other shots, hence the theme of the montage, that will express the Whole.

We come across one last problem there that ... I have what is called ... because ... it will be necessary ... we do not even have the means to consider it yet. It's that this Whole, but what is it? Because after all, where is it? What does it consist of? This Whole is intriguing ... I mean, there's been a lot of talk about the lack of reality in cinema. The reality of cinema, as everyone says, in cinema, it's weird that people believe in it so much whereas there is no presence. The absence of any presence, the framed objects are not there.

Moreover, what is annoying about the cinema? It's not that it's not there, but it's that they've never been there. If it was just that they are no longer there, but they have never been there. There is no Whole in cinema, or at least the Whole, right? It exists only in one's eye, the viewer's, or in the viewer's mind; why? You don't even have the coexisting elements of a stage set as in theater, because you can always screw the set after ... set it up after. You can always add it. And besides, you can paint some, there are ... there's a point in the history of cinema, you can paint it on the camera lens of the set. You can do whatever you want. At no point is a Whole given or giveable. You will tell me that is fine since it is on the order of time. Fine, so okay, but maybe this is unique to cinema. It is absolutely not given, this Whole, that is a matter for cinema. It is not there.

In a sense, what is there? They all said it: Pudovkin said it very well, that what exists in cinema, there are piles of rolls of film, full stop, that's it, rolls of film, and with which I can do whatever I want, I can always cut one out, put it there, okay. But that has never existed; all that doesn't exist at all, so what is it? This little bit of reality. It will be necessary for this to concern us in contrast with the other arts. And that is why there is a fundamental operation and why, until now, at the point we've reached, the Whole is neither graspable nor definable independently of a so-called montage operation. [*Pause*] As a result, what would matter to us in a series of examples, to finish with all this, is to see how shots are supposed to arouse, evoke, determine the Whole that is not given. How through the operation of montage, shots are stimulants (*susciteurs*), shots defined precisely by the determination of movement in the sense in which I have said, well, in what way does it arouse this Whole that does not exist? There again, there may not be a clear answer. And



I don't mean to say, that wouldn't at all be a theory of montage. You see, my problem is much more specific. We'll come back to a discussion of montage later, but ... it's ... it's entirely different; it's a very particular aspect of the problem I'm raising.

By what operations and how do shots, from the moment they are edited, stimulate a Whole that does not exist, that does not exist anywhere, that does not even exist on the roll of film? Well then, ... I would say there are several answers, so there we ... if you will, it seems to me ... the answer: I would say, there is a conception that could be called – once again, I still feel this concerns the problem of montage in general -- a conception that one might call dialectical. Dialectics, a dialectical conception of montage, I am saying here the simplest possible things which is that: shots, each shot and the shots in relation to each other, must play as much as possible with opposable or opposing movements. For Eisenstein, you find that, but also in many Russians, you find here a dialectical conception of montage. And it is through the play of oppositions of movements that the Whole is aroused, and that change as affection of the Whole is presented. Hence the idea of a dialectic of montage.

There would be another conception; I say to myself, wasn't that something original in French cinema? This time, it's a very different conception of montage, I would say almost, from the point of view that concerns us. You see that I take the problem of montage not at all for itself, but solely at the level of the movement-Whole relationship. It's only from this aspect for the moment that interests me. I present a first answer, let's assume it's a Russian answer, it was ... it is by opposing movements in each shot and in shots and from one shot to another that the Whole is stimulated, that the Whole is evoked. In a French conception, I'm also saying in Gance, [Marcel] L'Herbier, but even Grémillon later, there is a very interesting conception which was nevertheless a great moment in cinema. I would say it's a quantitative conception. It is no longer a dialectical conception of movement that will evoke the Whole; it is a quantitative conception of movement. [*Pause*]

What does it mean? It seems to me that all the French of that time, at least when they are great ones, have some kind of project? A kind of project, and when I express it, that seems very, very arbitrary; it's how to put the maximum amount of movement into a shot, almost bordering on abstraction? Even if it means bordering on abstraction and prepared to do what? To cause a rush of shots, because the greater the quantity of movement you have in a shot, the shorter the shot will appear. And that results, these things which are nevertheless a marvel by ... by Gance, by L'Herbier, by Grémillon etc., it results in these kinds of great feats of style, namely: the farandole, dance, Epstein too, all of them really, it seems to me that is truly a kind of problem ... here, there are, just as there are national characteristics in philosophy, there are national characteristics in cinema. This sort of trial they all went through, dancing in the tavern, the farandole, the farandole in a closed environment. I recently saw a silent Grémillon film, "Maldone," which has a dance, a farandole in an enclosed space, in ... the farandole in an enclosed space, that's not ... it is... So even guys like [Robert] Siodmak, it was enough for them to arrive in France, for them to find these themes and to get started with them as well.

Claire Parnet: ... [he] said the maximum expression in the maximum order ...

Deleuze: Well that's it, maybe that's it. Here, I would say ... I would prefer, well yes: the hard expression, maximum quantity of movement in an enclosed space, that is, in a framed space. And Gance, you understand, Gance's masterpiece has always been this kind of rush of movement, that is, starting from a space that will be caught in a movement that does not stop increasing even from a quantitative point of view. Epstein, Epstein's famous travelling fair, it's absolutely ... I would say this time around that it's by taking the movement not from the point of view of its dynamic oppositions, but by taking it from the point of view of view of the quantity of movement, that montage operates, that is, gives rise to the idea of the Whole since this Whole is purely ideal.

And then there would be, there would be, the last answer, obviously it's a little easy what I'm doing here, but that's how it is ... it's in order to finish here ... It's German cinema, German cinema with all its ... so, so many influences because there you have it ... There is something odd, and here, it is a problem that must be answered even with regard to Bergson, assuming Bergson is there ... there is a disturbing problem, which is: why do so many people, as soon as we talk to them about duration, immediately think of a process of decomposition? This is odd; why is there a kind of pessimism about duration? The duration, that's it, it breaks down. [Pause] Duration is a defection. Duration is turning into dust.

This is odd; for Bergson, it wasn't that at all; on the contrary, duration was the emergence of the new. It was the emergence of the new. But the point is, when we talk about duration, we get the impression of a process of decomposition. All life, of course, is a process of decomposition signed by Fitzgerald. This is the expression; this is the ordinary expression of duration. Ah, if it's a decomposition process, it endures ... yeah ... yeah ... Who was it that introduced duration into the novel before there was cinema? The person who introduced duration into the novel in its purest form was Flaubert. It's Flaubert, especially in *Madame Bovary*, and surely what we call realism or naturalism is strictly inseparable from the enterprise of duration. And how is it that this duration is a process of decomposition? If it endures, it breaks down. That's not Bergsonian at all. [Pause]

And, who is considered everywhere, in all the histories of cinema, as the Flaubert of cinema, that is, the great naturalist, the genius who brought duration to cinema? This is well known; it's von Stroheim. It's von Stroheim with "Greed" where, in fact, as they say, it's the first time that there isn't a single movement or a single mobility that is not related to the duration of the characters. It was a stroke of genius. It's not that the others weren't already aware of duration, but here really, duration as psychological consciousness makes its entry into the cinema. How is it that "Greed" is precisely the masterful study of a process of decomposition and even a double process of decomposition?

I mean, this time, it is the movement of decomposition or, if you prefer, it is the collapse (*chute*) which is responsible for being the operation through which movements can evoke the idea of a Whole. Movements can only evoke the idea of a Whole, it is said, insofar as they are movements of a decomposition, in which they accompany a decomposition, in which they are the movements of a collapse. And this is not at all required. I would say here that this is a montage, so no longer,

neither dialectic as in the Russian view, nor quantitative as in the French view -- in the sense I have tried to describe this -- but intensive montage. So there, an equivocation exists, but everywhere there are equivocations. This is an intensive montage, oh la la ... Yes, it's too complicated, so you see, this is the point we've reached...

Next time I would like this ... Of course, I will explain what I meant here, but very quickly. I would like for you to think about all this: that you speak, that you speak and that you too see where you are in relation to this ... if ... and so then, I will finish by summarizing Bergson's theses, and we will have finished a first [segment] ... and then by finishing where I have situated, and we will have finished a first research group. We'll move on to another group... [*End of the recording*] [2: 13: 46]

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> *Creative Evolution*, <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/26163/pg26163.txt> .

<sup>2</sup> In fact, Bergson says: “Such a science would be a *mechanics of transformation*, of which our *mechanics of translation* would become a particular case, a simplification, a projection on the plane of pure quantity.”

<sup>3</sup> *Matter and Memory*, [https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/matter-and-memory.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0HJ6\\_hrj8joXLYwu3LVtYuCJRH6EjmmRo-LsRO7v8XcPcxZXBzjgnpERw](https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/matter-and-memory.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0HJ6_hrj8joXLYwu3LVtYuCJRH6EjmmRo-LsRO7v8XcPcxZXBzjgnpERw).

<sup>4</sup> *Creative Evolution*, *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Deleuze refers to this film in the context of the grand form of action-image, *The Movement-Image*, p. 145.