

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image**

**Lecture 03, 24 November 1981**

**Transcription: [La Voix de Deleuze](#), Marc Ledannois (Part 1, 1:10:14) and Claire Pano (Part 2, 1:04:28) ; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation : Charles J. Stivale**

**Part 1**

*[The session begins with an intervention and a question by a student]*

A student: The metaphysics of duration appears as possible, if not necessary, with the consideration of the modern psyche as a science of movement. So, we start from this prerequisite (science of movement section, metaphysics of duration), but it seems to me that in both cases, we end up (let's say) with timelessness or the neutralization of time. In the non-limiting case of duration, the conception of the open Whole leads us into a sense of a sublime Kantian embrace, if you will, into the infinity of time, and on the other side, in relation to the science of movement, what you called (let's say) recorded time leads us once again into the center or into the bed, which you characterized by M-E of the system. Or again, it seems to me, there is a neutralization of time. As proof, if you will, I point to the impossibility of dealing with the question of the event in either case. We talked about the instant, we talked about several vectors, let's say entities of this order, but not about the event. In my opinion, the event seems to be a monster for both the metaphysics of duration and the science of motion. I bring up this question because *[incomprehensible words]* and to what you also mentioned: the status, let's say ambiguous, of cinema, science or art, and also in relation to the question of the reality of cinema that I imagine will be asked, in other words, once you've dealt with this case. I'm not going any further because we can't bring forth everything, if you will, the consequences of that, which you are developing regarding cinema, well, I don't know if it's correct, but I would like to have your opinion on this question. *[Pause]*

Deleuze: Well, it's a question, it seems to me very interesting, and it partly overlaps with the concerns that I have, which are very numerous, but this question, I would say at the same time that it actually relates to what we are doing, and it underlies a bit of everything that should occur here this year. Because if I translate -- and you present this, and you are not wrong, in the form of a kind of immediate objection -- and this objection, it amounts to saying: as much on the side of the instantaneity of the image as on the side of supposedly reconstituted duration, is there really a position of a real time and, in particular, a criterion of a real time? Is there any real understanding of what is correctly called a very bizarre instance that must be called the event?

I would almost say, I can say "yes" in advance, I think so, but it would still have to, you see, I am unable to state it in a few sentences. This is the topic for this year; while you have doubts, in my opinion, these are very good doubts, yes indeed, we are almost there ... and is it real time? What

is this metaphysics of duration? Doesn't its openness, doesn't the openness in what it claims lead us to a new closure? Doesn't the event continue to elude him? These are all perfect questions for the position we're in, it seems to me. But in our position, I think it's very premature to say yes or no yet. But on the wording of all this, I am proposing: if I take everything I just said as questions that you are asking yourself and if you ask me my opinion on these questions, I say these are very good questions. You have to ask them; it does not a given that you'll be able solve them; you are the one who poses them.... Yeah?

Another student: Mine are much more mundane questions and a little more understandable, I don't know if you understood everything he was saying.

Deleuze: Yes, it was very clear, yes, but no, you're not stupid. In short...

The student: There are two points that interest me, the first point, the effect of language ...

Deleuze: - The ...?

The student: Language, is there a language in cinema? Look at Pasolini; he expresses language, reality through reality; Pasolini says a lot of things. He says, reality through reality, ambiguity and even language or no language .... and a second point, that's why I am Hegelian ...

Deleuze: You're what?

The student: Fortunately, I am Hegelian. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: No, no; you're just saying that to upset me, you're not Hegelian at all. [*Laughter*]

The student: Insurgent. So, yes, necessities, opposites, [*Laughter*] then yes, cinematographic theater composition [*inaudible words*] already difference in nature, in size, he says it, insofar as he's a Marxist, he has an ethic [*inaudible words*] ...

Deleuze: He says so; does he believe it? [*Laughter*] It was in his interest to say that...

The student: Moreover, Pasolini says a bunch of other things; there is this beautiful line from [Roger] Caillois; he talks about people's efficiency, in regard to Bergson. Cinema is fullness as with Bergson and yet also the lack of reality in cinema, [*incomprehensible words*] dramaturgy of nothingness and in addition fullness, can we add something to the Whole? The last time you were talking on this, can we add something to the Whole?

Deleuze: Once it's said here -- I'm cutting you off because the answer seems immediate to me this time -- once it's said, and if we manage to define the Whole in a way as bizarre and original as Bergson -- namely the Whole, it is the Open -- the question: "Can we add something to the Whole?" is an empty question.

The student: I'm not asking you questions that are traps, am I? [*Laughter*] Where are the traps?

Deleuze: So, as for the other thing you said, I have already been asked this, we have already stressed this point, namely that it was not satisfactory for me to make jokes when I am speaking about linguistics applied to cinema in order to ...

The student: Well good ... [*inaudible words*]

Deleuze: ... to deal with the problem, indeed, in fact, it goes without saying. So, I'm just saying here that I once again ask for your patience. The problem with "is cinema a language?", all that, I could only consider it much later. So I am saying – nor am I hiding my only impression either -- that the cinema has nothing to do with a language in the sense that linguists make of it -- moreover all of them say this in the end -- and therefore this problem does not seem urgent to me at all. In any case, cinematographic concepts or big categories in cinema have no need [of this], even including how this concerns the sound characteristics of the image -- but you will notice for the moment that I am only considering and am only making assumptions about visual images -- I haven't said a word about what sound images would be; all of this is because I need to consider the topics one by one.

So, well, I am happy with these first interventions because today I will particularly need you at some point because if I do not provide a recap, but if reflect on both previous sessions, this is the third today, I must start very briefly, because too much is not necessary, I would like to start with a kind of self-criticism. Something is happening, for me, that makes me very deeply unhappy, so ...

A woman student: Me too.

Deleuze: Ah, you too?

The student: Yeah. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: As this disappointment bears on me, obviously, and not on you, I am saying this because I will later need for you to see this. My dissatisfaction, I believe in a very simple and very modest way, that I am working entirely -- but everything can get worked out -- but I am in the process of ruining what I had proposed to do. I'll remind you of one thing among those I was proposing -- I won't go back over it -- but it was a little complicated but very simple, in fact, namely it was the possibility of – related to a rather diverse audience which we have here -- it was the possibility at the same time of teaching you something about Bergson, by trying to show you that he is nonetheless a very, very prodigious philosopher, so there, Bergson being a worthwhile topic on his own, and then also to pose a certain problem about the image and cinema, and which is a worthwhile topic on its own as well. And then, nonetheless, both of these relate to each other, but on one condition. The concepts that I was trying to draw forth or extract as cinematographic concepts, and on the other hand, the Bergsonian concepts that I am trying to extract, each of these truly had to be as if "extracted" from their own territory.

And instead of that, I have the very, very painful feeling then that I'm talking to you about Bergson and then applying what I'm saying about Bergson to cinema. And just as in terms of concepts and as in terms of philosophy, any movement of extraction, extracting a concept, is an indispensable and necessary movement, so too the application defines mediocre work or failed work. If I apply a concept that has come from one point to another domain, this is a failure in any case. Fine, what disappoints me is that I am touching on this lightly rather than causing concepts

to spurt forth as I had hoped for; I'm creating a flat application of concepts or running the risk of falling into that.

So, we'll have to see if that continues; well, we'll have to... I will tell you later if [this is] what I am seeking, so that you might correct this aspect. So, fine, I sometimes tell myself to console myself [that] this is perhaps the fault of cinema, that cinema is such an inconsistent material that in the end -- ah if I dare say this, it does not go far, that there is no material -- only there, this would be to accuse cinema and not me, so it is embarrassing. The only thing I gain from this year's course is that now, when I go to the movies, I tell myself, I've done good work: I'm going to work. In the end, I keep falling asleep there, but that doesn't matter. I am very wiped out today. That's what is increasing the intensity of my self-criticism, and because I saw a movie on Sunday, to go to work [*Laughter*], which I was looking forward to; it's: "Tender is the Night". And "Tender is the Night" is first and foremost one of the most beautiful novels in the world.<sup>1</sup> This is a novel that you shouldn't be able to touch if you don't have some kind of genius or a special understanding of it. And lo and behold, I saw a movie that was shameful, so I tell myself, what is all this... Okay, but well at other times tell myself, it's not cinema's fault, it's my fault.

And that's why I feel the need -- not to start over what I did last time -- but to come back to certain points and to develop what I had not developed. And I'll start right there, full of enthusiasm, and then [when] I need you, I'll tell you when. So today I would like to finish this first segment that we had started twice, this first installment which was presented as a study of the great Bergsonian theses on movement.

Well, you remember that the last time, I started from a first expression: namely, in the movement-image -- since we are all still working on the first facet: it is to seek the definition of what we could call movement-image, with a little hyphen -- and I was saying, in the movement-image, it turns out that the movement of translation, the spatial movement, the movement of translation expresses duration, is supposed to express duration, that is, a change in a Whole! If you understand correctly, and here I am not going back over everything I said, I take it now as acquired, but if you understand this expression correctly as I tried to develop it the last time, I am saying that a very important cinematographic concept follows immediately from this. It would be the concept, and it was forged or it was proposed by a great filmmaker, namely [Jean] Epstein, it is the concept of temporal perspective, namely the cinema image does not operate, despite appearances, with simple spatial perspectives; it gives us temporal perspectives.

This notion of temporal perspective is odd. To try to establish his concept of temporal perspective, Epstein quotes a text by a painter, but by a painter who had been particularly involved in cinema, namely Fernand Léger. Fernand Léger worked with [Marcel] L'Herbier; he made sets for L'Herbier, and this is what Léger says: "All surfaces divide, truncate, decompose, shatter, as we imagine they do in the thousand-faceted eye of the insect. [It's a] descriptive geometry [of which the canvas is the end plane]" - or projective - but instead, but "Instead of undergoing perspective, this painter" -- add this man of cinema -- "splits it, enters into it, analyzes it and unties it, illusion by illusion. For the perspective of the outside, he thus substitutes the perspective of the inside, a multiple perspective, shimmering, wavy, variable and contractile like a hygrometric hair. [The perspective] is not the same on the right as it is on the

left, not the same above as below. That is," -- this is very important, for example, for the Expressionist decor, here is what he says there -- "That is, the fractions that the painter" -- let us add: and the man of cinema -- "presents of reality are not all in the same denominator of distance and relief, nor of light."<sup>2</sup> Well, he gives us in a very literary way -- the text is beautiful, it's a beautiful text -- he gives us a sense of what he calls "temporal perspective," the internal perspective or active perspective.

And, in fact, what is the difference? I tell myself, let's choose some very, quick examples, eh, once we admit that I'm always wrong in my examples, but you'll correct me yourself. Let's choose some big film shots, some great shots in the history of cinema. First big shot from King Vidor's, "The Crowd".<sup>3</sup> Image of the city, a kind of overall image of the city, image of a skyscraper in the city, image of a floor on the skyscraper, of an office in the upper floor, and a little man in the office; this belongs, in fact, among the great images that open classic films.

Second example, it is an image -- I would say, typically, this is what a movement-image is -- second example, Murnau's "The Last Laugh": the famous image at the beginning as well, a camera in the elevator, in the descending elevator, a camera that's mounted on a bicycle which crosses the lobby of the hotel and arrives in the street... [*Interruption of the recording*] [17 :45]

... signs become visible, and then we enter the crowd, and we mingle with the demonstrators. Title, see whoever is closest to me, see a protester or two particular protesters; there too, we have a splendid movement-image.<sup>4</sup>

I am saying, these three examples are temporal perspectives, in which -- not just spatial perspectives, these are temporal perspectives -- in which the concept seems to gain consistency because, in fact, it is very different from natural perception. Pudovkin tells us it's as if, it's as if I situated myself on the roof, and then I stopped on the second floor, and then I mingled among the protesters. This "as if" indicates that this is a reference to natural perception and, at the same time, that we are not within a frame of natural perception.

Here I am preparing something which still remains for me to consider: in what way is cinema perception completely different from natural perception? It is that in natural perception, one can already grasp a small starting point. In natural perception, you have at each of its stages, if I may say so, what one might call -- and after all, phenomenologists have spoken in this way -- each time you have an anchor: I am on top of the building and I see the whole demonstration; I am on the second floor and I read the signs; I am within the crowd and I see the demonstrators next to me. Each time you have an anchoring point, and between two anchoring points, you have a particular determined movement, a qualified movement.

In the cinema perception, you don't have that, and when you say: the camera was first put up high and then stopped on the second floor and then went into the crowd, it is absolutely -- it is not that it is false -- it means that, at that moment, you treat the camera like an eye, that is, you already prejudge this which is completely in question, namely the identity of cinematographic perception and natural perception. Even if, in fact, it hasn't stopped, that's not what it offers us. What it offers us is the continuity and heterogeneity of one and the same movement. Cinematographic movement conquered continuity and heterogeneity on its own in a single

movement. A single movement conquered continuity and heterogeneity, under what conditions? Strangely, on the condition of, as the phenomenologists would say or should say, on the condition of breaking with all anchoring points, of becoming unanchored. In certain way, the cinematographic image or cinematographic movement is deterritorialized. In this way, movement acquires continuity and heterogeneity.

It seems to me, if I go back to an example that we discussed very quickly the last time, that's what Wenders in a way shows us. Wenders shows us, if you will, different anchoring points separated by what? A qualified means of transport. For example, the bus succeeds from the plane, the car succeeds from the bus, walking in the city succeeds from the car, etc. ... You have a series of "stages" -- I would say that this is the image content for Wenders -- all the means of transport put into the service of movement, and that is the play of natural perception. And what Wenders does, if you will, is this: the image content, but at the image level, is no longer that; on the image level, on the contrary, you have the cinematographic correlate, namely a movement posed as "one" which has conquered for itself continuity and heterogeneity and which is valid -- and this is indeed Wenders' idea -- and which as such, as a cinematographic movement is valid, at once for the airplane, and for the car, and for the walk, and for etc., precisely because of what it is, and because it has conquered heterogeneity. So, maybe there we understand better; I would say: this is a temporal perspective. Whereas in natural perception, you move from one spatial perspective to another spatial perspective, in the cinematographic image, you elaborate a temporal perspective.

Okay, that's not important; I mean, it's not very important to understand or not understand, to agree or disagree; it's just, I am saying, it's just the possibility of anchoring the concept and of it giving more consistency than Epstein who still talks about it in a very literary way, it seems to me, fine. And to say once again the movement-image is a temporal perspective and not a spatial perspective, whereas ultimately the arts, the other arts -- except perhaps music -- they only give us spatial perspectives. To say, "speaking of temporal perspectives", it is only to say -- and it is not to say anything other than -- movement in space is in such conditions that now it expresses duration, that is, a change in a Whole.

Fine, I wanted to add this to what we saw the last time, and I am adding something else: you remember that the last time, and that was the whole point of our previous session, I had tried to show how it was necessary to pass from one expression to another: it was fully necessary to pass from the first expression, "movement in space expresses duration," that is, a change in the Whole, to another more complex expression but which is the same, which is more simply the same, more simply formulated, and that the same developed expression was: "movement in space is established between things" -- this is relative movement -- "the movement in space is established between things and relates these things, and consists of this: that it relates these things to a Whole, which itself henceforth goes on to be divided in things at the same time as things come together in this Whole". As a result, we had three levels of the image, of the movement-image, three levels perpetually communicating with each other, with one another, so movement in space is established between things in such a way that it relates these things to a Whole, which itself divides into things at the same time as things come together in this Whole. So, that was my expanded expression of the temporal perspective.

And so, we drew from it three levels to be distinguished in the movement-image. These three levels, I could call them there by different names; I'm trying to settle on the terminology I will suggest to you. These three levels, I could call them: the first, image content; the second: the image; the third: the idea. Or I could call them, I remind you, in more technical terms, the first: the frame; the second: the shot; the third: montage.

And I'm just reminding you of the definitions -- Would you please close the door? ... Would you please turn on the light? -- and I'm just reminding you of the definitions that we arrived at because we will need them for the entire year, given your interventions to come later. I was saying the frame or the image, what is it? It is exactly the determination of things as they form and must form an artificially closed system. You already feel that these things are the things that are going to belong to the shot.

What is the shot or the image? It is the determination of a complex and relative movement that grasps these things in One. *[Pause]* It grasps these things in One insofar as, even if it is particularly supported by one thing, it is established between the aggregate of things in the frame. So, it is the determination of movement insofar it grasps things in One; needless to say, this is a question, not of the spatial plane, but of the temporal plane.

Finally, montage is the determination of the relation of the movement or of the shot with the Whole that it expresses. Why does this determination of the shot or of movement with the Whole that the shot or movement expresses necessarily involve other shots? We have seen, it's for particular immediate reasons: because the Whole is never given. It is because the Whole is not given, including not being given in a shot, whereas movement is given because the Whole is not given, and moreover, in a sense, it has no existence outside the shots which express it, that is why we can call this Whole the Idea with a capital I. And indeed, Eisenstein called it the Idea or sometimes, a strange word but which, uh, we'll have to comment on, he called it "the synthetic image", in order to distinguish it from shot images (*images plans*), to distinguish it from shot images. Or Pasolini calls it: "ideal cinematographic continuity" or "ideal shot sequence" which only exists in real shots. *[Pause]*

From this point onward, if you thus grant me those three concepts, I believe we were left with a number of problems that I had started to consider. And the first problem is that, in fact, we could clearly see the relationship between framing, cutting, montage, framing, cutting of the shots, that is, determination of shots, and then montage, that is, the relationship of shots with the Whole! But once again, these technical operations were absolutely established almost in the very being of the cinema, and I said, okay, well, uh, if we call "montage" this operation which consists in recording the shot movement, the movement-image to the Whole that it expresses, that it is supposed to express -- since in its entire being, movement consists in relating things, objects, consists in relating objects to the Whole precisely which, henceforth, will be divided into the objects at the same time as the objects join together in, etc. ... -- so, it is obvious that we can already conceive of many ways: how will a movement in space express a Whole ?

And I said: this is one aspect of the montage problem -- once again, I am really insisting on this because otherwise you would make me say something seriously inadequate and even nonsense -- I'm not at all saying: this is the problem of the montage. I am saying: [it's] one of the aspects of

the montage problem, and in that regard, I think I was saying, historically it seems to me that there have been three great answers, that is, three great answers. There will be three great ways of concretely conceiving the relation of movement in space, that is, of the movement-image or of the shot with the Whole, that is, with the Idea. For the problem becomes this: how, how can a movement-image yield an Idea? And if there is a connection or if there is a first position of the cinema-thought problem that can be clarified, it is here. For regarding the movement-image in the other arts, we still don't know. In cinema, it seems that there is a kind of specificity; the movement-image is meant to spark the Idea. But what Idea and how does it generate the Idea?

And I said it seems to me, it's here that montage has something to tell us because there were three very great ways of conceiving how movements in space can refer to an Idea, that is, ultimately to a change in the Whole! It is the same as saying -- understand my equivalences -- as saying: how can the movement-image generate the Idea? or as saying: how can the movement-image express a change in the Whole? It's not hard to show that this is the same. And I was saying, well yeah, there is a first conception, let's call it -- for the last Hegelians [*Laughter*] -- let's call it "dialectical montage," and after all, all the Soviets at that time claimed their allegiance to a dialectical montage whatever their deep oppositions, which obviously poses problems.

But what is a dialectical montage? Here, the answers must be relatively concrete, eh, must be very concrete. And I was telling you, but I didn't insist enough on this at all, I was telling you: well yes, this is not difficult. Uh, a dialectical montage is a montage such that the answer offered to us is exactly this, namely: it is the opposition of movements in space; it is the opposition of movements in the space which will relate the aggregate of movement to a Whole, that is, to an Idea. Why will we call this dialectical? Because it is known that in the dialectic, things only advance through opposition, that is, something new and something new. So, let's call it from this point of view, even if it means constantly changing point of view, let's call it the Idea.

You recall, I was trying to show that the Whole was inseparable from a change in the Whole, that is, the Whole was always identical to the change that occurs in it, that the change that occurs in it was always the production of something new; producing something new, is that the Idea in our head as well? Well, we will say: well yes, in the dialectic, the production of the new goes through the opposition of movement.

So there, the answer is very, very precise: it is through the opposition of movements in space that movement in space will express the Idea. And that's the very rigorous answer, if you will, to our problem -- suggesting that our problem is well founded, it seems to me, in this regard -- it's the very rigorous answer of -- I can't say Eisenstein in general -- but of some well-known texts and some main texts by Eisenstein, indeed. I am referring to which texts? The texts in which he himself comments on "The Battleship Potemkin" and shows the importance of opposition and that the movement-images of the battleship are fundamentally built on great dynamic oppositions of movement, and that is what produces the "something new"!

The "something new" being what? Being both from the point of view of the event the revolution, which is coming, and from the point of view of the spectator's head the Idea that emerges, and that this is how cinema is indeed efficient or effective. And these great oppositions, for example, we have the famous scene of the great staircase, it is the perpetual and perpetually multiplied



opposition, all that reflected, which will give a whole theory of the opposition of movement in Eisenstein, between upward movements and downward movements where Eisenstein shows according to what rhythm an upward movement is followed by a downward movement, all of this being very diverse, very ... and that this constitutes the cinematographic rhythm: for example, the crowd going up the stairs, the soldiers' boots going down the stairs, the crowd going up, [*Pause*] I don't know what, someone again coming down, the mother, the lonely woman, the lonely woman going up, etc. ... until the famous descent of the baby carriage.

So, refer to these texts; we do indeed have the idea of what is, in a very simple way, a montage that we can call dialectical. But what interests me is that Eisenstein doesn't only say that. Because it would be difficult to understand at this level -- it would be specific to all the Soviets; we can say Pudovkin also adheres to a dialectical montage -- well, they were forced to; this is why I'm saying, uh, what exactly did they believe in that? Vertov claims to support a dialectical montage; yet Vertov and Eisenstein are not the same thing then, so what is happening? I would say, what's specific to Eisenstein, if I try to state this, it's that ultimately, he doesn't hide; it's strangely curious. He's almost more a Platonist, Eisenstein; he's a dialectician, yes, but he's more Platonist than Hegelian, only he couldn't say it after all. Why is he more Platonist? Because the opposition of movement as a condition for creating something new, that is, as a condition so that the moment might express the Idea, might express the change in the Whole -- it does exist, but it is what Eisenstein calls "the pathetic". It is the pathetic, and the pathetic is one of the poles of the dialectical montage, but it is only one of the poles, and indeed, pathos, Eisenstein tells us, is shock, is the opposition of the two forces; it is the collision. He tells us very clearly: montage is a collision and not a juxtaposition.

Okay, all of that is going well, we understand -- but precisely what a dialectician would never have done, never, he has to establish his dialectic, that is, the pathetic element -- already bizarre for a dialectician: to reduce the position of movement to the pathetic element, once it's said that there is another element. Well, what does this pathetic element of opposition of movement refer to? It refers to another deeper element according to Eisenstein, a supposed element he calls "the organic element". The organic element: that means that Eisenstein subordinates the opposition of movement to organic movement, in what sense? Well, the opposition of movement is something that occurs, yes, that occurs to organic movement. It becomes important, this idea of an organic movement. What is the organic movement according to Eisenstein? We will see that it is very important to distinguish this aspect, this type of montage, from other types of montage.

But the organic movement, says Eisenstein, is a movement that expresses growth; it is a movement which expresses growth and which, as such, is subordinate to mathematical laws. I have never seen a dialectician speak of a subordination of movement to mathematical laws -- it's whatever you want, but it's not a dialectician here, maybe infinitely better, maybe another thing, but it is not a dialectician who can say a thing like that. -- And what is movement insofar as it expresses growth and therefore has, and therefore obeys a mathematical law? It's the spiral, the logarithmic spiral; it is not yet dialectical, the spiral. It is the spiral, and Eisenstein insists enormously on the importance even at the practical level of its constitution of the film images. The theme of the spiral occurs everywhere, that the images organize themselves in a logarithmic spiral. Ah, right, a logarithmic spiral, yes, it is very odd! For what is the mathematical law of the logarithmic spiral? Here, Eisenstein no longer really feels comfortable; he says: it's the golden

section -- which is strange for a dialectician, stranger and stranger -- it's the golden section. Ah, what is "the golden section"?

The golden section in its simplest form, you -- here I'm moving very quickly because, and then [either] you already know it or you will look it up in the dictionary, it is... or you will read Mathila Ghyka's books, who worked extensively on the golden section and its presence in the arts<sup>5</sup> -- and Eisenstein himself explains that indeed, the golden section which he says governed architecture, painting, is also a fundamental law of cinema. Oh good, but then very quickly, what is the golden section?

Well, the golden section is this: when you trace yourself a line eh? you trace a line, you divide it into two unequal parts; when the smallest part is in relation to the greater part what the greater part is in relation to the Whole, you have the golden section. Why is this organic harmony? Indeed, the smaller part... [*Someone near Deleuze tells him that this explanation should be repeated*] -- I'll repeat -- Your line is divided in such a way that the smallest part is in relation to the largest part, you divide it in two, the smallest part is in relation the largest, what the largest is to the Whole. And this is a law of part/whole relations that must already be of interest to us and that will define organic movement. Well, I am not specifying, but Eisenstein shows it very well, how -- here I have chosen my simplest example at the level of the simplest straight line -- but in what ways the logarithmic spiral is the very expression of the golden section. Fine, the logarithmic spiral is the very expression of the golden section; in other words, the golden section is the law of growth, and snail shells are referenced, and there, all the spirals of nature are references to discover this golden section. This is the domain of organic movement.

I am asking you: why does he need the golden section? Here I quickly digress because it refers to something you asked me the last time: it's obvious, it's obvious, [*Pause*] it's obvious, remember that I was trying to show: of course, in cinema, you can always make images centered on privileged instants and moments of crisis -- yes, here, you can -- that does not prevent it from being cinema, that is, you won't reach those moments of crisis and those privileged instants like they emerge in other arts, for example, in tragedy. In tragedy, you establish privileged instants directly as a function of forms considered for themselves. But I've said from the start... dynamic forms considered for themselves. I said from the start, there is cinema only when the reconstitution of movement occurs, not starting from privileged forms or moments of crisis, but when the reconstitution of movement is made from equidistant images, that is, starting from any images whatsoever. And if you don't have that, you have everything you want in the shadow puppets genre, but you don't have cinema. It is the equidistance of the image, that is, the fact that movement is related to any instant whatsoever, therefore to equidistant instants, that defines cinema.

Fine, you see well that with his theme of organic movement, why he needs an organic substructure under the pathetic, because it is the law of organic movement which gives Eisenstein his equidistance -- his own very particular equidistance -- it will be the equidistance of the parts determined through the golden section. In the simplest case, let the smallest part be, no, yes, uh, let the smallest part be in relation to the greater [part] what the greater [part] is to the Whole, there we have an equidistance that you can express, in fact, as a quality of an analogical type, as a relation of analogy of the golden section. He needs this equidistance, and you see why,

so I would say: he calculates equidistance in such a way that it coincides with the privileged instants. But Eisenstein's way which is going to restore instants of crisis in cinema is not at all a pre-cinematographic revival; it is with the resources of the cinema, that is, as a function of the equidistance of the images, that he will achieve a stroke of genius: to find in a properly cinematographic way the pre-cinematographic idea of the instants of crisis. Yes, that's right; that's good, and that's why he couldn't be a dialectician: dialectics can only intervene secondarily on an organic background.

It can only intervene secondarily; this is necessary because how is it going to intervene? It will do so when you already have your organic spiral, and only then can you see that the vectors of this spiral are organized following a second law which is no longer the law of growth, but which is the law of opposition of movement. And in fact, in your spiral you have opposing vectors, and the spiral image is going to develop as these opposing vectors, that is, as the opposition of movement. At that moment, the dialectic -- but only at that moment -- the dialectic appears: it is a dialectic which operates, and which only develops a deep law which is the law of the organic -- Eisenstein, traitor to dialectics.

So, obviously, uh, the Party suspected this -- so, uh, well, it's part of the long history of Soviet pseudo-dialectical cinema -- but anyway, you can call it dialectical montage in the sense that the answer of this type of montage, Eisenstein's answer at least, will be exactly this: yes! movement in space can express the Idea with a capital I, that is, can express a change in the Whole, in what forms and under what conditions? On condition that movement in space takes place, is organized, in opposition to movement, in dialectically opposed movement, under the general condition of organic movement. Hence the two poles of the image according to Eisenstein: the organic and pathetic image, and the cinema image must be both. It must be organic and pathetic. So, here is the first response that I will call the dialectical response, and which therefore yields, and which inspires, understand, that this is indeed a certain way of setting up shots.

Ohhh, yeah. So the second, second grand manner: I see another one which is very interesting because -- once again, fine, I do not see any problem with there being national geniuses just as there are individual geniuses, right? -- this time, it is no longer Soviet montage, with its appearance -- but here it is up to you to choose -- with its reality, or its dialectical appearance, eh, Hegelian in a Russian style -- *[Laughter]* eh, yeah, so -- the other type of montage is French montage, in its heyday. And in fact, this is completely different; you have to see, then, uh, and at the same time, it's completely mixed up, uh, well, understand that concretely, I'm holding up a little, I have to point out the differences. It goes without saying that each kind picks up, in principle, what the other puts forth, that all forms of montage get communicated, eh? I'm just trying to make an abstract typology.

And French style of montage, well, yes, I am saying French style because there is something Cartesian about it. In their great lingering madness, this is not a reproach after all, all the others were false Hegelians *[Laughter]*, the others who have, those guys are false Cartesians, because they have a theme, I believe, really the French of that time, they have a big theme that will dominate their conception of the montage, namely the greatest amount of movement. See that their very own answer is not going to be: let us oppose movements so that movement in space

expresses the Whole, that is, the Idea; it will be: the maximum quantity of movement so that movement expresses the Idea or the change in the Whole.

This is an equally rigorous response, a wonderful response. The greatest quantity of movement, it's not that they're speed freaks, right? However, they like what's accelerated, the French. For everything, they use a huge amount of fast motion, all of them, or slow motion, all of them; they are fast-motion and slow-motion artists. Why slow motion as well? I'm saying, it's not because they're not obsessed with the quantity of movement. This is just as good: moving the quantity of movement away from the maximum, that is, reaching the minimum rather than approaching the maximum. But all the same, in the law of rhythm, this is rather tender, and for them, that will be their moment of crisis, that is, the instant of crisis or the privileged instant reconstituted through cinema in its own way and by these cinematographic means -- if I come back to the Idea that I was discussing earlier for Eisenstein. [*Pause*] -- Uhhhh. [*Laughter; interruption, a student responds to Deleuze's groan*] Ah, has he been doing that for a long time?

The student: No.

Deleuze: Ok, fine -- [*Pause*] right, from a rhythm point of view, that's why the French are going to be fantastic rhythm artisans, cinematographic rhythm artists because there are going to be at least three variants. The quantity of movement, the width of the frame, you see that all my notions are linked there. It is at the level of the French montage that, yes, the width of the frame and what you've placed in the frame obviously come into play. In the movement-image and its three dimensions, there is perpetually the frame, the shot, the montage. You perpetually have communication and the passage from one to the other, yes; there's the relative quantity of movement, the width of the frame, the length of the shot. And the more quantity of movement you are including following the law, you could almost call it "Gance's law", the more quantity of movement you are going to include in a sufficiently wide or increasingly wider frame, the more the shot must appear short and will be short.

And in Gance's work, what great thing does that produce? It produces heaps of things of which Gance always claimed to be the inventor even if it existed before him, but to have given a consistency such that, with his work, all that took on a whole new meaning. And these four things, first of all or following a temporal order, the accelerated montage which can only be understood, in fact, from the problem of capturing the maximum quantity of movement, the accelerated montage; second, the camera's fantastic mobility; third, the super-impressions which multiply the quantity of movement, which produce a kind of volume to the quantity of movement on the shot image ; and finally, the triple screen and later polyvision, the triple screen and polyvision which are -- and understand that these four technical elements are very, very different from each other, from one another -- find a perfect homogeneity from the point of view which concerns us, namely this montage which I will call a quantitative montage.

And no doubt, starting from there, they are very different, but it is not surprising that I tell you, finally all who say that our master is Gance. But from there, whether it's L'Herbier, whether it is Epstein, whether it is, much later, Grémillon, there remains this problem. There remains this problem, for example, this film that I saw, that was being revived, wait, not very long ago, that I alluded to the last time, "Maldonne" by Grémillon, a silent film by Grémillon, in which there is

this splendid farandole. And I saw in the explanatory documents that, furthermore, it was one of the first times, it seems, that a filmmaker had maintained a closed the set, that is, had filmed on a closed set, in closed decor. And it is very different there, I am insisting, it is very different, for example, uh, certain of Gance's big scenes, on the contrary, but it all depends on the case, it all depends on the evaluation; there is a kind of creative act, every choice.

Why did he do that, [film] his great farandole in a closed set? Obviously because for him it's about, so there, he has a camera on rails, on a wire eh, movement is on a wire up high; he makes his farandole move up high, the farandole must close in, uh, must brush against the roof, uh, so that it climbs the staircase, then come back down, all these are splendid images, but about which I can say: they are signed. They are signed, as was said in the French painting school, at a particular moment, they are signed as "the French school". It really happened at a moment in the image through the intermediary of other images, happened at a moment in the image, in which you will capture the maximum quantity of movement in a specific space, in this specific case, a closed space. And I was saying, okay, well, fine, choose some great scenes: L'Herbier's "Eldorado", the great dance scene; Epstein, I don't know what anymore, but you all know it: the travelling fair; Grémillon, the farandole in "Maldonne"; well, Gance, I've said enough about him, right?

And what does that mean? What do they expect from this quantity of movement? In what way are they Cartesian? Well, it is not difficult, it is that they, their answers would be: it is by pushing the movement all the way to capturing the maximum quantity of movement in a variable space, this is how movement will express the Idea, that is, the Whole and the change in the Whole. There, the answer is also very rigorous: the Whole is no longer a dialectical idea at that point; they are very foreign to it; what kind is it? It's, I was saying, quantitative montage, uh, some have called it lyrical montage as well; it is a lyrical Idea, that is, it is the Idea as rhythm, and at the extreme, they all say: the Idea as sensitivity (*état d'âme*). [Pause]

I would say this time that the two poles of montage -- or even, at the extreme, the two poles of the movement-image -- it is no longer organic-pathetic, as in the case, as in Eisenstein's case, but it would be kinetic-lyrical. Kinetic is the capture of the maximum quantity of movement; lyrical is the Idea determined as a state of mind, as a corresponding, as the new something corresponding to the maximum of the quantity of movement. Hence Gance's great idea, right, that he presents in this regard, which goes so far as to say: it is really the soul/feeling (*âme*) which is the garment of the body and not the body which is the clothing of soul/feeling, it is necessary to put forms of sensitivity (*états d'âme*) in front of the characters. And that can only be done precisely through this technique of quantity of movement.

Alright, alright, alright, so what can he remain? Well, I was just saying, and about this, I hadn't mentioned it at all the last time, I was just saying: well, there is a third great school from this point of view, a school of montage, a third grand conception of montage. And this third grand conception of montage, well, it's no more dialectical than the others. All that is not serious, it is not reasonable, and it is German, it's the German school, and in the German school, they have one of these ideas then, they have one of these great ideas and which is an answer; I would really like to emphasize the very concrete nature of the answers that we are considering. Once again, this is really practical. Someone who tells you, if you will, this is abstract, it's theory when I say:

oh yes, movement, movement in space will express the Idea, that is, a change in the Whole. Maybe we say to ourselves, well yes, we have to do it, how do we do it? The really concrete answers are if you are told: well, if you oppose movements -- obviously, no, no, it is not enough to cause two billiard balls to collide -- but if you oppose movements to a certain extent to rhythms, at that point, the aggregate of movement will evoke the Idea, you can say. I don't like it; you can't say it's an abstract answer. It's a formula (*recette*), not a formula at all in the sense that you just had to apply it to make something great, but in the sense that if it's done with genius, it works. Likewise, the French response, Gance's response, think, it worked so well that it produced an icon of French cinema.

And it remains for me to look at this third answer in which tender souls, sentimental souls, for which sentimental souls necessarily have a preference, a small preference, this German answer, or perhaps the hardened souls, I do not know, I do not know, no, the tender souls preferably. *[Laughter]* This time around, it's a very, very weird idea, and here I want it to be as concrete as for the other ones. Suppose someone says to himself: oh but, if it is only a question of making movements in space express a Whole, that is, a change in the Whole, there are people who say: well no, that does not suit me, opposing movements, no, that does not suit me, it is not my thing. *[Interruption of the recording]* [1:03:06]

## Part 2

... intensive of movement in space, so there, yes ... Perhaps movement in space would express a Whole, that is, express an Idea. Assume he said that, or some people said that to each other. It's not clear, but anyway, you can sense this, it can be a .... We can always try, but what is it, an intensive factor in an extensive movement? You will tell me, there is an extensive factor in any very simple movement; it is acceleration, it is speed and acceleration. That's doesn't work, that's wrong; that would be more for the French school. It would be more for accelerated montage because speed and acceleration presuppose movement; non, that doesn't work. We would have to invent an intensive factor corresponding to the cinematographic image which might truly be the intensive factor of movement in space, that is, tension, the tension of movement.

The answer ... Maybe we will only be able to understand there, there ... I always ask you to be very patient here. Assume that the answer – we are trying to sense this before understanding it – assume that these people are saying, well yes, after all, the intensifying factor or the tension inherent to movement in space is light. What a peculiar idea! There's no need to wonder if this is correct from the point of view of physical science because it will only be necessary to ponder this afterwards. Maybe that's right, or maybe there is something right there, from the point of view of physics itself. The intensive factor of movement would be light. So, what would we do? What would light mean? It wouldn't mean light in general; that's too vague. One must say: the intensive factor of movement is the infinity of states of light intensity. This would already become clearer because there, we can clearly see that infinite states of light intensity is movement. Well, that would be the intensive movement or the intensive element of any movement. And that is what we would have to develop from movement to relate movement to the Whole that expresses it. Ah that's it! And why?

So, let's step back and continue exploring our hunches because why would ... why would an intensive factor relate movement in space to a Whole or unity? Why? What does it mean, an intensive factor? What does an intensity mean? The definition of an intensity is very simple; it was provided by the great philosopher, Kant: an intensity is a magnitude apprehended in the instant. See, saying that is enough to distinguish between intensive quantity and extensive quantity. In fact, an extensive quantity is a quantity apprehended successively. You say: it has so many parts. For example, you say, an intensive quantity it's hot, it's cold, it's 30 ° C. It is clear that 30 ° C is not the sum of 30 times a degree. No, a length of 30 centimeters is the sum of 30 times a centimeter. 30 degrees is not 30 times a degree. Fine, these are obvious things. So, you say, the paradox of intensive quantity, it is a magnitude apprehended in the instant.

Well, that's already very interesting from the viewpoint of concepts. You are forming a concept of intensity. Let's try to clarify. Magnitude apprehended in the instant, what does that mean? So, what is this? Whoever says magnitude, says multiplicity, says plurality. [Pause] Fine, an intensive quantity, I would say, is a quantity, it is a magnitude of which the plurality or something such as the plurality contained in that magnitude -- when you say it is 30 ° degree, for example -- the plurality contained in this magnitude can only be represented by its indivisible distance from zero. [Pause] The plurality contained in this magnitude can only be represented by its indivisible distance, that is, its moving closer in the instant to zero. This is an intensive quantity.

In other words, an intensive quantity implies a fall, if only an ideal fall. In fact, 30 ° does not pass ... the plurality contained in 30 ° does not pass through a succession in which I would go from one, two, three, four, up to 30; that would be to treat intensive quantity as an extensive quantity. And what does that? What does that is the thermometer, yes. But the function of the thermometer is to substitute an extensive quantity, namely the height of mercury, for the intensive quantity, heat. So, the evaluation of 30 ° does not occur in the pure state by the thermometer, that is, by all the intermediaries which reduce the intensive quantity to an extensive quantity but occurs by the distance treated as indecomposable between the intensive quantity considered and zero, that is, by the fall. Fine, what does that mean? Intensity refers to a fall of the thing it characterizes in intensity. This is fundamental, this idea of a fall, of the intensity inseparable from a fall, from a descent.

So, hey, fine, I look like I'm distancing myself, but not at all. What is the zero point? I was saying, this is ... this is negation, yeah, this is the negation of intensity. And what then is the end of this fall? We will say that the intensive factor is inseparable from its distance, its distance from the zero state of matter, and what defines it, that is, its distance from the zero state of matter as an indecomposable distance, belongs to it. [The intensive factor] is inseparable from [its distance], that is, it is inseparable from this virtual fall. In other words, if I release -- understand, we're making a lot of progress -- if I release, uh, the intensive state or the tension corresponding to movement, I have stepped forward within the other two solutions that I didn't have, namely I introduced a necessity of not separating movement from a matter. I've introduced the necessity of not separating what's moving (*le mouvant*) from a moved matter (*matière mue*). And after all, the rest of them were involved in a lot of moving, but not a lot in the moved matter.

And here, there is a kind of practical choice, that is, they were catching up with the moving matter, of course, it caught up with it, but did so secondarily. What interested them first was what's moving (*le mouvant*). And now, here comes this third kind of men of cinema who will be greatly interested in the moving matter and its possibility of being moved or not. And they could not release the moving matter in its essential character of connection with movement; they could do this only in the shelter or thanks to the hypothesis of an intensive factor of movement.

And now what is this indecomposable distance which links the intensive factor of movement to moving matter as equal to zero, as a degree equal to zero? Sense what we're putting together, it's ... you must have already guessed by now. [Pause] Well, this will be expressed in the simplest way; we will see that, perpetually we have to correct what I am saying. It will be expressed in the simplest form: movement is the process by which something keeps coming undone. Movement is inseparable from a fall within matter. Movement -- then we would have to imply -- when you have related it to its intensive factor, is strictly inseparable from a fall within matter, and if this fall is indefinite or infinite, what might the result be? The movement becomes one -- when you release its intensive factor -- becomes one with a possible decomposition process.

A possible decomposition process, what does that mean? Namely that you will relate movement to what is happening in the darkest site of matter. What is happening in the darkest site within matter, the movement related through intensity to what is happening in the darkest site within matter, what can that be? Concretely, we can see it clearly: the smoky rooms, the pestilential swamps, the sites where the matter is agitated, is at its zero level, but sloshes at this level. And any intensity will relate movement in space to that marshy depth. Oh... and the fumes will come out of this depth. And what will this be? The movement related to this depth of matter, to this dark depth of matter, ah the movement, at this moment, I would say that I have released the intensive factor of the movement. And what is this depth? What could we [call], this abominable depth, this nameless depth? Let's name it, then. It's the opposite of light, okay, well, it's the opposite of light. It is shadow, it is absolute shadow, it is dark depths (*ténèbres*).

Ah good, yes, since in fact, if the luminous was the intensive state of movement, the fall of movement into this matter which is irremediably linked to it, it will be dark depths (*ténèbres*). Ah, fine, then, here we have the vaguely lit marshes, some kinds of lights which are made to die. It sloshes, yes. What is it then, that movement, which can be identified in this sloshing state of matter at this degree zero? This is well known. What is it, this decomposition? It's, uh, I'll say yeah, it's all very alive. But this is essentially a non-organic life. It is the non-organic life of things. Things have a life. Yes, ah! do you think that, in order to live, you have to have an organism? Not at all. But not at all then. The organism is the enemy of life. The organism is what conjures the terrible things in life. What's alive are things because they are not subservient to the organism. So fine. What's alive are things, so is there a non-organic life? Yes, life is fundamentally non-organic.

Admire the opposition with Eisenstein. Eisenstein told us: montage and the staging (*mise en scène*) of the opposition of forces can only be done against a background organic representation of the organic image, and cinema's movement-image is life, it's the organic life of the spiral. And then we have these obscure Germans emerging to say: not at all. The element of life, the



first element, the first element of the movement-image will be the non-organic life of things, and the entire Expressionist decor arrives there, a non-organic life which is the life of things as things. Things live, yes, things live. In what form? In the form of the marshland, in the form of the swamp. Houses themselves are marshes. Houses are pathways. Houses, the city, this is a marshland, everything is a marshland. There is an inorganic life of things. The living, the organisms are accidents of life. What an idea, what an idea! We might even say what pessimism! What pessimism, what despair! If the intensity is only evaluated by its fall, if the fall is the fall into the marshland, that is, into this state of matter equal to zero, if all movement must express the non-organic life of things like what makes our very terror, it's not a happy world, right? And you'll see at what point all this gets corrected.

And indeed, this is a whole aspect of Expressionism, and after all, the esthetician who baptized, who came up with the name "Expressionism", this is such a confused and vague concept that I would like to try giving it a little consistency. There are a thousand manners. I'll choose one aspect; I'll choose the aspect that interests me, eh? You can have many other aspects as well. I would say the first aspect of Expressionism -- as I found in the other two cases, two poles; you feel that for German Expressionism, I'm also looking for two poles to make this clearer -- I would say the first pole of the Expressionist image or of the Expressionist montage, is going to be the non-organic life of things. And once again, the non-organic life of things refers to the intensive factor of movement in space insofar as this intensive factor only exists through its indecomposable relationship with a state of matter equaling zero. All that is not difficult; it comes together really well.

Ah well yes, all that is well known. It's very well known, and I... and in [Wilhelm] Worringer, the esthetician who invents the word Expressionism and who will apply it in turn to all kinds of things, but who will end up applying it to the cinema, how does he, the baptizer, define it? This is necessary because he's the one who invents and uses the word. Well, it's very odd; in all of the texts by, in all of Worringer's texts, there is something that he does not lose sight of, finally, in the most beautiful texts. He tells us, the Expressionist line is the line that expresses non-organic life. It belongs both to the non-organic, and yet it is living. And he opposes the Expressionist or non-organic line, the non-organic vital line, to the organic line of classical harmony. What a tribute to Eisenstein, classical harmony! This is the great classical man of cinema, Eisenstein.

And how does he define the non-organic line? The organic line will be the circle or the spiral. What about the non-organic line? Ah this one, it's violent, says Worringer, that's the violent line. What is the violent line? It is the line that keeps changing direction [*Pause*] or the line that gets lost in itself like in marshlands. He doesn't say that; he almost says that, eh he says "like in sand"; it's the same, wet sand, ok. The line that keeps changing direction is what he called it, and the first form of Expressionist art, according to Worringer, is Gothic art. It is Gothic art with its perpetually broken line, which keeps changing direction, perpetually opposing an obstacle to regain strength by changing direction. This is a line that no organism can make and yet it is the line of life itself as it goes beyond any organism. So, to the organic line of so-called classical art, Worringer opposes the non-organic line, equally vital nonetheless, of so-called Gothic art; in that

way, it will be Expressionism. This line breaks and keeps changing direction or gets lost in itself. This is the very movement of intensity.<sup>6</sup>

Well then, well, is it any wonder that, henceforth, movement in space as German Expressionism is going to conceive it, is fundamentally a movement in which it seems, for the moment -- everything is going to be corrected; we will see -- it seems to be a movement of decomposition. The soul will decompose, the intensive soul will merge with the movement of a decomposition which brings it back to swampy matter. My god, what a pity! and this going to be the stroll in the marsh, and it's going to be those smothering decors, and it's going to be those stuffy decors not because it's closed in an organic curve, but because it's perpetually broken and changing direction. "The Cabinet [of Dr.] Caligari", Caligari with its extraordinary sets which are decors that are fully cinema, and which precisely introduce a site where there is no longer any straight line. A straight line, that's an organic line.

The diagonal. Ah the diagonal, it's suspicious; that's what goes between the two. From the diagonal to the broken line, there are very intimate relationships, the diagonal which refers to a counter diagonal. Oh, but this is not the opposition of movements at all, not at all. These are intensities, it's the intensive factors that make the straight-line veer off. We can always translate into opposition of movements; at that point, we lose the originality of Expressionism. It's not at all a thought of opposition; it's a thought of intensity, and it's very, very different, eh. They chose something else, another direction, and it's like a Soutine painting where the city goes mad. The city is going mad since there is no longer a vertical nor a horizontal. There are diagonals with a diagonal that evokes the counter diagonal. All things look drunk; all things are swampy, and the soul finds its mirror in things, that is, its intensity insofar as the soul of movement is inseparable from moved matter, and this soul of movement, this intensive soul of movement can only be grasped in the movement which relates it to the moved matter, that is, to the swamps, to the sloshing.

And it's there that all Expressionism passes through; I'm not saying they can be reduced to that. But whether it is Murnau's "Sunrise", Pabst's "Lulu" by Pabst, Murnau's "Nosferatu" or because I believe that, in some respects, he is very deeply Expressionist, "The Wedding March" and "Greed" by Stroheim, how is this Expressionism? I can always say this if I give a criterion according to which, for me, it is Expressionism, for precisely this reason, that movement in space fundamentally expresses a process of decomposition which depends on the very intensity of the intensive factor released into movement.

Except, except everyone immediately knows that I have only spoken about half of it. So, in fact, pessimism to pessimism, tragedy to tragedy, yes, this is all awful, what a world, what anguish! But uh, no, no, that's not it. It could be it, it might be, for example, "Greed". There is nothing but the movement of decomposition. It is a masterpiece, but you can see that there, movement in space is indeed a concrete response to: how does movement in space express the Whole? Well, of course, let it express the Whole. Obviously, it expresses the change in the Whole. It only does just that through this method. It's a great method. If I translate it into a cooking recipe, release the intensive factor, obviously that implies an entire interplay of light and darkness. That's why

Expressionist cinema is going to be founded on this. Release the intensive factor, that is, the luminous factor of movement. Grasp hold of it as intensive.

So, in its relation to the moved matter, with the moved matter which is the degree zero of darkness, all movement is going to be qualified as a movement of decomposition, that is, as the movement of the fall of a soul. How to lose your soul is the lesson of this first aspect of this Expressionism, and everything passes through here; all the mythology you want about the loss of the soul finds all its concrete and practical justification. Except that there we are, this was just one aspect because not all things can end so badly. It was just one aspect. It was only one aspect because ... because, except in a few cases, you can be satisfied with that aspect. That can create wonderful, amazing things once again; there is no need for more.

A perfect decomposition process is a masterpiece, but I don't believe it ever happens like that. There are never desperate works, you now, right? Uh, art even involves so much a call to life, if only to non-organic life, and this is life nonetheless; there is no work of death. Sometimes it looks like there is, but works of death are always ... We know what they are; they're not worth anything, it's not worth anything; these are sad and poor works. That does not exist. So, I don't mean you need a message of hope; I don't need to propose a message of hope, although it could also be like that, a message of hope, well yes, it must be said, always in a work, go ahead guys, all that is fine. Otherwise it's not worth the trouble, eh? It's not worth the trouble because finally if it's in order to cry like one never cries, if you will, over yourself, it provides the worst, it provides small narcissistic works of disgust, right; it's not worth it.

But I am saying, there's no point in introducing a message of hope, although it often does fit into a work. There is no great work, in my opinion, which does not contain this formidable message of hope, and sometimes contains it all the less since it is not explicitly said, but it is better than that, it is formulated. It is there; it is as though engraved through the lines. And so, I seem to be balancing it out, but you yourself are correcting; it all becomes one, because in a lot of these movies, what is it? It may even sound like a purely ironic hope.

At the end of Pabst's "Lulu", there is the Salvation Army, the Salvation Army, the very beautiful images that end the film, the Salvation Army, the song of the Salvation Army, the salvation of the soul. It was more beautiful in the opera. In the opera, after Lulu's death, there is no Salvation Army; there is something that is splendid, there is Lulu's friend, who hurls, who brings forth his wonderful song, but this wonderful song that rises upwards does nothing but carry Lulu's soul to heaven just like the Salvation Army, ensuring the salvation of Lulu's soul, like an ascent of the soul.

Ah, right, a soul's ascent! Oh yes. In Stroheim's "The Wedding March", there is a sequence which rightly passes for one of the most beautifully admirable sequences by this harsh, deceitful and cynical author, and which is one of the most beautiful, among the most beautiful images of love that the cinema has never made, which is, for those who remember "The Wedding March", which is prince Nicolas -- I do not know, in fact, if he is a prince; well it does not matter -- which involves the poor little proletarian woman in the apple garden where there is an abandoned cart; they shelter under the cart; there are apple trees. This is odd; it really is like an Impressionist

sequence. And it is very often said that Expressionism and Impressionism did not reconcile until very late, that it did not work out. I'm not sure of that. I myself have the feeling that Impressionism is a sequence of Expressionism; it's very curious that the communications were constant. Here, there is an Impressionist scene, so Impressionist that it seems almost like an advance version of Renoir. Uh, this is really an Impressionistic painting, the scene that Stroheim created.

In Murnau's "Sunrise", ah there are marshes, dark lakes, they are there. The soul's fall, there it is, drawn by a bad woman into the marshes. The man, the man, the man's soul contemplates murdering his wife, his young wife. And there is the marsh, a first trip across the lake. The young husband realizes the horror of his project, and they reach the city; there is the reconquest of their love, a purely Impressionist passage full of vacillations, full of tiny bursts of light, full of brush strokes. Then there is the return across the black lake, there is the accident etc. ... Again, there is the scene of a fall.

What do I mean? Worringer said it very well after all, but at the same time, not so well, there we are; he said this, Worringer, he said: yes, nature, non-organic life, that is the first aspect of Expressionism. This world is cursed, this world is cursed, and the laws of this world are laws of decomposition. But the other aspect of Expressionism, the correlative aspect, is that the soul maintains a relation, not with nature – that's screwed -- Nature is the fall. But since it is correlative -- this is not a correction; it is really the correlate -- the soul relates to the divine. The soul relates to the divine and remains in connection with the divine. And Worringer said, Expressionism is -- apart from Baroque art which preceded it -- the only art form which considered that the business of art was not with the sensitive (*le sensible*) but was with the purely spiritual.

That's not bad even if we find it funny, this weird idea, art related to the purely spiritual. You could say that it was a strong idea that must have marked an era. In fact, everyone lived except the idea of organic life. And the presupposition of organic life is obviously, or of organic representation, is: art is fundamentally related to the sensitive and can only pass through the sensitive. But those who tell us: I maintain the sensitive because it is matter as decomposition and because it is the correlate of the relation of the soul with the divine, that is completely a change, a redistribution in all the elements of art.

So, what do I mean? What do I mean? Well, Expressionism is made up of these two movements. Something is created through something that comes undone. You'll tell me, this is really a platitude, that something is created through something that comes undone. At that point, you are not saying this to me because you'd be really dumb. I mean, if somebody lives that idea -- something gets created through something that comes undone -- if he lives it with enough intensity, he possesses his work of art. He has his work of art because showing something like that is not an idea in your head. Something like that is not a ready-made formula. If it's about mobilizing the elements that will show it, that will create a work of art of it, it's in this way that cinema lives.

In fact, in a way, cinema is a metaphysics, yes. Uh, and it's not because this is rubbish (*nul*) that films are rubbish, because there are philosophies that are rubbish as well, there is literature that's rubbish. Cinema doesn't get any worse – I am saying that to reassure myself [*Laughter*] -- it's no worse than anything else. It's like the rest, it's not worse. You can't see it anymore, yes, because there are posters, yes, but it's not worse. [*Laughter*]

So fine, something occurs through what gets created and what is undone. As a result, in two ways, you can have a pole that is a little pessimistic, a bit, namely what is undone is like primary and what is created is only a small compensation for what is undone, or else a tendency, really, let's say, optimistic, namely what is essential is what is created, that is, this relation of the soul with the divine. See, I find Bergsonian terms, to undo, to create. This is the blossoming of the new, this is the Idea: the relation of the soul with what is created, the soul insofar as it is created in a relation with the divine.

Okay, so from that somewhat optimistic side, it's what is coming undone that is no more than the temporary interruption of what is being created. In any case, you will go from light to darkness and from darkness to light through all states of light, through the infinite series of states of light for it is this intensive factor that will relate your movement in space to the Whole. And the Whole, what is it? It is the coexistence of the moved matter which never ceases to become undone, and of the moving divine soul which never ceases being created. As a result, German Expressionism is the identity of two poles, just as I had found two poles for Russian montage, two poles for French montage, for the harmony of things, two poles for the montage, uh, and for the problem and for the Expressionist solution of ... our problem, I would say, is at the same time and irremediably linked, the non-organic life of things, and the non-psychological of the mind.

And what is the Expressionist actor? It's not difficult at that point. What is "acting" in the Expressionist manner? It's not giving signs there like that; it's very specific. It's an acting technique. Acting in the Expressionist manner is two things, it's two things. It means acting so that expression is no longer organic, so that expression exceeds the organism, hence the gestures in effect, the gestures themselves broken, perpetually broken by the Expressionist actor. The completely murky facial expressions, the role of light in Expressionist acting, etc., and at the same time, that is, acting that is neither organic nor psychological. [*Pause*] As a result, so the two poles of the Expressionist problem, it would be the non-organic and the spiritual and the correlation of the two, that is, the non-organic life of things and the non-psychological life of the soul. [*Pause*] Are you tired or are you not tired?

Student: Oh no, not at all.

Another student: It depends for whom.

Deleuze: I'll finish then, I'll finish up quickly, but I would have liked ... Do you ...?

A woman student: I would like to talk.

Deleuze: You would like to speak; very well then, then we will speak, eh, and then if there is time, if you are not too tired, I will add a little something or I will not add, there we are.

So yes, so once it's said that my concern is real, that my self-criticism is not at all, uh, a kind of vanity, there really is not, uh, if there is something that I'm not happy with in all this, uh, maybe you could help me, say, uh, not at all encouraging me, not telling me either: it's okay, that because ... no, uh and then uh, you yourself, if you have to something to add, ... what?

A student: [*Inaudible start*] ... that doesn't sound like applying your texts to a [*inaudible, sounds of chairs*]

Deleuze: No today, it didn't. It's odd, it didn't. Maybe it's better that it is... yeah, yeah ...

Another woman student: For me, I had that feeling too, uh last time ... I don't know, maybe it's better this time. For me, something very confusing still remains finally that would connect to what you are saying. That is, in a way, I have the impression that uh, what Bergson is talking about, uh that could indeed be applied to the cinema, but not at all to the cinema that you mentioned, in the end, to the three categories of cinema you mentioned today. That is, yes, I would indeed see in Bergson a certain connection with the cinema, but that would apply for me to, uh, certain categories of extremely recent filmmakers. In particular, I would cite Godard, Resnais, and Chantal Ackerman. And in a way, it seems to me that, uh, the cinema that you were discussing today in relation to Bergson, for me, it relates to this feud that Bergson was talking about and that he's trying to get rid of, that is, between idealists and materialists. That is, in these schools of cinema, something remains, that is, German cinema, Russian cinema and French cinema, something of that dialectic that Bergson was trying to avoid, well, that is, when he is discussing this in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, fine: Does the exterior world exist outside of us? Do we exist, well, all this dialectic? And what it seems to me is that the cinema is indeed quite related to this duration that Bergson is trying to determine. But from the moment he introduces an external element into cinema and, in this case, fine, for example, for Resnais and for Godard, that would be for me a certain use of the voice, for example, in Godard's last film, a certain use of music, that is, the character is in a room, we have the impression that he only hears the music in his head; when he goes out, the music continues, good, and he is constantly playing with three kinds of music which give a certain duration of time, but which can be found for example, in composers like Haydn. Anyway, I don't know, that's it, that's all.

Deleuze: Yeah there, I'll answer right away because I measure, I wonder if one of the things that results in that not working, in fact, isn't this an ambiguity for which I am unfortunately responsible by the choice of the subject that I've made? Because what you just said, I understand very well that it would be possible to do this, but listening to you, I said to myself: my God, that's what, among other things, I didn't want to do. I'm not saying it's not legitimate, but for myself, I would be interested in that point, in the end, it would interest me if it weren't someone else.

The same student: I'm not saying that it interests me.

Deleuze: But what you're saying a bit is, well, even if it means doing what I set out to do, why not instead have sought out film authors and films about which, in some way or of another, we could say, in fact, they have a certain connection with Bergson? And there, those you cite, you

have chosen your examples well, but I absolutely do not want that. [*The student*: No, but ...] There are two things, if you will, there are two things that I was dreading before I started. What I dreaded before starting, what I was very interested in, I told myself: I'm going to win on all counts, that is, but with all honor. Once again, I told myself, I must provide a certain knowledge of Bergson to those who do not know Bergson and to those who are not philosophers or who are attending for reasons related to philosophy. And I really care about that, so much so that if it continued to go wrong, I would sacrifice everything for that aspect; I would only retain the commentary aspect on Bergson. And moreover, what I wanted was then almost for my own purposes and with you, to try to form some cinematographic concepts while almost forgetting that it was Bergson who supplied them to us or who helped us to develop them, and these concepts had to be, for me, they had to be valid ... At that point, I wasn't interested in one trend or another in cinema, but that [the concept] be valid for cinema in general, independently of a particular film, independently of films. And here, if I mess that up, that means I'll have hardly succeeded, that I'll have blown it. [*The student*: No, but ...] And on the other hand, I didn't want these cinema concepts to be an application of Bergson, that is, concepts forged for other purposes, in cinema. So, in fact, what you said, we could have done it.

The student: No, but ... Wait. I would like to clarify one thing for you, which is that I would not prefer that you talk about Bergson compared to Godard or Resnais or others ... I mean, in fact, I am much more interested in you talking about Bergson, okay, and that you try to talk about cinema and see what concepts we could draw from him. If I mentioned Godard or Bergson in that way, it is because... it is to speak of something confused which until now seemed to me something I couldn't quite get which is that, in Bergson, I find this thing that you spoke about and which is the existence of three movements, finally, of three levels which must necessarily exist for something to happen, and that, for the moment, the thing which making me constantly feel unbalanced is that in the cinema that you spoke about, I only see two movements.

Deleuze: Really?

The student: Oh yeah, that's it.

Deleuze: Really? Which ones?

The student: Okay, I mean, now I'm feeling rather awkward because I don't know if I need to talk, or if I need to find out about more technical characteristics of cinema. Here I'm feeling a bit awkward, but that's what I feel, and that's why I was talking about Godard, Resnais and people like that who, in my opinion, had brought something into the cinema other than cinema, which was either a certain way of using music or a certain way of using the voice.

Deleuze: Yeah, it's nothing other than cinema.

The student: Yes, no ... it's not something else.

Deleuze: Yeah ... I know what you mean, yeah, yeah.

The student: At times, I feel like there are three [movements], and at times I feel like there are only two. That makes me think every time of this problem that Bergson was trying to solve, that

is, well, to get out of the two dialectics that confronted him, that is, the idealists and the materialists. ... [Deleuze: Yeah] about the problem of perception. [Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah] It's simply that. But hey, actually, I prefer your choice, anyway.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah ... That's good because indeed we are swimming in ambiguity. [Interruption in the tape] [1: 48: 14]

Another student: [Inaudible discussion; Deleuze speaks with several students, but the subject is not clear]

Deleuze: What? ... This is ...? No, it's because it's impure.

The previous student: It's transparent.

Deleuze: It's impure. [Inaudible words] Yes, oh yes, that can pose, uh yes... Well, do you still have a little courage or not [to continue]? [Voice: Oh yes.] We can stop there, eh? You are reflecting here on our sad situation. Ah, a quick note ... [Pause] Yeah, well ... [Pause] Okay, well then, I'll end on that; that will make a complete ending ... after all, to redouble the ambiguities. From what I'm coming from, what ... of the three levels of the image of movement that I tried to identify, again it's not difficult, these are coexisting and communicating movements. Determining the objects that enter the shot, this is called framing. To determine, second, to determine the shot as the relative movement, one, which brings its objects together, this is called a temporal shot or a temporal perspective. And finally, to determine their relation of the shot, in brackets "with other shots", to determine the relation of the shot through other shots with the idea or the Whole, this is montage.

I tell myself, I don't have the impression that we are defining these three categories, that is, only this gives me joy, so then maybe these are very insufficient definitions. But I don't feel that they are usually defined so clearly. This is very clear here; it seems to me, right? Well, we can understand that as just something like an outcome, in order to finish today, a contribution to the important question, well, who is the author of a movie?

Let's immediately eliminate one of the ... Well, the answer is that, in general, the author of the film is the director (*metteur en scène*); what does this mean? It is because, in fact, a director is someone who is neither foreign to framing, nor cutting, nor montage. A director who wouldn't know what montage means and who would let the editor do the work, if famous directors even, for whom montage is not however, if you will, the essential thing, something essential like Stroheim, for example, considers that a film that they have not edited ceases to be a film of ... uh, that he answers the question well. It is obvious that the director is the author of the film only if he is the one who determined the frames and if he is the one who determined the montage. Fine, this answer is simple. But it amounts to saying the author of the film is at the same time the one who constitutes the artificial systems of objects entering into the frame, and here, it is obvious that I am hardly making any differences at this level even if in practice a difference is made between the decorator and the cameraman.



Uh, that's one more positive mark there. To unify these two functions, the decorator and the cameraman, and even the one who strictly chooses the objects, if these are several persons or if it is a team, they must function as a unit, that is, really at an image level, the director, that is, the organizer of the cutting and the shots, also his level with which he communicates concretely. And then there is the one who has the idea of the whole, so obviously, the director is the total author of the film, if it is he who directly or indirectly determined the framing, cutting and the idea of the Whole.

But are there cases, because there is not a one-size-fits-all answer to who the author is? It's quite variable. There I place variables, well yes, the one who fills in all these variables is the author of the film. If there are two guys filling in the variables, well, the twofold work exists or work among a small number at that point, the group is the author of the film. If, well, if there is a perfect meeting between a decorator and a director, it is evident in German Expressionism. Well, it must be said, there are two authors of the film. It's not complicated.

And there are some relatively complicated cases because each person can betray the other. Ah well, betrayal in creation, there is always betrayals. And I tell myself, who has ... So, if we try to establish the idea of the Whole that does not exist in cinematography, that does not exist filmically, that only exists as expressed as one of the shots, the edited shots, who is it that has the idea of the Whole? And then, in what sense is he also the author of the film?

I always tell myself, in the ideal situation, I can thus define the cameraman, the decorator, the object selector, the ideal assistant director through my first level of the image. The ideal director through my second level is the idea of the Whole who knows he has it. I would say ideally, the one responsible for the idea of the Whole is the producer. So, of course, the director has to be a producer as well, or they have to get along admirably with the producer. Producers like that, let's face it right now, they no longer exist.

But uh, a very interesting historical problem, a very interesting historical problem. There has been, or has there been...? Here, I do not know enough, but refer to histories of cinema, I do not know. Jean Mitry, perhaps he spoke about that. Uh, the great Hollywood producers, in what way? Did that happen? The guy, the producer who could define himself that way, I have the idea of a film to be made. Of course, I am not the one who can do it, and at that point, the director really becomes like the executor of the producer. I think it happened a lot, that's how things frequently happened. And conversely then, I have the idea of the Whole, but I am not a director. So fine, that can have downsides, even with monstrous things like the director who gets replaced like a dog, in the golden era of Hollywood, eh. Uh oh, not between them; that doesn't work. You are betraying my idea. Is the producer completely wrong if he's the one who came up with the idea? And again, the idea of the film, we gave it a certain kind of meaning here.

So, as I personally don't know anything about this whole situation, I tell myself, all the same, in our concepts, we can already locate this ideal producer and see that, without doubt, the murky producer that we hear about from time to time, well, this is a failure of the ideal. But we can see why cinema, even independently of questions of money, has producers. Producers are

nonetheless guys who, ideally once again, have ideas. They have the idea of a movie to be made. Who knows who will be able to do it? Fine.

So, I came across a text from the *Cahiers du Cinéma* that makes me happy and ... And I tell myself, ah fine, so I made some inquiries. It seems that there's a producer; he's a guy named [Daniel] Toscan du Plantier. He's a producer ...

The previous student: [*Inaudible; no doubt, she asks for the reference*]

Deleuze: Huh? *Cahiers du Cinéma*, number 325, June 81. And so, I don't know what is false or true in this text, but it is a very, very beautiful text. It's a very, very beautiful text. It's clear that, uh, Toscan du Plantier as a producer plays a bit, uh, I guess -- here I am saying everything I can say, I'm taking responsibility -- acts a little, uh, [like] the big Hollywood producer, like Balmer. He's trying to suggest that ... that, fine, and he says -- and that's what interests me; this is where I would like to finish -- he tells us the following story in this very, very interesting *Cahiers* interview. And I think *Cahiers* published it because of that; for them, it had... I don't know, anyway.

He says, there you go, recently I had two ideas -- take note of all the words, this is very important -- recently I had two ideas for films to be made. So, we excluded one response. The, uh, answer, the rude answer, the insolent interruption, well why didn't you do them, you poor guy? That would be silly, that would be silly; as a producer, he has ideas about everything, a Whole, a Whole, that is, it's cinema, and he's looking for someone to make a film out of it.

Fine, he says, I had two ideas; they were good, both of them. And I thought, who is it that'll be able to create them? And in both cases, I believed -- he adds, he puts himself forward a lot; he looks very cute; I don't know who he is, but he seems very cute -- he says, well then, I was still a little suspicious, and I didn't have anyone better as a director, so I chose some directors, told them my idea, and gave them the task. So, to me, that sounds like a very old Hollywood technique. Again, maybe it's not true, but we don't care; I'm developing an ideal example.

And he says, my two ideas were this. The first idea: show how, in an environment worse than hostile, absolutely indifferent, worse than hostile, even more, but indifferent to what is going to happen -- [*Deleuze seems to turn toward a student*] I'm thinking here of you, obviously -- there the event, something incredible will happen, namely a small group of women, for whom nothing predestines them for that, will take possession of a kind of statement, will take the speaker's role and, in a certain way, impose their statement into an environment that really is not used to it, in any respect. And he said, that was my idea for the movie, "The Brontë Sisters." Those are two recent films, eh, "The Brontë Sisters".<sup>7</sup>

That was his idea, that is, there, we can see clearly, it is literally the idea of a Whole, that is, the idea of a change in a Whole in which the production offers something new. That works very well with our concepts. Three girls, three girls that nothing predestined, will speak up and impose their statement with the [social] conditions in England at the time, which are really not in favor of such a thing. This is how he sees his idea for a film. And that's the first one.

His second idea for a movie, he says, well there we are. He says -- and there, he becomes cuter and cuter; he says, I always feel like a woman. I have a very deep becoming-woman, he says. We all have it, he's wrong to claim that; we all have it, you see, I have a very deep becoming-woman, so I am very sensitive to the situation of women – on this point, the situation of women would be a little retro, a little retro ... not great. He said, I had an idea, a second idea, to make a movie about -- I'm basically summing it up, but you'll refer to the text -- making a movie about women and market value, woman and market value. That is, there we see his idea: women, they are like cinema, it's so caught up in money, so caught up in a money system. Is that still true? No, no, I would say, no, Toscan du Plantier, that is not true. But it was, surely, it's caught within such a story, it's like painting, right? This is all rotten. [*Laughter*]

So, forgive me; that's a mistake, I mean for painting, so caught up in money that it's over, it's ... over, it's money and corrupt, because there is a painting market; never has the market invaded an art like painting. Music is not invaded by the market, except unfortunately for some ... at least the music, uh ... and not to this point. Literature is not invaded by the market. What's going on with the market for literature is not serious. But here, painting is really invaded, determined, dominated by the market. Well then, women are like painting according to Toscan du Plantier; they're like painting, that is, the confrontation with market value is conscious. A woman has to make money, there you have it, or she has to raise it, she has to turn money around, she has to keep money circulating, that is her sad condition.

Fine, he said, I had this idea, and that's how I wanted to return to it -- because it wouldn't have been a sufficient idea -- uh damn, I forgot the name, uh -- "The Lady of the Camellias". It's like that in ... it's an idea ... you can't fight. If it's true what he says, he indeed had an idea. Because consider "The Lady of the Camellias", a very classic subject; until now, it has not been considered that way. Consider "The Lady of the Camellias" as referring to the idea of the confrontation of women with perpetual market value. Namely he says, and he says it very well, and he says, and well yes, his father rapes her -- for him, this is his version, "The Lady of the Camellias" -- her father rapes her, but it earns him money. On this basis, he distributes her to men. He sells her; that earns him money. Men, they will do without all that, with a business that is occurring at the same time, at the same time. All that still earns money. She has consumption; what does consumption mean to her? It's too much; he says spiritually, Toscan du Plantier, it's an occupational disease. It is an occupational disease. Well, she's earned a lot of money and on that basis.

What is happening? A little guy, Alexandre Dumas fils, who falls vaguely in love with her, and who does what? What will he do? A play, a play that will make money. The poor thing is dying from it. [*Laughter*] All the money that revolves around her, that she raises etc. ... So, it's woman and the market value, woman who does not escape market value. It's an idea; let's grant him that what he says is true, "The Brontë Sisters" and "The Lady of the Camellias". And there he said, my God, what happened? I will choose my directors. I'll tell them: This is the idea. That's the Whole.

And I don't see anything shocking there, it's still within my problem, who is the author of the film? And what are they doing surreptitiously (*dans le dos*)? In fact, I saw one of the two films,

and it is true that what he says, it is less certain that he had the idea as purely as he claims, but surely after all, no, no, there is every reason to trust him. He says, well, don't you know what he did to me as the director of "The Brontë Sisters"? He turned it into a story of three sisters who only think about one thing: Castration of the brother. [*Laughter*] He says, in any case, I was aghast. So, is this true? I haven't seen the movie, so I'm not going to ...

A student: Yes, it is.

Deleuze: Uh so, you see, the idea of the Whole, the Whole, what was it, as the ideal producer conceived it? It was three women go outside, break down barriers, speak up. Fine, you can say, this is a bad idea, you can say whatever you want; it's an idea. On the other hand, three women unite closely around the brother and castrate him. I can say, this is another idea, quite differently oriented, and if it is, in fact, well, we can say once again it is for the ... yes, finally psychoanalysis has struck.

A student [*who had spoken before*]: They are taking the spotlight away from men, uh ...

Deleuze: "The Lady of the Camellias", I saw it there, it is absolutely true what he says. The Whole has been completely betrayed because what we see and what is constantly suggested and shown in the images is that consumption is not at all an occupational disease, but that it is a psychosomatic disease, a psychosomatic illness that comes from this: from the guilt that the poor girl experiences from the guilty relationship she has with her father. So there, once again, psychoanalysis has struck a second time, that is, has transformed a good film idea into a lamentable psychoanalytic idea.

So, in a case like that, you see that, because of our criteria, we can indeed ask the question, "Who is the author of the film?", with both a relatively constant response and the variations corresponding to that response. I am saying: The author of the film is the one who conceives the idea, once we allow for my three instances, the one who conceives the idea and who determines the movements, that is, the temporal movements, that is, the shots which will express the idea and which operate the framing of the objects into which the idea will be divided. But we do not at all exclude that there might be an encounter between several people, the cameraman, the decorator, and the assistant director (*régisseur*) that, once again, I would situate as a block, the director, the producer, the ideal producer; the three can be united in the same person. I would say the ideal producer is the one who conceives the idea, that is, the Whole, which takes existence only as conceived. The director is the great assembler (*agenceur*) of the shots. The cameraman-decorator-assistant is the one who determines the objects that enter into each shot. So, when the three people are united in one, there is no problem with who the author of the film is. And I believe there is a possible problem, for example, between "producer" and "director", in ideal privileged cases like the one I just quoted with all the betrayals you want. Because sometimes the betrayal occurs in reverse. Obviously, the producer who has a shitty idea, right, who has a really bad, insignificant idea, and it only takes a great director to enhance the idea. So, it's at this level that we would ask the question: Who is the author of the film?

Next time, we will continue, and I will urge you to think about my concerns, and if necessary, you will say what you have to say about it. [*Sounds of chairs*]

A student: Moravia tells this story ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, from the producer, yes, but this is a producer yes, indeed. [*End of session*]  
[2:07:39]

[*End of the Web Deleuze recording; the Paris-8 recording, date 24/11/81-2 as well as the transcription of this segment on the Paris-8 site erroneously repeats about forty minutes of this session which ends at 2:07:39, not at 2:50:00*]

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> The novel is by F. Scott Fitzgerald; the film is by Henry King (1962).

<sup>2</sup> Deleuze quotes this text, that he properly attributes to Jean Epstein and not to Léger, in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 23-24 (*L'Image-mouvement*, p. 39), citation from Epstein, *Écrits sur le cinéma, 1921-1953*, volume I (Paris : Seghers, 1974), p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> Deleuze refers to this shot by Vidor in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 22-23 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 36-37). The subsequent reference to Murnau's "The Last Laugh" is on the same pages.

<sup>4</sup> By referring to *The Movement-Image*, we can add this third example, lost due to the recording's interruption. Preceding the two other examples, Deleuze refers to the movement-image as Pudovkin describes it (p. 22), and then continues with Pudovkin's example. However, Deleuze seems to derive his reference from Pierre Lherminier's *L'Art du cinéma* (Paris: Seghers, 1960), p. 192; see *The Movement-Image*, footnote 17, p. 220.

<sup>5</sup> In this example of a reference quickly presented by Deleuze seemingly in passing, it concerns a Romanian poet, novelist and mathematician who wrote, among other works, *The Golden Number: Pythagorean Rites and Rhythms in the Development of Western Civilization* (1931; Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Deleuze cites Worringer's take on Gothic art in *Form in Gothic* (Putnam, 1927), in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 51-52, and note 29, p. 225.

<sup>7</sup> This was a 1979 film by André Téchiné.