Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image

Lecture 10 - 23 February 1982

Transcribed by Kamissa Koné (Part 1, 1:13:30) and Transcription unattributed (Part 2, 1:10:58); additional transcription revisions and timestamp, Charles J. Stivale

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Part 1

We'd got to this point… We were analyzing, were in the middle of analyzing, the second type of image, the affection-image. And the affection-image, in the conditions posed by cinema, seemed to us *firstly* – and by *firstly* I don't mean *exclusively* – it seemed to us to be firstly the face. And the face seemed to us to be the close-up. So just as we had done for the preceding image, or type of image, the perception-image, we looked for the poles that would allow us to undertake an analysis, to pursue this analysis and perhaps, for the sake of convenience, we found two poles, the two poles of the affection-image, or what for moment – and it makes no difference for our purposes – we can call the close-up face.

Basically, the first pole was – and here I recap very quickly – the contour-face or the face that thinks, the face that reflects. And it seemed to us that this reflecting face, this face that thinks, could be defined as follows: it expresses a quality, it expresses one or more qualities. To the point that we could as well call it *the qualitative pole of the image*.

Second pole, second pole... this was the trait-face, the traits of faciality, and this time we had the face that feels. It was no longer a question of contour, because what we had now was the marking of traits in the facial mass – traits that were variable – and this is equally valid for the eye, the mouth, a corner of the nose and so on. And this face that feels was defined, or presented itself, as follows: it passed by way of an intensive series, and by passing by way of an intensive series it no doubt made us pass from one quality to another. For example the gradation of despair, or the gradation of wrath that will make things pass from one quality to another, meaning it will make something possible. And this time, this second pole of the face – the trait-face or face that feels – could as well be defined in virtue of its character, the intensive-series from which it cannot be separated, as it could according to the notions "potential" or "intensive".

So there were two poles of the face: the qualitative pole and the potential, or intensive, pole. Now, it goes without saying that, in a certain sense, in a close-up face, in a certain manner and whatever filmmaker we invoke, we will find examples of both. As a matter of fact, the two poles are always present. So, while I was trying to sketch out, or indeed – because this is all stuff we've already covered extensively – take up some concrete examples from such and such a director, it was clear that the two poles were always already there. I just wanted to say that in any given example, whether we were looking at an author, a film, or a particular image – there was nevertheless a prevalence of one pole over the other.

But I would also add that, if it's true there was a prevalence of one pole over the other, whatever example we happened to be looking at, it was necessary that from the prevailing pole, one was able to recover also the other pole. In fact, the two poles were always there.

Quite simply, they were present under conditions where one pole prevailed. And it's from the prevailing pole that we would be able to recover, to grasp the other pole. That is to say, let's suppose… let's suppose a close-up where what prevails is the qualitative aspect. The question will then be: under what conditions can the intensive series be grasped? Let's imagine an intensive close-up. The question will then be: under what conditions can the qualitative aspect be grasped?

As a result, I started with a first doublet, taking up analyses concerning the Griffith close-ups and the Eisenstein close-up, and showing how, of course, the two poles were present in each of the two. But perhaps, perhaps, that does not prevent, with all sorts of precautions, one from speaking of a prevalence of the qualitative close-up, of the qualitative face in Griffith, that is, of the face which expresses a quality, and conversely, when I was talking about a prevalence of intensive faces and of the intensive series in Eisenstein.

And then I moved on to another doublet, another comparison, and that was Expressionism on the one hand and Sternberg on the other. And in the case of Expressionism I had been saying, well, yes, finally their conceptions of the close-up face are going to be inseparable. And that's what will prevail in both of them. A series of degrees of shadow, series of a single degree… an intensive series of degrees of shadow which, incidentally, can be analyzed in very different ways – either in the form of the striped image, of zones of shadow and light, or in the form of chiaroscuro. So already there are some quite significant variations in style.

And if the face is treated according to this prevalence – the intensive series of degrees of shadow – how can the other pole, the qualitative face, be grasped? It seems to me that it will somehow be recovered at the very end of the series. Meaning that the series of intensive degrees of light and shadow will eventually lead to the face, the luminous face, the strongly lit face that emerges from darkness surrounded by a halo. H-a-l-o. And this is the "Expressionist halo", the infinitely reflective head, the infinitely reflected head of Mephisto or the devil. So there again I found this oscillation, but in fact the prevalence of the intensive pole in Expressionism served to confirm our previous analyses.

Then I moved on to Sternberg, saying that if the term anti-Expressionism could be employed in his case, it was precisely here. Because what is it that is going to count, what will be constitutive or will prevail in Sternberg? This time it's the immediate relationship between light and the color white. You might tell me that that's not the only thing, which is why I'm taking precautions. But as I was saying, it's clear this isn't the whole story. There are shadows in Sternberg. But that's not the question. The question is: at what moment of his operation, we might even say his logical operation, do these shadows appear? How are they generated? Isn't there a difference in nature between the Expressionist shadow and the Sternberg shadow for example?

I would say that he begins… that is to say, the prevalence is given to the adventure of white, and the adventure of white is the encounter between white and light, meaning that white reflects light. All that interests him is this and all he does he will do using these elements. The rest will be a consequence. He expresses this in a very interesting text, a kind of memoir[1] where he says that there are two ways of treating the face – and this suits us because it's, well... anyway, so what does he add. He says that either the face should be made to reflect light or if this proves impossible… if this proves impossible – meaning that either one doesn't know how, or that the face is of a type that isn't able to reflect light, or that for some reason this effect is not what is desired... anyway "if it is impossible" then it's better to plunge it into shadow.[2]

What interests me in this text – it clearly isn't a confirmation of our two poles, which in any case we don't really need – what interests me is when he says "if it is impossible" meaning that the prevalence, explicitly stated, is to produce a reflecting face, make this white face reflect the light, and "if it is impossible" it's better to plunge it into shadow.

We can clearly see here that from this prevalence, he will grasp something of the intensive series, even if his essential business is above all with white and light. And how will he manage this question of white and light? I already gave you some examples – which is the point we reached the last time, so I can pick up from there – I gave you some examples, looking at *The Scarlet Empress* [3], of those close-ups where the white of the face reflects the light under different conditions. But I hadn't yet analyzed these specific examples drawn exclusively from *The Scarlet Empress.*

If we want to analyze this further, it seems to me there's an excellent text on Sternberg in Claude Ollier's book *Souvenirs écran*[4]*,* a collection of articles he published in *Cahiers du cinéma.* There's an excellent text on a Sternberg film that has just been rereleased, *The Saga of Anatahan*.[5]

Ollier begins by pointing out something that seems to me quite significant, which is particularly evident in this film, *Anatahan*. He says that Sternberg's preliminary approach is always to reduce the space, compress the location... reduce the space, compress the location, so as to produce what Ollier very eloquently calls an "exiguous field of operation".

I said that this is a preliminary step. Why is this? Because from the very start of the film, depending on what he requires, he begins with rather narrow spaces, spaces that are somewhat reduced. But in most of his films we witness a reduction of space, even if later he goes back to a slightly larger space that he will reduce in turn. However, this operation of reduction of space is exemplary. In my view, and it's no accident I refer to this director, there is only one other filmmaker who is able to obtain such powerful effects of the reduction of space: It's Mizoguchi. Although in Mizoguchi's case, it's for a completely different purpose, and with completely different means.

I think there's just something about Sternberg that we should keep in mind for our purposes. It's no accident that Sternberg was fascinated by oriental themes. There's something in his need to reduce, to frame, to partition space that is already quite significant and that will draw him towards oriental themes and quite often make the situations in his films oriental ones. That's strange. What do I mean by this? Well, quite often we will see this in *Anatahan*. Ollier describes it well, because at the beginning of the film… what kind of space do we have? Right from start, we witness a succession of reductions of space, but to arrive at what? Obviously to get to what he wants. But what does he want exactly?

The space of the first shots is that of the war in the Pacific, with a Japanese ship that has the job of supplying the islands held by the Japanese army. The ship is torpedoed and so on, and very quickly we have a reduction of space. The survivors arrive on an island. First reduction: it's no longer the war in the pacific but the survivors on the island. Reduction of space. A new reduction of space follows: it's no longer the island, which is very quickly dispensed with, but the house on the island. And then, finally it will no longer be the house on the island – and this is where, you feel, he gets to what he wants – it will be the portions of space delineated both by paper walls and by all kinds of veils. Since indeed... and this will be the accompaniment to what? Instead of the world we began with, what will emerge more and more? The face of a young woman in close-up. Everything occurs as though the reduction of

the space, the reduction of subsequent spaces, led us from the establishing shot of the world to the close-up face.

Now I ask you, what is that delineates this reduction of spaces finally... as Sternberg moves towards the space he really wants? As we saw last time, he uses all kinds of veils. It is in fact the veil that will circumscribes the white space in which something will happen. In other words it's through the veil that the confrontation between white and light will take place. And what is it that will happen? Actually, many things will happen. What will happen first of all is the extraordinary adventure of the Sternbergian close-up – that is, the face caught between the white background and the veil that describes the space, the exiguous space involved, constituted or preserved. The face will become an adventure of white. The face will become an actual incrustation of the *voile*.

And here I recall – I already mentioned it last time – the extraordinary images in *The Scarlet Empress* where you have her face asleep on the white sheets, on the white pillow... and through a veil, her face becomes truly an incrustation – hence the use of lace, muslin... of everything, everything Sternberg knew by heart... really by heart, meaning in accord with his taste and skill. The space is reduced in such a way that the face, described and determined by the veil, by the tulle or lace, becomes no more than an incrustation of the veil. The traits of faciality seem to have completely vanished. This is the adventure of white.

What is telling here is that, while it's quite true that the traits of faciality disappear, so too does the contour. And this clearly complicates matters. And what does he obtain by this? He will be able to determine the conditions under which light and white meet. The conditions under which light and white meet consist in the veiling that determines an exiguous white space. The same goes for the place, which will become the place of light, to the point that there is an absolute complementarity of light and veil. The veil passes to the light, the light passes through the veil.

So now stop for a moment to ponder on this... Usually, what happens in a close-up, what does he obtain? I have the impression that he manages to obtain something... that in the end he is perhaps the only filmmaker who has been able to do so. As they say of a great literary author... that's him, that's his style. You mustn't touch it, you mustn't even touch these things, it can only work once. He found something, what was it? Well, put yourself in his place... we come back to a normal close-up of the reflecting type, which is to say of the Sternberg pole, since we saw that he gives prevalence to the reflecting face – but a normal close-up of a reflecting face, one that reflects light.

I see two cases here, two possible cases: either the reflecting face looks at the camera or the reflecting face looks away. And these are the only two possibilities. The first possibility is well known. It's known throughout history. It is what has always been strongly criticized, with a few exceptions. What has always been criticized in close-ups is precisely the camera-look, when a face shot in close-up looks at the camera.

Clearly this produces a quite special effect, but if the special effect is not absolutely necessary, it's a catastrophe. It's a catastrophe. It's very, very bad. Which is why, in the vast majority of reflecting close-ups, of reflecting faces in the sense both of reflecting the light – notice how I always play on this word, *reflecting*… I use reflecting face both in the sense of "face that thinks", but more profoundly in the sense of "face that reflects the light", and cinematographically it amounts to the same thing: to think is to reflect the light, at this level. So, well, what would be the cases where it's very successful?

Let's cite some successful cases of the camera-look. There are a number, I think, but we should look at them again. It's so annoying, when you can no longer remember. I think in the famous close-up in *City Lights* there is a wonderful camera-look, at the end Charlie's head in close-up looks at the camera – but we should check. One I'm pretty sure of, because Bazin speaks about it, is at the end of *The Nights of Cabiria* [6] – and it's interesting that in both cases these examples happen at the end of the film. Bazin says that the heroine, on several occasions, looks at the camera but he congratulates her on the fact her gaze is as if distracted. In fact she passes, she roves the field, she passes, and her eyes pass, several times in front of the camera. And now I'm taking a risk, because I have a vague impression – but there is at least one person who has confirmed this to me – that also in *A Day in the Country* [7] there is a quite beautiful camera-look.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, really? And so… what?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh yes, I don't know it... It's a...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, really? Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes... [*Pause*] [26 :00] Have you finished?

A student: Yes.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: In *Monika*? [8]

The student: It's the story of a young Swedish girl who gets married… and in the middle of the film, right in the middle... there's a camera-look [*Inaudible*]

A third student: [*his name is Alain, as we will see in the next exchange*]: Orson Wells too, in *Citizen Kane*...

The second student continues: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, really? You're saying that in *Citizen Kane* there are camera-looks?

Alain: At the end, when Orson Welles asks his wife not to go and says: "Don't go!"

Deleuze: Ah, really?

Alain: There's an enormous shot of a swollen face, huge and quite striking!

Deleuze: So it seems to happen more often than I… I've never seen *Monika*.

The second student: [*Inaudible*]

Alain: *Monika*'s awful... *Monika*'s awful…

Deleuze: So the whole of Bergman would be awful. That's not the question, that's not the question. Yes... What? [*Deleuze speaks again to the second student*]

Alain: You shouldn't... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes...

Claire Parnet: There's Sylvia Bataille at the moment she's just lost her virginity to the son, when she looks at the camera...

Deleuze: Yes, that's it!

Claire Parnet: Her eyes are slightly teary. Godard also talks about it. There you have a very emphatic camera-look...

Deleuze: Very emphatic, yes...

Claire Parnet: Long before *Monika*.

Alain: Is that in *A Day in the Country*?

A fourth student: [*Inaudible, but seeming to question Parnet's observation*]

Claire Parnet: It's in *A Day in the Country*, it's a very sensual look that nonetheless lasts quite a long time...

The fourth student: [*He continues to object*]

Deleuze: But it isn't the same type, because I remember Bergman's statements, when he always says: I like to throw in an image that reminds people that it's only cinema... it would be that, it would be that… But in my view, he's wrong, I don't mean he's wrong to do that, but I would say it's for a completely different reason... indeed we'll save that for later, we'll go back to it another time... Is it that in certain cases... you already see our subdivisions? And that they would multiply because, even if we focus exclusively on the example of the camera-look, we could say that in certain cases it has the pretension of reintroducing a "cinema consciousness", an "all this is just cinema". In other cases – I think you're absolutely right – in *A Day in the Country,* that's not at all what happens. The look which is quite splendid, the sublime look of Sylvia Bataille, when she casts a glance towards the camera, that's not what happens, we can't just say, this is all just cinema, not at all. On the contrary, it has a specific meaning. But what would that be? In my view, the "cinema consciousness" argument is never sufficient. I don't mean it's false – and we will see why in a minute, perhaps we will see why precisely with regard to Bergman.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: In… [*incomprehensible title*] it's constant too? That's very interesting... [*Several students including Parnet all speak at once*] It's in Schmid too? Yes, yes, yes... But she no longer looks? Yes? [*Laughter*]

A student: And in *La Paloma*?[9]

Deleuze: Good, good... Yes?

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What film are you thinking of?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah yes, it's true but there it's another case again. Yes, there's the famous camera-look in... No, in *Breathless...* but in *L'Atalante*... do you think there are camera-looks?

Alain: Oh yes, it's fantastic, when they're walking... there's a simulated act of love...

Deleuze: He looks at the camera?

Alain: He looks at the camera!

Deleuze: You see? Blessed be this day! [*Laughter*] Yes, that's great! I thought there were very few, but then I don't go to the cinema very much...

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: In Ozu? Also in Ozu? [*The student continues*] Oh yes, so it happens quite often… [*Laughter*] very often, very often... Really? It's a principle of his cinema? Oh dear! [*Laughter*] Okay, so we should keep in mind this frequency and draw our conclusions from that... All you need to do is… those of you who feel misled by me, you can just correct it and put "frequent" instead of "rare"… [*Laughter*] Yes?

The second student: [*Inaudible, though seeming to respond to the negative comments made previously regarding* Summer with Monika]

Deleuze: Yes, yes... [*The student continues to speak about the importance of Bergman; several students speak at once*] … So, as you remember it, the close-up at the end of *City Lights* isn't a camera-look? Can anyone tell me if there is a camera-look at the end?

The second student: There, it's an homage to... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: This is something else again. [*Deleuze laughs*] So as we were saying, our two cases of reflecting face, the case where the look, where the face... [*Speaking to Alain*] You're going? Do you have a telephone number? Can you write it down there?

Alain: I don't have a phone any more...

Deleuze: You don't have a telephone any more? [*Laughter*]

Alain: I've only got an address.

Deleuze: So give me your address, then. [*Pause*]

Alain: I'll be a German assistant next year.

Deleuze: Here?

Alain: Yes.

Deleuze: Thanks. So he's going to teach German.

Alain: Mein Herr, mein General! [*Laughter*] [*Chair noises*] Kamerads!

Deleuze: You forget everything, eh? You forget everything? You leave everything? How are you going to get out? [*The students are so tightly packed that it's difficult to reach the door*] Wait, I'll clear you a path? There's an exit this way. [*Pause; students' voices*] We can make an exchange. I'll come to your course later, no, not later... Soon, soon! [*Pause; Deleuze whispers*]

Alain [*at the door*]: So long, Gilles!

Deleuze: Bye! [*Pause*] All of a sudden I looked at him [*he refers to the student who has just left*] and I realized that... you know who he reminds me of in an almost hallucinatory way? Bruno... Herzog's Bruno S. Absolutely! You remember in *Stroszeck* [10], when Bruno takes out a whistle, and begins to whistle I don't know what and he says "Bruno whistles", and talks about himself saying it's always as Bruno... "Bruno is going to do this or that…" [*Laughter*]

Okay, let's get back to what we were doing! What happens in the two cases? Let's call it… Although everything is extraordinary regarding Sternberg who we've hardly started on, who we abandoned, let's call it two ordinary cases, two ordinary case of reflecting faces. In the case of the camera-look, I would say that what we have, borrowing a term from physics, is the equivalent of a total internal reflection. It's as though the light arrived in a medium from where it then bounced back, with the ray changing direction but remaining the same, with the same angle. But what's interesting about the other case? The face that reflects while looking away, no longer looking into the camera… It's quite simple, it's what we would call, no longer a phenomenon of total internal reflection, but of pure reflection. It's as if the light, on meeting with a new medium, was reflected away.

You see… remember what you learned in physics. What makes this happen? It is precisely… What is it that ensures this reflection effect? What ensures the effect of reflection in the close-up face is the fact that he or she doesn't look at the camera but elsewhere, so that... So now let's ask ourselves what more can we do with a reflecting face, with a close-up?

And here we come back to Sternberg. Now all this is quite confusing and it will become even more so, but since this is a blessed day, I'm sure you will help me out. I would just say this. I'll start by saying it very abstractly, so that it's almost clearer that way. I think what is really curious about Sternberg's films, is the way he manages to obtain certain effects where the face

is no longer simply a reflecting surface *vis à vis* the light but instead his adventure of light and white makes the face *refract*. It's no longer the domain of simple reflection... he confers a new function on the close-up face, which will be the equivalent of a kind of *refraction*.

But what do I mean by refraction? Here I'll stick to the basics. I'm not even going to speak about... I'm just going to refer you to a book on the physics of light, where you can find the terms reflection and refraction... So, you know there's total internal reflection and ordinary reflection with the angle it forms. But what do we mean by refraction exactly? It's when light passes from one medium to another. And what happens at the surface of the medium? On the one hand, a part of the luminous ray is reflected symmetrically back to its point of origin, while on the other, a part of it is refracted – which is to say that it sinks into the new medium while changing direction.

You see, if I'd planned to use the blackboard, I would simply have made a drawing. You see… here I trace the line of difference of the two mediums, the ray that arrives along that line, this is the reflection, the two being symmetrical with respect to a given axis and the refraction happens when you have a phenomenon of displacement in the other medium… of the image in the other medium. And this is what we call refraction.

Hear what I'm saying... with his adventure of white, meaning with its veiled white space, and the face between the veil and the white space… the exiguous space, the voile curtain, the face become incrustation of the voile: what does he achieve with all this? To my mind, he obtains some extremely curious effects of refraction, or rather he doesn't simply obtain them. They will coincide, they will coincide with all this: everything happens as if the white face absorbs a part of the light by shifting its direction. The woman reflects a part of the light and at the same time absorbs it, the ordinary close-up subsists, but Sternberg obtains something more: an effect of refraction. She absorbs a part of the light by effectuating a kind of displacement of its ray.

But how is this? How does he obtain this? Suppose… what I'm going to say now is going to sound more and more confusing... but at least I'm proceeding in the right order. Normally, a reflecting close-up of a face is filmed by the camera from a point of view that's not exactly identical but similar, similar to the point of view of the viewer. For example, face to face. I would say for convenience that in this ordinary close-up, whether there is total internal reflection or pure reflection, what you have is basically… not identity but affinity, an assimilation of the point of view of the shot with that of the spectator. So yes, it's a sort of face to face, which nicely defines the conditions of reflection.

And now imagine – and you can sense that this is what occurs in a certain number, not all but a certain number, of Sternberg's close-ups – imagine that the camera is filming the close-up-face from a point of view completely different from the one of the viewer who is called upon to see it. I see a face in close-up, but it has been filmed, in relation to my position, from a point of view that is higher and a little to the left. Yet it's still a close-up that I see frontally. So what do we have here? There is a kind of disequilibrium, a deliberate disequilibrium, between image and vision, and this will be the refraction effect.

And at this moment… I'll finish before you... but I feel that what I'm saying really isn't clear. We'll be able to grasp a whole series of gradations of shadow, since in fact this frontal shot of the close-up-face is made under such conditions that a whole section of face will be in shadow, giving rise to degradations – degradations that consist in what would be the difference between image and vision, meaning between the spectator's point of view and that

of the camera. To the point that this displacement of the image, this kind of displacement, this shifting of the image, or what is even sometimes a blur, will in Sternberg's cinema play exactly the role that the halo, the phosphorescent halo, played in Expressionism, be it of a completely different nature. It's through declination – because that's precisely what refraction is: declination – it's this declination of the image that will become the crucial new element, it seems to me, the fundamental effect of this story of white space and its fundamental encounter with light in Sternberg.

And here, I think, something very peculiar happens. Before asking your opinion on this, I believe that in the review *Cinématographe* [11] – which has two issues that, as I mentioned before, have some interesting articles on the close-up – there's one article in particular regarding Sternberg by Louis Audibert... Louis Audibert who writes something, he makes a remark that seems to me quite important. Though I'm troubled by that fact that he himself doesn't find it particularly important. It bothers me because he says there is a more important point; whereas to me it's quite the opposite: the second remark he makes seems to me to be without any importance, whereas the first is quite brilliant, and at the same time I find the piece as a whole really difficult.

So anyway, I'll read it to you... I have the impression that what I've just been trying to say is the same as what the text says. But I'm not entirely sure... In any case, it's very interesting what Audibert says. He writes: "The close-up focuses... the close-up focuses the spectator's vision... the close-up focuses the spectator's vision on the gaze that it isolates." Okay. And this is specific to Sternberg... "Insofar as this gaze targets..." – but target as a noun, not targets – "Insofar as this gaze constitutes a specific target [*visée*]" – t-a-r-g-e-t – "from a point off screen... Insofar as this gaze constitutes a specific target from a point off screen..." "Insofar as this gaze constitutes a specific target from a point off screen – it sets off a process of perspective that is thus justified by and refers to a point of view, even if there is no absolute identity between image and vision".

Now, I must say that this text really bothers me, because I don't understand... I don't understand if what he means is... There's a first point: does he mean simply... when I read the phrase "The close-up focuses... the close-up focuses the spectator's vision... the close-up focuses the spectator's vision on the gaze that it isolates"... does this simply mean, okay, in the close-up the spectator's attention is attracted towards the gaze of the face of the person shown in the image while this person looks elsewhere? Now he can't mean simply that. He can't mean that because this is true for most close-ups, so it has nothing specifically to do with Sternberg. And yet what annoys me is that it seems he really means "Insofar as this gaze constitutes a specific target…" – t-a-r-g-e-t – "from a point off screen...", it seems to me that this means insofar as the camera films the image from a point of view that doesn't coincide with that of the spectator, in this measure a shift will occur, will necessarily occur, a shift between the image and the vision, meaning between the image such as I, the viewer, see it and the vision, that is to say the camera shot. But if that's what it means, he shouldn't have ended the sentence... I hope that's what it means, I have the impression it is.

So, he might have made a fine analysis of what I tried to define as the refraction-effect, meaning this shifting of the image, this variation of the image. But then he goes and ends the sentence with "*even if* there is no absolute identity between image and vision." And this irritates me because it's not *even if* there's no absolute identity, because it is that, that's what it's made *for*. It's made to break the identity between image and vision, which is to say to obtain the effect of diversion, the effect of drift that we call, precisely, refraction – meaning

that drift of the image which no longer coincides: drift of the image defined by the difference between image and vision, between my point of view as a spectator and the camera shot.

You understand? So I'm a bit puzzled by this text, can anyone enlighten me? I imagine not, so I have the impression that... Let's go back to what I was trying to say... do you? I have the feeling I'm trying to say something and I can't find the right way to put it, but that maybe we can manage to express it, even speaking more technically, we can find a good way to express it. In *Shanghai Express* [12] and *The Shanghai Gesture* [13] this kind of drifting close-up appears very powerfully, much more so than in *The Scarlet Empress.* In *The Scarlet Empress* there is the blurring effect but it seems to me there is also... yes, yes, also... there are clearly several close-ups of faces that are shot slightly obliquely from a high angle. Looked at from an angle. Meaning, I look frontally but the camera films from an angle. That's it! That's the effect of displacement: the spectator is facing the image while the camera angle is awry, from above for example. Yes, that makes it clearer.

So there you have an effect of shifting the image, and I could even say that the shift of the image, meaning the refraction-effect, is the very opposite of the Expressionist halo. If we were to establish a theory of light in cinema, we would have to take into account all these factors and many others besides. While the Expressionist halo was a form of shadow, beginning from the prevailing pole of the intensity or degree of shadow, it led to the other pole, meaning it attained or managed to reproduce a type of reflection. But here it's the reverse. Sternberg's shift, Sternberg's blur, the drift of the image, which is to say its refraction-effect, is the way that beginning from his own prevailing pole, meaning the reflecting face, he will grasp the other pole – for in that veiled white space, shot through with light, what will happen thanks to the refraction-effect? What will happen is the intensive adventure of passions.

The intensive adventure of passions, but at the very summit of their intensity, in series where they become, or even intensify, because – and here I come back to an idea in Ollier's fine article – this white space, which is artificial, veiled etc. is in the end the most open space there is, but open towards uncertainty, meaning that it's the space where *anything can happen.* Anything can happen, no matter what. And this, as everyone knows, is part of what makes Sternberg's images so wonderful, his compulsion in ensuring that at a certain moment the veil will be torn, either by... but of course it varies... it could be by a red-hot iron – but I don't remember in what film – or a knife, as in *Macao* [14], all these ways of tearing the veil so as to let something from outside enter the frame, something external that intrudes into the white space of the veil.

So I would say that while through the refraction-effect Sternberg is able to grasp the whole series of intensities, at the same time the white space circumscribed by the veil opens up, meaning that it is the very space where we have passed from the quality of white to potentiality, to intensive potentiality, where everything is now possible – for example, in *Anatahan,* with the dagger that pierces the paper partition. So you see, and here I'll sum up again, just as Expressionism, beginning from the intensive series, was in its own way able to conquer the reflecting face, the face that reflects the light, so too conversely Sternberg, beginning from the prevailing pole of the light-reflecting face, will – through a highly innovative play of space – reclaim the potential, intensive aspect. From now on, anything could happen. And I repeat this phrase because it comes from the dialogues of one of Sternberg's films.[15]

So here we have another case, if we try to group them… histories of cinema often group Frank Borzage[16] with Sternberg – and here, unfortunately, if I've ever seen any of his films it was a very long time ago. But I think that in Borzage too, you have an extraordinary adventure of white, of light and white, but with means very different from those of Sternberg. In fact, I appreciate that in everything we do, and have done right from the beginning – and sometimes I don't even say it, because it's too obvious... I think it's a good idea to leave some gaps, which you can either fill in yourselves or re-elaborate in your own way. So what I'm saying is… here's something that really should be seen.

So, at this point, what progress have we made? Basically, we have, as it were, exhausted a certain number of examples. And when I speak of gaps, there are all sorts of big gaps... and that's why I wasn't so keen on the interventions you made earlier when you told me that we could just as well speak about this or add that or that I should go and watch that Portuguese – was he Portuguese or Argentinian? – that I have to see it. It's funny, isn't it? Quite boring? It's not, it's not... well, cinema is incredible because before... well... well, anyway.

So at this point, what should we do now? I think that if we go on piling up examples, we won't get any further, since we'll just be reconfirming what we already know, because we've already had two series of confirmations: Griffith-Eisenstein and Expressionism-Sternberg, so we can say ok good, that's enough, it's fine for the moment. It's sufficient. Now we really have to move on, *not* to more examples but to a real analysis, meaning what right did we have to begin – because we never stopped to question it – what right did we have to begin with the formula: "the affective image is the face and the face is the close-up"? Because in fact we used it as our point of departure, and now we can no longer go back. Actually, I said the affective image is *firstly*, and I say *firstly* – and I'm not saying it couldn't be something else – but why is it *firstly* the face and why is the face the close-up? Because for what we call face, generally speaking, there's no real need of a close-up. Why a close-up? And again not all close-ups are of faces, there are also close-ups of objects. Fine. Everybody knows that, right?

Half past eleven… Phew! Are you tired? Shall we stop for five minutes? Shall we? Yes? No? Can't we? I don't know… Would you mind shutting the door? I'm go there too… [*Various noises and voices*] Good, ok. Chin up! You can make it!

So you know what a face is, yours and mine... but what does that mean? What does a face mean? Well, a face – I'll keep it simple – a face, it's well known, means three things. It means three determinations. A face has an individuating character: your photo is your... Oh, these damned recording machines, ah... Your photo is your identity photo. Well, we can see that. At the same time, the same face is a social role. Yes. Can I go ahead? I'm trying to get through this but I'm not getting very far. We're drowning in platitudes here, but we have to do it... Individuating character, social role. These are two aspects of the face. This will help me. Let's try... when we're dealing with notions, there's always the temptation to elicit echoes. So can I say that the individuating aspect is the reflecting face, while the social role consists, rather, in traits of faciality?

In some respects you might want to say that. Professions, for example, people of whom you say: look, he's wearing the face of a particular profession, or you can see what he does from his face. This doesn't come from the reflecting contour-face, which to my mind carries very scant indication of a profession. The real indicators of the reflecting contour-face are those of individuation. However, traits of faciality, the way a neck that's a little too stiff, say, announces the military… Oh, what a stiff-neck! Here I see someone, I look at him and say "Good morning sir". But ten he stands up to go away and I see his neck is part of his face, and

I think: Oh I should have said, General... I should have said "Good morning General," not "Good morning sir." Or else I see someone at an exhibition looking at a painting and I look at him and say to myself, "That guy's quite good looking", and then I look again and I think, "He has an odd way of looking, from the way he's looking he must be an auctioneer." He has a trait of faciality socially stamped on his face.

Could we make this correspondence? Yes and no. In certain cases we can but not in others. There are certain traits of faciality that are clearly not professional. Again, we can say that anger rises, anger rises, but as Eisenstein would say proletarian anger doesn't rise in the same way as bourgeois anger. The traits of faciality are not the same. In the exemplary case of Eisenstein, if you take the two great scenes – one where the bourgeois women start hitting, bludgeoning people with their umbrellas and the other showing the proletarian anger rising among the sailors – there you have different traits of faciality that are very socially marked... from the point of view of class. But we'll leave it at that. I don't think it's going to get us very far

But on the other hand it must lead us to something, because after all, what is a face if not the dialogue between individuating character and social role? I mean, if faces communicate with each other, that's not what matters. Faces that communicate with each other are first of all faces through which each of us communicates with ourselves. And after all, this is perhaps one aspect of the actor's work – but we'll come back to these questions, we're getting closer – perhaps it's one aspect, a small aspect of acting. To ensure this face to face communication, but not between two faces, rather this intra-communication between the individuating factor of the face and its social or collective factor. And what we will call communication is above all the relationship between the individuating and social factors, and indeed this constitutes the face's credibility: individuating factor/ social factor/ communication factor. Good. So there you have it. An ordinary face.

So what is a close-up? You see that for the moment I'm still analyzing things, trying to justify the statement I so blithely proposed when we began. The affective image is first of all a face and a face is first of all a close-up. So what is a close-up? Imagine a face that has undone its triple aspect. It has undone everything, it has undone its appearance and it has denounced this triple aspect as pure appearance. Imagine a face like this, and you'll tell me, what's left? proceed very slowly here. Either nothing or else a close-up... nothing or a close-up. So what is a close-up? It's *the* face.

I repeat. There are no close-ups *of* the face because the close-up *is* the face. I just want to clarify this before we go on. Yes, of course, it's the face, but insofar as it has undone its triple appearance. Insofar as it has undone its appearance of individuation, its appearance of socialization, its appearance of communication. So what is left under this triple appearance? Nothing but a close-up. But of course you can sense right away that it won't be enough to say nothing but a close-up. However, we first have to consolidate this point. So, is it really that?

The figure who immediately arouses this question, the figure we spoke about earlier, is Bergman. Is it by chance that Bergman is the filmmaker who has so often repeated how cinema has only one subject, namely the face? Cinema has only one subject: the face.[17] And in the end, *only one* means: the close-up. The rest is there to bring us to a close-up, to circle around a close-up, the consequences of a close-up. But cinema has only one subject: the face. And only one means: the close-up. So what does this mean? It means that for Bergman there is no other question. It's a proposition that would be literally empty if it referred to the essence

of cinema itself. Bergman knows perfectly well there are filmmakers he admires greatly who don't work in this way. But for him, that's what cinema is. The cinema he makes is that.

So what does Bergman do with his close-ups of faces, because isn't he one of the great directors of the close-up? Well, here the close-up face has a triple function: to undo individuation, to undo socialization, to undo communication. To undo individuation... No I'll start with the easiest part, undoing socialization. That's the whole theme in all of Bergman's films. The drama begins, which is to say cinema begins, when people abandon their roles – revocation of the social role, culminating in the role of the actor, meaning that the actor at a certain moment… not forever naturally, the actor who at a certain moment gives up acting… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:13:31]

Part 2

… It's as though the role of the actor were the role of roles. And it's this that Bergman, employing a wholly classical philosophical terminology, or wholly classical psychology, calls the "persona". The persona is the social role, or at least this is one aspect of the persona. In all of Bergson's films… I mean in all of Bergman's films, the premise of the film – for one reason or another – is the collapse of the social role.

The second collapse, which is more interesting and more important... but you see the first would be worthless if – and here I think we're finally beginning to get somewhere – if it consisted in simply saying: but under the social role is your true individuality, be yourself… to which I would answer, all that may be true but in the end... it is neither very new nor particularly exciting. Of course you can say that, but you can already guess it's not what Bergman's about.

So I'm more interested in this. Strangely enough, for Bergman the individuating aspect of the face and the socializing aspect of the role are strictly correlative. If you undo or cause one to dissolve, you will also undo the other. So we don't know if he's right in this but in any case it's an idea that seems much more interesting – philosophically it's much more interesting.

And what aspect of Bergman's cinema does this refer to? It's that when the social role collapses… well what collapses with it? Individuation. And you will then find yourself confronted with strange faces, faces redoubled or tripled. So here we fall back into allusions, but what allusions? Do they look the same? Yes and no? Yes, perhaps we can say that Bergman's faces look alike. I quote… I've made a little list... the two women of *Persona,* the two women in *Face to Face,* the two sisters in *The Silence,* the two sisters and the maid in *Cries and Whispers.*[18] Those are the ones I can more or less recall. Those are the ones I more or less recall. So there you have it. There's a whole series there.

As I said, the individuating factors collapse. There is that famous image in *Persona*, the famous image from *Persona* that everyone recalls – and then the anecdotes about *Persona* where Bergman decides... is he making fun of us or is he serious? After all, the resemblances... He says that what struck him was the resemblance between the two actresses who play the film's two roles: the actress who has abandoned her role, her social role, who has abandoned her persona, and the nurse. He says they resemble each other. Yes, but then he says... not entirely. And then he says, it depends on the point of view, he doesn't really care about the idea that they look like each other. But obviously that's a trap, we have to be wary of people's public statements. Sometimes people's public statements can help us, sometimes a lot, but at any moment there can be a trap, a minor trap. It's not really interesting that they look like one another. Do they look like one another or not? As you wish. As you wish.

What's interesting is that they are at a level where they no longer have... and it can be a convenient sign that they look a little bit alike, for the viewer it's a convenient sign. And in fact, to cite another example, these two sisters, why wouldn't they look alike, since they are sisters. But that's not what's interesting. What's interesting is that more deeply and at the same time – yes they look like each other okay, yes it's true – but deeper down they are already at a level where it no longer matters if they look like each other or not. Why not? *Because it's the very criteria of individuation that have gone out the window*. It's the criteria of individuation that no longer exist. So the question is no longer that of resemblance or non-resemblance. And this is better. You cannot have abandoned – and this is what's so wonderful about Bergman – you cannot have abandoned your social role if you haven't also lost your very individuation. Not that the two are the same thing, but they are strictly correlated.

Hence the famous image of *Persona* where a part of the actress's face and a part of the nurse's face will compose – but it's something altogether different from a composite image – they will compose a single face in close-up. But what kind of face? One which is not the product of resemblance, which constitutes the level of all faces, the level of *any-face-whatever* that has at the same time lost its socialization and its individuation. It's a face that is no longer individuated. It's no longer individuated though you'll tell me that is only relatively so. It remains a woman's face. A face in the sense of *a*, not in the sense of *one*, but as an indefinite article, yes it's *a* face, and not an individuation of any person. That's what it is. Right. At the same time there isn't any individuation... and in *Cries and Whispers,* which seems to me quite typically Bergman, a really beautiful film – there where you have a trio, the two sisters and a maid, the maid who has a kind of lunar face – in this case there isn't necessarily a composition of two faces: she on her own has a completely washed out face which has at the same time abdicated any sense of social role and any individuated nature.

That leaves the third point that follows from this: from then on communication also collapses, since there is nothing more, nothing more to communicate. And here again the moment has come for us to break very quickly with those platitudes – because they really are unbearable platitudes about the drama of incommunicability, of non-communication, whereas the real drama is exactly the opposite, *the drama is that of communication*. There is no drama regarding non-communication. Non-communication is something to be celebrated. But both for Antonioni and for Bergman, everything that has been written regarding non-communication makes you want to weep. We shouldn't pay it any mind. What is clear is that the function of communication has collapsed because there is nothing left to communicate. There's nothing left to communicate. And how is this shown? The close-up face is struck by muteness... muteness of the heroine of *Persona*, muteness of the maid in *Cries and Whispers* and so on. What we call incommunicability in Bergman's world, far from being a theme for him, is only a preliminary to departure. That's completely obvious.

If you ask the question: Oh face, face, what are you face? If you realize that the very conditions for understanding this question consist in the face renouncing its triple function, then there's no need to cry over non-individuality, non-communication and non-sociality. Quite the reverse: there is something to cheer about, since this signal that more serious things are about to begin, namely the face appears in its nudity, the face appears in its very nudity.

And when the face appears in its nudity, when it appears in this way, this is what we could call the close-up. It's what makes the face's nudity appear. One realizes that the nudity of the face is greater, stronger and more intense than the nudity of any possible body, or body part.. The part of us that can be truly naked, not in a moral sense, but what can really accede to nudity in a dramatic adventure is the face. Bodies, not at all. The nudity of bodies doesn't

matter much. I mean that naked bodies abandon nothing of themselves, in the end they abandon nothing of themselves. Which is why naturism is a rather straightforward adventure. But naked faces abandon everything of themselves, they abandon appearance. Naked bodies on the other hand are in search of appearance, are continually in search of appearance. Naked bodies never cease shouting: give me another appearance! Naked faces are our true nudity.

And at this point let me open a quick parenthesis, quick because I'm already embarrassed by it. The question of the close-up's eroticism isn't hard to understand. The question of the eroticism of the close-up, which forms an integral part of the close-up's entire history, for example in the rapport between the close-up and the screen kiss... how can the eroticism of the face be explained? We can explain it in this way: why is a close-up of the face in some way more erotic than, say, the most typical porn scene? There is someone who understood this – someone quite far from our present field of inquiry, since he was not interested in the affection-image – and that was Hitchcock, Hitchcock's close-up screen kisses...

So perhaps the answer... again the answer would be quite straightforward... but that's fine since all these straightforward answers will be of help to us and we can eliminate them as we advance step by step. A straightforward answer would be to say: Yes, because in the close-up the face stands in for the whole body, which is to say that the face that stands in for the body is the detached object, or say the partial object. And we've been told many times how the close-up is a kind of cinematic partial object. But already we have grave doubts about this. Can we really say that the close-up is a partial object? Does the close-up's eroticism derive from the fact that the face stands in for the whole body? Not at all. Not in the slightest. Once again the thing is... I immediately sense that that's not what it is. Because in a close-up, the face becomes naked. That's a fact. And there is no longer even any need for there to be a kiss.

Hitchcock's cinema, of course, needs screen kisses, but for very simple reasons. In his films there is such a system of perception-images and action-images that affection-images can only intervene by way of the close-up screen kiss. You see what I'm saying. I've nothing against Hitchcock. But Hitchcock... Hitchcock's cinema, in relation to our categories, if you accept our for-the-moment quite abstract division into three types of image – perception-image, action-image and affection-image – we can say that Hitchcock is not particularly interested in the affection-image. The type of actor he seeks, the type of acting, is a kind of neutralization of the affection-image. And his is a prodigious cinema of perception and action images... and other types of image as well. Although here I don't mean to say his cinema can be reduced to this. So much so that the rare affection-images he allows himself, those famous close-up screen kisses, represent a formidable eroticization of the face in Hitchcock's cinema. There he really lets loose. He really lets loose!

Someone like Bergman, however, doesn't need to go through the screen kiss. Firstly, Bergman's characters don't kiss much. You see, kissing is still a form of communication. But that's not what we have here. It's the face in its nudity. And when I said that a face stands in for the whole body, here it's not the case. Because the manner in which the face is naked, namely the way it renounces its triple appearance, has nothing to do with the way in which a body can be naked. So what occurs in this case? What is this type of nudity? It's the face in its being, of all the parts of the body, *the least human element there is*. The close-up is the face torn from humanity. The face in its nudity, the face torn from its humanity, the face that has become inhuman.

So, the face has become inhuman. But then if that's what has happened, then many things become clear, but we're getting ahead of ourselves a little with this theme, which is

nevertheless an important one, a subject that has been present throughout the history of cinema. Ah yes, cinema in the end treats the face as a landscape. Yes? Yes and no. I mean we could have looked at this problem of relation before. Indeed there is a fine text by Bazin on *The Passion of Joan of Arc*, in which he talks about how Dreyer attains a kind of inhumanity of the face in his close-ups. He attains a kind of inhumanity of the face, and that's what makes it cinema, and indeed in one excellent passage Bazin adds how faces are treated as landscapes. Each... and it's often said: face-landscape. I say too bad, we should have thought of it before because it's not part of our current order of business... in that sense, we have already gone a bit further. Face-landscape perhaps, but it can't be a question of just any old landscape. If the face is a landscape, it's not just any landscape because it applies only to those landscapes that have lost their individuation, their sociability, their sociality and their communication. So in the end what constitutes the identity of face and landscape in cinema is something deeper than either the face or the landscape, namely it's this nudity, this appearance of the inhuman face or landscape, of a landscape that is non-human. So, actually we have an inhuman face or non-human landscape. Very good. But then, why wouldn't it be this way? So what is it?

In other words, while the close-up face may express something, it is certainly neither a social role nor a state of mind and it's certain that the cinema actor does not express states of mind, neither a state of mind submitted to a law of individuation nor a social role submitted to a law of socialization, no... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:31:47]

… Which is not to say that the close-up face isn't heavily marked. I don't forget… I mean with a close-up face there's no confusion. Why? Because of what I just said. You don't confuse a close-up of Marlene Dietrich with one of Greta Garbo. So... I will only say that this no longer has anything to do with individuation. Which is the same as saying that this face in its nudity continues to maintain some distinct traits. It's not simply nuance. And this raises the question: what is this face that has caused its triple appearance to dissolve? There is a simple answer to this, which will help us move forward. Only that it will also intrigue us. It's so simple that you're sure to be disappointed.

This face that has undone its triple appearance is a face that, in its nudity, or even its inhumanity, can only be defined thus: *it expresses an affect*. It expresses an affect or several affects. And if it can be distinguished, it's not through a distinction between individuals but one of a completely different nature, namely the distinction between affects. And if affects can be distinguished, it is not at all as persons.

So there you have it. The face in itself, or at least in the way it is presented by the close-up, can be defined as follows: it's the expression of an affect. Now you might tell me you thought we had progressed whereas in fact we've remained stuck. But this isn't true. Because what strikes us at this moment – and if we keep it in mind it should already give us a slight feeling of vertigo – is the mass of things that can no longer serve to define what an affect is. Since we have to understand... if I define the close-up face as the expression of a pure affect, I can no longer define affect either through individuated states of mind or through the signs given by social roles. And I would even say that an affect is always singular but never individuated. It is neither general nor individual.

So for the moment, let's add that a face in its nudity or in its inhumanity is the expression of a pure affect, which is to say – though I haven't justified anything yet – that it's the expression of a singular essence, a singular essence having nothing to do with an individual or person. Good. So have we made progress or not?

But what is this face that expresses an affect? Well, let's go back and look again and be done finally with this business of partial objects, When we're told that a close-up is a partial object and that cinema has all the means to highlight partial objects, meaning to separate the parts from the whole... I find this interests me all the more because it marked the very starting point of the confrontation between linguistics and cinema. I recall a text of Jakobson's that begins with words *pars pro toto* – the part taken for the whole, metonymy – metonymy = cinema.

So, this is interesting for us because it leads us to say: no that's not at all how it is, there is never a part taken for the whole and especially in the best of cases – that of the face – it is not at all a part taken for the whole of the character, or for the person... because *the person has dissolved in the close-up*. Generally speaking, however, there are many critics who hold to the idea of the close-up as metonymy, that is to say as a partial object, a part taken for the whole. And it seems to me that there are two ways in which they do this. Some say: yes, the close-up is a partial object and the problem is therefore that of inserting this partial object into the filmic continuity. As a partial object, it introduces a rupture... and they will go as far as to say that it represents a kind of castration... it introduces a cut, and the question is how to reconcile this with filmic continuity. Others would say that this isn't the case. If it's true that the close-up is a partial object, this shows the very essence of cinema, which is filmic discontinuity. But however much they oppose each other, they agree on this one point: close-up = partial object.

Now for the moment we have a different starting point... I'm not saying it's necessarily a truer one... we'll see where it leads us. We say, not at all, the close-up is not a partial object... so what is it, what is it then? Let's look for a word. It's the expression of a singular essence, that is to say a *pure affect*. It's the expression of a pure affect. But what is that? Let's immediately say so as not to... it's an entity, an entity. And what is an entity? I don't know... an entity is something that, strictly speaking, doesn't exist. Something that doesn't exist... so we go back to the idea that the face is a void. The face is a void. No, because we can moderate. If it's something that doesn't exist, how can I talk about something that doesn't exist. I could also call it a *phantom*. It's an *entity*, a phantom. So here we are… a phantom, an entity.

Something that doesn't exist… Yes, which is to say an entity. An entity is something that doesn't exist independently of what expresses it. *An entity is an expressed which has no existence beyond its expression*. And yet it's not the same thing. The expressed is the pure affect. The expression is the face. *The pure affect is an entity that has no existence beyond what it expresses*. The pure affect is an entity and this goes for the expression too, since it has no existence beyond what expresses it. It's the very set *expressed-expression* that is an entity, which is to say a phantom. The close-up presents the face and the pure affect as the two indissoluble parts of a simple entity – I might even say the two elements of a phantom.

So if that's what it is, this isn't going to help us much. A phantom. I mean, well, yes... Let's start with... Let's put it to one side, we don't seem to have gained much by it. We'll let it lie. And yet, we nonetheless have to... well, what? In what sense is what I've just been talking about real or tangible? What is it? What is it? What is it? It's this: I've always resented, I've always been critical of this conception of the close-up as a partial object. The effect of the close-up is in no way that of separating an object from the whole, of separating a part from the whole, nor is it to perform a cut. This is not at all the effect of the close-up. But we need to have a theory in the back of our minds, because when one is as naive as we are being here... anyway, it's not this, the effect of the close-up.

What immediate effect does a close-up of the face have on you? We know very well that it's the following: what is presented to you, this image... this special kind of image, this close-up

image is torn away. But from what? Not from the whole of which it would be a part, but this image is torn from something. So what is it? Not at all from the whole of which it would be a part. *It is torn from all spatio-temporal coordinates*, and this is how it expresses an essence. This is how you feel that all this is bound together.

So what is the effect of the close-up? What is shown to you no longer exists in either space or time. Does this mean that it exists in eternity? No, it's not that either. I'm not at all saying that it becomes eternal. But perhaps between space, time and eternity there are so many, so very many other things. The close-up image is an image that has been separated from all coordinates, that has been extracted from all spatio-temporal coordinates. Period. At least, as far as I'm concerned.

To make a close-up is the only way to obtain this kind of image. So what does this mean? It means you cannot say, except very roughly, that in a close-up you are up close. You are neither close nor far away. You are neither close nor far away. What is presented to you no longer refers to any spatio-temporal coordinates. And it's in this sense that, as I said before, it is a pure presentation of affects. Why? Because, perhaps affect is like this: pure affect is what no longer refers to any spatio-temporal coordinates, but which is not for this reason eternal. It is what is outside of space and time. So...

There is someone who saw this. There are… there are some wonderful pages, which is why I wish to refer to them now, by a critic I have already mentioned, an important critic whose name is Balazs. B-a-l-a-z-s. And in two of his books Balazs says this... it's so wonderful, so well-expressed… It's strange that few people have remarked on it, but it is Balazs' finest idea... in these books, I really think it's the best idea he has.

The two books to which I refer are *Le cinéma*, published by Paillot... the two books are in fact one. I don't exactly know how Balazs intended it, but they are two versions of the same book. So here is Balazs's text, page 57 of *Le cinéma*... Here it is... He mentions some names, but it doesn't matter, I'll just read you the part that interests me:

"The expression of an isolated face is a whole which is intelligible by itself. We have nothing to add to it by thought, nor have we anything to add to that which is of space or time. When a face that we have just seen in the middle of a crowd is detached from its surroundings, put into relief, it is as if we were suddenly face to face with it. Or furthermore if we have seen it before in a large room, we will no longer think of this when we scrutinize the face in close-up. For the expression of a face and the signification of this expression..." – in our terms I would say, the face as expression and the expressed of the face, namely the affect, you see how perfectly it fits… – "For the expression of a face and the signification of this expression have no relation or connection with space. Faced with an isolated face, we do not perceive space. Our sensation of space is abolished. A dimension of another order is opened to us..."[19] – which he says is that of physiognomy. Here I lose him, it's his business... a dimension... here he got it wrong, in fact what he wanted to say was, a dimension of another order is opened to us, that of pure affect.

And in *The Spirit*... I shouldn't have said that because... *The Spirit of Cinema,* page 100…[20] because that's not how the text goes:

"If we see a face isolated and enlarged, we lose our awareness of space, or of the immediate surroundings. Even if this is a face we have just glimpsed in the midst of a crowd, we now find ourselves alone with it. We may be aware of the specific space within which this face exists, but we do not imagine it for ourselves. For the face acquires expression and meaning

without the addition of an imagined spatial context. The abyss into which a figure peers...” – I have to read on first to see if it accords with what I'm saying... Great! Great! He's understood. Yes. Listen to this: “The abyss into which a figure peers no doubt explains... no doubt explains his expression of terror, it does not create it. The expression exists even without the explanation.” That's exactly it. It's the affect. What we have here is affect. He has realised that it wasn't at all... but of course now he begins to falter, because he then adds: “Confronted by a face, we no longer find ourselves within a space at all…” – Great! – “A new dimension opens before our eyes: *physiognomy.*” No, that's no good. But nonetheless it's still quite important.

So I would say that the function of the close-up is not at all to enlarge a part, nor is it conversely to diminish the space, reduce the space. And it certainly isn't to highlight a partial object. It's to extract, to extract the thing, that is to say the image, from all spatio-temporal coordinates. And what is a botched close-up? A botched close-up... it's easier said than done, but it's not easy to say and it's even harder to do. A botched close-up is when you have moorings that still hold... and by moorings that hold I mean spatio-temporal coordinates that persist. That persist, no matter what you do.

And here I'm thinking of a short, amusing text that made me very happy, even it's perhaps a little unfair... a text by Eisenstein that Cahiers du cinema published. A very amusing text where Eisenstein says: There is a close-up in Griffith's *Intolerance,* an obsessive close-up of a cradle that's supposed to be... that's supposed to be what? Well, no doubt... no, I don't want to add anything, I want to cite Eisenstein's text first. And he says that in a film by Dovzhenko there is also a close-up, a close-up of a naked woman. And he says that they are both botched. But I don't know if they are in fact botched. We should see or review the two images to which Eisenstein refers. But what interests me is why, according to Eisenstein, they are botched. He says that it's because the Griffith close-up, the one of the cradle, doesn't work. He says the cradle remains linked to... look! a baby being born, while Griffith's whole intention was to use it as an image of the origin of time. The cradle of time. And it turns out that it doesn't work. In other words... no, wait a minute, we'll see...

And in the other case, he says, Dovzhenko's image of the naked woman in close-up doesn't work either. It doesn't work because we saw this woman earlier, in her kitchen, surrounded by kitchen furniture and cooking utensils. To the point that we say, ok she's naked in her kitchen. In other words, Eistenstein's text is very useful to me because what it says amounts to this: these are botched close-ups because they are images that even in close-up haven't managed to break away from their spatio-temporal moorings, their spatio-temporal coordinates.

It didn't work. So the close-up was botched. The close-up failed. Well, we always come back to this, but at least we can say we've made some progress. It's odd. We progress while standing still. So there you see how the entity-face is the expression of a pure affect or a singular essence, or else the two elements together. But you understand that these are just elements, they don't constitute a real distinction. For the moment I can't yet distinguish them, for the expressed has no existence beyond its expression. There is no real distinction between expressed and expression. And yet I don't confuse the two. I don't confuse terror as pure affect with the terrorized face, even if the distinction isn't exactly real. Though the cause of terror is completely separate from the terrorized face, terror itself is not really distinct from the terrorized face. And yet there is a distinction. Meaning that terror is the expressed while the terrorized face is the expression. This constitutes a complex, what I called the phantom. And the phantom or entity is now justified, since now I could say that we call phantom or entity all things or beings – I won't say existences, since this doesn't exist, it has no existence beyond its expression – I call phantom or entity all things or beings that are abstracted from spatio-

temporal coordinates. That's what a phantom is. That's what a phantom is! And we live in phantoms.

Why indeed have we placed so much importance on the affection-image in cinema? You see, phantoms are something... something immense. So there you are… But phantoms are faces… that's what phantoms are, faces. There are no phantoms other than faces. So what does it mean to say we live in phantoms? Phantoms are not at all archaic things.

It's time that we took a break, but I won't be long. Time to rest. There's a text by Kafka that struck me, because it's a text that appears in his letters, the *Letters to Milena.* It's a text in which he speaks on his own account, things the way he... the world the way he sees it. And you can feel how important this is to him. So you see, on a first reading it doesn't feel like an idea, I would say it's more like an anecdote, an anecdote because this was how he lived.

It's just that... stories fascinate me, anecdotes from life and their resonance on art forms, especially when they concern a great artist. It's what Nietzsche called anecdotes in the life of a thinker... Empedocles and his volcano, Empedocles who throws himself in the volcano. It's a news item... It's simply that it's a news item of thought. And yet he really threw himself in.

It's a news item of thought. OK... and news items of thought are something extraordinary. Immanuel Kant taking his little walks. Here too you have a news item of thought. Not a news item exactly... yes... no… It's strange. It's a whole field...

So the Kafka news item... Well, the thing about Kafka is that he lived as though the world were twofold, the modern world. He said there are two kinds of things in the world. That's how he experienced it. There are two kinds of things, two kinds of things in the world. There is everything that helps us in space and time. There is, if you like, all of space and time as obstacles – you have to remember this for the future because we are going to need of it, we're really going to need it – what constitutes this first lineage is space and time considered as obstacles, and all the means we have to overcome these obstacles. And Kafka asks, what do these means consist of? Well, it's a whole series driven by the means of locomotion, the means of locomotion. And here he refers to the modern means of locomotion: car, train, boat, airplane. Car, train, boat, airplane. So that's the first series.

And then he says, only we should be careful because there is another series. Our modern world, he says, is fantastic. It could succeed in its enterprise of dominating nature... had there not been another line, no less modern, no less technological – the mistake would be to think that this is the price exacted by anachronism… There's another line, and what is this other line? It's the PTT…[21] the telephone, photography… and to this he would no doubt have added cinema, television etc.

So it's not difficult... actually, it's quite commonplace. No, not really, when it comes to Kafka nothing is commonplace because... And he says, you see, it's as though the technological lineage of space and time could not progress without summoning its opposite and its opposite is equally modern, but in what way would it be its opposite and what does it consist of? In what way is the PTT, telephone, letters... Well, the telephone is the opposite of the train, with it you no longer have to move. These are the means that, rather than making you conquer space and time, spare you from any confrontation with space and time. They take over the movement, something else takes over the movement. Well, what is this something else?

So how can I positively define this other lineage? For Kafka, and this is where he is really magnificent… *it's the lineage that engenders and nourishes phantoms*. And our modern

technology cannot advance without arousing, without producing as many phantoms as it produces technical innovations. Why is a letter a phantom? Why is a phonecall a phantom? As he says to Milena, in his inimitable style: *Even before the letter has been dispatched, the phantoms have already drunk up the kisses I sent you…*[22]

The phantoms have already drunk up the kisses I sent you… I hope he doesn't put it better than I have. I mean even better than I have, because that's already quite beautiful.

And now I can read you the actual text. It's near the end. So in his perverse style, what was Kafka doing here? A humor so diabolical that first of all he had understood well, he had made his choice, that this choice would mean his unhappiness... and that this would go on until his death. His extremely fragile state of health prevented him from facing journeys by train, car or plane. So he had chosen the technological line of phantoms. He was making amends... to have to move to visit his fiancée, not a chance. Instead, he would send her telegram after telegram, letter after letter, the previous letter cancelling the following one... no I mean the contrary, all of this mixed up. And inevitably, from his point of view, there wasn't a letter he'd written that the phantoms hadn't already drunk up so he immediately had to write another one. His dream, he said – and this why he is such a great precursor of today's technological innovations – at one time Kafka had a girlfriend who specialized in what was called the *parlograph* or *papagraph...* I don't remember, the *parlograph...* [23]

So there was already a whole field of these kinds of gizmos. That's exactly what they were. Phantoms. Don't you realize? It's the technological production of phantoms. And it's wonderful. Maybe life would be unbearable without it. You see? [*Here occurs a jump in the recording that creates a rupture in the development; the following paragraph is missing in preceding transcriptions at WebDeleuze and Paris 8*] [2:03:25]

This is what a close-up is. Someone who's really understood this, needless to say, is Godard. But there is another filmmaker who has grasped it even more. But anyway, let me go on... What was it I wanted to say? Yes, the text... no, his dream, was to put telephone cabins in boats or planes, telephones on planes. So, he thought, I might even go on one if it was to write letters. Ah yes, perhaps. We can just imagine Kafka… he would have had to be much richer than he was but he would have rented an entire carriage, and there begun writing a whole series of letters to his fiancée, all the while moving further and further away from her. Above all, he must never get close because... well, you know. [2:04:16]

You see, these two lineages... here is the text: "People have hardly..." – how beautiful this letter is! *Letters to Milena*, p. 223 – "People have hardly ever deceived me, but letters always have..." – including his own – "but letters always have and as a matter of fact not those of other people, but my own. In my case this is a particular misfortune which I do not want to discuss further, but it is nevertheless also a general one. The easy possibility of writing letters – from a purely theoretical point of view – must have brought wrack and ruin to the souls of the world..." Meaning, a double loss, both of the individuating and the social function – "...wrack and ruin to the souls of the world. Writing letters is actually an intercourse with ghosts and by no means just with the ghost of the addressee but also with one's own ghost..." – of the person who writes – "with one's own ghost which secretly evolves..." – evolves in the sense of augmenting - "one's own ghost which secretly evolves inside the letter one is writing or even in a whole series of letters, where one letter corroborates another and can refer to it as witness. How did people ever get the idea they could communicate with one another by letter! One can think about someone far away... One can think about someone far away and one can hold on to someone nearby..." – You see, that's the series of space-time, the serious one. I can

think of you when you're far away, I can grasp you when you're close. "Everything else is beyond human power" – so here we're in space and time...

"Writing letters, on the other hand, means exposing oneself to the ghosts..." – exposing oneself, being naked before the ghosts, here we have the essence of the close-up – "means exposing oneself to the ghosts who are greedily waiting precisely for that. Written kisses..." – and here's our phrase – "Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts drink them up along the way. It is this ample nourishment which enables them to multiply so enormously. People sense this and struggle against it; in order to eliminate as much of the ghosts' power as possible and to attain a natural intercourse, a tranquility of soul, they have invented trains, cars, airplanes – but nothing helps anymore..." – You see how here he asserts the two technological lineages – "but nothing helps anymore. These are evidently inventions devised at the moment of crashing. The opposing side..." – meaning the ghosts – "the opposing side is so much calmer and stronger; after the postal system, the ghosts invented the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless. They will not starve, but we will perish." What a text!

So, very quickly, you see how strange this situation is? Anyway, I would like to end by making two remarks. I said there was a filmmaker who had understood all this very well. Living, you can always decide not to live like this, I mean, we can always choose. Your own subdivision of concepts could be something completely different from these two lines. But he, in terms of the most modern technology, will distinguish between two lines: the spatio-temporal line – and here I'm being a little bit tendentious, but just a bit… – the line of space-time, namely trains, planes etc; and the line of phantoms which is equally a technological line, a more advanced technological line than all that junk. And for him it's this. But if you tell me that the one goes with the other, of course, but he's the first one to say this. Yet there is a tension between the two.

So that's my first remark. To move on quickly I would say that the second line is – it's not by chance that I cite this text... The first line is that of space-time and the conquest of space-time, while the second is the line of pure affects or entities, the line of phantoms.

So, now… it's just about time, because I've been circling around this director for quite a while now... Is there someone in cinema who would be really Kafkan? Yes, in my view, it's clear there is, and it's Wenders. Probably Wenders loves and knows this text really well… I don't mean that he took it literally from Kafka but it's an encounter, a wonderful encounter.[24]

At first glance, however, we can see that in Wenders there is no real Kafkan atmosphere. It's completely different. Of course there's no Kafkan atmosphere, and it's better this way, since we're talking about a prodigious encounter. All of Wenders' cinema is founded upon the co-existence and interference of these two lines, these two types of lineage... the two lines. On one hand, the line of the means of locomotion and their conversion – the means of locomotion being the major line, the switch from one means to another, conversion, equivalence between one mode and another and so on. It's present in all his films without exception.

In correlation– but the whole problem lies in how one line reacts to the other – in correlation with this we have the line of little phantom machines. And the journeys in space and time will take up all the means of locomotion – and here is where Wenders has a truly magnificent cinematic idea. The same way Bergman would say, the question for me is the face in close-up, Wenders' question seems to be this: the history of the two lines and their relation. So you'll have the first line and then the other line which appears to be a phantom.

So as we go on I will select from memory, but some of you will certainly have a much better knowledge than mine… In *Kings of the Road* [25] it's clear: the journeys by car, truck and so on with their conversions, the journey of the two men... the strange visit to the printing works and the traveling cinema and what have you, are confronted with the other line, the phantom line of ghosts. They have to traverse these phantoms at the same time as they journey through space and time. So he did this once. This is his subject. But being a great filmmaker, he won't waste time doing the same thing twice, once is enough. Yet because this theme is his obsession he will keep it on board, it will always be there.

If we take *Alice in the Cities*, for example, here you have in their purest form the changes in means of transportation and the conversion of one into another. This is what you have. But more than this, I remember that the male lead, in order to get the little girl he's been saddled with to fall asleep, he tells her a story. Often the dialogue is very important because it goes well beyond the actual situation. I mean that that's when a dialogue in cinema attains a literary value, precisely when it goes beyond the situation depicted in the image itself. He tells the following story to the little girl who doesn' want to go to sleep. He says there is a little boy who is playing with his mum but then gets lost. And he meets a small frog, I think... I think it's a frog...[26] and he follows it. You see, first means of locomotion: he follows the frog. And here we could think that it's a dream, but in fact the opposite is the case. It's the technological line of reality.

And then the frog arrives at a river where there is a fish. O the boy now follows the fish, he follows the fish... another change, exactly the way we exit the metro to take the train. In Wenders it's just like this. The boy follows the fish and arrives at a bridge where there is a horse. Like that. A motionless horse. It's odd that it's motionless... we would have to look into why this horse is motionless. But the boy waits and then the horse starts to move and then the boy follows it. Once again he changes means of transport. And so he arrives at the sea –and that moment the man looks and sees that the little girl has fallen asleep – and the boy says: "Nice!" And then he stops... no, no. He arrives at a road where there is a truck. He gets onto the truck… "Oh this is great!" the man tells the little girl. The boy is delighted because he can fiddle with the radio dial. And then the truck arrives at the sea and we don't know what happens from that point on.

But what has he been doing, this guy from *Alice,* what has he been doing all this time? For much of the film he takes Polaroids non-stop. While changing means of transport – plane, boat, metro, everything, you have everything in Alice – again, all the great conversions of movement that are typical of Wenders… he takes Polaroids all the time. And by doing so, I think he annoys the little girl. And the whole film, if you like, is composed of these images that extinguish themselves, until you see the theme of the Polaroid in negative emerging. What I mean is that in the same way you normally see the image of a color Polaroid emerging – and here the first part of the film is prodigious, you have the impression of a very unusual type of image – in this case it's the opposite, what we have are images that fade out, as a way of showing that they are like Polaroids, but Polaroids in negative. And when they arrive, I think it's when they arrive... I mean the guy and Alice arrive in Amsterdam, Alice turns to him and says, You are not making Polaroids anymore… And by this point the style of the film has changed. It's interesting. There will be other phantoms, a whole other parade of phantoms.

But then I would ask, what in Wenders is specifically Kafkan? It's not the overall atmosphere, not at all. It's this way of living the two lines and the confrontation between the two lines. Even in *The American Friend* [27], you remember how there too in all the switching between means of transportation, how the strange rapport between the two is established? There too in

the end he abandons both individuation and the social role. So one may ask, how does communication function here? By means of the exchange of small optical objects, small gifts they exchange, small objects, the art of phantoms.

Claire Parnet: There's also *The Meetings of Anna,* where she does all the drifting, crossing capital cities and going from one hotel to another, and then when she gets home she goes to her bedroom and listens to the answerphone messages coming from outside.[28]

Deleuze: Yes, quite, quite... *The Meetings of Anna* by Chantal Akerman... So, what does all this mean? [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:17:45]

What Kafka says is that finally the pure technological line, the means of locomotion, of overcoming space and time is already beaten, already defeated. It is defeated in advance, vanquished by the line of phantoms. We will be drowned by the phantoms – that's what Kafka says – we will perish, we will no longer have any contact with reality. All that is over. It's finished. There will no longer be, as in Wenders' films, this incredible sense of space and time. There will no longer be these interferences between phantom machines and machines of space and time. There will no longer be rivalry or interference between the two lines. Everything will be folded along a single line: that of the phantom machines. The letters. And the phantomatic character of letters will appear, for example, in a very playful form.

Here I want to mention the important role letters play in Bergman's cinema. In Denis Marion's book on Bergman, he cites two examples... No it's not that page... page 37, that's it! In *The Communicants* (aka *Winter Light*)[29]*,* a pastor receives a letter from his mistress in which she takes stock of their relationship. In the woman's mind, there is the actual, the desire for something real. So how does Bergman convey this? As Marion, the commentator, says: "There would normally be two ways of filming this sequence. Either the woman writes the letter..." – and in fact this happens very often in cinema, we see a woman writing a letter – "or else the other way would be to film the man who reads it." We can either film the author writing their letter or the addressee reading it… "Bergman invents a third method: while the pastor reads the letter, the woman in the foreground speaks the sentences without writing them..." This is very interesting in relation to the rapport between the close-up face and phantoms.

In *Autumn Sonata,*[30] the situation is even more complicated: "The text of the letter is divided between the woman who writes it, her husband who gets to know about it, and the addressee who has not yet received it." I find this very interesting because here we must imagine that there is no longer a struggle or interference between the two technological lines. All the phantoms have already won, the phantom line has already won. So what does this mean, for someone who makes cinema? He will say, I can only make close-ups, the rare trains that I put in, the rare means of communication I include, will be made sufficiently indeterminate that they will be submitted to pure affects. It will be a world in which there no longer exists either perception or action, because such phantoms as inhabit this world will only be able to perceive through affects and act through affects. *Affects will make up the perceptions and actions of the phantoms that inhabit such a world.* I could say that this is, broadly speaking, Bergman's cinema. I don't at all want to say that he goes further than Wenders but that he has completely shifted the problem.

So, there you have it. For the moment, we can stop here because next time I would like to take up another level. We have spoken about this rapport between... this phantomatic rapport

between face and affect but what we haven't yet done is to analyze pure affects, this phantom line... Yes, just a second, yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: In my view, I would say we shouldn't... I'll try to talk about this a little bit next time… You'll remind me about it, won't you? But in my view the mask has no privilege, because the mask is an ambiguous notion. I mean, a face unmasked can be much more of a mask than a masked face. So what would I say... well, I'll think about it, and you too can think about it for the next time. [*Sounds of chairs; end of the session*] [2:24:31]

Notes

1 See Joseph Von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry*, New York: Macmillan 1965, pp. 323-324.

2 Paraphrasing here, Deleuze also refers to this passage of Sternberg's memoirs in his 1975-76 courses at Vincennes on faciality (See *A Thousand Plateaus* 1 - Deleuze at Paris 8 / 07 Jan 13, 1976). Regarding the two approaches to filming a face, which he compares to a landscape, Sternberg writes: "Values must be altered as in an actual landscape by investing it with lights and shadows, controlled with gauze and graded filters, and by domination of all that surrounds the face. Just as I spray trees with aluminium to give life to the absorbent green, just as the sky is filtered to graduate its glare, just as the camera is pointed to catch a reflection on the surface of a lake, even so the face and its framing values must be viewed objectively as if it were an inanimate surface. The skin should reflect and not blot the lights, and light must be used to caress, not flatten and wipe out that which it strikes. If it is impossible to otherwise improve the quality of the face, deep shadows must add intelligence to the eyes, and should that not be enough, then it is best to shroud the countenance in merciful darkness and have it take its place as an active pattern in the photographic scale".

3 *The Scarlet Empress* (1934, directed and produced by Joseph von Sternberg and starring Marlene Dietrich and John Lodge, is a film about the life of Catherine the Great.

4 Claude Ollier, *Souvenirs écran*, Paris: Gallimard/Cahiers du cinéma 1981, pp. 274-279.

5 *The Saga of Anatahan* (1953), more commonly known simply as *Anatahan*, was Sternberg's last film. Set on an abandoned Pacific island, but shot in a studio in Kyoto, it tells the story of a group of Japanese sailors who are stranded on the island in 1944 after their ship is torpedoed and who will continue to live there, not realizing when the war has come to an end and with no knowledge of goings-on in the outside world. Things change for them, however with the discovery of a beautiful, enigmatic island woman who comes to dominate the men and set them against each other.

6 *The Nights of Cabiria* (1957) is a film by Federico Fellini starring Giulietta Masini as Cabiria, a Roman prostitute who wanders the streets and hills of the city eventually falling into the clutches of a seductive but desperate con-man.

7 *A Day in the Country* (1936, completed 1946) is a film by Jean Renoir, based on a short story by Guy de Maupassant, starring Sylvia Bataille (the ex-wife of Georges Bataille) and Georges d'Arnoux and featuring Renoir himself in a small role.

8 Here the students are referring to Ingmar Bergman's *Summer with Monika* (1953) starring Harriet Andersson. Highly appreciated in Cahiers du cinéma circles, it was a key influence on the French new wave.

9 La Paloma (1974) is a film by Daniel Schmid starring Ingrid Cavan, Peter Kern and Bulle Ogier.

10 *Stroszeck* (1977) is a semi-documentary film by Werner Herzog, starring a real-life street performer called Bruno S. who, following his release from prison, leaves Germany together with his sex worker girlfriend and an oddball neighbour for the promise of a better life in Wisconsin.

11 *Cinématographe* was a French film review founded by Jacques Fieschi, which ran from 1973 to 1987.

12 *Shanghai Express* (1932), one of a number of films Sternberg made with Marlene Dietrich in the permissive pre-Hays Code years of 1930s Hollywood, recounts the adventures of a group of mostly affluent American and European travellers who are held hostage by a warlord during the Chinese Civil War.

13 *The Shanghai Gesture* (1941), the last Hollywood film Sternberg completed, starring Gene Tierney, Walter Huston and Victor Mature, is a noir-style thriller set in the world of Chinese gambling dens.

14 *Macao* (1952), directed by Sternberg but completed by Nicholas Ray following a troubled production, is a 1952 film noir adventure set in Hong Kong starring Robert Mitchum, Jane Russell and Gloria Grahame. Citing studio interference, Sternberg disowned responsibility for the film's production.

15 Here Deleuze is referring to a line in *Shanghai Gesture*: "I didn't think such a place existed, except in my own imagination – like a half-remembered dream. Anything could happen here, at any moment."

16 Frank Borzage was an American director and actor who rose to prominence during the silent and early sound era. Among his most famous films are: *7th Heaven*, *Street Angel*, *Bad Girl*, *The Mortal Storm* and *Moonrise*.

17 "Our work begins with the human face… The possibility of drawing near to the human face is the primary originality and the distinctive quality of cinema." Bergman in a 1959 Cahiers du Cinéma interview, quoted in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Trans, Hugh Tomlinson & Barabara Habberjam, London: The Athlone Press 1986, p.96.

18 The Bergman films Deleuze cites, *The Silence* (1963), *Persona* (1966), *Cries and Whispers* (1972), *Face to Face* (1976) all but one featuring his long-time creative and life partner the actress Liv Ullman, are some the key works of the director's modern period.

19 The same citation appears in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p.96.

20 Bela Balazs, *The Spirit of Cinema* in *Early Film Theory: Visible Man and The Spirit of Cinema*, Erica Carter (Ed.), Trans. Rodney Livingstone, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books 2010, p. 100.

21 Acronym for *Poste, telegraphes et telephones*. This was the name of the French administration of postal services and telecommunications.

22 Kafka's own phrasing, as reported in the English translation of *Letters to Milena,* is as follows: "Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts drink them up along the way." See *Letters to Milena*, Trans. Philip Boehm, New York Schocken Books, 1990, p. 223.

23 Here Deleuze is referring to Kafka's long-term fiancée Felice Bauer who worked as a stenographer at the Berlin record company Odeon and subsequently for a manufacturer of gramophones and parlographs, which at the time were the world's most advanced dictation machines. Kafka's letters to her are published in the volume *Letters to Felice*, Erich Heller & Jurgen Born (Eds.), Trans. James Stern & Elizabeth Duckworth, New York, Schocken Books 1973.

24 Deleuze explores the link between Wenders and Kafka in terms of the two technological lineages in *The Movement-Image*, op. cit. p. 101.

25 *Kings of the Road* is the English title of *Im Lauf de Zeit* (In the Course of Time), a 1976 film by Wim Wenders starring his regular actors Rudiger Vogler and Hanns Zichler. The film is the third part of Wenders' road movie trilogy, which began with *Alice in the Cities* (1974) and continued with *False Movement* (1975), more commonly known in English as *The Wrong Move* – a title that, however, omits the double sense of the original title, *Falsche Bewegung*, which alludes to the false movement constitutive of cinema itself.

26 Deleuze misremembers the tale, where the animal in question is a hedgehog and not a frog. The story runs as follows: Once there was a little boy who had gotten lost. He'd gone for a walk in the woods with his mother... When they came to a clearing his mother suddenly felt tired and wanted to rest. All of a sudden the boy heard a rustling in the bushes, and he discovered a hedgehog. He followed the hedgehog until he came to a stream. And in the stream he saw a fish. He walked along the stream for a long time until he reached a bridge. On the bridge he saw a horseman. The horseman sat very quietly on his horse and looked into the distance. The boy went up to the bridge and walked cautiously around the horse. Then the horseman rode slowly away. The boy followed him until he lost sight of him. And he reached a big road. On the road there were many trucks. The boy waited on the roadside until a truck stopped. The driver asked him if he needed a ride. The boy was delighted. He was proud to sit next to the driver who let him turn the dial on the radio. And the boy drove with him until they reached the sea…

27 *The American Friend* (1977) is Wenders' adaptation of Patricia Highsmith's novel, *Ripley's Game*, featuring Bruno Ganz, Dennis Hopper and the director Nicholas Ray to whom Wenders would subsequently dedicate a portrait-homage, *Lightning over Water* (*Nick's Movie*), shortly before Ray's death.

28 *The Meetings of Anna* (1978) is a film by Chantal Akerman, starring Aurore Clement as a film director (loosely based on Akerman herself) who has a series of adventures and encounters as she travels across Europe screening her film.

29 *Winter Light* (1963) is a film by Ingmar Bergman starring his regular actors Ingrid Thulin and Max Von Sydow. The film is the second in a series of thematically related works following *Through A Glass Darkly* (1961) and preceding *The Silence* (1963).

30 *Autumn Sonata* (1978) is a film by Bergman starring Liv Ullman, Ingrid Bergman (in her final film role) and Lena Nyman.