

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image**

**Lecture 13, 16 March 1982**

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## **Part 1**

[*Session begins in medias res, with a student making comments*]

Student: [*Almost inaudible remarks... reference to Eisenstein and to 19th century mysticism...*] ... I see an absolute self... does it have anything to do with the category of the impersonal?

Deleuze: These quotations that you were reading, who are they from? Who are the quotes from?

Student: [*Inaudible answer*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes... The rigor of the question worries me... Here's what's happening. I want you to be able to sense these things for yourselves. Indeed, suppose I say – and as I have already said this, suppose I say it again – we group in the category of "firstness" a certain number of states whose only common feature is the fact that they have no relation to a "self," and that they are without spatio-temporal coordinates. That's what I want to say. You see, on the basis of this, we have something like a first group. But I have to say that not everything is like that... There is also, as we have seen, "secondness", and then there is "thirdness". I'm not specifying – once I've made this first... I wouldn't even call it a definition... this initial, extremely broad grouping of firstness – I'm not specifying if there is, assuming that there is...

The first question you could ask me is: Do such states exist? Here I would say that it's not a matter of taste but a matter of philosophical taste. Because what does this question – Do such states exist – mean exactly? It could mean: do such states appear in a pure state? Then, I suppose, there will be some among us... there will be a certain number who will say: Firstness doesn't mean anything. But that would simply mean that I shouldn't use it, if this is the way I see things. I shouldn't use it. Which would be quite legitimate, quite legitimate.

Second possible reaction... Ah, yes, firstness, that says something to me! And indeed, in your experience, you might say to yourself: Ah yes! I've known states of this type, states that I've experienced as having no relation to me and having no relation to a determined space-time.

Or else, the third possible reaction: Yes, I can clearly see what he means... You might say to yourself, I suppose, I can clearly see what he means, but these aren't pure states, at best they might be a pole of certain experiences. Which would mean that what you call firstness can never exist in a pure state... It's an abstract pole of experience that you have the right to draw

out. But it's clear that all concrete states include an aspect of firstness, even if they also have other aspects.

So, that's why, concerning the questions you pose, and without meaning to be polemical, very often I want to reply: it's only the person who asks the question who has the means to answer it. In certain cases... If you say to me, for example, well, what did Peirce mean exactly by firstness or secondness, I didn't understand... In that case I can answer, or try to answer, by beginning... by attempting to take up the analysis in a different way. But I'll go back to the example of the question you just asked me. In my view, I can only answer this: look in the texts that you've found. First of all, you give me two quotations. Well, I can hardly manage to get to grips with these two quotations. But I would say that the first one, as you yourself said, pretty much goes in the direction of "a state without relation to the self". And indeed, it is a mystical state. Remember, it should also be added that in what we have vaguely defined as firstness, we ought to ask ourselves the question – and there too, you can have different kinds of states – supposing that such states exist, we should ask ourselves: In what kind of experience are they present? And here it's very varied. Last time we saw that it could be the experience of sleep but it could also be the experience, or certain experiences, of delirium, certain experiences of a schizophrenic type, or then again it could be certain mystical experiences. And we didn't at all mean to say that these were the same thing. It was simply an aspect of the kind of experience that could be equally discovered in certain experiences of sleep, in certain experiences of schizophrenic processes and in certain mystical experiences. Okay.

Concerning this you might say to me: Yes, but mystical experience cannot be not reduced to this since there are certain aspects of mystical experience where there can be a reference to a "self". There I would say – and I'm not looking to debate this – but I would say, I'm not quite sure... I believe that when the "self" intervenes in a process of mystical experience, it is no longer in the condition of pure mystical experience... There has been a shift from mystical experience to what could be called the "realm of faith", which is not at all the same thing. But, even if you were to answer me: No, no, it is part of mystical experience, then I would say: Okay, that's because mystical experience contains both a pole of firstness and some aspects of secondness.

All this is a way of saying that if you refer to something we have studied, that we've all looked at together... But if you refer that to your own problem, well of course I can help you give an order to your problem or to what material you bring, but I don't have the answer, only you can answer that. In any case, I never said that mystical experience is this or that, because I am completely incapable of talking about mystical experience. All I said was that certain aspects, according to the mystics' own accounts of their experience... certain aspects insist on the impossibility of relating mystical experience to a "self" and of relating mystical experience to spatio-temporal coordinates. That's all. Perhaps you're right in saying that there are other elements involved in mystical experience, perhaps... all fine and good. In particular, I would say that there is surely an element of thirdness, to use Peirce's terms. That is to say, there is a form of thought involved in mystical experience, but this is quite normal. You understand? What I mean is that you absolutely shouldn't close down these categories. You absolutely mustn't close them. You have to leave something open... Well, at the end of the day maybe all experience has its aspects of firstness, secondness, thirdness. Yes, clearly this is the case. It's simply that such and such an experience accentuates or puts the emphasis on... or even just presents a moment where you have an almost pure firstness etc. Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible remarks around the affection-image and the extent to which Bergson's remarks can be compared to those of Maine de Biran, considered in the previous session, followed by a question as to why Deleuze seems to have entirely left Bergson behind*]

Deleuze: Yes. You're so harsh on me! This is what I would say: strictly speaking, it's true what you say. If I had decided, out of vanity, to stick to Bergson as my only thread, I would have had no need to make any reference to Maine de Biran, nor to Peirce. I just want to note that if Bergson was able to so easily replace Maine de Biran, it is because he knew him very well. So why did I insist? I can say that in the end, our only effective guide has been Bergson, and why? So as to sketch out the distinction we made between our three images: the perception-image, the affection-image and the action-image. But as you have sensed – I don't even need to say this – we left Bergson behind some time ago. All that we have seen, all that we have said, is not something he himself says. I'm not trying to make him say things he hasn't said. He has simply been of use to us, and that's all. Both for me and for you, it has to work like this: we shouldn't try to make a great philosopher say what he didn't say, but we have to make full use of him, we have to consider what he said as something we can use, we have to make use of it.

Why did I feel the need to make a detour? I say this because it's shameful and yet at the same time it's quite respectable... because I thought, here we have a good opportunity to teach them something... I'm sure they can't know much, or even anything at all, about Maine de Biran, and they won't yet have encountered Peirce. So it's now or never. And it's fully justified if I've given even just two or three of you the desire to read Peirce or Maine de Biran. But I also had to do it for other reasons.

It's that Peirce's categories, for example – firstness, secondness, thirdness – it seems to me they will allow us to get going again. And in this sense, in fact, it goes beyond Bergson, it doesn't contradict what he says, it's just a completely different kind of problem that I have to unpack. Have I really forgotten Bergson in all this time? Because I remind you that, in the first term, we devoted one and then a second time... so two entire sessions, to a commentary on *Matter and Memory*. And in these two sessions we did no more than cover the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. So, I haven't forgotten at all, and if we have time after Easter, we will go back to *Matter and Memory* but this time it will be exclusively to look at the second and third chapters, so that, by the end of the year, I would like to have covered everything in *Matter and Memory*. But if I now introduce secondness, thirdness and firstness, it's because, in a way, this will allow us to rethink the three types of image that we had drawn from Bergson, and it will perhaps also allow us to push our analysis of the action-image much further – not than Bergson himself – but further than Bergson gives us the means to do... So there it is, now we have to go on. And indeed... yes?

Georges Comtesse: Concerning the question that was asked about mysticism, one could perhaps say that it is not so far from Bergson's own relationship to mysticism because he himself once declared that the metaphysical experience of the deep self led to mystical experience. And he went on to add that that he believed this is where the truth lies. In other words, in Bergson, there is a link between metaphysical experience and the truth of mysticism. This is my first remark.

As a second remark: when you say that in mysticism, obviously, mystical experimentation, mystical rupture differs from simple faith, in the sense, for example, of a religious faith that would refer simply to a god, to a given belief or that would even be channeled by a given clerical power of some kind, okay... Yet it must also be said that in mysticism there is a

certain faith involved, if only because of what all illnesses imply, namely a mystical faith in death, and this is precisely the limit and certainly the truth of the illness. For example, I recall a conference in Brussels, where Lacan had this to say about ill people: he said, death, supposing one didn't believe in it, that is to say, if it wasn't an object of great belief for us... would we be able to live in the same way? In other words, he directly posed the question of illness's relation to faith, illness as a mystical faith in death. That's my second point.

A third remark concerns what you said at the end of the last lesson, and there was someone who didn't understand... who didn't dare ask a question about... Yes, yes, it's odd how we can ask questions, but there are apparently some people who are often inhibited from doing so, whereas in principle it would be completely possible to understand a discourse like this... Well, anyway, there was someone who didn't understand the relationship between the sinsign, the qualisign and the legisign. And I thought of an example in cinema, the example of Alfred Hitchcock's film *Marnie*.<sup>1</sup> In *Marnie* you have an example of Peirce's theory of the sign in itself since we have the sign of what is for Marnie a state of things in her traumatic reaction to red flowers... we don't know why she is upset, what connection this has with her compulsion to steal money. This is the sinsign, which is embodied in a state of things, the red flowers that upset her. Then there is the qualisign, the color in itself, the color red as it is, which invades the whole screen and isn't just embodied in the flowers. And then there is the mediation at the end of the film, that is, the scene with the mother and the little girl who kills the sailor and which is the law of the color. This is an example...

Deleuze: And why... I haven't seen *Marnie*... Why... what role does red play in the third image?

Georges Comtesse: I think that in this scene, Hitchcock proposes an interpretation, which by the way is quite ironic, of the whole film, perhaps for his own amusement, I don't know, but he tries to explain how the color red relates to Marnie's shyness, which is linked to a childhood scene, a primal scene where the mother, because she didn't have any money, she'd been dumped, so she had to prostitute herself with sailors. And one day, there was a sailor who came, and while the little girl, who is Marnie as a small child, was sleeping, the sailor violated, brutalized the mother beyond measure, and she... and the mother and daughter killed him... So there is the mediation of red.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes... I see, that's a very good example, a quite excellent example you've given me... It's a good example. Yes, very good. Well, so this leads us to the next thing... that is, we're already in the domain of the action-image. You remember... In a word, firstness – to use Peirce's term – firstness is the affective, but not in just any sense of affect, in the sense of power-quality. Secondness is action, the effort-resistance relation, and thirdness, in the broadest sense, is the mental sphere. This division of the world, this division of images into three types, seemed rather bizarre to us. When we thought we had finished with the affection-image, we naturally entered the realm of the action-image.

Now the action-image, as we were saying, is secondness, that is, not only is it what comes second – the logical order is not so important – but it is *that which in itself is two*, as opposed to the power-quality which in itself is one and refers only to itself. It is that which in itself is two. Let us now try to define what the action-image is composed of. We have to take it in the broadest sense. Firstly, after all, secondness, I would suggest that – and this accords with Peirce's analyses dealing with a completely different subject – that, in fact, there are two forms of secondness. There are two secondnesses. You see we can't get away from the two. There are two secondnesses. Let's say that there is a kind of primary secondness, that is, a

secondness – we have to be quite literal about all this – that would still be very close to firstness. It would no longer be firstness, but as a secondness in itself, it would be a primary secondness.

What is primary secondness? As we have seen, it is when one or several power-qualities are effectuated or actualized in a state of things. And this is exactly – it responds to Peirce's notion – the *sinsign*.<sup>2</sup> The power-quality in itself was a *qualisign*; when the power-quality is actualized in a state of things, we have a *sinsign*. There is already secondness since you have "power-quality", on the one hand, and a state of things that actualizes it on the other. It's a primary secondness. The whole, therefore, you would call a *sinsign*. It is... For example, the *qualisign*, was "the rainy" or "rain", whereas the *sinsign* is "this rainy day". This time, the power-quality, "the rainy", is actualized in a determined state of things: this day, here and now. So what we have here is the actualization in a determined space-time.

You see that this is already sufficient to distinguish it from the domain of affection. We had seen the role played by the any-space-whatever. Now, in the case of action-images, the space will no longer be any-space-whatever; it will be a space in the here-and-now, that is, a space defined by its spatio-temporal coordinates. I hope that this is quite clear. So, there we have the first aspect of the action-image. We can choose to call it many things – and we will see why – a world, a milieu, a situation. We can choose or maybe not. Perhaps world, milieu and situation have hidden nuances, perhaps there will be nuances. But this is the first aspect of the action-image.

And then I would add that there is a secondary secondness... that this time we could call *true* secondness, a secondness that is true, because you feel that the first secondness is still very close to firstness, that there are imperceptible transitions from firstness to primary secondness. True secondness appears, this time, not at the level of the actual world or of the determined state of things, or of the situation, it appears at the level of pure and simple action. The situation, in one way or another, generates an action that will react upon the situation. The situation or the milieu will generate, give rise to an action that will react upon the milieu, so the action, both under its aspect of effort-resistance and under its aspect of action-reaction, always implies "two".

Action, what is action? It is the duel... Action implies the relation between at least two forces, effort-resistance, action-reaction – whether these forces are distributed between two people or between a person and a thing... All sorts of combinations are possible, but for the beginning of our analysis we can roughly accept the formula: action is the duel. And that is true secondness... We'll be less surprised, in the end... Well, you remember, when the sign, according to Peirce... when the sign is of the dual type, action-reaction, effort-resistance – for example, my effort is the sign of the resistance that I face, or conversely the resistance that I face is the sign of my action. These signs of duel, where a term, an existing term... where something actually existing becomes a sign of another actually existing entity, is what Peirce called, in the table we looked at last time, an index.

So, in the same way, I can already conclude, because it seems very important to me that we establish... what I mean is two contradictory things at the same time. What seems to me very important is that we establish our terminology – since these terms are real concepts – and at the same time it's important that you don't harden them, that you get the feeling that we can go from one to another in a very subtle way. If I try to summarize, I would say, well yes, the action-image begins, on the one hand, when the *qualisign* becomes a *sinsign* and, on the other hand, when the icon becomes an index. Affection-images were *qualisigns* and icons. The

qualisign was the power-quality exposed in an any-space-whatever. The icon was the power-quality expressed by a face.

You see how the action-image supposes that we have left this domain of affection-images: we are no longer in the domain of the qualisigns, we are in the domain of sinsigns – that is, power-qualities actualized in a determined state of things. And we are no longer in the domain of icons, we are in the domain of indices – that is, of actions that proceed by way of duels. Now, in my concern to always keep to these two poles so as to be able to carry out my analysis, don't I also have another complementary concern, namely that these two poles shouldn't be superimposed on the two poles of other types of images? In other words, aren't we in the process of discovering what would be the two poles of the action-image, which we could roughly call: the situation or the sinsign on one hand and the action, the duel or index, on the other? And the whole action-image would unfold not in a fixed order, but from one pole to the other or vice versa.

After all, we have a long way to travel. Here, we are immediately struck by something, if you will. What immediately strikes us is that, from a situation to an action... what will have to be done to be able to legitimately pass from one to the other, or from an action to a situation, at the level of the image, at the level of the cinema image? What is at stake here is a whole mode of narration, of storytelling, it's a whole cinematographic logic. What intermediaries will be needed? I would say, the situation gives rise to an action, and the action reacts upon the situation. That's fine. But at what cost? How do we get from the situation to the duel?

The action-duel is something you find everywhere in the action-image in cinema, you find it all over. If I look for it in different genres... in the western it goes without saying; in the historical film, as soon as you have a battle, with all sorts of problems... because after all, where is the real duel? The good thing about the action-image in cinema, we will see why, is that we never know where the real duel is. It is never where you think it is. It's like a dovetailing of duels one inside the other. Why is there necessarily a dovetailing of duels one inside the other? Oh, I thought the duel was between such and such... such and such a character in the story, and then I realized at another level that that wasn't the case. It happens between a third and a fourth, or between the second and the third. The duel is never where I think it is.

But if there is this dovetailing of duels, it is because the passage of the situation... that requires action to be resolved... the passage of the situation to action is not at all self-evident. And what exactly is the element of action? What is the action that will resolve the situation or react upon the situation? There is, if you like, a whole system of approximations that will be the making of the pleasures of cinema, that is to say the discovery of a narrative, the discovery of a story whereby, in order to pass from the situation to the duel, to the duel-action, one needs a considerable number of intermediaries. And for the duel to redound on the situation – except in certain cases... to tell the truth I know of only one case... so beautiful and so funny – but imagine a film where one proposed to show an immediate transformation of a situation into a duel, to put it bluntly, a film where one would propose to show immediately the brutal transformation of a sinsign to an index. If such a thing occurred, everyone would laugh. In other words, this could only happen in a specific genre, burlesque comedy. It's not easy to do.

I can think of only one case, a single case... which is so funny, but I say all this because, in recounting it, there won't necessarily be anything to laugh about. And those of you who recall the scene will understand... There is a W.C. Fields<sup>3</sup> film, which is a real marvel, and which is his great Shakespearean film, though I don't remember the title either in English or in

French...<sup>4</sup> There, he shows all his talent. What an actor he would have been doing Shakespearean theater! What a brilliant Falstaff Fields would have made! But, but, but... he is... he is in his cabin... in his cabin in the north, it is snowing everywhere and so... does nobody remember what it's called?

A student: [*Inaudible reply*]

Deleuze: Anyway... He's got his hat on, he's got his great fur hat on and everything. He's paid a visit by his son... he's going to clobber the son. You have Shakespearean soirees where they go on saying goodbye: Goodbye, father... Goodbye, son! For ten minutes. All these goodbyes. Then there is a classic Fields gag... What?

The student: [*The same student suggests a title and reminds him of details*]

Deleuze: Maybe... That's it! He's going to milk the moose. He keeps opening the door all the time, he rhythmically opens the door, and he says: "Weather's not fit to put a dog out!" in a pure Shakespearean voice. He immediately gets two snowballs in the face! You see why this is burlesque. "Weather's not fit to put a dog out!" Indeed, you see the wind, the ice, the snow and so on. It's an image of a situation. And as soon as he says this, he receives the two snowballs in the face, as if someone had thrown them. This is the immediate transmutation of the situation into a duel. And then, when we see the image, not when I recount it, but when we see the image, we are indeed seized with laughter... because we had precisely this situation... this immediate transformation, this transformation happening on the spot. But otherwise, it is very complicated.

And this will constitute the object... and undoubtedly all the great directors will recognize themselves in certain styles of action cinema, where action-images prevail... they will recognize themselves in these two poles, and in the way in which they combine these two poles, the sinsign pole and the index pole, the first secondness and the second secondness. That is, I remind you that the action-image oscillates from one pole to the other: the first pole is, once again, that of power-qualities, that is to say, affects as actualized in determined states of things; the second pole refers to the actions that, in the form of duels, will arise from the state of things and react upon the state of things. There you have it, but unless... actually, we've already gone too fast, because I'm saying... we should go back. As soon as we have the impression that we're going too fast, we should go back a little. Power-qualities are actualized in a state of things... This is what we could call a milieu: a milieu is made up of actualized power-qualities... And this will develop into action-reactions.

So, what I'm saying is: aren't we going too fast? Too fast? And from what point of view would it be too fast? Perhaps that, let's suppose, certain directors of genius can try to grasp the actualization – since we are indeed in the field of the action-image, that is to say, the process of actualization. These directors of genius might perhaps say to themselves: okay, we are going to take things from an earlier point... but this is not enough. Suppose we could play a radio quiz game. I'm not going to name the directors I'm thinking of. No, actually we're going to play an anti-radio quiz, because if you guess the names, you lose, because it will mean my description was so accurate that I deserve to win, and if you don't guess them, you win because my description will have been false, my idea about them will have been false... So I won't say which directors.

And so they say to themselves: before power-qualities are actualized in milieux, in determined space-times, they are actualized, let's say, in "worlds". In worlds! In worlds... and what does this mean? As in *the birth of a world*. For there to be actualization, it is necessary

that a world be born. Cinema, under its aspect action-image, must give us to witness the birth of a world. And yet, and yet we will show you – remember that it's these directors speaking – and yet we will show you perfectly determined states of things. We will show you milieux... whether fictional or real, it matters little. We will show you mountains, we will show you casinos. We will show you – don't try too hard to guess who I'm thinking of... I don't think it's of any interest – we will show you fictitious principedoms, we will show you apartment rooms etc.

But you will see that through our art – I always let them do the talking – you will see that through our art, you will not only simply seize them, you will seize them as determined space-times, but at the same time you will seize them like the birth of a world. They make us witness, I mean... they are at the same time completely determined milieux... [43:17]

*[Interruption of the recording: the paragraph that follows is provided by the transcription available at Paris 8]*

... and worlds born under our eyes. These determined milieux stand for an originary world. They will say that the world is continually being reborn, the world continues to be born, at each moment of the story, and it is up to the cinema to show this aspect by which the world is continually reborn.

In other words... every determined milieu is as though doubled by an originary world that will take its place. But originary doesn't mean the world of nature "before". It's in the here-and-now that milieux, if you know how to grasp them at a sufficiently profound level, stand for originary worlds... This sounds odd. And I would say that this is the fundamental ambition of... well, what could we call it? If the action-image, which I was rushing towards earlier, situation-action – and then I realized I was going too fast – if situation-action provides the schema for one of these two types of secondness, then let's give it a name: this is what we shall call realism.

Milieu-action, reaction upon the milieu, this is realism. If we try to establish a concept of realism, this is what realism is. But when the milieux give way to originary worlds, when determined states of things give way to an originary world that stands for them, in the here-and-now, what do we have then? It is no longer the endeavor... you sense that there is something which surpasses realism. It seems, in a way – and this is how we recognize these particular figures of cinema – it seems that the world itself begins only with the film, only with the images that it shows. In the case of the realists, that's not the way things are. The images the realists show refer to a pre-existing world, which is to say that the film is supposed to be caught in the current of something that overflows it. But here it's not the case. With the film, we witness the birth of a world. Nothing precedes it and nothing will follow. Nothing precedes and nothing will follow, so what would this be? It is the ambition that surpasses realism, and that once again borrows from it.

But to reconstitute the originary world, this has always been the ambition... an ambition, it seems to me, both secret and profound, of what is called naturalism. And naturalism, as you all know, does not refer to the world of nature. It refers to determined time-spaces. Yet unlike realism, these are *determined time-spaces from which we wrest the value of the originary world*. And in literature, the inventor of all this, it seems to me, the amazing inventor of this, was Zola.<sup>5</sup> And it was Zola, who became famous for his bizarre constructions that are at the same time his strength and his weakness... a very, very curious form of literary construction whereby he takes a subject and exhausts it. He is, if you like, the anti-Balzac.



In a sense, Balzac<sup>6</sup> is way ahead of Zola. The Zola method has a rather quaint aspect, and yet at the same time, if we return to his quaint project... well, okay, it is rather quaint in one respect, but from other perspectives it's highly innovative. You see, his novelty is the way he proceeds in stages. If he writes a novel about money, well, the subject has to be exhausted. If he writes a novel about alcoholism... there you have a set of frescoes, each of which is supposed to exhaust its subject. It's not at all the same system running from one novel to another where you have all sorts of links and cross-references, etc. This method that consists in really going to the end of a world... this is naturalism. And this can only be understood if you understand, if you grasp, in naturalism, this essential element, this very beautiful element, which is that... all the milieux they present to us are perfectly determined states of things, both historically and geographically, but they are at the same time presented as originary worlds. And it is as originary worlds that the writer takes them at the beginning and lead them to their end. These originary worlds will have an absolute beginning and a radical end. So much so...

[*Someone enters*] Good morning!

So much so that you have a kind of double layer: the action will take place in a historically determined milieu, but at the same time, something of a completely different nature will occur, something more profound, which will take place in the originary world that corresponds to this determined milieu. And at each moment of the story, you will be able to discover the originary world that corresponds to the derived milieu.

You see, naturalism is not at all – it seems to me – simply a description of certain milieux that are determined as precisely as possible. The naturalists are, on the contrary, very great poets. It is the elevation of historical milieux, of determined historical or geographical milieux... it is the elevation of states of things to the form of an originary world that has its beginning and its end... That's the first point.

Second point: it therefore follows that this originary or primordial world is as if, you understand... They won't have any difficulty in explaining it to us, but this changes everything. If you understood this first point, I would say, it won't be difficult to show us that, whatever the world... whatever the milieu under consideration, it will have remained, literally, the most "natural" possible. That is to say... the most natural in what sense? In the sense that it is the world of bestial cruelty, of animal cruelty, or of primitive health, of the most delicate soul, of the original soul, and that, in all the determined milieux of history and geography, you only have to scratch the surface to find the originary world which will deliver up the most incredible prehistoric animals, but which will no longer be prehistoric, or the most celestial figures, but who will not be celestial. It's an odd operation, naturalism. So, I hope that you have already encountered them...

So, to sum up this second point, you see I've just developed the main theme... the first actualization... in the action-image, is not, if I try to follow a logical order, it does not take place in the set milieu-situation-action. It occurs in this instauration, this exhibition of supposedly primordial worlds, originary worlds. Second remark... What?

A student: [*Inaudible remark, seeking to suggest a problem*]

Deleuze: Not right away, not right away. We're coming to that... yes, I'm going to consider it... Second point... okay, so what does it consist of, what does an originary world consist of? What is it made of? What is the secondness in this case? What secondness will occur here? What duels? As we saw, as they are not milieu-type situations, they are not yet milieu-situations, they constitute originary worlds, primordial worlds. In the same way, these are not

yet actions. Or, rather, beneath the most rigorous and precise action, you will discover something. In the same way that in the most historically and geographically determined environment, you discover the originary world, here, beneath the most rigorous and implacable action, you will discover another secondness, an originary secondness. And what will this originary secondness be?

It will be – and this is indeed a secondness – the coupling of what will found all action according to naturalism, namely the coupling of the impulse and its object. Originary worlds are made of impulses and objects of the impulse in the form of a secondness, since these objects and impulses are separated. The impulse is the blind, obstinate search for its object, or for something that will be its object, and the object is in search of its impulse... And this could be the purest savagery. Why? Because object is a bad word. The impulse does not choose an object. It tears, it cuts, it captures, it wrests its object. It doesn't wrest it out of sadism; it wrests its object in order to constitute it... Why? Because it is well known, and it isn't surprising that these authors will have been in some way influenced by psychoanalysis.

The object of the impulse<sup>7</sup> is what psychoanalysis, thanks to Melanie Klein, began to refer to as "the partial object". Now, the partial object... what is disappointing about the expression *partial object* is that we have the impression that it is a type of object, but the partial object is not at all a type of object. It is an object that has been *reduced to this state*. Something had to be torn away from the complete object. In other words, we have to find another word than partial object. Since I haven't found one, let's say instead of object, "*é-jet*" or better "*dé-jet*"<sup>8</sup>, implying the action of tearing away. It must be wrested from the state of things. The impulse must triumph. In other words, the impulse never has a global object as its object; it must wrest fragments from the state of things. For the real object of the impulse is the fragment.

And the original world is precisely the world where impulses and object-fragments, the fragments that will serve as objects for the impulse, confront one another. And what might these fragments be? As many as there are impulses. And what would the impulses be? As many as there are fragments. Everything that is in fragments provokes an impulse, even if it is an artificial one. We are beyond the difference between nature and artifice since, even in the most artificial world, there is something original at stake. So that everything that is a fragment is the object of an impulse, which could be what? Well, sexual impulses with fragments of bodies; impulses of money with those ready-made fragments, coins and banknotes; impulses of hunger, food impulses – excellent for fragments – and then maybe many others. And so, you will have the originary world – here, the notion of originary world becomes clearer – when the determined state of things, however historical it may be, however artificial, permits this one and only story to emerge: the story of impulses and their objects.

So that at this level of the action-image, what will be the type of sign that will respond to an originary world insofar as it develops into an impulse-object? What is the form, the sign of this secondness? The sign of this secondness is what we will have to call the *symptom*, and this cinema will be a cinema of symptoms. And after all, the directors who have risen to the challenge of this cinema will have the right – if they wish – to say as Nietzsche did: "We the physicians of civilization"... We physicians of civilization... This phrase that he applied to philosophers and which a small number of great directors have the right to claim... "We are physicians of civilization", meaning something very, very precise, namely that in the most historically determined milieu, we diagnose the "originary world" that this historically determined milieu, this state of things, contains.<sup>9</sup> For we diagnose the impulses, the objects of impulse, the nuptials between the impulses and the objects, as they unfold in this world.

Third remark... Consequently, I would say, this originary world defined by the adventure of impulses and their objects constitutes a radical origin, it is at once an absolute beginning, and an absolute end. What interests these directors, therefore, is that this world... it's not the intermediaries that interest them, this is precisely what interests the "realists", they are interested in the intermediaries, in what occurs in the between, they have no interest in either the beginning or the end... But they [the naturalists] are exclusively interested in the beginning and the end because they are the same thing: it's in the same movement that this world is hatched and is already finished. It's as if the naturalist idea is precisely to make all worlds aborted worlds, because in their eyes, God has really succeeded only in creating aborted worlds. We might suppose, in mythological terms, and such mythologies do exist, that God, before creating the world, makes several botched attempts. He makes a lot of botched attempts that don't work, so he throws them away before creating our world. They [the naturalists] say: well, actually, no, we are still in the period of failures. We have all kinds of originary worlds, all of them botched, so how can they be defined?

Time, the true time, is this identical nature of beginning and end. The only thing that counts is the absolute beginning of the originary world, and consequently, also its absolute end, its radical end. And why do they go towards a radical end? It's because these originary worlds are closed systems, and they are abominably closed systems... We are locked in these attempted worlds, these primordial worlds, or rather the characters are radically and forever entrapped – Forever? Let's be careful, perhaps we are going too fast, but that's okay, we will rectify things later. And why do they head towards their end? Because they follow the slope of the impulses and their objects. And the originary world is nothing else than the common slope of impulses and their objects.

And what is this common slope of impulses and their objects? Well, on the one hand, it is death, and there arises the strangest death-drive as a summa of all impulses. Yes, psychoanalysis has been there! But here it is much livelier, and they do not necessarily depend on it. What is the slope of objects? It's where all the fragments come together to form a kind of humus that is one with the humus of the beginning of the world and the humus of the end of the world. It is the garbage dump, the universal rubbish tip. And when the impulse is to root through the garbage, we will know that the originary world has come to an end, but its end was there right from the beginning. [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:04:06]

## Part 2

... Long live naturalism! What a marvel! And it's like the world of Empedocles when it is led by discord: eyes without foreheads, hands without arms, all these partial objects that come together, lapping around and forming a kind of swamp.<sup>10</sup> See how this is no longer in any way like Expressionism. I don't want to dwell on this point, but it's clearly nothing at all like Expressionism. It's the world of impulses and their objects. It's no longer the world of affects... Here I don't want to, I'm not going to elaborate...

So, there is this common slope that goes from the original world in its absolute beginning to its radical end, with what is nonetheless... in fact it's too sad, it's all just too sad unless – it's like entropy, the entropy of the originary world... ah yes, unless the closed world, the originary world in its closure, in its slope, in its entropy, is somehow... open to the Open, or else partially open, ajar... unless there is a rise in entropy or a *negentropy*. What would bring about this rise in entropy? Is there a possible salvation? Well, God knows naturalists are far from mystical! But they have never stopped posing the question of faith.

Is there salvation? Not in any general sense, but considering that they are the ones who invented this problem of the originary worlds, of the closed vessels in which they discovered under the determined states of things... it's inevitable they would have to confront the problem of "are we going to get out of this? And who will get us out of it? What faith? And they no doubt oscillated between two responses: a faith of the type... no, between several responses. Perhaps a religious type of faith, that is, all abdicated religions. To extract a faith from religion, that was a possible answer. Or else, ah yes, perhaps love. But what kind of love would it take to increase this entropy, to open up these closed worlds? Or even revolutionary socialism. And after all, these were all directions Zola had already taken. How to get out of these originary worlds, through love, socialism, an equivalent of faith? Is it possible?

Here is the table, in three moments... you see the table I wanted to make. Well, it would be sufficient... You have already guessed, to my mind there are only two figures in cinema who have managed to build from one end to the other this world of impulses and objects, and have let us see the originary worlds that lie under determined states of things: Obviously I'm referring to Stroheim<sup>11</sup> and Buñuel<sup>12</sup>, and this would be the action cinema of Stroheim and Buñuel... Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: We are going to look at that, because I would like to... yes, we'll look at that, as the question is extremely pertinent. We'll address it through these two directors... In this respect, I will try to show... I'm not going to try and apply this theory to Stroheim and Buñuel, but on the contrary, I will try to show how everything I've been talking about came directly from the cinema of Stroheim and Buñuel. In other words, I could almost say that this is a cinema before action, not action cinema. It's not realism, it's naturalism. And this is very, very different. It's this world of impulses and their objects. And filming impulses and [their objects]... to my knowledge, American cinema, despite its many powers – and here I'm not saying... remember my rule of thumb, I'm not saying it's better – American cinema has never understood anything about this problem<sup>13</sup>. To the point that neither Stroheim nor Buñuel could be integrated into American cinema, even when they were in Hollywood, or when they went there.

The real genius of American cinema, it seems to me, simplifying a lot, was in action cinema. But what was happening at the level of... They don't believe in the idea of originary worlds, necessarily. The idea of originary worlds is such a European idea, to discover originary worlds under, under determined states of things, is not an idea an American could have, it's an idea of an old German or Spanish guy who's a little bit twisted. Yes, it's an idea... well, it's very bizarre. But as far as I know, they are the only ones who have grasped this.

A woman student: And what about Ferreri<sup>14</sup>, where would you group him?

Deleuze: Who?

The student: Ferreri.

Deleuze: Ferreri... Ah yes, Ferreri, that's another case! Perhaps Ferreri would belong to this lineage. Yes, perhaps it would be interesting to look at Ferreri from this angle. Yes, there are films... I can see immediately which ones you're thinking of... Ah yes, it's not a bad idea. Perhaps, but did he... have the genius of the other two? Yes, perhaps Ferreri could very well fit into this... Well, I have to run to the secretary's office. Don't disappear... You too? Oh, what

a coincidence! But, me first, because I'm in a hurry... [*Pause; interruption of the recording*]  
[1:10:40]

Deleuze: [*Deleuze speaks to someone near him softly, then to the class*] Fine, so can you please close the door... if you don't mind, if you don't mind could you close the door? [*Pause*] Are you ready? [*Pause*] So? [*Pause*] Well ... That door annoys me... [*Pause*] I hate doors. [*Pause*]

So, well... I would like to say very quickly what this "naturalism" really consists of. If you've understood me, I don't see any... Everyone knows that with Buñuel, for example, the question of his "Surrealism" is a very difficult one to pose. I want to say something very, very simple in this regard: the misunderstanding of Buñuel's relationship to Surrealism can be explained quite easily. It is that... I mean, what is really surreal for Buñuel? It is precisely the discovery and construction of these originary worlds. And this had little to do with Breton. Breton was not mistaken regarding the oddness of his relation to Buñuel – he felt quite rightly that Buñuel was not one of them. Literally speaking, the first form of Surrealism is precisely naturalism, if we define naturalism by this construction and discovery of the originary worlds interior to historical-geographical states of things. So... Crap! Crap! Crap! [*Pause*] Would you shut the door? I feel very Buñuelesque... The door must be closed, it's the enemy! I don't see what form of salvation can come from outside, it can only bring calamities.

I take... now that I've attempted to develop the general schema, I just want to try to... I just want to add a few things... First of all, I'll start with a question: what do you find that Stroheim and Buñuel have in common, especially in their way of filming? You have a first quite fundamental theme, which is that of closed worlds. Even when they are open to nature – they can also be exteriors. But the great enclosures, even of exterior landscapes, in the films of both, are great moments. Stroheim's mountains have huge significance, while Buñuel's exteriors are filmed in such a way that they in fact constitute isolated spaces. Here we have a first... these closed worlds that are in fact originary worlds, that is, places where the history of impulses and their objects will be unleashed.

Second point: all actions are related, indeed, this is the first form of violence in cinema. In our analysis of the action-image, we will see... we will encounter all forms of violence. But this first violence is naturalistic violence, meaning first in the logical sense of where we are in our analysis. It is the violence of impulses and their objects, of these torn away objects and of these impulses that tear away. It is the world of predators. I tear away, and that's it, the actions are only there "for something", which is the originary action, that is, the act of the impulse. These are not actions, there are no actions in this kind of cinema. They are impulsive acts, which, if necessary, imply the greatest cunning. Cunning... Yes, that is part of the impulse and so on. But it is not yet the action-image the way American cinema intends it.

So, this is what I'm saying... then you have the double slope of degradation, where the impulse and the object plunge towards what? Towards what is in fact the end of the world, the end of the world that unites both of them in the same image, for example, the famous image from *Foolish Wives*...<sup>15</sup> the corpse dumped, the corpse dumped in the rubbish tip, that is to say the common end of the impulse and the object. And the no less famous image at the end of *The Young and the Damned*...<sup>16</sup> the corpse of the kid thrown onto the rubbish tip. And, in both cases, the affirmation that it is always a question of an originary world. In Stroheim's case, it could be the principdom of an operetta, it could be an operetta like *The Merry Widow*.<sup>17</sup> It could be anything, it could be the casino in *Foolish Wives* and so on. This closed world is

discovered and posited as the originary world, the world of origins, that is, the world that is defined as a symptom by its impulses and by its objects, and by the objects that are torn away.

So, in both cases, we have a completely new type of close-up. This time and only this time, the close-up is indeed on the partial object. In both cases, you have shoes as objects of a sexual impulse, or a missing leg, infirmity. But you see I'm not going back on what I said when I was talking about the affection-image: that the close-up never constitutes a thing as a partial object. It operates in a completely different way. Here indeed I find another type of close-up, but I don't have to correct myself, because it is not the close-up that constitutes the thing as a partial object. It is precisely because the thing is in itself a partial object insofar as it constitutes the object of the impulse that it consequently becomes a matter for a close-up. Hence the close-ups of shoes, hence the close-ups of missing legs, hence the close-ups of infirmities and so on.

The common slope is, in the end, the way in which the impulse seizes... an originary world is something you can easily extract from a milieu. It traverses several milieux. It is even one of the differences there is to what we will see later constitutes the milieu. It includes different milieux, but how is it oriented? It has two coordinates. It is oriented... an originary world is already oriented in its distribution of impulses between rich-poor, through the classes that are a derived notion. But the brutality of rich and poor and of good and evil... rich-poor, good-evil, is what will frame the world of impulses and their objects... Both in Buñuel and in Stroheim, you have the way in which the food impulse, hunger, is quintessentially filmed, but especially in Buñuel, it goes without saying. So, you have all that.

But I would just like to begin considering if there is a distinction here... In a sense, the parallels and correspondences between the two directors seem to me so evident, that we can speak of a common naturalism. But at the same time, we can all sense that these two directors are extraordinarily different. I could also say that what they have in common... you know how Stroheim, in a pathetic way, when could no longer make films, he was dying from no longer being able to make films, so he wrote cine-novels, and these novels were screenplays of what he would have liked to make. These screenplays make terrible novels. If you want to understand how different they are from real novels... they're very bad as novels, but as screenplays they are sublime. He wrote a lot in this vein, these pure screenplays which are admirable.

There is one in particular, *Poto-Poto*<sup>18</sup>, which is very unusual. One gets an idea of how Stroheim's film of it would have turned out. *Poto-Poto*, spelled p-o-t-o-p-o-t-o... is his great African film. Now you may know that one of Stroheim's films, *Queen Kelly*,<sup>19</sup> included... although it was interrupted, and he didn't... he wasn't able to finish it the way he wanted... but it included an African episode. Kelly, the heroine Kelly, was going to Africa where abominable things were going to happen. And *Poto-Poto* is the continuation, it's the great African film where there is a... where the young woman, where the young woman sells herself, she sells her body, but in a very odd way: through a game of roulette. It's the world of the rich. She sells her body at the roulette table, that is, there are men who place bets, and the one who places the biggest bet gets the right to play roulette with her. This is a typical Stroheim scene. You can imagine what he would have done with it in the movie.

So, there is a kind of brute who's an alcoholic, a local colonialist, who places a big bet and so earns the right to play roulette with her. And then it's either she wins, and she takes all the money of the bet, or she loses and she gives herself to him. Of course, she loses. And he will take her to a putrid swamp where he has installed his system of exploitation and enslavement.

He is a tyrant... he's a tyrant. And at this point, and here it gets more and more pure Stroheim. As soon as she arrives, she is thrown into the swamp of Poto-Poto, and he cries out: "Now you have been baptized, you have been made an honorary citizen of Poto-Poto, the cesspool of the world, on the equator. Who was it that said... just a minute, it was something like... "One degree of latitude or longitude more or less changes the whole code of morals and jurisprudence?"<sup>20</sup> It must have been some kind of Montaigne or Pascal who said that, that one degree of latitude or longitude more or less entirely changes the code of morals and jurisprudence. In terms of cinema this I would say is the cinema of action-milieux. But in the cinema of object-impulses, it is not that. That is not the law.

Well, here, you see, here that's not the way things stand. It isn't one degree of latitude or longitude more or less that changes, because here *the latitude is zero*. This is the originary world. The latitude is zero! We, from Poto-Poto, have no laws, no morals, no worldly etiquette. Here there are no traditions, no precedents. Here everyone acts according to the impulse of the moment and does what Poto-Poto pushes him to do. Poto Poto is our only law, our all-powerful leader, king, emperor, mogul, supreme judge. He is merciless, he accepts no extenuating circumstances."<sup>21</sup> Well, imagine all that in cinema! Amazing! So, this is latitude zero, this is the originary world. There you have it.

So, you've got all this. And yet you feel that despite everything, this comparison is highly formal... later I'll come back to a case that someone just mentioned because to me it seems quite fascinating. Wouldn't this be something quite close to the very unusual practice we see in Ferreri's recent cinema? Wouldn't he be the one who has understood something of this very intriguing, very violent cinema? Because this is the first great cinematographic violence. It is the first world of violence.

But I would just like to point out the differences. What is it in this community of styles, this common naturalism... that makes Stroheim's naturalism different from Buñuel's? It is not the same thing. It's not the same world. I would say, and I insisted on this, I began with Zola, by saying: Yes, you understand, Zola's work, we know, is naturalism. But the history of the naturalist movement, if I push my comparison a little, seems very interesting to me because there was a disciple of Zola's called Huysmans...<sup>22</sup> and with Huysmans, something happened. He wrote a kind of manifesto saying: well, as for Zola, I'm fed up with him because he's too limited, too parochial. But what are the concerns of Zola's naturalism? Well yes, it exhausts, as I just said it exhausts everything in each book, but why? On account of the most material, the most animal impulses. So yes, a book or a film on sexuality, a film on avarice, a film on hunger or on food And yet, he says that this doesn't go far, it doesn't go far enough.

He says that what it would be necessary to discover – and it's at this moment that Huysmans develops a very strange project – he says: but finally, we have to understand that there is a naturalism of the soul. There is not only a naturalism of the body, there is a naturalism of the soul. Furthermore, *there is a naturalism of the most artificial*. There is a naturalism of the most artificial. It is necessary to go even further, he adds, there is a naturalism of the spiritual, but to understand that, he says, one would have to have faith, and I do not yet have it. Fortunately, he will soon have it. Yes, that's all he says. He says: I'm fed up, there are not only social documents, or psychological documents. There are documents of souls. And he claims to renew naturalism by this kind of move: to make a naturalism of the soul, either under the form of artificial lives... He says: yes, naturalist heroes, finally, are not so celebrated because they're reduced to what? They're reduced either to the brute beast, to man dominated by his most material impulses, or to the average man, who slides into realism. The human beast or

the average individual. So he says, well, I'm going to make you a... [*Interruption of the recording*] [90:00]

... including the field of artificial lives. And then he recounts how Des Esseintes,<sup>23</sup> who suffers from all kinds of illnesses and who is neurotic to the end, organizes a life of pure artifice for himself. Right. And, in the course of the book, the ever-returning theme is that, finally, artifice is still disappointing, because there is something even more beautiful than artifice: the supernatural. And the supernatural is something that only faith can give us. You see this shift from the perverse... from the man of perversion to the man of faith, all of which is going to constitute a very strange new naturalism, where we can almost say that naturalism and supernaturalism are no longer distinguishable.

I would almost say that between Stroheim... obviously I'm oversimplifying here, but between Stroheim and Buñuel, there is something similar to this difference you have between Zola and Huysmans. Because what is the major difference here? It seems to me that the big difference is this: Buñuel, I would say – you can refine this for yourselves, but I want to go quickly – Buñuel does not cease to question the possibility of the existence of impulses of good, or impulses of faith, faith as an impulse. Well, from there on, the problem is twofold, faith or good as an impulse.

The first response Buñuel gives is not a return to Zola's naturalism, he adds another element. The element has changed. Buñuel's first answer is: Well, yes, there are impulses of faith, and even more so there are impulses towards the Good. Only *they are no better than the others*, they are just as disgusting as the others. This is the theme of Buñuel's relationship with Catholicism, and it's very odd. But I think that at least we are a bit more equipped now to try to understand. But of course, there are saints. But of course, sanctity exists. But you know, none of that is worth very much. It's as bestial as the beast, a partial-object impulse. In *Nazarín*<sup>24</sup>, remember what is said to the priest? "You and I" – and this is obviously the voice of the devil – "You and I are the same. The only difference is that you are on the side of Good and I am on the side of Evil, and that's why both of us are useless." This too is a kind of key sentence. "Both of us are useless." If you remember *Viridiana*<sup>25</sup>, the man of Good, or the man of faith, is radically useless. It's a closed universe no less than any other.

More than that, it's part... it's part of the closed originary world. You will have the men of Good, you will have the men of Evil, you will have the poor, you will have the rich... the two do not correspond. You'll have these four categories, but the radical uselessness of it all, the Good as well as the Evil. This very uselessness lies in the parasites. The inhabitants of this originary world are all parasites, whether poor, rich, men of Good, men of Evil, they are all parasites, they are predators. Okay. So all these themes were also present in Stroheim's work, but it's in Buñuel's cinema that this will become the fundamental theme.

And what about the second level? And yet... and yet, isn't there a form of salvation, what I call the rise in entropy? In Stroheim... there are some very odd statements Stroheim makes, where he pretends to be a pure Christian. But of course, he was so fond, he was so fond of making statements designed to shock. He says, oh, but Christianity is very important, Christianity runs through all my work. It doesn't seem obvious to me. But with Buñuel, it's obvious. So there's something like a small step... And indeed, it's very much related to that question: is there salvation? From these closed originary worlds, can we climb back up the slope of the impulse and its object?



In the case of Stroheim, I leave the question completely open because, as I said, his work was too soon interrupted. I would just point out that in the screenplay projects, when he had to interrupt... his own endings were most often cut. For example, *Queen Kelly*, at least as it is taken up by the *Poto-Poto* screenplay, is a story of pure love where, in the end, the two heroes emerge from the swamp – though in what condition – where they were tied to one another as the waters rose and the crocodiles gathered. That would have made for images of the swamp... for Stroheim the swamp wouldn't at all have been an expressionist swamp, it would have been an extremely odd naturalistic swamp. Kind of like the "rubbish tip" because this is what fascinates him: the dump, the dump and the corpse. Right.

But, in fact, the two lovers who are tied to one another as the crocodiles gather and the waters rise makes for an amazing image! They are saved in time, and it is love that saves them. Right. There's the famous scene in Stroheim of the rise in entropy, the scene of the apple trees in bloom and pure love in... *The Wedding March*, I think... yes, it's in *The Wedding March*.<sup>26</sup> But let's leave it... let's leave it open. We don't know, we don't know what Stroheim would have done.

What I am saying is that in Buñuel's case you have a precise order. An indication that, by some means... by some means perhaps, perhaps... in his case, it always turns around two poles, the revolution or love. To transform the world, change life, all those famous things, I don't need to elaborate any further... It seems to me that what I need, what I need to develop, is novelty. The Stroheim formula, after all, is relatively well known, not his way of filming, but degradation with a capital D, the question of whether we can rise from this Degradation? It's known. What is amazing is the way he films this Degradation.

When people say he is a filmmaker of time – we'll see later, since I hope that, after the holidays, we'll get to the problem of the time-image in cinema – I would say it's both true and false, it's true and it's false. It's true as they say in all the histories of cinema that he was the first to really introduce the element of *duration* into cinema, but they always say that about *Greed*.<sup>27</sup> I believe that he is a filmmaker of time, but where the question of time cannot intervene as such. So it's not quite true; he's not a filmmaker of time strictly speaking. There aren't many filmmakers of time, because it is a difficult question, but there is a very simple reason why the problem of time cannot really be the object of Stroheim's cinema. It is precisely that time is subordinated to the slope of impulses and their objects. And time can only intervene *in function of* this major theme of Stroheim's cinema. It cannot come to the fore, it cannot be treated directly as such. It can only be treated as a function of the impulses. Whereas take another guy, who completely missed this question of impulses. He would have liked to, but he was too elegant, he was too elegant, too aristocratic. And for him, it's just the opposite. While his problem is time, he was never able to reach the problem of impulses, however hard he tried. This is Visconti, it's Visconti. He wouldn't get to the cinema of... He was much too aristocratic to get to that world of violence.<sup>28</sup> But it doesn't matter...

I would say that in Buñuel there is something... there is an absolutely new formula that, it seems to me, could be summed up as follows: we no longer find ourselves confronted with degradation or with the eventual ascent of the slope, which would in some way constitute the terms of Stroheim's cinema. Because Buñuel discovered something that cinematographically belongs only to him. It is that for him... well, what is degradation? He turns around something... for him degradation – and we'll see what he means by this – is *repetition*. It's repetition. He was undoubtedly the first to make of repetition a cinematographic power. It's repetition, but why? Because *everything deteriorates through repetition*. Repetition is both

life and *the degradation of life*. Always getting up, always going to bed, every day being fed, how do you imagine all this could go well?

As Comtesse said earlier, or rather as Lacan said: if there was no death, how could you live? You wouldn't be able to bear life. But if it had to go on like that, then repetition is the very essence of degradation. What will happen in Buñuel's closed universe is this process of repetition. This is what happens in the originary world. The originary world is given over to a process of self-repetition that is at one with its own degradation.

But is this true? And what could save us from repetition? The answer is simple, and after all, it has been given, here, and it will allow us to come back to philosophy. What can save us from repetition? Nothing, except repetition. Ah, so... there are two types of repetition. Surely, there must be a thousand! But among others, there are two. And there would be: the repetition that saves, and then there is the repetition that does what? That kills. There is the repetition that is at one with degradation, and there is the repetition that saves from degradation, and that raises back up the slope of degradation. So, who was it that said this?

Well, we have so many... I can think of a first author who said it in the "burlesque" mode, or else I don't know, burlesque is not the right word... an author that the Surrealists knew very well, and it doesn't seem to me entirely out of the question that Buñuel also knew him, although, as far as I know, he makes no reference to this author – it's... don't think that I'm trying to drag things out, but as always, I've got a hole in... what is the name of the author of *Impressions of Africa*?<sup>29</sup>

Students: Roussel!

Yes, it's Roussel, an author the Surrealists were very fond of. And Roussel recounted strange stories like this one... If you listen carefully to the story, you'll see right away that it's like Buñuel. Seven corpses – I think it's seven, but it doesn't matter – a few corpses, each one locked in a glass case, are condemned to repeat, to repeat a fundamental event in their lives.<sup>30</sup> So, each of them repeats... And there's one great scholar, a cadaver in his window, who never stops repeating the fundamental event of his life, namely the death of his daughter by murder. The hell of repetition is a well-known theme, you have Strindberg too...<sup>31</sup> Stroheim will also be sensitive to this, but you can see this is where Buñuel takes off. And then this great scholar, a corpse who never stops repeating the murder of his daughter in a kind of absolute somnambulism, a bad repetition, invents what for his time would be an incredible instrument. Nowadays, Roussel, who was always ahead of his time, would invent something else. Here he invents a synthesizer, where he borrows the voice of a singer. He tweaks this voice so much that he ends up reconstituting the most natural, most authentic voice of his daughter. And it is when he has found, thanks to the magic synthesizer, the pure voice of his daughter that he is delivered from the bad repetition. And in a way, in a way his daughter is returned to him. He is healed. He comes back from the dead. A lovely story, a really lovely story.

Roussel's writing abounds – this is just one example among thousands – he abounds in these devices, which consist, namely, in opposing two repetitions, the repetition that enchains and the repetition that liberates, the repetition that saves. And he distributes them. But you sense that this is not what is at stake here. In fact, he distributes them – the artist has every right to do so – such that he can recognize himself in them. There is the imperfect repetition, and the absolutely perfect repetition. Yet one senses that it something else is at stake. It is not the perfection of the repetition as repetition that is saving. But it's a way of speaking, a symbolic way of expressing the two repetitions to say that one contains small inaccuracies, while the

other is perfect and absolutely accurate. Again we can all sense that something else is at stake in these two repetitions.

Another author, who I don't know if Buñuel knew or not, and who has been very important for philosophy, is Kierkegaard. And the great Kierkegaard wrote a book called *Repetition*...<sup>32</sup> And in this book, *Repetition* – I don't think Roussel knew it – in this book, *Repetition*, he develops the following idea: there is a bad repetition, a demonic repetition that kills, and this he calls aesthetic repetition, and it is a repetition that enchains us. It can be the repetition of habit, or it can be even worse: it's the repetition of *Dom Juan*.<sup>33</sup> It is the aesthetic repetition of one who seeks to relive the past. It is repetition turned towards the past. "I want to reconstitute the moment when I was happy". Or "I want my fiancée back. But who can give her back to me? Hasn't she grown old and so have I?" You see, this search through time, trying to resurrect the past.

And then... and then, in the end they might think they're artists, but this is the bourgeois repetition, it is a bourgeois repetition. Yet in this world, this bourgeois world, there are strange men who appear that you don't recognize at first. They look like everyone else. Only, their real name is Job. Or Solomon. Or Kierkegaard himself, who was crying over a lost girlfriend, who was always crying over lost girlfriends... and who was faced with this problem of how to escape from repetition. And he discovered this: what is the operation of faith? The operation of faith consists in this, and here we're talking about a faith devoid of religion. What is the peak of faith when it no longer depends, when it breaks through the religious ceiling? That I renounce everything. Not so that... – and in the same operation that Kierkegaard calls a leap, everything will be returned to me. Let me renounce everything and everything will be returned to me. Even more, tenfold... I must renounce my fiancée so that what? So that my fiancée be returned to me, but under what kind of form? In the form of absolute fidelity. Oh sure, she will not be returned to me in flesh and blood. How could it be possible? Besides, she married someone else, this was Kierkegaard's case, she married someone else. She will be returned to me "better" than in flesh and blood. She will be returned to me in the absolute fidelity that I would have for her. It is at the same moment that I renounce her that I obtain the true repetition, the repetition that saves. Okay. Now we understand better. The symbolism was: inexact, imperfect repetition vs. perfect and exact repetition, but more profoundly, it would be aesthetic repetition vs. repetition of faith, repetition through faith. And that's what it is.

In Buñuel's case, what works cinematographically isn't, in a sense it is much less... because in terms of capturing the movement of degradation, and the little upward movements, the little upward movements of entropy, it's really Stroheim who knows how to do this, he's really on the side of Zola, I think, he's a kind of immense cinematographic Zola. But what Buñuel puts the camera at the service of is *the process of repetition* and *the possibility of a repetition that saves*, that is to say, that opens up, that opens up the closed ordinary world. And how does he show this?

We can all think, for example, those who know a little Buñuel, of two fundamental cases: first, *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie*...<sup>34</sup> Well, here we have the very type of repetition that enchains. And indeed, in the repetition that enchains, if you like, one must repeat, but why? What is the law of a repetition that enchains? In the end, Roussel had already stated it. That's why we can't exclude an influence through artistic forms, from Roussel to Buñuel. Namely, the event is undone even before it happens; the event undoes itself even before it happens. We can't make it. And *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* is the story of eight failed lunches that don't manage to take place, that is, that they unravel before they

can happen. It is the repetition that enchains, and each time for a different reason, a different motivation. But it is this repetitive series of eight terms that will constitute the structure of *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie*.

But the most famous film in this respect is *The Exterminating Angel*.<sup>35</sup> And *The Exterminating Angel*, if I summarize it very quickly, before ending, is: people, some bourgeois people – the theme of repetition is again linked to the bourgeoisie – these bourgeois find themselves gathered in a room, where they are have assembled for a social occasion. And the same scenes... from the beginning the same scenes are filmed several times with variations. Robbe-Grillet<sup>36</sup> took up this method again, but I think in a completely different context from this problem of impulses and their objects. So, I would say we should avoid purely formal comparisons since the questions involved in Robbe-Grillet's cinema are so different. For him, it's more a problem of time, not of impulses and objects; it's a problem of fantasy, but all this is very different.

But... I just want to give you an example, two people, at the beginning of *The Exterminating Angel*, two people are introduced to one another. One time, this is filmed in such a way that they immediately turn away, it's as if they don't know each other, as if they didn't much like each other, and the second time they're filmed as if they were old friends who are reuniting. And in my memory, there is even a third time when they are filmed yet again.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the master of the house, once, gives a toast to general indifference with everyone talking; a second time he gives a toast where everyone is attentive. And all the time, this is how it is. You have this kind of repetition that repeats through inexactitude. And then... you know what's going to happen: without knowing why they will find themselves unable to leave the room. They will be condemned to a kind of repetition. It's the closed originary world, the closed originary world and yet there are no barriers, no one forces them. There is an impulse, there is an impulse that roots them to this originary world. It is enough that the originary world, corresponding to the state of things, is unleashed for them to be unable to leave it from that point on. There is an impulse by which they root themselves to it.

Each time they will play out their story with the dead bodies, each time with the dead man's hand in that of the exterminating angel, this kind of obsessive repetition and so on... and then there is a strange young woman, the Valkyrie, who has a very odd role and who appears to be the daughter of God. It is she who has determined the initial confinement, that is, the bad repetition, at the moment when she threw a lighter through the window, which was like the beginning of the originary world. It was the signal for the development of the originary world to begin. And then she gives herself or doesn't give herself to the master of the house, who seems to be God the father, while she herself is the daughter of God, among other things. Well, we don't know very well because it seems that at the same time this God-the-father is impotent, well, that's the least of it, since it's all about impulses. So, you have all this. So.

And then suddenly they are liberated. The closed world has opened up. It has been opened by a special kind of repetition, which is the relationship of the Valkyrie with the householder. And here you absolutely have the Kierkegaardian theme or the theme of Raymond Roussel, that of the repetition that saves. Except that it saves and yet it doesn't save. Then, all content, they gather in a cathedral, along with many more people, to sing a *Te Deum* in praise of the repetition that saves. Too bad! They have confused faith with religion. They have confused faith and religion. This *Te Deum* is a disaster because they have all ended up in the cathedral, more numerous than the first time, and they can't get out. It will start again. That is to say, the bad repetition has resurfaced in the cathedral while outside we hear the rumble of social

unrest and revolution. So the saving repetition has failed, but there is this other possibility that the world can be opened up through revolution, and so on.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, in a very great Buñuel film, *The Milky Way*...<sup>39</sup> you can find all his themes. Of course, there are impulses of faith, there is everything you can imagine. Only once again, first of all, the impulses of faith are as disgusting as the impulses of pure matter or pure bestiality, and on the other hand, even if they aren't, all they do is do create useless people and parasites. The thirty or so characters of *The Milky Way* – which is, I think, one of Buñuel's greatest. And on the other hand, ah yes, the character of Christ, isn't he the repetition that saves? And there, the commentators of *The Milky Way*... here I refer you to a book that is quite good in this respect, Maurice Drouzy's book, *Luis Buñuel, Architecte du Rêve*.<sup>40</sup>

Maurice Drouzy makes an excellent commentary on *The Milky Way*, showing how technically, each time there is a bad repetition, it is actually the camera, that either in the interiors, or in the exteriors, constitutes the world as a closed space, as a closed space even outside where it creates prisons with columns through some extremely clever pieces of set design or movements of the dolly.

And on the contrary, in the passages of Christ, where we never see the sky, notably, even in the exteriors, and on the contrary, in the passages of Christ, there, on the contrary, it is the open world, the possibility of a repetition that saves, but in what form? It is a Christ who is as much an embodiment of faith without religion as of revolution... without what? That's what the surreal is for him, that's what the surreal is. It's not something opposed to the real, it's something that happens in the originary world that corresponds to the real world, or to the real milieu. It is by passing through the originary world that we will know if we are definitively condemned, or if the closed world can be opened, and opened by what? Only here, at the end, we have Buñuel's doubt, as Drouzy shows very well, when at the end you have the only occasion, in these final images, that Christ himself is filmed in a closed world, as if he had opened up to us the possibility of a repetition that saves, but then he reminds us that we must not go so fast in this direction... and bang! Here we have a Christ who returns to his originary world where he is like the others, a parasite.

So you see what happens in the end? I would like that next time – indeed, your remark interests me more and more – if you can possibly follow me in this description of the first level of the action-image, namely, the originary world as a form of secondness referring to the secondness of the object-impulse and that whole adventure... Indeed, when I say that it happens twice in the history of cinema, and you said that maybe the same question is at stake in Ferreri's cinema, especially in one film that you mentioned, an early film of Ferreri's where there are two guys who never stop blowing up a balloon... that would be very interesting. Do you know this film? What is the name of the film?

A student: *Break Up*!<sup>41</sup>

Deleuze: Ah yes, *Break Up*, great... Amazing! So, I feel... for next time, we'll see... for next time I would ask that especially those of you who know something about Ferreri's cinema... could talk about Ferreri. And there you can see exactly where we've got to. We will be moving on to the second level of the action-image... That's it. [*End of the session*] [2:03:12]

## Notes

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1 *Marnie* (1964) is a film by Alfred Hitchcock (starring Tippi Hedren and Sean Connery) about a young kleptomaniac woman who becomes involved with a rich publisher for whom she goes to work and from whom she begins to steal. After abusing her trust by raping her, he tries to help Marnie root out the childhood trauma that haunts her, which is signalled by flashes of red that assail the young woman when she sees some red object.

2 Here, as in *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, Deleuze sometimes refers to Peirce's term *sinsign* and sometimes modifies it to *synsign*.

3 William Claude Dukenfield (1880 – 1946), better known as W. C. Fields, was an American comedian, actor, juggler, and writer. Fields' career began in vaudeville and although mainly a stage comedian, he began appearing in films in 1915, several directed by comic impresario Mack Sennet and one by D.W. Griffith.

4 The film in question, as Deleuze reports in *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, is *The Fatal Glass of Beer* (1933) written by Fields and directed by Clyde Bruckman. See *Cinema 1*, p. 154.

5 Emile Zola (1840-1902) was a French novelist, journalist, playwright, the best-known practitioner of the literary school of naturalism, and an important contributor to the development of theatrical naturalism. Among his most well known novels are *Thérèse Raquin*, *Germinal*, *Nana*, *L'argent* and *Pot Bouille*.

6 Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850), French literary artist who wrote a vast number of novels and short stories collectively called *La Comédie humaine* (The Human Comedy) in order to present a broad panorama of French society, meticulously describing the urban working classes and provincial life. Owing to his sharp observation of detail and unfiltered representation of society, Balzac is considered one of the founders of Realism in European literature.

7 In line with the translators of *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, we translate the French 'pulsion' with 'impulse', though for some later commentators this remains a controversial choice. While the more familiar term 'drive' relates more closely to the psychoanalytic underpinnings of Deleuze's discussion of the impulse-image, it is clear that from a cinematic perspective 'impulse' is the more appropriate term since it is the impulse (as an observable 'embryonic' behaviour) and not the drive (its supposed explanation) which the image renders visible.

8 Trying to distance himself from the psychoanalytic concept of the 'partial object', here Deleuze attempts to hack the etymology of 'object' itself: *ob* (in the way) - *ject* (thrown), appealing to the sense of *é* as an 'un' prefix, therefore suggesting an undoing or a displacing of the object from itself, or *dé* referring to 'off' or 'from', therefore reinforcing the notion of something torn away from the object. Nonetheless, in *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, he will choose not to pursue this line of linguistic deconstruction.

9 Deleuze would return to the Nietzschean idea of the "physician of civilization" in greater depth in *Essays Critical and Clinical (Critique et Clinique)* though – as Ronald Bogue points out in a note to his survey *Deleuze and Literature* – the term *physician of civilization* does not occur in the works Nietzsche published under his own supervision. In a letter to Rohde, March 22, 1873, Nietzsche referred to a projected book on Greek philosophy as *Der Philosoph als Arzt der Kultur (The Philosopher as Cultural Physician)*, and under this title the editors of the 1901–1913 *Nietzsches Werke* published a brief selection from Nietzsche's 1873 notebooks.

10 See for example Fragment 57: Strange creatures of olden times – "There budded many a head without a neck / And arms were roaming, shoulderless and bare / And eyes that wanted foreheads drifted by" – in *The Fragments of Empedocles* (trans. William Ellery Leonard) Chicago: Open Court Press, 1908, p.36.

11 Erich von Stroheim (1885-1957) was an Austrian-American director, actor and producer best known for his uncompromising style and fastidious attention to detail. After working as an actor and assistant to D.W. Griffith in *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Intolerance* (1916), his first film as a director *Blind Husbands* (1919), followed by *The Devil's Passkey* (1920, now lost) and *Foolish Wives* (1922). Stroheim's most famous film is *Greed* (1924), considered one of the masterpieces of silent cinema but whose original 9-hour runtime was eventually edited against his wishes to a 140-minute version. Following *The Merry Widow* (1925), *The Wedding March* (1928) and *Queen Kelly* (1928), all of which suffered from studio interference, Stroheim's career as a director was effectively ended. He returned to Europe as an actor, appearing in Jean Renoir's *La Grande Illusion* (1937), and to Hollywood for a role in Billy Wilder's *Sunset Boulevard* (1950), for which he was nominated for an Academy Award.

12 Luis Buñuel (1900-1983) was a Spanish filmmaker initially connected to the Surrealist movement. An atheist and communist sympathizer, he won early fame with avant-garde experiments in France and then pursued a career in Mexico before earning international acclaim with the later films he directed in Spain and France. Among his most famous works are the short film *Un chien andalou (An Andalusian Dog)* in collaboration with Salvador Dalí, *L'Age d'Or* (1930), *Los Olvidados* (1950), *Susana* (1951), *The Exterminating Angel* (1962), *Diary of a Chambermaid* (1964), *Belle de jour* (1967), *The Milky Way* (1969), *Tristana* (1970), *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* (1972), *The Phantom of Liberty* (1974) and *That Obscure Object of Desire* (1977).

13 Deleuze returns to the question of American cinema's problem with naturalism in *Cinema 1*, where he finds evidence of a naturalist approach in the cinema of King Vidor, notably in the two films he made with Jennifer Jones, *Duel in the Sun* (1946) and *Ruby Gentry* (1952). See *Cinema 1*, p. 134.

14 Marco Ferreri (1928–1997) was an Italian director, screenwriter and actor who began his career in the 1950s. Acclaimed for his provocative, visionary style and surreal humour, among his most known films are *The Ape Woman* (1964), *The Seed of Man* (1969), *Dillinger Is Dead* (1969), *La Grande Bouffe* (1973), *Touche pas à la femme blanche* (1974), *Bye Bye Monkey* (1978), *Tales of Ordinary Madness* (1981) and *The Future is Woman* (1984).

15 *Foolish Wives* (1922), Stroheim's second major film is a silent erotic drama about a bogus Count (played by Stroheim himself) who uses the status of his forged identity to seduce and exploit rich women. Like many of Von Stroheim's films, it was drastically cut on release.

16 *The Young and the Damned* (Orig. *Los Olvidados*, 1950), also known as *The Forgotten Ones*, is a teen crime drama directed by Luis Buñuel about a group of destitute children and their misfortunes in a Mexico City slum.

17 *The Merry Widow* (1925) is a romantic comedy drama written and directed by Stroheim adapted from the operetta by Franz Lehár about a prince who falls in love with a poor dancing girl whom he is forbidden to marry and who ends up in the hands of a lecherous old man. When the man dies he has to try to woo her all over again.

18 *Poto-poto* was one of two cine-novels Stroheim wrote in the 1930s (the other being *Paprika*). Set in the same location as the heavily censored and re-edited African section of *Queen Kelly*, which his star Gloria Swanson and the studios considered scandalously unseemly. See Erich Von Stroheim, *Poto-Poto* (trans. Renée Nitschke) Pygmalion Books, 1991. See also Deleuze's discussion of Poto-poto in *Cinema 1: The Movement-image*, p.126.

19 *Queen Kelly* is an American silent film directed by Erich von Stroheim. The film was produced in 1928–29 and released by United Artists. It starred Gloria Swanson, in the title role, Walter Byron as her lover, and Seena Owen.

20 Here Deleuze is no doubt referring to an incorrectly remembered phrase from Blaise Pascal's *Pensées*: "Three degrees of latitude upset the whole of jurisprudence and one meridian determines what is true." See Blaise Pascal, *Pensées* (Trans. A. J. Krailsheimer) New York: Penguin, 1995.

21 See Erich von Stroheim, *Poto-Poto*, Paris: Editions de la Fontaine, 1956, p. 132.

22 Joris-Karl Huysmans (1848-1907) was a French novelist and art critic most famous for the novel *À rebours* (1884), published in English as *Against the Grain* or *Against Nature*.

23 Jean des Esseintes is the protagonist of *À rebours*. The last scion of an aristocratic family, Des Esseintes is an eccentric, reclusive, ailing aesthete who detests nineteenth-century bourgeois society and tries to retreat into an ideal artistic world of his own creation.

24 *Nazarín* (1959) is a satirical Mexican drama directed by Buñuel from a script he co-wrote with Julio Alejandro. The plot concerns a priest in a poor community who lives a charitable life in accordance with his religious principles, but many others do not return the favor.

25 *Viridiana* (1961) is a film by Buñuel concerning a novice nun who becomes the obsession of a middle-aged man whose dead wife she resembles, and later of the son who inherits his property after the man kills himself from shame at his treatment of the girl.

26 *The Wedding March* (1928) is a film by Stroheim the footage for which was originally cut into two films (the second being *The Honeymoon*, now lost) before being re-edited for release as a single movie. Starring Fay Wray, the plot revolves around a nobleman from a rundown family who falls in love with a commoner girl but who is forced to marry a rich socialite.

27 *Greed* (1924), considered Stroheim's masterpiece and perhaps the greatest film of the silent era, is a meticulous adaptation of Frank Norris's novel *McTeague*, which tells the story of of McTeague, a San Francisco dentist, who marries his best friend Schouler's girlfriend Trina. The film was brutally cut by the studios and the original version forever lost, though in recent years an attempt was made to partially restore it.

28 Luchino Visconti (1906-1976) was one of the fathers of Italian Neo-realism, although later moved towards luxurious epics dealing with themes of beauty, decadence, death and European history. His 1943 directorial debut, *Ossessione*, was followed by *La terra trema* (*The Earth Trembles*, 1948), based on the Giovanni Verga's novel *I Malavoglia*. During the 1950s and 1960s, Visconti veered away from the neorealist path, notably with *Senso* (1954) and *The Leopard* (1963). His so-called "German Trilogy" includes *The Damned* (1969), *Death in Venice* (1971) and *Ludwig* (1972). Visconti was also a stage director of plays and opera. Deleuze will discuss his cinema more extensively in *Cinema II: The Time-image*.

29 Raymond Roussel (1877-1933) was a French poet, novelist, playwright, musician and chess enthusiast. Through his works he exerted a profound influence on certain groups including the Surrealists, Oulipo and the authors of the Nouveau Roman. His work is notable for its inscrutable surfaces and extreme density, its wealth of puns, double entendres and homonyms. Roussel's best-known books include

*Impressions of Africa* (1910) and *Locus Solus* (1914). His long poem *Nouvelle Impressions d'Afrique* (1932) famously includes long digressions and footnotes in rhyming alexandrines.

30 Deleuze refers to this story from Roussel's *Locus Solus* and its connections with Buñuel in more detail in *Cinema I: The Movement-image*. "In *Locus Solus*, eight corpses in a glass cage reproduce the event of their life; and Lucius Egroizard, artist and scholar of genius, who has gone mad after the murder of his daughter, repeats indefinitely the circumstances of the murder until he invents a machine to record the voice of a singer, deforms it, and restores so accurately the voice of his dead child that he regains everything: daughter, happiness. It moves from an indefinite repetition to repetition as decisive instant, from a closed repetition to an open repetition, from a repetition which not only fails, but induces failure, to a repetition which not only succeeds, but recreates the model or the ordinary," pp. 131-132.

31 Johan August Strindberg (1849-1912) was a Swedish playwright, novelist, poet, essayist and painter.

32 See Søren Kierkegaard, *Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs* (Trans. M.G. Piety, Oxford: OUP, 2009). In the spirit of Kierkegaard's other writings, *Repetition* was written and initially published under an ironically "repetitive" pseudonym, Constantine Constantius. The book is divided into two sections. In the first Constantius seeks a new model of modern philosophy that would replace the Platonic idea of recollection with that of repetition, saying that these two concepts embody the same movement but in different directions. The former, turned towards an illusory attempt to recover the past, is a bad repetition, while the latter, which completely renounces the past, opens itself to a salutary repetition which may arrive from the future or from an unforeseen outside source. In the second part, adopting a slightly mocking tone, Constantius dispenses epistolary advice based on his reflections and evoking the biblical trials of Job to a sensitive 'young man' who has broken up with his girlfriend and who wonders how or whether to keep his love for her alive.

33 *Dom Juan* (1665) is a five-act comedy by Molière based upon the Spanish legend of Don Juan Tenorio. The aristocrat Dom Juan seduces, marries and abandons Elvira, whom he discards as just another romantic conquest. Later, he invites to dinner the statue of a man whom he recently had murdered. In the course of their second evening, the stone statue of the murdered man charms, deceives and leads Dom Juan to Hell.

34 *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* (orig. *Le charme discret de la bourgeoisie*, 1972) is a film by Buñuel from a screenplay he co-wrote with Jean-Claude Carrière, starring Fernando Rey, Stéphane Audran, Jean-Pierre Cassel, Bulle Ogier and Delphine Seyrig. It centres around five failed attempts of a group of bourgeois Parisians to have lunch together intertwined with the dreams of four of the characters.

35 *The Exterminating Angel* (orig. *El ángel exterminador*, 1962) is a surreal, supernatural drama directed by Buñuel which follows a group of wealthy guests who, after a lavish dinner party in a luxurious mansion house, find themselves mysteriously unable to leave, a situation which results in chaos and a number of bizarre deaths.

36 Alain Robbe-Grillet (1922-2008) was a novelist and filmmaker. One of the key figures of the Nouveau Roman movement, he began his filmmaking career writing the screenplay of Alain Resnais's *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*. His own films, which are characterised by a fragmented structure of temporally disoriented repetitions and variations of tableaux-like scenes, often involving elements of fetishism and sexual perversion, include *L'Immortelle* (1962), *Trans-Europ Express* (1966), *L'homme qui ment* (1968), *L'Eden et après* (1970), *Glissements progressifs du plaisir* (1974), *Le jeu avec le feu* (1975) and *La belle captive* (1983). Deleuze discusses the cinema of Robbe-Grillet more fully in *Cinema II: The Time-image*.

37 In his memoir, *My Last Sigh*, Buñuel writes of *The Exterminating Angel*: "In life, as in film, I've always been fascinated by repetition. Why certain things tend to repeat themselves over and over again I have no idea, but the phenomenon intrigues me enormously. There are at least a dozen repetitions in *The Exterminating Angel*. Two men introduce themselves and shake hands, saying, 'Delighted!' They meet again a moment later and repeat the routine as if they'd never seen each other before. The third time, they greet each other with great enthusiasm, like two old friends. Another repetition occurs when the guests enter the hall and the host calls his butler twice; in fact, it's the exact same scene, but shot from different angles." See Luis Buñuel, *My Last Sigh*, (Trans. Abigail Israel) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983 p. 239.

38 For a more detailed analysis of repetition in Buñuel's films see *Cinema I: The Movement-image*, pp. 132-133.

39 *The Milky Way* (orig. *La Voie lactée*, 1969) is a film directed by Buñuel starring Laurent Terzieff, Paul Frankeur, Delphine Seyrig, Georges Marchal and Michel Piccoli. The title of the film refers to a popular name used for the Way of St. James, a route of religious pilgrimage running from northern Europe to Santiago de Compostela in Spain. The film follows the picaresque journey of two vagabond travelers, for whom the pilgrimage seems to be a means of escape. Along the way, they witness a series of bizarre incidents involving persons named in documented heresies from different epochs of Catholic Church history. At key moments they also encounter Jesus and the Virgin Mary, as well as modern believers and fanatics.

40 See Maurice Drouzy, *Luis Buñuel, architecte du rêve*, Edition Lherminier, 1978, referred to extensively in Deleuze's discussion of Buñuel in *Cinema I: The Movement-image*, pp. 126-133.



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41 *Break Up* (1965) is a film by Marco Ferreri starring Marcello Mastroianni, Catherine Spaak and Ugo Tognazzi, which follows the adventures of a Milanese entrepreneur who becomes obsessed with how much air a balloon can take before it breaks. His inability to control this fixation eventually destroys his perfect life and leads him to madness.