Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Part 1

[*Given the opening discussion and Georges Comtesse's intervention, the recording begins apparently following a number of remarks not recorded*]

… if you even understand cinema, you certainly haven't missed reading recently the declarations by a great author, a great director – but who is not as great a thinker as a director – who declared – so, it's the old refrain that comes back – "cinema no longer has anything…, there is no story anymore, so cinema can only recite its own history and take this as its object", right?

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: [*He chuckles*] You mean he was drunk? Well, that's truly the first time that such shamelessly Hegelian propositions were presented until now, so everything was included: poetry can no longer present anything except its own history, and its own reflection; philosophy can be nothing but the reflection of philosophy and the history of philosophy, etc., etc. But strangely, that hadn't been proposed for cinema; it took a German to say it, that's seemed inevitable.

But this topic is funny: first, it's vapid as a topic, the idea, the idea, and all these theories of the story [*le récit*] that is left nothing other than to recount itself, this reflexivity of the personal work, this is so tiresome! Or this topic of the work within the work; I mean this is, this is immodest, it's impudent, it's impudent. Constantly repeating stuff like that which was never true, it's really odd. Ah, the world is not all that joyful, right?

But it's the serene ease of the people who say stuff like that, even thinking – this extends quite broadly – they manage to think that they are saying something new in asserting that there is nothing new. That gets complicated; they're so tiresome. Instead of doing their work, I mean, you understand, the good thing about philosophy is that it doesn't have, it doesn't contain a gram more reflection than other disciplines, that's what is good in philosophy. So, on the contrary, if we insert philosophy everywhere, at that point, everything becomes processes of self-reflection, and then we'll find ourselves being told that painting is a reflection on painting, that music is reflection on music, that cinema is reflection on cinema. But we never did anything with reflection, especially not any philosophy, never, never. Yeah, a sad world, yeah, [3: 00] it had to

be!

It has always seemed to me -- I hope for many of you as well – well, all the topics that consist in telling us: to write is ultimately to ask oneself, "what is it to write?", or "how does one write?", Or "is writing possible?", “writing is the confrontation with the blank page”, all that always seemed, I don't know, really bad jokes. I ask myself, but what is... what’s wrong with your mind? Aren’t you feeling well? It’s odd. That's life. You have to put up with everything. You must not seem to be saying that this is not true because on that point, we would find ourselves in some impossible situations. You must say: “Very well, go ahead”. There’s no risk of that going far anyway. [*Laughter*] Yes, in fact, this was amazing because cinema was spared; well, for a few months now, it hasn't been! At least since it has a brief history, this will go faster! Okay, let’s get to work.

Georges Comtesse: Regarding what you are saying there, about the Whole and the Open, it seems to me that you were trying to say that the only point of agreement between Bergson and Heidegger was precisely on the question of the Whole and the Open. That raises a problem!

Deleuze: This comparison?

Comtesse: Yes, because the essence of truth, when Heidegger says that the important thing is allowing the being [*l’étant*] to be, that is, the possibility of opening oneself to the Open, he does not mean the Open as Whole. It is simply, from its original difference, what metaphysical or philosophical thought, between being and the being, essence or appearance, and appearance, this difference is not simply the difference of forgetting the Open. This is because openness to the Open is not necessarily -- and this is what is unthinkable for a philosopher -- openness to the Open is not, is not immediately and necessarily the Appearing of being, the Appearing in this difference both with appearance and phenomenal appearance, because precisely what metaphysical or philosophical thought with its original difference between being and forgetting does not think about forgetting what one forgets, this is because the Open itself, the Open itself can be closed. In other words, there is a refusal, a play, the play of time. If being is time, as Heidegger would say, the unthought of all philosophy, whether being is time, and that is precisely what forms the reversal, the square or the turning and the very overcoming of metaphysics beyond its completion, well, it’s because in being, in the very thought of being, there is the thought of an enigmatic "withdrawal" in its very dispensation, that is, that the production precisely of the luminous presence outside the latent, if this is possible, this advent precisely of the luminous presence, there is in the advent a strange evasion, that is, at once, Heidegger thinks of the enigmatic play of "being as time", but also poetically the enigma of this play, that is, this latency of which precisely to be outside of it would bring about the advent of being as light. This is why it is perhaps not sustainable or possible to identify or to make, let us say, a bridge between Heidegger and Bergson who unfortunately remains with metaphysics, and can be worse than metaphysics, that is, "mysticism".

Deleuze: [*He laughs*] I see you coming; your whole development is excellent, the conclusion expresses a taste that I ... an entirely philosophical taste. That is, it consists in telling me, "how are you going to dare to connect Bergson, whom I do not like, with Heidegger whom I admire?" That’s your business. I would just respond with two things: your whole analysis is very correct

on Heidegger, but a first rule, you must not transform a general remark into a specific remark. I call "general remark" what I was saying and which seems to me to remain entirely valid, namely if you seek in the history of philosophy which authors have linked deeply in an original way -- but not the same, I said, not the same way -- but at least have in common to have linked the three notions of the Whole, time and the Open, to my knowledge, I only see two: Bergson and Heidegger, [10: 00] which seems to me sufficient to make a comparison at a general level.

As for everything you said about Heidegger, it is absolutely correct, but only to see in Bergson -- with quite different concepts obviously, and quite another terminology, there is fundamentally in duration something which, at the very moment when it is the object of intuition, is also its "withdrawal" and the movement by which it escapes -- only to see that in Bergson is simply to say that you are not interested at all in Bergson. Bergson's texts are so formal, namely that our psychological duration, that is, what is revealed to us, is only, at the same time, the movement by which the other durations, which, in fact, really constitute duration as Whole, namely through which other durations escape, to the point that in order to reach the essence of duration, we must go beyond what he calls "the human condition". In Bergson, it isn't duration which is to be given; duration never ceases escaping by giving itself all of that which nonetheless does not authorize me to make any Bergson-Heidegger connection beyond this very general connection.

I was saying, well yes, it's still odd, these two writers that are very independent from each other. I don't know if Heidegger read Bergson; maybe he read Bergson, but anyway, that didn't impress him much, it's not his own tradition. This is odd because Heidegger reached this connection -- it seems to me -- totality, openness, temporality, through a certain tradition that you say very well, finally, was very poetic, philosophical-poetic. In my opinion, Bergson reached this very strangely, through a, much more through a reflection on the living: if the living resembles a totality, if the living is a Whole, it is precisely because it is "open" to the world whereas people before said, on the contrary, that if the living resembles a Whole, it is because it is a microcosm which reproduces the great closed Whole. It is by reversing, it is by twisting the traditional metaphor, it is through a reflection on vitalism, in my opinion, that Bergson arrives at his conception of the fundamentally open Whole. OK, are we ready? Let's continue.

So, you see, where I'm at still, my dream would be to reach, I would have to go rather quickly because for the Christmas break, we'd have to be done with all these image and sign problems, and inevitably we dragged things out. So, notice that after dishonoring myself last week, since I spent two hours saying that Peirce was an admirable English philosopher, and then at the end someone gently pointed out to me that he was American, [*Laughter*] I obviously felt, I told myself: they will never again believe me on anything that I'm going to tell them, after a mistake like that. So, I would only speak of "Anglo-Saxon" thinkers, [*Laughter*] and everything I said about the particular merits of English philosophy obviously had to be understood as the particular merits of Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American philosophy. Okay, so... but so that bothered me anyway; I was upset. Obviously, you understand, he was born in Cambridge, I read it poorly, I read it poorly; but obviously, there is a Cambridge in America, all that is grotesque. [*Laughter; students talk to him*] What? Is there a Moscow? There is a Paris too, so I could also quote the famous French philosopher if there is an American who was born in Paris, fine. It doesn't matter, so it doesn't matter, no, no, no, not "it doesn't matter". There we are.

So, notice that, according to Peirce, we have our first two types of images: Firstness, Secondness, that, I assume, it has become quite clear; if I am already making a small graph, I am saying Firstness refers to what we called, in our previous analyses, affection-images, and this greatly enriches everything we could say about the affection-image. Here we have a coincidence. As a category, Firstness... No, rather as a modality, you know, if I try to situate the modality in the sense of modalities of judgment, there are three modalities of judgment in classical philosophy: the possible, the real and the necessary. From the point of view of modality, Firstness is the possible. From the point of view of what one could call quantity, and no longer modality – as we saw, Firstness, we took a little initiative, a bit of distance from Peirce -- but Firstness is the singularity, [*Pause*] and I would add, from the point of view of acts of the spirit, Firstness is expression. [*Pause*] The characteristics of the Firstness as we have seen, are quality, potentiality, immediate consciousness ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [16 :28]

... [Secondness] corresponds perfectly to our action-image. [*Pause*] The corresponding modality is the real; the corresponding quantity is individuality; [*Pause*] the corresponding act of the spirit is position or opposition. [*Pause*] The characteristics of Secondness are: the state of things; the fact or the duel; experience, experience understood as the part of the event that is actualized, or as the passage from one state of things to another state of things.

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: No, these are not categories, these are points of view on categories. The categories are Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; then, the points of view on categories, which is the modality, which gives us the possible, the real, and we will see for Thirdness; quantity: singularity and individuality; and the act of the spirit which gives us expression, position or opposition.

Well then, we now have left this third category from Peirce, this third type of image, according to him, this third type of Appearing, which he calls Thirdness. And there, well, we are indeed immediately forced to leave something empty, because if you refer to our classification of images, as I proposed it last year in the presentation on Peirce, for the moment, we do not see anything that corresponds to it. You will understand it immediately from the way Peirce defines Thirdness.

I would say that for him there is no doubt; in any case, Thirdness has as its modality the necessary. These are again the three modalities of judgment: possible, real and necessary. It has for quantity, it has for quantity no longer the singular or the individual, but the general, the generality; it has -- we will understand why as we go along -- for act of the mind, interpretation or understanding; it is therefore a very rich aggregate. Suddenly, what characteristics will define Thirdness? What are they? Well, exactly as I said, Secondness is what is two by itself; Thirdness is what is three by itself, that is, what refers to something else. It is a "one", which refers to a "two", and that would be Secondness; we must add through the intermediary of a "three", and that would be a Thirdness. So fine, that’s a Thirdness.

Only, we must already specify: in what way is this Thirdness a type of image? Peirce's response, what he calls Thirdness is all that can be designated, all that can be understood as "the mental,"

the mental. [*Pause*] “Thoughts are neither qualities nor facts,” says Peirce; "thoughts are neither qualities nor facts" -- remember? -- that is, are neither Firstness, nor Secondness. A thought is always a Thirdness. Thirdness, I can say, well, that it is a thought-image as distinct from the affection-image and the action-image. Fine, we haven't yet found it in our categories; that's why we are going to need to confront, to mix all this up. It's the mental. But when is there really the mental? When are there really three? And as soon as there are three, why is there the mental? This is complicated! And why not more than three? A lot of questions come to us: why does he stop? Since he does indeed stop -- he thinks that Thirdness exhausts this -- why not a four, a five, a six? This is all important.

Frankly, what can Thirdness be? I take a piece of paper, and then another piece of paper, and I pin them together, or I put on a paper clip. This is an example he selects. At first glance, it is the constitution of a Thirdness; I have one, two and three. That's always where the Anglo-Saxons start from, with two things like that. It's not difficult. I see my two papers with a pin or a paper clip. Is this Thirdness? No, it seems like a Thirdness, Peirce will say, borrowing the term from the theory of conics in mathematics, but no matter. He will say: this is a case of degenerate Thirdness; that’s not Thirdness. Why isn’t it a Thirdness? Because you can very well remove sheet B from the paper clip, and you will keep the duo, the sheet A and paperclip dyad, without anything having changed in sheet A, nor in the paper clip. So, you could have subtracted one of the terms without the other two being affected, are you following me? It is therefore a false Thirdness.

In a true thirdness, you cannot subtract a term without changing everything, whereas here, what shows you that it is false Thirdness is that, once again, your paper A and the paperclip remain quite the same, although you have subtracted, and you have removed sheet B. So, it’s a degenerate Thirdness, not true Thirdness. And what is a degenerate Thirdness? In fact, it's a couple of dyads, a dueling couple, it's Secondness. You simply consider two duels at the same time: you consider a first duel, sheet A and the paperclip, and a second duel, sheet B and the paperclip. With two duels that have a common term, you can still construct a Thirdness, only it’s a false Thirdness. You will never achieve true Thirdness by multiplying dyads, that is, by multiplying couples. Couples are Secondness. You can multiply couples, you will not get out of Secondness. Moreover, Secondness is made of the multiplication of couples.

Another example: [*Pause*] A throws object B. C arrives and picks up object B. Can you say that A gave, gave B to C? No. You have two dyads, you have two duels, you have two Secondnesses: a first Secondness, A throws thing B; a second Secondness, second Secondness, C picks up B. You have two couples, you have two dyads, you do not have a Thirdness. You will never be able to obtain a true Thirdness -- this is Peirce's idea -- from a combination of dyads.

By the way, that’s going to move us forward because you sense that with his one, two, three, we risk immediately telling him, ah, well once again, you are Hegelian, really. Peirce's idea is that Hegel indeed said: one, two, three, because he had a presentiment, but he did not understand at all what Thirdness was, that finally he only knew how to align pairs of dyads. And this is also what Peirce criticizes in logic, that logic got stuck in Secondness. And so, he who claims to be the creator -- and this is historically true -- of a triadic logic, that is, which is no longer bipolar with the only two values of true and false, but which is tripolar, he thinks that it constitutes, in

fact, the proper logic of the mental, so he attaches great importance to it.

Another example for you to understand fully: I open my window in the morning, and I drop and I push out a flowerpot that falls into the street, so A and B: A, I throw the flowerpot without looking ; B, the flowerpot falls. Person C comes by then and receives the flowerpot, okay. Just like I said earlier: can I say… I gave the object, when I threw an object that another came to pick up, and that I said no, this is two Secondnesses. Here, can I say: I killed someone? No doubt I will blame myself for this unfortunate accident, but strictly speaking, I didn't actually kill anyone. There have been two dyads: me and the falling flowerpot, the other person and the flowerpot he receives, two dyads having a common term never constitute a Thirdness. But then, what constitutes a Thirdness? And you can go on to infinity here like that, duels, you can multiply duels, you'll never reach three. Good.

So, on the other hand, let's assume acts, here we have acts that can be considered with the following expressions: I kill, Cain kills Abel, I give, I exchange, etc., etc. So, we could play all kinds of games, practice exercises. Here, Peirce tells us: these are Thirdnesses. Why? Why, in fact, does "I give" -- immediately notice the difference – why does it not mean throwing an object that another comes to pick up. I give. Ah, good. "I kill", this isn't throwing a flowerpot that the other receives by accident. It means waiting for him to pass by and then wham! Here we have a Thirdness: I waited two days for him to pass by, and when he did, [*Laughter*], just, just, whew, I reached the Thirdness. Fine.

What is the characteristic? Notice, I was saying, in all of my previous examples, they were degenerate Thirdnesses. If we look back, well not too much, there are also degenerate Secondnesses. According to Peirce, and that's a problem, it will be a problem when we dare to have a confrontational discussion with him; according to Peirce, there can be no degenerate Firstness. We understand why: because what is one by itself does not degenerate. But an example of degenerated Secondness, an example of true Secondness: I dine at Pierre's, implied that me Paul, me whatever, I dine at Pierre's. But according to the pink page of the Larousse dictionary: "Lucullus dines at Lucullus's", here we have a degenerated Secondness.[1] Notice that in our language, there are lots of degenerated Secondnesses, lots of stuff like that. Okay, but no matter.

I give, I exchange, I kill, here we have Thirdnesses; what do they have in common? It's odd. A first common characteristic: I would say, they indeed involve, you feel that all these acts indeed greatly involve the mental. Here, they refer to a law; what they have in common is that they refer to a law, and that will be the first characteristic of Thirdness, the existence of a law. This law can be physical or moral. [*Pause*] And in any case -- in my opinion, here Peirce is very interesting – in any case, whether the law is physical or moral, but it is particularly evident when it is moral, then the act has a dimension and symbolic determination. The symbol will be one of the deep characteristics of Thirdness; as soon as there is a symbol, there is Thirdness. As soon as there is law, there is Thirdness. [*Pause*]

And in fact, the gift is always accompanied by a symbol that determines it as a gift, even when this symbol is very, very hidden, even when the donor's gesture – ethnologists are doing research on gift-giving behaviors through civilizations -- each time, we see the presence of a symbol in the gift-giving behavior. Likewise with exchange, likewise with killing. What is killing without

reference to a law? So, in the Thirdnesses, this is how you will recognize them, there is always a reference to a law, and it's in this way that there are three. There is an object, another object, and a law which refers one to the other, which refers one to the other according to a rule, according to its own rule. [*Pause*]

But immediately there is an objection which comes to us; let's not exaggerate since Secondness, already implied laws. I hope you already realized this, immediately! You remember that Secondness was, among other things, action-reaction relationships, [*Pause*] action and reaction, that is, a duel. But there is a law, it was the relationship between effort and resistance. Well, there is a law, there are laws of resistance, there are laws of effort, there are laws concerning the relation of action and reaction. Given a thing, given an action, calculating the reaction of something whose nature you know is all within the realm of laws.

Well, this is both very easy, and of course, he's not a fool, Peirce. Obviously, there are laws which regulate actions and reactions. But what he means is quite another thing, and it is very simple: it is that no action or reaction is ever caused by the law which governs it. [*Pause*] It's a very simple idea, and this is good philosophy, very… things that we don't usually think about, but which are absolutely convincing: an action and a reaction, an effort and a resistance always conform to laws, but they do not derive from them. [*Pause*] It is the same as saying: an action and a reaction indeed respond to a law, but they do not have that law as a cause.

In fact, let us take some simple cases: an animal movement responds to laws, and even a human movement; this applies to animals and humans, and to humans as much as to animals. For example, if I want to raise my arm, well, that engages all kinds of relations of actions and reactions between innervations, muscles, organic resistances, organic tensions, etc. All that is governed by law, but nobody ever raised an arm, I would say, while thinking about all that because if I thought about all that, I would never raise my arm. Which means, all the more so, an animal, when an animal makes a movement, it is in accordance with all these physical-physiological laws, but it is never these physical-physiological laws which are the cause of an action, and why?

It's so obvious. It's because a law, as they say, is always hypothetical. If you do that, then a particular thing will happen. A law is always conditional; if you bring water to 212 degrees, then it boils. But the law was never sufficient to boil water. It's not the law that boils water; the law is the rule that water conforms to when it starts to boil such that Peirce can tell us with the utmost rigor: of course, the world of Secondness is governed by laws; however, laws are never considered in Secondness as such. On the other hand, if you are forced to consider a law for itself, you can say: I am in the realm of the mental, I am in Thirdness.

As a result, the first characteristic -- and you see how Peirce can already tell us that the modality of Thirdness is generality -- there is Thirdness as soon as a physical or moral law intervenes explicitly, explicitly, the presence explicit of the law being indicated by what he will call "a symbol". [*Pause*] He would just as well say that the law -- and he says it designating Thirdness -- well, what is it? It is neither affection nor action, it is sense, or signification. The first characteristic of Thirdness was the law; the second characteristic of Thirdness is sense or signification. Why? It follows straight away: signification -- here I take the sense of

“signification”, I’m not trying to distinguish sense from signification; from the point of view we’ve reached, we could multiply the distinctions; what interests us is that, in any case, it is part of Thirdness. -- Why? Because signification is always a model. According to Peirce, it is always a model which, under very different conditions, which are either physical or moral conditions, that is, symbolic in the narrow sense, comes to inform the actions and reactions, and here, there is a true Thirdness. Because if you withdraw the model, the actions and reactions are no longer the same.

And we will perhaps understand that better with the point that interests me the most: it is that the third characteristic by which he defines Thirdness is the logical relation; he says: "there you are, this is Thirdness, it is the relation, it is the logical relation”. Only what is the logical relation? So, he would give it, we would find three characteristics specific to Thirdness according to Peirce: law, sense, and the logical relation. If you understand the logical relation, I believe you understand the other two characteristics very well, this is the real knot of Thirdness, and in fact, why?

And here, I am opening a parenthesis; I am no longer speaking in Peirce’s name, I am speaking in the name of philosophy, that is, what was this problem of the relation, which tortured philosophy from the start, and which was a part, which finally belonged to one of the founding reasons of philosophy? I would say that what belonged to one of the founding reasons of philosophy from the start is even more than paradoxes about movement, it's paradoxes about relations. How can something as strange as the relation be possible? And that, from the start, it was, as Peirce would say, the existence of the mental that was completely engaged in all this. Why? Well, philosophy was already faced with a strange problem, and here I am going very quickly, I’ll be saying simple things, therefore very, very simple, to organize a specific problem. So, this is no longer exactly Peirce, but it's to get back to him.

You know, philosophy as early as Plato was confronted with a problem, the problem of judgment, and the Greeks are deeply involved in it; they say, judgment is still strange, even the simplest judgment. The simplest judgment is what is called judgment of attribution: the sky is blue, the sky is blue. Well, that's odd, how can we say that the sky is blue, since literally, it means A is B, A is B? In other words, unless you repeat all the time, being is being, blue is blue, the sky is the sky, unless you stick to the principle of identity all the time, it must be recognized that any judgment of attribution is an offense against the principle of identity. Indeed, the judgment of attribution can be written in the form: A is B. [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] And Plato says it's difficult, and we're going to have to explain that, how is it possible that A is B?

But there we have another kind of judgment, a second type of judgment. So, we’ve barely said "oh what kind of problem will we be saddled with now?”, and we learn that there is going to be a worse problem, and it's like that, it's always like that. I say A is smaller than B. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] So this is different. Even without having done any philosophy, we immediately feel that, can this be reduced to a judgment of attribution? A is B, I can say in a pinch: the sky is blue; I can say in a pinch, this can be explained. Yes, then one would have to conceive of A as a real being, or the concept of a real being, and B as the concept of a property. The judgment of attribution assigns a property to a subject. How is this possible? This is already another matter. But finally, we are sort of figuring this out: I attribute properties to subjects.

But when I'm faced with the other kind of judgment: A is smaller than B, can being smaller than B be likened to a property of subject A? This is annoying because B is also a subject; it's not a property, it is also a subject. So, can I say at least that "smaller than" is a property of A? Well yes, I can say that "smaller than" is a property of A, but I should also say, at this point, that "greater than" is also a property of A because "smaller than B", there is always a C, such that A is greater than C. So, if I treat relations as attributes, this time, it is not simply the principle of identity that I'm slighted; it's the principle of non-contradiction. I attribute contradictories to the same subject, I attribute "smaller" and "larger" to it. You will tell me: "But look out, it's smaller than A, and greater than C". So what, what does that change? Small B and small C are real beings. I could say at the same time, I could say in a pinch that the concept of A contains properties, the concept of a real being contains properties, but can I say that the concept of a real being contains other real beings? Impossible say something like that; at first glance, it's not possible, [*Pause*] impossible to resolve this. The attribution already called into question the principle of identity, the relation calls into question the principle of non-contradiction.

And how is Plato going to resolve this? He's going to say: yeah, it's not difficult; you won't resolve this, and Socrates addresses it, Socrates comes in, and he hasn't finished, he'll say: well yes, you can't escape the following conclusion, which is that the relations do not depend on their terms, that relations are Ideas with a capital "I", and that there is an Idea of the small, that there is an Idea of the great. And Ideas are discovered by Plato, first about the problem of relations. There is an Idea of the great, and an Idea of the small, and simply, when you say: A is smaller than B, and greater than C, you mean: the term A participates in the Idea of the great with respect to a term B, and participates in the Idea of the small in relation to the other term. Plato will have been forced to make the relations from pure Ideas which go beyond the sensible world.

The problem started off well, so much as they [Ideas] are irreducible to attributes of the thing, you understand? No? You will not be able to reduce the judgment "Peter is smaller than Paul" to the judgment "Peter has blue eyes". Moreover, when you'll have let go and when you'll have discovered the world of relations, you will wonder, so if all judgment is not in fact a judgment of relation, namely, if when you say: "Peter has blue eyes", it is not already a judgment of relation, namely that there would not even be properties at all, but that there would only be relations, that would be even better. But finally, there's no need to complicate this, we'll leave it there.

A madman in the philosophical sense, that is, a kind of incredible genius who will stop at nothing, arguably the most daring philosopher who has ever existed, says: no, no, we have to save it all. We have to show at any cost that the judgment of relation can be reduced to a judgment of attribution, otherwise we are lost. However, that will lead him to some strange things. He's going to be forced to say: well, okay, every real concept, every concept that designates a real being, [*Pause: Deleuze writes on the board*] well, it has to contain -- since we cannot stop -- the totality of other concepts. That is, A will have to contain, the concept of A will have to contain the concept of B, the concept of C, the concept of D, ad infinitum. So, at that point, relations will indeed be internal to terms, to concepts. [*Pause*] If the concept of Caesar includes the concept, contains the concept of all other terms, all of Caesar's relations, not only with his contemporaries, not only with what came before him, but with we who have come after him, all the relations imaginable can be reduced to attributions, that is, to attributes of the

concept. Which comes down to saying, the concept of each real being must express the totality of the world. What a strange idea! That's how it must be. It's amazing. This philosopher was Leibniz. [*Pause*]

He will be very annoyed, he will be very, very annoyed because what he just said about concept A is only valid if I can also say [*Deleuze writes on the board*] that concept A contains concept B, the concept C, concept D, ad infinitum. As a result, the relations of A with C, smaller than B, greater than C, all of these are attributes of the concept, by calling attributes all the properties it contains. But he has to say the same about concept B, which in turn must encompass everything: C, D, E, including the concept of A. Hence the problem, which is what? The problem is, once again we're lost because he reduced the relation to a judgment of attribution. But what will the relation be between the following two judgments of attribution: A is greater than B, in the concept of A, and B is smaller than A in the concept of B? He will have reduced the relation to an attribution, on condition of splitting the relation into two relations, you understand? Well, in the end, no matter; this is so that you have an idea of the complication in all that. So, in fact, Leibniz's operation is pretty amazing.

So how do we reconcile this? [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] You have a formula: A (R1) B where A is the container, R1 is the relation, and you have a formula: B (R2) A, how to assert… So, you have reduced R1 to an attribute, R2 has an attribute, but alas, you come back to: what is the relation between R1 and R2? So being a creator, every time he is faced with a difficulty, he creates a new concept. He will create the concept of preestablished harmony, which is not at all a simply verbal concept, but he will show that in the understanding of God -- he must take that route -- in the understanding of God, there is a correspondence and a harmony between [*Pause*] everything that is in the concept of A, everything that is in the concept of 2, and for a good reason: it's because it is one and the same world which is expressed for concepts of real beings, and that will complicate matters enormously.

So, notice this notion of relation, even at the level of a simple relation like "smaller", "bigger", it's very, very difficult. As a result, I believe it was a great day in philosophy when -- and there I believe one can find predecessors -- but to assign it precisely, when a new tone, when an Anglo-Saxon philosopher, who I'm sure was a Scot [*Laughter*] and his name was [David] Hume, appeared and said as if it were obvious: relations and all relations are by nature external to their terms. They are outside their terms. And this proposal for me is absolutely like a thunderclap in philosophy. Properties are interior to the terms of which they are properties, to which they attribute themselves, but relations are exteriorities. Relations are external to their terms. A is smaller than B, well then, "smaller than" is a third. In other words, relations are not contained in the concept of thing or things; the relations are C.

With this begins what will be called the principle of the exteriority of relations. And Hume's simplicity consists in saying – only, what it will commit him to – well, try to take the world as it is -- instead of thinking it, objecting to it, all that, saying that it should be like this or like that -- take it as it is. You can't even see -- that's one of Hume's great ideas -- you can't see. Take the world as it is, that is, you find yourself in a strange world. Instead of immediately invoking Ideas with a capital "I", or undertaking operations as complicated as Leibniz's, get used to the world you live in, because it is yours, it is your world. Well yes, there are things, and then there is, for

example A, and then there is B, and then there are relations, and these relations are in-between, it’s not things, it is "between things".

So obviously, if he had said only that, only he himself fully accepts to provide to us and to constitute the concepts that will respond to this world, to this extraordinary world. "Accept exteriority". Until now, philosophers had endured only interiority. To understand was to internalize something in something else. They understood that if they put it inside, inside one’s head, inside the concept, inside the subject, there had to be any interiority whatsoever. Hume arrives and says, but can't you see that you live in a world that is a world of exteriority? And exteriority is not, that does not mean, as we always say... Empiricism, believe me in this, never was defined by: knowledge comes from experience, or else: the sensible world is first. Empiricism is defined by this position: relations are external to their terms. And if relations are external to their terms, understand that at that point, empiricism is faced with a fantastic task which is to invent a new logic. A new logic will be needed, namely, a logic of relations will have to be created; it will be necessary to break with the logic of attribution, which had reigned until then. A logic of the relations will be required.

That Peirce assumes all of this, since he is not sure that a logic of relations can be dyadic. A dyadic logic, a dual logic, is the one that recognizes two values of the proposition, the true and the false. Well, maybe that’s only valid for the logic of attribution. The logic of relations has to be a specific logic, which begins with, very oddly, which begins with Hume in the form of the theory of probability, [*Pause*] and which takes on a form as definitive with [Bertrand] Russell… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:03:07]

... or if you prefer, it is external to the concept of the thing and of the other. "Smaller than" is not included in the concept of A which is however smaller than B; "greater than" is not included in the concept of B, which is nevertheless greater than A. It is a radical exteriority.

But think that even at the level -- all I'm saying, that's nothing, but it's huge; if you understand that, you understand that this is a whole other, a whole different theory of thought -- the task of thought is literally to reflect exteriority. It's no longer about interiorizing any more, not at all; it's a completely different conception of true and false. It is an appeal to the exteriority. But yes, the world is made of radical exteriority, that is, it is an aggregate whose parts are irreducibly external to each other, that is, the parts of which will not be totalizable. This is a world of bits and pieces. As [William] James will say, this is a Harlequin coat, it’s a bright palette. Well, between two pieces, there are relations, so fine.

And maybe things, and perhaps ultimately, there is no term, there are just bundles of relations. What you call a term is a bundle of relations, and there you go. You, each of you is bundles of relations, and that's very good, very good that way. They're actively dissolving substance, things, etc. At the extreme, they admit, at your choice, at a middle level, we will say: there are relations which are external to their terms, and at a much deeper level, we will ask: are there even terms, or are there variable bundles of relations? Everything is possible! [*Pause; Deleuze says something in a very low voice to someone near him*]

So, there is something extraordinary about the relation. We begin to grasp the paradox of the

relation. I am saying at the same time: a relation is external to its terms. Good. In other words, a relation is always external to the concept of the one thing and the other that it places into relation. It is external to the concept of the one thing and the other that it puts into a relation. This isn't difficult, it's not difficult to understand. A resembles B in order to change, and resemblance is a relation. A resembles B. Well, it's not encompassed in its concept, nor is it encompassed in B's concept; the relation is external to its terms. Do you understand that?

However, you've only understood half of it yet if you understand that. That's because, at the same time, the relation can change -- and that, I insist on this greatly, because here, this will be my only small contribution -- I am saying that in order to distinguish things clearly and so that you don't mix everything up. But they know it from the start, all those authors who start thinking about the relation and who are called empiricists, or logicians, in the sense of the logic of relations. This isn't surprising; I've tried to make you understand why this wasn't surprising that it was the empiricists who invented the most formal logic in the world, namely the logic of relations. There is a very deep connection. At first glance, it is strange that it's the empiricists who favor the sensible world and who at the same time invent the formalism of logic, which we will call formal logic. It is inevitable, since what the sensible world reveals to them is not at all the sensible; they could care less about the sensible. What interests them is the exteriority of relations linked to their terms. Henceforth, you will not account for relations by referring them to their terms; henceforth, you need an absolutely new logic and a completely new formalism to account for logical relations, the logical relations the list of which is open.

Okay, but I was saying, fine, A resembles B, Peter resembles Paul; that's encompassed neither in the concept of Peter nor in the concept of Paul. Resemblance is a relation, unless you are Leibnizian; there once again, if you feel it, at that point, you resolve it as best you can, that's your business. But if you accept to be in the atmosphere in which relations are external to their terms, we don't try to argue, we take it as a fact, the fact of experience. Well, fine, fine, resemblance is not contained in the concept, which cannot prevent it from changing without the concept itself changing. It cannot change without the concept itself changing. This is getting very strange; this is not encompassed in the terms, and yet it cannot change without the terms changing.

I mean, the relation of resemblance -- and for me, that is very, very important; for me, therefore not necessarily for you -- I believe that one cannot think the relations independently of an at least virtual becoming, whatever the relation might be, and that this, in my opinion, the theorists of the relation, however strong they are, they did not see it. But they have it, well no matter, they have it, I don't know, but I would like to insist much more than they do on this point. In my opinion, a relationship cannot ... not only is it external to its terms, but it's essentially transitive in the sense of transitory. Relations, don't ruin relations, they're so fragile. Bang on the attributes, that's something solid, but relations, ooh la la... Relations are inseparable from a becoming, I would say -- and I will need this idea later -- of a possible or virtual change. I don't resemble B, without in this very resemblance, at the heart of this resemblance, me being haunted by the possibility of accentuating it or losing it. [*Pause*] It will be enough that I, as a term, that is, as a concept -- it comes to the same thing --, that I change, for example, as I age. Or else, I am haunted by the possibility, again, a relation does not exist apart from the possibility of acquiring it ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 10: 52]

Part 2

... it is this link of the relation with the becoming -- I choose resemblance because, but this is valid for all relations, because it strikes me strongly – they say -- despite all my efforts, I've never been able to notice it -- but they say, they say it's true, that a newborn baby at birth looks like its father, mother or someone, whatever, [*Laughter*] and then that fades away. Even then, in old age, astonishing resemblances are discovered which, literally, have been put on hold, forgotten for so many, many years. All of a sudden you think, oh, but that's the spitting image of her mother. [*Laughter*] For ... as if old age was restoring resemblances that had only been very, very indistinct. I believe that it is not possible to think of the relation without thinking of it as becoming always possible. Fine. But we'll see how I find this comment useful.

I'm just saying -- and I'll hold onto this -- and those were the two fundamental points of Hume's theory of relations, the two points, that was, first point: relations are external to their term; second point, and nonetheless, a relation cannot change without one or both terms changing. A resembles B: relation external to its terms. A stops resembling B: the relation changed. But the concept of A had to change, A had to change -- or B, right? And it was with these two things, with these two basic propositions, that Hume was led to try to work this out. Fine.

So, let's try, we, there, I, I'm no longer trying to... I'm not offering summaries of theories because we'd never get finished; I'm giving something like premises so that you have an aggregate about this problem of such difficult relations. So, I am saying: let's change the point. You'll see that all of this... There are a number of very different authors who revolve around an idea. That is, there are two kinds of relation, or there are two senses of the word "relation". [*Pause*] I cite Hume first... hey, that's interesting, the way he defines it. At the start of his great book *Treatise of Human Nature* [1739], [*Pause*] in the chapter on relations, this is what he tells us: "the word relation" -- they're always external to their terms, right, whatever they are, that is a given -- but on this, he tells us: "the word relation is commonly used in two notably different senses. Sometimes it serves to mark the quality whereby two ideas are linked together in the imagination and where one introduces the other".

What does he mean? This will be well known as "association of ideas", namely: the image of something given to me awakens in me the image of something that is not given. [*Pause*] There you have it, the first meaning of "relation". The relation is the process through which the mind moves from the image of something that is given to the image of something that is not. And, you will notice, it passes according to a law. In fact, it does not happen just any old way. I see a picture; I say, "this is Peter's picture," and I think of Peter, who's in America right now, or, uh, etc., fine. The photo is given to me; I pass from the image that is given to me to the image of something that is not given to me, namely the image of Peter in America, according to a relation which is the relation of resemblance: the photo looks like Peter. Right? So, you see, the first sense of the word "relation" is [*Pause*] the process through which a given image evokes or leads to another non-given image.

Well, these relations, Hume tells us, he calls them "natural", they are natural relations. They indeed form an activity -- here, hold on to everything he says, because this is important -- they do form an activity, but in a sense, it just happens by itself. It's akin to an automatic activity. I pass

from the photo of Pierre to the thought of Pierre, from the perception of the photo to the thought of Pierre. I tell myself: hey, what is he doing right now? It's very simple. These are natural relations. They obey laws, which mark what? In particular, which mark its limits. I mean, this runs out pretty quickly, right? That's very, very important, and Hume talks about it a lot there. He says: human nature, well, it gets tired quickly, right? Things have to be, the relations have to be very narrow -- of course, external -- very narrow between the terms for the idea of one to introduce the other.

For example, if this is a very vague resemblance, it doesn't work, does it? For example, that is, I see a picture of someone, and I tell myself, oh hey, that reminds me of a painting, a painting that I saw a long time ago. But what was this painting? Who created it? Where did I see it? That doesn't work at all. It does not work anymore. It can work, I have an impulse there. "Ah yes, that was ... I saw him in a particular year, in a particular place! Oh, how they resemble each other!" I see a woman in the street; I tell myself: hey, but I've seen her somewhere, but in a museum. Ha! Mona Lisa, it's Mona Lisa! [*Laughter*] It's Mona Lisa passing by ... Amazing! But more often than not, I tell myself: "Oh yes, she reminds me of ... that one, she emerges from a painting, but which artist? What painting? A Flemish, a Flemish painter?" You will see why I need this entire example. "A Flemish painter, yes, yes, yes, but which one? Not this one? No, no, no, no, it can't be that one. So, who is it?" Then it can come, it doesn't come, but this is not a natural relation. Why? Because it's a distended, distant resemblance. You pass easily, according to a natural relation, from the photo of Peter to the idea of Peter, but you do not pass easily when things only have a vague resemblance. I mean: the characteristic of natural relations is to wear out quickly, that is, to form series, understanding these to be short series. Ah, fine, there you go.

The relations -- I am summarizing -- natural relations would be relations through which an idea or an image naturally introduces another, according to a rule or a law, thereby constituting a series of images which are exhausted pretty quickly. All terms are important. This is the realm of natural relations. [*Pause*] Another example, just to reassure you right away, I still wouldn't say, naturally, I wouldn't say, "The Arc de Triomphe is bigger than a flea". No natural relationship in that. On the other hand, about something that is a little bigger than a flea, there I would tend to say, there is a natural relation. I am saying, for example: well yeh, what is that on my hand? Is that a flea? No, it's too big. Too big ... eh? It's not a flea. [*Laughter*] So, anguish takes hold of me; I tell myself: what can it be? What is that thing, eh? Good. Here there is a natural relation. That doesn't prevent me from comparing the Arc de Triomphe to a flea. Okay, fine. So there may be a relationship between the Arc de Triomphe and a flea. Okay, fine. It won't be a natural relation. So, you see, a natural relation, then, is the process through which one image introduces another according to a rule that constitutes a short series. We cannot say it better.

Hume continues: but "relation" is expressed in a completely different sense. Notice, sometimes it is used to mark, the word "relation" is used to mark the quality through which one idea introduces another -- that was our first case, natural relations -- sometimes the circumstance, sometimes the relation signifies the circumstance through which, even when two ideas are arbitrarily united in fantasy -- exactly the Arc de Triomphe and the flea -- the circumstance through which even when two ideas are arbitrarily united in fantasy. I'll translate: even when two ideas have no natural relation to each other, so, this is the circumstance through which, even when two ideas or two images have no natural relation, we may see fit to compare them. There is

a reason why I am comparing them.

I'll choose an example. Good. I'm there in a room, and then I need to write, and I want to write on a table. But there is no table. Good. So, one thing can happen to me: I think of a table that I saw in the next room. I go to the next room, and I sit down. I would say: natural relation. The image of the missing table evoked in me the image of another table that looks like it and is next to it. This is a natural relation. One image introduces another, in a relatively short series.

I don't have a table, there isn't one in the next room, or I want to stay in this room, I'm looking everywhere. There is no natural relation, nothing that looks like a table. I notice, upright, a folded ironing board. I tell myself, shit, here I ... this is what I need ... I'm going to make a table out of it. Well, you will tell me, there is less difference than between the "Arc de Triomphe" and "flea". OK. But there is still a big difference between a table and an ironing board. It's rare, it's not according to a natural relationship that "table" would make me think of "ironing board", or it would require an intermediary. It would require an intermediary constituting a short compact series. Namely: I see my table, I surprised someone there who, instead of being at my table, should have ironed. So, I have table-ironing board link, a natural relation. But here, I am in the room; I am looking for a table, there is no table. I see the vertical ironing board, I tell myself: this is it.

So, what have I done? I didn't create a relation, I didn't follow a natural relation. To take Hume's text literally, I was in the grip of a particular circumstance in which even during the union -- namely my need to write, the particular circumstance – with the result that even in the arbitrary union of two ideas in fantasy, the table and the ironing board, the horizontal table, which was not there, and the folded, vertical ironing board, we may see fit to compare them. The relation, then, is the reason for the comparison between two ideas, however foreign they may be to each other, that is: even if they have no natural relations. And in a way, I could find the same things as examples of natural relations and other, unnatural relations.

These unnatural relations, what are we going to call them? Hume will call them "philosophical relations", philosophical relations. Which doesn't mean that's what philosophers use them for, right? That doesn't mean they're just for philosophers, [*Laughter*] no; he means that they are not natural. Maybe he means they're abstract, and the others are concrete, but let's save that for later. But notice that concrete or abstract, natural or philosophical, they are always external to their terms. That doesn't change. But there are still two types of relations. I would say that philosophical relations are relations which, instead of forming a short series determined by a law, what do they do? They form an aggregate, by rights unlimited, referring to a sense. [*Pause*] Good. [*Pause*] There you go. So, the distinction natural relations-philosophical relations which will have the greatest importance.

Much later, [Edmund] Husserl will make distinctions, who nevertheless has for Hume a relation at once of fascination, but this is his enemy. And Husserl, without saying anything -- and perhaps he did not realize it --, in his first book which is called *Philosophy of Arithmetic* [1891], proposes a difference between what he calls the "primary relations" and "psychic links". [*Pause*] He defines primary relations by continuous conjunctions, [*Pause*] and psychic links by acts of the mind which constitute an aggregate independently of the continuous conjunctions between their

parts, between their elements. Fine, here I don't have time to develop this, it would be endless, but it's odd. Here we have the anti-Hume rediscovering a distinction that fundamentally belongs to Hume, which in my opinion – I'm not developing this -- but this distinction by Husserl corresponds word for word to Hume's distinction. Good.

And finally – a last point -- I discover Bergson on a new point which I have not yet mentioned at all, and which seems to me quite extraordinary. So, in two texts, Bergson will distinguish, in one chapter -- no, especially in a text -- on "effort", an article entitled "Intellectual Effort" or something like that, in a collection of articles: *Mind-Energy*.[2] And he tells us: there are two ways in which the mind proceeds. [*Pause*] And that seems very, very important to me, and you'll understand why. Good.

There you have it: the mind can proceed in two ways. Here, I ... let's forget everything, right? Let's forget everything that precedes. We're starting over with Bergson. I would like to persuade you that, finally, much more than contradictions between philosophers, there are these stupendous things which are encounters. They do not copy each other, they do not recopy each other, but between philosophers – who nonetheless belong to "schools", if you will, in the sense of "realist", "idealist", "empiricist", whatever you want, absolutely different schools -- but much more than their differences, there are these stupendous echoes like these appeals from one to the other.

Listen to what Bergson says. He tells us: well, you know, yes, there is a way, there is an activity of the mind that ultimately, at the extreme, occurs without effort. He says "automatically". And in the end, this is the association of ideas. And he defines it like that, very quickly; he characterizes it like this: the mind moves from one object to another on the same horizontal plane. [*Pause*] We could not say it better; this occurs by itself following a series. The mind -- it happens on its own, automatically -- the mind passes from one object to another, implied from one object image to another object image, the mind passes from one object to another on the same horizontal plane. I hold on to the idea of "a diversity of objects"; there are several objects. A second point: on the same horizontal plane. A third point: constituting a series. I would say, this is the status of natural relations which I call, for my part -- it's really not a significant change -- I prefer to call "concrete." [*Pause*] They're external to their terms, okay, yes.

And then, Bergson tells us, there is a whole other activity of the mind, much more difficult, because the tendency of psychology, he tells us, is always to bring back to this easiest diagram. You see, this easiest diagram, if I draw it ... [*Deleuze writes on the blackboard*] that's it. That's it ... a horizontal plane, it's not the same as my old plane of movement-images, right? Here it's quite another thing. On this horizontal plane, a plurality of terms, the mind goes from a given term to one which was not given, which becomes given, which being given, will make us pass on to a third, etc. One, two, three, four ... good. This diagram is simple, where everything is ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] Bergson says, there you are, we live a lot like that. So, the photo of Pierre -- the first term given to me -- I think of Pierre, I think of America where Pierre is. There, it was a relation of resemblance, here, it is a relation of continuity. I'm thinking of... actually, I don't know. I don't know ... Anything, whatever... You can -- we can complete, really, that's ... -- there you go.

There is a whole other case, says Bergson. What is this case? Well, this is precisely when the mind no longer operates automatically. This gets complicated. I hear someone talking. This is the first case. I hear someone talking. How is this not an automatic activity? Well, this is ... I'm looking. This could be: pass me the salt. So, at that point, at the extreme, I misheard him, I made him repeat it, but it would be of this type. But I hear someone giving a speech. I tell myself, if I listen, I tell myself: what is he talking about, but what does he mean? I'm looking for what he means. I'm looking for what he means. [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] Or else, I see someone, and -- I come back to my example -- he reminds me of someone, something, but what? Where did I see that guy? Oh ... I'm sure I saw him, but where? This time I am looking for a memory. [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] Good.

Notice that, in fact, our temptation would be to reduce this second case, the nature of which we do not yet know, to the first. But what would that yield? We'll see right away if it works. I have a perception of someone. That would be my term 1. [*Pause*] And that would awaken a memory in me: term 2. Simply, there would be a kind of blockage in the natural relation, which would make it difficult for me to recall the memory. We can still try to say that. In my other example, I wonder: what does he mean? Well, my perception would be the sound perception of words. The [term] 1 would be the sound perception of the words, and it would more or less awaken the ideas to which the words supposedly correspond.

Notice that in this interpretation, I bring back, I reduce my second case to the first. Well, Bergson says: it is enough to speak of reduction to feel that it does not work, that the effort of comprehension, or the effort of interpretation, is not of that type. This can't work. That’s not it. I can say it. We can always say everything. We can say: why yes, it’s the same case, there is only one case, there are only natural relations. Well, no, says Bergson. He says: I don't think that's the way that works. And for a simple reason, you will see.

Put yourself in the situation of someone who is looking either for a memory or trying to understand what someone they’re listening to is saying: but what does this guy mean? Or else, a third possibility, which I prefer, because it is perhaps more enlightening: [*Deleuze writes on the board*] I’m listening to a speech in a language which is not entirely unknown to me -- because there this would be no problem -- and which, at the same time, is not well known to me, and I am trying to understand. You see. This mixes up the two previous examples a bit because then I am calling upon memories: what does that word mean that I believed… etc.?

But what characterizes all of these cases? It’s that, when someone, when I listen to someone – there we have the real criterion of distinction between my first case and the second -- when I listen to someone speak and I tell myself: "What does he mean?", I'm trying to grasp the sense, then. I'm trying to grasp the sense. But there are not at all two terms. I don't have a complete understanding of the words he is saying at first. And then the sense, when I understand the sense – the sense, let's say, for the moment, the ideas which correspond to the words --, well, on the one hand, I do not have a perception of the words, valid for it itself, and which would arouse, by natural relation, the ideas which correspond to the words. No one has ever understood in this way.

When you try to understand, or when you understand what I am saying, you are doing a

completely different operation. You don't grasp the words for themselves that would lead you to the ideas for themselves. Moreover, moreover, whether or not you understand, you grasp – here this changes nothing – you grasp one word in every four. As in reading, it is well known, we don’t read all the words. Words are like signposts, then you complete them. It depends on what you read there; the newspaper, you read it quickly, that is, you take in a few words, like signposts. Obviously. But we have an incomplete perception. Starting from that, what will happen?

Likewise, when I tell myself, looking at someone, but who does this guy look like? Where have I seen him? I don't have a complete perception, by definition. Within the angle from which I see him, on the contrary, I have an incomplete perception of him, since I tell myself, "Shit, where have I seen that guy?" I only wanted to show that it would seem that the second case being irreducible to the first, since in the first case, on the contrary, I was going from one complete image to another complete image, which was not the same. So, it seems impossible to reduce the second case to the first.

So, for the second case, Bergson offers us a not easy diagram because it’s ... He uses it very often, with strange terms. He says: in the second case, what you perceive, be it the words, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] the words which you perceive very incompletely, since once again you cannot say "I understood" because you grasped every word of, that I’m saying, that's not understanding. And to understand, you don't wait for me to finish my sentence. That's even why ... and then at certain moments, you let go, and at certain moments, you get back on track, that's how we understand. Okay, so what's going to happen? Likewise, when I’m searching for the resemblance, I have an incomplete perception, which I use how? By a signal, I was saying, yes, sort of, by a signal. There we are. [*Deleuze writes on the board*]

Starting from what is given to me -- and which is an incomplete datum, unlike my first case, where I started from a complete datum – starting from incomplete data in the second case, Bergson all the time uses: "I undertake a jump". There we are. That’s my plane. Notice this, my horizontal plane, it’s there. There I have my term, my incomplete term: the words that you hear me say, or else the incomplete perception you have of someone about whom you ask yourself: who the hell does he look like? “I jump,” says Bergson. He jumps. Fine.

What does he jump into? In the example of the recollection, he tells us ... and the expression will be used quite often. It's very odd because, Bergson, if you know him a bit, he's not the kind of guy who jumps, right? I mean, that's not his style. No, I'm talking nonsense. That’s very odd, which is why it’s important. One would expect Bergson to say anything but jump. [*Laughter*] He flows, he sinks, he explodes, that's his stuff. Vital momentum [*l’élan vital*] that explodes, duration that flows, elapses ... good. But jumping, on the other hand, someone like Kierkegaard, he never stops jumping. He jumps, it's his, it's his mental activity, he's the philosopher of the jump. Good. [*Laughter*] Here we have Bergson, he starts to jump. And he will say it emphatically, both in *Matter and Memory*, chapter II, and in "Evolution"... in this article in *Mind-Energy*. So, this is very, very odd.

And where does he jump? In the case of the recollection, he tells us: I am settling into a region of the past. This is not the memory, right, above all, since he doesn't grasp the memory. He’s

looking for the memory. I'm settling into an approximate region of the past, all at once. So, understand this because we'll have to find all of that when we talk about time. There would be regions of the past that precede memories. I am settling into a region of the past, that is, a vague intuition. Ah, yes ... wasn't it that? Is it that? Question mark. So anyway, a long time ago ... that, that guy, I haven't seen him recently. And not only it wasn't recently, it wasn't in Paris. That's what he calls "I jumped": I'm settling into a region of the past, "I jumped". He says that; he says: "I get there straight away". When he doesn't say "I'm jumping", he is saying "I'm immediately getting myself into a region of the past".[3]

But then, we see the past has regions. Obviously, you understand what that means and what's on his mind: the past doesn't destroy, the past preserves, right? The past is a ... ultimately, this is his great idea: the past is a conservatory. What he absolutely wants to oppose is the idea of destruction by time. Time is not at all the operation or process of destruction. Time is the process of infinite conservation. This is his idea; he has reason to think so. But finally, this isn't at all, ... things don't disappear in time. On the contrary. On the contrary. Fine. Well, a region... there would be other things, more recent, for example, closer to where I am.

But I'm making a kind of bet. I'm settling into a region of the past – there are some up above, all that -- and then, do I wait? No: I am searching through this region. And either that fails, or it works. It fails, in fact; I may have slid into the wrong region. No answer responds to my jump. I jumped there, into a region of the past, nothing comes. So, I can try another region. I tell myself, "Well no, that's not it." Another region ... That's the way it's done, that's a splendid description, it seems to me. So, suppose that there, I tell myself: "ah well yes, there, on this plane, on this plane, there is something answering." And, from this pure region, from this region of the pure past, what is going to descend, then? A memory descends, to be embodied in an image... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 49: 39]

... it descends to incarnate in a memory-image. And then, I would say: "ah yes, this guy that I just saw, I saw him around a particular year at a particular place", or else: "ah yeah, he was a classmate". If I was able to settle myself, to jump, to the right level of the past, in the right region of the past, it's amazing, this ... That's what the interpretation is. You have to jump.

And if we come back to the other example, then, someone's speaking you are trying to understand. Well, here as well, once again, the words you hear are like incomplete shreds; it is given, but it is given as incomplete shreds. And you, what you do when you try to figure it out, and you see it right away, as soon as you snap. As soon as you snap, that is: as soon as you start falling asleep, as soon as you let go. You fall back into the first, into the first diagram.

So, I'm saying: Bergson, so as a second term, that yields… [*Deleuze writes on the board*] Oh shit, he already talked about it! [*Laughter*] Or else you just let go, you make associations of ideas. I am saying, "relation," so you create links: love relations, business relations, relations, etc. Fine, at that point you gave up on understanding. You take a break, a recess. [*Laughter*] When you really try to understand, you start from my words, which you grasp as incomplete realities, for yourself. And you settle in, you jump. You take the leap. You immediately get yourself into a region that will no longer be called the past, but maybe it comes down to the same thing, you settle into a region of sense.

And, in fact, someone might come in now, right, into the room; suppose that someone comes in. He tells himself, this happens: what's he talking about? So, he listens a little. "Is this a course on commercial law?" [*Laughter*] Oh yes, that, he might enter on an example of law that I might be giving. He tells himself, "Well then, this is a law class." See: he settles in -- if he wants to listen, if he is ... -- he immediately settles into a region of sense: juridical relations. What juridical relations? I would define this relation of sense through juridical relations, period, the aggregate of juridical relations in general, right? And then he listens a little better, and he tells himself, "Oh well, this can't be that after all. Something is wrong, that is, I am not settled into the right level of sense, this must not be law that he is doing, this guy. So, he's making diagrams: wouldn't that be mathematics?" Another region. He tells himself, "Oh well, no..." because nothing descends from that region of sense into which he's settled. He tells himself, "What can that be, this stuff? Really, what?" Well, there are the good days; he's finding the bad days. Take my painful case. I start saying stupidities, "Peirce, the famous English author". What did I do there, huh? Which .... Obviously, I, let's say, I confused two levels a bit ...

A woman student: You missed your jump.

Deleuze: I missed my jump, yeh, I missed my jump… What does it mean, not understanding someone, something? It's a bad jump. It's missing the jumps. [*Laughter*] You settle into a region ... not understanding is like forgetting. It's not at all that one is reduced to the other, but just as the past had regions in itself which preceded memory, and which undoubtedly made the descent of memories possible, sense has regions in itself which precede ideas, that is, understanding, interpretation. And if you don't settle in, if you don't jump into the region of sense where your problem has its answer, you will never solve anything that interests you most.

And what do people do, when they... Having a lived problem is just the same. A problem, whether it is lived or not -- there are some people who have solutions, there are some who do not -- but, where does it come from, the absence of a solution? What do we keep on doing? We settle into regions of sense that do not correspond to our problem. It's not there -- this is not where you had the pieces of the solution. No luck, that will be for another time! Right? It's true, there is never a problem without a solution. Me, I am… you have to be very optimistic; you have to tell yourself: I have not been able to find the region of sense where the problem is located, he would have found the elements of his solution. So, a discipline as admirable as psychoanalysis, what does it do? [*Laughter*] It's very simple. It found the level of sense. Right, ultimately there is only one, there is only one level of sense for all problems. And it invites us to jump to this level of sense. So, it seems that sometimes that solves the problem; other times, it seems that doesn't solve it. In any case, it is certain that this is a region that takes a very long time to be explored, since the problems last a very, very long time! So ... [*Laughter*] It's the same, it's all the same ...

So, I believe rather that there is ... that there is not a grid, that in the end, there is not a region of sense for all regions. It's not possible, and there is a multiplicity, so what? Now let's make the diagram that is distinctive. Bergson will tell us ... Earlier, I had a horizontal plane, with several different objects, and I went from one object to another in a short series. What is the formula of the other, here, of the jump? This time, I would say: an aggregate, if you prefer, a volume, a vertical volume, [*Pause*] or a same object, where there is only one and the same object, which

passes through different levels or regions. This is opposed term to term, a vertical volume that includes an infinity of regions or levels through which one and the same object passes.

In fact, what does he mean? It goes without saying that if I choose the example, where we are: you listen to me, you understand, but, as is said, there is not one person who understands in the same way because there are not two people who settle into exactly the same region of sense, within the same region of sense. Obviously. Obviously. So, if you have understood this second Bergsonian diagram, what are we going to find, as if by magic? The second figure is: a vertical volume where one and the same object crosses different zones, regions, and levels. It suffices that ... [*Pause; Deleuze draws on the board*]

There we are, I've come back to my cone.[4] Notice, henceforth, if you will ... alas, my drawing is more and more confused, so I'm doing it over. [*Deleuze erases everything*] We are going to find exactly the big figure, then, at which we arrived, but we are really finding it starting from a completely different problem. Namely: you remember, I had a vertical section plane in which all the movements, actions, reactions, etc. took place, with centers of indetermination, "S". And then I was saying, there is something -- so we didn't really know what it was -- that fits into an "S", a cone, which would be becoming. And there, it would be the becoming that changes, and there, it would be the plane of movement-images, and the plane of movement-images would always come, the cone would always come to insert itself at its point in the plane of movement-images.

Now what's going on? So, my first case, you situate it at the level of B. This is the way in which "S", starting from a thing, from an image, evokes another image, a horizontal plane, the constitution of a series, by which "S" passes from A to B, on the same horizontal plane. There, on the contrary, [*Deleuze draws on the board*] I'm trying to understand, or I'm seeking a memory that... I jump into the cone. I jump into the cone, but what? Yes, now we can add: the cone necessarily has levels, regions, which are like sections of the cone. And there, Bergson only conceives of parallel sections at the base. Obviously, we, in our Bergsonian spirit, we will say: no, there may be positions such that there are entirely different sections. That is, we would take much more account of the theory of conics, in which the cone can be cut by planes, by sections that are not only parallel. So, it would get even more complicated. For a theory of images, this would be very important. And so ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

So, I'm looking for a memory, or I'm trying to understand, and I jump in a region, or into a zone. Literally, this is a whole philosophy of levels, this is a whole philosophy, yes, of regions of being, of ... I settle down, and it's there -- without going through the other levels -- if I have chosen the right level, I do not go back through the other levels, but it is there that either the idea, emanating from the region of sense, or the memory, emanating from the region of the past, will come to be incarnate.

A woman student: Don't you find that this makes our plane of natural relations really odd? Doesn't that start a crazy trembling within it? Especially if we go from sections…

Deleuze: Here? Well, that's going to screw them up completely. Well, obviously! It's okay ... or else, oh, it's okay, it's okay. So, understand, in fact, he understands very well, I believe. Here this was the domain of natural relations. But in the other case, each region will be what? Each zone

of sense will literally be a bundle of abstract relations, a bundle of abstract relations, of resemblances without my knowing which ones resemble each other. It will be a zone, the aggregate of juridical relations, regardless of the terms between which they are established, the set of aesthetic comparisons, etc. All that will be zones.

They are not prefigured, they do not wait for my jump, it's rather... rather yes, they wait for my jump, that is: it is at the same time that I jump that I introduce a section in this cone and that I then settle myself into a particular domain of relations. I would say: these are abstract relations. And what do these sets of abstract relations define? What we call sense, that is, a particular zone of sense, or what we will call the past, a particular region of the past. As a result, like earlier, I will have a distinction between so-called natural or concrete relations, on the one hand, and abstract relations, on the other. So, what I mean is... There you go, that's all I mean.

I come back to Peirce to draw a conclusion. In my opinion, you understand, what plagues the problem of relations is that we don't realize sufficiently, once again, that relations are variables. Namely that any relation is inseparable from its possible change. Once again, no one looks like someone without risking ceasing to look like oneself. And conversely, there is no absence of resemblance without the risk that the two terms become alike. In other words, abstract relations are inseparable from a changing and ever-changing Whole, while concrete relations are established between distinct parts. ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:06:21]

Part 3

... natural relations are the processes by which I move from one distinct part to another distinct part. Abstract relations are sets or bundles of relations regardless of their term, [*Pause*] which express, of which each zone, each region expresses or is an aspect of a changing Whole. Good. And for me, that's what sense is. As a result, I can then say, I come back to Peirce, you don't have to be able anymore, but I would need to... yes, and then that's okay. And yes, you see Peirce, this is very good, he tells us: Thirdness, what is it? What is Thirdness? It's the law. OK. It's the relations. OK. It's sense. OK. Because, once again, if I maintain the natural relation-philosophical relation distinction, or better, the concrete relation-abstract relation distinction, the abstract relations, this is sense.

So, Thirdness will be defined. And in fact, it is neither an expression like Firstness, nor a position-opposition like Secondness, but an interpretation. And the interpretation occurs, I am just saying, following two paths: constitution, interpretation is sometimes the constitution of a brief series, open, but brief, following natural relations, [*Pause*] sometimes the constitution of a figure at levels, or if you prefer, of a… -- I cannot even say of a Whole -- but of a Whole, yes, of a Whole with levels and regions by which a one and same object passes. It looks like there are two kinds of interpretations. And as Bergson says, very well, the two, these two figures, and I would say the same thing of mine, of my two types of interpretation: they do not stop mixing, we do not stop mixing them one into another. Concretely, we do not stop mixing. So, there you have it. I don't have much more because I'll just give you some quick exercises to finish.

So, I have the three types of Peirce's images: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Well, I'll end

with two remarks. First remark: we are far from having finished, since on this we will have to proceed to the study of the signs. It's just the types of images. But we do know and expect Peirce to show us how images will become signs. In my opinion, we have everything to understand it very easily. But I am postponing it until next time.

On the other hand, I immediately see what is for us a drama, a catastrophe. We also had three types of images, right, we also had three types of images. Even what they had been called: perception-image, action-image, affection-image. Well, the catastrophe is that that this doesn't match up. What a drama, because the affection-image links exactly to Firstness; the action-image links exactly to Secondness; but his Thirdness, I don't have anything to do with it at the moment. And there is nothing in his works that links to what I was trying to define as the perception-image. Do you comprehend the drama? Because, after all, Thirdness is not the perception-image, it is the mental, it is thought. That is formal, and then it’s obvious! He doesn't even have to say it. So, we're going to have problems of adjustment. And then we must not adjust; we will have to try to understand why there’s this cruel difference. But, so, this is for next time. And that can only happen when we understand what signs are for him and what signs are for us. This is surely where there is going to be a... Well, never mind. It’s not serious, all of that.

But I would just like to end by tying into what I was doing last year on cinema. Let's select some exercises just to confirm the richness of these three notions anyway, and you see from what I said in what way he can say, Hegel, you understand, Peirce does not support Hegel. But he can't stand him, and he says, the dialectic has only ever been a betrayal, a manner of not understanding anything in 1, 2, 3, in Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. In fact, the dialectic is the operation which substitutes for Secondness a degenerated Secondness, and for Thirdness a degenerated Thirdness. As a manner, it’s very odd. He can't stand Hegel. In fact, I'm not sure he read him. [*Laughter*] But, it doesn't matter, it’s not important. He himself has something to say, so that’s not a problem either.

But, but, but, let's go back to our tales of cinema from last year. There is something I hadn't done then because I wasn't thinking about it. There you go, I am saying: if we took these three categories from Peirce as types of images and we tried to do practical exercises, then the first practical exercise: the burlesque. With the burlesque, last year, I got into something that... I tried to state, for me, the difference between a classic subject, what was the difference for me between [Charlie] Chaplin and Buster Keaton?[5] But I’m thinking of the others. I hadn't spoken about any others. And I select a simple exercise. Who is “one”? What is the burlesque of Firstness? We can get into this, we are doing small [exercises] like that ... if Peirce was still alive, he would be, oh well yes, he was only doing that, after all ... But hey, fine.

A small exercise. The burlesque of Firstness, I would say, it’s ... I can't remember his name, so this... the famous burlesque, [Harry] Langdon? That's it, Langdon. Indeed, he is affect in the pure state, the lunar and childish affect. And I am not analyzing. But he is fundamentally "one", he is Firstness. I’m not taking Keaton and Chaplin into account, because in my opinion, they don't fit into those categories.

Two, I just have to say who it is, the burlesque of the duel, it's Laurel and Hardy, it's Laurel and Hardy. Only, what's very important, that's what I would like ... I chose this example solely to

make you understand this: Laurel and Hardy, this is brilliant burlesque of the action-image or Secondness. And in fact, they are in dueling relations with everyone, dueling with the world, dueling with others, dueling with each other. And as this is burlesque, they discovered the non-sense specific to Secondness. The non-sense specific to Secondness is to develop the simultaneities of the duel over time. The duel must be simultaneous, agreed. Laurel and Hardy make the sublime discovery of a duel distributed and stretched over time. That is, I punch you in the eye while you're doing nothing, and then in turn, I wait and I get a big punch in the eye or the nose, etc. These are… I'm not saying this is the only one, it's one of Laurel and Hardy's comedic sources that only exist with them, except for those who copied it, etc., fine. But they are the ones who invented it: temporizing the duel while the duel implies any simultaneity whatsoever.[6]

But what matters to me more is a thing that Peirce saw very well: it is that when there is one, there is "one". But when there are two in Secondness, [*Deleuze returns to the board and writes*] there is necessarily one of the two that takes over the "one" of Firstness. Both of them, right -- are you following me? -- both form Secondness, that is, the duel or the duo. But one of the two is going to take over the Firstness in the Secondness, that is, one of the two is going to be the Firstness of the Secondness -- you sense how complicated Peirce's diagrams are -- and the other will be the Secondness of the Secondness. And it is obvious that the Firstness of the Secondness is Laurel. And he is the representative of affects. He is the representative of all potentialities. Hardy is the man of action, who wants to act and who keeps Laurel from acting, who isn't as committed. He is the Secondness of the Secondness. And the adventure will unfold, so in this arises the second source of burlesque for Laurel and Hardy: it is that the man of action -- who is really Hardy, it is not that he is a false man of action -- he never stops failing. He never stops failing because he is such a man of action that he has left the domain of qualities for Laurel who is the representative of Firstness. So, the huge Hardy can only collide with states of things in their raw materiality. From then on, he no longer has the means to overcome them. And on the contrary, Laurel who has kept the qualities without embodying them in states of things, at that point, it is as if states of things didn't exist for him. As a result, he passes without even seeing it into a stream, and Hardy follows him and, strangely, collapses. Although he put his feet in the same place, for him there is a big hole.

But, but, what interests me in this is that, in your play of Secondness, there is necessarily a Firstness of Secondness, and a Secondness of Secondness. As a result, if I try to do the analysis, then for the Marx Brothers, who are Thirdness in its purest form -- in my opinion, they even introduced it deliberately – what does this produce? I'm not sure Groucho hasn't read Peirce there. One is as funny as the other, really, it's ... If I created a kind of diagram, this has been done often, the distribution of the three, [*Deleuze erases the board to start over*] but there you have it, at least we have the tools to try to create it or redo it. I don't need to say that the three have to be taken together. We must take the fabric of relations independently of the terms. [*Deleuze writes on the blackboard*] I would say, this is a zone of sense for the Marx brothers, here. And then, the three terms: Harpo, Chico, Groucho. Fine.[7]

No problem for Harpo; I would say he is the Firstness of the Thirdness. He's the one, in fact, who is both the representative of heavenly affects, the harp, and infernal impulses [*Laughter*] like voracity, sexuality, destruction, etc., fine. It is one within the other. But between affects and impulses, we will see the differences, this is really the regime of Firstness. Good.

So, I find that Chico is not discussed enough, because he is very important, he is the only one who is the man of action. He is the one who constantly protects either Harpo or the selected lover, in the ... He is the one who always presents himself as the bodyguard. His piano is a mode of action, unlike the harp, which is truly an instrument of affects. And then, all his behavior is going to be what? He is going to have a special relationship with Harpo, as if the first two types of images -- and that, I care about the affection-image, action-image, Harpo-Chico -- had a direct relation while, in most films, not in all, but in most Marx films, Groucho comes from elsewhere. The two already know each other, and Groucho comes from outside. There you go, Groucho is really another domain.

And then the hellish dance of the three follows; they're going to work things out, all of that, fine. But finally, well, between Harpo and Chico, what's going on between them? If you agree to Chico as truly being the man of action, Harpo's role is truly to provide qualities-materials material qualities. Harpo is not acting, Harpo; he ensures the qualitative supply. From his immense raincoat, he pulls out things that he, Harpo, does not consider as objects, but as qualities or as powers, potentialities. And he takes them out, and takes them out when Chico asks for them, and Chico is going to turn them into a means of action. As a result, between Harpo and Chico, you are going to have a double relationship, which delights us every time and which will already be, then, from the point of view of Thirdness ... I mean Harpo, to speak barbarically, he's the Firstness of the Thirdness; Chico is the Secondness of the Thirdness, without keeping them both from being of the Thirdness.

What will reveal this? The first diagram from Chico to Harpo: Chico says something with his accent; here, one has to pay close attention: sometimes it's an impossible Italian accent, sometimes a Yiddish accent – like in one film I saw recently, a very, very complex accent – "flash", flash, and the other guy pulls out of his coat successively a fish, [*Laughter*] "fish". There's the other aspect, "flesh", flesh. [*Comments here, from Claire Parnet and other students*] Yes, I get the impression that in this case, he's speaking Yiddish. There's… ah, "flush", he pulls out four cards, and he pulls out a fifth one there, some gigantic cards, I don't know what else. [8]

And then there is the big moment when Chico sums it all up in a sort of mumbling, he goes over the whole list of words with that impossible accent, saying "no, no, no", and at that moment, Harpo pulls out of his raincoat a flashlight to look for the other's flashlight. What is that, as a point of view? We are deep into interpretation. The interpretation that goes from Chico to Harpo is: Chico pronounces a word, and Harpo has to translate it into the corresponding object. What is non-sense? It's always the least matching object. This is non-sense at the level of the word. And this is the first type of Marx Brothers' non-sense. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] A lexical non-sense is non-sense at the level of the word. But that's already interpretation. I would say, these are unnatural relations, but in the sense of natural relations. These are natural relationships that are deliberately degenerate.

In the other direction, from Harpo to Chico, it is exactly the opposite path, which is equally famous. It's Harpo's famous sign language, and this time it's Chico who has to interpret. It is no longer a word to which the other must match an object, it is a mimicry to which Chico must this time match a proposition. Two, the second type of non-sense among for the Marx Brothers is

propositional non-sense. But propositional non-sense is still a perversion of natural relations, natural relations contained in sign language. It is typically a set of so-called gradual relations.

And Groucho is the Thirdness of the Thirdness. Of course, that doesn't mean he's better than the rest, no, not at all. In the end, he may be decisive, and he is, in fact, the man of what? It goes without saying that he is the man of discourse, of speech, but he is the man of the mental. And what instrument does he play? What is he doing? What non-sense? He is the man of abstract relations. Whatever one term and another term might be, he will find the relation, the philosophical relation that is established. On the other hand, faced with any natural relation, he remains like that.

An example, also in a film that I saw recently, he is presented with a photo which reveals the killer. He said: "But it's Monsieur's eyes…" -- I don't recall what -- "it's Monsieur's eyes" -- I don't know – "it's his nose, it's his mouth, who can this possibly be?" [*Laughter*] He's completely lost in the natural relation. On the other hand, the relation, the abstract relation, the philosophical relation, so there he juggles with it, and what results? It is no longer the word as coming from Chico to Harpo, it is no longer the proposition as from Harpo to Chico. From him to him and from him to everyone, he is the master of reasoning, the master of the syllogism. And everything culminates ... So, absolute contempt for natural relations, constantly appealing to a higher non-sense, that is, to pure non-sense, to logical non-sense, which culminates in syllogisms or in Groucho's reasoning. So, this is wonderful. For those who don't remember, I remind you, every morning when he takes the pulse, Harpo's pulse, he takes his pulse and he looks at his watch and he says: "Either this man is dead or my watch has stopped". [*Laughter*] That's the disjunctive syllogism. It is a wonder of disjunctive syllogism. He can't be matched at this level.

Finally, to finish, we could do -- and last year I had tried a little, this is to make connections with what we were doing last year -- I had tried a little to make... we might take these three categories as well, Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and we might consider the types of actors. We create a typology of actors, this typology of actors obviously only being valid as a function of the directors who film them acting. I'm not saying always, not always; I'm asking, who are the actors? This we might see much better, and in addition, there are constant passages. I'll say this very quickly, because we have seen, we have seen things about this. Who are the actors of the Firstness, who affirm themselves as such? Actors of affect, of expression? These are the expressionists. The expressionists are the great actors of the Firstness.

Between Firstness and Secondness, it seems to me that there is a funny thing that I tried to talk about last year.[9] This is what I tried to call Naturalism, where this is no longer affection-image, but is something a little more special, it's the impulse-image. The impulse-image is not the same thing, but anyway, it is before the action-image, such that they can be grouped together. But that's a nuance, impulse-image is not the same as affection-image. This is a type of actor who you recognize by ... I can't think of an expression other than: static violence, as we talk about static electricity. They walk into a room, they don't do anything. I can only see an equivalent in literature, in [Jean] Genet's *Thief's Journal*, a very short page, alas too short, where Genet describes the hand of one of these little guys, and he describes it motionless, at rest. And he explains the tremendous violence there is in this hand at rest, much greater than when the guy is waving and engaging in brutality, this hand on the table that is like a contained violence. You

have people like that. So, with actors, that is ... and all the great naturalist filmmakers obviously employed actors who were rather good at that.[10]

It doesn't matter if they're ... often they're great actors. I think of one of the greatest filmmakers of the impulse. Last year, I studied two who were [Erich von] Stroheim and [Luis] Buñuel.[11] Good. But Stroheim as an actor, he is typically a naturalist actor. What I call the naturalist actor is the man of violence at rest. He is the man of static violence. And there is one who for me exceeds them all, who scares me when I see him enter onto a screen. His very presence, he doesn't do anything, he doesn't say anything, he watches, and I collapse in my chair. This is Stanley Baker, who is the actor for [Joseph] Losey. But Losey also seems to me to be one of the greatest filmmakers of the impulse there is. Stanley Baker gives the impression of brutality, violence, absolutely unleashed violence the same moment he is casual, he's doing nothing. It's a type of acting; I don't think it's just their nature. The actors in Losey, [Humphrey] Bogart, who in my opinion was not, was not good at it, it was entirely Losey who trained him in this, in this very particular kind of violence.

There are many women among American actresses who have reached some kind of degree of actress-impulse. Maybe it's easier for a woman than for a man. Women are more easily, within the imagination, carriers of elementary impulses. But that's not all American actresses. I would put Ava Gardner here. It's all the actresses who are anti-Actor's Studio; they're the great naturalist actresses, and ... I would put ... Ava Gardner, Jennifer Jones ... [*Suggestions arise around him*] Who? I don't know, I don't know. After all, you yourselves can … And the last one of this kind was, for me, it seems to me, Marilyn Monroe who, contrary to what they say, it seems to me, does not at all have an Actors-Studio approach, a completely, completely different approach. Okay, but finally, no matter.

If I continued on this, this would be, I would then have the realist actors. These are the actors of Secondness. Last year, I talked about it a lot because realist actors are what seems to me... they are the typical American actor, that is, they are the actor of Secondness, namely: action of the milieu on him-reaction onto the milieu, absorbing the influence received and then, "acting out", dynamic violence. This is a completely different violence from naturalist violence, completely different from the point of view of the actor's approach, from the point of view of the directing as well. So, for me, I'm not very enthusiastic about the Actors-Studio, so when it's very, very good, that yields [Marlon] Brando, but it's perpetually… as [Alfred] Hitchcock said, these guys can't sit still, there is no way, sometimes they absorb into themselves, sometimes they break everything, and there is no way that they remain calm, to have a neutral face.[12]

That's what I was trying to tell you last year: on the one hand, these are actor-vegetals, on the other hand, it's actor-animals. They drench themselves, they drench themselves in the atmosphere and then they detonate; their reaction is an explosion of a discontinuity.[13] So it's the whole school, it's all the guys who went through the Actors Studio, you know them, from Brando to [Paul] Newman. They've all been there. And it's not that the Actors Studio trained them, it's because, in my opinion, this was, this was the natural tendency of the American actor because American cinema is deeply a cinema of Secondness, a cinema of the action-image. Okay, so Thirdness would be very complicated; that would be good, the act of Thirdness.

I'm opening a parenthesis: it doesn't matter how good the actor is, because once again, everyone knows that when it is explained by a director, it changes. This does not mean that there are not actors who by themselves have an immense talent, but unfortunately the reverse is also true, actors without any talent, who are very good with a great director… [*Interruption of the recording*] [2: 36: 20]

... he is much more violent when he does nothing with his head, with his way of holding himself. [14] He is much more violent when he does nothing than when he starts shooting a pistol or running; it would be in his best interest to do nothing at all, [*Laughter*] because there is a kind of violence, a fearful violence. Do you realize, being between Stanley Baker and [Alain] Delon? The actors of Thirdness, that's not nothing, we would have to... I might have ideas in this direction. Take… First it gets complicated because once again we would find the same topic, there is a Firstness of the Thirdness, there is a Secondness of the Thirdness, and then there is a Thirdness of Thirdness.

So, I would say, for example, Firstness of the Thirdness, these are [Robert] Bresson's actors, that is, Bresson's non-actors. Because Bresson is really affect in a very special sense, it's lyrical affect; it is not expressionist affect. That is, it is the part of the event that does not allow itself to be realized by the state of things; it is the part of the event that overflows its own actualization, this is what we saw last time. This is completely, it seems to me, it's this dimension of the vertical event. Only, only, it's not expressionism at all. Why is it not expressionism at all? Because it is an entirely different operation through which Firstness is reflected, it does not cease being reflected in a Thirdness, hence this very odd conception of the actor in Bresson which has nothing to do with Brecht's distancing, not at all. And this way in which he has them speak, which is precisely the actor's speech and the tone the actor has, consists precisely in introducing the entirety of Thirdness and in bringing affects to a higher level, that is, even farther from their realization. This is very, very, very complicated.

And then a whole series, we would have to search in our way, we would find lots of others... So, these are exactly other types of actors. For recent actors, something has happened, it seems to me. You would also have to ponder in which case, for what kind of image do I need a non-actor or, if you prefer, non-professional actors, for what kind of image. There are obviously types of images that can only be brought forth, represented by the people directly concerned. I mean it's not because it's direct cinema, it will be direct cinema because it is these types of images.

So, I've precisely reached this point: what, how is Peirce going to go from these three types of images to signs and which signs? And, a second question, for us, what do we become within this? That's what I would have to do next time. [*End of the session*] [2: 39: 52]

Notes

[1] The "pink pages" in the Petit Larousse dictionary are the pages listing French, Latin and other foreign language citations. The phrase in question, from Plutarque, means one dines better at home than anywhere else.
[2] Henri Bergson, *L'Energie spirituelle* (1919); *Mind-Energy* trans. H. Wildon Carr (New York: MacMillan, 1920).
[3] These references correspond to Bergson's *Matter and Memory*.
[4] On the conical sections, see the previous two session in this same seminar.

[5] See session 18, of Cinema seminar 1, May 11, 1982.
[6] On the burlesque, the duel and Secondness, see chapter 9 in *The Movement-Image;* for this specific analysis, see pp. 198-200 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 268-269).
[7] Deleuze speaks briefly of this perspective regarding the Marx Brothers in session 21 of Cinema seminar 1, June 1, 1982.
[8] See *The Movement-Image,* p. 199, for the reference to the scene in which Harpo responds to Chico's words by producing the corresponding object, "in a series that is constantly denatured (for example, the series *flash-fish-flesh-flask-flush…* in *Animal Crackers*)" (*L'Image-Mouvement,* p. 269).
[9] On this analysis, see session 15 of Cinema seminar 1, April 20, 1982.
[10] On this analysis, see *The Movement-Image,* p. 136 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 190-191).
[11] On this analysis, see session 13 of Cinema seminar 1, March 16, 1982.
[12] See *The Movement-Image,* pp. 155-159, for Deleuze's discussion of the Actors-Studio technique.
[13] On the plant-animal distinction, see *The Movement-Image,* pp. 155-157 (*L'Image-Mouvement,* pp, 214-216).
[14] From the context of what follows, this reference concerns Alain Delon.