

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

Bear with me for a moment, because on the subject of methodology, I'd like for you all to decide how we ought to proceed through what's ahead. This is how I'd like to kick things off our second term. *[Pause]* Granted, it's a logical extension of where we left off, what I've already hinted at. I'm going to focus on something in particular, to begin with: the movement-time relationship and its reversal. That's our main topic: the relationship between movement and time and the reversal of this relationship. *[Pause]*

Which means, painting in broad strokes, up until a certain point in the history of thought, time was subordinate to movement. *[Pause]* We could *[second]* at some point pin down something of real revolution, overturning this relationship. *[Pause]* Movement comes to depend on time *[Pause]* and, third, such a reversal has its consequences. *[Pause]* And I'd even add a fourth point—fourth, because things are never simple—but going back to the first moment, *[Pause]* where time was thought of as being dependent upon movement—of course, already, it isn't so simple, and there were all sorts of things about this first stage that anticipated the overturning of this relationship. So, you can see our outline, then, a skeleton, a pretty bare-bones outline. We need to fill it in. But my goal is to flesh it out in two ways, independently: *[Pause]* once with philosophy, and then with cinema.

I insist on doing so, and I think it's something you're already used to, so there's little risk of us making the mistake of mixing them together. Our goal is to trace two distinct developments, two distinct developments where we may find echoes, resonances, *[but]* which don't happen at the same time, so by no means do they mix together. Working out philosophically—each in turn: first philosophically and then with regard to cinema—how we'd flesh out our basic outline, I therefore end up with two outlines that are still pretty barebones.

In philosophy, right, for the longest time, yes, it's true that generally, *[Pause]* time was taken to be derived from movement—in very different ways *[Pause]*—but it remains more or less the case from Antiquity to the 17th century, raising all sorts of questions: what movement? Movement of the world, or movement of the soul? What sort of movements? And so on. And then what happens—but why does it happen at this moment in thought?—along comes the great revolution, the Kantian revolution. And while we might agree that critique, what Kant called

Kritik, while everyone might agree that critical philosophy, which Kant invented, is defined by a revolution or reversal—since he himself defined it as such—we may disagree on the fundamental point of this reversal.

What I'll try to do is explain the fundamental point of the Kantian revolution, and the overturning of the movement-time relationship, in particular. That is, he is the first philosopher who, explicitly, subordinates movement to time and frees time from movement. [Pause] He'll call this philosophy—famously—[he'll call] the critical philosophy behind this and many other reversals besides, he'll call it "critical"... No, I mean, "transcendental philosophy." [Pause] And it can be hard to avoid confusing, as we often do, transcendent, transcendence, and transcendental, so it behooves us to try and pin down why transcendent and transcendental are two completely different things. And then, third, the Kantian revolution has consequences which will play out in everything we've come to know as post-Kantianism. What sort of consequences? Well, that's the first side, the philosophical side of things.

Moving on to the other side of things, regarding cinema. What do we find? I think, well, in a certain way—but like, it's still very... we need to be mindful of any nuances; this is off the top of my head—wouldn't we be justified in describing a sort, a kind of cinematic revolution whereby we can distinguish—in very rough terms—between so-called classical cinema and modern cinema? Which, again, isn't to say there's something outdated about classical cinema. It became classical with respect to something that had functioned as a revolution. Our immediate hypothesis—you might guess—is that, if we're justified in talking about a cinematic revolution, it doesn't really have anything to do, for example, with the advent of talkies. No, its revolutions never consisted in technological innovations, the significance and consequences of these technological innovations notwithstanding. They have something to do with technological innovation, but they are not wholly expressed by any single technological innovation.

My question, of course, is—isn't the real cinematic revolution characterizing modern cinema totally distinct from the pseudo-revolution of the talkie? How did it go down? It would have happened after the war. Why? Because after the war, something rather peculiar happened. So-called classical cinema was an approach to filmmaking where images of time were roughly—emphasis on "roughly"—derived from movement-images. [*Airplane noises*] And if we're justified in talking about a revolution in cinema characterizing modern filmmaking, it's because after the war, for reasons to be worked out in cinema itself, there was a reversal where, on the contrary, movement-images do no more than expand upon an even deeper time-image. [Pause] The first elements of this revolution would lie in Italian neorealism, then the New Wave [Pause] and would have been preceded by Ozu in Japan, without there being any direct influence, [Pause] so it likely plays out differently—very differently.

Third: if this cinematic revolution turns out to consist in overturning the movement-time relationship, what follows as a result? That is, what new image, what new type of image results from this overturning?

And fourth: we shouldn't overstate our case—even with classical cinema, there were all sorts of clues (or what should have been clues) that things weren't so simple, that simply using movement-images was not enough for time. Thus, it was already in the works, just as the ground

had been laid down for the Kantian revolution in classical philosophy; the way had already been paved.

[*Pause*] One American critic specifically uses the word, “transcendental”—an American critic, Paul Schrader, in a book called something like *Notes on the Transcendental Style of Film*,¹ excerpts of which were translated in *Cahiers du Cinéma*, in an issue devoted in part to Ozu.² Well, Paul Schrader discusses a transcendental style, which he uses to link Ozu and Bresson. Is he gesturing toward Kant? Perhaps not, because I can’t help but notice how—for reasons of their own—the English and Americans have always confused transcendent and transcendental, which, on the contrary, the Germans carefully distinguished, [*Pause*] which Kant formally distinguished, at any rate. Alright.

Why do I need you to decide? See, I have two different approaches: I could either examine both domains successively—both domains having four stages, you see. I think it’s a question of what works best for you all. See, the four stages are: a period we could loosely refer to as classical philosophy or classical cinema, a period of revolution overturning the time-movement relationship, its consequences, and then how it was anticipated in the classical period. So, I could, I could—how to put this—I could proceed in one of two ways: either... start, let’s say, with cinema and go through how this all plays out in cinema, and then afterwards go through its development in philosophy. Or, since there are four different aspects, I could do one in cinema, one in philosophy, one in cinema, one in philosophy. But I feel like the bett—...it depends; what’s important is that I go through it as rigorously as possible. So, I’m leaning toward covering it in two separate routes: first only cinema and then only philosophy. Alright, then, let’s go, let’s get started. [*A student says something*] What? ... What was that?

The student: Can’t we do it the other way around at first? Because...

Deleuze: Because I think that if I start off, if I flip the order—which would actually be a more logical, chronological order—if I start off right away with an examination of Kant or whatnot, what Kantianism means, I’m afraid we’ll be starting things off with too much abstraction. If we already have—again, I’m not at all suggesting that we combine the two fields—but if we start by working with images, I think a lot of the allegedly difficult aspects of Kant and other philosophers get... If we start with film, we’re at least somewhat equipped to find images to match the philosophy; if I start with philosophy, right, I’m afraid we’ll have a rough time of distinguishing, for example—since ideally, I’d be able to make it clear—transcendent from transcendental. I feel like you’d prefer... Ozu, it’s philosophy... Alright.

I’ll start with our first point: what happens before—in vague terms—how can we characterize the major films that we now consider classic? “Classic” doesn’t mean anything besides what, for us, has come to be classic—let’s say pre-war cinema... I’d say—as we saw two years ago—I’m getting at something very straightforward, you know? For such films, what matters above all is the movement-image. What do I mean by “what matters above all”? I don’t mean that it stops there. It proceeds by using movement-images, which come to define cinema, and from the movement-image is derived [*Pause*] a properly cinematic perception of time. Cinema is already fully aware of time, but its consciousness of time stems from the movement-image. For me, such an approach to filmmaking deserves to be called, not “classical” cinema—my god, it wasn’t

that—but “now classical” cinema, having “become classical,” and it obviously includes extremely different filmmakers.

Yet, dipping very briefly into philosophy, what does it mean to subordinate time to movement such that, in one way or another, time-consciousness derives from the movement-image? What does that mean? It means something very simple: it means—and we’ve already look at this, we’ve seen it a thousand times—it goes back to any philosophical definition of time where time is portrayed as the unit or measure of movement. When we’re told that time is the unit or measure of movement, understand that this statement expresses time’s subordination to movement as a philosophical concept. [Pause] When we say, “Time is the measure of movement,” we know that movement is thereby understood as an “extensive” quantity, and time gives us its “measure.” That which is measurable is an extensive quantity. [Pause]

When it comes to cinema, the idea that time-consciousness derives from the movement-image means something extremely straight-forward. It has to do with technique—to be exact, it means: the consciousness of cinematic time, or rather, the cinematic consciousness of time, derives from montage. Montage is what determines time consciousness. How so? Well, it’s quite simple: the cinematographic activity that draws time-consciousness out of movement-images is the montage of movement-images. It is *through montage* that movement-images give us an awareness of time or an image of time. It’s the montage of movement-images that gives us an image of time, that traces an image of time from movement-images. [Pause] Right. That on its own is quite significant—What a beautiful day; yeah, our next room ought to have a great view.

Anyway, this is a crucial development. I’m coming back to it because it’s no surprise that the major filmmakers of the so-called classical era attributed—not all of them—but so many of them attributed so much significance to montage. Indeed, it’s fundamental since we don’t get a cinematic image of time from movement-images [alone]; we extract a cinematic image of time by putting them through montage. How do we explain that?—We’re only halfway there! [Laughter; Pause]—See, what does that imply? It’s an easy idea to sort out. I’m really banking on—my dream is always to take us on a sort of roller coaster, where the easiest leads to the most difficult, and the most difficult to the easiest—it’s a very simple proposition. I mean, anyone can figure it out.

The editor [*le monteur*] is the one who organizes movement-images such that a time-image emerges, the time-image of the film, an image of time. They process the movement-images. But that means a lot of things. It implies a lot of things; what does it imply? It implies—I find the idea so, so very strange, all the stranger and all the more suspect in that it’s presented as self-evident. Ah, I’m not the only one who finds it suspicious—the idea I find so strange is the claim that movement-images are, by nature, always in the present tense. [Pause] It’s become cliché: film images are in the present. It’s even how images are defined, to distinguish them from language.

This cliché sometimes appears in real film criticism—for example, a writer named [Jean] Bloch-Michel wrote a scathing critique of the New Novel titled “The Present Tense,” [*Le Présent de l’indicatif*], an essay with one basic message: “the New Novel is not literature because it models itself on the image, and images take place in the present tense; images can only bear on the

present; images are fundamentally impoverished in that they can only be in the present tense.” That’s hostile, but you [also] find it in [Alain] Robbe-Grillet, oddly enough, because Robbe-Grillet, devilish as he is, obviously needs this cliché in order to wring something out of it which isn’t cliché. Robbe-Grillet invokes the idea as self-evident, without questioning it, for reasons of his own, he doesn’t want to challenge it; he tells us in passing: cinematic images are always in the present. Good.³

And then we find it again—a third example—in a great writer and film theorist, [Pier Paolo] Pasolini. Not only is the movement-image in the present, but successive movement-images form a theoretically infinitely drawn out present. That is, a succession of movement-images, he claims, if we were to hold on to a succession of movement-images, it would form, he tells us in *Heretical Experience* [*sic*], it would form one endless sequence shot [*plan séquence*], i.e., an indefinitely expandable, indefinitely extensible present.⁴ Images never leave the present tense. A continuity of the present, the present’s continuity and limitless extensibility; film, Pasolini argues, is “by rights” [*en droit*]⁵—remember this “by rights,” you’ll see why—one endless sequence shot, a pure present.⁵

That’s what the movement-image is. [*Pause*] But, Pasolini adds, that’s not what matters. An in-principle [*en droit*] endless sequence shot is what characterizes cinema, but it doesn’t characterize any one film. One endless sequence shot, an eternal present that would merge with life, he says, isn’t interesting. Every film—hence his distinction, cinema in principle *versus* films in practice—every film makes cuts. Of course, every film has cuts; every film has gaps in the continuity of its present. [*Pause*] And such cuts are what constitute film, as opposed to cinema. Thus, he opposes film as it actually exists to cinema in principle, cinema as an endless sequence shot. And you know Pasolini hates sequence shots. [*Pause*] But that’s exactly what cinema is, in principle: the pure continuity of an infinitely extensible present. But the act of film is to “cut” into this present continuity. Right.

But when does he specify—this is still *Heretical Experience* [*sic*]⁶—what exactly do these cuts do in the continuity of the present? They amount to introducing choices, selections, reinforcements, corrections. One chooses, selects, reinforces, corrects, etc. Here, notice that those are more or less the same terms that Robbe-Grillet uses to define description, that Nietzsche uses to define the artist’s task. What does an artist do? They sort, they select, they reinforce, they correct, etc., they choose. And here, Pasolini’s text is rather odd because he says, from there, that that is the work of montage. Montage is what cuts into the continuity of the present, replacing it with—to use Pasolini’s own terminology—the analytic continuity of cinema, that is, instead of a continuation of an endless present, an endless sequence shot, it replaces the analytic continuity of cinema with a “synthesis” of the discontinuity that constitutes film.

Thus, by cutting into the present continuity of the movement-image, I replace it with a synthesis, the operation of montage. And it is this montage, the synthetic operation of montage, that wrests a real sense of time from the pure present of the movement-image, a time furnished with dimension: past, present, future. It is through the synthesis of montage, the cuts of montage, the montage’s selection from the continuous present of the movement-image—through these cuts and this synthesis, an image of time emerges from the purely present movement-image, via the intermediary of montage. Why? Because—what do we have with a present life, or a present

unfolding in which I make my choice? It is in fact already no longer present. So, Pasolini puts it plainly: “It is a life already marked by death,” hence his famous comparison between montage and death—in other words, he does something in cinema similar to what [Maurice] Blanchot did regarding literature: a fundamental relationship between writing and death—Pasolini believes to have found a fundamental relationship between cinema and death. It was bound to happen! [Pause]

Why does he say that? You can see his argument. You think, still, still... I don’t know, speaking for myself, I think, okay, sure! Isn’t that a bit literary, though? He says: “As long as we are alive, it’s undecidable.”⁶ Why? Because you don’t know; you can only make cuts in someone’s life after they’re dead, removing this aspect, keeping that one, making selections. Some say, “Oh, they were so nice! Remember when...?” And we only hold onto our memories of their kindness. They have to be dead; otherwise, so long as they’re still alive, people are—with a few exceptions, which we have to suffer with today [Laughter]—otherwise, people are sometimes nice, sometimes nasty throughout the continuity of a present that’s constantly unfolding. Once they die, only then do I have a whole series of memories, all the bad memories; I sort out certain types of memories. I can sort out someone’s life after they’re dead; otherwise, they could always surprise me, right up to the end. I can’t cut away from their present continuity.

As a result, Pasolini is able to reconcile—in a way that might still appear somewhat vague—death, which selects moments from the life of the person who’s passed, and montage, which selects from the continuity of movement-images in the present. Thus, montage is a cinematic being-toward-death, and film is born. And it’s a rather strange entity since, indeed, the image is alive, right, the image is alive. Moreover, Pasolini tells us—I should read from the text—“for technical reasons, it remains present,” since he maintains that cinematic images can only be present. *Heretical Experience* [sic] — the two main references for the whole idea I’m working out begin at page 200 and then starting again on page 211 in the French translation.

I hope you can immediately surmise how Pasolini concludes what I just described “once montage intervenes,” “from the very moment montage intervenes, that is, when we pass from cinema to film”—which he says are two completely different things—“from the moment montage intervenes, that is, when we pass from cinema to film,” [Pause] “the present becomes the past,” “the present becomes the past.” A past—notice what he’s getting at—in fact, montage introduces cuts, ruptures, what have you, and using these cuts or ruptures to synthesize and treat life, a living person, as if it were dead, since death is what performs these cuts or ruptures.⁷

I think it’s funny—I really like this book. [Deleuze laughs] I think that, fundamentally, it’s off the mark. It’s too contrived. But this is what I mean when I say to pick up whatever works for you. If you like the idea, if you don’t think it’s contrived, if it works for you—have at it. There’s nothing stopping you. Personally, though, it doesn’t work for me because it feels to me like he’s... he’s just saying things, but maybe I’m wrong... And so, “once montage intervenes, the present becomes past.” I know what he’s getting at. To me, that’s totally abstract. It’s a past that—listen closely—a past that, “for reasons immanent to filmmaking as a medium”—in particular, the present-tense character of movement-images—“a past that, for reasons immanent to filmmaking as a medium, and not for aesthetic reasons, is always in the present tense (*thus, a historical present*).”⁸

See, I'm summarizing Pasolini's main idea, because he still has some surprises in store. What is a great author? Great authors have their weak points, they go on for pages, they have their great moments, yeah, it's funny how it plays out. He says—this is what he says: movement-images are in the present. *[Pause]* Thus, you won't get time out of them. They are primary; they make up cinema's ideal continuity. Thus the pre-condition for cinema is its ideal continuity. Only cinema's ideal continuity doesn't actually exist! What *do* exist are films! The reality of films.

Well, the reality of films depends on an image, on an operation shattering the ideal continuity of the present movement-image. How does it break it up? It introduces clips, ruptures, cuts. It substitutes—and this is the sense in which we call it a synthesis... *[Deleuze corrects himself]* we call it montage—it substitutes a synthesis for its analytical ideal continuity. See? The work of montage is analogous to that of death. The editor *[le monteur]* is death. *[Pause]* Right. What does that get us? Through montage, through montage, *[Pause]* we get an image of time from the movement-image. From the montage performed on movement-images *[Pause]* an image of time is deduced. *[Pause]* Or, if you prefer, since the image is in the present, from the infinite present of the movement-image, we will derive, via the synthetic process of editing, an image of time endowing this present with temporal dimension.

But it's odd, I think, things take a strange turn, because we ought to account for this small... this nod to Pasolini's modernity, in this comparison between montage and death. It's the most classical thing about Pasolini. It's the most classical idea, the oldest in cinema, which amounts to saying: we get images of time from movement-images through montage. *[Pause]* Yet Pasolini... how can we explain everything new about Pasolini—not only in his practice, not only in his work, which is new in a lot of extraordinary ways—but also in his theory. In another way, then—to give you a sense for how things are never easy, never simple, it's so very complicated—from another angle, his position is rather backward.

It's interesting how his whole theory of montage and time with cinematic images might come across as a step backwards, since it harks back to pre-war cinema. On the other hand, what's so modern about Pasolini? An idea I've brought up in years prior: free indirect discourse and its application to cinematic images. That's completely new, an entire understanding of narration will depend on it, an entire way of relating cinema and literature, with Pasolini at the forefront, along with Rohmer. They will be the two major innovators or creators of a new form of cinematic narrative. *[Pause]* What's still new about Pasolini? Functions of cinematic thought, and even completely new functions of the camera, which he'll name—we'll come back to this—he uses a word he'll make theoretical and practical use of: “theorem.” A sort of “theorematic” function. Okay. We might come back to these points.⁹

But our third aspect, with his theory of montage, is very closely tied to the other two—and this is what makes an author so fascinating, you know! He can move forward in such interesting ways while simultaneously falling back on what I've been calling a retrograde or classical understanding. That's why, when you read someone, you always take stock of their inventory, suspending judgment, feeling them out and getting a sense for what's there. He can only reach his high points by passing through valleys, and so in Pasolini we more or less find—perhaps it's because he comes so late, because he's so modern, that he can give us, in an exemplary form,

what I'm calling classical theory. And again, in cinema, this theory amounts to saying that there are first movement-images, and it is through the montage of movement-images that [*Pause*] you derive or obtain an image of time.

Yet that can mean just one thing, and it's that, obviously, so long as I'm deriving my image of time from pre-existing movement-images, if that's what I'm doing, i.e., if I use montage to obtain it, I can only ever expect to get an indirect image of time. Necessarily, it will be an indirect image of time, since it can only be inferred, save—I'll leave it open to the possibility—save perhaps for special circumstances. Generally, though, for the most part, it can only be inferred from movement-images. It won't simply be drawn out from movement-images as if it were contained therein; it will be taken from movement-images by means of their montage. And that's the classical understanding, I think, of the relationship between movement in time, and in that sense, it is... [*Interruption of the recording*] [45:51]

... I'd add that... Coming back to movement. First, we have the movement-image—it's not so simple, is it? Because when we're looking at the movement-image, we have to take stock of three coordinates, three coordinates; movement has three different coordinates. What are the three coordinates of movement? [*Pause*]

The first coordinate, I claim, is something invariant. Movement has an invariant. [*Pause*] The invariant of movement, ah, well—does movement have an invariant? It does, otherwise there is no perception of movement. Movement, once perceived, implies an invariant. What is the invariant of movement? Historically—and I'm encroaching a little bit into what's to come, into philosophy—historically, movement's invariant could be understood in one of two ways: as something outside of movement, that is, something immobile, around which movement—the most perfect motion, at least—revolves. [*Pause*] That would be, let's say, a rather Greek understanding, [*Pause*] that's one sort of invariant. [*Pause*]

There's another way of understanding an invariant: not as something immobile, i.e., as external to movement, around which the allegedly most perfect motion would revolve. There's another approach, which feels closer to our own way of understanding something invariant about movement, i.e., as something “in” movement which is maintained. [*Pause*] That would bring us back to Descartes, right. What's maintained is the quantity of motion, that is, the product of mass and velocity, *MV*. And indeed, it's true that one of the major differences between ancient physics and medieval physics, not to mention 17th century physics, is the switch from one type of invariant to the other.

Still on this first aspect of movement, I'd argue that our first coordinate is permanence, [*Pause*] and to some extent, eternity, characterizing what we might call the Whole of movement. [*Pause*] If, for example, circular motion keeps going, it does so by revolving around an invariant which is itself eternal. [*Pause*] Or, if motion is conserved in the universe, it is in virtue of an invariant which itself remains constant in the universe. So, that is the first aspect, regarding eternity. [*Pause*] I'd describe it in terms of an invariant or permanence. Just to get our concepts in order.

The second aspect of movement: instead of considering the movement as a Whole, movement is taken up piecemeal. Movement actually has parts, parts which are themselves movements.

Movement is divided into other movements, which is a way of saying that movement is articulated. [Pause] Achilles' trajectory is made up of steps or strides; his running is made up of leaps; his path is made up of steps. Ultimately, a movement is infinitely divisible. [Pause] In other words, a movement's parts are themselves movements. [Pause] But a movement's parts, those belonging to the same movement, happen in succession: step by step. Thus, looking at movement through its parts brings us back to time. Looking at movement as a Whole refers us to the eternal, that is, to some kind of invariant or permanence. Looking at movement through its parts refers us to time as a succession of partial movements. [Pause]

The third aspect: a movement's parts have boundaries. [Pause] Infinitely divisible, the parts of a movement tend toward, or each of a movement's parts tends towards a limit. The boundaries of a movement's parts are called "instants." [Pause] So, you can define an instant as the boundary of a part of movement. [Pause] From there you can say—you get to the concept of simultaneity [Pause] when describing the relationship between a movement *B* [Pause] and the end of part of movement *A*, [Pause] you'll call that simultaneity. [Pause]

Thus, I claim that movement considered as a Whole refers to the invariant, the permanent, or the eternal; movement considered in its parts refers to time as succession; movement considered in its limits refers to simultaneity as space, since you can work it out end-to-end. The end of movement *A* of movement gives you a simultaneity with movement *B*—working end-to-end, you can make the whole universe. Simultaneity, the third aspect of movement, movement approached via the limits of its parts, the end-points of its parts, makes up simultaneity and—step-by-step—space.

To quickly tie that back to a Kantian problem, which Kant articulated so impressively: how do you define, how do you distinguish simultaneity and succession? Rather simple, that's easy enough, but it's not so easy! Because I'm looking at a house—I have to begin—when I look at this room... ah, for the last time [Laughter]—I'm looking at it, right? Well, follow my gaze: I start from one end, let's call that corner "*A*," and then I go over to the wall, thinking, *This room is so small, so ugly. What a hideous room! Our next room is going to be so lovely.* I go from *A* to *B*, right, *A* to *B*. Whatever I'm looking at, I have to start at one end. I turn my head, and on the river—whether it's a river, a highway, it's the same—I see a car or a boat, a boat passing by. I start with *A*, and I follow over to *B*.

Kant's basic question is the following: what difference is there—philosophy celebrates moments like this, when it gets its hands on something like this—what's the difference? In both cases, your perception is successive. What makes you say, what allows you to say that the parts of the house are simultaneous, whereas the boat's positions are successive? Because in both cases, your apprehension is successive.

What a lovely problem! His answer is quite simple, [but] explaining it in detail is rather complicated. He asks what it is that's successive in either case. In the case of perceiving the house or the wall, I go from *A* to *B*, and then *B* to *A*. There is indeed a succession that is entirely inevitable, but this succession is that of vectors, *A-B/B-A*. When perceiving the boat—or the car, with burlesque films—the successive vectors are *A-B/B-C/C-D*, i.e., they're sequenced according

to an objective law, following an objective rule, as they are. It's not possible for boats to go upstream—naturally, he means sailboats—the boat can't possibly go upstream. Well, anyway.

Where does that come into play in our account of cinema? Well, we can now specify that... I'm talking about movement-images from a classical perspective, if you will, using classical theory. It's a theory we can reconstruct. I say *the* movement-image, but the movement-image itself has three different aspects. [*Pause*] I can approach it as an image referring to the eternal—effectively, as the Whole of the film... [*Interruption of the recording*] [59:10]

Part 2

... It was a real concern, for example, for Eisenstein: the search for a constant, for an invariant. Throughout the French pre-war school, in a completely different way, as we discussed two years back—don't worry about it if you weren't there, I spent a lot of time on it—throughout the French pre-war school, there was this whole investigation—certainly not a scientific sort of investigation—but investigation along the lines of an “aesthetic judgment,” an aesthetic evaluation of movement's invariant, i.e., a set of metric relationships that stay constant—between what and what? Between speed or movement and other factors: light, surfaces, the volume of space, etc. And the invariant ought to be all of these relationships between movement and the image's other factors. For Eisenstein, famously, it was his exploration into the golden ratio, a characteristically invariant relation within movement since, if you recall, the golden section is expressed as follows: the smallest part ought to be to the largest what the largest is to the whole. Or, if you prefer, with a spiral: if you start from the point of origin *O*, *OA* over *OB* equals *OC* over *OD*, etc., equals little *m*. It's a strikingly different approach to invariance from that of the French school; hence why, at the time, I argued that the French school is really Cartesian. They're looking for something equivalent to an invariant quantity of motion. For Eisenstein, it's more about a harmonic sort of invariant. Well, regardless, I think, well... There you have it.¹⁰

While, on the other hand, the movement-image can be understood not as a global image of the permanent, referring to something eternal, but as a local image of the simultaneity within the instant. However, since that is extensible, it gives us space. And lastly, you have the image of time as a succession, this time regarding parts of movements. What shape, then, [*Pause*] does this whole aspect end up taking? When I deduce an image of time from movement-images using montage, what sort of image of time do I get? [*Pause*] It's an image of time reduced to mere succession. [*Pause*] And, in this form, time-as-succession, it will present itself as an image of eternity, as an expression of eternity, as a dimmed expression of eternity. Time will be defined by sequential order just as space will be defined by coexistence. Those are our three coordinates: the permanent or invariant, succession, and simultaneity. Time as no more than sequential order. Thus, it is only one of our three coordinates. All of that is what Kantian philosophy calls into question, obviously, but for the time being, we're talking about cinema.

So, you see, my summary—I'll give you a moment to rest—the short version of everything I just went over is that classical cinema does indeed, it seems to me, have movement-images. Of course, they move; of course, they have chronological time, but that's not the image of time we're after. We're looking for something deeper. What we call... it isn't, it isn't... We're not

simply looking for the duration of a present. Ultimately it isn't a chronometric phase; you can always count how long an image lasts. What will qualify, what will pass for, what will act as a time-image will be the montage enacted upon movement-images. Hence, I argue: such time, such an image of time, forged by the montage of movement-images, has two limitations: it is an indirect image of time, and on the other hand, it's an image reduced to succession. Of course there can be disruptions in this succession, with a flashback, for example; it can pull off simultaneity by superimposing, by going back and forth, and so on—that doesn't stop it from adhering to this general framework.

And of course, I might add—I'll make it quick since it's something we've already been over—that of course it isn't only in classical cinema, that there is another approach. I'm saying that it goes further than drawing time-images from movement-images *qua* objects moving in space. There is another approach, but curiously, in light of our discussion, it comes down to the same thing. With this other approach, already tremendously important, the movement—what they have in common is that things are still based on movement. But we're no longer dealing with the movement of an object in space; it's based on the movement of a soul in space.

In philosophy, the one who made—this reversal was already there in classical philosophy—this great philosopher's reversal amounted to saying: *No! Time does not derive from the movement of an object in space, however glorious that object might be. It's based on the soul.* [Pause] It was Plotinus, and in so doing, he founded what's now known as "Neoplatonism." [Pause] How does this come down to the same thing? From a certain angle, it changes everything. From another angle, it comes down to the same thing because time is still deduced from movement. Simply put, it's [still] the movement of an object through space. For example, it's no longer the movement of the planets, it's the movement of the soul.¹¹

What is the movement of the soul? Plotinus always had a sublime way of putting it: "It emanates / pours out." The soul pours out. Emanating, a soul pouring itself out, i.e., it puts itself outside itself. And by placing itself outside itself, it's divided, and it divides—we'll see what that consists in and what leads Plotinus to say something so strange—it passes from one state of life to another. Right. [Pause] Movement is fundamentally the movement of one's soul, and what is the soul? The soul is light, or the pouring of light, at least. It isn't light itself, light being even higher than the soul, but it is a certain phase of light, light insofar as it pours out, insofar as it places itself outside itself, insofar as it is divided. Good. Plotinus puts together the first great philosophy of light, which has important consequences for every field, including that of the arts, since in ways very similar to Neoplatonism, Byzantine mosaic will discover a new art of light. Right.

So, what does that have to do with us? Well, now, when it comes to time, nothing has changed and everything has changed. The image of time is still drawn from movement-images. Only the movement-image is now that of a soul's movement and no longer that of an object's movement in space. It's the image of a soul's movement expressed as changes in light, in successive phases of light. [Pause] And time is the successive phases of light insofar as these directly express a soul's changes, a soul that is pouring out. [Pause] You can immediately recognize that as what expressionist film has been about all along. And you'd find the same themes in a completely different context: eternity, time as succession, simultaneity.

How so? Simultaneity is the simultaneity of instants, but this time, the soul's movement is the movement of intensity; the instant is the snapshot of the intensive quantity that lets us delineate simultaneities. Eternity shows up in intensive movement *qua* Whole, and intensive movement *qua* Whole is the circle of light specifically known as the "color wheel." And time itself is [Pause] what expresses and intensively measures the soul's movement, the degradations of the soul and its conversions, which is the object of all expressionist cinema.¹²

Thus, I could also claim that this is a completely different understanding of movement. But time is something deduced in both cases. Going down the line: time is deduced from the movement-image; second, it is deduced from montage; third, then, it's only an indirect image of time; fourth, an indirect image of time reduces time to mere succession, possible hiccups in this succession notwithstanding. Ah, yes, clear enough. You want me to repeat that, don't you? I've already forgotten what... [Laughter]

First conclusion: on either side—there are two main sides in classical cinema—this is just an outline—so, assume there are two main sides: the movement-image is either the soul's intensive movement, or an object's extensive movement in space. First conclusion: classical cinema—or rather, what we now consider classical—whatever you call it, it wasn't classical; now it is. It's become, it's part of what we consider classical. First conclusion—provided that they are the same—the time image follows from the movement-image by way of montage. That's the first conclusion.

Second conclusion: under such conditions, the image can only be, time can only figure into an indirect image. It's an indirect image of time because we obtain it through the montage of movement-images. Hmm, I feel like this went a lot better the last time around. [Laughter]

Third conclusion: an indirect image of time is also one that reduces time—ah, it's better now—that reduces time down to only being a matter of succession, even if it involves disturbing or disrupting its sequence. Yeah, so far, so good—that's the third, so what comes fourth? There were four earlier, and now I only have three. [Pause] Come on, then... yes?

A student: [Inaudible]

Deleuze: Listen, I would, I'd love to, but if you ask me to go any further, I need, I need some, some stuff to show you, pictures, right, and I'll do it. I promise you—I'll have to make a note. I'll do it with Plotinus because Byzantine mosaic and cinema don't really go together, while Plotinus and Byzantine mosaic work together perfectly. I'll ask some of you to help with that, then. But I'll make a note for when we get to philosophy; do me a favor and remind me if I forget. Alright, well, we're making progress. All I'll add is... What's that?

Another student: [Inaudible]

Deleuze: The fourth conclusion? I must have put it into one of the other three; [Laughter] I must have... Oh, you know, three, four... [Pause] I'm moving pretty quickly.

With this kind of classical cinema, what is it that ensures... what ensures the movement-image, whose montage will give us an indirect image of time? I'll speed through this because we covered and reviewed these things last year, and only some of it is pertinent here. As I see it, what ensures this indirect image of time as something concluded from movement-images, is what the image depicts, what successive images depict—fundamentally, sensorimotor sequences, the sensorimotor sequences established between here types of images. [Pause] We went over this so many times in the past two years, so I won't get into it, but there are three types of images: perception-images, affect-images, action-images. And expressionism deals with perception-images and affect-images and how one extends the other. Action films deal with the relationships between perception-images and affect-images and the extension of one in the other. In any case, the activity of movement-images, rendering an indirect image of time, [Pause] consists in a series of sensorimotor sequences.

In other words, this is what we looked at last time or the time before, what Bergson called “automatic” or “habitual” recognition, the way in which a situation or a perception is extended into an action, [Pause] which carries over into another action, each time modifying the situation, successive perceptions and actions established on the same plane: a linear representation of time, successive situations and actions linked together along the same plane. And so I think this sensorimotor structure is what enables [Pause] this process whereby, from movement-images and the different types of movement-images, not to go over it again, the different types of movement-images—the three main types: perception-images, affect-images, action-images—are handled by montage in such a way that they yield an indirect image of time. The sensorimotor sequence is what lies beneath.

Well, that raises a certain question—this is where we ought to dial in—a rather strange problem. It's as if someone were to say, Yeah, you could say that, but that ignores everything bizarre and unusual about the overall form of cinema taking shape; it's a formulaic take on what's happened. Sure, you can always say that after the fact, since everything I've said already hints that it's going to be surpassed. See, that's cheating. Once something else comes along, it's easy to say, *Ah, well, it was inevitable*. So it wasn't that they were lacking.

What have I forgotten? I wanted to talk about it concretely. All that's interesting, all that's concrete. Because it sounds like I'm saying that movement-images were rather simple, and then once montage comes along and messes with them, they yield an indirect image of time. Sure, but montage or no, these movement-images—are they as simple as I thought? No, no, no. There were and have always been aberrations; cinema was defined, and movement-images in film moving forward were defined much more by the aberrations imposed on these movement-images, and by aberrations in the movement-image. I'm using “aberration” in a precise way, because as you know, it's a term used in astronomy: “ab-errant,” aberrant, aberrance. Well, these little aberrations—refer to your Webster's—what came through as a result? Already, what came through? You sense that what was already coming out in the movement-image's aberrations was an image of time which is no longer indirect—a direct time-image was already in the works; it was already there.

They brought it forth, and they took risks to seek it out. They didn't know where to look, they didn't know, they knew, they didn't know, they started again, they tried everything. It wasn't a

calm situation where, with a firm grasp on movement-images, montage would have sufficed to give us an indirect image of time. There was that. But every great filmmaker, while they kept that, introduced aberrations into the movement-image that, regardless of whether they were brought into montage, would cause a completely different sort of time-image to peek through, which we should recognize as the “direct time-image.” And what happens to cinema after this revolution? No doubt it would come to focus solely on this direct time-image—that’s what they’d want to bring out, that’s what they’d want to come to grips with. To the point that I can’t boil it down.

And, in that respect, I’m reminded of a fascinating book that I’d like to tell you about, along with my reaction, what I think about it. – Do you need a break? Right, a quick break?

A woman student: No... [*Indistinct remarks*]

Deleuze: Ah, yes, since we’re going to have one, but Mr. Roussel isn’t coming. Are you sure he hasn’t already come, and that...

A student: He came in through the window.

Deleuze: ... he came in through the window? Listen, a planning manager can’t really just come in through the window. That’d be...

The first student: Was there a knock earlier?

Another student: Yes.

Deleuze: There was a knock? [*Pause*] Someone knocked and no one said, “Come in”?

The student: No!

Deleuze: What a mess! Well, you didn’t know what was going on. You know, something always going wrong. I thought I had taken every precaution. No, really, it’s a real disaster if he came and went. Oh my God! If you could, take a quick peek, [*Laughter*] see if there’s someone waiting at the door. [*Pause*] Hmm? Anyone? [*Pause*]

The student: Someone’s there.

Deleuze: Really? Well, let him in. [*Pause*] My God. Someone knocked? Why didn’t you all tell me? [*Pause*] I was clear that you had to say, “Come in,” that you had to say something. [*Pause*] Aren’t you all a bunch of Judases. [*Laughter*] [*Pause*] Oh, no, it isn’t funny. If someone knocked, it must have been him. [*Pause*] Why? [*Pause*] Well, no, if he’s nice, he might have thought we didn’t want to see him; [*Pause*] that’s frustrating. Well, listen—if someone knocks, now you’ll tell me because... I’m shocked because... [*Laughter*] My, oh, my. [*Pause*] I have very good hearing.

Anyway, I want to discuss a book I find rather strange—quite beautiful, but strange. It's by an author I'm unfamiliar with, named Jean-Louis Schefer. The book is titled *The Ordinary Man of Cinema*.¹³ It's part of Gallimard's *Cahiers du Cinéma* series. And the book, I'll just say, you sometimes come across books like this. It's the sort of book that's kind of written like a poem, but at the same time, there are some extremely tight, rigorous ideas. In which case, then, you want, well, you want to hang onto its poetic character. But you also want, I don't know, to dissect it, to dig out the solid parts of its ideas. You want to do that and then put them back in... I'm not at all suggesting that book's poetic qualities are just pasted on, not all of it, just a little. A great poet is able to handle powerful propositions, which we'd like to bring out. And so now and then—and it's different for everyone, depending on how you feel—every once in a while, you think: oh, no! [Pause] Because they're playing it loose, cutting it close to the edge. But they always catch themselves in time; it's a sort of balancing act. Fascinating.

And so, even if it unfortunately means spoiling its poetry, I come away from the book with three ideas, having translated them into claims—which is madness—and I won't pretend to make these three claims any clearer than... Alright, he says: the secret of cinema—he says something along these lines—is that cinema comes down to movement-images. So, he's coming at things the same way we are. But anyway, it's not an ordinary sort of movement. I like that; we'll have to hang on to this “not ordinary.” I don't mean extraordinary movement. It's an un-ordinary movement. It's an un-ordinary movement for an ordinary man—hence the title, *The Ordinary Man of Cinema*—it's an un-ordinary movement for the ordinary man, the ordinary man of cinema. But perhaps the ordinary man of cinema isn't an ordinary man. [Pause] That's funny.

And to show us that this isn't ordinary movement, he tells us—to pull a quote somewhat at random: “Most striking is not the general mobility of the world, but the disquiet added to this movement.”¹⁴ [Pause] It isn't the mobility; it's the disquiet added to the movement, i.e., it isn't an ordinary movement. And what makes it an un-ordinary movement? He goes on in different directions; he piles things up, even in disarray; he doesn't care what order things go in. He says it's a movement, for example, which doesn't necessarily move away from an immobile spectator. Sometimes it moves away, but sometimes the unmoving spectator follows along with the movement, despite its moving away from them. That's not ordinary! I don't budge, and yet I'm following its movement. Yes, that is an un-ordinary movement. It doesn't move away from an immobile spectator.

And then, he adds, it's a movement with perpetual—[a movement] which is inseparable from the image's disproportions. [Pause] A tiny movement can appear huge to us, a huge movement tiny, perpetually disproportionate... [Interruption of the recording] [1:31:46]

... “Disproportionality of images, [Pause] thunderous rumbling of the actor's voices [...] those giants' kisses [...] those dwarves' smiles.”¹⁵ I don't quite follow here. I get that “a giant's kiss” is in a close-up, but I don't really see what he has in mind with “a dwarf's smile,” but it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter, we won't... Well, you can see what he's getting at. There is something un-ordinary about movement-images. The cinematic movement-image presents a non-ordinary movement, that is, an aberrant movement—simply put, that's the first point.

Second: to whom is this aberrant movement addressed? ... No, I'll add that for the first point, he gives a characteristic example: *The Bitch*, by [Jean] Renoir [1931]. You know the protagonist is going to kill the woman, but we don't witness the murder. In wonderful Renoir fashion, we enter... the camera leaves the room where the murder takes place and enters through the window, where the murder has already happened. Schefer comments: "I discover the deed when I reenter through the window (I'd left without any memory of my flight)." We can see what he's getting at; he puts it well. I left the room and come back in through the window "without any memory of my flight."¹⁶ Right. That's an aberration in movement. As he's gliding along this first level, Schefer will make a chilling conclusion—we're getting chills already; it's great—the simplest movement-image in cinema is an aberration so far as movement is concerned. That's great; however simple, it seems like a powerful idea. He says, coming back, "Most striking is not the general mobility of the world, but the disquiet added to this movement"—its movement is always that of a crime.¹⁷

And once again, just like Pasolini's needed to invoke the concept of death, [Schefer] finds it necessary to bring in the idea of a primordial crime. Ah, there it is, psychoanalysis rears its head—I mean, that's the primal scene; the primary psychoanalytic approach to film is that there is but one film, and that, across every film, all cinema has ever done is perpetually rehearse the primal scene. That's a lot simpler, isn't it? There's the cowboy version of the primal scene, or whatever version of it, and so on... any way you look at it, it's the primal scene; it isn't complicated. It's not complicated. Sounds like we're basically lumping cinema together, claiming that its movement-image is fundamentally that of a crime, so much so that Schefer even says—and this would be the "disquiet added to movement"—"a crime committed against nobody and *forever suspended*," as a pure form of crime, functioning as the birth of cinema.¹⁸ That, too, is a way of connecting the cinematic image to death. Well, uh, that might be, I mean, certainly, you could argue that, but it seems to me that we don't need to take it that far. We already got what we needed. It was enough to discover... more than the notion of some crime, I find the idea of an aberration in movement much more significant—the idea that, in its movement-images, cinema depicts an aberrant movement.

Hence what I take to be Schefer's second claim: to whom is this un-ordinary movement addressed? If the movement image depicts un-ordinary movement, to whom is this un-ordinary movement addressed? To a spectator, yes: the ordinary man of cinema. The un-ordinary movement of cinema's movement-image, since the movement-image is its ordinary image, but the movement-image is one of an un-ordinary movement, addressed to an ordinary man, the ordinary man of cinema. But what about the ordinary man of cinema? It isn't you or me. [*Pause*] It doesn't represent a mean, nor is it some ideal spectator. Is it something like [Robert] Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*? Perhaps, based on some aspects of Schefer's text; he doesn't make the connection, of course, but his ordinary man is strikingly similar to the man without qualities.

You see, both claims work together quite well in this poetic atmosphere—poetry and rigor, right. Once again, it's normal for the movement, for whatever is un-ordinary, the un-ordinary movement—for the movement-image to be directed at the ordinary man of cinema. He asks, who is it? Is it a child? Is it our inner child? That raises our hackles again. Oh boy, it's the primal scene again. Is it our inner child? Certainly not the child we were, but the fantasy-child. He's always running that risk, but the way he puts it is sometimes infinitely better and more beautiful.

He says no, it's "the sudden rise in us," the ordinary man of cinema is "the rise in us of a ghostly existence." It's a man we have "behind our eyes."¹⁹ [Pause] In a way, it's a doll, part of the cinematographic assemblage [*agencement*]. [Pause] It's a second body—I'm quoting him now—"the second body in the ignorance of which we live." [Pause] It is a "diver" within us.²⁰ [Pause] What's going on here—this man behind our eyes, the ordinary man of cinema, to whom the movement-image's un-ordinary characteristics are addressed?

It gets more precise. He says: it's that we spectators, faced with the cinematic image, because of its aberrations, have lost our center of gravity. [Pause] Or, at least, what we see no longer corresponds to our center of gravity. You can see what he's getting at, effectively. When I see something, for example, a table from a distance, with my natural perception, it does correspond to my center of gravity. Because it corresponds to my center of gravity, I can conceptualize, I can go around it to confirm that it is indeed a table with a certain shape and a certain color. My center of gravity is what makes my displacement and exploration possible within natural perception. With the cinematic image, according to Schefer's analysis, I've lost my center of gravity, in the sense that I can't do anything with it in order to understand the movement-image. He invokes a wonderful bit of Kafka, who wasn't talking about cinema: "This good center of gravity I still have, but to a certain extent I no longer have the corresponding body. And a center of gravity that has no work to do becomes lead, and sticks in the body like a musket ball."²¹ Lovely. "I no longer have the corresponding body [and so this center] sticks in the body like a musket ball," which is to say, I have nothing to do with my center of gravity. On the other hand, there are centers of gravity outside me. [Pause]—Let them in, go ahead and let them in. [Pause] Oh, Jalila, come in, come in, come in. [*The voice of Deleuze's associate*] Oh, I'm interrupting... Well. I'm going to go see the room... [Pause] [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:42:01]

Deleuze: ... It's a palace [*the new classroom*], a palace [*sound of students settling in*] where we will finally know happiness. Picture a small courtyard with, I'm not exaggerating, a tuft of grass in the middle, [*Laughter*] a small square courtyard, with single-story buildings around, on the ground floor. Everything lovely in ochre and green, I think, I think—my memory changes. With a door opening out, which will save our lives in the event of a fire; anyone staying here is screwed since the doors open inward, and doors that open inward cause panic and are illegal in any public space. So all this is illegal. I'm going to press charges [Pause] so Ms. Rondeau [*unclear due to laughter*] the doors are unacceptable. Speaking of which, I can assure you that the room is much larger than this one. It's got a lower ceiling, which makes it easier to concentrate. [*Laughter*] It has big double-pane windows, so no noise issues. No heating issues. Things will be great there, and if we get kicked out, we'll move to the parking lot. [*Laughter*] Alright! [Pause]

Hiddenobu Suzuki: And it's room what? H...?

Deleuze: I've got it all worked out. I'll have us break every hour, smokers can go smoke in the grass [*Laughter*] in a circle, and we'll finally enjoy peace, health, and no police surveillance. We'll be free. The only problem is crossing the boulevard, obviously because, yes, there are traffic lights, but there are trucks, and so on. So, for everyone coming, be very careful with the boulevard.

Hiddenobu Suzuki: Where is the entrance?

Deleuze: What?

Hiddenobu Suzuki: How do I get there?

Deleuze: How do you get there? Well, you come here; [*Deleuze laughs*] as you usually do, you come here—not *here*-here, because it wouldn't turn out well if we were seen here again, [*Laughter*] we'd better not. Basically, you go through the main entrance, the biggest entrance, you stop at the biggest entrance and go back out. [*Laughter*] You'll come to a crosswalk. Go across the boulevard, and on your left, buildings so charming you'll immediately recognize them, like Social Security, [*Laughter*] and the like, prefab, the prefab cobblestone. [*Laughter*] It's there—walk in, and you'll end up directly in front of some perfect study rooms where nobody hangs out. It's not like the lobby downstairs with folks milling about; it has an immediate atmosphere of work and serenity. [*Pause*]

Suzuki: Great!

Deleuze: And to think, we didn't know it even existed. What's that about? [*Pause*] Oh! I forgot—*H* as in *H*, *H*... [*Pause*] 5, I think. I'm not totally sure, but we'll meet up, we'll all meet in the courtyard; the little square courtyard. [*Pause*] Alright. [*Pause*] Oh, that's good. [*Pause*]

I'd like to wrap up our account of Schefer. You can see why he says that the ordinary man of cinema isn't an average man. He isn't... [*Pause*] He isn't even an ideal man. He is, yes, if not the man without quality, he's the man without a center of gravity. Why's that? Because he's faced with these un-ordinary images [*Pause*] which lack any heaviness. [*Pause*] He defines them as, still rather poetically, he defines them... —I've lost it—“thin, gesticulating granite,”²² a “world with no outside,”²³ I don't know what... [*Pause*] “Such images,” the movement-images of cinema, “do not add to any past or possible perception: they replace it.”²⁴

So, this autonomous world, this world of movement-images, which is autonomous precisely through its anomalies, through the aberration of the movement it depicts—where do they come from? Was that it? What or who within us are they addressed to? That is, to what other center of gravity? It's as though our center of gravity corresponding to these movement-images were no longer our body's center of gravity. My body no longer accompanies its center of gravity. Its center of gravity is elsewhere: it's floating, outside me, following a line of movement-images, and that's what defines the ordinary man of cinema—who, take your pick, is either a man behind you or a man within you. That's the second aspect of his idea, but once again he comes close to the psychoanalytic theme of cinema, and childhood, and so on. Only it's an ageless child, he says, a monstrous child; it's a child in the sense of something within us, behind us.

The third and final thing that interests me among Schefer's poetic ideas is that, alright then, what is the connection between the un-ordinary image in cinema and the ordinary man of cinema? His answer: time. To go to the cinema is to go in time. “Cinema”—I'm quoting him *verbatim*—“is the only experience in which time appears as a perception.”²⁵ [*Pause*] What? Here, again, it comes back to things that might not work for us anymore. This suits us quite well. Notice what

he's saying, which lines up perfectly for me; he seems to be saying something like: the movement-image in cinema is such that you can use it to draw out, to deduce an indirect image of time. But beware! –Schefer's claim consists in adding this "beware" [*Pause*] – if it's true that cinematic movement-images can yield an indirect image of time through montage, beware, it also presents anomalies or aberrations that offer a direct time-image.²⁶

It is through the anomalies of the movement within the movement-image. There would be two sides of the movement-image; the movement-image of classical cinema would have two aspects: as a movement-image, it can only give us an indirect image of time through montage. [*Pause*] Second: insofar as it presents us with anomalies or aberrations of movement, it becomes capable of taking us within time, that is, of giving us a direct time-image. A direct time-image means that the ordinary man of cinema enters into time, penetrates time. That's a fine thesis. It's exactly what we were looking for.

For example: [Carl] Dreyer's "mismatch cuts".²⁷ Dreyer's work has both. No one can do a tracking shot like Dreyer; that's a particular sort of movement-image. In this case, it's the camera's movement, only as a movement-image; we find a montage in Dreyer, which gives us an indirect image of time. That doesn't stop Dreyer from constantly using mismatch cuts. Where is this music coming from? A mismatch cut is a quintessential aberration in movement. The movement-image continues to be a movement-image, but it's grasped and we grasp it as such when we apprehend the mismatch as an aberration with respect to movement. It isn't an aberration so far as the movement-image is concerned; it's an aberration in its movement. Again, as [Jean] Narboni says, where did Gertrud go?²⁸ She went into the crowd; she's gone into the cut; something happened in the mismatch cut. You can see, then, the movement-image, if I consider it as a movement-image as such—and there must be a whole other dimension, I consider it as such, I ought to consider it as such—well, I'll put my movement-images into montage, and I'll obtain an indirect image of time.

But it's also possible that my montage deliberately introduces genuine aberrations regarding its movement. It's still a movement-image, but now we grasping it based on the aberration in the movement it depicts. As I see it, every movement-image from the major classical filmmakers of the pre-war period has these two aspects, more or less. To a fantastic degree, in Dreyer's case, so far as movement-images where the movement-image depicts an aberration of movement go; it's as though we were sucked into time. We go into time, we witness a direct time-image. I'm not saying that's exactly what Schefer is talking about, but, in any case, it seems to be along the same vein.

That's why I was justified—or am justified—in maintaining these two conclusions: [*Pause*] How do we define classical cinema, no... [*Deleuze corrects himself*] How do we define what has now become classical cinema? Again, understand the extent to which the sound revolution wasn't revolutionary; that's not it, it's not about that. Talking pictures would be enormously significant if it meant redistributing the image's elements, but that wouldn't be because of its having sound. Rather, we can define now-classical cinema roughly corresponding to the pre-war period, save for the rather unique case Ozu which we'll cover later, using the two following characteristics: [*Pause*] first, the movement-image is prior to time, such that an image of time derives from

movement-images through the intermediary of montage—an image of time which can only be indirect.

The second payoff: nevertheless, and consistently, the movement-images of classical cinema present aberrations, which is why its filmmakers experiment in all sorts of ways with the possibilities of film, including laboratory possibilities. *[Pause]* And these aberrations of movement cause us to break through, or almost break through, into what would be a direct time-image.

But, as my conclusions always come in threes, notice how the first aspect tends to snuff out the second. The second is hard to discern beneath the first, unless it takes the form Schefer describes, as disquiet added to the movement, a disquiet that emerges from the movement-image. It will take a long time—it will take a very long time, it will require a huge step backwards to appreciate Dreyer’s greatness. *[Pause]* And that’s why it’s as though the relationship between aberration in movement and direct images of time were covered over by the so-called classical side of things: the movement-image/the indirect image of time. As a result, in order to make what was already there perceptible to us, it will require a more explicit revolution. *[Interruption of the recording]* [1:59:18]

Part 3

Then consider another major example, using a very different method: Epstein’s use of slow-motion in *The Fall of the House of Usher* [1928]. It’s clearly an aberration of movement. And this aberration of movement opens up a certain direct relationship with time; we enter into time. *[Pause]* But it’s as something lying perpetually underneath. If there’s such a thing as modern cinema, it’s an approach with concrete reasons for liberating this all but hidden aspect of classical cinema, for bringing it out in full, for framing it as the image’s *raison d’être* rather than as a mere side effect, or if you will, rather than as merely a disquiet added to its movement. *[Pause]* Does that make sense?

You see, then, where this is headed—what sort of revolution is this? We’ve gotten into the thick of it, then—everything so far today has been the first stage, what we could think of as “now classical” cinema. Which specifically leads to the question: what does the revolution characterizing modern cinema consist in? Recalling one of our conclusions from last time: it consists in—we know already; there’s no other choice, the way is paved for us before we even get into examples; if later on down the road we can’t find any examples, we’ll reassess—but we can already say, well, the primary upheaval consists in overturning the movement-time relationship. *[Pause]* Now the primary relationship with movement is the direct time-image.

But what do we mean by “primary”? “Primary” in what sense? As I said last time: obviously, the movement-image isn’t stamped out. The movement-image hasn’t gone anywhere, but now it’s only the first dimension of an image whose dimensions keep growing. Does that make it primary, you ask? No, because the word, “first,” now means something else. Here “first” no longer refers to “what comes first” but “the outer envelope.” The movement-image is now nothing but the container for an image whose dimensions are constantly increasing, that is, an

image whose other dimensions are deeper, more constitutive than the envelope that comes as a result.

What's going on with these other increasing, constantly increasing dimensions? Even when it comes to blank cinema, when it comes to cinema with no depth, when it's a flat image, or as Dreyer used to say, when space has been reduced to being two-dimensional, that's the best way to reach a fourth or fifth dimension, that is, increasing dimensions—could be depth in some instances, could be whatever you like. Extend its depth out infinitely, stretch its depth out infinitely or remove its depth, [whether it's] the image's depth of field or its flatness, it doesn't make much of a difference.

In the context of madness, it's something well-known by all schizophrenics; there isn't any schizophrenic who [doesn't?] vividly experience the absolute identity of infinite distance, i.e., everything stretching infinitely far away from the nearest to it, flung out over an infinite distance or a world of pure flatness. It can just as easily be described as a world of flatness as it could a world of infinite depth. That's not to say that filmmakers using infinite depth are the same ones leveraging the image's flatness. But anyway. At any rate, that doesn't mean that the movement-image disappears; the movement-image is only there as the extrinsic container for an image of growing dimension.

Just what is this image with increasing dimensions, exactly? Among other things, it is the direct time-image. And this time, we shouldn't even say that we enter into a direct relationship with time; we enter into time. We break through into time. [*Pause*] Well then, what happened? How do we define it if that's how it is, if that's what's changed? You'll agree that it's a reversal, considering what we said early about the richness of classical cinema, about its aberrations of movement—that doesn't change the fact that, for classical cinema, movement still needed to be subject to aberration in order to have an approximation of direct time, of an entry into time.

That's no longer the case. The contained element, the contained element responsible for the beauty, the strangeness of now-classical cinema, is unleashed, causes the image to burst, and we're confronted with a new type of image, one which owes a lot to the prior form of cinema. There will be other turning points, Dreyer, Bresson—there's Ozu, who had already started during the silent era, since the silent era lasted a very long time in Japan. You have all that going on, that's all on the table. There will be transitions, and so on, but there will also be, as in the case of philosophy with Kant, the irreducibility of a reversal, where modern cinema, again, reverses the relationship between time and movement.

You might be wondering, but what could explain that? How can that be explained? All I'll say, so you can think more on it, I'd offer a small example. Going back to something I think I talked about two years ago, to circle back around, assuming you aren't familiar, it all comes back to this: well, okay, what can we generalize about cinema based on the post-war period? It's generally become the case that, every country in turn, successively, not all at once—all of them run into the same crisis. A crisis of what, exactly? As if by chance, it's sensorimotor sequences, either in the form of a weakening in sensorimotor connections, or in the form of a break in sensorimotor connections.²⁹

In other words, we're no longer dealing with characters reacting to situations. It's no longer "perception - action." We're no longer dealing with a sensorimotor relationship where perception extends into action. You might think that means the spectator isn't acting. That's not what I mean; I'm talking about the character. For the character, in classical cinema—and this was at the root of this whole business with movement-images, with indirect images of time, which we just looked at—it was sensorimotor structures. And that's what constituted both description and narration, the description of the situation, organic description. Recalling the terms we picked up in the first quarter: the organic description of the situation, the truthful narration of the action, is its sensorimotor sequence—organic narration since its description refers to a supposedly independent object; truthful narration since it shows what the character does to modify their situation. And their modified situation will lead them to another action: a sensorimotor chain of situations and actions along the same plane. That was the situation.

Well, that all comes apart. It's the crisis of sensorimotricity which defines modern cinema. What does that mean? I'll tell you where it first shows up, but it's tiny; it's not hard to see when it breaks out. It broke out with Italian neorealism in both forms: as a break and as a weakening. Sometimes it's the weakening of sensorimotor sequences, sometimes it's a clean break. With Italian neorealism, then, that's all I'll say to keep it brief; these are things we've already covered. That's how I'd define neorealism; I certainly wouldn't say that it's tied to something about reality, like [André] Bazin.³⁰ It's not about some new conception of reality. It's the first form of cinema that shows us and is based on a deliberate break in sensorimotor sequences, or a deliberate weakening of sensorimotor sequences. What does it actually present us with? Characters who see and no longer know what to do, who no longer have the means to respond to their situation or to what they have seen. What they've seen can no longer be extended into the actions of adaptation or modification. They've seen something. A cinema of action is replaced by a cinema of vision.

Narboni offered a simple anecdote that I think gets to the heart of what makes this rupture important. When [Roberto] Rossellini was making *Europe 51* [1952] with this famous American actor—one of the greatest American actors there is—he shot, and shot, and shot... Rossellini gave very little direction, and the actor, [George] Sanders, as always, did an amazing job.³¹ Still, eventually Sanders comes, would come to Rossellini and say, "Alright, we've done all the middle scenes, the transitions, going in doors, coming out of doors, transitioning between locations; when do we get to the dramatic scenes?" [*Laughter*] Since there was... the thing was... there was Bergman...

Student: Ingrid.

Deleuze: ... her first name? Ingrid Bergman was there, his partner, and he was expecting actual action, something really moving with Ingrid Bergman, or what not, and Rossellini goes: "Oh my, no, there's been some misunderstanding; it's all done!" Well, but that's really the clash between American cinema, which is a really great filmmaking scene. I don't mean there was anything radically new about saying, "But where is the action in all of that?" The action, i.e., the sensorimotricity.

What do we find in Rossellini's major films from the very start? He creates characters who see. I call it a cinema of seers, what begins with neorealism is a cinema of seers. It isn't about reality; *pace* Bazin, it has nothing to do with that. It's something stranger still. It's about the breakdown of sensorimotor relationships once a character sees something, something which they're no longer in a position to react to. It's the bourgeois woman in *Europa 51*. She sees a factory. We often by factories; we come to them with ready-made sensorimotor schemas in hand. We say, "Well, people do have to work; they don't seem happy, but people do have to work," right? Ahh... The situation of the woman in *Europa 51*, which could happen to any of us, is that when she looks at the factory, she sees something. She might have passed by the factory a hundred times without seeing it. She looks at it, terrified. And she says, "No, what I saw were prisoners." She has no way to respond to that. Her sensorimotor sequence has been cut off.³²

In *Stromboli* [1950], the protagonist, an outsider, comes to this fishing village with a volcano, and she sees tuna fishing, some incredible tuna fishing. When I say movement-images haven't gone anywhere, obviously not. Here's your movement-image, damn it, it's this tuna fishing scene! It's such a wonderful shot of tuna fishing that, unfortunately, to his chagrin, Rossellini was accused of stealing it from a newsreel. He was furious because he had spent weeks on fishing. So, some great tuna fishing, but here comes this outsider. She doesn't know how to respond to something like that. She says, "My God, how awful, I can't stand it," watching the tuna bleed and so on. Imagine all this happening in an American film; it's just unthinkable in a sensorimotor film, right.³³

That's Rossellini through and through, from his earliest films. It amounts to an approach to filmmaking, a great cinematic tradition rooted in seers, what Godard will rebrand as visionary filmmaking, and even as—day I say—class activists, i.e., leftists, the Communist Party especially, even as they bristle at the rise of these new sorts of characters, denouncing them for being marginal, or for being bourgeois, or for being passive—bourgeois in Rossellini, marginal in Godard—as an approach to cinema, it establishes [*Pause*] a new political reality, a new political form of cinema. Obviously, you can't find anything political in the work of [Yves] Boisset or, or... I forgot his name... You find it here—but in what way is such cinema political? Insofar as it's a sort of denunciation through vision, a social critique through sight: "I've seen the unbearable." I might have gone twenty years without seeing it, and then one day, I see the unbearable. You might ask what difference that makes, seeing the unbearable. But perhaps seeing is as important as acting.³⁴

Once again, I think I've already said this, but English Romantics... this idea forms the entire basis for English Romanticism: a substitute for revolution—since they were responding to the failure of revolution, i.e., Cromwell. Talking about the failure of revolution isn't something outdated, you know? The main thrust of the English Romantics—you'd think they were modern-day—revolution is not possible; there's always a Cromwell. The English revolution failed. All one can do is to reframe vision as a weapon, as a way of decrying the unbearable. That's Blake, that's William Blake in a nutshell. Denounce the unbearable, denounce what he calls "the empire of misery." The work of a seer. To see. People have forgotten how to see. It's a running theme in English Romanticism. People have gotten used to it; yeah, they walk right past misery.³⁵

Appreciate how, hundreds of years later, what do we get from Rossellini—in *Germany Year Zero* [1948], for example? He gives us a child who knows how to “see,” one who will die from what they see. And for Rossellini, that’s what, up until the final chapter of his work—where different problems are at stake—far from being a passive form of cinema, his is an intensely potent approach to cinema, politically... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:17:50]

... it’s a hard break. Understand, it’s the break in sensorimotor relationships; this break is what affords us a direct time-image. I won’t yet get into why; all I’m asking is that we try to grasp this fracture even when it’s imperceptible. Why do we always hear that the first Neorealist film is *Ossessione* [1943]—*Ossessione* [*Deleuze sings the title*], right? *Ossessione*—which is a Visconti film preceding Rossellini, one of the adaptations of *The Postman Always Rings Twice*, an American *noir* novel [by James M. Cain], an excellent novel, right, belonging to American cinema, that seems made for... What does he add? For this film, obviously, it’s transposed into the Po Valley; that’s no big deal, not that impressive, right? How did this kind of filmmaking—perhaps we didn’t notice it at the time—what about it made us later think, *What is it...? There’s something odd about this sort of filmmaking, something peculiar is afoot*.

I’ll tell you; I’ll tell you what it was because I’m confident I have it figured out. Visconti was very unsure about what he was going to do with his first film—well, his first feature film, I guess. He was toying with something, but what did he have in mind? He couldn’t express it; he couldn’t say, “I’m going to break down sensorimotor relationships,” especially since it seems very sensorimotor. A guy comes along, he sees a woman, he falls madly for this woman. *Affection* – its perception-image, the *affection-image* – and then they conspire to kill her husband, *action-image*, and so on—that all sounds quite run of the mill; it sounds pretty sensorimotor.

But to his credit, what Visconti does is a stroke of genius, and again, it’s like a philosophical idea. You’d have a great idea on your hands if you did the equivalent in philosophy. Visconti found a trick. He asked himself, “What’s going on? What’s wrong with American cinema?”—I’m speculating; imagine he says this—“What’s wrong?” He says, “It goes too smoothly. When I walk into a coffee shop, we shouldn’t make too much of it, you’ve already walked into a coffee shop, you walk into a coffee shop, you don’t know what to do—not right away.” You know, it’s worth pointing out. You don’t immediately know what to do. When the light turns green—you’ll see, when we go... [*Laughs*]—you don’t know what to do right away unless you’re totally accustomed to it, at which point, you’re definitely ready for American films.

But if you don’t immediately know what to do, what are you missing? You walk into a coffee shop; a coffee shop has its habits and routines. If you know, you know—if you’re a customer, they say, “Ah, good morning, Mr. Pierre, how are you today?” Purely sensorimotor. The cowboy walking into the saloon: purely sensorimotor. He glances around; he acts, glancing around, sees the people, guns, and so on—sensorimotor, perfect. It can lead to some incredible images. I’m not making light of it.

So, what does Visconti do? He does something that, as far as I know, I think had never been done before: he portrays what we [actually] do. In an unfamiliar coffee shop, we get a lay of the land, by sight or by smell; we assess, our perception gives us a brief pause, something like “What

have I gotten into?” And then, uncertain, we go and look for the best spot. Right. Either that or it isn’t a big deal; I think that’s what’s brilliant about *Ossessione* or *The Obsession*, that’s its genius. The guy arrives after a long journey. He’s standing in front of the coffee shop, in front of the inn, he goes into the room. Right away, you can tell he doesn’t enter in an American way. It’s a new way of walking in, the first herald of neorealism. He enters, stops for a moment, and tries to familiarize himself, to get his bearings. What do we have here? What’s the deal? He’s looking at the coffee shop; at this point, it’s full of people. His perception is sort of removed from any reaction. What he can do is take stock of any perceptible data. What’s primary is this vacillation, this weakening, this slack, the loosening of his sensorimotor ties.

Then, if you consider another film from Visconti’s early career, *Rocco [And His Brothers]* [1960], it’s brilliant how this provincial family gets off the train at the main station—in Milan? I think it’s Milan, the main train station in Milan. This on its own is Visconti at his best, the way we see the whole family, this whole family of peasants who, literally, are trying to appropriate this utterly new world. Not to appropriate it in the sense of taking it for themselves, but in the sense of assimilating anything they can perceive. And you have one of the brothers with his eyes darting all over the place, another with his mouth gaping open like this—but you can tell his mouth is taking in all sorts of perceptible data—and we see them walking through the station, and they take a bus, and the way the entire family is there is just so great. What’s new about this? That’s never been filmed in this way. What’s never been filmed this way? Perception cut off from its sensorimotor extension. If Visconti is the first Neorealist, it’s because he was the first to capture the moments we have like these.

When we focus specifically, considering the time, what was in the air at the time... [Pause] well, it was, it was an absolute break. Yes?

A student: [*Indistinct comments about Visconti’s film, The Earth Will Tremble*]

Deleuze: In the same way. *The Earth Will Tremble* [1948] is from Visconti’s communist phase. The wonder in—here too, you could argue that there’s movement, it moves, there’s action; there’s the fisherman’s whole effort to form a union, and so on. What’s my point? The point is that Visconti’s communism—there’s no reason to suspect that his commitment to communism wasn’t utterly sincere, but what sort of communism? Visconti never—not during his communist phase, I believe—never had in mind a sensorimotor communism. What I’m calling “sensorimotor communism” is the official communism of every communist party, which amounts to saying: man [*sic*] is in a struggle against nature, and it is in man’s struggling with nature that he comes to struggle with his fellow man, and that inevitably the proletariat will triumph in order to restore man’s unity with nature. That’s what I’m calling “sensorimotor communism,” alright?

Clearly, that’s not what Visconti is doing in *The Earth Trembles*. What is it, then? It’s the perceptible [*sensible*] and sensual union between humanity and nature. There is a perceptible and sensual unity between nature and humanity, [Pause] and that’s exactly what the whole backdrop—I don’t just mean the setting—the whole backdrop of *The Earth Trembles*; there may be nature, it might be beautiful, it might be wonderful, it might be... From this perceptible and sensual unity, this purely perceptible union between nature and humanity, the rich are excluded.

Visconti's thought will later evolve; he'll go on to make even better claims, that the rich are excluded from creation, not just because they are profiteers, but at a deeper level, because they are artists. Then he's not even talking about the same rich people. But in *The Earth Trembles*, when it comes to his communist point of view, the rich are profiteers, as opposed to later on; it isn't that way in *The Leopard* [1963]. The nobility certainly aren't profiteers; something else is going on.

But sticking with *The Earth Trembles*, the perceptible and sensual unity of nature includes the fisherman, the peasant, and the worker—a Marxist trinity—but it includes them in a perceptible and sensual unity. A unity with nature, and not at all a struggle against nature. The rich are excluded. Because the rich are profiteers, exploiters, rich. Certainly, we can make attempts at action. There will be attempts to act against the rich. First and foremost, Visconti's communism is a visionary communism. I'm certainly not saying that it's utopian, because in my opinion, this approach to vision, highlighting the unbearable, denouncing the unbearable, etc., is extremely profound and very, very practical. But, if you will, the dialectical humanity-nature opposition isn't at all what leads to revolution; the only chance for future revolution is secured by the perceptible unity between humanity and nature.

It's no coincidence that he doesn't film his planned installments, which would have featured active guys. It casts this first installment as a big failure, because if anything he's not suggesting that revolution will fail. What he's trying to tell us is that, for him, at that point in time—it's a romantic or aristocratic communism, a sort of romantic communism—at that point in time, the only possibility for revolution didn't reside with action, as advocated by communist parties. It resides in a vision of humanity and nature, hence why he begins with fishermen and peasants, and that's our only hope, the only possible revolutionary hotbed, which can only be realized through history, Visconti's understanding of history, which will play out in all his later films. It seems to me that this break with the sensorimotor is really salient in *The Earth Trembles*. It is a visionary communism rather than a pragmatic communism. It's something to consider; you might disagree, especially since there's so much nuance.³⁶

All I want to say, then, to wrap things up is—consider where we are: this would be the first aspect of this revolution, but we still don't see why it leads to the time-image. Why would that take us into an image? I have the following guidelines, at least: sensorimotor situation – indirect image of time [*Pause*]; situation cut off from its sensorimotor extension – direct time-image. These two levels line up perfectly with the two forms of Bergsonian recognition: sensorimotor recognition, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the sort of recognition Bergson calls “attentive,” where rather than moving from one object to another, you leave the object and come back to it, retaining only a description. A “sight-sound/direct time-image” description, rather than a “sensorimotor sequence/indirect image of time” one. Does that make sense? Next time we'll be in our dream home! Some won't be able to find it... Well, I don't know where... Well...

Eric – oh, thanks. Thank you, so... [*End of the session*] [2:32:24]

Notes

¹ *Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).

² Issue 286, March 1978.

³ In *For A New Novel*, Robbe-Grillet writes: “the cinema only knows one grammatical mode: the present tense of the indicative.” “Time and Description,” translated by Richard Howard (New York: Grove, 1965), p. 151.

⁴ Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Osservazioni sul piano-sequenza,” in *Empirismo Eretico*, (Garzanti, 1972), pp. 237-241.

⁵ For more on Pasolini in this regard, see Deleuze’s *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone, 1989), pp. 28-30.

⁶ From Pasolini: “It’s therefore absolutely necessary to die *because, so long as we still live, we lack the meaning*, and the language of our lives (with which we express ourselves and which we hold as of the highest importance) is untranslatable.” [*È dunque assolutamente necessario morire, perché, finché siamo vivi, manchiamo di senso, e il linguaggio della nostra vita (con cui ci esprimiamo, e a cui dunque attribuiamo la massima importanza) è intraducibile.*] “Osservazioni sul piano-sequenza,” in *Empirismo Eretico*, (Garzanti, 1972), p. 241

⁷ For more on Pasolini along these lines, see *The Time-Image*, p. 35.

⁸ Pasolini claims that once montage intervenes, “the present becomes past,” and this past, “for reasons immanent to filmmaking as a medium, and not for aesthetic reasons, is always in the present tense (*thus, a historical present*).” [... *un passato che, per ragioni immanenti al mezzo cinematografico, e non per scelta estetica, ha sempre i modi del presente (è cioè un presente storico)*] Pasolini, p. 240.

⁹ See sessions 6 and 7 of Cinema seminar I (January 12 and 19, 1982) and session 7 of Cinema seminar II (January 11, 1983). See also Deleuze’s *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone, 1986), pp. 71-76. On “theorem,” see *The Time-Image*, pp. 273-276.

¹⁰ For more in this regard, see session 3 of the Cinema seminar I (November 24, 1981), as well as all of Chapter 3 from *The Movement-Image*.

¹¹ Deleuze refers to Plotinus in session 11 of the Painting Seminar (May 26, 1981), sessions 13 and 15 of the Cinema seminar II (March 8 and 22, 1983), and sessions 12 and 13 of the current seminar on Cinema III (February 28 and March 13, 1984).

¹² See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 53-54.

¹³ Jean Louis Schefer, *L’Homme ordinaire du cinéma* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980). In English as *The Ordinary Man of Cinema*, translated by Max Cavitch, Paul Grant, and Noura Wedell (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016).

¹⁴ Schefer, p. 115. Deleuze modified to match translation.

¹⁵ Deleuze’s quote has been somewhat adapted to match the language of Schefer, p. 121. However, his exact wording does not seem to appear in the text.

¹⁶ Schefer, p. 148

¹⁷ For more on Schefer, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 36-37, 168-169, and 201.

¹⁸ Schefer, p. 97

¹⁹ Deleuze is likely paraphrasing several lines from Schefer, p. 112. Some of his wording has been adjusted to help the reader follow Deleuze through Schefer’s work.

²⁰ Schefer, p. 112. In the Schefer translation, “diver” [*ludion*] refers to a Cartesian diver.

²¹ Franz Kafka, *Diaries, 1910-23*, trans. Joseph Kresh, Martin Greenberg, and Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1976), p. 18. Cited in Schefer, p. 107.

²² Schefer, p. 97

²³ Schefer, p. 37

²⁴ Schefer, p. 106

²⁵ This basic sentiment runs throughout Schefer’s text, but Deleuze’s quote does not seem to appear there *verbatim*.

²⁶ On Schefer’s themes, see *The Time-Image*, p. 37.

²⁷ A *faux-raccord*, in English, is sometimes translated as “jump cut,” but this buries the “false” [*faux*] so pertinent to Deleuze’s aims. In other Deleuze translations, the reader may find it put as “false continuity,” which is apt, given Dreyer’s engagement with the American-forward style of continuity editing. A “mismatch cut” communicates that a *faux-raccord* is a deliberately “off” instance of the “match cuts” that are the bread-and-butter of continuity editing.

²⁸ Referring to Dreyer’s film, *Gertrud* (164). See *The Time-Image*, p. 41. For his reference to Narboni, see p. 288 note 22.

²⁹ See sessions 18 and 19 of the Cinema seminar I (May 11 and 18, 1982); see also *The Time-Image*, pp. 272-273.

³⁰ Deleuze begins *Cinema 2* with this disagreement with Bazin; for his reference to Bazin, *Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?* (Paris: Cerf, 1958-1962), see p. 1.

³¹ Deleuze appears to be referring to *Journey to Italy* [1954] rather than *Europa 51*, with Sanders and Ingrid Bergman.

³² Deleuze discusses *Europe 51* throughout *The Time-Image*; see pp. 2, 21, 45, and 171.

³³ On Rossellini's filmmaking, especially *Europe 51* and *Stromboli*, see session 18 of the Cinema seminar I (May 11, 1982) and session 23 of the Cinema seminar II (June 7, 1983); see also *The Time-Image*, pp. 2, 19-20, 45-47, 171-172, and 247-252.

³⁴ On "the unbearable," see *The Time-Image*, pp. 18-21.

³⁵ On Cromwell and the English revolution, see also session 4 of the Spinoza seminar (December 16, 1980), session 26 of the Foucault seminar (June 3, 1986), and "G as in 'Gauche' (Left)" from *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*.

³⁶ On Visconti, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 4-5, 97.