Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

We didn't forget—now we're to the philosophy part of the course. After having spent some time looking at cinema, we're back to philosophy. I was nuts, I must have been out of my gourd last time, when I said we were going to clear… —So, yeah, side note: we have a break coming up, or rather, we're going to be between terms from the 13th to the 27th, then we meet again on the 28th, I think. But I'm sure we'll still be in each other's hearts. [*Laughter*]

What I'd like for you to keep in mind, then, is that our project is the same on both tracks. Thus, what I'm looking for—on a completely different timeline and, as we'll see, perhaps using different concepts—is ultimately something that develops both in philosophy as well as in cinema, a development in thought. And it always revolves (this time in philosophy) around the relationship between movement and time: under what circumstances is time subordinated to movement? In what circumstances is time freed from movement? And what happens when time is freed from movement?

With that, you can tell we're in familiar territory. At the same time, I wonder—and this is why I said it was crazy for me to talk like we were going to get through it all in one day, because we're going to take a longer look at philosophy, since what I want to show you is how this whole series of events is, at the same time, rather straightforward, easy to follow, but also rather nuanced. That is, we have to be wary of ready-made propositions like, I don't know, "the eternal return is an ancient way of thinking"—because that's not true—or that, on the flip side, "historical time is a modern way of thinking"—because that's not true. So, then, we then have to take all these things into account.

In the end, what background problem am I trying to… [*Pause*] It's no accident that, since the start of the year, I've been trying to reflect on the idea, "Everything is ordinary." Certainly not because I think that phrase is the final word on the matter. On the contrary, I believe that "Everything is ordinary," such as I was trying to pin down in a certain approach to cinema, which we'll also find in philosophy—everything is ordinary, everything is banal—I think the idea itself isn't as important as what it leads to, and that insofar as it leads us to do or understand something, it transforms. Then why is this motto not the last word on the matter? I think what it

is, is the axis things revolve around. In other words, what is time? I'd say that time is everyday banality. It's everyday banality.

However, this day-to-day banality runs the gamut. We don't experience it the same way, and so it's complicated. [*Pause*] What I'm saying is, there's day-to-day banality. [*Pause*] I think of everyday banality, "everydayness," as an axis. I might say: time is quotidian. Which isn't a definition; it's another way of saying that time, right, is quotidian, it's the most everyday thing there is; it's at the heart of what constitutes everydayness, see. But as an axis, everydayness might be thought of as [*Pause*] precisely the milieu from which I rise above the day-to-day. [*Pause*] You can't say what philosophy is without relating it to everyday life and the certainties of everyday life.

We can only answer the question, "Why philosophy?" if we can demonstrate why everyday thinking isn't enough. Since everyday life isn't just a form of activity—commute-work-sleep. Everyday life is a way of thinking, which includes a particular sort of thought known as "opinion." Opinion is quite substantial, and thinking in terms of opinion can be all too easy. Philosophy is justified replacing opinion with its own concepts [*Pause*] only if we can determine what philosophy has to do with everyday life, both negatively and positively. [*Pause*]

Now, I argue that, in a way, we can imagine this relationship in the form: everyday life is a milieu I lift up out of—toward what? Toward what we'll call discovering or meditating on the eternal, on something which isn't everyday. [*Pause*] And the relationship between meditating on the eternal and everyday life is such that everyday life isn't just any sort of everyday life. Everyday life is opposed to meditating on the eternal; they're distinct but meditating on the eternal implies a relationship with that from which it's distinguished.

I could just as well say [*Pause*] belief in the Sabbath—"And on Sunday, God rested"—what does it mean to say that "God rested on Sunday"? [*Pause*] It doesn't mean he just stops because, as St. Augustine himself asks, "How could God stop?" We stop, we suspend the course of our day-to-day life, our everydayness, so that we can manage to meditate on something that isn't everyday, to meditate on the eternal. Good. [*Pause*]

What's going on? What do we make of everyday life stopping on Sunday, i.e., allowing for meditation on the eternal, [*Pause*] and referring to such meditation as something other than itself? See, that's ultimately what I'm interested in. What's going on? Perhaps such life, seemingly without changing anything, could just as easily be set up differently, in a "never Sunday" mode, where Sunday is always tomorrow. [*Pause*] What does everyday life do, then? See, I'd argue that everydayness is no longer cyclical, that there are no more Sundays. Everyday life takes the form of an infinite straight line. Obviously, there might still be Sundays, pseudo-Sundays, on this straight line, but everydayness, right, is no longer connected to meditating on the eternal, to Sunday meditation, meditation which would simultaneously be both part of it and separate from it, twisting back like a circle looping back in on itself. Everydayness has been stretched out.

Could I say, then, putting everything together, since we'll have to account for everything, that now it's a sort of urban everydayness? [*Pause*] Right. And the axis has changed; everydayness

has become that of a uniform, homogeneous time, [*Pause*] a single-file everydayness. [*Pause*] And now everydayness is no longer connected to meditation on the eternal. Again, there are no more Sundays. What do we have? See, now everydayness is linked to something quite… [*Interruption of the recording*] [12:52]

… and to meditating on the eternal, to Sunday. [*Pause*] Philosophy, on the other hand, will connect everydayness to the production of something new—not meditating on something eternal, but producing something new. [*Pause*]

And the problem of time takes on a completely different character. Turning to a passage from Heidegger, one I find rather strange, rather interesting. In *Being and Time*, he writes, "In a preliminary way, its analysis"—never mind that—"the focus of the analysis was not the possibility of the existence of a determined, characterized existent"—or, if you want, we could bracket the Heideggerian language and say, our analysis isn't about a defined, determinate existential possibility—"but is directed toward its dull and average way of existing"—but was directed toward the dull and average way of existing—"We called the manner of being in which the existent is immediately caught up 'everydayness'—we called the way of being which the existent most often engages in its "everydayness."[1]—And of course, we find out that, for Heidegger, everydayness is at the same time an allegedly "inauthentic" mode of existence. Even so, we don't buy it; we know that's too simple. Just like in Bergson, there's a distinction between authentic and inauthentic, only for Bergson it's between a so-called superficial "ego" and a more profound "ego." But the distinction isn't an opposition at all. It's insofar as everyday banality runs its course that the production of something new becomes possible.

Driving the point home further—because I'd like us to end up elucidating these concepts—I'd say it's the same difference as that between transcendence and transcendent, why it's necessary to distinguish between transcendence and transcendent. In rough and ready terms, what is transcendent? It describes a thing, it's a way of describing a thing that implies that it is "beyond," "elsewhere," "above," [*Pause*] "above time," [*Pause*] "above movement," "above myself." [*Pause*] And in this sense, using the word "form," I can say that the transcendent, something transcendent, is an eternal, immobile form. [*Pause*]

Famously, what was a crucial turning point in the history of philosophy? When "transcendent" no longer described—or "transcendence" no longer described the state of a thing and instead described the activity of a subject. [*Pause*] How would "transcendent" or "transcendence" describe the act of a subject? It applies to the activity of a subject insofar as the latter is exceeded by or exceeds what it is given. [*Pause*] At which point, we'll say that it transcends the given, i.e., that it goes beyond it. What does it mean to go beyond the given? [*Pause*] Going beyond the given is, by definition, belief. What does it mean to "believe"? [*Pause*] What is… Believing is different from knowing, and it's also different from having faith. To believe means to infer; it means positing something that is not given based on something that is given. [*Pause*]

I say, "The sun will rise tomorrow." I say, "Julius Caesar existed." These are beliefs. [*Pause*] Indeed, right, "Julius Caesar existed"—what do I "know"? I learned it from books. [*Pause*] That is, I infer from certain signs, the existence of certain signs given to me, the existence of Julius Caesar, which is not given to me. "The sun will rise tomorrow." Yes, I've always seen it rise. I

infer from what's given to me—it rose this morning, it rose yesterday, etc.—I infer: it will rise tomorrow. But by definition, tomorrow is not given. Tomorrow only appears to me when it becomes today. I go beyond what I'm given. Right. In my most day-to-day activity, I exceed what I'm given. Isn't that the time of everyday banality? [*Pause*]

Here, instead of transcendence describing the state of particular things—substances—of certain higher, essential things, etc., we have transcendence as the act of going beyond, the act of a subject going beyond, [*Pause*] and this going beyond produces something new. [*Pause*] See, everything proceeds as though my axis were this everyday banality, the axis of my everyday life, and along that axis… "I rise toward the transcendent, at least on Sundays, through knowledge or faith"—that's why knowledge, faith, and the relationship between the two will be so important for philosophy, throughout all of the Middle Ages, throughout all of the Renaissance, throughout the entire 17th century.

And then, coming back to the axis of my everyday life, its everydayness now takes on a completely different meaning: the temporality of everyday life is characterized by the act of transcending, that is, it's directed toward something completely different, the production of something new, in the mode of belief and not knowledge or faith, which it had discovered by meditating on the eternal. What's going on? Everydayness figures into both cases. What happens in either case? That's what concerns me. Depending on the status of everydayness, you get, you get different understandings of philosophy. At the end of the day, we ought to entertain questions like: "What is rural everydayness? What is urban everydayness?" With the transformation of everyday life, don't we have to consider the development of cities? Aren't there a lot of things we have to take into account? But, I mean, at the heart of the problem with the time-movement relationship, we get to something that philosophy has always struggled with—the status of everydayness and philosophy's relationship with the everyday.

Assuming that's the case, then back to what I was saying. I'm saying we ought to look more closely at this point in time where, at first glance, it seems that time is subordinated to movement, or that it derives from movement, exactly like what we saw with cinema. And that this time, in fact, it takes a philosophical montage to derive time from movement. So, that's what I set out to do last time, and then I thought, no, no, I'm getting ahead of myself.

Because if we want to say that the Greeks, for example, viewed time as subordinate to movement and movement as subordinate to eternity, we'd first need to understand how the two are linked, but that isn't at all obvious. Last time, I had already touched on the eternal return, but the eternal return is so strange that it often comes across as myth, and it's anything but myth. I think that for the Greeks… Again, we're bracketing Nietzsche, because what Nietzsche wickedly manages to do is absolutely reinterpret the eternal return in a way wholly bound up with modern philosophy, which even contributes to the foundation of modern philosophy—there's a kind of stunning playfulness in Nietzsche's take on it, what he does with a concept already so laden with meaning, with ancient and respected interpretations. Remember, how every time he brings up the eternal return, he calls it a secret, right. How Zarathustra isn't mature enough to discover it. How Zarathustra's animals say, "Yes, everything returns, everything returns, everything returns," and Zarathustra says, "Shut up! You're already making a mockery of it." Zarathustra couldn't be any clearer: "No, my eternal return does not mean that everything returns." Zarathustra's animals are

the ones who portray it that way, and each time, twice, Zarathustra tells them, "Back in your kennel! That's not it." To his eagle and snake. "You've already made it into a song." In other words, you've already turned it into a refrain [*ritournelle*]. You've made it into a little song, a refrain, a circularity. So, we're bracketing all that.

For the Greeks, the eternal return took two basic forms. It had an astronomical form, which we've discussed: how the seven planets come back to the same arrangement in relation to the sphere of fixed stars. Then there's a version which isn't astronomical but which we might think of as physicalist. This time, it's the transformation of qualitative elements: air, earth, water, fire. First of all, we have to keep them straight because it gets complicated—I mean, for anyone who would like to look a bit further into this stuff—it gets complicated, because they don't necessarily go together. Sometimes they complement each other, sometimes they butt heads. For some pre-astronomical thinkers, what they have in mind isn't an astronomical eternal return. On the contrary, they're working with a physical, physicalist eternal return. Others strike a sort of balance, leaning one way or the other, and so on. Anyway, it's complicated. It's complicated. But it's either physics or it's astronomy—it certainly isn't myth.

That's why when someone like [Mircea] Eliade portrays the eternal return as an old myth, I mean, it's not even a question, "Is it a myth or not?"[2] As we'll see, it's obviously not a myth. What's more, it can't be myth. Understand, in the case of the cosmological… uh, astronomical eternal return, it's based on—how should I put this?—an astronomy that accounts for local position; it's an astronomy of local positions, the local positions of the different planets, [*Pause*] that is, it's an eternal return rooted in local motion. [*Pause*]

The physicalist eternal return is one based, not on local motion, but on qualitative change, on how qualities transform into each other and form a cycle. So, you can already tell why it gets complicated, because suppose that—and once again we find ourselves dealing with problems where, if you will, you cannot say that some are right or some are wrong—suppose you were to think of astronomical bodies, planets, as eternal bodies. Thus, they'd be exempt from any qualitative change. Thus, they're what determine the qualitative changes in mortal bodies. At which point, we'd say that the astronomical eternal return takes priority over the physicalist eternal return. However, say we think of planetary bodies as bodies like any other, as describable and described bodies. [*Pause*] In that case, the local motion of the planets is clearly subordinate to the play of qualitative transformations or physical changes. In which case, it's the physicalist eternal return that has priority over the astronomical return.

It's complicated, but no matter how you look at it, we're no longer dealing with myth. Why not? Here I think we're getting to something essential for the subject at hand. This is from [Pierre] Vidal-Nacquet, an excellent historian of Greek antiquity—it's already an old essay at this point, but Vidal-Nacquet writes, all the same, we shouldn't put too much stock in all these claims about cyclical time; you won't find any cyclical time in any of the great myths of Ancient Greece. You find the opposite, even. [*Pause*] And he refers a lot—he refers to Hesiod a lot. You could always look for cyclical time in Homer. You could always say that Homer doesn't say all that much about time, right. Homer was the 9th century B.C. Here, you need a little bit of a sense for… But there's another major Greek poet, Hesiod, 8th century A.D [*B.C.*], who was very interested in time. He's interested in it in two ways. We'll see why it tormented him. We have two of his

surviving poems; it's rare to have that much.— [*Pause*] Well, things are off to a good start: I forgot my first passage. Like I was saying, *The Odyssey…* [*Pause*] not *Works and Days*, it's the other one, [*Pause*] uh, this is embarrassing, I'm drawing a blank; doesn't anybody remember… [*Deleuze looks for his text; someone calls out the title*] Ah! *The Theogony!* Thank you. *The Theogony*. –

Now, what is *The Theogony*? It's a genealogy of the gods, a linear genealogy, the sort that goes: and so-and-so begat so-and-so, who begat so-and-so, who begat so-and-so—which comes awfully close, all things considered, to certain passages in the Old Testament: a huge linear genealogy. Why do we not get even a hint of circularity in *The Theogony*? [*Pause*] What *do* we find? The time it describes is extraordinarily eventful. It's a time of clashing generations, each overthrowing the next. It's a wild time. A wild time, I mean, an unchained, untamed time.

Now, ultimately what I have here is an idea beautifully worked out by [Jean-Pierre] Vernant in *The Origins of Greek Thought*—this is what the time of myth is.[3] I'd more or less say that the sort of time that belongs to myth is a wild, untamed time, [*Pause*] i.e., time as an abyss, where successive generations emerge, where they battle—a terrible time, a time of terror, a fathomless time, fathomless terror and fathomless struggle between gods. [*Pause*]

And why, what does this have to do myth? This is what strikes me as so important and profoundly apt about Vernant's thesis. Why isn't there specifically a time… It's the same thing. You'll notice how, in a way, circular time has always, I claim, meant putting time in a circle. It needs to be put into a circle; it isn't a circle on its own, it isn't a circle on its own. To put time into a circle is to tame it, to make it obedient. Obedient to what? Well, to some very deep-seated needs, no doubt, but it has to be done! What myth gives us is an embroiled, untamed time. But why? We don't have an answer as to why myth foments an untamed time, a wild sort of time, with wild seeds, wild seeds yielding abominable gods. That's what myth is! [*Pause*] Really, it's this bottomless sort of time.

I find Vernant's response quite rigorous. He says that myth always has two extremes. It ranges between origin stories and establishing order. [*Pause*] It goes from origin to sovereignty. In that sense, you might say that all myths are myths of sovereignty. The mythical model is necessarily monarchical. I'm just paraphrasing Vernant's argument—it goes from the beginning, or from the bottom, to sovereignty, to domination, and the question it addresses is: "If things begin with chaos, when and how could any order have been established?" [*Pause*] Thus, a myth bridges the gap between the origin of things and sovereignty, that is, the establishment of order. Once there's no longer any distance between the origin of things, between the absolute origin and established sovereignty, once this gap between them is gone, there's no more myth. [*Pause*]

And what do we learn from Hesiod's *Theogony*? That everything begins in chaos, [*Pause*] and then how a subsequent genealogy is set into motion when chaos combines with something else. This something else, is it also chaos, you ask? Yes, it… Well, it isn't order, at any rate; it certainly isn't order. [*Pause*] And then, right, each different generation—along comes the terrible Cronos, the dreadful Cronos, born from the union of earth and sky. It's a whole mess, from beginning to end. For one thing, Cronos [*Pause*] emasculates, castrates his father, devours his

children. Well, that's not great, is it? And one child is saved by the earth: Zeus. [*Pause*] Then Zeus deals with his own father, Cronos, and then Zeus is the one who's sovereign.

But what about Cronos? Well, Cronos might be misleading, which is to say we have to be careful: he isn't "time." Hesiod's Cronos is written without an "H," which matters because Chronos, time, is written with an "H," *"C-H-R-O-N-O-S,"* while Hesiod's Cronos is "*C-R-O-N-O-S*." Cronos without the H isn't time. Sure, there could always be some cross-pollination between Chronos and Cronos, but strictly speaking, Hesiod's No-H-Cronos doesn't represent Time-Chronos but has a completely different etymology, is derived from a completely different root—it comes from *craino,* where we get *cras, crastos*, etc.[4] Which refers to the act of accomplishing, the accomplisher. Cronos is the accomplisher. What does he accomplish? What does he accomplish? Which is why we don't need to interpret it the other way [as "time"].

[*Someone from administration brings him some files*] … You have them? Ohhh [*Pause*]. That's awfully nice, but… you gave them to me. I've gotten them.

Admin Representative: Then they have to be turned in by March 19th at the latest.

Deleuze: March 19th?

Admin: At the latest.

Deleuze: So, that's the last week, then! Perfect, thank you… Goodbye. [*Pause*]

We don't need to interpret it the other way—it's actually better if we don't. It's even better if we don't take it that way. For in what way is "No H" Cronos the accomplisher? He's the accomplisher because he bridges the divide. He fills in the gap between the origin of things [*Pause*] and the establishment of sovereignty. Who establishes sovereignty? Zeus! [*Pause*] Zeus will become the leader of the gods and lay down the order of the world. He is the sovereign. Between the origin of things and the order of the sovereign, there is the Chronos of Cronos, i.e., the time of Cronos, the time accomplished by Cronos, meaning that Cronos is not time but the one who accomplishes time, and time is the gap between the origin of things and sovereignty—this gap being a wild time, untamed time, the messy time before Zeus straightens everything out. [*Pause*]

And that would be what myth is, and so Vernant can move on and ask, when does philosophy really come onto the scene? Philosophy comes about when, for a variety of reasons, the mythical model collapses. And when does the mythical model collapse? Well, [*Pause*] when the two terms held apart in myth, i.e., the origin of things and the foundation of sovereignty, come as close as they can to overlapping. [*Pause*] At the very same time, the world is both formed and set in order. [*Pause*] The who formed the world is simultaneously the one who puts it in order. Mythical gods, the accomplisher and the sovereign, are succeeded or replaced by the demiurge, the one who both makes and orders the world. [*Pause*] It happens at the same time; it's the reconciling—bordering on identification—between order and genesis, between the radical origin of things and the organization of sovereignty which things are subject to. This identification is what defines philosophy.

Well, it's a really intriguing idea since that's indeed how I believe it goes down, how it happened. But what does that imply? Well, it implies that the paired mythical terms—the pair being origin-power, origin-domination, origin-sovereignty, with a temporal gap between them, a gap filled by all the horrors of myth—are replaced by a totally new pair of terms, [*Pause*] that is, the world is simultaneously both created and shaped, ordered, according to a "model." [*Pause*] The world is made and shaped based on an eternal model. In other words, the gap between origin and sovereignty is replaced by a complementarity, a dyad between copy and eternal model. The demiurge is the one who contemplates the eternal model, and, at the same time, both makes and orders the world according to the model's requirements. There is no more myth; there is philosophy. Hence this is where we should put everything we talked about before, on the concept of truth inasmuch as it involves this model-copy relationship. Model-copy ends up replacing origin-sovereignty.

Now, this new philosophical relationship—model-copy—notice that it implies two things. What are copies? Obviously, copies are images; they're images. [*Pause*] And what could I say about images, about the world-as-image? The world is created according to a model. The world is an image. We could say that, as such, this image is both movement and change. [*Pause*] The demiurge forms the image and, at the same time, orders it based on its model. What is the image? The image is movement-change. Movement—that is, the image has two aspects: both movement as such and local motion. Movement is essentially the passage from one position to another. [*Pause*] As change, it is qualitative, the passage from one quality to another. You get both themes: qualitative change and local motion. [*Pause*] The image is mobile and changing. Local movement and qualitative change are the image's defining characteristics.

From there, what is the demiurge's job? Insofar as he "makes," he makes the image and puts it in order; those are two operations: he makes the image, and he puts it in order. But where do these eternal forms, these models, come from, you ask? They are eternal. They're eternal; they've always been there. Are there more than one? You can hear in that every problem of Greek metaphysics. No, in a certain light, they are "one." But to what extent does this "one" already imply more than one? At any rate, I might say that the model is the form of forms; it's the form that contains all forms as "one." That's already incredibly complicated, but all that to one side—that's not the subject at hand, what we're worried about right now. Perhaps we'll come back to it in some aspect of our overall problem, but we'll leave it alone for now.

As I was saying, the demiurge creates a moving, changing image and organizes it, closing the gap between them. The demiurge has snuffed out myth.[5] Which isn't to say that the two operations are no longer distinct. There's a wonderful text—it's beautifully written, and ought to be read as a poem rather than a myth—it's pretty difficult, but that's neither here nor there. You're all welcome to read it if you like, even if you don't have a background in philosophy, and treat it like one element. It's Plato's *Timaeus*. The beginning of Plato's *Timaeus* is difficult for many reasons, but nothing a careful reading can't handle, even if you aren't philosophically savvy. Because if you take it line by line, something funny starts to unfold. It can feel like you don't understand anything at the beginning because it's such a…. it's so… At first blush, it's just too difficult, or you'd need to be a specialist… [*Interruption of the recording*] [58:47]

Part 2

…where Plato tells us that the demiurge creates material for the world. [*Pause*] He builds the world's material. He creates [*Pause*] this material—it's interesting [*Pause*]—by combining substances. [*Pause*] It gets complicated. Combining substances. Let's call one of these substances, "*A,*" [*Pause – Deleuze gets up and goes to the board; he's looking for some chalk*] the substance of the Same, the substance of the Same, there is a substance of the Same, right. And then he combines that with another substance, the substance of the Other, right—we'll call that "*B*." But what is this Other, this substance of the Other? Well, it's the Other than the One; it's different from the Same. It's the not-Same. That sounds strange, you think. He goes on: however, the substance of the Other, precisely because it's the substance of the not-Same, slips away; it avoids getting mixed together. And so, the demiurge combines A and B by force, but B slips through. Then he re-combines them with C—what is C? It is A + B. A third substance, then, the substance of the Same and the Other, a compound substance. He re-combines them—if we read the text literally, I don't see how else to interpret it—what the demiurge does is: A + B + (A + B). In other words, he's trying to pin B down, which is always trying to wriggle away from the mixture. How can he pull it off, then?

In fact, I think it's worse than that—it's even worse because "B avoids getting mixed in" basically means there's some part of it that fails to get mixed in. Really, all that gets combined is A + (B / 2). What he says in the text isn't all that important—this is for anyone who might be interested in what the text literally says—because the mixture takes the form: A + (B / 2) + (A + (B / 2). That is, once I pin B down, there's only one B for every two A's. Pretty clever of the demiurge, but I'm only guessing, right, since he doesn't say it. I won't get into where these substances come from. Because it's easy to guess where substance A comes from: it comes from the model, from eternal form. But the other substance, substance B? That remains to be seen, but here's how we'd start: when the demiurge has his mixture, if you accept that he carries out this combination, Plato begins, and it all sounds pretty bizarre, but we aren't going to just say it's scientifically outdated because…no. I don't think that would make any sense. Neither can you say he's just being poetic. You can't say… what can we say? You can't say anything—admire, follow along, try to make sense of it, right?

From there, if I'm not mistaken—I say, "if I'm not mistaken," in case anyone specializes on *The Timaeus*; fortunately, I don't get the impression that people really focus on this bit about mixture—but following the text as it's written, while it enters into the mixture, Substance B constantly resists getting mixed in. Then, you say, there's still the problem of how it gets divided in two. In two, that is, two times one. I'd say that's precisely what A does, the substance of the Same. The substance of the Same can't force it, can't just overpower it, but nonetheless, it has the leverage to sort out something it does control in Substance B and something that eludes it. It prevents B from getting away entirely—hence, B / 2. At which point, through C, we get A + (B / 2), but that only gives us one B for every two A's. As I see it, it can't escape any further. Without this B / 2, I can no longer make sense of the text. So, there, okay. But from there—I'll spare you, since otherwise… —from there, notice how the demiurge goes about this mixture through a whole series of "progressions," geometric progressions, namely—as I see it, geometric progressions are all the more reason for us to bring in a fractional B / 2 —a whole series of

geometric progressions [*Pause*] and where does that leave us? I'll spare you the details, but we end up with a series of figures [*chiffres*]. [*Pause*]

See, then, my question is: how does he form the image? He forms the image by combining substances [*Pause*] and establishing geometric proportions in their combination, geometric proportions which determine key figures that don't appear in their natural sequence—it isn't 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. They follow a particular sequence based on geometric progressions. Okay, that goes on for several pages of the *Timaeus*, it's wonderful, it's like a kind of… it's music, you know, music. What's more, there are actually harmonic relationships; there are explicit comparisons drawn with art.

And he goes on, not only—well, this is the third phase of the mixture—I'll go over three phases, but it all happens at the same time. There's the combination of substances; second, the establishment of geometric relations… sorry, geometric *progressions*, which determine key figures—and third, based on these geometric progressions, we'll find that intervals or the medians, or means, are determined… the determination of averages. [*Pause*] What does "the mean" refer to? As many of you know, it's the average between a progression's two extremes, the average between a geometric progression's two extremes, averages that change depending [*Pause*] depending on the progressions in question, right?

Well, keep your finger on that. What I'm giving you is sort of the outline I used to get through it. It's a hefty text, after all; if you understand the *Timaeus*, you understand all of Greek philosophy, right. Does this make sense? [First] Mixing, [Second] determining the mixture's geometric progressions, which give us figures, a sequence of numbers, a sequence of sacred numbers, evidently. [*Pause*]

Third, there's the averages, the middle terms between both extremes of each progression [*Pause*] which, in turn, gives you figures and numbers. [*Pause*] That's how I'd describe the formation of the image. I'm not getting into the question: Where does Substance B come from? Substance B is a sticky wicket; how is he going to get out of it? It's beautiful when a philosopher finds themselves… Philosophers have a tough job, solving problems they set for themselves. And then, this is how you know you're on the right track. You're blindsided by a problem you hadn't thought of, and now you have to deal with it.

Which is why any objections to it won't come from talking it over with other people. Conversation has nothing to do with it, that's just talking. All true objections or issues always come… they never come from other people. It's not when somebody says, "You're wrong." It's always some problem that catches me off guard. Any system of problems I put together always excludes a particular problem that catches me off guard. And then I either figure out how to deal with it, like saying, bring it on—or I don't know what to do with it, and my theory… what I mean is that a theory's truth isn't determined by its results or how it's developed; it's determined by how it deals with a side problem, i.e., the problem that ends up crashing in from outside the problem's proper domain.

Well, Plato has this sort of side problem on his hands. Wonderful! Alright, so far, so good; that all makes sense, save for one burning question—what about this Substance B? It's funny.

Because I can argue that Substance A, right, is taken from its eternal model—it's the Same, the substance of the Same. But where does the substance of the Other come from? I can't say that it comes from copies, since I use it to make copies; it's part of what I use to make the image. It's what I, the demiurge, use to create the world. Well, Plato should have seen that coming; he walked right into it.

Second operation. So, the demiurge is the one who made the world. I just outlined three aspects, three aspects. [*Pause*] The demiurge creates the world. Secondly, just as he creates it, he puts it in order. And how does he arrange it? It will become clearer. Why does it happen at the same time, why is it one and the same—creating the world and putting it in order? There's a simple explanation for why they're one and the same. It's because, in forming the world, he obtained a number of privileged positions. [*Pause*] Positions indicated by different figures [*chiffres*], whether these figures correspond to geometric progressions or whether they correspond to averages, to mediants. [*Pause*] So long as any movement or change—so long as the image's local movements and qualitative changes pass through these privileged points, these privileged positions, these privileged states, then the image will be said to copy its model.

The second part, setting things in order, solely comes down to [making] the movement pass through the privileged positions and states laid out in the very creation of the world. [*Pause*] In other words, [*Pause*] the image will then resemble its model. This is what the act of ordering things comes down to: I've produced an image of the copy; I had to bestow it, to endow it with resemblance. I needed the image to become similar. The solution was—having formed the world according to a mixture that allowed me to determine privileged figures, positions and points, I make it so that the image's movement and changes pass through these privileged movement-points. Meaning what? Meaning that I curve, I bend its movement. The demiurge curves and bends movement in such a way that local motion passes through the positions, [*Pause*] figures set by the mixture, and that qualitative changes go through stages set by the mixture's figures. [*Pause*] Movement is now curved. As circular motion, it imitates its model. The world is a copy in the sense that it's formed as an image and shaped as a likeness. [*Pause*]

The model-copy relationship brings us to the subject of veracity; the image is made in the likeness of its model. All of these operations were necessary both to form the image, and on the other hand, to give it a likeness. From there, there's no longer any difference, no longer any gap separating when things originate and when their order is established. The final outcome of which is that, once movement became an image in the likeness of its model, [*Pause*] once movement became circular, time was tamed; time could no longer play out in its abyss. It comes out of its abyss. It becomes sage time, the time of wisdom, time as no more than a unit of circular motion. It measures local, circular motion, just as it measures the cyclical transformation of qualities. [*Pause*]

Then, it all happens at once—to give you an overview—when movement becomes an image of its model, [*Pause*] when its image starts to resemble its model, [*Pause*] when its image becomes circular motion, [*Pause*] i.e., a mobile image of the model, and time becomes subordinate to movement. Its domestication means both making movement circular so that its image can resemble what's eternal, and making time a quantity of circular motion.

And indeed, while we're on the subject, what becomes of these figures, these privileged positions? You find them again, in a precise way. As I was saying, the demiurge knows that when movement is bent, is put into a circle, such that it passes through the mixture's figures, its sacred figures—what does that mean? Sure enough, what you'll find is that we can't talk about circular motion without getting into how it "embodies" privileged positions and privileged states, [*Pause*], i.e., the astronomical model at the heart of circular motion. What's going on with these privileged positions? Never mind that. For those who know a bit of astronomy, I think the easiest examples are the equator and the ecliptic. The equator and the ecliptic are what determine the circular movements of all the spheres we looked at last time. You remember how this astronomy works, right, with eight spheres—an outer sphere with the fixed stars, seven spheres corresponding to each of the seven planets, and the Earth. We covered that; I won't go over it again.

But what is it that determines… They don't have the same axis; all these spheres turn on different axes. What determines their axis? What… this is where privileged positions come in—where do these privileged positions come from? We'll find out shortly. So, these main privileged positions, these sacred figures, are manifested, on the one hand, in astronomical circular motion, [*Pause*] where you'll get the equator, the ecliptic, but then, on another level—it gets so complicated—the equinox and the solstice, [*Pause*] and so on implies that circular motion is defined by its passing through key points—you can really see how tightly interconnected this all is—and physical changes will also be described [*Pause*] as the passing through key states. I don't want to get too far into it, but Aristotle offers a rather unusual theory, albeit a beautiful one—a theory of "contact," contact defined as the moment when, in a physical process, form, that is, the eternal model, force is instantaneously actualized. As he puts it, it's the final contact between hammer—a wonderful passage; it isn't Plato, but it might be Platonic—it's the final contact between hammer and vase… no, sorry, [hammer] and *bronze*, where the form of the vase is instantly realized. There's a whole process, then, in what goes into the vase, but the form of the vase is actualized instantaneously.

In the same way, there's a physical transition from white to black, but the form of black is instantly realized upon final contact, as he puts it in a great passage: "the form of the house is instantly realized when two tiles make contact." Does that mean the last two tiles? Undoubtedly the final two tiles, because earlier in the process, at every point in the process, there's a form that's instantaneously realized. With the first two tiles, we can already say that the roof is instantly realized. But the physical process passes through privileged states, and with every privileged state, a form is actualized. You know how it is—all of a sudden, it's perfect! So, that's how time was tamed. That's how the demiurge was able to tame time. You haven't said much about time, you'll tell me. Of course not, because this is the story of how it was reined in by circular motion.

Where does that leave us, then? Well, there's one last question we need to answer. Where is Plato getting Substance B from? It's great. It's great where he gets it from. He gets Substance B… Alright—as I understand it, going out on a limb—I haven't been satisfied by any commentary I've come across, not a single one, because the interpretations I've looked at, even older ones, all skirt the issue. Where does it come from? What is Substance B? [*Pause*] As I see it, this is exactly what Plato says: change and movement apply to copies, while the model is

characterized by the Same and the eternal. [*Pause*] Alright. Which makes that Substance A. But he goes on—if I understand correctly—why wouldn't there be another model? [*Pause*] That is, how come change and movement only apply to the copy? Shouldn't there also be a model of what moves and changes? [*Pause*] Right. He can't say there *is* one, because if there's a model of what moves and changes, that's Substance B. For there to be a Substance B, it must be that movement and change can't just apply to images and copies; [*Pause*] that has to describe a model. You see the problem, then.

Well, then, what is it? What is this Substance B? It turns out it's wild time, wild time; [*Pause*] wild time is what blind-sides him. The question is how, at this level, he's going to get rid of wild time, and that's because B, the substance of the Other, isn't the copy's moving, changing nature—it's the model's moving, changing nature. Only with this model, instead of copying it, we desperately need to get rid of it, that is, it needs to be mixed in. It must be mixed together with the model to be copied. You get what I'm saying? It's only natural—there must have been this rumbling, untamed time in order for it to later be tamed and subordinated to movement. It has to have been there. And well, our mixture can't really get rid of it. Plato says as much: all we can do is combine them as best we can, and yet, remember—it will be important—there's a whole part that escapes, a whole part that gets away.

Anyway, moving on. We've almost… So, I'm circling back to what I talked about last time, and I'll make it quick because I'd like to get through at least the first half of this. I was saying, it's not hard… — Yes, if anyone wants to leave, right, since for the next several weeks I won't be focusing on cinema, as you've noticed, I'm no longer focusing on cinema. I completely understand, then, if folks came for… when we were talking about cinema, they can skip two or three weeks, no problem. Now, I'm doing… That's what we'll do all year. Our analysis will alternate as needed, since time is primarily what I'm interested in. For the time being, I will come back to cinematic time-images later on—soon, in fact. No hard feelings if you skip class for a while. The way we're doing things, you can pick back up down the road…

As I was saying last time, so far, so good. Movement becomes circular; it's been made to conform to a model, and as a result, time is subordinate to circular motion. Right. And it escapes all over the place. It will constantly slip out in Greek thought. Which is why I say you always need to keep track of nuances. It's as though this were the delayed reaction of Substance B, the prolonged vengeance of the half that got away. Then there's a return to myth, in Plato. [*Pause*] It's the great payback, the final revenge of the time that got away. And what will the time that escaped look like?

Well, I told you that this copy… circular motion, as an image resembling its model, [*Pause*] will continue to present anomalies, aberrations. Such aberrations ought to be attributed to the Substance B that got away. Circular motion won't stop. The ordering of the cosmos won't stop showing us aberrations. It's an image of movement as circular motion, having subjugated time, that will nonetheless continue to exhibit aberrations, and as for these aberrations, what do we get with every aberration in movement? Each of the aberrations of this bowed, disciplined movement-image will correspond to a kind of—to put it crudely—a kind of flash at time, a flash into an untamed time, a kind of time coming back, showing up and threatening to submerge everything. How does this happen? I'll cut to the chase. Take Aristotle. With Aristotle—jumping

around, but that's fine—we might say: with their astronomy and their eternal return, it would be perfect if the planets directly determined physical phenomena on earth, the course of human life. We could relax. But nothing of the sort. The closer we get to Earth, the more aberrations appear in circular motion, and the more such aberrations indicate an untamed time, or worse, we ourselves are given over to an untamed time.

See, it's the exact same pattern we saw with cinema, but my hope is that we've discovered it on an entirely independent basis. The closer we get to Earth—to borrow Aristotle's beautiful turn of phrase—"we are sublunar." The moon, the lunar sphere, is the closest of the seven planetary spheres to Earth. We are between the moon and the Earth; here in our atmosphere, we are sublunar beings, creatures. Well, in our sublunar world, aberrations in movement will immediately start to pile up within astronomy, such as what I said about rational or irrational relationships. Astronomy is chock full of aberrations that account for irrational relationships between… [*Deleuze corrects himself*] accounted for by the irrational relationships between the different spheres.

But even if we don't take that into account, even if we say, "It's fine, our astronomy still functions," the further we go into the sublunar—and I brought up Aristotle's hierarchy, Aristotle's hierarchy plays a crucial role here—Aristotle's hierarchy basically demonstrates how the closer we get to Earth—I'm giving you an interpretation of it, I'm giving you a version of it that's a bit, a bit… but, I believe it's accurate, that the hierarchy is exactly… [*remark unclear*]—the closer we get to Earth, [*Pause*] right, the more matter turns against form. If you like, broadly speaking, the more the copy rebels against its model. But copy and model aren't Aristotelian terms; for an Aristotelian, it's form-matter. I'd say that the closer we get to Earth, the more matter rebels against form, i.e., the less—recalling what we discussed last time—the less properties can be directly deduced from essence or form, the less a thing's properties can be deduced from its eternal essence and its form. [*Pause*]

Which is why Aristotle's hierarchy is so interesting. I think what makes this hierarchy so impressive are its criteria. At the top, there's what he calls "*noos*," or the prime mover. Indeed, the prime mover is what determines the movement of the heavens, but it is pure intelligence, form without matter. Then the stars are governed by intelligences. These intelligences are in turn intelligible in relation to the prime mover. Thus, intelligence thinks itself in intelligible things. Here we have a domain of pure forms. Forms which are such that they have no matter. Their actuality is independent of all matter; they proceed independently of all matter, and their properties immediately, necessarily follow from their essence. Right.

Now, heavenly bodies? The second rung of the hierarchy: heavenly bodies are steered by an intelligence, they have matter; they have both form and matter. I'd go so far as to call it a light matter. It's a light matter. I stress "light," because Aristotle approaches things in terms of light and heavy, and we'll see why; it will be his downfall. Ultimately, it's a matter of preference, since what terms will the Neoplatonists use in their approach? I'll let you in on the secret of Neoplatonism: they think in terms of "rare and dense," not heavy and light. And because they no longer think in terms of heavy and light, but instead rare and dense, everything changes. Everything changes. They discover—this is for next time, I'm getting ahead of myself—they uncover the qualitative movement of the soul rather than the local, extensive movement of the

body—what am I saying?—not qualitative movement, they don't uncover qualitative movement, it's a physical movement. They discover the "intensive" movement of the soul. The rare and the dense.

But that's not Aristotle. He does form a theory of intensity, but his theory of intensity falls apart. That's what the Neoplatonists are worried about. Just to give you an idea of how much it changes. Well, I'm going with heavy and light, right, heavenly bodies have a light matter. Meaning what? It means that they have, to borrow one of Aristotle's more intriguing expressions, they have a local matter. They have local matter. What does local matter mean? It means matter actualized in local movement, by a pure change of position. Heavenly bodies have a purely positional matter, a matter actualized purely and simply by changes in position. The only matter belonging to heavenly bodies is local matter. [*Pause*] Therefore, their properties are very closely tied to their essence, but not as immediately as with pure forms, see? Since they do have matter, albeit light matter, there must be a cause… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:44:43]

Part 3

… Did I get you, [*Laughter*] was it you? Oh, all my money? [*Laughter*] It wasn't me? Oh, well, then, likely story!

Thirdly. Are following along somewhat? You don't want to understand too much, now! [*Laughter*] Thirdly, think about the world of… You're getting closer to the Earth. What do you see? Now the bodies you can see, the heavenly bodies, aren't swerving. It's far away. What you see are bodies rising and falling. Aristotle is great here. But he gets all this directly from Plato—it's quite different from Plato, but it's also pretty close. It's as complicated as it is beautiful! Bodies rising and falling. That's what you see, then. Yeah, smoke rises. And… and stones fall. What is rising and falling? It's so-called rectilinear motion. The closer we get to Earth, the way we poor sublunar creatures move, see, it isn't even curved anymore! In our atmosphere, things fall and rise! We can't call it a downgrade, just appreciate that it's a new kind of matter. Bodies subjected to this are a new kind of matter.

And what is it, exactly? It isn't a local matter anymore. You saw his extraordinary definition for local matter, which only refers to matter active on the basis of spatial position. For bodies rising and falling, stones and smoke, it's rather simple: it isn't local motion, in fact. What does rectilinear motion imply? Changes in state. [*Pause*] Which no longer implies a matter of local change, but one of "alteration." Why? Because a rising body is one that's gotten lighter; a falling body is one that's gotten heavier. What does that entail? Certainly, it implies that there will be a cycle, a cycle of qualities. According to Aristotle, the cycle of physical qualities is cold and hot, dry and fluid. [*Pause*] Why does it rise? Fluid is what rises. It's fluid, and moreover, hot fluid is what rises. And cold and dry things descend. So, again, we need external causes. And we need more and more of them. It ultimately points back to the movement of the stars, that is, the dry and the fluid strictly depend on the fact that the sun moves away from and towards the earth. Thus, there is an astronomical cause. There are other intervening causes. They multiply such that I can move from the form of this body, subject to rectilinear motion, to its essential properties, i.e., falling and rising. A multiplication of causes.

In this case, I'd say that, however you look at it, the matter of alteration is much heavier than purely local matter. Therefore its form and its essential properties are a lot more indirectly connected, and the link between form and essential properties necessarily brings in outside causes, more and more external causes. In Aristotle, that's how it's laid out. It was already that way with Plato. Auxiliary causes, subaltern causes, and then Aristotle brilliantly adds his theory of *tyche*. What is *tyche*? It means occasion, occasional causation, chance. It speaks to a lot of things we've covered: from auxiliary causes to subaltern causes, to occasional causes, etc. All these causal processes will pile up the closer we get to Earth, simply because the link between form and matter, the link between essence and essential properties, becomes more and more complicated and less and less direct.

And last, we get to the heaviest matter, the one we're made of, sadly—we, living things. To wit, for us, our form involves not just local matter, not just alterable matter, such as that of the physical elements—physical elements are what have alterable matter, being fundamentally alterable—for us, we, alas, are generable and corruptible. And this matter, the matter of generation and corruption, is special; it will entail a series of causes, whereupon Aristotle will brilliantly—it comes as no surprise—this is his foundation for everything that will come to be known—no, yeah, more or less, I think—as "natural history." Right. See, that's good. So far, so good.

If I wanted to, then—but I'm trying to hurry… That settles it, then. Each aberration in circular motion, and see how such an aberration is rooted in circular motion itself, right, every aberration, whereas circular motion subordinated itself to time, every aberration in circular motion unleashes time and runs the risk of allowing time to overwhelm movement. We come back to the same dramatic [*pathétique*] pattern. In my opinion, it's even lovelier in philosophy than in cinema because in philosophy, it's even more dynamic. It's a lot more dynamic. It's much easier to imagine. Cinema is too abstract for philosophy, you know? It's funny, but… well, then, moving right along. We haven't seen the last of aberrations. And every time they show up on the scene, we come back to this double aspect. How might we understand circular motion as a copy, the likeness of a model? How might we go about it? How, at the same time, can we create an aberration of uncontrolled movement that will overturn the relationship between movement and time? [*A noise*] Ah! An aberration! [*Laughter*] I'll quickly go down the list.

It's inseparable from a political problem, a psycho-political problem, even. What happens in Plato? Okay, "the just city" is the equivalent of a circular model. But there are aberrations, accidental and yet inevitable causes, such that "the just city" is strictly speaking inseparable from the problem of its decadence: it might be ideal, but it's caught up in a process of decay, which is fundamental to it. [*Pause*] The problem of souls: circular motion, a psychological problem, then. I apologize for going so fast. We would need… I'd recommend reading *Politics.* How exactly circular movement will be set up, and then how it will produce an aberration, there will be an aberration such that time will drag the city into a process of decomposition. Right, that's a fundamental part of [Plato's] political thought.

Thought, psychological thought—well, how should we approach this circular movement of souls? A circular movement of souls along with the subordination of time? Well, in a way, it's an equilibrium. It shows up quite early with the Greeks, alongside theories of astronomy and

physics: it's an idea famously expressed by Anaximander, a pre-Socratic; the pre-Socratics were 6th – 5th century B.C. And Plato was 5th – 4th. The pre-Socratic, Anaximander, is famous for saying—it's been translated in different ways, and Heidegger offered such a dazzling interpretation for it—basically: "beings compensate for each other…" They pay for each other, beings "pay penance and [are] judged for their injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of time."[6]

Meaning what? Meaning that the circular movement of souls is something like a perpetual process of compensating for imbalances. It's basically: how do we keep aberrations at bay? And that's the problem, really. Circular motion is full of aberrations. How do you get rid of them? How do you avoid aberrations? Well, there's something that comes out of this circular law. What comes out of it? Well, for instance, there's the tragic hero, marked by their hubris, their excess.[7] If time is what measures circular motion, right, the tragic hero represents excess. They emerge from excess, they step out of circular motion, they perform outrageous acts. That needs to be compensated for. Each one goes beyond measure, leaving a state of equilibrium. There must be compensation. By compensating for imbalances, circular motion will be restored.

Now, this idea of compensating for imbalances was on everyone's lips; it shows up, for example, in Aeschylus' tragedies, it's there in the first great Greek tragedian, Aeschylus. It's also in Herodotus. It's a Machiavellian idea; it's a really beautiful notion. This compensation doesn't seem like much, but for them, it's fate, it's destiny, it's humanity being provoked by the gods. And they provoke us for one simple reason. They provoke us into getting out of balance. Why? Again, wouldn't that be revenge, payback? How does it happen? It's because oracles can never be understood. A great historian picks up on this and devoted some great work to the subject: Herodotus. [François] Châtelet did such a wonderful job of covering all this in his book, *Birth of History.*[8] [*Pause*] The oracle is, by nature, oblique. What they say cannot be understood my human beings; which means, then, that the oracle is time. They represent pure time, as well as time's revenge. Humans can't make heads or tails of it; they can only understand it afterwards.

And you find this Greek way of looking at things, if you know your literature, you find it come back in *Macbeth*, through the witches, in a wonderful scene in *Macbeth*—it's almost *verbatim* Herodotus or Aeschylus, basically like, *damned witch, always telling our futures in ways we can't understand*. It's not about how obscure the oracle is. That's not it. It's about the gods laying traps. Macbeth is told that all will be well until the forest starts walking, until someone comes along who isn't born of a woman, and third—I don't remember, anyway. He thinks, alright, that means I'll be fine. He lashes out at the witches in a magnificent, a magnificent passage, one fit for the Greeks, fit for Greek tragedy, Aeschylus at least. He says, yeah, they did it on purpose, this is how gods speak. They throw us off balance. They "themselves" pull us away from [*Pause*] circular motion. As payback for wild time, now reasserting circularity, compensation. Balance will be restored, blow for blow. Since the great circular movement is always in jeopardy, it's like the gods seem to use aberrations in movement as a way of restoring balance. Is there another way out, seeing as how aberrations proliferate the closer we get to Earth? There's no other way.

But you can tell that's not the end of the story, because, if we have to plug up aberrations in movement every time, what's to say wild time won't undo everything? Indeed, before long, the

Greeks no longer buy into the autocorrection of imbalances. They no longer believe that aberrations in movement can be corrected for at every step, every time, blow for blow. And after Herodotus comes the terrible Thucydides, who unfurls history as pure time, as wild time, as untamed time. [*Pause*] It's no longer an aberration in movement; Time has already been freed from movement.

And after Aeschylus comes Sophocles, and Sophocles no longer believes in the compensation for imbalances, that excess pays, or that beings "pay the penance and [are] judged for their injustices in accordance with the ordinance of time"—time still as the measure for movement. No. What do we find with Sophocles? What happens to Oedipus? We discover a time freed from movement, and that's the time Oedipus is working with. He won't even be punished. Hence what Nietzsche says, so splendidly, about *Oedipus*: it's the most semitic Greek tragedy. Because time is no longer a quantity of movement; it no longer measures circular motion. Quite the contrary. It is time freed from movement, and movement now jogs along a timeline. And Oedipus wanders off just like Cain in the Old Testament—hence the most semitic Greek tragedy. Cain, with the mark of Cain, follows a path where no one can take him down, no one can demand he pay for his crimes. The whole business with restoring balance is over.

We've entered a regime of Time where, literally, all we have are sequences of states further and further from equilibrium. And that's what will overturn, what will drag the Greek world, will… It's awful. I'd like to offer one last example before we wrap up. And this one isn't mine, because Eric Alliez is the one working through all these points. The way I see it, if he's willing, I'd like for him to step in a couple times after our break to talk about what happens with the Neoplatonists, as well as a further aspect of Time I have to go over. But today, when it comes to this next topic, which will be our last [for the day], if he would go over a few… [*Deleuze doesn't finish his sentence*].

The same thing is demonstrated, I mean, in Aristotle too, and that's why we need Alliez to go over it, because in his research he does the best job of showing… The same development playing out at the level of economics. And it will be very important moving forward, especially for the connection between Marx and Aristotle. Because there are basically two texts. I'll briefly sum up Alliez's position before he goes into detail. Take a work by Aristotle called *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, you more or less get a theory of circular, compensatory exchange—circular, compensatory exchange, which, using terms that have become popular since Marx, take the form of *C*-*M*-*C*, i.e., money determining the equivalence of commodities. Why is that necessary, I hear you ask? I think Alliez does a good job of demonstrating how, for Aristotle, this power comes, not from labor time put into commodities, obviously, which was completely equivalent to… but from need. From need. Right.

I could argue that the same thing happens economically, we find the same pattern: the establishment of a circular movement, [*Pause*] the subordination of—What, time? Money?—take your pick, it's the same thing. And we'll see in what sense, for Alliez, inevitably, things build towards the idea that time is money. Time is money—it's an economically founded proposition, since that's the whole idea behind credit and usury and profit, or what have you, of surplus value—money is fundamentally the economic form of Time. Thus, we're still dealing with the same problem. So, you have money-or-time subordinated to movement and circular

motion, and the two are one. It's because movement is circular—commodity-commodity—that money is how we measure movement. It's the quantity, literally, the amount of exchange that makes up for any imbalances. We're right back in the middle of... [*Deleuze doesn't finish his sentence*]

And so, Alliez says, listen! In a completely different work, not the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but, oh, Christ, it's called… [*Someone gives him the title*] *The Politics,* Aristotle discusses something completely different, what he calls "chrematistics," *c-h-r-e-m-a*, from the Greek, *khrema*—chrematistics. And chrematistics is really strange because, at the same time, Aristotle says, it's inherently different from circular exchange, and yet it in a way it's derived from the latter and resembles it, and yet it tosses it out the window.

This is chrematistics. It corresponds to Marx's formula, *M-C-M*—money-commodity-money. What does this formula, *M-C-M*, mean? In other words, I buy a commodity, and I sell it. What do I mean by that? I buy a commodity and sell it? It means that I buy it as cheaply as possible, and I sell it at the highest price I can. Thus, *M-C-M* means *M-C-M'—M'* being greater than *M*—So, what's going on here? Listen!

Circular exchange has been replaced by—what Alliez does so well to call, using a modern term, unequal exchange. What is that? Why is it unequal? Precisely because it no longer forms a loop. *M-C-M* is actually *M-C-M'*. In other words, it's a straight line: *M-M'-M''*—always growing, further and further down the line, growing bigger and bigger. It will never be enough. I will never buy cheaply enough, and my asking price will never be too high. *M-C-M', M'', M''',* etc., etc. What's happening here? Time's liberation from the movement of exchange. Now it's the exchange that's become subordinate to Time, movement submitting to the march of time, whereby time constantly produces something new, i.e., even more money. Always more money.

In what context does that happen, the development of chrematistics? Obviously, like I was saying about the decadence of Greek cities—why is the Greek city bound to fall apart? This is all wonderfully covered in Châtelet's account. Athens, right—it was a democratic city, but at what cost? It's like America, just like America. America is a democracy, but at what cost? Imperialism, a maritime empire, controlling the market, controlling the world market—that's Athenian democracy to a tee. We shouldn't be too hard on the anti-democratic Greeks. We can't just say they're a bunch of fascists. For some of the anti-democratic Greeks, they looked at Athenian democracy, and well, what did they see? They saw imperialism, market control, naval politics, maritime politics—you can't just separate Athens from all that. And it's in that context, when Athens, thanks to the Persian Wars, came into its own an imperialist, maritime, mercantile power, that this *M-C-M'* formula takes shape.

I'd say the same thing here, then. It all gets confirmed in this last stage. See how the movement of exchange, the circular economic movement of exchange produces its own aberration: chrematistic movement, an aberration representing a sort of abyss in Time, literally, in the proliferation of money—*M – M' – M''*. [*Pause*] And when it comes to chrematistics, it's clear that Time is freed from movement, at the same time as movement ceases to be circular. As a result, it's now movement that's subordinate to Time. At which point, things look different, it's radically different; it won't be the same movement.

Alright, now I'd like for you to expand on that [*Speaking to Éric Alliez*]—I gave an outline for you to elaborate on, going over any necessary nuances or even correcting anything if I've forgotten anything essential. Speak up.

Éric Alliez: That's more or less what I wanted to cover, in terms of what Aristotle calls *oikonomike*, that is, the Marxist form of commodity-money-commodity, thus in the sphere of use value, the sphere of need, which is something Marx gets from Aristotle. But effectively, the time we're dealing with is that of topology. [*inaudible*] becomes time as a unit of circular [*inaudible*] movement. Where, at the level of the wild anomaly that is chrematistics, i.e., the form *M-C-M'*, we're no longer dealing with need but with profit, neither use value nor exchange value—effectively, it was a form of time that was abstract, owing to a material form [*inaudible*] *M', M'', M''',* and so on. So here we have two operative figures of time, [*inaudible*] which doesn't correspond to mathematics at all, since this second form, the form of abstract time, sort of requires like a hint of this aberration in Aristotle's text.

On the other hand, if we want to come to grips with the transition between the economic form, *oikonomike*, to the chrematistic form, we see that, again, Time intervenes and then there's some kind of organicity in the exchange. Since, indeed, in the case of the former, where use value is determined by need, the movement is straightforward: as Marx would say, it's really a circuit, i.e., *C-M-C*. We offer one commodity in order to buy another commodity, which, as use value, I use for a purpose determined by my needs, Marx follows Aristotle in saying. What happens is that, once there's a discrepency between the two, then the vector of money's movement gains an autonomy, and we have to write [*inaudible*] differently: it's no longer *C-M-C*; we have *C-M* and then *M-C*, and obviously whoever has the money automatically takes over the whole process. And immediately the whole process is flipped around, and we've reached *M-C-M'*.

Thus, Time has an extraordinary amount of power. I believe Aristotle [*inaudible*] in some of his writings where he's really ambiguous in how he describes the reserve function of money. So [*inaudible*] we might mark out a new genealogy, i.e., the genealogy of the [*inaudible*] form. For me, ultimately, the point of my work wasn't to end up with a post-hoc chrematistics on a form of abstract time, i.e., a time that isn't subordinate to…

Deleuze: For those who haven't studied Greek, remind us of what *chréma* means.

Alliez: So, *chréma*, simply means wealth or property. Thus, "chrematistics" effectively describes an exchange where the goal is to make a profit [*remark unclear*]. And so here, even at this level, we'd get two forms of Time. What's more, things get more complicated, because I'd juxtapose, on one hand, movement… *time*, sorry, time defined as a quantity of movement alongside how Aristotle describes *mneme*. In his *Ethics*, he says that *mneme* stands in for [*inaudible*]. Well, I don't think Aristotle would have a problem with saying that *mneme* is a quantity of need. Thus, we'd end up with this double sequence…

Deleuze: Need itself being a product of circular motion.

Alliez: Exactly.

Deleuze: Which shows up all the time in Aristotle, even with his physics, since need is a final cause. The system of final causes—it's inseparable from final causes, so need is indeed love of the good.

Alliez: That's why Aristotle relates *oikonomike*, the first form, to the practice of [*inaudible*] practice.

Deleuze: So, on that front, you and I are on the same page. We ought to say, "time is money" in an extremely rigorous sense, i.e., that time is the unit of measurement for the movement represented by the exchange of goods as dictated by need. Alright.

Alliez: So, on the one hand, in *Nicomachean Ethics*, we have this definition of money as…and I'd argue you could link it in particular to the definition of time from Aristotle's famous treatise, *Politika*. Where, in *The Politics*, Aristotle attempts a sort of genealogy of the money form. And you can see how things start to get complicated, because he's forced to bring in a movement, what from a modern perspective we'd call international trade, in concrete terms, trade from outside the city. Which raises a problem, then, since he says that such trade, within the framework of this trade, we're no longer framing things in terms of needs. What we're really looking at is a system of negative interrelations.

Deleuze: And imperialism.

Alliez: And imperialism. So, you get the feeling that this money, which was supposed to emerge from a non-chrematistic form, since it was placed along the horizon of need, we also know how important need was for Aristotle, because for him, the *polis* itself is formed by need. Thus, in this genealogy of money, you get the sense that things are desperately veering towards chrematistics. That is, it's from chrematistics that [*inaudible*].

Deleuze: From the perspective of a world market.

Alliez: That's right. It is more [*inaudible*] that the market is absent from the *polis* [*remarks unclear*].

Deleuze: All of this lines up with what we've been saying. It's obvious that this new time, time freed from movement, is a world time. It'll be a world time. Sorry…

Alliez: Yes, so, in fact, it's with chrematistics where we effectively see the beginning of money, of the money form. Which leads us to something rather unusual that… When we read Marx's commentary [*inaudible*], he read very, very carefully, whether we're talking about the *Grundrisse,* of whether it's [*inaudible*] or we're talking about *Capital,* there's a phrase that comes up again and again, the same way of describing the movement of law, equivalence—but he hesitates, he hesitates because he's arguing that equivalence is formed by money. What I'll demonstrate is that labor value, the substance of labor is what's behind the equivalence. Thus, there's this famous hesitation. I think that if we read the text carefully [*inaudible*], Aristotle's hesitation is tied to his historical economic situation, where despite there already being a

monetary form, things still function on the horizon of use value. I believe that this poses a real problem, one of use value.

Deleuze: In other words, his hesitation is absolutely not about asking: Does money, as an equivalent standard, refer back to needs, or does it refer back to something else, i.e., labor time? The Marxist solution. His hesitation is over the two forms of money, because as Marx tells us, there's no need for him to hesitate since he's had labor time there from the beginning, which results in a homogeneous time. What I'd like for you all to take away from what Marx says, is how we get to the idea that untamed time is abstract time; it is abstract. And we're already equipped to appreciate how this abstract Time implies two things. It implies a homogeneous Time running in a straight line instead of passing through privileged positions, i.e., one whose moments are all equal. [*Pause*] There's that. We talked about the solstice-equinox sort of privileged positions. That was a rural Time. Urban time no longer has any… there are no more seasons, you know? There aren't any seasons. Well and good. Ultimately, that's not what's important about abstract time. Abstract time is uniform and homogeneous; that's the sense in which it is abstract. Each one of its moments is like any other.

But, the second meaning of the word, "abstract," implies that it's "abstracted from movement," that it's no longer a quantity of movement. At which point, it's what is concrete. How's that? Insofar as Time is a quantity of movement, it is abstract. It's a number, a measurement. Movement was what it measured, so [movement] was what was concrete. But when [time] becomes "abstract"—in quotation marks? It no longer measures movement, and once it no longer measures movement, it's been abstracted from movement. But when it's abstracted from movement, Time is now the concrete reality. And so, "abstract Time emerges" is a way of saying that "the concrete reality of Time emerges." You see, by virtue of both meanings of the word, "abstract." From there we can cheerfully conclude by saying: the abstract is the concrete, [*Laughter*] but in this case it's the verb, strictly speaking, right?

Anything you'd like to add? I think your overview is really great; it's very clear. I'd like for you to elaborate, for us to hang onto, since you've gotten it, because when we get to modern times, starting with the discovery of an abstract Time, how will we situate it? For that, we'll have to come back to Aristotle.

Alliez: Yes, because, in fact, there's at least one question [*inaudible*]. It seems like there's yet another, third figure of time that shows up; at least, it's the form of abstract Time that, instead of splitting, becomes a [*inaudible*] figure.

Deleuze: It's quite interesting, with usury, because I'll need you again when we get back. Maybe with the other aspect, time and the soul, we'll get to the bottom of usury, and then, if you're willing—I don't know anything about the Aristotelian understanding of usury—you can tie that back to Aristotle. The main problem with usury is its relationship to the soul, and that will be Time as well—wholly a question of time.

Alliez: Yes, because this Time [*inaudible*] access to this powerlessness will be determined by some future subjectivation, even appropriation.

Deleuze: Which would constitute a third form… which is neither time as quantity of movement, nor the now independent, homogeneous time, but a third…

Alliez: What we could refer to as "power," with all the extraordinary ambiguity that word entails, because if you understand "power" in an Aristotelian way, that obviously takes us back…[9]

Deleuze: Back to the first form [of time], right, yes, yes.

Alliez: …if, with Bergson, we're just dealing with creation-time and invention-time, we won't run into the problem of…

Deleuze: Of usury, which would be, like, invention-time… Yeah. The way I see it, then, that will lead straight into the part where we'll go over Platonism, and St. Augustine. There we go!

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You'll talk it over. Anyway, see you on the 28th! [*End of the session*] [2:28:10]

Notes

[1] Cross-referencing the French translation of *Sein und Zeit*, it proved difficult to track down these exact phrases. For readers consulting Heidegger's text, the above translation reflects Deleuze's wording and does not correspond to any particular passage—however, he is likely referring to a handful of passages in 16-17, following the German pagination.
[2] See Mircea Eliade, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949; 1969).
[3] Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Les Origines de la pensée Grecque* (Paris: CNRS, 1962).
[4] The etymology of Cronos' name is controversial.
[5] Deleuze says that the demiurge has "erased" myth—*écrasé.* This could be a play on words, since he suggested in his above etymology for "Cronos" that the root for the latter, *craino* (to accomplish), leads to *cras.* Thus, the demiurge has *é-crasé*—"un-accomplished"—what myth had accomplished.
[6] Following the translation of Anaximander as it appears in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,* translated by Marianne Cowan (Regnery: Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 45.
[7] Original: "…*frappé par l'hybris, par la démesure*." In what follows, *démesure* is translated either as "excess" or "outrage," bearing in mind that—although it's been retroactively analyzed as *out* + *rage*—the latter refers to an excess, a transgression, stepping out of bounds, etc. The reader should note the use of *démesure* alongside frequent descriptions of time as a *mésure* of movement.
[8] François Châtelet, *Naissance de l'histoire* (Paris: Minuit, 1961).
[9] "Power" here is *puissance* and not *pouvoir*, for any reader tracking the distinction.