**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984**

**Lecture 22, 12 June 1984 (Cinema Course 66)**

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**Part 1**

First of all, I'm a little annoyed because Georges Comtesse said he was going to bring in an American who had a good knowledge of science fiction and who was going to tell us something about the crystal as it occurs in science fiction. So, I said, well yes. But he is not here, and today we are in a hurry. Because... it's the last session and... I don't know what I'm going to do with this American, if he turns up. And in any case, we have to move forward, to finish things up, and then recapitulate on everything we've done, if only to convince ourselves that we've done a lot of work this year. This recapitulation seems to me to be essential in order to group together possible readings that you might have made in terms of the perspectives we have covered. So, there we have it, you understand?

Last time we had begun to look at what would be almost the last point that matters to me, which is this: how the direct image of time presents itself in two forms. Today, I would like to clarify this, I mean... The image of time, the direct image of time presents itself in two forms since these two forms are like the process of the differentiation of time itself. And these two forms are… the presents that pass… and the pasts that are preserved. And these two forms are complementary in a very simple way, in the sense that time is the process, or the movement, which at each moment never ceases splitting into two jets, two non-symmetrical jets: the jet of passing presents and the jet of pasts that are preserved.[1]

You remember we were saying how this has nothing to do with psychological recollection. The pasts that are preserved, are not preserved in our brain, they are not preserved in our memory. They are preserved *in time*. To the point that it is time itself that we can call memory. You will say to me: Presents that pass and pasts that are preserved. If this is time, why not invoke the dimension of the future? But the dimension of the future is already contained in the other two.

And so, we had begun – I had begun, but I was…  I wasn't being very clear – I had begun by studying the pasts that are preserved.  However, I'd like to backtrack a bit, to finish very quickly with one point, because ordinarily we would have had time… this was my plan and I would have developed it afterwards... But here, I want to quickly deal with this other aspect. It's a question of knowing, you understand me… here is our problem… we have this image, or rather, this is the direction of the direct image, of the direct time-image. But our problem is how to obtain a little bit of pure time, that is to say, a direct time-image, from the presents that pass, on the one hand, and the pasts that are preserved on the other.

What will the direct time-image consist of? We have to imagine two direct time-images, one corresponding to the movement of the passing presents, the other corresponding to the movement of the pasts that are preserved, two direct time-images each of which will give us a little time in its pure state, that is to say, a time which is no longer subordinated to movement, which is no longer deduced from movement, which no longer derives from movement. So, very quickly, I mean, regarding the presents that pass, the presents that pass do not yet constitute a direct time-image. I could even say that empirical time is confused with passing presents.

What would it take to obtain a direct time-image, that is to say a pure time, from the passing presents? The first thing we have to ask is: under what conditions do presents pass? The answer comes straight away: presents pass insofar as there is always another present that comes to replace the previous one, and another that follows it which comes in turn to replace the actual one. I mean, you see how it is always *in relation to the presence of something else* that something is said to be past or future. It is in relation to the presence of something else that something is said to be past or is said to be future. I would say that this is a horizontal vision… It is as if I were scrolling along a horizontal line. Here, there is a present which passes, another present... There is always something present, and it is in relation to the presence of something else, that something is past, or in relation to the presence of something else that something is not yet there. It is thus this horizontal succession of passing presents that defines the empirical form of time.

But what we saw… what we looked at vaguely this year, but much more thoroughly the previous year, was the extent to which this horizontal line referred to vertical lines, where this time, we consider what appears as an event, and instead of passing along successive events, as in the horizontal line, we remain within the event, we plunge into the event, we don't get out of it. This was the schema that Charles Péguy had tried to draw from Bergson when he opposed history and memory, and he said: Yes, history – as Péguy understood it – consists of passing along events, while memory, true memory, consists of plunging into the event and not coming out of it.[2]

To plunge into the event, not to come out of it… what does this mean? It means that if I plunge sufficiently deeply into the event – I take for example event B – it is that the event has a law. The event is very strange, which is why it belongs to the vertical dimension, it has the strange property of being able to include within itself other events, that is to say, it can expand or contract. I mean, you can treat as a single event a period of your life, your whole life, several lives together, or ultimately the entire universe.

So, what will you have on a vertical line? You will have the projection of past events, or the retrojection of past events, and, why not, the projection of future events, and much more, even more, if you consider the expandability of the event, what you will have on the vertical line is the same event as present, as past and as future. The same event. Well, it doesn't matter if it's... But what form will this take? It will no longer take the form of a present, past and future. Because this would be the horizontal line. It will take the form of *three presents*.

The deeper you plunge into the event, the more you grasp that there are three presents, and what are these three presents? *A present of the present, a present of the past, a present of the future.* According to Saint Augustine's formula: There is no longer a present, a past or a future. There is a present of the present, a present of the past and a present of the future. What is this inner present? It is no longer the succession of the presents that pass. The succession of

the presents that pass was: present, past, future. Here, what we have is a *simultaneity* of what should be called three *peaks* or points [*pointes*] of present [3:] present of the present, present of the past, present of the future. The event itself is *the simultaneity of these three interior presents.*[4]

I no longer have – here's what's important, and this is what will give us the first direct time-image. I'm going very quickly, as you can see, I'm going very quickly, but I'm addressing your sensibility, not your intelligence – you will no longer have a succession of presents that pass. What you will have is a simultaneity of three presents or three peaks of present. You're no longer going to have a succession of actual presents, instead you will have a simultaneity of *de-actualized* presents. The succession of actual presents is present-past-future. The simultaneity of de-actualized presents is *present of the present, present of the past, present of the future* for the same event, all simultaneous. Precisely, insofar as they are de-actualized… being de-actualized, what they give you is a little bit of pure time, a direct time-image.

Oh, well... And it's the same expandable event. It's the same event that you will grasp in terms of the three simultaneous peaks of present: peak of present, *im*plication of present, as opposed to the *ex*plication of passing presents. You will have a simultaneity of implied presents and no longer a succession of explicated presents. So... the same event will play out in the triple mode of the present of the present, the present of the past and the present of the future. What's going on here? What is this simultaneity of peaks of a de-actualized present? Here it is – and this would be my first definition of the direct time-image – *simultaneity of peaks of a de-actualized present, as opposed to the empirical form of time as a succession of passing presents*. And you see that the simultaneity of the peaks of de-actualized presents corresponds to the aspect of time… to the empirical aspect of time of the passing present.

Well, let's try to construct some examples where the event represents the simultaneity of the present tense, that is to say, the simultaneity in relation to the event, of the present of the present, the present of the past and the present of the future. A and X get to know each other in a present of the present, but they already knew each other in a present of the past, and yet they will also meet in a present of the future. If they meet in the future, they do not know each other now. If they knew each other, they wouldn't have to get to know each other now. So, these are the peaks. They knew each other, so they don't have to get to know each other. They don't know each other yet. At the same time, they already knew each other: simultaneity of the three presents. It is not a simultaneity of the past, the future and the present because that would bring us back to the law of succession where they follow one another: They knew each other, they will know each other, they know each other, they have known each other. This is no longer the situation. It's the simultaneity of the three de-actualized presents. Okay.[5]

Second example: Someone has a key, a key to open a door. Somebody doesn't have the key anymore, that is, he has lost it. So, he had it. He still has it, so he hasn't lost it, he has it. He finds it, that is, he will have it. So, he didn't have it: simultaneity of the present of the present, of the present of the past, of the present of the future, whereas the present, the past, and the future cannot be simultaneous. But once they are de-actualized, the present of the present, the present of the past, and the present of the future can be simultaneous. So, it is at the same time that he no longer has the key, that he has it, and that he finds it.

Okay, third example: A young girl is abducted. Someone plots the abduction of the girl. But the way to ward it off is to carry out the abduction oneself. And carrying out this abduction is the way to avoid it happening, so that she is not abducted but at the same time she is

abducted. So little is it true that she has been abducted that in the end, actually not in the end, at the same time, she will have been abducted, because she has abducted herself. Things get complicated, but schemes such as this are only complicated in appearance. This is the simultaneity of the three de-actualized presents.

What do you see here? Do you recognize something we've already looked at? Of course, you will recognize the films of Alain Robbe-Grillet: the key, the event with the key is taken from *Trans Europ Express*[6]. A and X who know each other, knew each other and will know each other, are taken from *Marienbad*. The abduction, which is at the same time the means of avoiding it by plotting it so that it occurs, but where it is the girl who abducts herself, is taken from *Playing with Fire*[7]. And then we also see a situation with a present where one betrays the other, a present where the other betrays the one, a present where neither betrays the other, a present where both betray the other, a present where both are the same person and betray each other under two different names. This is *The Man Who Lies*[8]. All these presents exist simultaneously as de-actualized presents, and this is the first image of time.

What is Robbe-Grillet doing in his films, through these images that he produces? And which would explain why he insists on telling us that these images are in the present. But once again, these cinema images are so little in the present, so little are they naturally present that it takes all the artifice Robbe-Grillet can muster in order to produce this type of image that would be in the present. And indeed, it is a very specific present, a completely de-actualized present, where therefore the present of the past, the present of the future, the present of the present are, strictly speaking, simultaneous. So much so that in Robbe-Grillet's mysteries, I see nothing… I see nothing that can be related to either linguistics or the signifier. What seems interesting to me is that these images in the present that Robbe-Grillet creates constitute a direct time-image, a fundamental figure of time, namely the simultaneity of peaks of present.

So, to put it simply, it can be distributed… well, yes: X in *Last Year at Marienbad*, the man X, he is in a present of the present... no, sorry, he is in a present of the past, meaning he knew A, the woman. But the woman A, she is in a present of the future. She didn't know… she doesn't know X, but she will know him. And the difference between the two simultaneous presents produces a third present: M, the great hypnotist. According to the law that behind a hypnotist there is always another hypnotist: A, the woman, is the hypnotized, X is the hypnotist, M is the hypnotist behind the hypnotist. So, you have this structure. But it's not that important, I'm just mentioning it as an example. But from this point of view, far from escaping time, Robbe-Grillet gives us a very important figure of time.

And this bothers me a little in comparison with the others, which is why I didn't speak about it last time. Because if I start on the second pole, we are faced with a dimension of cinema that... I mean, are there any other filmmakers besides Robbe-Grillet, who have gone in this direction of exploring the simultaneity of de-actualized presents? I think there are. But strangely enough, they are fewer than those who have pursued the other direction that has been taken by cinema, it's not an equal balance. Because this other direction is... and here we'll find a very interesting problem. I said that the other figure… is one that we don't draw from the presents that pass but from the pasts that are preserved. And in this case, what is the figure of time… what figure, what direct time-image do we draw from it? No longer the simultaneity of the peaks of de-actualized present, but, as we have seen, the co-existence of sheets of a virtual past.[9]

And so here I approach what I began to look at last time. So, this will be the second major direct time-image. In fact, chronologically speaking, it was actually the first to emerge in cinema. This coexistence of sheets of virtual past came first. Why do I use the term sheets of *past*? I think I explained this the last time. Once again, it is because these sheets of past must not be confused with sheets of recollections. Recollection-images will be taken from the sheets of past insofar as I settle on a given sheet. But insofar as I settle on a given sheet, say this one… or this one here … these sheets do not consist of recollection-images. I form my recollection-images from these sheets of past. These sheets of past are not preserved in me, they are preserved in time. Fine.

And here again, I will adopt exactly the same reasoning as I did before regarding peaks of present. From the point of view of the empirical form of time, we have succession. They succeed one another in relation to the former presents that they were. But the sheets of past do not succeed one another in relation to an actual present to which the evocation refers. They are all coexistent. Again, as Fellini says, we are at the same time the child, the adult and the old person. They come one after the other in relation to the former presents, yes, but not in relation to the actual present to which the evocation refers, where I settle on one sheet rather than another. According to Bergson all these coexisting sheets design, as we have seen, the cone of memory. Coexistence of virtual sheets of past. Recollection-images are something else altogether, they are actualizations of such and such a point on any given sheet.

So, I have my two formulas of the direct time-image. I define one as the coexistence… or rather as *the simultaneity of peaks of de-actualized presents*: present of the present, present of the past, present of the future. I define the second as *the coexistence of sheets of virtual past*. As I was saying, the first filmmaker… the figure, it seems to me, who introduced the time-image, the direct time-image, into cinema – whatever preparations had taken place before – I don't mean to say that it came to him just like that – was Welles. I'll take *Citizen Kane* as the first example, and it's no small achievement![10]

You… you have the sheets of past, the depth of field being, as I said another time, a factor of temporalization much more than of spatialization. You have the sheets of Kane's virtual past that all coexist, and we settle on one, or on another, on the pretext of discovering what Rosebud is. Here you will tell me that he fabricates a bundle of recollection-images from this. But this is of no interest, that's not where the main interest lies. And the proof that it's of no real interest is that, as I told you before, *Citizen Kane* immediately sets out how useless and vain these recollection-images are. Finding out what Rosebud was is of no importance. The recollection-image, when it is found, is found for no one and by no one and is left to burn alone in the hearth. The recollection is fundamentally useless.

And when I was trying to establish a progression, in Welles' films, I said not only that *The Magnificent Ambersons* denounces this uselessness even more emphatically, since, as the old Major says, and the voice-over confirms, nobody cares about this anymore. So why does he make a film about it? Because what interests him is something else altogether: sometimes the recollection-image is useless, sometimes it is at best impossible to recall, and these cases correspond to the two disorders, the two fundamental disorders that Bergson analyzed with regard to the recollection-image. And the disorders of psychological memory reveal… they are like keys that reveal the process of temporalization. For example, in *The Lady from Shanghai*, recollections cannot be summoned since what is at stake is the past of others, and particularly mysterious others at that. And *Mr Akardin* goes yet a step further, since it is a question for Arkadin of making *his own past* impossible to recall. What we have, therefore, is

an exploration of the sheets of a purely virtual past, independent of their actualization in recollection-images, where all these sheets of virtual past coexist.

You will ask me, what do these sheets give us, since they don't even give us recollection-images? Again, in *Ambersons* or in *Citizen Kane*, they do give us some, even if they are useless. But from *The Lady from Shanghai* on, they no longer give us any. So, what do they give us? They don't... the sheets of the virtual past, when I settle on them thanks to this leap in time, which is no greater or smaller than the leap I make in space to perceive something outside of myself, so, what will it give us? The sheets of past do not, how shall I say… the sheets of the past no longer deliver recollection-images to me, images that no-one cares about. What they will give us instead are *hallucinatory presences*. The past of the infernal trio of *The Lady from Shanghai* will emerge through the hallucinatory presence of these three demonic characters, and you might especially remember the emergence of the character called Grisby in the film, this kind of hallucinatory emergence that occurs all the time. It's one of the most beautiful things in Welles' cinema. For *Arkadin*, the characters who are part of a relay and who represent so many different sheets of past, assume a kind of hallucinatory presence.

And all of this culminates in *The Trial*, where there are only hallucinatory presences, since *The Trial* turns around the same problem. Namely – and here the depth of field will fully assume its temporalization aspect – that K receives a visit from the police who come to his room one morning. The low-angle view, the low-angle depth of field will mark K's search for the equivalent of Rosebud: on what sheet of past lies the secret of whatever it is I am accused of? And he launches into his investigation, which is an investigation in time and not in space. Is it this? Is it this one? Is it there? Is it there? Is it in my childhood, is it in my youth, is it...? Where is it? Where is my fault? It is not there, it is not that. He has no recollection-image. One the other hand, what we have are hallucinatory presence everywhere: hallucinatory presence of the girls. Hallucinatory presence of the lawyer. Hallucinatory presence of the lawyer... no, sorry, of the student. Everywhere, hallucinatory presences. These are the hallucinatory presences that will be the witnesses to the sheets of virtual past, and time will be the mixing-up of these sheets of virtual past.

So that in the end, we would have to say… you see, Welles' cinema – and here I'm going really, really quickly, since we don't have much time left – Welles' cinema is very interesting. Of course, it's a cinema that remains centered. There is a center, even if this is only the center of recall that generally coincides with one or more deaths. Kane is dead, Kane has just died. From here, the summoning of the sheets of past begins. This center is a fundamental component of Welles' cinema, and some fine commentators have remarked on it, on the fact that it is not simply a given center that exist of its own accord, or one that coincides with an event, such as the death of someone. It's a *vocal* center, and Welles has always considered the position of a radiophonic center as something essential for cinema. Michel Chion has shown this very, very well. And indeed, remember that Welles came from radio, he never abandoned the theme of a radiophonic center.[11]

And apart from that, what interests me, in accordance with all we have studied this year, is the prodigious mutation that he makes the notion of center undergo. He keeps a center, but he makes the notion of center undergo a prodigious mutation. It is that – very quickly I would like to take up again an idea, because now or never is the moment to make our groupings – a theme that Michel Serres has analyzed very well in relation to the 17th century. Welles is often asked in his interviews: What century do you belong to, in your view? And the answers

are varied. They tell him that he is a Renaissance man, and generally he is not very pleased by this. Or that he's a Shakespearean man, and he's not thrilled with that either. Just to add one more answer to the others, he's a 17th century man. Which doesn't mean he's behind his own times, of course. He's a neo-17th century man.

In what sense would he be a 17th century man? I'll tell you. In Serres' book, *Le système de Leibniz*[12], there are what seem to me some very fine passages on the truth about what is called the "classical" world. You know that the classical and the baroque are more or less the same thing. So, the classical is something that can refer to many things except the age of wisdom and reason. And he says, all right, what happens, what is it that defines the world of the 17th century? What defines the 17th century world, is the collapse of centers. They no longer have a center. It's a situation of pure panic and this is the classical world. What does it mean to say that there is no longer a center? It's pure panic, they have no center… It means that the world is losing all its centers. We can always discuss this matter: Is it the earth that revolves around the sun, or the sun that revolves around the earth? This presupposes at least the idea that there is a center, whether it is the sun or the earth, at the same time as they fully discover the infinite… this is again what defines the 17th century, it is also this kind of innocence with regard to the infinite. This way of thinking about the infinite. At the same time that it... [*Interruption of the recording*] [41:56]

... Their center, their center of balance. Masses lose their center of gravity, movements lose their center of revolution. That is to say, there is no longer a center meaning a center of configuration. To put it in the terms we're using here: there is no longer a *sensory-motor center*, in the sense that the sensory-motor center is a center of configuration.

Hence, if they can save themselves from this, it will be through an extraordinary mutation of the notion of center. According to Serres' analysis, this mutation of the notion of center will generally take place – and in this respect the two key authors would be Leibniz and Pascal – the mutation of the notion of center will occur particularly in two new disciplines, among others, two new disciplines that are of interest to us since we can only call them scientific-artistic disciplines. The first of these is projective geometry and the other is its complement, or reciprocal, what Leibniz calls the theory of shadows – that is to say, the projective, if you like, and the tenebrous. And here I'm getting more and more sketchy [*indistinct words*] ... in terms of the figure that constitutes projective geometry, there is no longer a center, in terms of a center of configuration, bodies no longer have a center.

It just seems so... As I'm speaking you should apply what I'm saying to Welles' cinema. No, don't *apply* it, but try to *feel* how Welles' images will be of this nature. If there is an author for whom bodies no longer have a center – except when they die, in which case they find a kind of center… Welles' images are always at an angle. In the case of both depth of field and the cutaway shot, the image is always askew, at a tilt. Well, let's go back, let's go back to...

In projective… what happens in projective geometry? What used to be the only center has become simply a point of view. Strangely enough, what we find again here is the cone, and we will see that this is not unrelated to our problem. You have a point of view: top of the cone, position of the eye. This is a center, okay, and this center is a point of view. This is a real mutation. The center is no longer a center of configuration, the center becomes a point of view. What else do we have? There is an object we would call *geometral*, and there are sections of the cone in the form of planes. So that Bergson, as we have seen, presented us with a very, very rudimentary schema of the cone – we should always begin with what is

simplest – since he only considered parallel cuts, parallel to the apex and parallel to the base. Whereas in projective geometry you can consider not only parallel cuts but also transversal cuts, as well as cuts that pass through the peak, or cuts that pass through the sides of the cone etc., etc. You can consider all sorts of planes, therefore all sorts of sheets, and each time, the projection of the so-called geometral object will vary in such a way that each projection can be considered a metamorphosis or anamorphosis of another, a visual metamorphosis and anamorphosis.[13]

What has happened on account of projective geometry? I would say in our terms, in the terms we have been using, that it has substituted a purely optical center for the sensory-motor center. That's what has happened. And this marks the advent of a new type of cinema. The way Welles participates in this cinematic mutation, which has substituted purely optical situations for sensory-motor ones, is in the transformation he forces centers to undergo, which is the equivalent of the revolution in projective geometry in which centers cease to be centers of configuration of bodies and become centers of points of view that place bodies in a perpetual relationship of metamorphosis with one another. But finally – and this, I would say, to resolve a question, but I'm going too fast here – projective geometry is, if you like, the equivalent of rapid montage, of Welles' chopped-up montage. Each image is like a projection of a point of view with metamorphoses occurring from one image to the next.

For example, in the rapid cutting of *The Lady from Shanghai*, Grisby, the lady from Shanghai, and the lawyer Bannister, constantly switch places from one image to another. There is no longer any center but an optical one, and these three diabolical figures are like its metamorphosis. Each one, each is the metamorphosis of the others. The rapid montage corresponds completely to the optical center of a projective geometry. Again, I'm not saying that Orson Welles applies Pascal, it would be disastrous to say that. All I'm saying is that what you have is a kind of 17th century resonance happening somewhere else, at a much later time.

But it isn't hard for you to understand, even from the little I say, that there is something projective geometry doesn't give us. It cannot distinguish a circle, that is to say a plane figure, from the border of a section of a sphere. As Leibniz says in his own terms, it cannot distinguish a flat surface from a convex or concave surface. In any case it will still be a circle. What I mean by this is that, in terms of a circle, the projective will not give you the means to distinguish between the section of a sphere and the form of a plane figure. Also, as we say in the 17th century, we must add to projective geometry a theory of shadows that will give us reliefs, concavities and convexities through shadowed areas, and for this, we reuse the cone, but we redistribute its elements. Instead of having an optical center – that is to say, the point of view of the eye, the geometral object and the projection on the planes of intersection, which was the triadic formula of projective geometry – we will have a light source, with the light source being in S and no longer the eye. We will no longer have a geometral object, instead we will have opacity. We will no longer have projection, rather we will have a distribution of chiaroscuro, areas of shadow… We don't return to the old conception of the center. The center is simply no longer an optical center, it is a luminous center that will accentuate reliefs, constitute shadow areas. And what is this? It is the formula that corresponds to depth of field. That's what it is.

As for the way Welles manages to reconcile his two great procedures, he always said that they were relative and interchangeable and so on, though to my mind they are not entirely interchangeable. They correspond to two extremely profound aspects: Welles' so-called rapid

or chopped-up editing actually corresponds to the projective, while the depth of field sequence shot corresponds to the tenebrous, that is, to the theory of shadows. And in both cases, we see the constitution of hallucinatory presences, the series of projections that transform into one another, or the shadowy areas that determine the different zones of chiaroscuro. And this is what the coexistence of sheets of past will give us, and not simple extractions. So, this is highly obscure, it's very obscure, but it's good to end… to leave you on a note of obscurity.

So, let's imagine this – I'm going faster and faster – imagine this… what can happen here? Well, we were in the middle of saying how this is the direction that… the direction that the second direct time-image takes in the search for the coexistence of virtual sheets of past. And what will this coexistence of the virtual sheets of past give us? Either the projection of hallucinatory presences or else the darkening of these same hallucinatory presences. And if we consider a film like *The Trial*, it is clear how it has retained a profound element of Kafka's work. Everything, everything here is auxiliary to the court! That is to say: girl, lawyer, screaming girl, lawyer, cathedral priest… cathedral priest, co-accused, office colleague – I'm trying to make a list, I'll probably forget some – woman with webbed fingers, files, legal files and so on. A hallucinatory presence of one and the same thing, which does not exist outside of these metamorphoses. Who are the Jews? They are the screaming girls. Who are the screaming girls? They are the homosexual painter. Who is the homosexual painter? He's the lawyer and so on. Okay. You see how the sheets, the coexistence of the virtual sheets of past will give us hallucinatory presences. This is what… [*indistinct word*]

So, let's go one step further, because after all, we can say: Well, yes, he completely transformed the notion of center, but he nonetheless kept a center. All right, this center suited us because it was a purely optical center, yes. But suppose we remove the center. That is to say, there is no longer even a center of recall. If we remove the center and there is no longer any center of recall, then the virtual sheets of past, the sheets of virtual past will be unleashed. They will begin to function on their own account and compete among themselves. There is no longer a center of recall, or else each virtual sheet can serve as a center in relation to another and vice versa. This will complicate things, it will complicate things in theory, but not at all in terms of vision. You simply have to let yourself be transported by it. And indeed, who is the greatest disciple of Welles, and at the same time the most independent? It seems to me that it is Resnais. He will be the filmmaker who takes up Welles' problem of the virtual sheets of past. But everything will lead him… everything will lead him, to eliminate the centers. There is no longer a center, there are only virtual sheets that will play the role of a possible center in relation to one another.

And if we very quickly try to compile a list of Resnais' films, I would almost like to do so in chronological order. But I'm isolating the first example, because it seems to be the most complicated, whereas in fact it's the simplest. This is *Je t'aime, je t'aime*. Because here, it seems that there still is a center.[14]

Well, you see, there's this the guy who they put in a time capsule – I talked about this a little bit last time – from where he will go back in time to relive a specific moment. But, as I was saying, mice may be able to relive a specific moment. Animals might be able to relive a precise instant, at least, so we suppose. But human beings cannot. Why not? Because every precise moment pertains to a sheet, so if the experiment fails, this is the reason. Instead of reliving his precise instant, which is to say the moment when he came out of the water while Catrine was lying on the beach, instead of reliving this instant… the guy will not be able to

relive it without slipping. As the instant pertains to several sheets, he will not be able to relive it without slipping or jumping sometimes onto this sheet, sometimes onto another sheet and so on. And then step by step, on sheets from the time before Catrine to sheets from the time after Catrine and so on. And so we have a coexistence of all the sheets of past, and this will be the subject of *Je t'aime, je t'aime*, sheets that will accelerate, get mixed-up with each other, and then fragment. For the moment I'll leave aside the question of how these sheets of the past fragment. In any case, they will never provide us with a single instant. They will always remain sheets, they will always be continuums of the past, the coexistence of all the continuums... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:02:12]

**Part 2**

... From this point, let's try to follow the films in chronological order. Resnais' cinema is quite simple to understand, it is not at all… it is not theoretical. It is always the same problems that obsesses him, you only have to make the list. It is always the coexistence of sheets of past, without a center. He himself will be the figure that occupies the center.[15]

I'll start with *Last year in Marienbad*. I can't quite keep to a chronological order. What is the situation in *Last year at Marienbad*? I can say that it is still a common past. There is something common, namely: A and X, X the man and A the woman: have they already met, have they not met? In addition to the even more complex questions, I'll stick to the simplest one. The answer is not difficult: X settles on a sheet where he has met A, A settles on a sheet where she has not met X. She settles on a sheet where she has not yet met X, and X settles on a sheet where he has already met A.

I point this out, and this is what, for me, creates the challenge: we have never seen such a coherent film made by two authors who understand it in two completely opposite ways. This is surely the secret of fruitful collaborations, because Robbe-Grillet makes the film – considering that he is much more than the screenwriter, as everyone recognizes – in my view, Robbe-Grillet makes the film by conceiving it not at all in terms of a linguistic signifier, but in the form of a simultaneity of peaks of present, discontinuous peaks of present. And Resnais makes the film by conceiving it as a coexistence of continuous sheets of past. The great thing is that it works. But that's how it is, the most wonderful collaborations come from having absolutely different things in your head. That's how it works.

At a stretch, we could distribute them. One could say that the woman, A, is closer to Robbe-Grillet, and that the man, X, is closer to Resnais, because A jumps from one point of present to another, she jumps in a discontinuous mode, from one point of present to another, sometimes denying that she has met him, sometimes half convinced. While the man tries to envelop the woman in his sheets of past. If it's not this one you recognize, it must be that one, and so on. He jumps from one sheet of past to another, in an attempt to wrap the woman in a sheet of past. So, we could resolve the matter by saying that one character refers to Robbe-Grillet, and the other to Resnais. But in the end, in *Last Year in Marienbad*, this still works because in this story of sheets of past, there is something they have in common. Have they met, yes or no?

If I move on to *Hiroshima mon amour* [1959], here you see… Resnais detaches, he really detached things through a very interesting idea because here we have two sheets of past, Hiroshima-Nevers, which have nothing to do with one another. And each of the two will serve as the past for the other, just as they will in turn serve as the present in relation to the

other. There is a confrontation of the two sheets of past. With this difference: that the Japanese man wants to chase her away… he does not want the woman to enter his sheet of past at all. "You've seen nothing in Hiroshima". While she draws him with all her strength into her own sheet of past. You are the German; you are the same as the German. The challenge in *Hiroshima mon amour* is that this time... You see how the memory detaches itself from the individual. How can two people make a memory when they have nothing in common? This is the first step towards a supra-psychological memory.

With *Muriel,* it seems to me that people get lost wondering what is true, what is false, regarding the recollections that arise in *Muriel.* For me it makes no difference. This isn't what interests me in the film. What interests me is that the problem becomes even more complicated. Here Resnais takes a big step. This time, it is not just a memory shared by two people. It is a memory that exists on several levels and through several characters. Two levels: World War II and the Algerian War – and three, four, or even more characters. There's at least three, right? At least four? Four at least, who will divide up and confront… who will each confront what happens. And what counts is not at all whether the hotelier is more or less convinced by a lie, and that he was never in Algeria. Because, as Robbe-Grillet cannily remarked, there is no greater reason to believe that Bernard, the soldier, the former conscript, was really in Algeria either, or even that he saw Muriel there or... [*indistinct words*] Indeed, the question, you see, is never that of recollection-images, it's the hallucinatory presences. What hallucinatory presences will emerge from this play of sheets and continuums of virtual past?

One step further, I would say, concerns the revolution, I don't know… I'm not sure which revolution it was... anyway the next film, after *Muriel,* about the Spanish civil war...

A student: *The War is Over*?

Deleuze: *The War Is Over*, sorry… Yes, *The War Is Over*[16]. Here you have… – I have to go faster and faster – you have a memory that is so present, a memory on three levels. It's a kind of world-memory and even – and this is something that will interest Resnais a lot in the films that follow – a memory-age *of the world*. You see, he goes from a memory for two, to a memory for several, to a world memory, *all the memory of the world*[17], to the infinity of… [*indistinct word*] ages of the world.

And *The War Is Over* will confront and will stir together three ages of Spain, and in each of these ages, there will be Spain in its totality. As I said, at each level, you have the whole of the past. There is the age of the civil war and of those who remained more or less connected to the civil war. There is an age which seems to be the age of the future, the age of the young radical terrorists. But here, there is no longer a clear distinction between the already and the not yet. It is a continuum. And then there is the level of the hero, who wants to break with the recollection-images of the civil war, and who also finds that the politics of the radical terrorists are no good – because this concerns the specific politics of the last phase of the Franco regime. Okay. Three ages of Spain, and these are what continue to mix together... There is no center, each one serves as a relative center in relation to the others.

With *My American Uncle*[18], the theme of a memory-age of the world becomes more complicated… it becomes even more complicated – not at all from the point of view of the images, these are all films of an extreme clarity – since you have three characters, each of whom stirs up his or her own sheets of past, confronting them with those of the others, here

too through processes of fragmentation, distribution, overlapping, exclusion. All of which has the curious effect of bringing out what is constant, of bringing out the constants of each sheet. This is the contribution of Henri Laborit[19] who for each sheet distinguishes: territory, line of flight out of the territory, blockages of the lines of flight. So that, thanks to these constants, the sheets of the past can go beyond humans, that is to say, they can apply to animals. And here we have the great reconciliation of man and mouse, which was forbidden and excluded in *Je t'aime, je t'aime*. This really is the ages of the world, including the island, the island and its treasure, with sheets of a sub-human past, that is to say the animal, and also the superhuman, the cosmic.

And then his latest film, *Life is a Bed of Roses*[20], is even more exemplary in this regard: three ages of the world, three ages of the world that come into confrontation. And this time, why does *Life is a Bed of Roses* still represent progress, from the point of view of his work as a whole, Resnais' frantic pursuit of this problem that haunts him so intensely? It is because this time, each of the ages of the world, or the sheets of past, have absorbed their characters. They no longer refer to characters. *It is they themselves that have become characters*. Whereas before, they referred to characters, each of whom possessed several sheets of past. Now, however, the sheets have swallowed up their own characters. Okay, but if there is no longer a center, how do we explain this?

Here again, I would like to do something similar to what I did in the case of Orson Welles, but I apologize because normally, if we weren't in such a hurry, I would take more precautions, because I am afraid that this will seem like I'm applying these ideas. And then, I'm a bit embarrassed, because Isabelle Stengers is here, and this bothers me because, because I would like to recount a story that she knows much better than I do. In the book by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos,*[21] we see at one point an operation that is very, very, very charming, very, very interesting, that mathematicians call "the baker transformation". You will understand why I mention it. And Isabelle will understand why, I hope, that I'm giving such a rudimentary presentation of it, one that is oversimplified to the point of being false.[22]

But I'm happy with this, since it's sufficient for the task at hand. I give myself a square – I have the right, we have the right to give ourselves a square, we have the right, not at all because everyone has the right, but we, we in particular, have the right to give ourselves a square, since what we call a sheet of past is actually a square, a continuum, this is what a sheet of past is. The baker stretches his sheet or his square, and he stretches it – he's a talented baker – into a rectangle whose width is half that of the square, and whose length is double that of the square. Okay? Are you following me? You have to follow me, because what I'm saying will be important, even if it will probably make her laugh. This rectangle, no need to make it, I divide into two halves, which I call A and B… Is that all right? With these, imagine that I continue being a baker and I take the B half and put it on top of A. I could have done the opposite, which is to say the story is more complicated than it seems. So, I have a square that I can mark with an AB division. Do you follow me? This is what I did, I stretched it, then I took the B half and I put it back on top of A. So I found my square again, but this time with an AB division.

I'll call this square 2. I take my square 2, and stretch it. I don't complicate the shape, I pull it in the same direction. At the same time, you can imagine that if I pulled it in another direction, it would give something else equally interesting. But we mustn't overcomplicate things, we mustn't... so again I pull it into a rectangle, under the same conditions of half the

width and double the length. Now, what am I going to get? I can divide my rectangle. But I have the remaining division of my original square, to the point that now my rectangle has on one side AB and also on the other side AB. There, I stretched it well… And I do the same thing as before: I put the second half on top of the first and I obtain a new square, this time with four divisions, which taken in order are A, B, A, B. Well, that's enough for me.

What I just said is almost wrong, but no problem with that, it's an example of clarity. Because it goes without saying that one can stretch in all possible directions, so you will also have vertical divisions. You can number the transformations according to the number of divisions. Okay. First point: you can number the transformations according to the number of divisions. Second point: if you include everything – and even if you only include the figures I just made – you can already understand that if I take a region of my original square, however small, there will always be a moment, at the end of $n$ number of transformations, when two points, however close they may be in the region, will be fragmented insofar as they will now be in different divisions.

So, first principle: once a transformation has occurred, you can always calculate the *age* of the transformation according to the number of transformations – what we call the age of the transformation. Second point: for a region however small, there will always be, at the end of a certain number of transformations, a moment when two points in a region, however close they are, will become fragmented, as they will find themselves in different divisions.

Do you understand? So, my apologies to Isabelle Stengers who must be cringing at this… but you must understand that all that matters from here on is that, if I understand correctly, it involves two considerations, … on the one hand, probabilistic considerations… a probabilistic space, and on the other hand, a topological space – be careful not to confuse these two things – and which in mathematics produce problems that go infinitely beyond the idea of the baker. Is this clear?

Now, why am I telling you all this? It's not for fun, or as a tribute to Isabelle. I'm telling you because it seems obvious to me that… not that Resnais is doing a baker transformation, no, that's not what he is doing. However, Resnais's problem in cinema is something like the problem of the baker transformation in physical mathematics. If you take one of Resnais' admirable early short films, *Van Gogh*[23]. What does he do in *Van Gogh*? What do you find in *Van Gogh*? He proceeds by making tracking shots within paintings of the same period. You see what he does, the way he zooms in within the frame. It's a journey through the different paintings of the same period. Here once again I would say that as with Orson Welles, the tracking shot becomes a factor of temporalization, much more than of spatialization. What we have is an exploration of the past. And it is not by chance that Resnais once said that every time there is a work of art, or even just a reading of a text, there is memory. It is not a question of a recollection-image. It is not a psychological memory.

So, this is what he does. As he approaches the last period, the Provençal period, the tracking shots get faster while the fragmentations are subject to cuts that are more and more rapid. Both fades and cuts multiply until the final black[24]. From one period to another of Van Gogh, what we have are the sheets of past, the continuums of past. He did this well... and this explains why it was necessary for Resnais not to film a painting, and then another painting, but to establish a continuum corresponding to a period, one that covers several paintings. The tracking shot goes deep into the paintings and does not recognize the borders that separate one painting from another. Each time it therefore establishes continuums. And what will

happen from one continuum to the next? There will be a reorganization...[25] [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:27:59]

... and the fragmentations that occur on this sheet. And this is something constant in Resnais, it's almost his formula. And what is this formula? It's not a formula that he just applies, it's a formula that comes from the heart, it's… it responds to his problem. It's exactly what I said earlier about Orson Welles, but in a completely different way. Orson Welles' reconciliation of rapid montage with the long sequence shot has never been a problem for him. Why not? We saw the answer in Welles' cinema. I really believe it's because the rapid chopped-up montage creates the conditions for a kind of projective view, while the sequence-shot takes care of what the projective cannot give – because projective images are necessarily flattened – it accounts for the distribution of shadows, the areas of shadow and the reliefs. So, here the conciliation is obvious, there is no problem. He requires both techniques as the means of his creation.

In the case of Resnais, I would say, the same thing applies but for a completely different reason. With Resnais, how do we reconcile the rapid editing that, for example, dominates *Muriel*, and the famous tracking shots, Resnais' long tracking shots? It's the same thing. The tracking… Resnais needs both. And that makes these the two components of his art, because here the trackings shots take care of the sheets of transformation and the age of those sheets, while the rapid montage conveys the state of fragmentation that corresponds to them.

I summarize: our two direct time-images had to be quite distinct from the empirical form of time. We found them, we defined them in the following way: on the one hand, simultaneity of peaks of de-actualized present, on the other hand, coexistence of sheets of virtual past and the transformation of these sheets among one another. In both cases, we will speak, to take up the expression of… I don't know if I told you about him, a great Russian novelist who seems to me very close to Resnais… I would like to know if Resnais knows his work, his name is Andrei Bely, and he wrote a novel, a masterpiece called *Petersburg*, which spoke of the identity of the city and of what he, Bely, called the cerebral game, that is to say, the identity between the topology, of the topology of the city and the cerebral game – and in his novel, he invents a biology of shadows, saying that as long as one has not made the biology of shadows, one will not understand the precise identity between the topological city and the cerebral game.[26]

To say that – if we were to continue, if we were to continue another year, which we won't – these two direct time-images would necessarily lead us to a new exercise of thought. It's clear in the case of Resnais, and equally so for Robbe-Grillet. What this cinema, what this cinema tends to, is a cerebral game. Not at all in the ludic sense, but as a determination of the exercise of thought, that is to say, *cinema becomes thought at the same time as it liberates the time-image*. This is more or less our schema.

So, we would have two things left to do. Comtesse, did you bring your friend? Where is he? If you would be so kind, as I still have some conclusions to draw, what we have to do is... Well, Comtesse told me that you could suggest a few research paths for a field that I'm not at all familiar with, which is the use of crystalline ideas in science fiction. Since what we have called the crystal-image, or the crystal, doesn't include any of this, because... But I would like you to cover as much as possible – and I'm sorry to insist on this – in ten minutes, because I don't have much time. You can just give us some directions for further research… if we want to see the role of the crystal-image in science fiction, what do we need to do, and how do you

conceive it… but please be very brief… forgive me but this is my last session. Like this... Oh, no, maybe we can hear better here, yes.

A student: [*points out to Deleuze the title of another Resnais film,* Providence]

Deleuze: Ah! Yes, I wanted to talk about that! *Providence*… which is the closest of his films to Bely! My God, I forgot *Providence,* one of Resnais' most beautiful films... you should have told me. Well, you can start.

John Vandow: I'm very happy to be here. My name is John Vandow [*approximate name*] and I'm a science-fiction writer. I haven't published much. But I would consider people like Borges, Joyce and also Malcolm Lowry as science fiction writers, and there's also somebody called Pynchon, Thomas Pynchon, who's not very well known, even in the United States. He wrote a big book called *Gravity's Rainbow*, but he refuses to give interviews. We haven't mentioned this book, but for me it also forms a part of this cluster of new ideas. I looked, I looked up the word crystal in the dictionary, and I found two things. My dictionary is an English dictionary... But I think you have to look at one dictionary, and then another, and then another, because if you look at one dictionary, you have an idea, and you are sure of something. But if you look in several dictionaries, you find different things, and suddenly you are no longer sure. I believe that we build our intelligence through uncertainty, not certainty, because if we are certain of something, it's like we know it, and so we don't think about it anymore.

In my dictionary I found: "ice" and "crust". This was something... the etymology of the word crystal. And I thought... at that moment, I also thought about Poe, Edgar Allan Poe, who wrote a book called *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket* (1838). He wrote a sequel to that book which was called something like *The Pyramid* or *The Ice House*.[27] The narrative comes from a true story of someone who thought that there was a paradise in the South Pole … that we would find something, a hole in the earth, and in this hole we would find a paradise… and some... And the United States government gave this man money. He went on a trip, but he never returned. Maybe he found this hole, I don't know. But it is a real story.

And there are people who think things like, things that are really crazy, really crazy. This morning I thought… I'm in the middle of a book called – I have two books here – *How to Build a Flying Saucer?* And another – it's very good, it's very interesting – and another one called *The Life of Nicolas Tesla*. And this morning I looked in the… in the… you know, this little book where there are all the streets… there's a street called Edison Street, but not a Tesla street. And it's Tesla who gave us all these lamps, he gave us the fluorescent lamp, he also invented the electron microscope, and he also gave us the alternating current. It was Edison who discovered direct current, wasn't it? Well, Tesla gave us alternating current. He died in the United States, in New York, in extreme poverty. And when he died, the cops came to his apartment, and they took all his notes. It was… it was, I think it was the FBI or something, and they took all his notes, all his... And he, the only thing he wanted to do was to... In this book, this big book here, there's a whole chapter called, wait… the crystal planet, the crystal planet. And here it talks about Tesla's genius. And Tesla wanted, he wanted... he made experiments with the earth, with the idea of providing electricity for everybody, by digging a hole in the earth, and by capturing the electricity. I don't know how he did it, and with that, he... You know, in the United States… in the state of New York, I think, there's

been six or seven deaths, because people didn't... a family of six died because they didn't pay their electricity bill. And Tesla wanted to make electricity available to everyone.

Deleuze: Listen, you'll have to forgive me for interrupting you but I'm afraid we don't have time for this. What you are saying is very interesting, but what we were hoping for in terms of this perspective – but it goes far beyond our work of this year, we would need another year – what Comtesse had spoken to me about concerned a very precise point: the possibility that you could tell us in which direction, and in which classic science-fiction films, can we find themes linked to the crystal. Didn't Comtesse tell you this? Didn't he tell you?

John V: I'm starting to work on a story of another... it's not about Tesla, it's about a guy… a drunk living in Chicago... his name is… Ted Serios. And he, he cut up, he made photographs, he made photographs using only his brain...[28]

Deleuze: Ah, okay. Yes, yes, but I see you're working on a whole different problem than ours, which regarded science fiction films and the crystal, right? There seems to have been some confusion. Listen, I would be very happy if next year you would be so kind as to come back one day, because I will be talking about the brain next year. But that's enough for the moment, thank you.

John V: Thank you very much. [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:44:58]

**Part 3**

So, listen, having said that, we still have… we still have only – it's not out of personal vanity that I want to do this – but what I'd like you to have, if you don't already have it, though surely you already do – is a feeling of the whole of what we have covered and the reasons we've gone through all this, anyway. I mean, the group of notions, so we'll be able to say… well, that's one thing completed. I think that if I had to draw conclusions… because my dream would after all be to... but I'll tell you my dream afterwards. Now I want to quickly draw my conclusions. Okay.

As a first level, we focused on – I'm not following the chronological order of what we did, I'm summarizing the whole – at a first level, I think we considered the distinction between two types of descriptions. I would like to point out that this is a subject – and this is not to be complacent about it – it's a fashionable subject, in the best sense, since notably thanks to Gérard Genette[29] there are, both in the field of modern logic and in modern literary criticism, some very interesting and very profound studies on the meaning, nature and role of descriptions, both in terms of a logic and a literary criticism of descriptions. I think that the point of view we took was such that I didn't have to quote them, not for lack of admiration, but because my problem was another one.  For my part, I've just tried to distinguish between two types of descriptions, and it would be up to you, if you're interested, to see in what ways they overlap or don't overlap with other people's distinctions in this regard.

Organic description, of which I said that this would be any description that *presupposes* the independence of its object, even if this isn't actually true – the question is not to know if the presupposition is correct – in this respect we have a set corresponding to an organic description if it presupposes the independence of its object, that is to say, if it refers to a supposedly independent object. And to this I opposed the crystalline description that I distinguished… that I defined as a description that stands for itself, that presents itself as its

own object and that only refers to other descriptions that may repeat, modify or contradict it in the well-known mode of repetition-variation. These descriptions I called more precisely *pure optical and sound descriptions*. So, this allowed us to see a certain number of things related to descriptions, and in particular, we based our reflections here upon what seems to me to be the major text in this regard, Robbe-Grillet's theoretical work and his theory of description.[30]

As a second major point, we dealt with the relation between the real and the imaginary, here again, to distinguish two types of relation. According to a first type of relation that we will call *organic*, the real and the imaginary are opposed as two poles of existence, one defined by legal, or causal connections, the other defined by pure appearance in consciousness. We opposed to this another regime of the real and the imaginary, where, this time, though the distinction between real and imaginary remained valid, the two distinct terms became indiscernible. What do I mean by an indiscernible distinction? It means that there are always two images, one called real and the other called virtual, but they don't stop running after each other and swapping roles. And this is when we started talking about the crystal-image properly speaking. Here we had a second stage of research that culminated in the idea, once again, of an indiscernible distinction at the level of the crystal-image, which led us to consult a certain number of texts, those of Bergson among others, and also to consider this independently of Bergson… to attempt to give a certain status to the crystal, in the sense of a philosophy of the crystal, just as at the end of the 19th century we had philosophies of nature.[31]

As a third point, we were no longer talking about descriptions, but we entered the domain of narrations, where we distinguished a first type of narration that was again organic or spatial. And this type of organic or spatial narration was defined by the development of sensory-motor connections or sensory-motor sequences. A narration is organic when it follows sensory-motor connections. Now you may say to me that it is difficult not to bring language into narrative, but I don't care either way. There are narratives without language, and when language intervenes, it inserts itself into sensory-motor connections and develops sensory-motor connections of its own, so I see no reason why we have to consider language a special instance in this respect, from the point of view of narrative itself. That it intervenes and what it engenders would constitute another problem that we haven't had time to go into this year.[32]

This spatial, organic narration, which proceeds through sensory-motor sequences, referred to a double space. Concretely, a hodological space, h-o-d-o-l-o-g-i-c-al. Abstractly, a Euclidean space. What is a hodological space? It is a lived, dynamic space, defined by paths – hence its name – goals, obstacles or resistances, detours, in short, by a distribution of centers of forces. This notion of hodological space was the creation of the German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin. Okay. So, there we have the group for organic spatial narrative.[33]

To this we opposed a narrative that, once again, we should call temporal or crystalline. Why? Because here there isn't such a thing as a lived space... Oh yes, no, I forgot about the others... Why would Euclidean space correspond to the abstract form? Because as I tried to say, Euclidean space seems to me the abstract schema of the resolution of tensions within hodological space, that is to say, that Euclidean space is precisely the space where the tensions between forces are resolved according to laws of minimum and maximum. In terms of maximum, the shortest path… of obstacles, for example. The tension will be resolved according to a path and Euclidean space seems to me to be the space of this abstract resolution.

At the other pole, I would say, we have a crystalline or temporal narrative, another lived space and other abstract spaces. These are spaces that are – how shall we put it – pre-hodological or post-hodological, either one or the other. That is to say, they are spaces which cannot even be said to be pre-hodological, since we are not even in the position of having to choose between paths, or to look for the best path. There is no path. Space has not yet been structured into goal, means, obstacle. There is an overlap of perspectives. In this sense, pre-hodological space is *a space before choice*, one does not choose. There are simply overlapping perspectives, and one always belongs to several neighboring but disparate sets.

You will find these forms of pre-hodological spaces in cinema, not by chance, in a series of modern films that all revolve around the same theme, passion. This is *the space of passion*. And indeed, passion is the opposite of action. Hodological space is the space of action. But there is a space of passion. You are in a state of passion when you belong simultaneously to disparate and yet neighboring sets. The space is not structured in such a way that you take one path rather than another. You belong to two sets simultaneously. This is passion. This marks the extremities of the Nouvelle Vague, and the cinema after the Nouvelle Vague. It goes without saying that among the great films of this movement, we can already think of Jean-Luc Godard, notably in *Every Man for Himself, Passion*[34], where the term "passion" acquires a highly specific meaning, and *Prénom Carmen*. But you will also find them in many other estimable, highly estimable Nouvelle Vague filmmakers – I leave it to you to guess who I'm referring to – some of whom are great in their own right, but who willingly acknowledge Godard's influence.

But you also have another type of lived space, which is *the space after choice*, that is to say, the choice that has been made once and for all, and which continues to recommence as a firm spiritual determination. And this is the Dreyer-Bresson tendency. And between the two, between the pre-hodological space of non-choice and the supra-hodological, post-hodological space of firm spiritual decision, as in Dreyer and Bresson, there are important lines of communication, it goes without saying, since Godard, for example, owes a lot to them. So this second direction would already be very varied. And abstractly, all new spaces correspond to these lived forms. Abstractly speaking, I would say, that they all constitute types of paradoxical space.

If I again begin the list, which we looked at a little bit this year, and which we had already seen the year before… Disconnected space: I mention very quickly Antonioni, Bresson, Ozu, Godard, Cassavetes. Empty or amorphous space: Ozu, Antonioni, though not in the same way. Those two especially, in terms of their empty spaces, I think, are the two great masters, and again, not at all in the same way. Space… – but write this down with multiple scare quotes – "quantum" space – here I'm getting out of my depth, we should find another word, don't you think? Quantum space of the Robbe-Grillet type, the jumps between presents, the peaks of present, and our jumping from one to another. Probabilistic space of the Resnais type, for which see our previous analysis on the transformations of the sheets. Crystallized spaces: Herzog, Tarkovsky. So, all this has given us a new group of notions and paths of study.

Fourth point: In terms of the regime that I could equally call organic or spatial or sensorimotor, what do we find in this space? There is an indirect image of time, since the image of time derives from movement, and we dwelt on this for a long, long time, since through Platonism and Neoplatonism we had mixed the destiny of philosophy in with it.[35]

In the other case, that of the temporal or crystalline narrative with its paradoxical spaces, there is on the contrary a direct time-image, and instead of the time-image being deduced from movement, it's… – it's not movement itself, that would be too easy, it's not movement that is deduced from time – it's *the anomalies of movement* that are deduced from the direct time-image. This is the reign of false continuity, false continuity being one of the anomalies of movement, among others. But it is obvious that false continuity can be used for its own sake, it's no miracle solution. Every regime of images generates its own nullities, its catastrophes, its idiocies, its abominations, so one is intrinsically no better than any other. It is quite obvious that false continuities for their own sake are of no interest and become nonsensical unless they are founded on... any technique becomes stupid if it is not founded on a reason which, like it or not, which we can only call metaphysics. Meaning that if there is nothing in the time-image that requires these breaks in space, then false continuity has no place, and you can multiply them all you want, but you will only make something idiotic. When a collaborator of Resnais says that in *Last Year at Marienbad*, you won't find a single real continuity shot, she knows what she is saying, but she also knows why Resnais needs false continuity. If you can't say why – Godard said it a thousand times better than I can – if you can't say why you need a tracking shot here rather than a panning shot, don't do either. Better, don't do anything.

So, I ask myself, why does the second, crystalline, regime of images, give us a direct time-image? For a simple reason: the paradoxical spaces we were talking about, pre-hodological, post-hodological and non-Euclidean, these paradoxical spaces are of a character that cannot be explained spatially. Contrary to Euclidean space, they are therefore already direct presentations of time, and they can only be described and traversed by aberrant movements, that is to say by *false movements*. The direct time-image is effectuated by false movement, of which false continuity is only one possible case. And this is a fourth group of notions that brought us to a close examination of Bergson's conception of time, as well as the time-images of a number of filmmakers. You will see that... no, not right away.

Last point: I can oppose, in the same terms, to a type of narration that I will call "truthful" – it doesn't matter if it's true or false, it *claims to* be true. It's the claim that defines it as truthful. It claims to be true, whether it is true or not. Truthful narratives refer to organic descriptions, they refer to narratives that are spatial or organic, they refer to hodological, or Euclidian spaces – to this I opposed a falsifying narration. But then we were faced with the following problem, which for us was an urgent one: why is the direct time-image necessarily related to a falsifying narration?

We have solved this problem at several levels, considering first that *time has always been the one and only factor capable of putting the notion of truth in crisis*, and this under two forms that were already well known from Antiquity on: in virtue of time, the impossible must proceed from the possible, and the past cannot necessarily be true. And under these two forms, that the past is not necessarily true, and that the impossible proceeds from the possible, truth was shaken by an immense crisis. In other words, it was never movement that challenged the notion of truth, *it was time*. Truth has always accommodated itself perfectly to movement, but never to the aberrations of movement. I mean, truth has always accommodated itself to movement perfectly *as long as there were centers of movement*. On the other hand, when there is an aberration of movement, it's because the time-image has become primary, as we've seen. You see how well everything is linked here. The crisis of truth was undoubtedly brought about by the aberrations of movement in astronomy, in physics… but in terms of logic, it was brought about by what the aberrations of movement

continue to hide from us, namely, *the direct presentation of time*. Since once again movement will be all the more aberrant if it depends on time, and not the reverse. This should be absolutely clear, right, crystal clear, crystal clear.  No, since… [*indistinct words*]

And in what forms does the time-image constantly generate falsifying narratives? The fact is that the direct image-time has both forms. No longer do we have – which is why we had all sorts of levels – no longer do we have indiscernible distinctions between real and imaginary, but an undecidable alternative between different sheets of past. Which means that the past is not necessarily true… Undecidable alternative between sheets of the past, this means that the past is not necessarily true. This is what I would call the Welles-Resnais tendency...
[*Interruption of the recording*] [2:13:48]

... the inexplicable distinctions between peaks of present, which implies different presents, each of which are possible, but incompossible with each other – incompossible, this notion of Leibniz that we have analyzed. These presents, each of which is possible but incompossible with the others are nevertheless simultaneous. In one present, one betrays the other; in another, the other betrays the one; in a third, neither betrays the other; in a fourth, they both betray each other; in a fifth, one betrays the other, but it is the same person and so on. This would be the Borges-Robbe-Grillet tendency.[36]

That's the fifth point, I've almost reached the end. An adventitious addendum to the five points. Through these five points, it is thus each time that two regimes that can be distinguished, two regimes of description, two regimes of narration, if you take… in short, we have two great regimes of the image. A word of caution: it goes without saying that they constantly encroach upon each other. A great filmmaker has one foot in one regime, another foot in the other, that's what makes things interesting. You can't say, Ah, it's this or it's that… especially not – and not only that, perpetual encroachment, all of that, but each, each great filmmaker has their own way of handling things. They don't apply readymade recipes. Great filmmakers encounter one another, they don't apply each other's methods. Resnais does not apply Welles. When it tries to apply Godard, post-nouvelle vague cinema is not very good. But when it takes an independent path, as it does in the case of Philippe Garrel or Jacques Doillon for example... you see what I mean?

But what would be interesting would be to look for the specificity of each great filmmaker. Let me take an example. For example – I try to summarize everything now – I say the modern regime, with all its nuances, and at the same time I say it's not modern, I can take out every word, every word I say. I can say, it's not a regime, there's always another encroaching. I can say that it is not modern; it already exists, but not in this form. Well, it's still modern... well, whatever you prefer. Don't take this literally.

I could say that the regime we've been studying this year is the one that unites crystalline or, if you prefer, pure optical and sound descriptions with falsifying narrations. Right. But if that's what we see all the time in the cinema today – this linking of pure description, of pure optical-sound description, therefore no longer sensory-motor, with falsifying narrations that are no longer true, that is, that no longer claim to be true – if that's what makes us happy, assuming that it makes us happy, let's look at how each filmmaker proceeds. To take two recent examples who… well, these two are not even among the greatest, I mean they are very important filmmakers but they are not among the greatest directors in cinema.

Let's take Agnès Varda. Agnès Varda… I take her recent film *Documenteur*.[37] The title enters fully into our problem: the documentary has become docu-*menteur* [liar]. That is to say, it remains "docu-", meaning description, and it is linked to a falsifying narration. Indeed, the documentary aspect of Varda's film is no longer sensory-motor. What is it? Pure optical and sound description: the walls, the city, graffiti on the walls, the city to which she connects a narrative that is composed of what? Disconnected gestures. A woman who has lost her sensory-motor patterns after losing the man in her life. Perfect. I would say that in her, in her... I'm not saying that all of Agnès Varda's work can be summed up in this way. What I'm saying is that in the case of this particular film, the link between pure optical and sound description and falsifying narration is established in the way I just explained.

I take another example, to show you how varied the methods can be. Robbe-Grillet is another filmmaker who constantly proceeds using the two poles. The descriptions are pure descriptions, that is, they are not supposed to refer to independent objects. What we have is a description that is repeated, denied, and so on and he has even elaborated the theory of this. But he also produces it in practice. And the narrative is eminently falsifying. Robbe-Grillet's best film is without doubt *The Man Who Lies* but the man who lies is not a liar, he is not a liar. He is the man of the falsifying narration, which is something else entirely, as we have seen. But how does he proceed in his distribution? He makes a strange distribution. I would say that in Robbe-Grillet's work – and this applies to all his films – you know what it is that plays the role of pure optical and sound description? Well, it's the erotic scenes, the erotic scenes. In his films, the erotic scenes have the value of pure description.

And he himself says this, though he says it in another way, in a way that always amuses me because, he says: Do you know why I do sadistic scenes? And you say no – even if you do know, you don't say it, so you say no, I don't know. Well, it's because women are always jumping around and this annoys me. That is to say, the sadistic scenes – but here I think he's joking; well, whether he's joking or not, what does it matter? – The sadistic scenes in Robbe-Grillet always have the function of attaining an immobilization, an immobilization that will produce a purely descriptive image. In fact, the woman starts becoming agitated and then at some point she is tied up. She is tied up. We can call this what we want. Some find these scenes highly erotic. It depends on the viewer, it depends on the viewer. But erotic or not, its function is to ensure a description that no longer refers to anything other than itself, a purely optical description. It consists in binding… it consists in tying a woman up. So why does he always tie up women? That's his business, that's his conceptual problem. But anyway, it's a question of immobilizing the image. Okay. This is one way of immobilizing the image. Because it's not necessarily using the methods of the experimental cinema that you freeze the image. You have to be able to use all kinds of methods. So, for Robbe-Grillet, it's this.

And what about the falsifying narrative? If it is true that the erotic scenes in Robbe-Grillet's work take care of the pure descriptions, what produces the falsifying narrative? All the different means of transportation, all kinds of transportation, it could be a car, a hay wagon, a boat, a motorbike – Robbe-Grillet is really fond of motorbikes.[38] Okay? Do you follow me? But why? Why is it that the means of transport take on the role of the falsifying narrative? Why? Because in Robbe-Grillet's work all the different means of transport are sources of false movements, and falsifying narration takes place in these false movements.

I'm only taking two examples here, which is just to say that it's not a question of applying a formula. It's through their own particular talent that each filmmaker generates their pure descriptions and their falsifying narrations and moves from one to the other. And if it's

gratuitous, it will be a failure, it will be a film that does nothing other than copy, it will be either bad Godard, or bad So-and-so, etc. One cannot say that this regime of images saves us from mediocrity any more than others. But if it is founded upon necessity, upon affectivity, that is to say, metaphysics, then it will be wonderful.

Hence the last remark: what has collapsed in the passage from pure descriptions to falsifying narrations? All will to truth. But in favor of what? In favor of *the power of the false*. What brings about the power of the false, or rather what elevates the false? Because the false in itself is not very interesting. Actually, the false is not at all interesting. What is important is to give a *power* to the false. In philosophy, as we have seen, there was the false and then there was Nietzsche who gave the false a power of the false, just as he most radically questioned the notion of truth. Right. And why? When does the false assume a power? Well, precisely when it frees itself from any model of truth, when it does not present itself as true. The error is to present what is false as true. The false assumes its power when it is freed from any model of truth. And what is it that permits the false to free itself from any model of truth? It is time, in the double form of undecidable alternatives between sheets of past and inexplicable distinctions between points of present.

At this point, what figure is established from one end of the falsifying narrative to the other, or if you prefer, from description to the narrative, from the beginning of pure description to the end of the falsifying narrative? The falsifier. Why is the falsifier not a liar? It is because the liar is localizable, whereas the falsifier cannot be localized. They are there at every point on the chain. Why is this so? Because the power of the false implies and requires *an irreducible multiplicity*, the series, the series of degrees of power, the series of exponents. It is not astonishing when we ask ourselves: what is a falsifier? What is a falsifier? There have been many books on f falsifiers. If you ask yourself what a falsifier is, you'll have great trouble finding an answer since the question is badly posed. The question is badly posed. The falsifier does not exist in terms of... without a plurality whereby they always refer to another falsifier behind them. There is no hypnotist who does not refer to another hypnotist standing behind them.

So, what did we have on this? There were the two great texts on which we based our idea, two great texts, or rather three great texts, three great works on which we based this idea: Melville's prodigious novel – since it is without doubt the most unusual book of the whole 19th century – *The Confidence Man*. And then an admirable book that is a masterpiece of both poetry, philosophy and literature… the last book, book IV of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in which Nietzsche presents us with the list of "higher men", in quotation marks, the examples of "higher men" all being falsifiers, each of whom refers to the next falsifier in a process of metamorphosis. And in cinema, we have Welles, whose oeuvre culminates in the great series of falsifiers of his last film… *F for Fake*, which reflects, precisely, on the power of the false.

But we have seen that, from the point of view of Nietzsche as well as, undoubtedly, Melville, if it is true that the chain of falsifiers destroys every concept and every model of truth, on the other hand, its conclusion is not that everything is equal, everything being false. Because to say that everything is false is a stupid and banal proposition. As Nietzsche says, once again, in one of his most beautiful sentences, "We have abolished the world of truth, but we have also abolished the world of appearances"[39]. Only the half, the half... I don't know what, only they think that to abolish the world of truth is to ensure the triumph of the world of appearances. No, to abolish the world of truth... the world of appearances is the false that presents itself as true.

I would say that if there is one great man, one great genius of cinema who did this, who abolished the world of truth, and brought the world of appearances to the cinema, it was Fritz Lang. He is the greatest filmmaker of appearances – so what I'm saying is in no way restrictive – a kind of Protagoras in philosophy. But, ah... after Lang, there is Welles. It was not sufficient to abolish the world of truth by retaining the world of appearances. It was necessary to do something else; it was necessary to go beyond Protagoras, that is, Heraclitus. There is no longer either truth or appearance. It is at this moment that the false becomes the power of the false. Not everything on the chain has the same value. The power of the false is multiple, just as the superior person is multiple. Nietzsche speaks of the multiple cry of the superior person. The power of the false is multiple, there is no single power, by definition power has several exponents. You will have a series, power exists only as a series of powers. Do not ask yourself: What is *a* falsifier? Since there are always several falsifiers.

What does it mean to say that not everything has the same value? We tried to analyze this. Not everything has the same value because if they are all falsifiers... even the truthful man, as we have seen, the truthful man finally realizes – and here we have another phrase of Nietzsche's that you should know by heart – "even the truthful man realizes that he has never stopped lying". Good. The truthful man is the first power of the false. And then, the power of the false is also what Nietzsche called "the will to power". And here he plays between two extreme degrees, two powers, of which Nietzsche will be careful not to say which is better than the other. He leaves the choice to you. To you... to you to put yourself where you want, in the chain of falsifiers. At one end, the falsifier is the one who wants to judge life, either in the name of values superior to life, and that is the truthful man, or in the name of himself as a "higher man". Both of these are falsifiers. They are part of the same chain.

With Orson Welles, if you think of *Touch of Evil*, Vargas is the truthful man, the one who, while his wife is being tortured, searches the archives for the truth and who says: I want the truth. And behind Vargas, the truthful man, who is already a complete falsifier, there is Quinlan, the falsifier. One wants to judge life in the name of a value superior to life, the truth. The other wants to judge life for himself and arrogates to himself the right to judge since he considers himself a superior being. This is the only difference between the truthful man and the falsifier for Nietzsche. They are equal, they are the first two powers. The falsifier refers to other falsifiers, as the figures of the falsifier multiply. They both represent degrees of the will to power, in terms of which the will to power has become a will to dominate life.

Now, according to Nietzsche, all this power of the will to power, all this degree of the will to power expresses life. Even those who claim to judge life in the name of a higher value can only express life. They simply express an exhausted life, an impotent life. Only impotent life wishes to judge life from the point of view of a value higher than life. All falsifiers recognize themselves by the fact that they have prostheses. Certainly, there are some people who have prostheses who are not falsifiers. One can conceive of a Zarathustra with prostheses. But in any case, the falsifiers, the real man… Quinlan with his cane is a falsifier, the crutches of the lawyer Bannister in...[40] Welles has seen it all, wonderfully.

So, what remains? Someone who is much a falsifier as the others, but to a different power. Who is this finally? Someone who does not express any sense of strong health nor great strength, but who expresses a gushing life, a life that is not exhausted. Life exhausts them, so they can be as sick as the others[41]. I'm not offering much consolation, am I? They can be even sicker, life exhausts them, *but they do not exhaust life*. This is the great Nietzschean criterion. Do you exhaust life or is it life that exhausts you? If it is life that exhausts you, you are good;

if it is you who exhausts life, you are bad. If you judge, you are bad. If you dominate, you are bad.

The will to power at its last power is, as Zarathustra will say, "virtue that gives". It is goodness, generosity; there is no other will to power, or there is no other. It is life in the ascendant. And again, it's not a question of health. One can forfeit existence in an ascending life as much as one can save one's skin in an exhausted life.

There are exhausted people who never finish dying. They are the most dangerous. Why is this? This is the scorpion. As Welles who is fully Nietzschean says: the frog is an idiot, and the scorpion is a bastard. This is pure Nietzsche. The frog is literally the truthful man, because in the fable – I don't have time to recount it all to you, this fable from *Mr. Arkadin*[42] – the frog is the truthful animal because it believes in the pact, it believes that the scorpion will not sting it because they have made a pact. This is Vargas, the man of truth. The frog wants the truth. The falsifier is the scorpion. He will sting, he will sting himself, he will sting even if it means dying. He can't help it, he's the great falsifier. The frog is an ass – or rather, I quote exactly – "the frog is an ass, the scorpion is a bastard".

So, what remains? All manner of things. The scorpion's life is an exhausted life, it only knows how to sting, that's all it knows how to do. It's a completely exhausted life. The lawyer Bannister in *The Lady from Shanghai* knows only how to sting. Quinlan in *Touch of Evil* knows only how to fake evidence. They only know how to do one thing. What a life. What a life. That's what Nietzsche means. He says very, very simple things: a sick life, an exhausted life, a degenerate life, is not a life that lacks strength; it can have a colossal strength. But it is invested in one thing only, to sting, to sting, its only concern is to sting. It's the great scorpion, it's Hitler, it's whatever you like. It's... Okay.

So, gushing life is nothing particularly extraordinary; it's like the Bergsonian *élan vital*, you know, it's not at all extraordinary, it's even very tiring, it's no great joy either. But these are people who are exhausted by life, even a small one, even a small life, instead of themselves exhausting life. So that through them, something of life will pass and bounce back. Something... these are people for whom the power of the false no longer lies in judging life but in ensuring its metamorphoses.

This for Nietzsche is the will to power. This is Zarathustra: I announce the metamorphosis. They are falsifiers. They are falsifiers, I would say, to the power of *n*. What is their sign? Goodness, generosity. Welles never ceases waxing lyrical over Falstaff. He tells us: Falstaff is the character of my life.[43] Of course, he's a liar, a braggart, whatever you say, but you won't understand him if you don't understand that he's *good*. And Welles, who can no longer hold back, adds: he's good like bread and wine. This could be a phrase of Zarathustra. Welles' two characters, Welles' two positive characters, are Falstaff and Don Quixote. They are men of metamorphosis, men of metamorphosis, men who turn the will to power into the will to metamorphosis. Sometimes they have another name. When they can be, they are *artists*.

So that neither Welles, or Nietzsche, or anyone else, have ever considered things to be equal between an artist and their copyists. That the power of the false is the only power there is never meant that any falsifier was worth the same as an artist. Do you know why the genius falsifier, who makes counterfeit Vermeers is worth nothing in comparison to Vermeer himself? For a very simple reason: it is because the falsifier does not know how to change, whereas Vermeer does know how to change. And if we go back to the chain as it occurs in

the famous case of the Vermeer falsifier, a chain similar to that in Welles' *F for Fake*[44], you will see that the painting expert, the truthful man, is himself a falsifier. He judges, he judges: ah this is a Vermeer, this is a real Vermeer. No, that is not a true Vermeer! And he is wrong, why? Because behind the truthful man, there is always a falsifier, even in him.

Indeed, according to what criteria does the expert judge the veracity, the truth of a Vermeer? According to the criteria that he as a truthful man has established concerning Vermeer's style. Now, the falsifier has perfectly studied the expert's criteria regarding Vermeer's style. Hence the expert can say that these are real Vermeers, since they meet all the criteria for being so. So, behind the expert, the truthful man, was a falsifier. And what's more, he was feeding him with his own substance. It never occurred to the expert that what defined Vermeer as a great artist was that Vermeer himself changed. Now, the expert cannot change – at the most, he will distinguish periods of Vermeer. But Vermeer was exhausted by life and died. So, at that point he must have stopped changing, so obviously, obviously... But the expert believes that he does not change. And behind the expert, the falsifier himself is unable to change and so will make his fake Vermeers.

What distinguishes a fake Vermeer from a real Vermeer? A real Vermeer has a power of metamorphosis, whereas a fake Vermeer is like a judgment on Vermeer, which fulfills and carries out the criteria of judgment, period. Nothing in it changes or will change. The lowest degree of the will to power according to Nietzsche is the will to judge, that is, to dominate life, while its highest degree is the will to metamorphosis, as announced by Zarathustra, Dionysus and characters simpler than these. So, there you have it.

It is in this sense that narration as the power of the false can finally be said to be creative. But what will it create? At that point, we no longer have any problem with using the word "truth". *It will create truth*. This means that truth is neither a model nor a copy, it is *something to be created*. Now, truth in so far as it is to be created, has nothing to do with the truth of the truthful man, that is, the truth that is to be found.

Philosophy is the enterprise of the creation of truth, that is, of the will to power in its highest degree. Behind the higher person, there is the superman. And who are these higher men so bitterly denounced by Zarathustra? The superman is announced, and the superman is not at all something extraordinary. The superman is simply the one who "knows" how to pass through his different metamorphoses.

You have all kinds of expressions; Rimbaud who did not use the expression superman spoke of one who knows how to take responsibility for giving even *animals* the power of metamorphosis.[45] As long as you know how to change – "change" here not meaning simply to change one's mood, though each time there can be a possible counter-meaning – as long as you know how to really change, you will be on the side of goodness, of generosity, of art. Whereas when you start knowing how to do only one thing, with your little anger, your venom, your sting, that can do only one thing, only that! Your bite, all the ways you will judge life and believe yourself superior to life, all this will make you a pathetic wretch.

Well, after this lesson in morality... That's it, we're finished... Oh no, I would have liked – no, it's too late – I would have liked to know if Isabelle Stengers was suffering when I... because, I must say, I would have liked to talk less and let her explain for ten minutes how it is in fact much more complicated than this. But in the end... [*Isabelle Stengers makes a comment that we don't hear, but that makes Deleuze laugh*.]

Well, well, I wish you all a good rest, good work, all that... Hey, Miss Dolbenne, I need Miss Dolbenne. Isn't she here? Does anybody know Miss Dolbenne? … [*End of the session*] [2:48:00]

## Notes

[1] See the beginning of chapter 5 of *The Time-Image,* pp. 98-100.

[2] Deleuze refers to Péguy in *The Time-Image*, p. 91. Moreover, Deleuze discusses Péguy in sessions 2, 4 and 22 of the Cinema seminar II, November 23 and December 7, 1982, and May 31, 1983; in session 15 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, April 28, 1987. See also at the end of chapter IV of *What is Philosophy?* pp. 111-113.

[3] In the translation of *The Time-Image* the terms "peaks" and "points" or sometimes "shining points" are used interchangeably to convey this notion of the present.

[4] Deleuze refers to Saint Augustine's formula in *The Time-Image,* p. 114. See also session 15 of this seminar, March 27, 1984, in particular the intervention of Eric Alliez.

[5] On this analysis and the one that follows, see *The Time-Image*, p. 103.

[6] In *Trans Europ Express* (1966), starring Jean-Louis Trintignant and Marie-France Pisier, a director, his scriptwriter and his producer take a trip on the Trans-Europ-Express. During the journey, they imagine the scenario of a film about drug trafficking from Paris to Antwerp. Very quickly, the script and the changes they make in it in their discussions begin to shape their surrounding reality.

[7] *Playing with Fire* (orig. *Le jeu avec le feu*, 1975). When Carolina (Anicée Alvina), the daughter of a wealthy banker (Philippe Noiret), is reported kidnapped, it is upsetting to him even though he knows it isn't true as the kidnappers have taken the wrong person. The banker hires a seedy detective (Jean-Louis Trintignant) to find his daughter and hide her safely away. The young woman soon finds herself in a place where all kinds of perversions are practiced. There, a near-double of her father whips and then seduces her. Eventually, she and the detective leave, after extorting the kidnapping money from the girl's father.

[8] *The Man Who Lies* (orig. *L'homme qui ment*, 1966) is a film written and directed by Robbe-Grillet starring Jean-Louis Trintignant, which tells the story of a man sometimes calling himself Jean and sometimes Boris, who turns up in a village somewhere in Central Europe that had been occupied by the German Army during the Second World War. Mourning the death of an unseen friend, he is taken in by the family of the dead rebel. His conflicting tale gives rise to doubts about his story. Robbe-Grillet's film leaves the viewer to decide if he is telling the truth or covering up for his deeds leading to the death of the Resistance fighter. For this film, Trintignant won the Silver Bear for Best Actor at the 18th Berlin Film Festival.

[9] On the cinema of Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais see *The Time-Image*, pp. 103-109.

[10] On Welles' cinema see *The Time-Image*, pp. 110-116, as well as the previous session.

[11] For the reference to Chion and the concept of *acousmètre*, see *The Time-Image*, p. 323, note 24. See also Chion's *The Voice in Cinema* (trans. Claudia Gorbman) New York: Columbia UP, 1999, where he delineates different aspects of the *acousmètre* (a voice we hear whose source is hidden or unknown) as it is used in cinema. On the theme of the center in Welles, see pp. 142-147.

[12] See Michel Serres, *Le système de Leibniz,* Paris: PUF, 1968.

[13] On Bergson's second great schema, see *The Time-Image*, p.294, note 22 (*from Matter and Memory*). Regarding the point of view and projective geometry, see session 3 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, November 18, 1986.

[14] On *Je t'aime je t'aime,* see the previous session, as well as *The Time-Image*, pp. 116-125.

[15] On Resnais' cinema see section 3 of chapter 5 of *The Time-Image,* pp. 116-125.

[16] *The War is Over* (orig. *La Guerre est finie*, 1966), starring Yves Montand, Ingrid Thulin and Geneviève Bujold, tells the story of a weary, aging Spanish revolutionary living in Paris three decades after the Spanish Civil War, where he becomes involved in a plot to overthrow Franco and his fascist government. The film was withdrawn from Cannes so as not to offend Franco's government.

[17] *All the Memory in the World* (orig. *Toute la memoire du monde*, 1956) is a short film by Alain Resnais, with a text by Remo Forlani, about the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Deleuze probably makes indirect reference to it here as an essay on the potentials and limits of dutifully archived human knowledge in relation to the theory of the world-brain that he will develop in the next year's seminar.

[18] *My American Uncle* (orig. *Mon oncle d'Amerique*, 1980) is a comedy-drama film by Alain Resnais starring Gerard Depardieu, Nicole Garcia, Roger Pierre and neurobiologist and philosopher Henri Laborit. The film uses Laborit's theories about human behaviour as a framing device around the narratives of three protagonists, all from different social backgrounds and inhabiting different working milieus, whose destinies become strangely intertwined. Throughout the film the episodes involving one or more of the central characters are interwoven

with more essayistic passages in which Laborit voices (and experimentally demonstrates) some of his own theories, echoes of which Resnais then sometimes comically and surreally weaves back into the narrative.

[19] Henri Laborit (1914-1995) was a neurobiologist who was an actor and narrator in *My American Uncle*, and whose writings play an important role in the film.

[20] *Life Is A Bed of Roses* (Orig. *La vie est un roman*, 1983) is a 1983 French film directed by Alain Resnais from a screenplay by Jean Gruault, starring Vittorio Gassman, Fanny Ardant, Geraldine Chaplin and Pierre Arditi. The film interweaves three stories that all take place at different times in the same Ardennes forest location: a medieval fairytale about an exiled dragon-slaying prince; a story set immediately before and after World War 1 about a Count who builds a castle where he conducts an experiment to wipe people's memories and allow them to be born anew; and a comic tale involving ideological conflict and academic skulduggery at an education conference staged at the castle in the 1980s.

[21] Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order out of Chaos* (based on *La Nouvelle Alliance*, Paris: Gallimard, 1979), London: Verso, 2018.

[22] On the transformation of the baker and Resnais, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 118-121, and page 301 note 31 (cf. reference to Prigogine and Stengers). More generally, see *L'Abécédaire*, "N for Neurology", as well as *Negotiations,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 124-126.

[23] *Van Gogh* (1950) is an early short documentary film by Resnais, written by Gaston Diehl and Robert Hessens narrating the life of the Dutch painter through a visual exploration by the camera of the different periods of his art. The film is notable for the way Resnais films the paintings such that our view of them is almost always inside the frame of the canvas, while his own editing and framing dramatizes the subjects in a manner that points to his later cinematic style.

[24] At the end of the film Resnais invents an unusual hybrid between a lateral tracking shot and a fade to black as the camera tracks across Van Gogh's last painting, *Wheatfield with Crows*, towards an erased black area on the right of the canvas that gradually invades the whole of the frame.

[25] On this precise point, see *The Time-Image*, p. 120.

[26] "[…] the biology of shadows has not yet been studied; and so I tell you this – never come to terms with a shadow: you will not understand its demands; in Petersburg it will enter into you through the bacilli of all kinds of diseases that are swallowed in the very water that comes through the taps …" See Andre Bely, *Petersburg* (trans. David McDuff) London: Penguin, 2011, epub edition. On Bely and the connection with Resnais, see *The Time-Image*, p. 125, 213 and note 42, p. 302.

[27] Actually, it was Jules Verne who wrote the sequel to *Gordon Pym*, under the title *The Sphinx of the Ice* (1897)

[28] Ted Serios (1918-2006) was an unemployed American hotel worker who claimed to be able to produce polaroid photographs using the power of his thoughts alone, which were dubbed "thoughtographs". Though his claims were supported by a psychiatrist, Jules Eisenbud, who wrote a book on Serios, they were later debunked as fraudulent by photography experts.

[29] Gérard Genette (1930-2018) was a literary scholar and structuralist theorist who had a broad impact on the development of narratology. Among his most well-known books are *Figures I-III* (translated as *Figures of Literary Discourse*) and *Palimpsests.*

[30] Alain Robbe-Grillet, *For A New Novel: Essays on Fiction*, (trans. Richard Howard) NY: Grove Press, 1965. On the question of description in Robbe-Grillet, see in particular sessions 2 and 3 of this seminar (Cinema III), November 22 and 29, 1983.

[31] This is a continuous reflection starting from session 9, January 24, 1984. As for the image-crystal, Deleuze approaches it slowly from session 14, March 20, 1984, and accelerates this examination from session 18, May 15, 1984.

[32] This is an ongoing reflection from session 3 of this seminar (Cinema III, November 29, 1983.

[33] On hodological space and Kurt Lewin, see session 18, May 15, 1984, and also *The Time-Image*, pp. 127-143 and p.217.

[34] *Passion* (1982) is a film by Jean-Luc Godard, starring Isabelle Huppert, Hanna Schygulla, Jerzy Radziwilowicz and Michel Piccoli. The second film of Godard's so called "middle period", it recounts the adventures of a film director who wrestles with his producer over a seemingly impossible film he is trying to make on the subject of passion, involving elaborate tableaux-vivant reconstructions of several historical paintings, while his attention drifts to the disenchanted wife of a factory owner and a female factory-worker who is trying to organize a strike.

[35] These discussions begin in session 11, February 7, 1984, and continue during the rest of the seminar, in particular in sessions 12-17.

[36] Deleuze introduces the distinction "truthful" / "falsifying" in session 3 and continues to develop this in more detail throughout the seminar, hence the subtitle, "The Falsifier".

[37] *Documenteur* (1981) is a film by Agnes Varda made during a stay in Los Angeles in the early 1980s. The title is a pun on the French words for documentary (*documentaire*) and liar (*menteur*), a juxtaposition that has

informed Varda's filmmaking since the beginning of her career. Tracing the alienation of a recent divorcée newly arrived in L.A. with her young son, *Documenteur* uses interior monologue to underscore the woman's status as an outsider, vividly using Los Angeles to evoke her sense of loneliness. In this film Varda blurs the line between fiction and documentary by incorporating elements from her L.A. documentary *Mur murs* and by casting her own son.

[38] See for example the highly artificial scenes of a woman riding a motorbike at night that punctuate *La Belle Captive* (1981).

[39] In the Cambridge edition of Nietszche's works, this phrase, from *Twilight of the Idols*, reads: "The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps? But no! we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one!". See F. Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other* Writings, (trans. Judith Norman), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005 p. 171

[40] *The Lady from Shanghai* (1948).

[41] One of Deleuze's last texts, concerning Beckett is called "The Exhausted". See *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Trans. D.W. Smith and M. Greco), Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997, pp. 152-174.

[42] *Mr Arkadin* (1955) is a film by Orson Welles starring himself, Akin Tamiroff and Michael Redgrave in which a criminal-turned-detective is employed by Gregory Arkadin, an oligarch of Russian origins claiming to suffer from amnesia, to piece together his own story by tracking down his former associates. But Arkadin's real plan is to use the investigator to locate these people, all of whom have knowledge about his shady past, so he can eliminate them. Like many of Welles' projects Arkadin suffered production troubles and interference and several versions of the film exist, including one heavily cut and renamed *Confidential Report* which for a long time was the only version to circulate in the Anglophone world.

[43] *Chimes at Midnight* (1965) is a film by Orson Welles, based on Shakespeare plays *Henry IV* Pts. 1 and 2, but also collaging scenes from *Henry V*, *Richard II* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor* and starring Jeanne Moreau, Margaret Rutherford, John Gielgud, Marina Vlady, Keith Baxter and Welles himself as Falstaff, a role he had long coveted.

[44] *F for Fake* (1973) is an experimental documentary essay film by Orson Welles, thought to be his last feature film until the recent discovery and restoration of *The Other Side of The Wind*. Featuring himself, Oja Kodar, Elmer de Hory, Joseph Cotten, Gravy Graver and Francois Reichenbach, it begins by recounting the story of art falsifier De Hory and those who knew him before evolving into a playful meditation on the false, authenticity and fabulation that Welles connects to aspects of his own biography, while inventing among other things, a fictitious anecdote involving Picasso and Welles' wife Kodar.

[45] Rimbaud's exact sentence in his letter to Paul Demeny (May 15, 1871) is: "The poet is truly the thief of fire. He is responsible for humanity, even for the animals", see Arthur Rimbaud, *Complete Works, Selected Letters*, University of Chicago Press, 1966.