

Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries : Charles J. Stivale

Leibniz and the Baroque, October 28, 1986-June 2, 1987

20 Sessions

In his introductory remarks to this annual seminar (on 28 October 1986), Deleuze stated that he would have liked to devote the seminar to the theme "What is philosophy?", but that he "[didn't] dare take it on" since "it's such a sacred subject". However, the seminar that he did undertake on Leibniz and the Baroque "is nearly an introduction to 'What is philosophy?'" Thus, the 1986-87 seminar has this dual reading, all the more significant in that, unknown to those listening to Deleuze (and perhaps to Deleuze himself), this would be the final seminar of his teaching career.

Deleuze planned the seminar in two segments: under the title "Leibniz as Baroque Philosopher," he presented the initial operating concepts on Leibniz, notably on the fold. Circumstances during fall 1986 limited this segment to four sessions with an unexpected final session in the first meeting of 1987 (6 January). For the second segment, Deleuze chose the global title "Principles and Freedom", a segment consisting of fifteen sessions lasting to the final one on June

Part I: Leibniz as Baroque Philosopher (6 sessions), October 1986-January 1987

Session 1, October 28, 1986

To open the seminar on Leibniz's philosophy and the Baroque, Deleuze states hypothesis: that "the Baroque creates folds", characterized by matter never ceasing to be pleated, or the soul never ceasing to be folded, hence *the pleats of matter* and *the folds of the soul*. He raises two questions, first, about the Baroque fold going on to infinity, and second, about the correspondences between "pleats of matter" and "fold of the soul". To explore the first aspect, Deleuze provides traits of pleats of matter, which for him also define Leibniz's philosophy: treatment in bulk (*en masse*), *gravitas*, weight (cf. Wölfflin); horizontal enlargement; softening, even turbulent fluidity; conciliation of mass and water; harmony as resonance of masses, with counterpoints. Moreover, Leibniz's study on acceleration focuses on a differential or *conatus* of movement, with Leibniz translating the body's elasticity in terms of movement. After tracing the origins to Antiquity, Deleuze contrasts these origins to Leibniz's physics, requiring that he invent mathematics of infinite series and differential calculus. Then adding a third aspect, both the living or fleshly body and Leibniz's point of view of pre-formation, i.e., foldings and unfoldings (*implicare-explicare*), Deleuze links the Baroque to Leibniz's conceptions of vitalism and death, as an infinite envelopment of the body and with the infinitely pleated bodies unfolding at the Final Judgment. The first vitalist aspect corresponds a second, the diffusion of inorganic matter, and both aspects linked to a point on a curvature with its own inflection. By considering the Baroque's treatment of form through the genetic element of inflection, Deleuze contrasts Paul Klee's "active line" to Kandinsky's straight line under tension, then he refers to Bernard Cache's work in architecture. Deleuze describes the point for Leibniz as following the curve's tangent, i.e., the straight line, traveling along an inflection thereby engendering the form. Hence, the

curvature must refer to a free spontaneity of the point as point of view, with all the bundles of straight lines meeting at the center of curvature, with the folds of the soul alone accounting for the ideal genesis of forms, and with the folds and pleats of matter presupposing this second region of folding (*plissement*) of folds and pleats.

Session 2, November 4, 1986

Deleuze now adds another layer to previous hypotheses, starting by reviewing some well-known philosophical principles (identity; contradiction; excluded middle; existence; causality; finality), and hypothesizing that Leibniz's proliferation of principles is assured by the milieu of infinity in which his thought develops. Recalling the two directions introduced in session 1, the pleats of matter and folds in the soul, Deleuze suggests that these two directions constitute an upper and lower floor (lower floor with pleats of matter, upper floor with folds of the soul), with movement related to resistance on the lower floor, movement related to its own spontaneity on the upper. Moreover, these also constitute two labyrinths, the lower as "the labyrinth of the continuous", the upper as "the labyrinth of freedom", with returning to the traits previously presented. By suggesting additional traits -- the fluid as a physics of elasticity (or the spring), or of the curvilinear trajectory; the organic body endowed with a folding capacity (implication-explication), Deleuze offers a second proposition: organism is a machine that is infinitely machined, pleating itself to infinity. With another trait emerging -- in organic as well as inorganic matter, simple animals (animalcules) are diffusely present --, Deleuze identifies a third principle: all matter is a life pool, i.e., Leibniz's vitalism. Deleuze concludes that this first floor constitutes a logic of aggregates or composite beings infinitely composed, with Deleuze alluding to the question of God in all this, as guardian of the life pool. Then, joining all this to the second floor, Deleuze justifies this operation based on natural history and physics. Deleuze concludes that the Simple is located on the upper floor, the Composites on the lower, evoking Heidegger's important use of the fold as armature for his philosophy, as well as this folding operation in Michaux and Mallarmé. The turn toward study of the upper floor consists *not* in the elastic body on an irregular curve, but rather the ideal genetic element of the materiality studied, i.e., the pure, mathematical point, hence a study of Leibniz's theory of points and inflection, recalling his discussion of Paul Klee and reference to Bernard Cache on architecture, and drawing on René Thom's views on catastrophe. Here Deleuze also indicates that Leibniz also developed a revision of the notion of the object, affected by a fundamental curvature, describing a family of curves as operations of the fold, and he considers the circle in detail, drawing on the Baroque physics of Huygens, then studying points on a straight line in terms of the continuous and inflection. Deleuze reaches the conclusion that only the irrational number founds the necessity of an infinite series, and suggests that the continuous is a labyrinth, an infinite series of folds like the irrational number, distinguishing 17th-century mathematics (notably Descartes) from Leibniz and, much more recently, from aspects of the fractal object developed by Mandelbrot. So Deleuze returns to the upper floor by insisting that the fold be considered as inflection of the infinite series and also going to inclusion, folding to infinity and closes by appealing to students to reflect over the following two weeks (a holiday occurred on November 11) on the connection of the three notions of fold, infinite series, and irrational numbers.

Session 3, November 18, 1986

This session's detailed analysis of theories of perspective and point of view is exceptional both as the sole color video recording and also as a nearly complete session, without the usual gaps due to cassette changes, filmed for broadcast on RAI-3 (accessible through YouTube; viewers will note that Hidenobu Suzuki is seated to Deleuze's right and Georges Comtesse on his left). After a brief review of earlier key points, Deleuze recalls that the fold's genetic element was a point of inflection or curve, and he proposes here to go from inflection to inclusion via the infinite series since, for Leibniz, inclusion is the final cause of the fold to infinity, which Deleuze demonstrates by folding a piece of paper to demonstrate that what is folded is placed inside. Observing that the center of an inflection with irregular curvature is "point of view", Deleuze provides two drawings on the board, on one hand, a conical perspective (convergent straight lines) and on the other hand, a cylindrical perspective, each immanent to the other. To reflect on the sense of center as point of view, Deleuze draws from texts by the mathematician Desargues on "conical sections", i.e., the circle's metamorphosis into, successively, circle, ellipsis, parabola, hyperbola, point, and line, hence projections yielding "the geometral", grasped only by God. Proposing for this new status of the object the name "objectile" (the object insofar as it is affected by an inflection of variable curvature), Deleuze develops details of Desargues's theory of conical sections and proportions, and its relation of "involution", i.e., envelopment. Deleuze can then argue for point of view as a point from which an "arrangement" (*ordonnance*) can be established, constituting a series, leading him to arrange different cases corresponding to the problem (e.g., in astronomy, the rotation of planets with the sun as point of view). He also argues that a truth in a domain refers to a point of view onto this domain, leading him to describe Pascal's arithmetic triangle, to which Leibniz will join a harmonic triangle. Moreover, not only is the "objectile" under the point of view, but also the subject as, borrowing from Whitehead, the "superject", e.g., each person as point of view on the world, with Deleuze suggesting that Leibniz at once transformed the notion of the subject into philosophy and introduced the plurality of subjects as a metaphysical problem. Hence, one grasps an infinite series only as this or that variation, a tiny portion, i.e., not grasping the infinite series clearly, thus the tiny, clear region is the site of the point of view with what one grasps clearly relating to one's body. Deleuze also concludes that point of view serves as the subject of inclusion, and whereas the city is always folded, existing or included within the point of view, it is the accord of subjects or of points of view, i.e., of superjects. After reviewing the levels on which Leibniz speaks about point of view, Deleuze adds that each subject is like a concave mirror on the world and that each monad is a mirror of the universe according to its point of view. Deleuze situates the session's discussion on the Baroque house's upper floor, moving from inflection to inclusion within a point of view, provided that point of view has no reference to an exteriority and solely to other points of view, the information grid.

Session 4, December 16, 1986

The unusual four-week gap (due to student strikes across France) dictates Deleuze's point-by-point recapitulation of previous material (corresponding roughly to chapters 1 through 3 of *The Fold*) and from the "Ninth Remark" onward, Deleuze continues his development, attempting to wrap up the first part of the course, with his first real consideration of Leibniz's concept of the monad and its importance for the Baroque architecture of the two floors. The recapitulation proceeds by numbered points: first, Leibniz's Baroque philosophy unfolds on two floors, one with the pleats of matter (lower, the infinitely composed), the other with the folds in the soul

(upper, of the Simples). Second: given that matter's (with its pleats) constant refolding, the variable curve or inflection constitutes its ideal genetic element, engendering an infinite series. Third: given that variable curvature's center is the vertex or point of view. Fourth: the list of characteristics for the point of view. Fifth: the passage from point of view to inclusion or inherence implies that what is folded necessarily is enveloped or implicated within something that occupies the point of view. Sixth: whereas the subject (or superject, possessing point of view) envelops, it envelops what is folded, i.e., the objectile, and the states of the world are attributes of the subject (or soul), with a shift from the domain of visibility to the domain of legibility such that we shift from the domain of the percept (on the level of envelopment) to the domain of the concept (on the level of subject-predicate envelopment). Seventh: each subject is the mirror of the world, but only from its point of view, such that the world exists only as enveloped in each subject. Eighth: given the plurality of points of view, one envelops the infinite series of the world, but only from the tiny, clearly and distinctly grasped region, necessarily distinguished from another's legible portion. Ninth: Deleuze develops the question of Leibniz's term "monad", i.e., the individual in its notion, that envelops infinity, grasped through the notion of the concept, i.e., through understanding and extension. What constitutes individuation can be explained variously, e.g., as contingencies or accidents, or as the ultimate act of final form (Duns Scotus), and for Leibniz, there is no indefinite but rather an actual infinite, with the individual as the concept insofar as its comprehension is an actual infinite and its extension unity, i.e., the monad as the huge individual unity of an infinite multiplicity, or mathematically, 1 over infinite (1/infinite). Deleuze situates the interest of this topic in Christianity's philosophical engagement with proofs of God's existence and concludes that the formation of the upper floor of the Baroque house, with individual substances that envelop the world, i.e., subjects as individual notions, while matter and its thousand pleats occupy the lower floor, with inflexion between the two as ideal genetic element of the upper floor but also reaching the genetic elements of pleats of matter. Having hoped for time to develop the floors in terms of painting, arguing that between the floors, their relations will be named "harmony", one of Leibniz's great concepts, Deleuze closes rather allusively by suggesting that a topic for reflection on this concept is the harmonic mean of numbers, in contrast to the arithmetic mean, dealing with the number and its inverse.

Session 5, January 6, 1987

Deleuze here adds a final session on the opening theme, "Leibniz as Baroque Philosopher", although the transcription corresponds only to the session's second half which starts with Deleuze relating the notions of preformation and epigenesis in the 17th century to Leibniz's view that the organism never dies. Returning to the communication of floors, upper and lower, in the Baroque house, Deleuze focuses on how monads communicate without doors or windows, via musical harmony attuned to another's tune or melodic line, a sound inflection, linked to the basic intrinsic singularity. With "individual", i.e., the monad excluding the world, distinct from "singular", i.e., the event undergone by the subject, Deleuze says that the latter would require a mathematical theory of singularities. Then considering the 17th century "problem of numbers" and Leibniz's "combinatorics", Deleuze's notes Leibniz's interest in a Chinese mode of calculus, linking this to Leibniz's physics as related to creating the fold, in contrast to use of "the fold" by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre (the dynamic of the hole). Deleuze concludes that the Baroque operation is the fold going to infinity, which Deleuze relates to Leibniz's interest in

veins of marble, i.e., inflections, inclusions, pleats of matter, virtual figures within the soul, hence, marble as the figure of the world.

Part II: Principles and Freedom (15 sessions) January-June 1987

Session 6, January 13, 1987

The seminar's part II, "Principles and Freedom," starts with Leibniz's conception of sufficient reason and the three forms of inclusion (cf. *The Fold*, chapter 4), but also with Leibniz's understanding of the individual and the conceptions of compossibility and impossibility (cf. *The Fold*, chapter 5). Deleuze follows Leibniz's sense of the term "freedom" in relation to the word "multiple" as in a labyrinth with many paths, with being free meaning to inflect or fold oneself, falling under Leibniz's principle of "sufficient reason", i.e., everything that occurs has a reason. Deleuze explains that sufficient reason presents itself as the reason of the event which is a fold, an inflection, not the cause of the thing (or what happens to it), but rather the concept of the thing insofar as it contains the reason for everything that occurs to the thing. Deleuze argues that far from having reduced the event to an attribute, never reducing the predicate to the copula "to be", Leibniz grasps sufficient reason as inclusion and as the reason for inflection. However, Leibniz states that two kinds of propositions correspond to two types of inclusion: inclusion as "express" corresponds to truths of essence (for which the contrary implies contradiction), whereas inclusion as implicit (or virtual) corresponds to truths of existence or of fact or of event (the contrary not implying contradiction). Here "virtual" has a very special sense, not opposed to actual (since everything is in act, even the virtual), so the two types of opposition, express vs. virtual or implicit, are best understood as the former (truths of essence) being only grasped as an outcome of a finite number of operations, the latter (truths of existence) grasped as an outcome of an infinite number of operations (e.g., crossing the Rubicon, the notion of Caesar). Whereas truths of essence belong to God's understanding, truths of existence do not put God's will into play, with Deleuze drawing from Leibniz's text "On Freedom" to insist that "God alone sees", not "the end" (since the end is infinite), but the connection of terms as the envelopment of the predicate in the subject. Hence, inclusion is an envelopment, and for the two kinds of inclusion, inclusion is able to be unfolded in truths of essence whereas in truths of existence, it doesn't allow itself to be unfolded. further clarified with reference to "On Freedom". After summarizing Leibniz's distinctions between types of truths of essence and truths of existence, Deleuze pursues a sequence of demonstrating linkages of Leibniz's definitions regarding truth to show that linking reciprocal inclusions is what demonstrating is, i.e., Definables, in contrast to Identicals (A is A). Deleuze points out that Leibniz's had conceived a way to identify Identicals through a "Combinatory" that Deleuze describes with geometric figures on the blackboard, the Identicals being "disparate", containing nothing that another contains. Thus, at one end of the chain lie simple primitive notions, without doors or windows, while at the other end of the chains are individual notions that include the entire world, but also without relations with one another. Deleuze traces back these Identicals or Disparates, necessarily compatible with each other, to what Aristotle called "categories" or, in Kant, predicates of any object whatsoever, and then defines a "primary notion" as one that cannot be conceived as directly able to be raised to infinity, thereby marking the finitude of sensory reception. Yet, the primary notion at work in color implies extension, while with the Identicals being linked directly to the infinite, Deleuze asserts that Leibniz causes the principle of identity to undergo strange yet admirable operations.

Deleuze reaches a crucial turning point since to create the logic of the forms which are God's elements without infinite understanding, Leibniz offers a Characteristic, i.e., to divide up domains for reasons of perception and understanding: for a discontinuous quantity populated by the number, primary numbers are requisites, hence, to arrange the cases in the domain; for the visible populated by colors, primitive colors are requisite; for the living, organisms are requisites; for the inorganic, the requisite is the summation of small quantities of movement composing speed that Leibniz calls *conatus*, solicitations of movement, reaching tiny homogenous parts. As seeds in which the complex domain and objects are included, the requisite is the notion of the thing, and the domain is inflection or an event, with the object populating the domain as the things to which the event happens. Deleuze reaches a third case of inclusion, a non-reciprocal inclusion of the part-whole kind, that he supports with reference to "On Freedom", i.e. requisites necessarily encountering non-reciprocal inclusions establishing linkages between reciprocal inclusions. Deleuze summarizes the three types of inclusion: auto-inclusions, or Identicals, Disparates, simple primitive notions, primary Possible; then, reciprocal inclusions, or definitions; finally, requisites or non-reciprocal inclusions, all concerning truths of essence, all developable, unfoldable. On the other hand, for truths of existence, there is inclusion in the individual notion, which are requisites of truths of existence, but an inclusion that is not developable. Here begins a fourth type of inclusion, one that is non-localizable. Deleuze refers to Leibniz's assertions that, first, rather than create Adam as a sinner, God created the world in which Adam sinned, and second, the world does not exist outside the individual notions that expression (e.g., Adam, Caesar, Alexander). Leibniz's assertions lead Deleuze to wonder why the opposite of an individual notion is possible, with the answer emerging from Leibniz's concept of "impossibility", i.e., the possibility of Adam as non-sinner, impossible with our world, but compossible with another, this concept left for the next session.

Session 7, January 20, 1987

Moving beyond the Baroque house previously developed, Deleuze expands the concepts of inclusion, singularity, event, while also developing the concepts of the compossible and impossible, firmly linked to mathematical reflections. After the usual opening recap, he reaches the previous session's discussion on sufficient reason as a principle reigning over events, and to Leibniz's philosophy of the event, hence with propositions of existence, inclusion as the world-subject torsion or chiasmus, and the contrary as non-contradictory, but rather impossible, e.g., Adam non-sinner in relation to the world in which Adam sinned. To explain Leibniz's sense of God's reasons for the impossible, beyond the grasp of finite creatures, Deleuze recalls that given two individual notions, both express the world but only express clearly a small portion, and within this hierarchy of souls, Deleuze singles out Adam's predicates (i.e., list of traits), as inflections or a snaking line going from predicate to predicate, i.e., "singularities" or events. Addressing singularities mathematically as a line of ordinary points, Deleuze follows Adam's successive singularities as a convergent series or path with common values, and claims God's method of tossing out one event and the next, leads to a divergent event (e.g., Adam resisting temptation) becoming impossible with the first set of singular events, constituting another world. Deleuze links divergent series to mathematical theories developed by Karl Weierstrass's method of analytical prolongation, but returning to Leibniz's monads, no two of which includes the same clear and distinct portion, the real definition of the individual is a

condensation of pre-individual singularities able to be prolonged as convergent, with impossibilities perhaps implicated in mathematics at the level of convergent and divergent series. Following a ten-minute one-sided conversation (due to audio limitations) between Deleuze and a mathematician colleague (later identified only as Marek) regarding links between compossibility and impossibility and singularities more generally, Deleuze asks him to speak at the next session. terms.

Session 8, January 27, 1987

Deleuze to employs the resources of a colleague in mathematics, identified only as Marek (and not until the 3 February session), to complement Deleuze's own perspectives on point of view and singularities in relation to the fold. Deleuze's asks three generative questions linking the concepts of singularity, compossibility, and individuation are: what is a singularity? Second, between singularities, what is the type of relation that allows us to define compossibility and impossibility? Third, what is individuality or individuation? To illustrate singularities and bifurcations in action, Deleuze draws from three texts: in Leibniz's *The Theodicy*, a particular Baroque tale providing details of singularities, nested stories and varied narrations; Borges's story, "The Garden of Forking Paths" in *Ficciones*, with multiple simultaneous impossible worlds; and Maurice Leblanc's novel *La Vie extravagante de Balthazar* [Balthazar's Extravagant Life], with its interplay of singularities and impossibility. With each example, Deleuze reiterates the initial questions, setting up Marek's superb intervention, first with an historical and conceptual background on singularities, tracing Henri Poincaré's and George Cantor's developments. In the twentieth century, after providing details on David Hilbert's book on axiomatization and Thoralf Skolem's discovery of nonstandard models of arithmetic, Marek moves to Abraham Robinson's *Nonstandard Analysis* (1966), notably his explicit acknowledgement of Leibniz's postulating the possibility of extended universes and diverse aspects of singularities. Marek then considers the notion of convergent series (or convergent succession) from the Leibnizian perspective (in contrast to classical mathematics), developed in a report from 1701, and he concludes by linking the monad to singularities, i.e., relations between the singular point and everything around it. Expressing his "pure joy" with several specific questions Leibniz's 1701 text and Skolem's works, Deleuze closes with comments on the importance of knowing by what mode of calculation the infinite functions, and while the recording ends, it is possible that Deleuze continued his remarks.

Session 9, February 3, 1987

Following the previous, hybrid class (half Deleuze and half invited lecturer, Marek), this session marks the mid-point of the academic year and provides groundwork to develop discussion after the February semester break. The session begins in mid-sentence with Deleuze speaking prior to the actual start of class, and then he returns to the very definition of the Baroque, e.g., the monad without doors or windows, and also the importance of harmony for Leibniz on different levels, which he theorized as "pre-established harmony". He also provides several complementary perspectives on "the fold," notably Pierre Boulez's composition *Pli selon pli* (*Fold after Fold*) as proof of the concept's importance; Heidegger's use of the term; and especially Mallarmé's

poetics of the fold and his project of *The Book (Le Livre)* that Deleuze links to the monad, compressing folds into an active unity, similar to Leibniz's Combinatory. Then, following on Marek's presentation, Deleuze returns to the singularity, compossibility, moving on to divine creation, propositions of existence and propositions of essence, and to the concept of "the Best" in God's choices, particularly Leibniz's list of regions in God's understanding.

Then, Deleuze makes the important turn toward the importance of the material body's link to the individual's clear expression, thus developing the distinction between two kinds of notions, individual notions of existence or monads, and simple notions of essence, or requisites, which offers an entry to the question of freedom in Leibniz. This question prepares the ground for considering the soul's amplitude in exercising such freedom, that Deleuze briefly addresses here and to which he returns after the winter break. As more or fewer singularities in an event depend on one's sharpness or dullness of perception, this theory of perception implies a differential conception through which perception relies on the condition of the singularities grasped and on the prolongation of these singularities along lines of ordinaries. Hence, the definition of individual relies on admitting to pre-individual singularities (a notion developed by Gilbert Simondon) and conceiving of the individual as a condensation of singularities, the monad as a concentration of the universe, a finite number since the monad expresses clearly only a small portion of the world. Thus, with the monad constructed around what Leibniz calls primitive predicates of the monad, Deleuze suggests the possibility of creating one's own list of singularities such as one might for Adam and his regions of clear expression. Deleuze provides examples from the amorous domain and also the study of philosophy and mathematics to display the complexity of Leibniz's notion of compossible worlds and the problem of individuation. This description is complicated by the possibility of sin as part of a clear region and linked to the question of freedom. Drawing from two Leibniz texts, Deleuze shows that Leibniz emphasized the importance of motives, e.g., to leave or stay, possibly understood as weights on a scale, and of Leibniz's two-part process for examining options. While one may well choose to be miserable, one will have done so according to the clear portion of the world one expresses, yet another solution is to bide one's time, i.e., to allow the tiny solicitations their own transformations through the course of the day. Deleuze advises that one not regret what one has done at a moment due to the soul's limited amplitude, but to regret only having such a limited amplitude itself, hence the need to increase that amplitude. This example of the café (in fact, the tavern) and its relation to free will return in the following session, appropriately titled "The Tavern".

Session 10, February 24, 1987

While this is one of very few nearly complete sessions with clear start and finish, in contrast to the Web Deleuze transcript, the first eight minutes of the BNF recording starts with a presentation in progress by Richard Pinhas (musician and student of Deleuze), on the relation of Leibnizian concepts to music theory, notably accords, modulation, and pre-established harmony (a topic addressed in the Seminar's final session on 2 June). Then Deleuze returns to Leibniz's concept of freedom by denouncing a double illusion concerning motives: first, to objectify motives as if they were outside the mind (since motives are disposition of the soul) and to divide up objectified motives into rankings based on subjective motives (since motives are indivisible). Instead, Deleuze with Leibniz depicts motives as the fabric of the soul are a teeming of tiny

inclinations or perceptions, and he recounts Leibniz's own example of the choice of going to the tavern or staying home to work. The individual makes such a choice through a process of deliberation, inclination, and the extension of individual amplitude, and Deleuze points out that while certain habitual acts (e.g., walking across the street) require no confrontation with the problems of freedom, other acts arise around the possibility, or not, of filling the soul's amplitude at a given moment, just as there are certain cases in which waiting changes everything. This discussion raises the concept of duration in such deliberation, which in turn leads to temporal considerations within the act being accomplished in the present.

Then addressing Leibniz's theory as it concerns damnation, with the question "Is the damned man free?", Deleuze draws from Jean Rousset's book on Baroque literature, specifically death as movement in the process of being created, and also cites Quevedo on death. For the damned man accompanies damnation rather than inheriting it, e.g., Judas, damned because of the disposition in which he died, with the soul's amplitude filled with hatred of God, thus, the monad's region of clarity at the minimum amplitude. Considering Judas's fate as never stopping in being redamned, Deleuze intones Beelzebub's song (from the *Confessio philosophi*) and recounts the tale of the hermit who obtained from God the grace for Beelzebub, to which Deleuze connects Nietzsche's portrait of the damned as the man of *ressentiment* or vengeance in the present. Yet even if this very rigorous freedom emerges from Leibniz, Deleuze wonders how morality is to be saved, i.e., how to define the tendency toward the best, and here Deleuze reveals Leibniz's impasse, namely that the soul's progress is always compensated by the regression of other souls. Moreover, in this struggle for moral existence, monads must be subject to the order of time, and Deleuze refers to Leibniz's *The Cause of God* which states that if I exist from the start of the world, it is in the form of a body infinitely folded in on itself. At death, i.e., the other end of this process, one involves, carrying along a new official document, the death certificate, with one's soul existing but ceasing to be reasonable. And beyond this comes the resurrection, bodies unfolding into a subtle body with souls to be judged, reawakening according to one's final amplitude, with lights relit brightly or, for the damned, quite dimly. Thus, one's progress occurs to the detriment of others, but this is true only for the damned, having renounced their amplitude, and bearing the punishment of seeing their diminished state cause progress to be available to others. Deleuze concludes by suggesting that the next point to consider in this perspective is the conception of light.

Session 11, March 3, 1987

Returning to earlier topics, notably from chapter 3, "What is the Baroque?", Deleuze explains this strategy as offering a review of what he calls "the second part of the course" (the focus of which, he says, was to examine the "upper floor"), with Deleuze preparing for the third part that he defines as the study of "the theory of matter" in Leibniz. Calling the previous session's discussion a "dramaturgy of souls", Deleuze proposes here to explore the new status of life in this series of elevations and descents, taking Tintoretto's work "The Final Judgment" as an exemplar of interplay between lights and shadows, specifically the darkness in the monad's depths, the *fuscum subnigram* of the closed room. Deleuze underscores the Baroque return to ground in painting, and this discovery of the "dark nature of color" means colors are generated from the *fuscum* with a distribution of differential characteristics. Hence, each monad, while expressing the totality of the world, does so in a privileged manner, in its white zone, and the

more one reaches that zone's edges, the more one degrades, the light slipping toward the dark depths, the domain of chiaroscuro which is the interiority of light in a canvas, and also in the monad. Here Deleuze recalls the "dramaturgy of souls" since not all souls become reasonable, only those governed by the "official document" from God giving to souls a power of light, whereas animal souls remain in the *fuscum*. Deleuze follows Leibniz's breakdown of color perceptions, and in this succession of increasingly fine filters, the finest filter to infinity picks out the black and extracts the *fuscum subnigram*, the blackish depth of ground for colors. Moreover, Deleuze calls the action of light, between black and the *fuscum*, to be the fold, a new status for light emerging through the filters that extract the dark as well as successive colors.

Building on these insights better to define the Baroque and contesting assertions that the Baroque doesn't exist, Deleuze returns to the earlier definition, of the Baroque defined by the fold as primary and going to infinity, through tension and resolution of tension, i.e., the Baroque scission of two terms restarting each other. Describing the scission's coordinates — first, inside and outside, e.g., façade and interior, with the exterior constituting the lower floor, the infinitely spongy pleats of matter, and the interior constituting the upper floor — Deleuze notes the divisions of the fold to infinity into pleats of matter and folds of the soul, and also, the pleats of matter forming the exterior always in exteriority, while folds in the souls form the absolute interior without doors or windows. A final characteristic concerns the fold passing between upper and lower floors, i.e., light passing between spongy matter and the dark depths of the upper room, with Leibniz as the first great theoretician of the fold. Deleuze "applies" the concept of the Baroque to define any thinker attributing the basic dual property to the fold to be a disciple of Leibniz, e.g., Heidegger — for whom Deleuze outlines some key points — and Mallarmé — his "fold after fold" (*pli selon pli*) — and Thomas de Quincey. Deleuze seeks examples of the weaving and layering of the fold, exploring the Baroque in the plastic arts: contrasting the Gothic fold to the Baroque, then Greek bas-relief as well Greek political power, finally, the "disturbing case" of Gaëtan de Clérambault's fetishistic taste for fabrics and folds. Deleuze's interest leads him to three categories in Clérambault's work, folds, hems (particularly Clérambault's claim that tunics in Greek statuary had hems), and drapes, from which Deleuze derives his own categories. Deleuze returns to Leibniz's simple folds, and Deleuze links the monad, with its function of the point of view, or support, i.e., regulated variation of movement under impulsions, to the drape. As for the pleats of matter, their diverse types correspond to different textures. Here Deleuze undertakes discussion of substance with fundamental reference points, notably Descartes distanced from Aristotle who Leibniz resuscitates. But Deleuze notes that in philosophy, substance is the thing, and he follows the terms development from Aristotle and then Descartes, substance as a particular determined extension. While Leibniz corresponds to this view, Deleuze suggests that he creates of inherence — and the subject as a subject of inherence — an original conception, not just the individual as condensing of singularities, but as substance as what is present in substance, just as Aristotle stated.

However, this session also contains a supplementary discussion lasting another 16 minutes, in response to student questions, first regarding Mallarmé's conception of where literature starts in relation to his so-called circumstantial writings (fans, verses in a lady's autograph notebook), hence the newspaper fold (the fold of circumstance) versus the fold of the event, or the Book. A student's query about the need for coordinates of the fold triggers a different direction in Deleuze's response, namely, to address philosophical versus non-philosophical modes of

understanding. Another student refers to Deleuze reference to the monad's apartment as a "reading room" and asks if this might not also be conceived in a cinematographic way, and Deleuze accedes with enthusiasm, suggesting that it is a matter of perspective, that the room could be considered as new or digital images without models. The final question concerns details on Deleuze's references to the hem and drape, and these remarks clearly delight Deleuze in the way they might correspond to subsequent development, but he then prudently closes the supplementary discussion.

Session 12, March 10, 1987

Putting aside discussion of Leibniz's notion of substance, Deleuze proposes discuss some problems of physics in Leibniz and Whitehead, with the help of Isabelle Stengers. Deleuze calls "Whitehead's cry" to be: the predicate is irreducible to any attribute because the predicate is an event, and in fact, everything is an event. In light of Whitehead's claim that even the Great Pyramid is an event, Deleuze returns to Leibniz's example of Adam's determinations and extends the event to a variation of an electro-magnetic field, the support for an infinite number of processes – of subjectivation, of individuation, of rationalization –, and Deleuze seeks a classification of events as a way of understanding what it means to cause an event. Following Whitehead, Deleuze insists that any "actual occasion" refers to others, each presupposing data that precede actual occasions, and since each new actual occasion defines something new, from concrescence to concrescence, with the actual occasion itself consisting of an aggregate of "prehensions". Deleuze selects some examples, an instrument prehending other instruments (the fictional composer Vinteuil in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*); Alban Berg's "cry" in "Wozzeck", to which Deleuze links to the *Monadology*, bodies in a perpetual state of flux.

After summarizing the three coordinates of actual occasions – conjunctions, prehensions, and eternal objects –, Deleuze outlines three problems on which he seeks commentary from Isabelle Stengers. Despite Stengers's reply (approximately nine minutes) being barely audible, Deleuze provides a summary, and then in dialogue with Stengers, Deleuze argues that regarding the problem of genesis, Whitehead starts from a disjunctive diversity, the opposite of conjunction, revealing the production of something new, a diversity also undergoing a process of infinite divisibility, organizing infinite and limitless series. Deleuze sees diversity being organized starting from the vibration as formed in the "many" toward an infinite, limitless series, and the vibrations' sub-multiples possess infinite harmonics, within a cosmos of the "many", i.e., a chaos-cosmos. The next step, then, concerns vibrations as a principle of individuation, and seeking the process of the event's genesis, Deleuze locates the five stages in Whitehead. Deleuze considers this Whitehead schema to be close to Leibniz's, and reviewing each of these stages while seeking Stengers's approval, Deleuze explores whether these function from the perspective of physics, particularly regarding the formation of vibrations. Then, Deleuze pursues another point, translating from the English in Whitehead's *Concept of Nature*, regarding the birth of convergent series tending toward a limit. Deleuze follows how Leibniz derives distinct ideas through a haze, or folds, hence the problem of genesis, and this corresponds to God's choice of *a world* from the impossible worlds, i.e., from the disjunctive diversity or the "many". Hence, having an idea is an actual occasion, a concrescence, and to Leibniz, Deleuze attributes a filtering system, such as the action of light filtering from the shadows the dark depth of colors.

He also associates this to the screening act, the *cribratio* as an organization of the world, notably developed by Plato in *Timaeus* that Deleuze recommends as reading for the next session.

Session 13, March 17, 1987

Having devoted the previous session to the Leibniz-Whitehead connection in the presence of Isabelle Stengers, Deleuze continues this “confrontation”, opening with Whitehead’s affirmation “everything is event” and immediately noting critical misconceptions about Leibniz as well as Whitehead. Deleuze proposes to discern what the conditions of the event’s emergence are, i.e., the genesis of the actual occasion, which he developed in the previous session in four moments. Deleuze defines the event for which he seeks an equivalent in Leibniz, notably starting from initial disorder with its objective and subjective characteristics, the former previously described as exercises of tossing printer letters into the air or scattering cannonballs onto the battlefield, thereby producing series. As for the subjective characteristics, Deleuze asserts that Leibniz introduced into philosophy an affective tonality. Deleuze describes Leibniz’s disorder or chaos as the aggregate of all possibles, hence his state of hallucinatory perception, at which point, the screen arises, passing between shadow (infinitely perforated matter) and light, extracting the dark depth of all colors, or in vibration, the uproar of the sea from which emerges a drop of water, i.e., initiating an aggregate of differential relations. Deleuze turns to Plato’s *Timaeus* for its screen story, and through this tale, Deleuze proposes the screen as a veritable machine, Leibniz’s machine of Nature, one going to infinity. Then, Deleuze draws from Leibniz’s texts to shift to the step following the screen action, a first kind of text discussing series that enter relations of whole-parts, and another kind of Leibniz text reveals a different type of series: whereas the previous text dealt with rational numbers, other texts present irrational numbers which place quantities into relation without any common measure, thus implying another type of series which are limits of a convergent series (e.g., the irrational number π). Conjoined to the previous discussion of extensions is Deleuze’s proposal of a new philosophical word for the convergent series tending toward limits, the *intensio*, or “intensions”, with terms that are degrees and no longer parts, hence a theory of intensities corresponding to the preceding theory of extensities. Deleuze points out the idea of a certain conjunction of series at the level of the real, in matter, and that no reality has a sole characteristic, hence a conjunction such that Leibniz adds a third kind of series, of monads or possible existences defined by a convergent series, i.e., a portion of the world, which prolong themselves into another series, thereby forming a compossible world. Deleuze argues that through the sequence from chaos through the conjunction of two kinds of series, the event is constituted, requiring an understanding of its composition.

Returning then to the third infinity just described, Deleuze evokes Spinoza’s discussion of the third infinity which resembles Leibniz’s, and then he argues that the second and third types of infinity correspond to Whitehead’s second and third types which yield the event, i.e., vibration for Whitehead, inflection for Leibniz. Leibniz calls the event’s element the “monad”, a prehension of the world, with five aspects, and Deleuze refers to the neo-Platonic tradition in this regard, notably Plotinus’s third *Ennead*, where everything rejoices in itself by contemplating and thereby each thing fulfills itself, or in Leibniz’s terms, each thing is unconscious contemplation of its conditions of existence, i.e., of its requisites, e.g., the contemplative nature of the cow. For Deleuze, the aspect of auto-contemplation or self-enjoyment corresponds to Samuel Butler’s term “habitus”, and this “enjoyment”, says Deleuze, is living itself, a small confidence of

endurance in contrast to the agony interrupting “self-enjoyment”. Deleuze proposes that each of the organs prehends other prehensions to infinity, i.e., “feeling” as the private form of prehension, the calm confidence that this continues, but not forever, the individual as a conglomerate of prehending subject, a nexus or prehensions all having some “self-enjoyment”.

Session 14, April 7, 1987

This session is an extended review after a three-week break, Deleuze recalling the “unusual vision” of the event seen in the comparison of Leibniz and Whitehead, i.e., everything is event, and Deleuze proposes to discuss the “spiritual event”, i.e., for Leibniz, the event having actual existence only in the monad that expresses the world, the event’s spiritual dimension. The other dimension is the event’s actualization of a soul and realization of a body, which brings Deleuze to the question for the seminar’s third part, what does it mean to have a body? Deleuze returns to the previous session, namely Leibniz’s view of the predicate’s inclusion in the subject, but as an event, and Deleuze then asks, since substance is the subject, what is the result of Leibniz’s position for substance? Leibniz defines substance by its modes, and with this term, mode of substance, Deleuze states that it is something that implies substance without the substance implying it. Likening this to Mannerism, Deleuze argues that substance is defined by and as the active source of its own modifications, i.e., manners of being, and in short, no longer defined by essence, substance is defined in relation to its own manner of being, the monad as Mannerist, not essentialist, i.e., everything is event. Returning then to the Whitehead-Leibniz comparison, Deleuze retraces the conditions of the event and recalls Leibniz’s third type of series, i.e., convergent series having properties to extend themselves into another, a conjunction of worlds expressed by each monad, allowing Leibniz to define individuations, singularities. Deleuze also recalls the previously developed composition of the event, with the five aspects composing the event, starting with the concert example, then lists the five-part correspondence in Leibniz’s thought. Having completed these comparative lists, Deleuze returns to Whitehead’s notion of “actual occasions”, then shifts to Leibniz to reflect on the factor of duration that arises in “subjective aim”. Moreover, duration also provides “the similar”, which Whitehead calls “eternal objects” that Deleuze links to Whitehead’s notion of a concrescence of prehensions composing the event, i.e. components of the event. A question from Richard Pinhas regarding musical composition as potentiality and realization allows Deleuze to continue with the eternal object by discussing successive levels of actualization, and he selects the ritornello as an example and considers the question of performance as actualization of music, contrasting this discipline to others, e.g., painting and writing.

Deleuze then addresses Leibniz’s new theory of substance, focusing first on ancient Greece, structures of opposition in Aristotle that found the theme of difference, then to Plotinus, then to the Middle Ages and Gothic thought’s great profusion and questions of distinction, to which Deleuze relates work by Saint Thomas and Duns Scotus, clearly favoring the latter. Then, in the Classical era, differing from the Gothic profusion and distinctions, Deleuze notes Descartes’s return to order with three distinctions: real distinction; distinction of reason; and modal reason. Finally, he shifts to a subsequent “diabolical operation”, the return of movement, i.e., the Baroque, an overview that allows him to introduce the seminar’s third section, how Leibniz transforms the problems of distinctions without returning to the Middle Ages in his theory of

substance that reactivates Aristotle against Descartes. Deleuze indicates that he has asked several participants familiar with music to speak on the problem of harmony (the topic in the special final session, June 2, 1987), and that at the next session, he will sum up the presentation on substance in Leibniz as this relates to the additional topic of understanding philosophy.

Session 15, April 28, 1987

Deleuze takes the opportunity to outline an early version of his study on the very important question, “What is philosophy?”, and then to begin to address a final point for the course’s second part, the notion of substance. Deleuze links the meaning of the Whitehead-Leibniz comparison to the philosophical enterprise, notably the statement “everything is event” since, for Whitehead, the components of the event are capable of making us understand its different domains and their relations. Deleuze argues that one’s interest in any philosopher, or artist, or musician means having a common base with him/her and insists that arguments have no point since problems between two discussants might not well be the same (hence no common basis for discussion), or if the same, it would be only fruitful for moving toward a horizon of new problems (cf. *What is Philosophy?* pp. 28-29). After exploring the example of the problem of knowledge (*connaissance*) in philosophy in general and then within the history of philosophy, Deleuze concludes that a great philosopher is someone who changes the nature of a problem, e.g., “everything is event”, and in Leibniz’s case, inventing the procedures (e.g., infinitesimal calculus) to resolve certain types of problems. Encouraging the participants to assess their kind of connection, or not, with Whitehead and Leibniz, Deleuze explains his commitment to creating a lineage from which Nietzsche’s expression emerges, i.e., to imagine a thinker as someone shooting an arrow without knowing where it goes, with another thinker searching for it. Deleuze also develops the distinctions of two ways among many currently of doing philosophy, on one hand, the “abstract” serving to explain, i.e., to explain phenomena through principles, on the other hand, subjective abstracts with reason no longer discovered from abstract principles. Deleuze seeks an approach to philosophy that creates a cartography based on the domain of experience to which the problem refers, hence a map construction, consolidating a fuzzy aggregate, opposed to principle. Calling a “logic of aggregates of consolidation” an empiricist philosophy, that is, without reason realizing its ends from above, Deleuze states he attempted this with Guattari, to create assemblages (*agencements*) that undo subjectifications, favoring rhizomes, disparate junctions, to which Deleuze links Foucault’s work with “apparatuses” (*dispositifs*). Deleuze offers a third distinction between the two types of philosophy, on one hand, philosophy as possessing a power of reflection, on the other hand, philosophy as creation (of concepts) just as a musician or a scientist creates in the respective field. Finally, the fourth distinction is between philosophy as linked to the eternal in contrast to philosophy posing problems of emergence of the new, as Deleuze asserts he has done in studying Leibniz. Moreover, Deleuze insists that philosophers nonetheless overlap with non-philosophers in a common task of openness to each way of thinking will maintaining one’s respective quality as philosopher or non-philosopher.

Deleuze then returns to the comparative study of the notion of substance, turning to the Greek use of the term in Aristotle as something concrete, “that which is” or “Be-ing” (*l’étant*), then jumping to Descartes and on to Leibniz. Deleuze reiterates that to the essentialism common to Aristotle and Descartes, Leibniz opposes a “Mannerism”, and he adds a comment regarding the

mania in ancient thought for oppositions as a way to emphasize the great innovation in the seventeenth century to reduce oppositions to a simple limitation, substituting for the theory of opposites a logic of pure distinction. Deleuze examines the sense of “distinct” in Descartes who seeks to define each substance through an attribute belonging to it properly and positively, and he provides a logic of distinction with three types (abstraction, modal distinction, real distinction). Deleuze suggests in closing it is on Descartes theory of distinction that Leibniz’s polemic with him will explode.

Session 16, May 5, 1987

Continuing the discussion from the end of the previous session (28 April), i.e., the theory of substance, and its five criteria — logical, epistemological, physical or technical, psychological, and metaphysical – Deleuze says that Leibniz insists that extension cannot be substance, thereby provoking the Cartesians by reactivating Aristotle. After reviewing Descartes’s logic of distinction breaking with Aristotelian logic of opposition, Deleuze also seeks in Descartes a “logic of substance”-criterion which, in fact, is simplicity, a criterion of thought. Then, shifting to Leibniz’s *Monadology*, Deleuze points to the monad as simple substance, but Leibniz also distinguished composite substances, defining substance logically as unity, as one, as did Aristotle. Moreover, since movement needs internal unity, Deleuze briefly makes a connection between Leibniz and Bergson, distinguishing the differential of movement, the *conatus* or effort, a unity to which Leibniz gives a motor action as well as a metaphysical determination, the monad itself. This is also where spontaneity appears – *sua sponte* in Latin — as unity in the instant and as unity for the whole of the movement’s duration, required by movement in the process of occurring. Deleuze turns to correspondence between Leibniz and Pierre Bayle where Leibniz espouses the double spontaneity in the unity of movement, a claim that Bayle challenges with a concrete example of a dog eating soup, passing from pleasure (eating) to pain (being hit with a stick), hence a qualitative change. Deleuze argues, with Leibniz, that the qualitative change interior to the substance refers to the active unity of the substance that produces it through integration of tiny perceptions, hence the theory of substance as the theory of One, unity by itself. Concluding this search for a logical criterion, Deleuze insists that in Leibniz, something is never determined through an attribute, but something is determined as a predicate unity, the unity in action which is the criterion of substance, to which Deleuze attributes the name “Mannerist”. He summarizes Leibniz’s theory of substance as the couple spontaneity-depth, the depth of the soul, with everything that changes coming from the depth and this moment of change emerging precisely from the development of an active unity.

Shifting focus to the epistemological criterion, Deleuze again contrasts Descartes to Leibniz, concluding that the epistemological criterion for Leibniz defines substance by assigning it requisites, a being one by itself. Leibniz draws from an entirely new physics of movement (as well as new mathematics) in his era to counter the Cartesian position, and Deleuze suggests that to address this, he needs a brief detour through Aristotle, namely his theory of substance under which Deleuze situates three singularities, i.e., a thing or matter and two qualities needed for creating substance. Deleuze follows successive moments of reflection on this creation, outlining how Descartes undoes this structure point by point whereas, in Leibniz, substance is always evaluated in relation to change, and while substances are monads and are separate, they express the same world from each one’s point of view. Thus, the substance’s requisites (to be discussed

more fully in the next session) are limitations, a passive power, but also an active power with form ceasing to be essence and becoming subject. So, Deleuze concludes that there is both primitive active power and primitive passive power along with primary matter and secondary matter, hence a complex of properly Leibnizian singularities.

Session 17, May 12, 1987

Having moved into the concept of substance in the previous session, Deleuze devotes much of the session to reviewing the previous consideration of the concept of substance, thus preparing the important linkage with reflection on “having a body”. Recalling the session on point of view (18 November 1986), Deleuze insists that, despite their linkage, having a body means something different than having a point of view, and with Leibniz’s statement, “I thought I was in port, and I found myself thrown back into the open sea”, Deleuze introduces a new problem of the body, returning to the logical criterion of substance. Deleuze recalls that the monad draws from the depth of the soul, and as inherence, the monad expresses the world, with every thing as a *percipit* of substance for the monad, i.e., a perceived being, with perceptions as the actions of substance. Yet Deleuze claims that at the end of discussing the first criterion, “we are thrown back into the open sea” since Leibniz does not actually say there are only monads and their perception or simple *percipits*. However, Deleuze recalls that each monad, while expressing the entire world, does so clearly only in one’s tiny, privileged region, or zone, and insists that this zone that one expresses clearly is what concerns one’s body, i.e., the aggregate of events that pass through the body. Deleuze concludes that one has a body because the soul expresses a tiny region of the world, i.e., one expresses the world due to the principal singularities, around which one is constituted, extending themselves toward other singularities, thus suggesting that the soul is a condensation of a limited aggregate of singularities.

Thus, while the first requisite is active and primitive power, the second is the monad’s limitation of extension and of “antitype”, i.e. resistance or inertia, entering into convergent series. Deleuze asks how the requirement of extension, as pure limitation, is to be realized, with only one answer: through the body. To address Leibniz’s original way of conceiving of relation of limitation to positive power, Deleuze refers to *The Theodicy*, that matter is inclined to slowness, whereby Leibniz tries to understand the problem of metaphysical limitation of creatures in terms of physics. Offering Leibniz’s example of differently laden boats in a current, Deleuze says that Leibniz’s text suggests that limitation in the receptivity of a creature corresponds to the quantity of a shadow, according to one’s mass, at level of the soul, and he then poses the question, why do bodies exist, i.e., why the fact of clearly expressing a tiny region results in one having a body? Despite answering that this limitation is the requirement for extension and resistance, i.e., through the body, Deleuze is peppered with question about Leibniz’s example of boats in the current, creating a 27-minute back-and-forth with students. Deleuze eventually shifts the focus back to Leibniz’s physical criterion of substance, and claiming that Descartes cannot account for the genesis of movement in extension, Leibniz suggests that just as spiritual substance presented to us active primitive force, passive primitive force or limitation, so too bodies present to us active derivative force and passive force of limitation, i.e., delimitation of receptivity of the body to movements that it receives. Thus, to conclude Deleuze recalls that having a body is the only way through which the requirement of extension and resistance can be realized, not just as a

spontaneous unity of change and as a limitation, but as a third requisite, to which Deleuze will turn in the next session.

Session 18, May 19, 1987

The session opens with Deleuze announcing he will end his teaching career after the June 2 session, and so this session's theme, "what does it mean for Leibniz, having a body?" precedes the final sessions on harmony. Deleuze points out, though, that without a body, there would be no perception, but from previous examples, Deleuze concludes that as perceptions are data inherent to the monad, the monad would be full of perceptions, even ghostly ones, but that having a body corresponds to the event's double requirement, that of both preceding itself and succeeding itself. Here, Deleuze refers to Joë Bousquet's statement that the problem is being worthy of the event, and Deleuze explores this with the virtual-actual rapport in Leibniz, arguing that the event, as virtuality, refers back to individual substances that express it. Moreover, this is not only a virtual-actual rapport, but also possible-real rapport since the body remains pure possible without being actualized in a body. Returning to the Baroque house with two floors, the lower connecting to pleats of matter, the upper to folds in the soul, Deleuze argues that Leibnizian reason regarding these floors is the event, which must actualize itself in the monad and must inscribe itself in a lived body. Deleuze returns to an earlier point, that Leibniz needs animals (and perhaps invents animal psychology) since they force us beyond human souls and thus to agree that there are bodies, concluding that for the morality of the event, the two coordinates are being worthy of what happens and to inscribe it into one's flesh, and the two floors for Leibniz are the circuit of the event, the event not only actualizing itself in monads, but realizing itself in the body. Here Deleuze arrives at Leibniz's three aspect: the soul and folds in the soul; matter and pleats in matter; and between them, a "realizing thing", that which brings the lived body to the monad, i.e., the rapport of the folds in the soul with the pleats of matter for which Deleuze proposes the name, *vinculum substantialae* (the "substantial vinculum"), a chain or knot that intervenes as a kind of stitching of the living body.

Deleuze returns to the seminar's start, the definition of the Baroque, in which folds extend to infinity, and Deleuze takes an El Greco painting ("Christ in the Garden of Olive", with several versions) to note the fold's three registers: folds of fabric, folds of boulders, folds of clouds. Deleuze calls these the "textures of matter" for Leibniz, and Deleuze reviews this genesis, with the monad containing everything, expressing the entire universe, but only clearly in a small, privileged region. To this first proposition, Deleuze adds the second, I have a body from which I express the entire world but again only in a confused way. From here, Deleuze considers a hierarchy of monads, some in complete darkness, animals with a tiny clear region (e.g., the cow's field), reasonable souls with a clear zone of expression but also in a confused way. Then, considering how the body is an object of perception, Deleuze returns to the tiny unconscious perceptions that arise through which we create a conscious perception. Deleuze explains how the most confused thing in the world can communicate a clear perception to the monad, and he relates this example to an earlier one, the dog beaten by a stick, the experience of pain, that Deleuze develops by reading from two Leibniz texts regarding sensation in the monad and corporeal traces of the body. Deleuze insists on the contrast between bodies, exerting direct causality on each other, and monads, doing nothing other than inter-express a one and same

world, without doors or windows. Thus, Deleuze proposes for the penultimate session to consider the story of harmony implicating itself between monads and bodies.

Session 19, May 26, 1987

In this penultimate session, Deleuze draws together the seminar's key aspects: the definition of the Baroque as related to the fold; the intimate relation between singularity, event, and monads; the intersection of substance and expression, compossibility, perception and point of view, freedom and "having a body". Beginning with the seminar's focus as the philosophy of two floors and of relations of souls and bodies, Deleuze immediately asks how "harmony", from a philosophical perspective, corresponds to developments in music in the same era as Leibniz. He shifts back to constructing the two Baroque floors (recalling the seminar's opening sessions), noting that for the Baroque line, what matters is the event in inflection, with the unity of the world as an infinite succession of inflections or events, and Deleuze insists that an event is an event of the spirit, concerning bodies, enveloped in a spiritual unity called the monad, which expresses the world. Moreover, while each monad has an infinity of folds with the world folded into each monad, the monads' principle of individuation dictates that they only express clearly a tiny portion of the world. In terms of the upper floor (of souls), the soul is obscure, and God's choice from an infinity of possible worlds is the one with the greatest quantity of reality (hence, says Leibniz, the most perfect), but this is a world with no existence outside the individual substances that express it.

Returning to harmony, for Leibniz, this is a relation of expression (as in Baroque music which calls for expressive value), with each monad expressing its difference through its distinct point of view, its privileged zone through which it has a regulated relation with the world, but each monad sharing a fundamental darkness in the soul's depth. As to the other floor of the Baroque house, it is expressed by "I have a body!" which is required by the event, a spiritual determination or inflection actualized in an individual subject. On the upper floor, the mode of construction is a virtual world only existing actually in each monad, without communication between monads; on the level of bodies, these are outside one another, interacting upon each other, a differential relation being constituted. For Leibniz, the body is made of an infinity of tiny actual parts, the actual infinite, quite unimaginable, while monads are infinite through their cause in that God creates them in a way that they express the totality of an infinite world, and a third sense of infinity, for bodies, is one caught in its limits, a portion of matter, hence finite, yet with an infinity of actual parts. Deleuze insists that this aggregate concerns me, belongs to me under the hypothesis of an infinity of tiny souls, without body and soul being separable. By virtue of the first floor, the universal interaction of bodies, substantial forms never cease coming and going, nor changing parts, such that the organism's time period never coincides with a disappearance or a total birth, but always straddling one part while another part is departing. The conjugation of all this, for Leibniz, occurs through the seam or knot, the vinculum, linking the dominated monads to organs. Deleuze then provides an eight-point outline of this organizational structure, with the final point being the whole story of vitalism that causes us to pass perpetually from one floor to the other, which links to what Leibniz calls harmony. For one's body is pre-established harmony of souls and body connecting to God's general laws; that is, a dynamic interiority is necessary, a force of bodies in harmonic rapport with souls as primitive forces.

Session 20, June 2, 1987

To consider the theme of “harmony” (also the subject of chapter 9 in *The Fold*), Deleuze turns to several specialists in music, notably Pascale Criton and Vincent Valls, as well as Richard Pinhas, hence a seminar dominated by interventions from the participants in dialogue with Deleuze. The session is all the more of an event given the presence of a film crew organized by Marielle Burkhalter (in part available online as “Deleuze, Cours sur l’harmonie”). In this session, Deleuze is seeking musical examples that might help understand what occurs in harmony just as some philosophical examples might help understand what occurs in music. Deleuze calls on the presenters, predominantly Pascale Criton and Vincent Valls, to comment on these mutations from a musicological perspective, and while Criton’s opening 6-minute statement is inaudible (on the audio recording) and unrecorded (on the film), her comments emerge based on Deleuze’s response. She explains the conditions through which harmony is discovered and defined by the accord, via a new regime of voices, a vertical accord that traversed the aggregate of voices, and Deleuze clearly seeks a dual perspective, whether two independent variables might explain the development, on one hand, harmony by accord and not by interval, and on the other, the voice-instruments assemblage. Criton points out that writing for instruments did not exist at this point in history and that dissonances were not harmonic then but rather melodic, and that instruments were employed to imitate voices. She explains further the game of writing counterpoint as a kind of movement, voices always being allowed to have space between them, and here Deleuze sees “a wonderful opening”, that what must be retained regarding preestablished harmony in Leibniz is that it is the art of dissonance. Valls points out that at the time Pinhas indicated (the era of Montiverdi), the unified scale does not exist, that it varied according to the country, with composers having a harmony derived from dance music while also wandering in a way that allowed them to express and oppose two sentiments. While Deleuze accepts this, he replies that these views do not prevent what he calls “rigors of the concept,” i.e., the concept enhancing and causing to emerge “seeds of innovation” already prevalent in the earlier state. Criton seems to agree that new forces enter into play, becoming functional gradually, with accords gradually developing tensions among themselves.

Then, responding to Deleuze’s request, Criton provides a brief tutorial on accords, and Deleuze asks whether this development could indeed have occurred independently from the problem of voices. Criton says no, that all authors who established the norms began by working with voices (e.g., the madrigal), and Deleuze responds by saying that Leibniz may well have introduced a notion of accords close to what was occurring in music, connected to innovations concerning the theories of the union of soul and body. At Deleuze’s request, Criton continues to explain how a reversal occurred in the bass lines, contributing to constructing a harmonic universe with counterpoint resituated and creating a tonic architecture of points of relations and tensions inside vibration. Pinhas then asks Criton to clarify how the change of sound material occurred, and Criton explains that the start of orchestration occurred over several generations and several countries, with different groups of instruments coming to represent different tones (*timbres*), each having a continuous bass, and this formal organization, with a principle of variation between the instruments. Deleuze responds regarding Leibniz that the discussion concerns the idea of an accord of souls moving in the direction of an accord of souls and bodies, a movement of preestablished harmony for Leibniz that occurred at the same time as two moments in Baroque music, the discovery of harmony by accords and new organization of voices and

instruments. Pinhas's final intervention concerns the emergence of a particular synthesizer (with the convenient French term "*harmoniseurs*") for which he creates a graph on the board to indicate its pertinence for understanding the world of Baroque music and then explains its workings in somewhat exhaustive detail in terms of virtualities and actualities of sound. Deleuze links the harmonizer to game-playing, for example, God's creation of the world by playing, and Deleuze recalls that the important thing is to determine what kind of game this might be, with Leibniz having developed "God's game" in a distinct manner. Finally, after reminding the students of the solely administrative session the following Tuesday, Deleuze closes by thanking the participants for making the Seminar such a success and then by suggesting that this final session, while having produced some confused impressions, nonetheless provides him with new points of departure for his work. "So there we are (*et voilà*), thank you very much".