

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 10, 24 February 1987: Principles and Freedom (5) - The Tavern — Motives, the Soul & Damnation, Towards Progress

Initial Transcription, WebDeleuze; Augmented Translation and Transcription, Charles J. Stivale¹

Part 1

Richard Pinhas: ... of infinite harmony and of finite harmony. So the idea was to put into musical staves the symbols that we [*coughing blocks several words*] ... So I create the staves, I explain the signs, I explain the logical signs, the musical signs, I assign a chord which corresponds either to finitude or to infinity, and we see that the symbols suggested by Gilles correspond exactly to what we could do for a musical staff. So, I didn't develop it, I've provided the diagram in a way to try to formalize it analogically. So I create the staves [*He moves to the board and begins to draw for several minutes while speaking about the staves, developing the modulation of infinite harmony (what Deleuze calls "variation") in successive measures and also finite modulation, and corresponding symbols.*] [1:00-5:00]

[5:17] ... the chord representing, on the one hand, infinite variation, pre-established harmony, and the possibility of a complete chromatic a priori which would therefore be a kind of variation on infinity, represented graphically and chromatically by this musical chord, by the formula of ... [*jump in the recording*], by simple repetition ... [*jump in the recording*] with a non-finite bar of music, because if there is a finite bar of music, we have the symbol of simple repetition, therefore of a finite repetition, the symbol of the subject or the monad, and a finite chord. There we are. [6:00] Next time, [*jump in the recording, some words lost*]

Deleuze: And the relationship between one and the other?

Pinhas: So, the relationship is in relation, I would say, it is in relation to formalization and exclusion in the sense that if you have... if you develop the side... I started from this, that is, if you develop a formula of the infinity and a formula of finitude, you realize that in music, there is a formula that can be embodied by this type of chord – I didn't develop it but we may do that another time when we talk about preestablished harmony -- which means that we have in the formation of certain types of chords, of certain types of chromatic rises, for example, or of certain varieties which are at the limit of harmony, we have something which corresponds completely to infinity or to infinity in Leibniz. Whereas in the opposite case, we have exactly, I wouldn't say the opposite, we have the same thing [7:00], but in the case of finitude, and this is found in the development by the coda and by the possibility of repetition to infinity, as opposed to a simple repetition which occurs in finite repetition, and which would block us within the framework of finitude. [*Pause*] So, well, the most important thing will be to develop this part in relation to that one, and this is what we will do in two or three directions, in the case of pre-established harmony.

Deleuze: There has to be a third stave.

Pinhas: Yes, that would be a fractal infinity...

Deleuze: No, this stave is material [*la matière*] ... [*Deleuze and Pinhas speak simultaneously and over each other for a moment*]

Pinhas: It's going to be included in the development of that one.

Deleuze: But it is its own law, its own harmonic law.

Pinhas: Yes, but I think it's a detail. Everything that will be harmony, partial harmony, everything that... [8:00], everything that will concern harmony in music is part of [*unclear word*] of these formulas, and that is what we thought about developing it.

Deleuze: Oh, my turn! Yes, yes, yes, you'll have to keep this [*Pinhas's project*].

Pinhas: The program can be kept in musical form.

Deleuze: Yeh, yeh, yeh, so you will have to hold on to this. The ideal thing would be for it to be performed... [*Pause*]

Pinhas: I will keep that for another day.

Deleuze: ... so that you might create an orchestration of it. [*Pause*] So, good, you're ready? [*Pause*] [*The WebDeleuze site transcription commences here*]

So you recall perhaps that we had begun to examine what Leibniz had to tell us about freedom, specifically and more precisely our own freedom. I no longer know, I began quite a while ago, so I will quickly take up again the problem as it presents itself. What he tells us is extremely concrete. I hope that since then, as I requested, you have read and re-read Bergson, and I would like us to reach the most concrete conception possible. You recall perhaps how the problem presents itself: it's that at the level of propositions of existence, it is not at all contradictory that Adam would no longer be a sinner. It is not contradictory that Adam no longer sins. An Adam non-sinner, we saw, was a theme that we followed at length, an Adam non-sinner, a Caesar not crossing the Rubicon, are not impossible, they are simply impossible with the world that God had chosen. Fine. Henceforth we will say: it is not necessary that Caesar cross the Rubicon; it is certain that Caesar will cross the Rubicon or crosses the Rubicon. It is certain, and why? As a function of the chosen world, since "crossing the Rubicon" is a predicate or event, as Leibniz said, a predicate or event included in the monad Caesar. So it is certain that Caesar will cross the Rubicon, but finally that does not mean that this is necessary since another Caesar was possible. Yes, but he was possible in another world, and this world is impossible with ours.

I told you all that is fine, but it concerns the freedom of whom? Of what?² At the extreme, I can say that this story, this distinction of the certain and the necessary concerns God's freedom. It amounts to saying, in fact, that God chooses between worlds and that there is a freedom of God

in creation. But my own freedom, in this world, Caesar's freedom in this world, it's nonetheless a rather feeble consolation to tell oneself: well yes, I could have done something different than what I did, but in another world, and this other world is impossible with the first, and anyway, that would have been a different self. And Leibniz says it himself: a Caesar who does not cross the Rubicon is another self.

So we came to this with our question, what we want and we will not let go of Leibniz's texts so long as we do not have an answer: and what about our own freedom, in this world and without reference to other impossible worlds? And in fact, Leibniz distinguishes the problems rather well, and I told you that, to my knowledge, there is no, or there are only – we cannot engage with Leibniz – it's very curious how most of Leibniz's texts that pose the question of freedom bifurcate on [the question of] God's freedom, and are content to tell us: well ok, you see, [the fact] that we are doing this, no doubt it's certain, but it [God's freedom] is not necessary. Once again, the theme "certain, but not necessary" obviously does not save or obviously does not constitute my freedom in the world but founds and constitutes God's freedom in light of the plurality of possible worlds. I told you: fortunately, there are two texts that do not bifurcate on God's freedom, one long and the other short, a little text taken from the correspondence with [Samuel] Clarke [*Deleuze spells out the name*], Clarke being a disciple of Newton, and on the other hand, a long, admirable text in the *New Essays on Human Understanding*, book 2, chapters 20 and 21, in which it is fully a question of our own freedom, yours, mine, Caesar's, Adam's, etc.

And I told you that if we try to delve carefully, we see clearly – it's what I said the last time, it's the first great phenomenology of motives (*motifs*). It's on a phenomenology of motives that Leibniz is going to situate, is going to establish his conception of freedom; in which form? In the form of our freedom? By truly denouncing a double illusion, a double illusion concerning motives. Leibniz tells us, first of all: you understand, we cannot understand anything about freedom, we can grasp nothing about human freedom if we conceive of motives like weights on the pans of a scale, which is the same as saying what? Well, don't objectify motives, don't make motives into something that would be outside the mind, or even inside the mind as objective representations. Motives are neither objects, nor representations of objects; they are not weights on a scale through which you could ascertain which has import over the other, given all conditions being equal in your mind. So, first danger: objectifying motives, treating them like weights on a scale. In other words, it's the mind that creates motives, your mind that makes them motives. If you prefer, motives are profiles of the mind, dispositions of the soul as [Leibniz] said in the correspondence with Clarke. [*Pause*]

Second illusion: this would be dividing motives (*dédoubler les motifs*), no longer the illusion of objectifying, but the illusion of dividing, and this second illusion is triggered by the first. If you have made motives into weights on a scale, that is, if you have objectified them, you are forced to invoke new subjective motives that will explain why you chose certain motives rather than certain other ones. In other words, if you objectify motives, you are forced to divide them since you will need another rank of subjective motives to explain your choice of objective motives. In other words, you will fall into the stupid idea that one must desire to desire (*vouloir vouloir*). You will need subjective dispositions in order to choose one or another of the objective dispositions.³

Henceforth, what does this mean? One cannot desire to desire, that is, motives are not divisible. They are not divisible because motives are not objective or objectifiable. And in fact, they are the very fabric of the soul. What does this mean, the fabric of the soul? Leibniz explains to us, about what composes the fabric of the soul, [that] we must not believe here as well the soul is just a kind of scale awaiting weights to be placed on it. What is the fabric of the soul? It's a teeming (*fourmillement*), a teeming of tiny inclinations – hold on to the word “inclination” because we will have another word later that resembles it, but that will not be the same – a teeming of tiny inclinations that – to return again to our theme, this is not a metaphor – that plies, that plies the soul in every direction, a teeming of tiny inclinations. Later, we will see this, once we have devoted at least an entire session to the topic, to what is a fundamental theme in Leibniz, what Leibniz will call tiny perceptions and tiny inclinations.

You recall the base of the monad which is a drapery (*tapis*), which is draped, but at the same time, this draping (*tapisserie*) forms folds.⁴ You will rediscover the same theme, the fabric of the soul, teeming, that is, with folds that appear and disappear at every instant. A multiplicity. A multiplicity of tiny tendencies, of tiny perceptions. Very good. It's this fabric of the soul, this multiplicity that belongs to it which – you recall [that] the *New Essays* reconsider a book by Locke entitled *Essays on Human Understanding*, -- and it's this fabric of the soul that Leibniz, on his own, is going to designate by using a word introduced by Locke, specifically the word “disquiet” (*inquiétude*). He will say that what Locke calls disquiet is precisely this teeming that never ceases at any moment, as if (in chapter 20, book 2) a thousand little springs. Do you recall at the very beginning [of the seminar]? If you remember at the very beginning the theme of the constant spring (*resort*) in Leibniz as a function of elastic force. If the force is elastic, then things are as if moved by little springs. Here we rediscover the thousand little springs. In other words, you never cease teeming. And it's as if this kind of living fabric of the soul never ceased being plied not in one direction or the other, that's saying too much, but in every direction. It's a kind of itching. Disquiet is an itching. The soul is perpetually in a state of itching. And Leibniz tells us, in a very lovely text, it's the balance wheel (or pendulum), and in German, the balance wheel is called precisely: disquiet!⁵ That is, it's no longer an objective balance wheel. What does that mean?

So I returned to an example, I took it up with the possibility of developing it a bit, to derive the maximum from it, in chapter 21, book 2, of *New Essays*, the same example he gives: the tavern. And I was trying to complete it for it to be clear. He tells us -- you understand, I misspoke,⁶ I think, because I said, “going to a café,” which is completely misplaced in the seventeenth century, it was a mistake that you corrected since they went to the tavern. -- So I am going to the tavern or rather, am I going to the tavern? Typical example of human freedom! Am I going to stay and work, am I going to stay and teach the course, or am I going to the tavern? We'll have to see. One must understand. There are people who tell you: fine, you are going to assimilate the tavern, weight A, and remaining to work, weight B, and you will see if all things are equal, but precisely nothing is ever equal in my soul. That would presume that my soul precisely was not in a state of disquiet. Henceforth, the misunderstandings multiply. For at the same time that one lends an objective existence to motives, as if they were weights on a scale, and one bathes the soul of all of its disquiet, as if it were a neutral scale ready to register the weight of the weights. This is unreasonable. In fact, the fabric of my soul, in this precise moment, in this moment A, is made of what? I say: a thousand tiny perceptions, a thousand tiny inclinations that go from what

to what? In the distance I hear. I hear what? I hear... Is this my imagination, is it... ? It's not important; we'll use what we have. In any case, it's an aggregate of tiny perceptions and tiny inclinations.

What do I hear in the distance? I hear the clinking of glasses, I hear the conversation of friends, and if not, I imagine them. There is no cause for thinking that at the level of tiny perceptions, certainly in the domains where [there's] imagining and perceiving, [that] it's important to be distinguished them; at the level of tiny perceptions, it's less certain, [but] in any case, it's not our problem. You already see why motives are never weights placed on the scale, he tells us: but you understand, an alcoholic understands a thousand times better than anyone – while Leibniz nonetheless led a sober and exemplary life, but he understands quite well – an alcoholic is not at all someone who lives in the abstract, it's not at all someone whose soul is turned toward alcohol, alcohol, as if alcohol were the sole weight capable of acting on this scale. But alcohol is strictly inseparable from a whole teeming context: auditory, gustatory, that goes without saying, but auditory and visual, the company of companions in debauchery, joyous and witty conversations that relieve me of my solitude, all that. If you posit an alcohol aggregate (*ensemble alcool*), one has to include not only alcohol, but all sorts of qualities, visual, auditory, olfactory, the odor of the tavern, all that. But on the other hand, to stay and work, here one also has to consider it a perceptive inclinatory aggregate (*ensemble perceptif inclinatoire*), tiny perceptions inclinations: the sound of paper, it's also the auditory, the quality of silence, pages that I turn, the sound of the pen. All of that is hardly neutral. I mean, just as this was not alcohol as abstraction, it's [also] not work as abstraction. It's an entire perceptive-inclination aggregate (*ensemble perceptivo-inclinatoire*). [Pause]

What does the question of deliberation mean? It's understood that the fabric of my soul almost goes from one to the other, at a precise moment. – You can add others; I chose this particular example, but I could have chosen another -- It thus goes from the perceptive pole established in the tavern to the perceptive pole established in the workspace. And my soul is crisscrossed with tiny perceptions and tiny inclinations that fold it, that ply it in every direction. Deliberated, toward which side am I going to fold my soul? Toward which side? That is, toward which side am I going to integrate, to use a pseudo-mathematical term, toward which side am I going to integrate the tiny perceptions and tiny inclinations? Or if you prefer: toward which side am I going to fold my soul, means toward which am I going to produce, with all the corresponding tiny inclinations, an inclination, no, rather a remarkable inclination, toward which side am I going to produce every tiny perception possible, a distinctive perception? To produce with a maximum of tiny perceptions a distinctive perception, with a maximum of tiny inclinations, a remarkable inclination, that is, with all the tiny folds that twist my soul at every instant, and which constitute my disquiet, with what and toward which side am I going to make a decisive fold, a deciding fold (*un pli décisoire*)? [Pause] In other words, [Pause] what is the action that, at a moment [being] considered, will fill my soul following its amplitude? Hence the perpetual term of balance wheel or pendulum: the pendulum as amplitude of the soul at such and such a moment.⁷ [Pause]

As a result, as I was telling you, what is essential, in chapter 20, you are going to find a splendid formula: in the meantime, the scale changed. We can't say it better. The scale changed, it's the little drawing that I proposed to you the last time. [*Deleuze goes to the board and has trouble*

finding a spot to draw] I'll just do it over to the side; here I am going to attempt a bad drawing. You recall that this bad drawing; it's to believe that I have an upstanding soul (*âme tout droite*) that finds itself in front of a bifurcation: Motive A, going to the tavern; motive B, to stay and work. This schema is stupid and has all kinds of problems: the motives are objectified, my soul is assumed to be straightforward and indifferent, and in order to choose, it has to have motives upon motives (*des motifs de motifs*).

Therefore, this schema of deliberation, this phenomenology of deliberation is not reasonable and not serious. Why? Because when I deliberate, am I going to the tavern..., no, it's more reasonable to work... I work a bit and then I say: I still want to go to the tavern. [*Laughter*] I return to A. What is so idiotic about this schema? What's idiotic in the schema is that when I return to A, I act as if it's the same as the first time. It's obviously not the same. Between the two moments, the motive changed. First moment: I am going to the tavern. Second moment: no, I will keep on working. Third moment: but what if I went out anyway? But the second A is not the first for the simple reason that B has occurred between the two. The absurdity of assimilating motives as if they were weights on the scale is that in that moment, the motives remain constant in the deliberation.

Henceforth we do not really see how one could arrive at any decision whatsoever since if one reaches a decision through deliberation, it's really to the extent that, in the course of the deliberation, the motives do not at all remain constant. They have changed, why? Simply because time has passed. It's duration that causes motives to change, or rather, it doesn't cause motives to change, it causes change to the extent that the nature of the considered motive endures. Following which I told you, here we have its true figure... [*Pause as Deleuze draws*] There you have the only possible schema of deliberation.⁸ A -- so we're presenting this with the same values -- A is the tavern, B is work. It's a schema of inflection. Once again, we rediscover the thread of our story. There are only inflections in the soul. What will the inflection of the soul be? There's a name for it: inclination! What does being free mean for us? It means being inclined without being necessitated. Motives incline me without making necessity for me. The inclination of the soul is the inflection in the soul, inflection such that it's included. The entire first part of the trimester supports this.

So I continue. A = tavern, B = work. All of us knowing that motives change, there is no A and no B. There is A prime, B prime, [*Deleuze is drawing*], A double prime, B double prime, C triple prime... Ah no [*Laughter*] A triple prime, B triple prime, [*Pause*] A four times, B quadruple prime, etc. ... Is that ok?

You see that when I deliberate, I don't at all return to A, for example. It's not the same A. So, why stop in all this at one moment, and why even have deliberated, why? The free act will be the one that activates the amplitude of my soul at a given moment, in the moment that I act. You will tell me, but that's always the case. No! Why? You recall, it's a question of integrating the tiny perceptions and tiny inclinations in order to obtain a remarkable inclination, the inclination of the soul. That which is able or not of filling the amplitude of the soul at a given moment is a remarkable inclination. To integrate the tiny perceptions requires Time, and in all of Leibniz's philosophy -- and I believe that it's only later that we can understand the problem of Time in Leibniz only when it will happen to us later -- I think that perpetually in Leibniz this theme

intervenes, the kind of leitmotif: it's something that requires time. It's symbolic and exemplary; we will perhaps get there today if we have time, to reach the problem of the regime of light. The rupture or one of the fundamental ruptures is – as all the manuals say – Descartes believed in the instantaneity of the transmission of light. Integration, fundamentally, takes time. And if it's mathematical integration, it will be a mathematical time, and if it's psychic integration, it will be a psychic time.

You see? That's why I did not at all make my ... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*] So, let's say... I started off from A prime, that is, I have a vague desire to go to the tavern. B, why don't I go there? Simply because that remains in the state of tiny inclination, tiny perception, it seems, yes, I want to. But I am at work. The question is: I don't know what the amplitude of my soul is at that moment, I need time. Can I wait? Often I cannot wait, so I rush down to the tavern. [*Laughter*] Could I have waited? I could have waited, but it would no longer have been the same me. Then, very often, I commit an act that does not at all respond to the amplitude of my soul, I even spend my time in that. Each time that I commit a machine-like act that does not at all respond to the amplitude of my soul: when I shave each morning, that does not respond to the amplitude of my soul, but let's not exaggerate! [*Laughter*] There is no reason, as certain philosophers do, to submit every act that we commit to the criterion: is it free or not! Freedom is for certain acts. There are all sorts of acts that don't have to be confronted with the problems of freedom. [*Pause*] We commit them only when... I would say, uniquely to calm the disquiet, all these mechanical acts, all the habitual acts, etc. ... We will speak of freedom only there where the question arises of an act able or not to fill the amplitude of the soul at a given moment. And I would say: an act is free if it effectively fills the amplitude of the soul at a given moment.

Let us assume that at moment A, the maximum of amplitude is on the side of A prime, which is more ample than B, that is, going to the tavern, since going to the tavern implies an amplitude of the soul, it's not by pure narrowness; it opens itself onto all that I said: joining up with one's friends, joyful conversations, the wittiest of jokes the likes of which one rarely hears, etc. ... (*Laughter*) But can I wait? And you will see chapters 20 and 21 [*of the New Essays*] are full of the question, can one wait? We can conceive of anything. If Adam could have waited... Ah yes, if Adam could have waited, [would he have sinned?...] [*Interruption of the BNF & YouTube recording*] [47:46]

Part 2

... And I tell myself, let's wait, let's wait a bit, and I hold myself back. And the moment after -- not immediately after because this is a concrete problem, the question of waiting, being able to wait -- and then, to a certain extent, the world has changed, the problem no longer is posed in the same way. There are cases where one cannot wait; there are cases when one mustn't wait; there are cases where waiting changes everything. So there, [*Deleuze taps the chalk on the board*], you see that here, my soul has gained in amplitude, and it's toward the side of working, and there, my soul has again gained in amplitude, but it's on the tavern side. This suggests to what extent it's never the same motive; when I return to the same motive, it's not the same motive. Why? Some time has passed. Between A second and A third, some time has passed, some time has passed that we call duration. So if you tell me, ok, why not stop at A second, I would then answer, maybe this, maybe that (*tantôt, tantôt*). Maybe I stop at the second, maybe I don't stop.

According to what? Maybe because A second, at a given moment, activates the amplitude of my soul, or because at another moment, although A second may not activate the supposed amplitude of my soul, I... [*brief jump in the recording*] as if the mechanical act took it over. Moreover, you can invert the schema to no longer have a progressive process like I did there, but a regressive process in which my pseudo-spiral, on the contrary, will narrow, the amplitude will decrease. You have series in which the amplitude of the soul decreases. You understand?

Fine, [*Deleuze returns to his seat*] so this will perhaps work itself out in any event. This has to be very concrete. It comes down to saying that the free act is that which expresses the entire soul at a given moment of duration; the free act is one that fills all the amplitude of the soul at a given moment of duration; it's one that expresses the whole soul at a given moment of duration; in other words, it's one that expresses the *moi* [self, ego]. [*Pause*] It's the perfect or completed act whatever it might be. It is perfect or complete insofar as it expresses the *moi*. Ha, good! It expresses the *moi*, it is perfect and complete. There we stumble onto something that is going to be quite important, philosophically, vitally, everything. I mean, it's the perfect or completed act. The perfect or completed act is a very well known notion in philosophy, so it has a Greek name, but its Greek name sounds strange, it's *Entelechia*. [*Deleuze spells it out in Greek*], *entelechia* -- well, it ends in -chie in the French transcription -- *Entelechia*, that Aristotle spoke about quite a bit. Here I do not have the time to talk to you about *Entelechia* in Aristotle, but in fact, it's the act that has its end in itself, that is, the perfect or completed act, and in Aristotle's philosophy, it's the permanent act, it's an act endowed with permanence in opposition to the successive act. [*Pause*] In other words, the perfect or completed act, already in Aristotle, it's not the act once done, it's not in the past. And nonetheless, this story is very complicated, because *Entelechia* manifests itself in the very special Greek verb form of the aorist, and which is a tense that has something to do with the past, but that is, if you will, what we call the perfect. The perfect. But let us be aware that reducing the perfect to the past would be entirely insufficient, even for Aristotle, and would even be a contradiction.

Let's forget Aristotle and return to Leibniz. For Leibniz, it's obvious; it's much more obvious. The perfect act is the act that expresses the soul following its entire amplitude, following the entire amplitude of the soul. It's the act that expresses the *moi*; this act is an act in the present. And here, I'm returning, and I would like to return without tiring myself out and without always tiring you out too much on this, because this appears to me completely forgotten or neglected by commentators, the importance of the present in all of Leibniz's philosophy, the act of the present, the action in the present.

You recall that when it was a question of showing what inclusion consisted of, Leibniz always starts from the act in the process of being done, not the act done. "I write", in the *Monadology*, that is, I am in the process of writing; in the Letters to Arnauld, "I travel," I am in the process of traveling. [*Pause*] This is very important since at first glance, it would seem that inclusion in the monad is the domain of past acts. No, not at all. Past acts are included in the monad only because the present act should be included. Do you recall? It's because the present act "I write" is included in the monad that, henceforth, the causes for which I write, that is the past givens, are also included. Inclusion is closing off (*fermeture*): the monad encloses its own predicates, it closes in its predicates. What is essential is that closure or closure, that is, inclusion, is the

correspondent of the present act in the process of being committed and not past acts. Inclusion is the condition of the living present, and it's not the condition of the dead past.

Ah, good, we have seen this. But now what we discover here, for me, is very important because it's all of Leibniz that changes, you understand. Suddenly you must grasp that inclusion is fully in the process of being reconciled with freedom. It's because misinterpretations have been created about inclusion; some say, ha, inclusion means one includes everything in the manner of the already done. It's as if before having crossed it, Caesar had already crossed the Rubicon. At that moment, a misinterpretation has already occurred. Once someone says this, there's been a misinterpretation. Inclusion is the correspondent of the act in the process of being committed; it's the condition of the act in the process of occurring, and not at all the result of the act once done. It's not past acts that fall into the monad, it's the act in the process of occurring that could have occurred if, at the same time it is done, it wasn't inscribed in the monad, if it wasn't included in the monad to be committed while it's occurring. Why?

But then, what? Why? Why? Because, listen well: it's because the present act can be perfect only provided that what? Provided that its own movement has a unity. What defines the perfection of the act isn't that it occurred, it's that the movement through which it takes place has a unity. [Pause] A unity of movement in the act of being accomplished is necessary. [Pause] So there, what gives unity to a movement? The movement by itself? No, it's a pure relative, relativity of the movement.

So, what gives a unity to the movement is the soul, the soul of the movement. Only the soul is the unity of the movement. Otherwise, if you limit yourself to the body, you can just as well attribute a movement to body A as to body B. There is an absolute relativity of the movement. Only the soul is capable of giving a unity to the movement. Fine.

What is the perfect act? You will understand perhaps: the perfect act is the act that receives from the soul that includes it in the unity of a movement in the process of occurring. That's to tell you to what extent the perfect act is not an act over and done (*une fois fait*), quite the contrary. It's the present act, the act that's occurring, but that receives from the soul the unity of a movement in the process of occurring, that receives from the soul the necessary unity. Under what condition does it receive this unity? Under the condition of being included in the soul, of being included in the present. Hence, a new definition – I am concluding to be sure that... before asking you if you understand well -- a new definition of the free act; I was telling you earlier -- and be attentive to this as it's really the same thing, we are passing from one definition to the other in continuous fashion -- I was saying first: the free act is the act that expresses the *moi*, that is, that expresses the soul in all its amplitude at a moment of the duration, and I am saying now that the free act is that which received from the soul which includes it, it's the present act, which includes it in present fashion, it's the present act that receives from the soul that includes it the unity of a movement in the process of occurring. [Pause]

And note that I can start over: certainly, in the course of the day, it's rare that I commit free acts. The question of freedom poses itself at the level of importance. When I have something to do that matters to me, yes there, the question of my liberty concerns me. Otherwise, I spend my time committing acts... Fine. It's of no importance that my movement might have unity or not. Such

acts, the ones in which it is important that they receive from the soul the unity of a movement in the process of occurring, are very rare. In fact, there are all sorts of movements that take place all alone: walking, crossing the street, all that, and then suddenly, there is a moment in which I need some soul. I don't need it constantly, first, because it's tiring these stories of the amplitude of the soul. I don't know if you sense that you have an ample soul! Why have an ample soul, after all, I haven't told you yet. Why not be happy having a tiny little amplitude? There are lots of people who are happy with a tiny little amplitude, but they will commit free acts from the moment that actions that they commit in the present receive the unity of a movement in the process of occurring, that is, from the moment that their actions express the amplitude of their soul whatever it might be.

So, at the point we have reached, we must pause and say: "Have a soul with even a tiny little amplitude, simply find the actions that correspond to this amplitude, and you will be free men" (*des hommes libres*). In other words, what is threatened in Leibniz, is not freedom, it's morality, since saying to people, "Have a soul as narrow as you like, you will be free from the moment that you commit acts in the present that express this amplitude, so get drunk at the tavern as much as you want, [*Laughter*] if that's what corresponds to the amplitude of your soul", you understand that this isn't what one expects from a philosopher who has called for morality in morals (*la moralité des moeurs*), something that Leibniz never stopped doing.

What is essential, I believe, is what I just stated, that is the matter of the present in Leibniz. I think that you know that one of the most difficult theories in Leibniz is the theory of time, and so here, we are laying out the steps for the future when we arrive at this problem of time [in Leibniz]. And whether the free act is in the present, whether it is fundamentally in the present, appears to me extremely important. Whether the amplitude of the soul is variable in the order of time, all that is a reality of time as duration that is extremely important.

So the act in the present, good, is this understood or not? I mean, understand that what I would like you to understand is two themes: The perfect or complete act is not a completed act, not an act over and done. But the perfect or complete act is that act that receives from the soul that includes it the unity of a movement in the process of occurring. Third point, which is the conclusion: don't think that inclusion assimilates the acts into acts always and already past; on the contrary, inclusion is the condition of production of the present act insofar as it is present (*en tant que present*). ... Yeah? (*Ouais!*)

A student: [*Inaudible question from the back of the room*]

Deleuze: Duration can even occur, it can introduce a narrowing, yes, absolutely. [*Pause*] And you are perhaps going to understand everything if you take into account an extraordinary theory of Leibniz, one of the most beautiful theories, and we shouldn't say theory at this level, but it's a veritable practice that concerns a problem which we all care about, specifically the problem of damnation.⁹ The damned. What is someone who is damned? Or if you prefer: are the damned free?

And I appeal to you greatly to show respect for a discipline [that] today has disappeared, specifically theology. Theology survives somewhat, but in the end, it has become a physical

science today. But in the old days, in the seventeenth century still, I am not talking about before, theology understands what it was. Why is there such an alliance between philosophy and theology? It's not simply because of God, not the stories of God that fuse the theology-philosophy alliance; it's much more beautiful than that in any case. It's that theology is an extraordinary logic, an extraordinary logic; moreover, I think that there would not be any possible logic without theology. Why?

Because... that seems obvious to me because, today, we are told that we know that there is no logic without paradox, no logic without paradox; certain famous paradoxes even, in Bertrand Russell, have been the basis for... and others, not only Russell, are at the basis for the construction of modern logic. But this situation of a fundamental relation or linkage (*noeud*) between logic and paradox did not at all arise just recently. Simply put, before [logic] it was theology that furnished logic with its absolutely necessary paradoxical material. In what form? The Trinity, three persons in one, transubstantiation, the body of Christ and the bread, whatever you want, the resurrection, the resurrection of bodies. But understand, this paradoxical material is inseparable from a pure logic. They don't need to find it in a theory of aggregates in the seventeenth century because they don't know it, but that's not why. Theology is more fertile in paradoxes than mathematics. [*Pause*]

And if theology has such an intense life, it's because it fills this role. It's true that these paradoxes aren't without danger since for very little, one gets oneself condemned and even worse, burned. One has to recall that it's not outmoded at the time of Leibniz's writings, it's not outmoded yet, since one of the last great burnings was [Giordano] Bruno who had a great importance for Leibniz. But in the end, these were rather dangerous paradoxes, more dangerous than actual paradoxes, although getting insulted by Wittgenstein isn't fun, [*Laughter*] but better than getting burned alive. I understand that Wittgenstein doesn't seem to me to be a source of paradoxes, but rather a kind of grand inquisitor. All that is awful, you know?

But the link... I would like to... But no, we don't have time, but hold on to the possibility of the fundamental link between logic and theology. I believe that theology is the natural material for logic up to a certain period, up to the eighteenth century. And it's there, the fundamental theology-philosophy alliance, and one shouldn't or it's entirely insufficient to invoke dear old God and the idea of God to tell us: hah, it'll be at *that* moment. Nothing at all at *that* moment! If you want theology, it's exactly for philosophy what the crucifixion was for a painter. Exactly the same. That doesn't prevent them... I don't mean that they did not believe in God, I don't mean that at all, but I mean they didn't believe only in God, and if they believe in God, it's for reasons, in fact, that are closely linked to the logic of the paradox. Fine.

Which is why I say, let's not believe that this is an old problem in returning to this question, but what is someone who is damned after all? And Leibniz creates an extraordinary theory of damnation in which I dare not attribute everything to him. One has to be very, very knowledgeable, one has to invite a Church father here, a specialist, someone very learned, who might have read the theologians of the era. Leibniz does not hide himself borrowing greatly from theologians of the era, for not only are there paradoxes, but there are cases, there is casuistry. The two appurtenances (*appartenances*) from theology to philosophy or to logic are this double aspect: paradox and casuistry. The case. For example, a case: if it's a saint who asks that a

damned person be absolved of the sanction, does this mean one can conceive of a damned person ceasing to be such? Or is this eternally, is damnation eternal? You might say to me, oh really? But this is really important!

So I am also saying here [that] in two kinds of texts, Leibniz takes on the question of damnation. First, in the *Theodicy*, where he goes so far as to announce that the damned are free, as free as are happy souls (*les bienheureux*), but the text isn't clear; and in another text where he develops a whole admirable theory of damnation. Understand – and this remains our concern -- understand that at the time, this is not foreign to the Baroque, an entire theory of damnation, and this text is called *Confessio philosophi* in Latin, that is, in French: *Profession du foi du philosophe* [The Philosopher's Confession], and was translated by [Yvon] Belaval, a beautiful translation in fact, published by Vrin Editions. It's a little text of forty pages or so, very lovely, in which we learn all about damnation. And why do I return to all of this? Because one might believe that damnation... it intersects really with our problem at a necessary spot, since we might be given to believe that the damned person pays for an abominable act he committed. But actually no; Leibniz's grand idea is that the damned person pays for no abominable act committed; damnation is in the present, and there is only damnation in the present. So, for us, this will become... it matters little whether it's a matter of a theological problem, all that matters little, since it's a fundamental problem... And it's in this sense that the damned are free; damnation must be understood in the present. Fine.

But, we will try to understand this, but one might as well circle around this idea as it's quite lovely. But suddenly aren't we in the process of determining – so we are making a brief parenthesis here, if only to recoup some energy – aren't we in the process of rediscovering a constant about what might well be called the Baroque? [*Pause*] What I have just discussed, the unity of movement in the process of being created, the soul as unity of movement in the process of being created, that's what the Baroque is. Who was it that proposed, before the Baroque, grasping the movement from the point of view of a unity that defines it as in the process of being created? The theme of a movement in the process of being created and grasped while alive, in so far as it is created and in so far as it receives its unity from the soul, all that doesn't go at all without saying, and it's really a Baroque vision. We have often noticed that Baroque painting precisely never stops grasping movement in the process of being created, even if it's death. It's with the Baroque that painters begin to paint the saints insofar as they feel, in so far as they directly undergo their martyrdom, the unity of death as movement in the process of being created or death in movement.

It's Jean Rousset in his book on Baroque literature in France,¹⁰ in which a chapter is entitled "Death in Movement" to define the Baroque, that is, death as movement in the process of being created. And he quotes a very beautiful text by an author that everyone considers as one of the great Baroque writers, Quevedo, a beautiful text on death: [*Deleuze looks for the quote*] "You don't know death, you others", it's death speaking, and says: "You know, you represent me as a skeleton, you just aren't reasonable; I am not a skeleton," death says. Why? You see the importance of Quevedo's text for us, from the point of view where we place ourselves. I am not a skeleton, me, death; that is, the skeleton is what I leave behind me, it's the over and done with, it's death entirely completed, it's death... Let's try to say a word that will serve us later, perhaps it is symbolic death, but everyone knows, or at least since Walter Benjamin, everyone knows that

the Baroque is never defined by the symbol, but by allegory. The skeleton is perhaps a symbol of death, [but] it's not an allegory of death. Besides, it's curious, I think, and I am not speaking in Benjamin's name, I think that allegory is always in the present. The skeleton is always death over and done with, but death is death as movement in the process of being created. You don't know death, you people, you are – it's a beautiful text – and you are your death, you yourself are your death. You are all your very own dead! (*Vous êtes tous les morts de vous-mêmes!*) You understand, it's with your flesh, it's not with your miserable skeleton which appears only once everything is over; it's you in your present. Death is neither past nor future. The Classical age since Epicurus tells us that death is either past or future, so what do you have to complain about?¹¹ [*End of WebDeleuze transcript, part 2; start of inversion of a 12-minute segment, corrected in what follows*] If you are dead, well, that's it, and if you are waiting for it and it hasn't yet arrived, what are you... Stop your whining! But no, the Baroque will say, you understand nothing because you consider the movement already to have been completed.

Part 3

If you consider the movement in the process of being created, and that death like all things is a movement in the process of being created. You are all dead yourselves. Your skull is death, but understand well, not your skull – the skin removed, the hairy covering removed – your skull that you touch, that you tap, that's what death is. Your face, your face is death.¹² “What you call dying is completing life, and what you call being born is beginning to die, as what you also call living is dying while living. And the bones, it is what death leaves you and what remains in the coffin” -- this is the over and done with (*le une fois fait*) -- “if you understood that well, each of you would have, every day, a mirror of death in itself, and you would also see at the same time that all your houses are full of the dead. That there are as many dead as there are the living, and that you do not expect death, but you accompany it perpetually.” This cannot be said any better, movement in the process of being created! You don't expect death, but you accompany it perpetually, death as movement in the process of being created. And once again, the movement in the process of being created requires a unity, this unity that can only be received from the soul. You see, we come back to this, fine.

But the hour has come, damnation, death is in the present, even death is in the present, even damnation is in the present. And why? Because, you know that the damned man, yet again, does not pay for an act that he has committed; the damned pays for his very own present. Which is another way of saying: he does not inherit damnation, he accompanies it. Why? Leibniz tells us something very odd; he says: What do I call a damned man (*damné*)? So, here's where my competence is lacking because obviously, in my opinion, he makes a reference, he does not invent this, he doesn't invent this. It's so beautiful, I'll read the text: what does he call a *damné*? “Judas”, he even cites a *damné*. -- I think I've lost it, I think I've lost the text.... Oh here we are -: “Judas. What does Judas's damnation consist of? At first glance the answer is it's for having betrayed Christ. Not at all. We can even conceive of someone who might have done worse” -- here I'm moving forward, -- “and who isn't damned.” In my opinion, Adam is not damned.¹³ I tell myself, in the end, that this could be argued, or else it's a universal opinion... Do you know, Kirsten?

Kirsten: [*Inaudible response*]

Deleuze: You're sure? He [Adam] is damned? You're very sure? [*sûre sûre?*]

So let's correct [ourselves]. We can conceive of [this], and surely certain theologians were burned for that, for having conceived that Adam was not damned, for – or one has to identify damnation and capital sin, anyway, it doesn't matter. I was getting ahead of myself a bit quickly. I'll back up. Let us assume that Adam is damned, and yet that astounds me, it really astounds me: is he damned? Judas certainly is, he's damned. I am going to tell you why he [Adam] isn't damned, it's a mistake. It's some excessive theologians, who said that Adam was damned, [but] he cannot be damned. That depends on how you define damnation. But there you are, Leibniz defines it, in the wake of a certain number of theologians: if Judas is damned, it's because of the disposition in which he died. Read into this also, no doubt, the disposition that already was the one he had when he betrayed Christ. It's because of “the disposition in which he died, specifically his hatred of God that was burning him in dying” [The Philosopher's Confession]. [Pause] “The damned man is thus he whose” -- I translate -- “The damned is he whose souls is filled, completed, whose amplitude of souls is completed by hatred of God. This hate is in the present.”

You'll tell me, ok, but still, in what sense? First, I am clarifying a bit, because all this is very important. Am I not in the process – so here, we advance considerably within the problem that remains for us -- because am I not in the process of discovering that there is an absolute minimum of amplitude of the soul? What is the smallest conceivable amplitude of the soul? It's the soul of the damned man. That will have immense consequences. The minimum of amplitude is the soul of the damned. Why does the soul of the damned present the minimum of amplitude? This soul is filled with hatred of God in the present, the hatred of God in the present, and in saying nothing else but that, I don't know, you ought to feel, well, I'm feeling myself shiver a bit: the hatred of God in the present. We shall see what that brings about.

And I'm calling this the smallest amplitude of the soul. Why? Because God, by definition, is the supreme being, the infinite being. The soul penetrated by hatred of God vomits everything, literally, vomits everything, everything except this hate: me, I hate God. And the sole predicate of the damned soul [is]: I hate God. It's its only predicate. How is that possible? A damned soul is a monad, yes, it's a monad. Every monad expresses the world, yes, every monad expresses the world. Only you recall perhaps, I always return to this Leibnizian rule without which everything collapses: every monad expresses the world, yes, the infinite world, but the monad only expresses clearly a little region of the world, its own neighborhood, or as Leibniz says – I don't think I have ever cited this text – so I quote: his subdivision (*département*). Each monad is the expression of the whole world, but each one has a little subdivision that distinguishes it from the others, specifically the region of world, the neighborhood of world that the monad expresses clearly. You understand?

So the damned soul? Ok, it's a monad. It continues to express the whole world, but its subdivision is reduced nearly to zero, the only thing. It's a soul with a single predicate, if I call “predicate” the attributes or events of the region, of the subdivision, of the region proper to the monad. Its own region, its clear region, it has no other clarity than this horrible clarity of: I hate God! I can say that it's the minimum amplitude.

But why is this hate perpetually present? Well it's precisely because it fills the amplitude of the soul, [*End of part 1 of the WebDeleuze transcript inversion*] these so narrow-minded (*étroites*) souls, such narrow-minded souls, abominable souls, so narrow-minded, narrow-minded, they encompass only this: I hate God, God I hate you! That's what Judas is. But why is this hate always renewed in the present? Well, it's because, insofar as it translates the amplitude of the soul, it doesn't stop recreating itself at every instant. Minimum of amplitude, that is. It's a case of constancy, it's a constant amplitude, invariable, there is none that is smaller. And insofar as it fills the amplitude of the soul, it gives lots of joy to the damned. One has to imagine the damned as happy, except for something that is going to change (*tourner*) in their confusion. It's an episodic story, the pleasure of the damned.

The damned person is a kind of infamy, he is polluted (*infect*), because he complains. You will immediately recognize who rediscovered this tradition. He complains, he never stops complaining: my suffering, oh my, the fire, the horror of fire, etc., ah no, not that! I didn't deserve that, [*Laughter*]... and quietly he laughs!¹⁴ He feels pleasures that you cannot conceive. Why? Certainly, the fire exists, among small inconveniences [*Laughter*], all that is word for word in the *Philosopher's Confession*. But, you understand, the act that adequately fills the amplitude of the soul, this hate for God, it defines a fantastic pleasure, it's the joy of the free act: I hate God. The damned knows quite well that his complaints are false complaints. [*Pause*]

Leibniz's formula is splendid, so learn it by heart, because it shows, moreover, [that] I am correct about the importance of the present. Leibniz says: "The damned person is not eternally damned," not eternally damned, "but he is forever damnable, and damns himself at every moment." "The damned person is not eternally damned, but he is forever damnable, and damns himself at every moment." That you must learn by heart, [*Laughter*] so at least you will emerge from this course with a quote from Leibniz that isn't "the best of possible worlds," in which case you won't have wasted the whole year. And furthermore, this quote is much more disturbing than "the best of possible worlds", since how are the damned going to belong to the best of possible worlds? That will truly be a joy to discover it. But in any case, you see, he perpetually redamns himself in the present. Necessarily.

But to cease being damned, what must he do?¹⁵ So there we have the source of my question, Kirsten. You see? My question, what's bothering me greatly, is that I know of no sacred or secular book that says that Adam did anything whatsoever out of hatred for God.

Kirsten: [*Inaudible reply*]

Deleuze: He's what?... Ah, so you think that it's baptism that creates the border there. [*Diverse reactions and voices*] Ah, that's possible... No, but she may be quite correct, theologically... [*Diverse voices and discussion*] He [*God*] has given this possibility to whom?

A student: To all that came [*Unclear words*]

Deleuze: Ah, fine, to everyone, Adam included.

The student: Except the wicked.

Deleuze: Except the wicked...

Another student: [*Unclear words*]

Deleuze: In the theological, catholic deity, it's not damned... Yes?

Another student: [*Inaudible question from the back*]

Deleuze: What? I can't hear you. -- [*Diverse voices*] I'm sensing that no problem has ever [created as much reaction] ... [*Laughter*] It's really odd.... Ah, you have to be quiet, I can't hear what he's saying...

A student: [*A barely audible question about damnation*]

Deleuze: Ah, you want me to... Ah, well, there, listen, that not of me that you should ask that. [*Laughter*] Oh, I would be sufficiently damned for everybody, you know? [*Laughter*] Ah, nonetheless, that's doesn't work out at all, eh? Nothing's going well anymore, especially this...

A woman student: [*Question about Judas's suicide hanging himself*]

Deleuze: Why did he kill himself? Why did Judas kill himself?

A student [*close to Deleuze*]: He despaired of receiving God's forgiveness.

Deleuze: Eh, well no, he kills himself too but entirely out of hatred for God. His final thought – here, the text is formal – one must say, the term is a bit technical, out of rejection of God (*retournement contre Dieu*). His hatred of God turns itself against him, in the Leibnizian version, but this is fundamental, that the damned die on hating God as the final thought to the extent that someone who doesn't die within this final thought, on hating God, will not be damned whatever he may have done.

A student: [*Barely audible comment, about Adam*]

Deleuze: Fine, it's what we ourselves are saying, you understand? But then, what still bothers me a bit is that in this...

The student: [*He interrupts and continues his comment*]

Deleuze: Ah, yes, yes, yes, but all that you are saying isn't false, but our problem is theological, and notably... on catholic theology or then protestant or reformed theology, what did it say? So there, I have a specialist who tells me that Adam clearly was damned.

Kirsten: No, I didn't say that...

Deleuze: But then there's another specialist who says no... You know, theology is not at all like philosophy. In philosophy, everybody is in agreement, [*Laughter*] but in theology, that's not how it is. They got into fights... [*Pause, diverse voices*]

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Ah, there are other problems there. [*Laughter*] Listen, allow me to have a nice private laugh because [*Laughter*] sometimes I get worn out...

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Ah, no, everyone is damned? You're going to see that this is not possible.

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Oh, among the Orthodox? Among the Russian Orthodox, everyone is damned? What are you talking about there?

A student: Among the Russian people.

Deleuze: Oh, we'd have to go talk to the Russian people if...

The student: [*Comment on the dead in Russia*]

Deleuze: Oh, listen, listen, let's not get the Russian people mixed up in this because...

A student [*Comment from the back*]

Deleuze: What?

A student: [*Question about Adam and hatred against God*]

Deleuze: Well there, in my view... it's not defined as "hatred" for Adam, it's not defined as "hatred"...

Richard Pinhas: [*Propos pas clairs*]

[*Diverse voices*] No, damnation is infinite... Is death infinite? No, you'll see, Leibniz has thought of everything. [*Laughter*]

But finally here, I am torn between a rising mad howl of laughter (*fou rire*) and a radical indignation. Because I have to say that we have never had such an animated session [*Laughter*] except concerning such childishness (*puérilités*), whereas you were presented with some really splendid sessions on mathematics, and then suddenly, I mention Beelzebub, Judas, and you go aaaaahhhh, [*Laughter*] and everyone has something to say! This is really something, eh? ...

Shame on you! Shame! Shame on you! Besides, besides, perhaps you have some reasons for loving damnation so much.

So listen to me: obviously, it's joy. Of course, he suffers, he suffers abominably. But it's joy. It's joy to the extent that he has an amplitude of soul such that this amplitude is completely filled by the affect of hating God. And thus he is always damnable, but that means that at each instant, he could be undamned. Thus Leibniz does not at all consider as unlikely, or as impossible, that a damned person might escape from damnation. What would be required? It would suffice that his soul, uniquely – it's quite simple – it would suffice that he cease vomiting up the world. We saw what vomiting up the world meant. Vomiting up the world is to include in one's subdivision, in one's clear region only a single predicate: the hatred of God! [Pause] So it would suffice [Pause] for his amplitude of soul to increase a little, just tiny bit, and suddenly he would be undamned. But why, why is there very little chance of this, and even at the limit, that he will never do it? Because he desires this extant state of amplitude too much, this state that, in fact, is adequately filled by the single predicate: God, I hate you! Such that he never ceases being redamned. Forever damnable, he never ceases renewing his hate for God because that's what gives him the greatest pleasure in relation to his amplitude of soul. Why would he change the amplitude?

As a result, Beelzebub's loathsome song resonates. As I see that you are in a great mood, [Laughter] I have to sing for your pleasure the song of Beelzebub, that has been translated quite well by Belaval, but in Latin, it's all the more beautiful a song. I can sing it to you in Latin or in French. Here's the song of Beelzebub.¹⁶ -- [Aside to Richard Pinhas] That's what you have to put in [the composition]... [Laughter] [Deleuze reads in the most dramatic of voices]: "Poison" – it's quite beautiful – "Poison enters the limbs and already rages the anger through the whole body: crime is heaped upon crime" – since I am sure that you will like this – "Crime is heaped upon crime. Thus we are purified. The only victim for the frenzied is the sacrifice of the enemy. It is pleasing that his flesh be scattered in the winds and mangled alive, drawn into a thousand pieces, persecuted with as many marks of my own pain. The trumpet itself summoning those to be resurrected to withdraw the flesh."

So that's what Beelzebub says. And he is like Judas, the one whose amplitude of soul. And then Leibniz tells the story, the maddening story of the hermit who obtained from God the grace of Beelzebub himself. And God had told him: yes, go ahead; it [God] just says that the only condition is that he renounce, not anything that he had done, nothing at all, that he renounce the hate he has for me. In other words, he must open his soul a bit. And the hermit says, thank you, my God, it's done, he is saved! He goes to see Beelzebub who says, "there's certainly a condition," as Beelzebub is clever, "surely a condition." "No, no," says the hermit, "it's nothing, just a tiny little thing: renounce the hate that you have for God." And Beelzebub erupts, he tells the hermit: "Out of my sight, you poor idiot, poor imbecile; you don't see that this is my pleasure and it's my reason for living." Fine.

In other words, who is the damned? You recognized him. Shortly thereafter, Nietzsche will create his portrait: the damned is the man of *ressentiment*, the man of vengeance, the vengeance against God. It matters little that it's against God or something else, what matters is that it's the hateful man, the vengeful man. Henceforth we understand much better. If you take, for example, the entire theme of the resentful man in Nietzsche, we create a misunderstanding when we think

that it's a man connected to the past. It's not at all a man connected to the past, the resentful man; it's the vengeful man. He is connected to the present wound (*trace*). He never ceases scratching, exactly like the damned man, never ceases scratching this wound, this wound in the present that the past has left in him. In other words, the resentful or vengeful man is man in the present, just as Leibniz tells us: damnation is indeed in the present, it's the minimum of amplitude.

So, in fact, it is possible at every instant... What does it mean that the damned are free? The damned would be able to emerge from damnation at every instant. Return to the schema:¹⁷ in the end, I have an absolute minimum of amplitude in the soul. Thus it does not go on to infinity. [*Deleuze goes to the board*] It goes to infinity, there are nonetheless an infinity of degrees. But I can say that the minimum of amplitude is when the subdivision of the soul – here I use a very rigorous Leibnizian vocabulary, that is, the clear region, the clarified region, the reserved quarter, the portion of world expressed clearly – so it's when the subdivision of the soul is reduced uniquely to the present hate against God, to the present hate toward God, henceforth, I render myself damnable. The damnable is someone who hates God, and I damn myself at each instant precisely to the extent that I do not cease realizing (*effectuer*) this amplitude. But once again, by a mistaken movement even, were Beelzebub to give a bit of superior amplitude to his soul, he would be immediately undamned. That's what we learn from the great *Philosopher's Confession*.

Is this ok? No difficulties? [*Pause*] I don't know if it's because of my comment earlier, but you aren't saying anything, and I find you more suspicious (*sournois*, sly) than ever. (Laughter)

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: It's one or the other, but sometimes the soul is ample, and it's both, it's whole.

So, here's what I'd like to say now, that still and all, aren't you struck, for those who are a bit familiar... Whereas I believe myself to have completely respected Leibniz's texts, aren't you struck by their hallucinating resemblance to the Bergsonian conception of freedom? Much later, Bergson will devote the third chapter of *Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* to freedom. What does he tell us?

First, he distinguishes two problems, and we see that Leibniz distinguished two problems as well. And the first problem deals with the act in the present, what is a free act in the present. And I see that everything rests on the following theme: [*Pause*] those who deny freedom create a grotesque conception of motives, and therefore why? [It's] a critique entirely similar to Leibniz's, but I don't think at all that it's... but [it's] renourished, reformed based on properly Bergsonian themes, specifically the whole Bergsonian theme is this: in a deliberation, when I return to the motive, it's evident that this motive has changed due to there being duration. He says, "Let's take a simple case, I hesitate between two opposite feelings: do I love him or do I hate him?"¹⁸ The self and the feelings which stir it [are found assimilated by the adversaries of freedom, are found assimilated to] well defined objects, which remain identical during the whole of the process.¹⁹ But if it is always the same self which deliberates, and if the two opposite feelings by which it is moved do not change, how, in virtue of this very principle of causality which determinism appeals to, will the self ever come to a decision? The truth is that the self, by the mere fact of experiencing the first feeling, has already changed to a slight extent when the

second supervenes: all the time that the deliberation is going on, the self is changing and is consequently modifying the two feelings which agitate it. A dynamic series of states is thus formed which permeate and strengthen one another, and which will lead by a natural evolution to a free act.”

We could hardly say it better, that’s almost signed Leibniz: a dynamic series of states. We saw that this was inclusion, inclusion of a dynamic series of states in the self.²⁰ You follow me. In fact, the dynamic series is A prime, B prime, A double prime, B double prime, A third, B third, etc. And what will Bergson constantly say? He will say: it’s precisely the free act, it’s exactly the act that expresses the self at a particular moment of duration. Moreover, he will add to this on his own a schema that wards off or reunites both what one must criticize and what one must reestablish. I am showing this schema; it’s the schema of inflection. He brings together both of them, the good and the bad one. And in fact, if he joins them, it’s because he shows that psychic life is an inflection, and the adversaries of freedom forget it all at once and that, at the instance O, they make a kind of bifurcation that no longer corresponds to the movement in the process of being created, and that neglects all the laws of the movement in the process of being created. Such that Bergson’s great idea is: what is an act that expresses the self? It’s quite simple: he defines it all the time – and it’s so Bergsonian this definition – an act that expresses the self is an act that receives from the soul that makes it the unity of the movement in the process of being created, the unity of a movement in the process of being created, unity of a movement in the process of being created that one must especially not confuse with the wound (*trace*) of a movement already made. You will find both themes of... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] A little break?²¹

Part 4

I was pointing out to you this first schema on inflection in Bergson, and then I said: if you read the whole of chapter three in the *Essay on Immediate Data [of Consciousness]*, you will see that Bergson -- Does anyone have a little piece of candy...? Yeah? Is it good for the throat? Some lozenges? Yeah? [*Laughter*] Ah! [*Pause*] One has to live dangerously. [*Pause*] That’s what health is. [*Pause with lozenges*] So it’s even worse. [*Laughter*] -- Bergson tells us [*Deleuze slightly choking; laughter*]: there is another problem.²² He distinguishes it clearly: the adversaries of freedom, in general, the determinists, they can do nothing when they are shown what an act in the present is. As clever as they are, they always gather themselves together around the past. And it’s another problem, they say, and the problem is this: in assuming that someone knows all the antecedents of an act, that is, everything that happened before, will he be able to predict the act? You see that it’s another problem since the element is no longer the act in the present, but the past antecedents. Do past antecedents suffice to determine the act? And as you will see, Bergson says with insistence that it’s another problem, but that we have to reexamine everything on the level of the other problem.

And in Leibniz, it’s exactly the same thing. You have an emergence of this other problem which reconnects us to what? It reconnects us obviously to God. For what is this intelligence capable of knowing all the antecedents of the act? The intelligence capable of knowing all the antecedents in a monad is God. Bergson says, “A superior intelligence”. Assuming that a superior intelligence, that is God, might know all past antecedents, is it capable of predicting the

movement or the act before it occurs? You understand? That's the new problem. For example, in the *Monadology*, where God is said [to be] "reading all past antecedents, reading in the monad," you remember? We gave a lot of importance to this word, "to read". God reads in the monad all the past antecedents. Can he predict the act of the monad, that is, I travel, I write, I go to the tavern, assuming he would know all the antecedents?

Here's what Bergson says: what does it mean to know everything, to know all antecedents? One thing or the other: either it means knowing all the antecedents and the act that results from them, or it means knowing only the antecedents. And in light of this, we wonder if, knowing only all the antecedents, God is capable of predicting. This second hypothesis returns us to the problem. Ok fine, that remains a problem. God is supposed to know all the antecedents of an act that a monad undertakes, and is he capable of predicting this act? We're making no progress.

It's because God is everywhere and forever that God knows at once the antecedents and the act that is going to result from them. But what does it mean to be everywhere and forever? Understand? Being everywhere and forever is very simple; it means it [God] itself passes through every state through which each monad passes. And in fact, Leibniz seems to say so, in a text from the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, where he says: "All monads, each monad is the product or the result of a viewing (*une vue*) of God." I would say there is a passage of God in each monad. God passes through all the monads. I use this expression not simply because "to pass" is Bergsonian, but because I'm thinking about a text by Whitehead – and so, we are approaching the confrontation that I desire between these two great philosophers, Whitehead and Leibniz – where Whitehead tells us: what happens in a room over an hour, for example, what happens in this room over an hour is a passage of nature in this room. And he reveals this very beautiful concept; we shall see it, of passage of Nature. It's nature that passes; it passes through this room, and in this room, in the same way, I think, and in a very close sense, one has to say that God passes in each monad and through each monad. I would say almost that each monad includes this passage of God, God passing through all the states of the monad.

Simply put, God is eternal, and that means what? That means that, in its eternity, it passes all at once through all the states of all the monads. So, saying that it passes through all the states of all the monads, that comes down to saying what? That it coincides with this monad. When it knows all the past antecedents of the monad, it coincides with the present of the monad. In other words, it creates the act of the monad at the same time that the monad creates it [the act]. You will tell me: not at all, it gets out ahead (*il devance*). But no, Leibniz is the first to have insisted on this in all sorts of texts: it goes without saying that eternity doesn't consist either of getting ahead or getting behind. Moreover, getting ahead has strictly no meaning. And about this, it seems to me that Leibniz is almost going farther than Bergson in this regard. Getting out head strictly has no meaning.

Assume the world and define it by a succession of states, a, b, c, d, succession of states. And say: I can conceive that the world began ten years earlier, or thousands of years earlier. If you change nothing in the states, if it is a question of the same states, the proposition is strictly devoid of meaning. Reflect an instant; that ought to appear obvious to you. For if time must be defined as the order of states, or as the form of succession of states, you can say: what happens if the world began thousands of years before, provided that you change, that you assume that these are not the

same states? If these are the same states, you have no means of distinguishing the effective chronology and the chronology that would exist if the world began ten years or one hundred years earlier. In other words, although you could make it begin earlier, it doesn't begin earlier; everything is strictly identical.

As a result, to say that "the world could have begun earlier," to the extent that you keep and define the world by the same succession of states, is a proposition devoid of meaning since you will have no means to distinguish the two chronologies. That's obvious. In other words, this comes down to saying in a different way that eternity has never consisted in getting out ahead (*devancer*). What one must say is that God, in its eternity, passes through all the states of all the monads, whereas the monads, following the order of time, pass successively through the states [that are] themselves successive. But that does not prevent God, in its eternity, from only happening to coincide with each monad at the moment that [that monad] creates the act in the present.

So, I return to Bergson who said precisely the same thing. He says: you distinguish Peter who creates the act, and Paul, the superior intelligence who knows all antecedents and who is supposed to predict the act. Ok, Paul is supposed to know all the antecedents. At the moment that Peter commits the act, you will realize that Paul necessarily coincides with Peter. That is, he doesn't at all predict the act, he coincides with Peter, and he commits the act at the same time as Peter. It's afterwards that you tell yourself: so he could predict. But, in fact, Peter and Paul will have only created a one and same person at the moment of the present act. And Bergson will then inspire us, I refer you to the readings, [with] another schema of inflection. What obviously interests me is that there are two schemas of inflection; generally speaking, you will look in the text, to show that Peter and Paul, that is, the monad and God, coincide necessarily at the level of the act of predicting.

So, from all perspectives, what I draw from this is this an extremely, extremely, it seems to me, a very, very rigorous conception of freedom in Leibniz and that can be understood only by the theme, if you will, by the Bergsonian theme, but which once again seems to me absolutely and entirely present in Leibniz, specifically the unity of a movement in the process of being created, specifically the present act to which one is always brought back. And that does not prevent what, I maintain, presents itself quite seriously, and it's on this topic that I want to finish, is this: if it is true that freedom is saved, one does not see very well how morality is going to be saved.²³ And yet Leibniz is above all a moral philosopher, and moreover, he is without doubt the first among philosophers – and in this way, he already belongs to the eighteenth century – to have conceived of morality as progress, no longer as conformity with nature, but as progress of reason. It's through this that he is fully of the eighteenth century and pre-Kantian; he is already one aspect that Kant will realize. Morality is no longer at all in conformity with nature as the morality of the ancient wise man; it is the progressivity of reason, the progression of reason.

But my whole problem is: with such a conception of freedom, what does that mean? How can one define a tendency toward the best? I can always say: a tendency toward gaining amplitude, but from where does it come, and why? In fact, the progress of reason would exist if I could show that there would be a tendency of the soul to increase its amplitude, so then I could define progress. And still, even if I could define it, understand that [Leibniz] finds himself facing a

really strange problem that was noticed by all of Leibniz's commentators: that God, having chosen the best of possible worlds, there is a determined quantity of progress. The best of possible worlds is the outcome (*suite*), as Leibniz says in a letter, the outcome of the most perfect possible, although no state of this outcome would itself be perfect. The most perfect outcome possible. But the most perfect outcome possible, that defines a maximum, defines a quantity of progress. Henceforth, how could a soul, for example mine, make progress, except resulting from a horrible condition: that other souls regress? [*Laughter*] And it is common, in fact, among certain of Leibniz's commentators, to remark that according to them, Leibniz finds himself again before a kind of impasse since the progress possible for a soul is always compensated by the regression of other souls, by virtue of the necessity of a determined quantity of progress chosen for the world by God.

So, with this last point, we grasp at least a definition of progress. I progress if my soul increases its amplitude, but it's not enough to say that because how can my soul increase since it expresses the entire world? Ok! So we always come back, I come back eternally to this point that seems to me equally essential: my soul expresses the entire world, but it expresses clearly only a small part of the world, and it's my subdivision. My subdivision is limited, my region, my quarter, whatever you like. Henceforth what does it mean to progress? To increase the amplitude of my soul, that can no more be expressed than the world, I can't do it. On the other hand, I can increase my subdivision, I can increase my quarter which, itself, is limited. So I have a more precise idea of what it means to progress. "To progress" is increasing the amplitude of my soul, that is, increasing the subdivision or clarified region that comes back to us, comes back to each of us, and which is distinguished from whatever comes back to the other (*à l'autre*). Fine.

But what does it mean to "increase my clarified region"? Must we understand it in extension? Yes and no. I'm saying that here we must be concrete. I'm saying "yes and no" because the idea that a monad, you or me, might dispose of a subdivision, that is, a clarified region that we express more perfectly than the rest, it's correct, this idea, but this clarified region is a statistic. I mean that it's the same that we have as child, adult, and old man, but it's not the same that we have in good and ill health, [not the same] when feeling tired and feeling fit. For example, I arrived [today] with a vast clarified region, and now my clarified region is tending to become miniscule. So there are constant variations of the clarified region. Thus, increasing the clarified region, we see that this can mean carrying it to its possible maximum, in each case. And then, this is not a gain in extension, we must add, it's a gain in deepening. It's less a question of extending the clarified region than of deepening it, that is, I would say of developing its power of action (*puissance*), which comes down to saying in philosophical terms of the seventeenth century, bringing it to distinction. It was only clear, it wasn't distinct. One must bring it to distinction, and that can only occur through knowledge (*la connaissance*).

So all that offers a sense to increasing the amplitude of my soul, that is, progressing. And here you are, I even have criteria, [so] now I can return. I am giving a sense to the tendency toward the best. There is indeed a tendency toward the best. What causes me to say that it would be better to work than to go out to the tavern? It's because going to the tavern is an act that corresponds to an amplitude of soul quite inferior to working. Oh yes, oh yes, I'm afraid that's how it is! You see the extent to which I am served by having an absolute minimum of amplitude of soul. The damned man, once more, is a poor soul who has reduced his subdivision to a single

predicate: I hate God, hating God. So all this provides an idea of progress. I can progress. The tendency toward the best... You see that there is even a veritable philosophical revolution because the idea of the goodness (*bien*) -- which up to that point was the guarantee of the conformity with nature, was the guarantee of morality conceived as conformity with nature -- is replaced by Leibniz with the best. And the best is not the guarantee of morality as conformity with nature, but the guarantee of the new morality as progression of the soul. That's quite essential.

So ok, each of us can progress on his or her own, but by progressing, at first glance, we always fall back on this point: at first glance, it's as if [progressing] gave a swift kick to others. It's really necessary that my progress... since I accomplish a certain quantity of progress and the quantity is fixed for the best of possible worlds, it is really necessary that if I myself make progress, this has to be compensated. At first glance, it seems to me that an other soul has to regress. You realize, this is a kind of struggle for moral existence. Yeah.

How to get out of this? I think that Leibniz gets out of it, only it's extremely beautiful, so very difficult. For, here we are, contrary to the eternity of God, who passes through all the monads, eternally, thus outside time, the monads aren't developed outside time. Monads are subject to the order of time. The monads are subject to the order of time. In what sense are they subject to the order of time? Here's my civil birth. We have to come back to things we have begun to see. I am starting, I am outlining them, but we had best look only at them at a future meeting; it's a very theatrical production, all quite properly Baroque, that we will have to look at closely. I am examining cases. My birth certificate is what? It's the date on which I am born as a supposedly reasonable creature. [Pause] But my soul, it isn't born. My soul, you remember, it isn't born; it was there the whole time, from the start of the world, and my body as well. My body was infinitely folded in upon itself, infinitely tiny; it's infinitely folded within Adam's seed, and my soul, inseparable from my body, existed only as a sensitive or animal soul, there's what Leibniz tells us.

But then, what distinguished me, called [me] to become at any given moment a reasonable creature, what distinguished me from animals, they who also existed from the beginning of the world, folded in upon the seed of the great ancestor, with sensitive and animal souls? The most precise of Leibniz's texts is in a little, beautiful treatise, *The Cause of God defended by the conciliation of his justice with his other perfections*. You see that the abridged title, *The Cause of God*, does not mean that which causes God to be, but means "cause" in the juridical sense, defending God's cause. *The Cause of God, defended by the consideration of his justice*, etc. ... So in the text, *The Cause of God*, paragraph 82, Leibniz tells us: it is evident through this that we do not affirm the pre-existence of reason. That's essential! He does not say that the reason of a reasonable being is there from the start, that it coexists in Adam's seed. This would not be reasonable. He doesn't say that at all. He says: if I exist from the start of the world, it's in the form of a body infinitely folded in on itself in the seed of Adam, with a purely sensitive and animal soul. So we do not affirm the pre-existence of reason, "however one can believe that, in the pre-existing seeds, there was pre-established and prepared by God all that must one day emerge from them. Not simply the human organism, but reason itself, under the form" – under what form? – "under the form of a kind of official document (*acte scellé*)" – an official

document – “bearing a later effect.”²⁴ This text by Leibniz gives me much to ponder (*me fait rêver*).

You see: I pre-exist myself since the beginning of the world. In fact, I exist in the seed of Adam, but as sensitive or animal soul. But what distinguishes animal or sensitive souls, which are called to become reasonable souls sometime later, from those destined to remain animal and sensitive souls as are all the souls of cats or dogs or other detestable animals? What distinguishes it? The text tells us: the official document, an official document in the monad, in the animal or sensitive monad. An official document that says what? Bearing a later effect, an official document that is simply a raised seal or a mark, with a date, no doubt, and which shows that at the corresponding date, this sensitive or reasonable soul will be raised up. It’s the elevation. You recall, we started off from here. A certain number of souls, those who are destined to be reasonable, will be raised up to the higher floor at a given moment. So from the start, God placed within these souls destined to be raised up to the higher floor, it placed an official document.

There’s no need to search any longer, that’s going to move us forward. Recall this for the next time because I will really need this official document. For what is this official document? It’s obviously a light. It’s a light. What is reason if not a light? It’s a light. Without it, the monad is completely black, and we’ve seen that it’s draped in black. You sense what I have in mind and where I am heading one more, we’ll see the next time; Baroque painting or Baroque architecture. The walls of the monad are black. The monads destined to become reasonable, God seals therein a juridical document, an official document bearing a later effect, that is, he places there a light destined later to be lit. This is quite a marvel, it’s really beautiful.

So when my birth date arrives, it’s the hour of my elevation to the higher floor; my soul becomes reasonable, meaning that the light is lit in the dark monad. [*Pause*] It’s lit in the monad; the monad goes up a floor, that’s all the same. Good. You see, there is a One (*un*) when I wasn’t born, One before my birth. We just saw it: I was sleeping in Adam’s seed, or in my ancestors’ seed; I was sleeping all folded in on myself, with my tiny little light unlit, but sealed within my dark monad. That was before my birth. I am born. I am raised up a floor, to the higher floor, you recall all our analyses from the start on the two floors as definition of the Baroque. I go up to the higher floor, and at the moment, my body unfolds, my soul becomes reasonable, the light is lit.

But when I die, what happens? We must continue the series to understand. When I die – but listen, this is not good news that I am announcing to you, no more, no more laughing – you involve once more. You do not lose your body or your soul. That would be upsetting if you lost your body; how would God find it again? You’d be entirely scattered. Leibniz is quite disturbed by that. He says: the resurrection is quite lovely, but you must not get dispersed. There as well is a beautiful theological problem. When I die, I in-volve, which means? I go back down a floor, down to the lower floor. In other words, the parts of my body fold in again, and my soul ceases being reasonable, it again becomes a sensitive and reasonable soul.

But, ha ha, but, but, but... It carries off with it a new official document. There I regret to say that Leibniz does not say it formally, [*Laughter*] but all evidence points to him saying it implicitly. That is, it’s so obvious that he feels no need to say it. But for us, we do feel the need to say it. But in the end, if he says it, yes, he says it nonetheless. My soul carries away an official

document, obviously! And you can ask me what is this new official document? The new official document is a juridical document; all this is in the juridical sense. An official document is a juridical document. The official document of my birth is a birth certificate. I say: the soul necessarily carries off another official document while dying, my reasonable soul, it's the death certificate. What is the death certificate of a reasonable soul, when it dies? [*Interruption from someone entering the room*] -- What is it you are looking for? ... Ah, it's not here. [*Laughter*] ... Ah, well it's at two o'clock then. [*Pause*] ... We should have said yes! [*Laughter*] Ok, but really, he cut off all my...

A student: The death certificate.

Ah, yes, the death certificate. What is my death certificate? Ha ha, listen: it's my final reasonable thought. It's my final reasonable thought at the moment of death. That's why the final thought is so important. The damned man's final thought is: I hate God! I hate God. This is why he's damned, he's damned by his final thought. So the damned man carries away in his soul, again become sensitive or animal, this death certificate. And he again goes to sleep, like all other souls. My body folds in, my soul again becomes what it was before its birth as being reasonable, that is, it rebecomes sensitive or animal. I still have a body, and I still have a soul. But my body has stopped unfolding, my soul has ceased being reasonable. The light is snuffed out. [*Pause*]

Final point: the resurrection. The hour of resurrection comes. At that moment, and only at that moment, all reasonable souls, rather all souls that have been reasonable and have again slipped back into the ashes, etc. ... they are re-elevated, that is, again pass into the state of above, their bodies unfold again into a subtle body, into a glorious and notorious body, and souls are judged. And the damned are those who wake up as they died, that is, they wake up hating God. The fortunate and the damned, that's all there is. Each one reawakens according to one's final amplitude. The light is relit. Of the light of the damned – since same formula, same proposition: I hate God! as proposition of reason – [it] keeps a minimum of light; it occupies the clear region of the corresponding monad. All lights are relit; one must conceive of the resurrection as something quite enjoyable (*gai*); there are all the little lights that are relit, all the souls again become reasonable, and each one will have his due according to the order of time, that is, following the life that he led when he was reasonable. You understand?

And after, what I almost want to say, there we are, we almost have the... [*Deleuze seems to have lost focus on the topic*] I will take up this point the next time... I will take up this point the next time because it's not clear. But I will give you an immediate answer, how, you see. There is little space to say it: if I make progress, myself, it's to the detriment of others. That would be terrible. The commentators are wrong to say that Leibniz does not get out of this problem since, fortunately, there are the damned. To say: my progress necessarily occurs to the detriment of others that is valid only for the damned, it seems to me. It's even for that reason that all the others, except the damned, all the others can progress. For what did the damned do? There they are going to be caught in their own trap, fortunately; they are going to stop cackling like birds. What do the damned do? They lower the amplitude of their soul to the maximum; they lower their subdivision to nothing, except "I hate God." You see this enormous reduction of amplitude.

Henceforth, it's not at all that they give us a negative example; it's just that they renounce the amplitude that they could normally have reached as reasonable beings, and they renounce their own amplitude. They renounce it voluntarily by virtue of their devilishness (*diablerie*). Henceforth, they make possible infinite quantities of progress useful for others, and without doubt, it's their true punishment. Their true punishment is not the flames of hell; their true punishment is to serve the betterment of others. Not, yet again, not because they would offer a negative example of which everyone would be wary, but because they function somewhat, one might say, as a negative entropy, that is, a discharge in the world of quantities of possible progress. What does "quantities of possible progress" mean? It's the quantities of clarity that have been renounced, and that return by right to them, insofar as they are reasonable beings.

As a result, it seems to me, at this level, progress becomes possible. It's possible not detrimentally; all souls can progress without draining the quantity of progress. Why? Because there are the damned that voluntarily have withdrawn, withdrawn freely from the general progression and that henceforth have made possible the progression for others, such that the damned play a veritable physical role, like in physics, Maxwell's demons. There is a kind of physical role of the damned which is precisely that of making progress possible. So you understand, for a demon, for Beelzebub, making progress possible is truly the saddest thing in the world.

I would like you to reflect on that. We will return a bit to this question of progress, and you will see; you sense that on this matter, the time has come for us to consider more closely what the conception of light is in all this. [*End of the recording*] [2:50:49]

Notes

¹ This seminar offers one of several examples of a nearly complete session, with clear start and finish. However, the WebDeleuze transcript omits the first nine minutes of the session whereas the BNF recording (available on YouTube and oddly also at WebDeleuze) starts with Richard Pinhas's presentation in progress (musician and student of Deleuze). Since he speaks while drawing on the board, included in this translation and its transcript are only the sections that are relatively clear. Speaking to Deleuze and the seminar participants about the Leibnizian concept of harmony, Pinhas will also return to this topic during the final discussion on harmony in the last seminar meeting on 2 June 1987. During this short presentation before the formal class starts, Deleuze intervenes with some questions and comments.

Some notes on this transcription: because of considerable disorder in the sequence of paragraphs as well as redundancies on the WebDeleuze transcript, the French transcript and the subsequent translation have been revised and completed, first, with reference to the edited seminar recording (112 minutes) that provides the contents of the double CD collection produced by Gallimard entitled "Leibniz: âme et damnation" (Soul and Damnation) [2003], and second, with the BNF recording. Its length (151 minutes) suggests the extensive editing done by Gallimard in preparing the session for commercial publication.

² On impossibles, freedom, and the phenomenology of motives, cf. *The Fold* (University of Minnesota, 1993), pp. 69-70; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1993), pp. 93-95.

³ Deleuze speaks of motives and the letter to Clarke in *The Fold*, p. 69; *Le Pli*, p. 93.

⁴ This passage recalls the opening pages of chapter 1 of *The Fold*, "The Pleats of Matter", especially with the reference to Locke.

⁵ On *Unruhe*, cf. *The Fold*, p. 69; *Le Pli*, p. 94.

⁶ Deleuze refers to the 3 February 1987 session.

⁷ Cf. *The Fold*, pp.70-71; *Le Pli*, pp. 95-96.

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- ⁸ This drawing is not included in this passage in *The Fold*.
- ⁹ Deleuze begins to address Leibniz's theory of damnation in *The Fold*, p. 71; *Le Pli*, p. 96.
- ¹⁰ *La littérature de l'âge baroque en France: Circé et le paon* (Paris : Corti), 1953.
- ¹¹ We have corrected a transcription error in the original WebDeleuze transcript, thanks to the Leibniz CD and the BNF recording of the seminar. The re-ordering adopted here is in the Leibniz CD, at the very end of segment 11, the final segment on disc 1, and at the start of disc 2.
- ¹² Citation begins, source not indicated, but probably Jean Rousset citing Quevedo's text, cf. *The Fold*, p. 71 & p.153, footnote 30; *Le Pli*, p. 97 & footnote 30.
- ¹³ The location for end of quote is unclear, and its source is not precisely indicated, but is possibly from *The Philosopher's Confession*.
- ¹⁴ Deleuze will return to this theme of pain with reference to Spinoza in "J comme Joie" (J as in Joy) in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze (Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z, Semiotext(e) 2011)*; see link on the Deleuze Seminars <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/lecture/lecture-recording-2-g-m/>.
- ¹⁵ The following six paragraphs of discussion with students are omitted from the Gallimard CD.
- ¹⁶ Cf. <http://www.leibniz-translations.com/confession.htm> for the text from *The Philosopher's Confession* (accessed 19 March 2024).
- ¹⁷ Reference to a schema in Bergson's text on inflection as Deleuze indicates later in the session, a copy located at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bergson_sch%C3%A9ma.png (accessed 22 March 2024).
- ¹⁸ Deleuze cites Bergson's text; cf. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/56852/56852-0.txt> (accessed 21 March 2024).
- ¹⁹ The text between brackets is absent from the gutenber.org translation.
- ²⁰ The rest of this paragraph is omitted from the Gallimard CD.
- ²¹ The following text, after the break, continues Deleuze's reflections on Bergson and his schemas. We have resituated above, in the Second Part, the seven paragraphs that appear in the Web Deleuze French transcript at the start of the Third Part, thereby respecting the actual order of the seminar.
- ²² On the link between Leibniz and Bergson, and the topic of divine reading, cf. *The Fold*, p. 72-73; *Le Pli*, p. 98-99.
- ²³ On the question of morality and freedom, cf. *The Fold*, p. 73; *Le Pli*, p. 99.
- ²⁴ Deleuze refers to this text, *La Cause de Dieu plaidée par sa justice*, and this passage in *The Fold*, p. 153, note 37; *Le Pli*, p. 101. The rest of the seminar corresponds to the final pages of chapter 5.