Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

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Part 1

So, you recall, you recall the last time, we saw, we witnessed a kind of dramaturgy of souls. This dramaturgy of souls in Leibniz consists of this: if it's true that all souls are created from the very start, if we can say that from the very start of the world, at the same time as its creation, they were created in a form that Leibniz, for the moment, calls, sensitive or animal… And when, among all these souls, there are some, let's say – these are bad choices of words -- there's a certain number that are called to become reasonable, when their effective existence arrives for them, they are therefore *elevated* – this is the term, *elevation*, right, that is important for us for many reasons that you perhaps recall – they are elevated, they rise up. Literally, as you recall, they go up to a higher floor, to the upper floor. And then, with death, they go back down; they again become, they envelop, you recall, they refold their own parts. And then, at the moment of the Last Judgment, they rise up once again. So this is very curious, these souls that rise up, go back down, rise up again. I would say that this offers nothing new at all, and if it is always our history – are these two worlds? Are these two floors of the same world? – it seems to us that there were all sorts of problems there that were going to allow us, that had allowed us already to begin to define the Baroque.

But we had especially seen the status of the damned soul, and the status of the damned is something that creates great enthusiasm in Leibniz, [*Laughter*] the status of the damned, those who die with the single thought in mind, [the] hatred of God. In this, they again descend like everyone, and then they arise again on the day of Last Judgment, so good, fine. But, we saw how they were useful in the world, and this was their true punishment, and that true punishment wasn't at all the flames of hell. So, their true punishment was to free up, to renounce if you will, using by themselves the quantities of progress in such a way that the damned objectively freed up quantities of progress usable by other souls.[2] And this is an essential element in the initiation of a theory of progress in Leibniz. So, starting from here, this entire dramaturgy was sketched out. I am assuming there are no problems; that wasn't very difficult, all that, and then we have all kinds of ideas about this status of the damned. That made for me a… [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

What I'd like to present now more generally today is this: to a certain extent, isn't there something – perhaps this isn't the moment -- to grasp a kind of status of light in this series of elevations and descents? Isn't there in this a very special regime of light, the happy and the damned? Once again, at the point we've reached, this is like a painting by Tintoretto, a Tintoretto painting, the happy and the damned. In a very interesting text, Leibniz tells us, light and

shadows, light and shadows are like a kind of binary arithmetic. You recall that binary arithmetic, which we saw, is the kind that only contains two signs, 1 and 0, and that composes all the numbers with 1 and 0, light 1, shadows 0, [*Pause*] the two being separated – here Leibniz invokes Chinese philosophers – the two being separated by the thread of waters, the 1 and the 0 separated by the thread of waters, the happy and the damned, it's Tintoretto's *Final Judgment*.[3]

What does that mean, 1 and 0 as light and shadows? Perhaps this isn't an opposition? You immediately get my question here, one that becomes more general: can I define a regime of light generally as Baroque, in contrast to other regimes of light? Light and shadows, I am saying, are not an opposition; they are like the 1 and 0. Perhaps the 1 and 0, right, suffice to distinguish the happy and the damned, but in a certain way, we say that there isn't really an opposition. And why isn't there opposition? Because the first fundamental point, it seems to me, if we attempt to color in Leibniz's philosophy, is that the monad is dark (*sombre*), the depths of the monad is dark. And we saw this, we say this, if we take seriously the whole aspect of "without doors or windows" – the monad is without doors or windows, that is, the closed interiority that includes its own predicates – all that comes down to saying, if you put forth this monad, it's a closed room. As we've seen a thousand times, it's dark.[4]

Notice that I'm not saying that it consist of shadows. Darkness is not black. It's dark; we can't say anything more. Latin knows this term, dark; that is not exactly the same thing as black. In Latin, black is *niger*, but dark is *fuscum*. [*Deleuze spells it out*] If I say this, it's because Spinoza in his tab… Excuse me, Leibniz in his definition tables uses *fuscum subnigram*, that is, literally, a blackish darkness, blackish darkness. Why does he introduce it? So this isn't the same thing. In his definition tables, we will see, he defines white, black, *fuscum*, and colors. He sketches out a theory of colors. Good. I am saying, the depths of the monad are dark. This is the *fuscum subnigram*, the without doors or windows, the closed room. [*Pause*] Fine.

Perhaps we can call a "Baroque revolution" in painting the one creating a return to depths or grounds.[5] [*Pause*] The ground of a painting is not its background. The ground of a painting is this from which all the planes emerge and which determines the relation between planes. The ground is not background. The ground is that from which all the grounds emerge, the fore ground and back ground, and that [the ground] determines in each case the relation of fore ground to back ground. [*Pause*]

If I say – all this is hypothesis, eh? – if I say, we can define Baroque painting, or we can try to define Baroque painting as the return to ground, what does that mean? It means before, previously… What is previously? We need not look too far; let's say the Renaissance, or a bit before it. Before, the ground is white, [*Pause*] and no doubt, it's essential that the ground be white before because, in being white, the ground acts as foundation of painting as oil painting. You recall, I am not saying that the back ground is white; I am saying that ground is white. The founder of oil painting we generally consider to be [Jan] Van Eyck, fifteenth century. He's Flemish, and the Italians of the sixteenth century will adopt Van Eyck's secret. [*A brief, high-pitched sound is heard in the room; laughter*] An excellent commentator, Xavier de Langlais, judges that, finally, painting stops with Van Eyck, and that's fine, that's really fine.[6] This is like people who say, well yes, music stops with the Gregorian chant, philosophy stops with St. Thomas, [*Laughter*] painting stops with Van Eyck. I mean these are powerful positions, and that

means something. It's obviously… It's not enough to say that this is reactionary. They mean something, something humorous.

Langlais's idea is quite simple:[7] it's that after Van Eyck, painters no longer paint other than as pigs, and for some simple reasons, hence this story of the return to grounds. What was Van Eyck's ground that establishes oil painting? Well, it consisted in covering the canvas or wood with a rather thin layer either of chalk or of amorphous gypsum. [*Pause*] It's on this that the painter creates his outline; he washes the outline – this is the second operation – [*Pause*] with diluted water or with turpentine. Third operation: he adds colors and shadows and light.[8] [*Pause*]

Goethe writes in *The Theory of Colors* – Goethe describes admirably this operation -- paragraph 902 and those that follow, [*Deleuze looks in the text*] under the title "The Grounds": "It was the practice of the earlier artists to paint on light grounds" – "light" is not a good choice, but well, we can… and in fact, he immediately describes this: "This ground consisted of gypsum, and was thickly spread on linen or panel, and then levigated, polished"; that was the first operation. Second operation: "After the outline was drawn, the subject was washed in with a blackish or brownish color." [*Pause*] Third operation, so he adds: "Pictures prepared in this manner for coloring are still in existence, by Leonardo da Vinci, and Fra Bartolomeo; there are also several by Guido," very good, fine. Third operation: "When the artist proceeded to color, and had to represent white draperies, he sometimes suffered the ground to remain untouched. Titian did this late in life when he had attained the greatest certainty in practice and could accomplish much with little labor. The whitish ground was left as a middle tint, the shadows painted in, and the high lights touched on."[9] You see here Van Eyck's three operations of painting that are truly going to be the founding acts of oil painting.

What represents… Can we say that this is a revolution when this introduces – I'm not saying universally – but when that introduces the dark depth? It's a serious turnaround. The depth or ground becomes *fuscum*; it becomes *fuscum subnigram*. [*Pause*] It becomes blackish darkness; this is an act of [*inaudible*]; [Goethe] states it very well, paragraph 907: "It was the practice for a time to paint on dark grounds. Tintoretto probably introduced them." It was Tintoretto who introduced them; I believe that since Goethe, we are sure of this, and these grounds underwent a huge development with a very great painter named Caravaggio. Fine. [*Pause*]

What happens with a very dark ground, with this dark ground? With this dark ground, fine, over this, over this dark ground, what does this constitute? What's going to change? It's literally going to be like a ground of colors. There is also [Heinrich] Wölfflin, a very great art critic who speaks of this: at this era, what the painter discovers is the participation of all colors and what Goethe already called the obscure nature of color, the opacity of color, the dark nature of color.[10] You'll say, no, there are bright colors; that changes nothing. In one of his most beautiful pages, Goethe will define white as "the primary opacity". The dark nature of color, all color participates in a dark nature, a dark nature. And henceforth, the relations between colors as such, you sense already that the primacy of local color is finished. The primacy of local color necessarily is finished since what's in the process of being liberated when you paint in colors in their dark nature, that is, in the way that they emerge from a ground of colors, from a *fuscum*, that will be the relation of contrast and direct complementarity, how starting from the ground of colors a green stroke connects to a red stroke, how a yellow on the left refers to a blue on the right. This is what you are going to see developed freely starting from the *fuscum.* Colors are no longer

apposed on white -- to simplify everything, eh? -- colors are generated starting from the *fuscum*. [*Pause*]

That changes a lot of things. As I was saying, what is it that it changes? Well, the whole white ground was for… In my view, that changes three things: the entire white ground was to assure the preponderance of the fore ground. [*Pause*] Now, on the contrary, everything emerges from the back ground. [*Pause*] Second thing: [*Pause*] substitution of chiaroscuro for local color. [*Pause*] Third: substitution of recovering (*recouvrement*) for contour. [*Pause*]

At the same time, one could obviously object, ok look, it's not possible to define the Baroque by this reversal of ground, by this arrival of the *fuscum*, or by the discovery of the dark ground of color. Why isn't this possible? Here, we will say, well, we are going to encounter… I'd like us to encounter these problems. We are perpetually told, well, in certain cases, yes, but there are other cases, there are other cases that don't have… A typical example considered as one among the typically Baroque painters [is] Rubens. And it's obvious that Rubens does not use blackish grounds. Notice why Xavier de Langlais doesn't like that at all; he says all that is the death of painting; it's the death of painting because there are disadvantages. When one paints on this new kind of ground, it cracks very quickly. It cracks very quickly, and it quickly gets black. This is distressing. Besides that, the Van Eycks have a kind of eternal permanence, whereas the Caravaggios, well, they have to be maintained. They have to be maintained, otherwise they immediately get black, and worse, says de Langlais, they cracked. We know… This is why he says that they don't know how to paint from that moment onward, and that it's not going to get better because the Impressionists, what do they use to obtain their colors? That's really it. It's the secret of color. They use some famous grounds, bituminous grounds. So then, for de Langlais, the bituminous grounds are a catastrophe. It's an abomination itself. It's terrible. [*Laughter*] How long a painting lasts becomes very problematic. But finally, is this a reason…

So, Rubens, Rubens, we'll say, ah but no, look closely, you cannot define the Baroque in that way since Rubens, on the contrary, he creates white ground. So then, does he maintain the tradition? Well, no, people… When people say and always invoke one case in order to say, look closely, your concept doesn't work, this is because they create a grotesque idea of what the concept is. They often think that the concept must emit a common characteristic such that when I then speak of a concept of the Baroque, this concept would have to yield the common characteristic of everything that I organize under this concept. And that's not at all how it works. A concept can very well be a distribution of differential characteristics. [*Pause*] It can be differential characteristics. It can be a system of differences that link things together. It's not at all necessarily a system of resemblances.

And, if I take Rubens's case literally, what does Rubens do? He seems to hold on firmly to tradition with his white ground, but not at all! Not at all! In fact, it's him… First of all, white ground cakes on enormously; it gets really thick, and it's the white color, no longer chalk or gypsum. As a result, he lays on the paint directly. You indeed grasp that in this new order, whether it's the dark ground or a ground in Rubens's manner, at the extreme, there will no longer be an outline. Here too, this causes de Langlais to say [that] they no longer know how to paint. There will no longer be an outline. They are laying on the paint directly, that is, there will be direct alterations (*repentirs*), and alteration is the opposite of the outline. With alterations, this is an order in which you'll always find a painting under the painting…

So then… In Rubens's case, therefore, you have a white ground that is going to be washed. Washing is already going to give it a shade [*teint*], and he goes on to paint colors over colors. That is, far from being an exception, in fact he returns to the Baroque under a more general concept. If I say that the Baroque, in any event manages a reversal of ground, either in the form of the promotion of a dark ground of colors, or as the promotion of painting of colors on colors that is, in fact, very different from tradition, from the tradition that Van Eyck insists on, so literally it's not false when certain art critics refer to Rubens as a light Caravaggism (*caravagisme clair*). You understand? It's enough that you retain all this, at least if it interests you, but I don't think it's very difficult.

What I am retaining for the moment lays in what interests me… Please sense that Leibniz's philosophical concept is like a painting, let's say, a Tintoretto or a Caravaggio; it's not a Rubens. The depths (*fond*) of the monad is dark.[11] Once again, I am not saying black; I've justified this: it's the reversal of ground. What is this? You sense against whom this is directed. Who is a Renaissance man? Who is someone who did not leave behind the Renaissance? Well, it's Descartes. [*Laughter*] It's Descartes. It's he who paints on chalk, on gypsum. The clear or light idea (*l'idée claire*) is what? Well, the depth of things is clear; the depth of things is clear. There you have a Cartesian idea from the Renaissance, and that the depths of the monad might be the *fuscum*, there you have the Baroque reversal. Cartesian clarity is chalk and gypsum. We will see this, moreover, in Descartes's theory of light. Fine, fine.

Good, you understand, it's a reversal: the monad is the promotion of the dark depths, and in these dark depths, what happens? Light! But you understand, light, well yes, I indeed have an order of light because it doesn't occur in the same way as in a cave, as in a room without doors or windows, or then again in fresh air, on a white ground, on a cliff face of chalk. It's not the same light. Fine, in Leibniz, light only occurs in a cave, the monad. How will the monad reach a cave? It's not at all the Cartesian *Cogito*. The Cartesian *Cogito* is white ground. Good, so then how does light occur? Think of Caravaggio. Think of the great "Calling of Saint Matthew", if you have the painting in mind, the strange light that comes from a high opening (*soupirail*). Or else, as we have seen with the dark room, [light] comes from a tiny slit.

So understand that it's pictorial, but philosophical as well. This is optical, and it's philosophical. Who will differentiate between the optical and the philosophical? I mean it's optical if it's a question of physical light, and it's philosophical if it's a question of mental light, but it's the same thing. In Leibniz, light presupposes or at least arises on an *obscure* ground, and even more, not obscure, not only obscure, on a *dark* ground (*fond sombre*). [*Pause*] It comes from a high opening. [*Pause*] In the *Philosopher's Confession*, a text that I used at our last meeting, on page 75 in the French translation: "A light" – this already is important for me, that the text is in Latin, eh? But it's a certain kind of light, a determinate light; it's not just light – "A light" – I am reading the translation, but it's both lovely and precise – "[A light] sliding as if through a slit" – for those who know Latin, *per rimas* – "sliding as if through a slit in the middle of shadows" (*Une lumière glissant comme par une fente à travers les ténèbres*).[12] If a supplementary proof were needed that in the story of monads without doors or windows Leibniz has perfectly in his mind the existence of the obscure chamber, *camera obscura*, you have it there, you will find it in the text of the *Philosopher's Confession*.

So, light, so we could say, in the monad, the dark monad, light comes through a thin slit, a thin angled opening, as we have seen, like in the Chapel of La Tourette by Le Corbusier.[13] [*Pause*] If you recall how the obscure chamber functions, for light to penetrate through the slit and reach the dark room, what is necessary? What's needed is a reflective mirror; two mirrors even are necessary, an interplay of mirrors, the tilting of mirrors, etc.[14] Well, and yes, there's a mirror, and what is the white? Leibniz tells us that the white is an infinity of – here is how he defines it; it's a beautiful definition – an infinity of tiny reflecting mirrors; an infinity of tiny mirrors reflecting the light, that's what the white is. [*Pause*]

Good, so I'd say, light creates an eruption within the dark room [*Pause*] by imposing, by establishing a white zone. That doesn't surprise you and shouldn't surprise you at all, at all, at all, at all since you recall, I am reminding you, that the monad contains, in fact, a clear and enlightened region, a privileged region. [*Here Deleuze declaims*] *Each monad expresses the totality of the world, yes!* But it expresses in a privileged manner a subdivision (*département*), a quarter, it's the white zone, [*Pause*] and as one comes close to the edges of the white zone, [*Pause*] the more one degrades, that is, the operation of degrading, this is the shadow insofar as it rejoins the dark depths. Let's not confuse the shadow and the dark depth itself. You have therefore: light [that] enters into the monad, [*Pause*] the white patch made by the light, the degrading from the white patch, to wit, how the light slips toward the dark depths. In other words, the light that enters into the monad creates the white, and it doesn't create the white without creating shadow as well. [*Pause*]

And why? Because the white is obscured and is degraded toward the *fuscum*, toward the dark depths. And inversely, things and predicates of the monad, things that the monad represents, represents to itself, emerge from the dark depths through shadings (*ombrage*) and tints. [*Pause*] It's the domain of chiaroscuro. What is chiaroscuro? We could define it; so one can always give definitions thanks to the preceding analysis. And no, I no longer even have to justify myself. I'd say that chiaroscuro is the interiority of light; it's the interiority of light in a canvas when it's a question of a painting; it's the interiority of light in the monad. [*Pause*]

And this is not surprising; it's not surprising from Leibniz since, you recall, we saw this quickly, we saw it quickly, the way in which Leibniz tells us, and told us, that projections, geometric projections necessarily had a reverse side, and this reverse side was the theory of shadows. You recall when we discussed this story of cones and points of view.[15] At the apex of the cone, there was the eye. [*Pause*] An object was given that we named the geometral. [*Pause*] And finally there were cuts or projections of the object: the ellipse, the hyperbola, etc. You remember? I won't go back over that.[16] And Leibniz linked this projective geometry to his great author who was a mathematician of the period, specifically [Girard] Desargues. And Leibniz reminds us that Desargues himself divided the projective from what he called the theory of shadows.

And on this, what is missing in the projection, in the projective? What's missing in the projective is the possibility of creating the difference between the periphery of a circle – for example, a flat surface – and the periphery of a half-sphere. From the point of view of the projection, this is exactly the same. What allows you to distinguish the periphery of a circle and the periphery of a half-sphere? It's the shadows. The projective cannot give it to you. How will you have the shadows? Desargues showed this quite well, and Leibniz takes up this topic in citing Desargues. It suffices, says Leibniz in a beautiful text, it suffices to place the luminous, the luminous, the

luminous source, it suffices to place the luminous in the place of the eye. Notice, the projective had three instances: the eye, the object, and the projections. You place the luminous in the locus of the eye, the opaque in the place of the object, and you will have areas of shadow in the place of the projections. Good, so this is… This conception of light conforms completely both to Desargues's theory of shadows and to the new painting. – [*Laughter, interruption*] Ah, that's fine because that's exactly what it is. [*Reference unclear*] --

So I say, so what is chiaroscuro? And yes, it's the interiority of light in the monad because -- of course, it's a way of speaking -- because you recall that there wasn't even a tiny slit, eh? It's by metaphor that we say that light reaches into the dark monad through a tiny slit. There is no tiny slit. So how does it get in? But we know how it gets in thanks to what we saw the last time… You remember how it gets in? This is why I once again need the dramaturgy of souls. How [does it] get in, light into the monad, since there isn't even a tiny slit, there isn't even a tiny *rima*? But, but, but, but God started off by making, by making it [the soul] sensitive or animal, with all of its parts folded. It is born in ashes. When the hour comes, he elevates it; when the hour comes, he elevates it, that is, it unfolds its parts, it stops being animal and sensitive and it becomes reasonable.

Fine, but that doesn't happen to every soul. There are earthworms that remain earthworms. All souls are not called to become reasonable, so it happens that from the start of creation, God marked among the sensitive or animal souls those that were to be called to become reasonable. They are not already reasonable, but they contain – you recall [Leibniz's] beautiful text, *The Cause of God,* that I read to you at the last meeting; perhaps, I hope you recall – the official document (*l'acte scellé*).[17] God places into [the soul] an official document, and I told you about the official document in which we obviously see a term of law, it's a juridical act, well, a juridical act. What is this? It's an act that responds, that he gives to these monads that must become reasonable, to these souls that must become reasonable, that gives to it the promise, or gives to it *a power of light*, a power of light since animal souls – there are some, animal souls, we'll see this later – but that remain animal, in which there is no light that comes forth. When they become… They remain in the dark depths; they are condemned to the *fuscum*; they are condemned to the dark regime; it's the dark life.

And the reasonable souls, when they become reasonable, then yes, the light shines forth such that what is the great discovery of… What is this new regime of light? I would say that it's the progressivity of light; it's the progressivity of light. Light grows and dims; it dims toward the dark depths; it grows toward the central region of the monad, that is, the privileged area. Between the two are located all the degrees of chiaroscuro, that is, all the colors since the colors since colors are degrees of chiaroscuro. And in fact, Leibniz's theory of colors consists in taking account of colors through the concavity and the convexity of radius of the curvature, the refracted luminous radius; no matter… Fine, you understand?

What is this progressivity of light? It regresses, it progresses, it grows and dims. But all that is absolutely anti-Cartesian. You cannot suspect the extent to which it's anti-Cartesian. Wölffliin again, to come back to him, Wölfflin, an art historian from the end of the nineteenth century, said quite well – but that's how he defines the Baroque regime of light – he says, clarity becomes relative, the relativity of clarity… [*Interruption in the recording*] [46:24]

Part 2

… And what is relative clarity? In fact, it's [*Pause*] a clarity that depends on light. In what sense? In this sense that light doesn't determine clarity without also determining the degradation of this clarity in the interiority either of the painting or of the monad. So, chiaroscuro is relative clarity in contrast to absolute clarity. And if you take Descartes's theory of light, what do you see? First characteristic of Descartes's theory of light is the omnipresence of light, in all directions or, which in fact comes down to the same thing, the instantaneity of light. Baroque light, on the other hand, is directional, from the luminous to the *fuscum*, and it's progressive or regressive. It is certainly not instantaneous. Second characteristic in Descartes's theory: clarity is is absolute as much in optics as in philosophy; absolute clarity is what he calls "distinction". In fact, the distinct idea in Descartes is an idea that is completely clear, absolutely clear, all the elements of which are clear. About the idea of distinction, I would say it is absolute clarity, thus, the regime of absolute clarity. Third characteristic: shadow is limitation. Fourth characteristic: primacy of contour, thus of local color, firm contour, play of surfaces, pure colors and without mixtures, local color. Each point is opposed to Leibniz's conception.

I would like to finish up with all this because you will tell me if for you this seems sufficient to… Look, I mean, here it seems to me that we can talk, in fact, about a new regime or a Baroque regime of light, with this idea of a progressivity or a regressivity of light, of a light that grows or dims, of directions of light that go from the luminous point to the *fuscum,* and on the entire scale of gradation that is going to engender colors. But in all this, I stopped myself. I did not speak about black, the deep shadows (*ténèbres*). For what I showed is that, in fact, the somber, and with greater reason shadow, was not a simple privation. Notice that in Leibniz, shadow is neither a privation, nor an opposition with light. Shadow is truly the relation of the luminous to the *fuscum,* to the dark depths, and the dark depths are not privation at all. [*Pause*]

This doesn't keep the *fuscum* from not being black, and not the deep shadows. And you indeed sense why Leibniz needs the deep shadows, because without them, we would have difficulty seeing where the dark depths would come from. The dark depths have to come from somewhere. So, you will tell me, on the level of the deep shadows, he has to say that the deep shadows are either privation or else in opposition to light, [that] he's going to go back to the theme of privation and opposition. Perhaps not, since what is this? What do we have in the deep shadows or the black?

You recall the definition of the white. White is an infinity of tiny reflecting mirrors. And there's a definition of black that is so beautiful in Leibniz. He says, but black is not the opposite of white, fine, but what is the opposite of an infinity of tiny reflecting mirrors? It's an infinity of tiny caverns, and caverns of caverns, that no longer reflect any light, holes within holes. In other words, the black is infinitely spongy matter.[18] Here as well, this is completely anti-Cartesian since, as you recall, we saw this, in Descartes matter is hard. Infinitely spongy matter in which each cavern is a cavern within a cavern within a cavern, well that's black, an infinity of tiny holes. [*Pause*]

So then, what will occur? I would say that light passes between. There's how we could conceive of things to work things out. There is, in fact, no need to work things out; it works out by itself. In the end, starting from the black, everything is a filter.[19] This idea of filter, I believe that in his

book on Leibniz, it's Michel Serres who developed this very, very well. Those who know this book can refer to it; there's a whole chapter on filters that to me seems to be a very lovely chapter. So, let's use this idea because Serres says, yes, it's a tale of filter, and he opposes Leibniz's method to Descartes's by showing that Leibniz constructs his entire Combinatory as a succession of filters through which things pass or ought to pass.

Let's use this idea, and in fact, even on the level of perception, Leibniz tells us the sense in which sensitive perception is a filter. He says that you perceive some green. What does that mean, to perceive some green? It's as if your sensory organs, as if your eye had filtered some bits of dust – retain this expression, bits of dust (*poussière*) as it's in the *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* (*Méditations sur les idées*) – as if your eye had filtered yellow and blue bits of dust. Fine. Listen well: you know that green is composed of yellow and blue, but you don't see it. You see green as something original, irreducible, a color that is neither yellow nor blue. And indeed, it's as if your eye was a filter that eliminated anything that isn't the yellow and blue bits of dust, and that's it. And your filter doesn't go beyond that, which makes you say yellow and blue are primitive colors, [that] they are indecomposable. But the eye says no way, no way; there's no reason to think that yellow and blue are primitive colors. It would suffice to have a fine blue filter, and we'd see that yellow on one side is composed of bits of dust of X and Y, and that blue is composed of bits of dust of Z and Z prime, to infinity. In other words, I can conceive of a succession of increasingly fine filters. Yes.

And what would the finest one be, the filter to infinity? The filter to infinity? We know this already. We must be overjoyed! We know this! The finest filter – you'll tell me that there isn't one, but yes there is! There were one, there is one to infinity – what is the finest filter to infinity? Well, it's the one that filters the black, that is, the infinity of non-reflecting tiny caverns, and to extract what? Well, to extract the dark, the *fuscum*. [*Pause*] It picks out (*trie*) the black – this is marvelous – it picks out the black in order to extract the *fuscum subnigram* from it, the blackish depth as ground of colors. And starting from this filter, then other filters will extract colors, etc., etc. I can say that the action of light passes between the black and the *fuscum.*

To finish with this regime of light, I can add that the action of light is the fold. The fold passes between the black and the *fuscum,* [*Long pause*] such that you see that, literally, I can say regarding this new status of light, I mean, in fact, to understand the aggregate, we indeed have to start from the idea [that] the depths of the monad were dark, and there was a light, a light even shining forth. And to understand in what sense the depth of light is dark, we have to grasp that… excuse me, that [the depths of] the monad are dark, we have to grasp that the depths of the monad precisely imply this filter that extracts the dark as ground of colors starting from the black, so that this will bring back to you, this system of light will bring back to you all sorts of components of the Baroque.

I'd like to know if there are any comments, if there are any developments, any … yes?

A student: I'd like to say something?

Deleuze: Yes?

The student: I cannot stop thinking of Beckett while listening to you speak, when he says that grey is clear black.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The student: … and concerning your monad, the closed room, at this moment at the Bibliothèque nationale (BN), there's an extraordinary exhibit on Rembrandt…

Deleuze: Yes! I saw!

The student: … that completely illustrates what you are saying, and notably an extraordinary, very small etching called the portrait of a philosopher – they don't say which one, whether it's you or Leibniz, but anyway… [*Laughter*] – It's entirely what your just said, that is, it's in a closed, dark room, his head in his hands while meditating, he looks at us, and everything is completely dark except a small candle that illuminates his gaze. This is exactly… We might say you were describing this earlier. It might be worth going to see this because it's completely the Baroque light that you mentioned; it's there on the BN walls right now.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

The student: I'll bring you a catalogue if you don't have the time to go there because…

Deleuze: I've been there, but I didn't see [the etching] … [*Laughter*]

The student: Ah, you didn't see it? Maybe it was too dark!

Deleuze: I know that some people didn't go because the size of some etchings are like that [*Deleuze may be indicating they are quite small*]. There are some that are… So we'd just need to have someone like you who goes there…

The student: An opaque filter.

Deleuze: Yes, there you have a filter… So, I'd really like even for some among you to think a bit about these stories of Tintoretto and Caravaggio and that you present some research on it if you agree on this direction, on this new status of light. I believe it's essential, yes, essential, this idea of a dark depth because this will subsequently have some extensions into all of Romanticism, but where, it seems to me, that forms this great idea of a dark depth. Fine, so let's continue.

I believe that henceforth, for us, the most important – this is where I began creating some categories – I remind you that henceforth, we possess our coordinates that allow us to define, to define the Baroque. For, you understand, the Baroque and all that, it's quite nice, but it's both too much and it's also not enough. I mean that, sometimes, we are going in the direction where everything is Baroque, anything at all is Baroque, and sometimes, we go toward directions in which – and now this is becoming like it was a pendulum, that works fine – in which we are told that the Baroque doesn't exist and never existed. So, this is our choice, whether we've talked about it too much or it doesn't exist at all and all that. Really, I find this strange. I find all these stories grotesque because I understand well that someone might say that unicorns never existed [*Laughter*] or pink panthers, that pink panthers don't exist. There we have an intelligible

proposition. But the Baroque not existing, that seems to me an unintelligible proposition. It's nonsensical (*un non-sens*).

It's not that it necessarily exists. I mean something quite simple. It's that I can say – [*Noise comes from the corridor*] Can you close the door, please? – I can say, unicorns don't exist because I have a determined concept of a unicorn. So I can wonder whether an object corresponding to this concept exists or doesn't. But the Baroque is a completely different case. I'm being asked to furnish a concept by which the Baroque either exists or doesn't exist. The Baroque isn't like a unicorn; it has no reason to exist independently from a concept that causes it to exist or that causes it not to exist. As a result, to say that the Baroque doesn't exist comes down solely to arguing about them as concept and to denying that concepts about them previously proposed to us might be satisfactory. But by what right does one announce that it's impossible to construct a concept that might cause the Baroque to exist? That seems strange to me. First, that seems conceited, a process consisting of saying, no, no, you can't create a concept causing the Baroque to exist. This is completely anti-philosophical. Philosophy being the art of concepts and of the invention of concepts, I don't see why a concept would be impossible the nature of which would be to cause the Baroque to exist.

So, we have jumped into this topic a bit… Here I'd fully understand if you said, no, no, your concept doesn't work. Here, fine, then I'd say, good, we have to find another one, but also you could tell me why do you insist on causing the Baroque to exist? And well, why am I insisting on this, after all? I don't even know myself. [*Laughter*] Here we are, fine, but if we cannot do so, then at that point, we take another concept that would make something else exist, eh?

So, we're fine, but what would be another concept capable of causing the Baroque to exist? Well, I'd say we started from a simple idea: it's that the Baroque was defined by the fold under two conditions, that the fold be considered as primary and as going to infinity. Why? Well because we all know that the fold is… In the end, everyone has always discussed this, the arts, sciences, etc., all disciplines. It's everywhere, there are folds everywhere. So, we cannot define the Baroque through the fold. Yes, but we said that it was our departure point. To the extent that the fold goes to infinity, isn't that the Baroque operation? And we said that the fold that goes to infinity, how could we define it? Well, first, through a tension and through a resolution of the tension.

This tension, what is it? What is the properly Baroque tension? We saw this properly Baroque tension, or we almost did. At the extreme, [it's] the Baroque scission. There's an excellent art critic, [Jurgis] Baltrusaitis. In Baltrusaitis, there's a definition of the fold regarding the novel, of the novel-fold, but we can draw from this a general definition of the fold. He says, it's the scission of two terms, the fold, but to the extent that in this scission, each of the two terms restarts the other. Yes, in fact, it would be stupid to define the fold through the scission of two terms, but a scission such that each of the two split terms restarts the other. This would be a fold. Fine, we will see what it means, we'll see what this definition means. But I am saying, we have seen it, the tension, the Baroque scission: the first coordinate is the scission of the inside and the outside, of the façade and the interior. The façade is no longer adjusted to the structure.[20] It won its independence at the same time that the interior freed itself from the façade. In other words, the façade is full of holes, spongy matter, but the holes only display toward the outside. The

outside is always toward the outside. And on the other hand, there is the inside without doors or windows.

So, that's what the scission of exterior and interior is, and the commentators on the Baroque have greatly insisted on this characteristic of the Baroque church. The façade does not express the interior. The façade does not… [*Brief jump in the recording*] [1:08:20]

… I am reading an extract here, on the Saint Agnes [church] – Saint Agnes, I believe is in Rome – "The façade is not adjusted to the structure, working only to express itself whereas the interior is closed and yields itself to the gaze" – the gaze of the interior – "to the gaze that discovers it from a single point of view like a chest in which the absolute is resting".[21] A chest in which the absolute is resting, this is the monad. [*Pause*] And this… And so, with this tension of interior and exterior as a given, well, let's assume that it demands a lull, a solution of the tension. Well yes, the solution of the tension will occur when there is something like a reversal (*pivotement*), and the two split terms become the object of redistribution. The exterior is going to constitute the lower floor, and the infinitely spongy matter the pleats of matter, [*Pause*] and the pure interior, the without doors or windows, is going to constitute the upper floor. The four coordinates are exterior, interior, upper and lower, with the reversal in which the exterior constitutes the lower, and where the interior constitutes the upper, such that the Baroque characteristic, at that point, will be, first characteristic, the fold going to infinity. The second characteristic: the fold going to infinity is divided into pleats of matter and folds of the soul. Third characteristic: the pleats of matter form the exterior always in exteriority, [while] the folds in the soul form the absolute interior without neither doors nor windows. Final characteristic: the exterior refers to the lower floor, the interiority to the upper floor. The fold passes between the two floors, which is also to say that light is the fold passing between the spongy matter and the dark depths of the upper room. Hence everything is perfect. Everything is perfect.

The first great theoretician of the fold is Leibniz. But finally… And perhaps we could call "Baroque" those who give to the fold, thus independently of context, independently there, -- but allowing that I might be told… Fine, at least we proposed a concept. Let's apply it. We would call "Baroque" any thinker or any artist for whom the fold would have this dual property, of being the primary principle and of going to infinity, and of going to infinity in the tension and resolution of the tension [between] interior-exterior, upper and lower. All of them we call Leibniz's disciples. Obviously, there we'd have a strange cohort since one of the most recent disciples is Heidegger.[22] And why is Heidegger Leibniz's most recent disciple? For a very simple reason, that for Heidegger, everything is fold, and not only fold, but folded in two. This is the famous *Zweifalt* [*Deleuze spells it out*], the fold into two, that does not appear from the start in Heidegger. I'm not going to get into a course on Heidegger here; I refer you to a text for those who wish. I am just pointing out that, in fact, this is a relatively late notion in his thought, and I don't know… I asked some Heideggerians, and strangely, I never received any answers. They never answer. [*Laughter*] I'd like to know when the fold into two appeared in Heidegger. Well, then, I don't know, I don't know. They don't seem to be at all certain about this.

But I can point out that in a text from the book *Essais et conférences*, a text entitled "Moïra", a very lovely text, there is an entire development on this. This is, it seems to me, the most precise text on what he calls the fold. And you will see the extent to which the fold, in Heidegger, is the differentiator (*différenciant*), as he says, of being and the Being (*l'Étant*). This is the articulation

of being and Being. This is the split between being and the Being, but such that through the split, each of the terms restarts the other and is inseparable from one another. And on one side, the fold into two airs out (*ventile*) what? It airs out the appurtenance of thought to being, on one hand, the fold of thought, and on the other hand, it airs out the presence of things present in the world, [*Pause*] and in this sense, Heidegger states formally that light depends on the fold and not the opposite. [*Pause*] Good.

But what interests me more than… A great poet of the fold, surely the greatest poet of the fold, is Mallarmé.[23] I've already said a few things about this, but here I'd like for you to sense the extent to which the *Hérodiade* is already the great poem of the fold. Whether this is a chance for you to read or reread and return to this work, were it only to count them up, you will see the number of times that the word "fold" appears, including then the beautiful expression "the yellow folds of thought" (*les plis jaunes de la pensée*), the yellow folds of thought. To understand what these "yellow folds of thought" are, it would serve you to look at a painting by Tintoretto as well where you have the yellow folds that inspire the souls, that inspire the souls of the fortunate, the yellow folds.[24] So, there, Tintoret's work is full, completely full of yellow folds. And in the *Hérodiade*, you'll see. You know about Mallarmé, [but] what do you understand? We have to… Are these forms of taste? Are these perversions, as such? He adored kinds of fabric, textiles, anything that created folds.

Claire Parnet: Perhaps you can unfold your voice a bit?

Deleuze: Unfold my voice? Well of course, but this is because I've suffered from… I'm doing what I can. That's… You couldn't hear before?

Parnet: I could hear fine, but I think that the people in the back heard nothing at all.

Deleuze: Ah yes, well, that doesn't matter. They aren't protesting. [*Laughter*] Yes they are. They perhaps are taking a little pity; they are taking pity on me, right? So ok, let's speak more loudly? Well ok, what was I…

A student [*near Deleuze*]: The yellow folds…

Deleuze: Yes, good. In fact, there as well, we will see. The fold is the scission of two; the fold is the scission, but a strange scission that refers one of the two split terms to the other. Why? On one side of the scission, everything is ash, and we perceive in the ashes. I'd like… It's through the pleats of ash, that is, through the folds of fog. To perceive is always to perceive in the folds. But you say, why do you say that? Why? What does all that mean? To which I can answer, if you said that to me, just let yourself go. I don't know why. I don't know why. As if… But yes… Is all perception… Isn't this a way in which all perception is a little hallucinatory? I see things through fog, the opening of the fog. You'll tell me, everybody isn't like that. Ah, well very good! And the Baroque is like that! They see through a fog, through a haze, as if through the holes in a veil, as through a spongy matter, "fold after fold" (*pli selon pli*).

Fold after fold, what is this? It's a famous expression from Mallarmé. [*Pause; Deleuze looks into his copy of Mallarmé*] I am reading randomly, in a few poems: "O fogs, arise!" This is a very, very, very twisted poem. [*He reads from Mallarmé's "The Blue" (Azur)*] "O fogs, arise! Pour your monotonous ashes down / With long rags of dust."[25] Long rags of dust, are you feeling this?

This is starting to fold in. "Pour your monotonous ashes down / With long rags of dust from the skies". Bruges, “Bruges reveals itself in the early morning”.[26] Bruges, where’s Bruges? “All the nearly incense-colored outdatedness” – here too, we have ashes – “All the nearly incense-colored outdatedness / As furtively and visibly I feel / The stone widow unveiled fold after fold”.[27] [*Deleuze rereads this slowly aloud*] The stone widow unveils fold after fold; the folds, right, of the fog, folds of the falling fog. I see through the folds of fog; by folding in and varying its fold, the fog allows something to appear. This is what perception in the folds is. And I only see the things through the dust that it stirs up itself, and I cannot see them otherwise. Here we have Baroque perception, such that the conditions in which I see the things at the same time denounce the inanity of things, the vanity of things, the emptiness of things. You know, this is a constant theme in Mallarmé, this inanity, this absence of things, this emptiness of things. It means that at the same time that I grasp the presence of things through the dust that it stirs up, I grasp this presence as vain, inane, useless. This is the regime of perception in the folds. This is a kind of hallucinatory perception. [*Pause*]

An author that Mallarmé greatly admired was called Thomas De Quincey. In a marvelous text entitled *The Revolt of the Tartars*, Thomas De Quincey tells the following story: an entire people, a whole Tartar tribe is in flight, fleeing from the Russian empire and go join up with the emperor of China. They arrive – they have experienced, it seems, horrible suffering, and it’s a terrible epic tale, terrible, and finally they arrive near the palace of the emperor of China, who is strolling in his garden and sees far off some strange dust, and this text is a model of perception in the folds. I will read it to you:

"[When] the gentle morning breeze had a little freshened, the dusty vapor had developed itself far and wide into the appearance of huge aerial draperies, hanging in the mighty volumes from the sky to the earth ; and at particular points, where the eddies of the breeze acted upon the pendulous skirts of these aerial curtains," [*Deleuze repeats the previous phrase*] “rents were perceived, sometimes taking the form of regular arches, portals, and windows, through which began dimly to gleam the heads of camels ‘indorsed’ with human beings – and at intervals the moving men and horses in tumultuous array – and then through other openings or vistas at far distant points the flashing of polished arms. But sometimes, as the wind slackened or died away, all those openings, of whatever form, in the cloudy pall would slowly close, and for a time the whole pageant was shut up from view.”[28]

There you have the perception in the waves of fog, perception in the folds. Notice, necessarily, perception in the folds, once again, is that which grasps things through the bits of dust, through the dust, and why? Because the thing itself give rise to its own dust: this is its inanity. That’s what Baroque perception is. You will see only through the veil of dust that things raise up by themselves the presence of things present. This is the veil of dust that also hides presence.

Good, one will have to see… But here, we don’t yet have… I am stating that it will be very normal for Leibniz to furnish us with a theory of perception when one will fully have to expect that it will be innovative and extraordinarily rich, and that it will have as ground the veiled, quasi-hallucinatory steps, the dizziness, the dizziness, the uproar (*rumeur*), that is, all the forms that we can already situate under the name of perception in the folds. And thus, this is perception in the very object and of an infinitely spongy matter, caverns that never cease digging out new caverns. We see through holes, and holes that recreate themselves, etc. The things raise up their

own dust, like a horse, right, a horse that we only perceive momentarily when the dust that it raised up allows us to see it. Is it still a horse. And what matters? Isn't dust closer to the nature of things than the horse itself? Fine.

But on the other side, on the other side of the fold – there the fold swarms on one side; it swarms on the side of hallucinatory perception, of perception in the fold. -- But on the other side, what do we have? You recall, this is from having followed the exterior line or the line of the lower floor. But within the beautiful interiority or within the upper floor, what am I going to have? Let's follow Mallarmé. The fold par excellence, what is it in Mallarmé? You know the fold par excellence. It's the fan. It's the fan. [*Pause*] And [*Deleuze looks in his text*] they belong to the very great poems by Mallarme, the poems written on fans, notably here, the poem for the "Fan for Madame Mallarmé," and the other for the "Fan for Mademoiselle Mallarmé".

And in "Fan for Madame Mallarmé," there is this: "Limpidly (where will fall / Pursued grain by grain / A bit of invisible ash / Alone to cause me pain)."[29] Fine, what is this here? The open fan, you see? [*Deleuze seems to demonstrate with a fan*] The fan has folds, becoming the open fan that, through its movement, causes to rise and fall the imperceptible fog of tiny bits of ash. I see into the fan's folds, that is, through the ashes. [*Pause*] "Limpidly… a bit of invisible ash…" etc. "a bit of invisible ash / Alone to cause me pain," since as a condition of perception, it denounces whatever it reveals.

And in the other "Fan", the fan is closed, not immediately, but in any case, toward the end. Why? Here, we have this: "Do you feel the sullen paradise / Like laughter wearing shrouds / Flowing from the corner of your mouth / In the depth of the unanimous fold!"[30] Someone capable of expressing, of using this expression, "the unanimous fold," I can say that – and it's only a tribute to him – that this is not only a great poet, but that he's a Baroque poet. "The unanimous fold," and the last, final stanza is: "The scepter of pink embankments / Inert on golden evening, this is it [*Deleuze spells out the letters of these last three words:* "ce l'est, C-E L-apostrophe-E-S-T"] / This closed white flight that you place / Against the fire of a bracelet."[31] I say here, what is this? It's no longer the open fan. "The scepter of pink embankments," this is the closed fan, which is confirmed – two verses down – by "This closed white flight that you place / Against the fire of a bracelet." [*Deleuze repeats these two verses*] This appeal to light indeed interests me, and this time, it's the fold from within. You see, we have passed from the fold toward the outside that links to the hallucinatory perception onto the fold of the inside, the monad, the fold in the soul, the unanimous fold.

Good? And what is that? Well, we have seen it a bit. The fold on that side is what? It's the fold that goes beyond itself, it's the fold of thought, it's the fold *in* thought. It's no longer perceiving into the folds. It's the fold as condition of thought. And what is the fold as condition of thought? Mallarmé tells it to us, in a text that we have seen, if only quickly. [*Pause; Deleuze looks in his text.*] "The folding . . . does not strike as much as its layerings, [in thickness], offering the tiny tomb, certainly, of the soul."[32] Fine. On the side of thought, the fold goes beyond itself toward the… [*Interruption in the recording*] [1:33:04]

Part 3

… the soul, it's the monad, good, it's the monad, but finally, if it's the monad, what is it ? In Mallarmé, it's the unknown, it's what he calls the Book. It's the Book. You remember? We have seen this in Leibniz: in the end, the monad is a reading room. Each monad reads the world in itself. Good. Well, yes, Mallarmé's Book, the Book that is a world, the world-Book, that is a Combinatory, that layers an infinity of foldings that can be unfolded in a variable order, that is, the Book in infinite combinations. This is exactly the Leibnizian monad. [*Pause*]

So, on one side, you have the fundamental text of the fold, I'd say, the fan fold that, on one hand, opens itself to the exterior in the hallucinatory perception, [and] on the other hand, closes itself or layers itself in the interior in thought, but each of the terms restarts the other. In what form? In the very beautiful form that greatly moved Mallarmé, specifically there are two things that are folded, that are nonetheless opposed, but that never stop restarting each other: the newspaper which is pure circumstance, dust and ash; the newspaper is folded, the folds of the newspaper; and on the other hand, the Book which itself is also folded, but it's an entirely different order of fold than the newspaper. It's no longer the folds of the newspaper, circumstance, dust and ash. It's the fold of the Book, layerings of the Book, event. [*Pause*]

There we are; as a result, it seems to me, in a certain way, that what I have just done here rather quickly, regarding two authors, Heidegger and Mallarmé, was trying to show how we could discover in them our coordinates, our coordinates of the exterior and the interior, of the upper and the lower. For finally, once again, and I'd like to be done with this once and for all, that is… You understand, it's true that the fold… So, we started from this as an idea of… But in the process of trying to develop this idea, we realized, in fact, that the fold, but, well, it's everywhere. It's everywhere. I mean, it goes without saying that it's difficult to create plastic arts, or a history of plastic arts without encountering this problem that encumbers both painting and sculpture. So a history of the fold would consist in showing that the regime of the fold since, for example, Egyptian bas-reliefs, Greek sculpture, I'm skipping ahead, the Romanesque, the Gothic, fine… For example, in his last book, *Formations, déformations*, Baltrusaitis wrote a final chapter, in fact extremely engaging, on the Gothic fold, in architecture. And how does he define the Gothic fold from his framework? He defines it as the scission of two terms that restart each other, finally, towards the scission. But the scission that, according to him, determines the Gothic – and here, this is very important for me so that there's no confusion – he says, it's a perpetual scission of the figurative and the geometric. I mean, for example, the sculptor creates a figure, and the fold, for example, the folds of the garment restart an entire system of then purely geometric lines, and the exuberance of these geometric lines is going to revive a figure that will again yield a geometric line, etc.

This is why I tell myself, fine, the Gothic fold, perhaps that's what it is, but it's not what the Baroque fold is at all. We ourselves didn't define the Baroque fold as a function of a, yet again, figurative-geometric scission, but as a function of an interior-exterior scission, which is completely different. And at that point, it's up to us to see perhaps if there are other types of scissions; perhaps, in the West, perhaps the history began with Greece. Why not since…? With Greece, what occurs, because on the plastic level, what is the scission? I'd say that it's between the plane surface and the body which is not the same thing as the figure and the abstract line.[33] [With] the plane surface of the garment and the body, you have these two poles. There's indeed a scission, and you can relieve, resolve the scission, the tension, through one pole or the other.

For example, you can give the privilege to the plane surface; simply, you divide it into flat folds to which the body adapts itself. It's the flat fold that is going to resolve the surface-corporeal volume tension. Inversely, you can resolve the tension on the side of the body and of corporeal volume, notably when, for example, here, the shadow replaces the bas-relief. At that point, you no longer have the flat fold, but the fold that creates shadow. The flat fold doesn't make a shadow. It's a great period in Greek sculpture when the fold begins making a shadow. No doubt it's a new order of light as well that intervenes. In its own way, the Baroque never stops returning to this requirement that the fold is a luminous relief that creates shadow.

Fine, but it's not only… You understand? It's everywhere. I was telling you, from the start of our work this year, we have seen the extent to which natural history, the living, was a matter of the fold, created a fold of the body, but in mathematics, the inflections, and all that, we have seen all that, and in the end, there are folds everywhere. So, yet again, [there's] the necessity of marking precisely the very coordinates of the Baroque, if one wants to create them. If one wants to create out of the Baroque a grand theory of the fold, this must not be confused with just anything, with just any other period.

And I am just saying, but perhaps it's the aggregate of philosophy that is in play, the aggregate of thought because, after all, when Plato was seeking – let's go back here to the Greeks as well – when Plato was seeking a model both for the mechanism of thought and for political power, royal power, [*Pause*] what is he going to propose to us?[34] He proposes, precisely in a text that he calls *Politics,* he proposes the model or the paradigm of the weaver, of weaving, with two principal figures, the twisting of the thread and the interlacing of warp and woof. And political power, according to him, is going to result from this, or the model of political power will result from this. Fine, this is already a lot, but I am telling myself, such a model, such a paradigm, you know, it seems to me it only concerns components that we can call components of matter, the warp, the woof, the thread's twisting. And it's not at all that… I believe that Plato deliberately does this to situate himself on the level of the components of matter.

In other words, he doesn't reach the fold. However, he doesn't ignore the fold. He doesn't reach the formal element of the fold. I'd say that he stays – and that will be important for what I have left to say here; this is getting a bit confusing, that's how it is – he stays in textures, and textures are very important. I mean, he stays in the matter, he stays in the pleats of matter, and he wants to stay there. For Plato doesn't ignore the fold as a formal element, but he reserves it for other occasions. That doesn't mean that he was Baroque, and he made of the fold an entirely different concept from the one we have just seen.

But then, I tell myself, fine, we'd have to… Could we construct a model that wouldn't be one of the weaver or of weaving? Because instead of remaining content with textures, he would reach the formal element of the fold. What would that be? Would this be such a paradigm, and could it function? You understand, we can always try. We have to see in all… Look, I am posing… For the moment here, we are going to see why I am occupying myself with this opposition, the textures with components of matter, and on the other hand, the fold as formal element. So, the thread's twisting, the weft-woof intermixing, all that, these are components of matter for the moment; this is texture.

But I am saying, let's try for a model that reaches the formal element of the fold, that is, so I'd almost go, at that point, -- sense that we aren't far from the Baroque – I'd say that it's a "Mannerist" model, a Mannerist model. [*Pause*] And after all, we know that Mallarmé had a great dream that he achieved for too short a time for his taste, which was to direct a fashion review. Directing a fashion review was something quite important to him. He directed a review that nonetheless had seven, eight issues, nine issues, I think, that have been republished here, something certainly of interest. I haven't read it; I've just seen the tables of contents that are in the Pléiade edition.[35]

And then there's also a disturbing case, where one most ask the question: but, in all this, what's going on? Have we entered into a complete pathology or are we still in the realm of philosophy? [*Laughter*] I mean, there's someone famous – or famous in certain circles – a great psychiatrist from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – he died not long before the war, I believe [1934] – Clérambault, he was called Clérambault, with an odd taste for fabrics and folds. And this psychiatrist, Gaëtan de Clérambault, who was director of an infirmary, the psychiatric director of the special infirmary, so he nonetheless had a very official role – [*A noise comes from voices in the corridor, interrupting the class*] Ah, this is so annoying. [*Pause*]… Close the door firmly as you go out. – … This psychiatrist, who had a very official function, well he had a taste for folds, but an extremely upsetting taste, and notably, he created small, little statues; he arrayed [on them] the pleated fabrics and displayed a lot of things. He died; he killed himself. That created some scandal; his suicide caused a scandal, and it was widely said that the psychiatrist was a fetishist. Well, why not? We can say that about Mallarmé's shawl, and about just about anything. That's not at all what's interesting. What's interesting is listening to Clérambault and what he has to say about this. For, in fact, Clérambault created photos, and some admirable photos of Moroccan women, and of the pleated fabrics that he arranged on these Moroccan women in these photos; these were very lovely things. And on the other hand, he achieved his life's ambition as well. It was to present a lecture at the Ethnographic Society on pleated fabric and its history, and he did this.

And I am saying, it seems of so little interest to undertake the psychoanalysis of Doctor Clérambault. [*Laughter*] On the other hand, what interests me a lot is that, for Clérambault, the fold is the formal element of fabric, and this is the way in which I am claiming a Mannerist paradigm, a formal paradigm, a formal model. – [*Yet again, noise from the corridor interrupts the class*] Aaaahhhh, [*Pause*] but why do they stay pressed like that up against the door? Here you have some perverts! [*Laughter*] Yes, well fine – Yes! How did that organize itself in his mind? Clérambault is a specialist in two things that interested him greatly in psychiatry, these two things: what he himself called passion-related deliria, and on the other hand, hallucinations -- at that period, there were lots of them -- hallucinations with ether, so-called chloral hallucinations, and the hallucinations with ether are sometimes so-called Lilliputian hallucinations, minuscule hallucinations. Fine. It's an entire stage of hallucinatory perception.

And he explains that Lilliputian hallucinations never ceased creating folds in place. That's on the side of perception. On the side of thought, I believe that diagnostic thought, that diagnostic thought is fundamentally a thought of the fold and thought that unfolds, especially in the case of passion-related deliria. For the ordeal of passion-related deliria that Clérambault showed very well, it's that the subject gets less delirious in thought; the delirium of ideas isn't apparent. The delirium of thought is even non-existent. He doesn't get delirious in ideas. This is a delirium-

action. [*Pause*] Suddenly, there's an act. Because of that, the passion-related delirium is more dangerous than the rest because it passes into act. This is the passage into the novel act such that Clérambault has a very disturbing expression insofar as he was director of the special facility of the infirmary. He goes on to say: patients like this, right, cannot be interrogated; they necessarily have to be outmaneuvered. They necessarily have to be outmaneuvered because if they are interrogated, they are as reasonable as us. In fact, it's delirium in action. So there, undoing the fold, we see well that diagnostic thought is distressing. Good. The perception in the fold of the ether-induced hallucinating patient as much as medical thought of the diagnostic that undoes the fold, all of that is going to allow him to observe the paradigm, the model that is no longer a material model, but that is the formal model of the fold.

And in fact, in his lecture to the Society that has been republished – I mean, you can find that in a very interesting little book, edited by four young psychiatrists under the title *The Passion for Fabrics of a Neuro-psychiatrist, Gaëtan de Clérambault* [1981], in which there are Clérambault's texts and then there are splendid photos of Moroccan women that are very, very astonishing as research on folds. It's very good, very good. -- Fine, I mean, what interests me is that when we read Clérambault's lecture, we might wish to distinguish three great categories: the folds, that goes without saying, there's no need, but that gives us… fold; hems – [*A new interruption occurs from voices in the corridor*] They really are pains in the ass there (*chiants*)… Not human… -- the folds, the hems, and the drapes. We could even list more of them.

Yes, the fold would be defined as we did it there, the scission of two terms in the conditions such that each term restarts the other. For example, you speak about a fold in a curtain. A hem is like a very special fold, and Clérambault discovered -- he made this discovery, I don't know if it's true -- but yes, the Greeks had hems since specialists in plastic arts have maintained that the Greeks didn't make hems, and that the Greek tunic was without hems. Clérambault absolutely rejects this and believes to have brought forth proof that the Greeks, that the Greek tunics had hems. And that's a lot more interesting than psychiatry anyway! [*Enormous laughter*] So, hems are very special folds since these are folds that complete, folds that complete, folds that fold back in.

And finally, what is the drape? Your curtain makes folds; it drops down while making folds, but if you place it… The simplest, I'm going to take a very simple example: if you hook [the drape] into a wall attachment (*brassière*), there you have a drape. What is that defines the drape? A point of support, [*Pause*] and a movement, a movement that the fold takes as a function of this point of support, and third, eventually, a variation of this movement according to exterior actions, a regulated variation of this movement according to exterior actions. Fine.

That's where I wanted to arrive. As a way to end this study of the fold, there we have a list of categories that, in this way, I'd like not to propose to you, but for you to reflect on a bit: simple folds – eh? We are making categories of the fold – and there would first be simple folds; in second place, our second site, there would be composite folds; in third place, there would be hems; in fourth place, there would be drapes; in fifth place, there would be the aggregate of textures, components of matter and no longer, as before, components of forms – the four preceding [categories] are components of forms – components of matter, all the textures. All this would give us, for example, think about this, in painting, the great painters of textures – there aren't so many – the great painters of textures, of recent date, I'm not speaking of the past, but in recent painters, there were two great painters of textures, Klee and Dubuffet. And there is

perhaps… No, what I am saying here is stupid, there are others, there are obviously others, but in short, two among the greatest are Klee and Dubuffet in which, manifestly, texture truly appears as a component of matter, of the painting's material.

Fine, and then, even [with] the textures then, there would be several categories, and this would be up to us to determine them, all the categories of textures. So, we would have four of them [categories] plus X categories of textures. And finally, the categories of – they would connect, if you will, to the models of weaving, but with all kinds of forms of weaving. A bit of… What Plato did, we can do on the level of the fold, I mean, so this is no longer surprising. And finally, there would even be an underneath what is not woven, the nearly raw components of matter, notably the agglomerates, the agglomerates, of what type? Well, no longer woven, no longer textile, no longer texture, but felt (*feutre*), the felt; it's an agglomerate, and no longer a textile. I mean, you define the textile by texture, specifically by the fact that a thread passes over and under, the thread of the warp. A thread of the woof passes under and over, [and] that creates a textile. But felt is not a textile; it's a conglomerate, an agglomerate. So you would have textures and agglomerates with no doubt a single category – still, it's not certain – a single category for the agglomerate, but a lot of categories for texture.[36]

So, we would have the whole list of categories. And I am saying, what did Leibniz do? And once again, it's not… I am not at all trying to play the clown. If Plato did this for weaving, why would Leibniz… [*Deleuze does not finish this*] I believe, we have seen, that simple folds for Leibniz, look at the text with which we began, it was our first text of the year:[37] In understanding, understanding is covered with tapestries, but the tapestry creates some folds, and these are simple notions. Simple notions are veritable folds in God's understanding. [*Pause*] Second point: the composite folds would no longer be simple notions. These are the definitions and demonstrations and linkages of definitions resulting from them. A definition implies at least two terms; it combines, it composes. [*Pause*]

If you recall what we anticipated – so here, I am going very quickly because… -- the hems would be what? It seems to me that it's the position in Leibniz of the requisites. In fact, the requisites set off boundaries for domains; there where requisites were situated, a domain begins. And God's understanding, in fact, encompassed simple notions, linked definitions, and requisites. The requisites are typically hems.

Obviously, we have saved the most beautiful one for the monad. What is the monad if not a drape? Why is the monad a drape? I'm going to tell you: you recall… -- [*Again, the class is interrupted by noise from the corridor*] Aaaaahhhh… But is it even possible for the door to be shut? [*A woman student speaks from the corridor*: Excuse me, but I have a class; are you finishing up?] You have a class? [*A student near Deleuze:* It's at three thirty.] You don't have a class at all! [*The student from the corridor:* You're here until what time?] Until two o'clock… Until two o'clock every Tuesday. [*The student from the corridor*: *Inaudible*] What? [*The student from the corridor*: If you had written it, I would have known…] What would you have known? [*The student from the corridor:* That you were here!] [*Noise of voices; Deleuze speaks to students nearby him trying to understand*] Isn't it marked there? [*A student near Deleuze*: Certainly!] She got the wrong room number, this idiot! [*A student near Deleuze:* She doesn't know how to read…] Ah, so [now] she understood… [*Pause*]

Yes, good, it's all very simple, you see? The point of support is exactly the monad's reference to a point of view, and the very movement that the fabric takes as a function of the point of view, that is, as a function of the point of support, this will be precisely the reason of the movement in the monad, a regulated variation of movement under the impulsions. In this sense and only in this sense [is there] a comparison of the monad with a drape. Well, anyway, all this is just a bit of fun. [*Laughter*] I mean simply that, [it's] on the level of textures, so we will find ourselves, in fact, faced with a series of Leibniz's distinctions that we can only examine at the time that we consider matter. When we consider matter, we will see the whole problem of the series of textures, all the pleats of matter that are going to have some extremely different types, for example, physical matter or living matter, that are going to refer to different textures, all the way to what Leibniz calls the Agglomerates since he is going distinguish fundamentally the organisms and the accumulations (*amas*). [*Pause*]

So there you have what I was proposing to you; it's a review, and to finish up with the second part [of the course], it remains for me only to draw some final conclusion and about a point that is relatively important for me because we must conceive of it as very scholarly. This point is that all of my second part has consisted in the end of analyzing the upper floor. In our entire second part, we have analyzed, in fact, ideal inflections, inclusion in the monad, the compossibility of worlds, and the individual's freedom. Nearly… We have practically finished with the upper floor.

What would just be needed, and what I'd like from some of the more philosophical among you than others, would be to work out some of the conclusions on what Leibniz's conception of substance is. So, this conception, I'd like to try to state it because it's obviously very important, and to state it as a function of this [what's preceded] and while having in mind the idea of persuading you of something: that always, when one says that philosophers don't get along with each other, that they never have the same theories, the theories change, etc., this is idiotic. It's all the more idiotic since, necessarily, they don't agree among themselves because words have extremely precise meanings. You cannot do philosophy if you don't have, if you don't have a relatively strong lexicon. So, it's not at all that there are theories of substance. There, that's idiotic. But what's true is that "substance" signifies something very precise, and the question is of knowing: what does that signify? So, that's what I would like to do for you, and then afterward would come – and we will do this next time – would come the moment I have eagerly awaited which will be a comparative study of both Leibniz and Whitehead. And you see your future: then, once we've seen Whitehead, all that will remain for us is one thing, the theory of matter, and the conceptions of texture and matter in Leibniz. There you have it!

So, substance, I'd just like to begin a little bit to tell you that we would have to take up perhaps three fundamental reference points.[38] Of course, there's Descartes since Leibniz says nothing about substance without having Descartes in mind, without engaging in a kind settling of scores with Descartes. So there's Descartes, and then there is Aristotle; there is Aristotle in some strange conditions since Descartes created his theory of substance apparently against Aristotle, and Leibniz doesn't hesitate to associate himself with Aristotle, resuscitate Aristotle against Descartes. But, in fact, nor does he hesitate to invoke Descartes when for himself he wants to be distanced from Aristotle. In fact, it's perpetually a three-way arrangement. So, what I mean here is that I am above all looking for points of agreement.

And there's a very important agreement point, [*Deleuze searches in his book*] there's a very important agreement point that is [about] what everyone in the end called substance because, still, there was no choice. What do people call substance? Well, I believe that everyone agrees on two points. [*Pause*] Substance or a substance is concrete or, if you prefer, the determinate, the completely determined, that is, the individual. That's what substance means. Substance is the thing, it's the thing. And there, it's not a question of taste; there aren't… One cannot say that there are philosophers who use the word substance in another sense; it's not true. This is why it interests me, you can understand, I hope [that] what philosophy is [arises] from examples of this type. It's not true. Any, any philosopher using the word substance can only mean one thing. With this, he designates a concrete, a determined individual.

Aristotle will say -- in Greek, [for] those who have studied it a bit, [*Greek words unclear*], a this, a this. Or he will say further, substance is the Being [*l'étant*], it's the Being, and the question of substance is not at all what the Being is, but who is Being? Or if you prefer, *who* Being (*qui étant*)? *Who* the Being? *Who* is the Being? There's the question of substance. And Descartes says nothing different. For Descartes, substance is the concrete, the determined individual. Substance, Descartes tells us, is stone (*la pierre*), it's not the extension (*étendue*) in general. It's a particular determined extension. It's what is extended; it's not extension. Extension is an attribute, but what is extended, that's substance. In other words, what is substance is always a part of extent.

As we've seen and I'm not even insisting on it, Leibniz, but it's to say the extension to which it's not – you understand? – It's already an enormous misunderstanding to say that Leibniz's difference with others is that, for Leibniz, substance is the individual. It's true that, in Leibniz, substance is the individual, but in this regard, he's not at all new. I mean, the worst misunderstanding is when, considering an author or a writer, you grant him or her merit for what he or she doesn't deserve because at that point, you pass over what his or her true sources of greatness are. The idea that substance is individual, well, it's a commonplace; it's a commonplace since the word substance has been in use, that is, since Aristotle. Good, so Leibniz is like Descartes and like Aristotle.

And the second more important point is that substance has always designated for everyone a subject of inherence, that is, this into which, this into which. And there as well, it's very important since there is no doubt that Leibniz creates of inherence a profoundly original conception when he tells us [that] the monad contains or encompasses the entire world. Likewise, Leibniz creates a thoroughly original conception of the individual, we have seen, the individual as condensing of singularities. But what interests me is still not that. What interests me is the extent to which he speaks – yes, there's a kind of deep coquetry here – he speaks of… he says, but what are you making objections to me about? He says, I am only saying what everyone says; I'm simply taking that seriously. Other people tell us things, and then they don't know how to handle them. Everything occurs as if Leibniz told us, everyone agrees on this, that substance is individual. And fine, I'm going to show you where that leads us. Or else, everyone agrees on that, that substance is a subject of inherence, that is, it's this into which. Well, I'm going to show you.

But in fact, both Descartes and Aristotle always said that substance was a subject of inherence. That's what's funniest in the end, if I dare say; it's not… But it's what seems in any case the funniest to me. For them as well, it was a subject of inherence. The proof: Aristotle tells us,

substance is distinguished from the accident, and what is the accident? It's what is present *in* substance. The definition of the accident is what is present *in* substance. [*Pause*] Descartes tells us, substance is subject of its own determinations. Its own determinations are present in substance. As a result, Leibniz will certainly be able tell everyone who are then raising points of objection to him, he says, he answers, but you know, I've done nothing other than say what Aristotle said. Aristotle always said [that] accidents are present in substance. Me, I'm saying nothing different. Ah, this is very strange.

Fine, but what is going to happen in fact? What's going to happen? It's this: what prevents others from going all the way to the end of these two characteristics, substance is the individual [and] substance is the subject of inherence? What's going to come to hold them back? I believe that two things happen to hold them back. [*Pause*] The first thing is that, fine, accident is present in substance. So, substance is a subject of inherence. But there is at least one kind of determination that isn't of this type, not this genre, it's the attribute. One must distinguish attribute and accident. That's already some pure Aristotle. I am saying that in order to underscore the strange resemblances between Aristotle and Descartes. It's already Aristotle who says, Be careful, the accident is present in substance, but the attribute cannot be stated present in substance, but [it's] that which is very different, it's said from substance, it's affirmed from substance. For example, if I say, the man is white, white is present in the substance man. But if I say the man is reasonable, reasonable is not present in man, but is a predicate of man, attribute of man, it's said about man. [*Pause*]

Likewise in Descartes, [*Pause*] substance has an essential attribute and without an essential attribute, we cannot know substance. The essential attribute of corporeal substance is extension. The essential attribute of spiritual substance is thought. [*Pause*] And there it is, that on the level of attributes as well, that is, they will call it essence; the attribute in its difference with the accident, it's the essence of substance. And there we see that the essence of substance brings back the entire generality that substance repudiated. Whereas substance defined itself as subject of inherence and individual, the attribute as essence is going to be a general determination, extension in general, thought in general, to the extent that Aristotle is going to call it a second substance, essence, a second substance. He is going to define it by the general form. And Descartes is going to name it essence, and from the point of view of essence, then, we will have at least the impression that bodies, individual bodies, are no more than modes of extension, and no longer substance. Do you see?

So there we are, my question will remain here. I am going to take this up again next time. My question is exactly: henceforth, what are the criteria of substance in Descartes, taking account of what we've just said, and what are going to be the criteria of substance according to Leibniz? So this is scholarly, but I really insist on it. So we will do it next time, but we will start with Whitehead. [*Momentary end of the session*] [2:19:07]

[*Supplementary fragment: as indicated in the introductory note, Deleuze seems to continue discussion following the end of class based on a student's comment that Mallarmé's distinction between the newspaper fold and the Book fold leaves him or her indifferent.*]

… [Mallarmé's problem] is where does literature as art start? Is all writing already literature? So, of course, if you take the… It's because, you do not know generally… When we say, that doesn't

appeal to me, this means that we are not fully living the problem. Mallarmé lives a problem in a very vital way which is, if I write you a letter telling you, yes, I confirm our meeting for tomorrow at 4 o'clock; or else, I write to you a letter about, for example, a love letter; third case, I write a letter to you about substance in Leibniz. I ask you where does philosophy start or else, where does art start? In my letter about the meeting, did I say, well then, how do we make the difference? If there is, if there is a difference, where does it pass through? This is what fascinated Mallarmé. For example, he writes two verses on a fan or in a young lady's album – at that period, that happened a lot; he writes a little verse in an autograph notebook – is this already art? Is it not art? Is it circumstantial? Is a work (*oeuvre*) of circumstance a piece of art? Fine, if you tell me yes, it's already art, but if I write in a newspaper, is it art? Does this belong to something new or not? So this kind of problem interested him. Is all writing already art or already marked by the grasp of or attempt at the beautiful, etc.?

So there, this takes a direction. Saying that there are two kinds of folds, the newspaper fold that is a fold of circumstance, and the book fold that's a fold of the event, this consists in saying, yes, it's indeed like two poles, the two poles of non-art writing and art writing. But that's not enough; it's a problem. For precisely both being folded signifies for Mallarmé that both of them are participating, that we won't ever be able to establish, never be able to establish where the border passes exactly that causes writing to become art suddenly, or not to become so, and this is like a kind of fold going to infinity.

So in the end, you tell me, fine, I'm considering your expression, I'm considering your expression, and I don't get it, this idea from Mallarmé, the newspaper fold, the book fold. You don't get it because it seems arbitrary to you. And I am telling you – and this is in no way a reproach I'm making – that it only seems arbitrary to you because you aren't posing the problem concretely enough for him, as he did it. If you wish, it's an illustration… The distinction of the newspaper fold and the book fold for Mallarmé is an illustration of this question. So, if the problem also doesn't interest you, you necessarily wouldn't get the problem. I'm not saying that a problem necessarily has to interest everyone, but the problem that interests Mallarmé is precisely this problem of the relation between writing with art and with non-art. You understand? That means, where does poetry start? Where does philosophy start? Is it, in a certain way, it's, it's, it's, yes, it's… You understand?

A student: No…

Deleuze: No… Perfect, so if you don't understand, it means that the problem is completely closed off to you… Yes?

The student: That's not it, that is, this isn't the question.

Deleuze: Ah, I see!

The student: For me, the problem is what are the coordinates of the fold, interior [coordinates] that is, because it goes to infinity, so how can we define it, because I wanted to ask this question: if it's not completely a fold, what is it? We'd like to have some coordinates, some coordinates for this in order to understand. I understood what there is on the exterior; that I understand. But, the second side, I haven't understood this. I take this aspect as not being coherent, to remain

obscure. I find that it seems to contradict itself on that. That's what my question is: for Mallarmé, what are these sides [*some inaudible word*], but this is my problem, I understand. What did you mean by that?

Deleuze: This is your problem not understanding what I said. [*Pause*] As for me, I'd like you to sense the extent to which I am sincere when I say, you know, if you follow along with me over a year, you arrive here very different intentions. I believe that those who can propose to themselves to understand what I am saying – it's not that what I am saying is very difficult, and I don't have any preference for them – these are philosophers or those with a philosophical background. I believe that the others have a different mode of comprehension, that is entirely equal to a philosophical mode of comprehension, but one that is much more discontinuous and much freer, which is… It's very possible that, if you follow me, what I am saying might mean nothing to you two times in a row, and then suddenly, you get something from it another time. Those that are not primarily philosophers; I believe that when they come [to class], it's a bit in the camp of "is this working for me today, or not working?" Suddenly… It has to, at that point… A problem that I'm considering or posing has to encounter one of your own problems. So, in my view, this happens quite often – and it's the sense of philosophy that I don't at all believe that there are perpetually encounters between philosophers and other disciplines – at that point, in fact, it has to plug into one of your problems.

So, among you, I could say, among the non-philosophers, I am certain that there are some for whom it's extremely clear immediately, this Mallarmé question. For example, if I undertake a personal journal, take three categories: household accounts, I organize my expenses; I maintain a personal journal; and I'm writing a book. Are all three literature? Are only two of them such? Only one? Where does the fold that will be airing start, etc.? Fine, I assume that there are some who can be interested in this. I take today's session. Myself, I see no difficulty in some who might have… who didn't at all react to all these stories about drapes, hems, all of that, and that they have asked themselves, what is it with all this crap (*conneries*)? [*Laughter*] It's entirely my business whether I feel a need to discuss this, but it's not in order to convince you. And then, on the other hand, [there are some] who grasped something when we were discussing painting and told themselves, there's something I can relate to in this. It's not that… You don't have the right to say this is good, that's not good…. Well, yes, in fact, you have every right to do so! But that's not what matters. What matters is: can you find something that speaks to you in this or not? So, if drapes don't speak to you at all, or hems, that's fine, it's not bad, eh? Even I find that all that doesn't speak much to me! [*Laughter*] But maybe painting speaks to you, and at that point, fine, we've accomplished our session's goal. For me, I believe that, to some extent, for philosophers, concepts speak to them, but also for them, and not everything is of interest.

So I mean… I no longer really know what I mean. [*Laughter*] I mean that among the non-philosophers who come here, it's because you have an aggregate of problems, coming from other horizons than philosophy, and that can achieve clarification just as for me, my problems have always found clarifications, extraordinary ones for me, once I encounter – even here, that's what I find so charming here – well, there are people who have taught me things – I'm talking about previous years so that I'm not flattering anyone – but there are people who have taught me some things that are entirely… [*Deleuze doesn't finish*] because, because there were encounters between problems. I believe that philosophy has no kind of privilege. It has its kinds of

problems, and these can reverberate with problems in mathematics or aesthetics, and inversely, problems of aesthetics can explain everything.

So, if you tell me that a problem doesn't speak to me, well I tell you, you're right! This is why we should never argue. It's not in order to persuade you that a problem is interesting. If it doesn't speak to you, it doesn't speak to you. Some other time we'll see something better, or else, if no problem at all speaks to you, fine, you don't have… You just won't come any more. But I mean, everything is fine, to some extent. [*Laughter*] Everything is fine once you find your problems, right? I believe that's what counts. [*Inaudible question*] What?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

But I believe that Leibniz teaches us a lot, that it's this story of each person's subdivision (*département*). Certainly, we are limited; we have our subdivision; we have our problems, we have… I don't think that this is why, I don't think that, for example, Gaëtan de Clérambault was a fetishist, or he was, but not only that. His relation to fabrics was an aggregate of problems, and this wasn't a complex. Fine, that goes well enough. So, from this perspective, it's more interesting, because art history… You know, there are stores in Paris that I wanted to look at in order to try to bring in some concepts for you, [*Laughter*] and there are all kinds of boutiques with pleated fabrics, French pleats, assembled pleats (*plissé réuni*), all that, and I was hoping to have an entire list of folds. [*Laughter*] So I would have had 92 categories and not ten, and then I told myself that this procedure was rather suspect, [*Laughter*] that somewhere, this wasn't a good way to go, that there was reason for holding back a drape or one of the folds, that it was already… no.

There we are, so listen…

A student: Can I say something?

Deleuze: Yes, certainly!

The student: [*Question regarding the sense in which Deleuze really meant that the monad might be a "reading room"* (cabinet de lectures)*; the student asks if that might be conceived in a cinematographic manner*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, but there, you are really correct. We've seen that; one can say all sorts of things regarding the monad, but there even, literally, when I say that monad is a reading room, this is not exclusive. It's from a perspective, especially given Leibniz's pluralism, from one perspective it's a reading room. But from another perspective, it's decoration, it's decorative, eh? The whole depth of the monad is tapestry; it's decoration. From another perspective, it's something else. So, since… since… Given all the technical aspects that Leibniz doesn't know, in my view, you can say anything at all once there is no exterior model. So, cinema, I was saying – we discussed this. –[39] To say cinema, it's even insufficient because cinema had to have been filmed outside… At the extreme, at the extreme, at the risk in this way of saying just anything at all, it's a lot closer, what's happening in the monad, to new images, to digital images that have no models, that are produced through a Combinatory. But all the metaphors are good once you take account of the "without doors or windows". So, when I was saying "reading", it was one case, one case, and this was addressed to Leibniz's text in which he himself uses the word "to

read." It was meant to take his texts into account. But of course, that doesn't exhaust the entire subject. There you are. You have to… Yes?

A woman student: I have a problem with the hem because the hem is a kind of thread, not drape, [Deleuze: Yes] so my problem is how indeed to conceive of the creation of drapery and the requirement that there be hems? Would Clérambault agree with that?

Deleuze: So, would there… First, there's a problem of facts here. In the end, you are correct, but does every hem involve thread? I have the impression that the Greek hem, such as it's defined, such as Clérambault defines it, does not involve thread. He distinguishes two kinds of hems. He distinguished, precisely, the flat hem, very important; this is the one involving a thread, I believe, because the not flat hem, there's the thick hem that would rather involve… [*The sounds of students leaving*] This is a very technical question, right, so those who want to can go. So there you are, this would involve… [*Pause due to many students exiting at once, and Deleuze looks in his text*] I am telling you, I have to think about this, eh? I'm not finding it… [*Deleuze looks in his book*]

The hem, here we are. "The hem decorated with embellishments (*festonné*) in Greek drapery. We notice flat hems in Greco-Roman sculpture," that's one thing. "But another form of hem," wait, you'll see, "But another form of hem is seen in Greek statuary along the final edges, in other words, transversal edges or woof edges, in the case of the *péplos* [Greek women's tunic], of the *clamydes* [Greek men's cloak]. This hem is characterized by a uniform embellishment of the free edge," eh, let's continue "by a marginal thickening of the fabric," -- in the end, I no longer am understanding anything at all -- "and a marked ruffling of each particular lobe (*chaque lobule particulier*)". What's an embellishment (*festonnement*)?

The student: It's a kind of sewing … [*Different answers, inaudible*] …

Deleuze: So, that also involves sewing?

A woman student: No, no, no… [*Explanation of* festonnement]

Deleuze: Ah, so it's held by staples?

The student: No, no … [*The explanation continues*]

Deleuze: It's the drape that makes it… It's the support point of the fabric then? That would be marvelous! [*Laughter*] You would have an embellished hem, that's something! That would work! [*Deleuze starts laughing*] Good, I feel that I have to stop now. [*End of the discussion and the session*] [2:35:48]

Notes

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[1] Regarding the actual recording, the BNF version is nearly complete, but a peculiarity arises at the end of the recording. For Deleuze ends class quite clearly after approximately 139 minutes by announcing what will occur in the next meeting, but 18 minutes of recording remain following the end of class. After consideration of the content and context, we conclude that this discussion took place after the formal end of class in response to different

students' questions, and that the always diligent recorder, Hidenobu Suzuki, having removed the previous cassette, opted to record onto a new cassette.
[2] On the status of the damned, see *The Fold*, pp. 70-71; *Le Pli*, pp. 101-102, and the session of 24 February 1987.
[3] The reference to Leibniz's invocation of Chinese philosophers is located in note 10, chapter 3, of *The Fold*, p. 147, *Le Pli*, p. 44, notably the annotated edition of Leibniz by Christiane Frémont.
[4] On the regime of light and colors, cf. The Fold, pp. 31-32; Le Pli, pp. 44-45.
[5] *Cf.* The Fold, *p. 32;* Le Pli, *p. 45*.
[6] No doubt, the reference is to de Langlais, *La technique de la peinture à l'huile* (Paris: Flammarion, 1959), also cited in *What Is Philosophy?* (p. 232, note 31). For a longer discussion of de Langlais and white ground, see the Deleuze seminar on "Painting and the Question of Concepts", session 8, 2 June 1981.
[7] From this point onward, Deleuze pronounces "Langlais" (-lay) as "Langlois" (-lwa).
[8] Cf. references in note 11, chapter 3 of *The Fold*, p. 147; *Le Pli*, p. 44.
[9] Cf. Goethe's *Theory of Colors*, Project Gutenberg pdf, translation by Charles Locke Eastlake. See the seminar on Painting, especially session 8, 2 June 1981.
[10] On Wölfflin, see *Principles of Art History*, trans. M.D. Hottinger (1915; New York: Dover, 1922), and on his discussion of Caravaggio, see the Painting seminar, session 8, 2 June 1981.
[11] Here Deleuze returns to chapter 3 of *The Fold*, pp. 31-34; *Le Pli*, pp. 44-46.
[12] The Conley translation offers "a light in an obscure chamber (chambre obscure)" in *The Fold*, p. 32; Deleuze provides a slightly modified French translation from Latin in *Le Pli*, p. 45.
[13] Deleuze refers to the Abbaye of La Tourette in *The Fold*, p. 28; *Le Pli*, p. 39.
[14] Deleuze describes this system of mirrors during the session 3, on 18 November 1986.
[15] Deleuze refers again to the session 3, on 18 November 1986.
[16] Cf. *The Fold*, p. 21; *Le Pli*, pp. 29-30.
[17] Deleuze refers here to the text *La Cause de Dieu plaidée par sa justice* and to the passage in *The Fold*, p. 153, note 37, *Le Pli*, p. 101, as well as to the session on 24 February 1987.
[18] Deleuze considers this concept from another perspective in the session 2, on 4 November 1986 as well as at several points in *The Fold*, pp. 5-6, 16-17, and especially 32-33; *Le Pli*, pp. 6-7, 22-23, and especially 44-46.
[19] On clarity, the filter and this Leibniz-Descartes opposition, see *The Fold*, pp. 90-91; *Le Pli*, pp. 120-121.
[20] On this architectural aspect, cf. *The Fold*, pp. 27-30; *Le Pli*, pp. 38-41.
[21] The quote is from Jean Rousset; cf. *The Fold*, p. 29 and note 6, p. 147; *Le Pli*, p. 40.
[22] Deleuze refers to Heidegger and to these perspectives in *The Fold*, p. 30; *Le Pli*, p. 42, as well as in the 3 February session.
[23] Deleuze returns to this subject, already considered briefly in the session of 3 February 1987, and also during the Foucault seminar on 27 May 1986; cf. *The Fold*, pp. 30-31; *Le Pli*, pp. 43-44.
[24] See above, no doubt *The Last Judgment*.
[25] "Brouillards, montez ! Versez vos cendres monotones / Avec de longs haillons de brume".
[26] Deleuze pages through his book; this is, in fact, the poem entitled "Remembrance of Belgian Friends", to which Deleuze refers simply as "Bruges"; see the 3 February 1987 session.
[27] "Toute la vétusté presque couleur encens / Comme furtive d'elle et visible je sens / Que se dévêt pli selon pli la pierre veuve".
[28] This entire text is cited in *The Fold*, p. 94; *Le Pli*, pp. 125-126, Conley translation.
[29] ("Limpide (où va redescendre / Pourchassé en chaque grain / Un peu d'invisible cendre / Seule à me rendre chagrin)".
[30] (Sens-tu le paradis farouche / Ainsi qu'un rire enseveli / Se couler du coin de ta bouche / Au fond de l'unanime pli!).
[31] ("Le sceptre des rivages roses / Stagnants sur les soirs d'or, ce l'est, / Ce blanc vol fermé que tu poses / Contre le feu d'un bracelet")
[32] "Le pliage . . . ne frappe pas autant que son tassement, [en épaisseur], offrant le minuscule tombeau, certes, de l'âme." The text is a prose text by Mallarmé, "Divagations", that Deleuze introduced in the session on 3 February 1987.
[33] On this discussion of Greek art, see the Painting seminar, notably session 7, 26 May 1981.
[34] On this point, cf. *The Fold*, pp. 37-38; *Le Pli*, pp. 53-54.
[35] This is the collected writing of Mallarmé, the *Oeuvres complètes*, published by Gallimard.

[36] This whole discussion – on Mallarmé, Clérambault, and categories of the fold – corresponds in a general way to the end of chapter 3 of *The Fold*, pp. 28-38; *Le Pli*, pp. 40-54.
[37] Deleuze probably refers to New Essays on Human Understanding that underlies, at least implicitly, the first sessions of the course; see *The Fold*, pp. 3-4; *Le Pli*, pp. 5-6.
[38] On the theory of substance, cf. *The Fold*, pp. 54-56; *Le Pli*, pp. 73-76.
[39] Deleuze refers to the discussion during the session on 18 November 1986.