

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom**

**Lecture 14, 7 April 1987, Principles and Freedom (9) – Logic of the Event**

**Initial Transcription by Web Deleuze; Augmented Transcription and Translation by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:35:30)<sup>1</sup>**

### **Part 1**

What remains for us to do in order to finish up – we already did the first part of three; it's been a long time since we finished that; it was a mighty effort – and then we are reaching the end of the second part which, generally, we might call a theory of the spiritual event (*événement spirituel*). [Pause] Then, the third part remains for us to complete. I am saying all this so that you see what I have left to do, and there's no reason that this should stop before we've finished. We will stop when we are done.

What remains to be done in this second part is to situate ourselves fully in this theory of the event as spiritual event thanks to this comparison that we began, Whitehead-Leibniz. And it seems to me that this is something quite important, not for philosophy in general, but for the possibilities of philosophy, that this rather unusual vision of the event opens to us based on everything, everything, everything being event, as if [it were], according to the philosopher's choice, always a legitimate choice, the concept of an opening (*exposé*) onto such an unusual notion. I mean [that] we all think we know how to create an event, but it's rare to find people who think that the world is made of events. And yet, something connects in our mind when we are told, for example, what is an electron? However little we might know of the sciences, we are asked, what is an electron? What do you think an electron is made of? Do you take it to be a thing or an event? Might one say in fact, provided we verify this ourselves, that everything is an event?

But if there are only events, then what do you take yourself to be? Do you take yourself to be persons? There are people who take themselves to be persons, which is entirely legitimate, for you and me, to want to settle back into beliefs that certainly fortify us in life. But, do you take yourselves to be persons or events? You'll tell me, we are so modest that we don't take ourselves to be events. But there exist some very small events; there are miniscule events. Literally, an event isn't an event. There's nothing there to create an event! [Laughter] So where is the greater arrogance, to take oneself to be a person or to take oneself to be an event? So, we have all this.

And then, we must draw some conclusions, and still remaining in this second part, I am going to say immediately why, about the substance, that it's a philosophical problem and one that has traversed philosophy for a long time. And after all, why would anyone think that this would be a finished notion? And even if it were a notion that's done and completed, that no longer refers to anything but the history of philosophy, we must still establish why. Or else, is there a way to conserve it? We still need it today; everything isn't finished! And so, as I was finally straddling the two subjects, I had said that we would take advantage of the end of this second part to draw

some conclusions about what philosophy might indeed be, and what doing philosophy might be, or what it means, taking our yearlong work as an example, what it means to reflect on Leibniz today. What does... Fine, this is what we have left to do.

And then, and then, in order for us to finish the year, there remains for us something that we have never discussed, and I want to tell you immediately so that you understand the overview of what we have done. I am saying that all we have seen during this term is the event as spiritual event. What does that mean? [*Here begins the WebDeleuze transcript*] In one sense, every event is spiritual; moreover, something is an event only insofar as carried to the state of phenomenon of the spirit. Death is an event only as a phenomenon of the spirit, or if not, a birth is an event, etc. But in the end, we have seen how, in Leibniz, the event referred to inherence in the monad, that is, the event has actual existence only in the monad that expresses the world, only in the monad that expresses the world. The event exists actually in the monad, in each monad.

But this is only one dimension of the event, it's the spiritual dimension. The event still has to be realized (*s'effectue*). Here I would distinguish actualizing and realizing. I would say that the event is realized in a spirit, and that constitutes the most profound belonging of the spirit to the event and of the event to the spirit. The event actualizes itself in a spirit or, if you prefer, a soul. There are souls everywhere. That would very much be in conformity with Leibniz: the event actualizes itself in a soul and there are souls everywhere, but at the same time, the event must be realized (*s'effectue*), must be realized in a matter, must be realized in a body. With this, we have something like a double system of coordinates: the actualization of a soul and the realization of a body.

But what does it mean, having a body, since, precisely, during this whole term, we have devoted it to the relations between the event and the monad as pure spirit, as soul?<sup>2</sup> And we do sense, yet again, that the event so defined, as what exists actually in the soul, implies another dimension: to realize oneself in a matter or in a body. Hence our question, and the question as the departure point for our third part will be: what does it mean to have a body? What is this about? We will be aware what having a body means, or at least the body itself: it's this in which the event is realized. Crossing the Rubicon -- the eternal example to which Leibniz returns -- crossing the Rubicon is the actual event, rather it's the event that actualizes itself in the monad Caesar, and in fact, it requires a decision of the soul. Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon; we have seen in what sense there was freedom for Leibniz. But that also refers to a body and a river; it is necessary that this body cross this river, that monads have bodies, moreover that these bodies be located in a material world. This aspect we have not at all considered and this will be the aim of the third part.

But I therefore return in this way to the end of the second part that I would like to move forward today as much as possible. My dream would be to complete it, but I understand our path, which is: what is this entire logic of the event that we have tried to construct over so many meetings?

We started off from this, something that has crisscrossed our entire term, specifically: Leibniz invents or adheres to an inclusion of the predicate in the subject. Only we have to be very careful since what he calls predicate is always a rapport or an event. I am basing myself very strongly on the text *Discourse on Metaphysics* where, as if for him all of this goes in passing so much

without saying. Leibniz says: the predicate or event. Here we have something that, to my knowledge, neither Malebranche, nor Spinoza, nor Descartes would have ever said or even conceived of: the predicate or event. In other words, I am saying, be very careful because, on the contrary, and here we were forced to say this: no, there is something that doesn't work in many commentaries on Leibniz, since they act as if the predicate in Leibniz was an attribute, as was the case for everyone else.

And we even see an author as equally important, as brilliant as [Bertrand] Russell who devotes a book to Leibniz,<sup>3</sup> and says: the inherence of the predicate in the subject implies that all judgment is a judgment of attribution. Henceforth, how is Leibniz going to account for the rapport, the relation? I am saying: there is something frightening in this, it seems to me, since Leibniz certainly confronts difficult problems, but not that one, for a simple reason: it's that – of course, and this explains why he often talks about attribution in the same sense as about predication, but never, never, never, to my knowledge, at least I hope not, knock on wood, almost never will you find an identification between the predicate and the attribute. Why? -- For a simple reason: that there is no attribute for Leibniz. It's a good reason. So, of course, one can locate the word, but that doesn't change anything. I mean: the predicate is always event or rapport.

I myself have no sense that the problems of relation cause the least difficulty for Leibniz; his entire philosophy is created for that. His entire logic is created for that. It would nonetheless be astounding if that were to cause him a particular problem. So it's very strange since, you see, in my view, it's even funny, the source of mistakes is always funny – and if I am right to think that it's a mistake. When a man like Russell says: in Leibniz, judgments return to models of attribution, what does he base this on? On the formula: "The entire predicate is in the subject." So he says that everything is attribution. But, "the entire predicate" implies, for Leibniz's thought, that the predicate is not an attribute. So what is in the subject? What is in the subject is, in fact, rapports and events. In other words, Leibniz is an author for whom predication, [*Pause*] or if you prefer, assignment of a predicate to a subject, he's an author for whom predication is distinguished radically from attribution. And he's an author who, literally, at least at the extreme, would tell us: there is no attribution; there are only predications.

The question of the rapport and the relation, for Leibniz, has always been very simple; it consists of saying: there is a subject of the relation. You see those who say, those who object to Leibniz, like Russell, that a philosophy like Leibniz's is incapable of taking account of relations; these are those people who understand or believe to understand: the relation has no subject. So a philosophy, such as Leibniz's, which affirms that any judgment, any proposition is of the type "predicate is in the subject" cannot take account of the relation -- when I say, for example, "there are three men" (*voilà trois hommes*), to take an example from Russell, "There are three men", where is the subject? It's a proposition without subject.

Fine, I believe that Leibniz's answer would be extremely simple. Leibniz's response would be: in all cases, whatever proposition that you might consider, what the subject is doesn't go without saying. If you blunder in assigning the subject, it's obviously a catastrophe. In "there are three men," let's look for what the subject is. [*Pause*] In the name of logic, you will agree with me that here I can consider the proposition "There are three men" as a proposition referring to the same function as "there are three apples" (*voilà trois pommes*); they have the same propositional

function, there are three  $x$ . What is the subject of: “there are three  $x$ ”?

Leibniz’s answer: if you pose the problem well, you will find the subject! Hence Russell’s reasoning according to which the subject is not this particular man, or another particular man, or an aggregate of three men. And everything depends on what the predicate is as well. We saw Leibniz’s answer, which is: it’s “there are three  $x$ ”, the corresponding proposition is  $2 + 1$  are predicates of 3. That seems to be completely insignificant;  $2 + 1$  are predicates of 3. I tried to show that it was an extremely important answer since there is indeed assignment of a subject. And in Leibniz, this subject could only have as predicate a rapport; the rapport  $2 + 1$  is the predicate of the subject 3. Yet again, why say all this? It’s in order to say: the predicate is always a rapport or an event; it’s not an attribute. Predicate of the subject : this is a logic of the event.

My question immediately is: what results from this as regards substance? Because substance is the subject. In logic, what we call “subject” is what we call “substance” in metaphysics. Substance is defined as the subject of its own determinations. The two notions have been equivalent for a long time, and in the seventeenth century, there is a perfect equivalence between metaphysical substance and logical subject. It’s Kant and post-Kantian philosophy that create a difference to the extent that it will lead to a critique of the metaphysical subject, that is, a critique of substance, and henceforth will dissociate the destiny of the logical subject from substance itself. Were they correct? Everything depends on what kinds of problems they were posing at that moment. All this is not our business. I say: what are the consequences as regards substance? It’s essential. So there you have substance no longer defined and no longer to be defined by the attribute.

So, if you consider... I believe that from Aristotle to Descartes, of course in very different ways, substance is defined by the attribute, that is, what is the attribute here? The attribute is essence. The attribute is what the thing is, that is, its essence. And you have, if you will, conformity, correspondence between the logical schema “subject is attribute” and the metaphysical conformity “substance being essence.” If the proposition is no longer an attribution, that is, is no longer defined by the attribute of a subject, what becomes of a substance that can no longer be defined by an essence? It’s through this that the entire point reconnects with the most obvious and the most certain theme of our research this year. We will have to say that Leibniz breaks with the schema of attribution and that, at the same moment, he breaks with the essentialism of substance, of substance constituted by essence. [Pause] For attribution, he will substitute predication, the predicate always being rapport or event, and for essentialism, he will substitute what?

Well here, we can be quite delighted to have found the justification for a word that I will say very quickly: let’s call it Mannerism. For after all, we all know that Mannerism has very special rapports, either interior or a little prior to or a short while after, precisely with the Baroque. But we feel sorry for the critics who seem to suffer so much in defining Mannerism. [They] might as well change everything, location and place, and tell themselves: well fine, couldn’t philosophy give it a little help, since there is so much difficulty in defining Mannerism in art, and perhaps philosophy might give us a very simple means of defining Mannerism? And we sense that if substance is no longer defined by an essence, it’s going to be defined by what? In any case, a substance cannot be defined by its modes.<sup>4</sup>

What is the mode of a substance? What we call mode of a substance is something that implies substance without the substance implying it. For example, I say: the figure implies extension (*l'étendue*), or "the triangle implies extension," the triangle implies extension. But extension does not imply the triangle. The proof is that it [extension] can have another figure, and even, at the extreme, it can have no figure at all. I would say: the figure is a mode of extent. You see? If a implies b without b implying a, then [Pause] there is a mode, so a is a mode of b. You see immediately how we distinguish in this way mode and essence. Essence is that which implies the thing of which it is the essence, and which inversely is implied by the thing. In other words, we will say that essence is the reciprocal implication, and mode is the unilateral implication. It seemed very normal to define substance by essence, provided that there are essences.

What is Mannerism? Let's assume, a thought; let's define it as thought first, and then you have only to inquire within yourself and try while I am speaking, try to paint it within yourself. You unroll a mental canvas there, and you try to complete the corresponding painting. I am saying, imagine that a philosopher thinks, for undetermined reasons, that in the substance, there is more. There are not only modes, but there is something that is more than a mode or a modification, and that nonetheless is not an essence, is something other than an essence. It's more than a modification and is not an essence; it's something other than an essence. [Pause] Substance will no longer be defined by an essence. Go back to your mental canvas: I say that man is a reasonable animal. Paint the reasonable animal. That immediately gives you a style, a style of painting. Painting the reasonable animal is already a whole style of painting that constitutes some sublime paintings. [Pause] But if I say: no, of course, in substance there are things that are more than modes, but it's not essences; these are things other than essences.

I refer to a text by Leibniz, the *Letters to Father des Bosses* (French edition, page 176): "You say that it seems to you" -- Leibniz writes to the reverend father -- "You say that it seems to you that there could be an intermediary being between substance and modification" -- between substance and mode -- "but I myself think that this intermediary is precisely to..." -- I could read the rest, but we are not yet prepared to understand this -- "is precisely to establish one's substance (*se substancier*) one for self" -- that is, the composed substance. That matters little; what matters is that he doesn't say: this intermediary is an essence. I am saying, why aren't we prepared to understand what he is going to explain in his letter to the reverend Father des Bosses? It's because this belongs to our third part and draws on material that we haven't yet seen.

But what matters to me -- it's of little matter -- from what he is trying to say there, I focus on: there's an intermediary between modification and substance, and this intermediary is not at all determined as essence, which still is not an intermediary. So what is it, the intermediary between substance and modification? It can only be one thing, something that plays the role of a source of modifications, a source of modifications. Substance is not defined by an essence; it's defined by and as the active source of its own modifications, [Pause] source of its own manners (*manières*). Substance has no essence; it's the source of manners of being. A thing is defined by all the manners of being of which it is capable, the thing's substance being the source of its manners of being. [Pause] Whether you like it or not, this implies that substance is inseparable from manners of being themselves. In other words, it [substance] cannot be separated from its modes

except abstractly. [Pause] And if you insist on holding onto the word substance, you still can, but in that case, you will have to say: substance is everything.

And, in a text that seems quite important for us [Pause; *Deleuze searches in his edition*] from *Discourse on Metaphysics* (paragraph 15 [actually paragraph 16]), Leibniz tells us [Pause] something that seems so bizarre, we have to pay attention to it: "We could call our essence" -- "on pourrait" [*we could*] in the conditional is already very interesting; that proves that he isn't really all that committed to this notion -- "We could call our essence that which encompasses all that we express" -- and you recall, the monad expresses the whole world, the monad expresses the whole; he adds, he has a very special vocabulary, he has his reasons for this -- "But what is limited in us" -- so, we might call essence the whole of what we express, this would be our essence. Essence is the whole -- "But what is limited in us" -- And it's what is limited in us, you remember perhaps? It's the little region that we express clearly, that he calls so well our subdivision (*département*). We express the entire world, but we express clearly only a little region of the world -- "But what is limited in us" -- that is, our zone of clear expression -- "what is limited in us will be called our nature or our power of action (*puissance*)". It's curious, he refuses the word essence. You see his operation: essence is the whole of what we express, and on the contrary, we will call nature or power of action, the limited zone that we express clearly. [Pause]

Let me sum up: at this level, substance can no longer be defined by essence. We will have to review that more closely, but it was my general theme. It can only be defined in relation to its own manner of being as the source of its manners. The Leibnizian monad is profoundly Mannerist and not essentialist. [Pause] I would almost say that it's a revolution in the notion of substance, perhaps as great as the other revolution that will consist of doing without the notion of substance. Because what was important in the notion of substance? Was it the very idea of substance, or was it the fact of defining it by an essence? [Interruption of the *WebDeleuze text*]

## Part 2

In Leibniz, [Return to *WebDeleuze text*] it will no longer be defined by an essence; it appears in a Mannerist mode and no longer essentialist. And in fact, I believe that in a certain way, if you think of painting known as Mannerist, all of Leibniz's philosophy is the Mannerist philosophy par excellence. [Pause] Already in Michelangelo, when we find traces there of an initial and profound Mannerism, you will see: an attitude of Michelangelo is not an essence. It's really a source of a modification, the source of a manner of being. [Pause] In this sense, it's perhaps philosophy that gives us for once the key to a problem of painting, under the form: what is Mannerism?

So, in any event, let's go back [to our topic]. [Pause] In the end, what does this come down to saying? Why is there no essence? Once again for the same reasons that there are no attributes, but there are predicates. Predicates are events and rapports. Everything is event; that's what Mannerism is. The production of a manner of being is event. The event is the production of a mode of being. "Everything is event" is the Mannerist vision of the world. There are only events. Fine.

Let's go back to our very quick comparison. You saw, you recall, I hope... We had completed a first level, a first level as regards our confrontation at this level of a logic and a metaphysics of the event. Our Whitehead-Leibniz comparison had led us to develop a first level, specifically: [if] you take any event at all, once it's said that everything is event, what are the conditions of the event? What are the conditions of the event? I remind you of the departure point valid as much for Leibniz as for Whitehead: an event is not simply, as Whitehead said, "a man gets run over", but it's "five minutes in the life of the Great Pyramid". We were asking, what were the conditions of events? We could speak both languages, both languages being so close to each other. The event is vibratory and finds its condition in vibration. In the end, the final element of the event is the vibrations in the air or the vibration of an electromagnetic field. Or else, that reminded us of something, the event is on the order of inflection, [Pause] inflections as events of the line, vibrations as events of the wave.

And we saw how, in Whitehead, this vibratory assignment of the event occurred in the form of two series: [Pause] first, extensive series that define themselves as this, they have no final term; they are infinite; they have no limit; they enter into rapports of whole-parts. Typical example of a whole-part rapport, the life of the Pyramid over an hour – during which I am looking at it --, a half hour, a minute, a half-minute, a second, a quarter of a second, a tenth of a second, to infinity. The series tends toward no limit; the series is infinite, and the members of the series enter into rapports of whole and parts. There you have the first type of series.

Notice, if you recall, we found the equivalent in Leibniz. However, I do not at all think that Whitehead borrowed from Leibniz. They have such different contexts. Whitehead speaks in the name of modern physics of the vibration, whereas Leibniz spoke in the name mathematical calculus of series. I believe much more in an encounter (*rencontre*), especially as I am nonetheless forcing the resemblance a bit. I am saying, in Leibniz, you find a first type of infinite series that we can call extensions. Extensions are not only lengths (*longueurs*), they are commensurable lengths that enter into rapports of whole-parts, but these are also numbers that enter into rapports of whole-parts. It had seemed to us that it was extensions that, in Leibniz, constituted the object both of definition and demonstration. There you have the first condition.

Second condition, Whitehead presents it to us as follows: the first series have internal characteristics as well, intrinsic characteristics, which enter into a new sort of series, in a second sort of series, or rather to the extent, he says, they enter into a second sort of series. [Pause] What is this second sort of series? Perhaps you recall? These are equally infinite series, but that, this time, tend toward internal limits. They tend toward internal limits: in other words, they are convergent, in the sense used by Whitehead. These are convergent series that converge onto limits. And I was telling you, it's quite simple: let's take a sound wave. The sound wave is a first series. In what sense? In the sense that it has an infinity, or is supposed to have an infinity of harmonics that are sub-multiples of its frequency. Through this, it's a series of the first type. But, on the other hand, it has intrinsic properties: [Pause] height, intensity, timbre. These intrinsic characteristics themselves enter into series, simply different series from the first type: this time, these are convergent series tending toward limits. There will be rapports between these limits: always the idea in Leibniz as in Whitehead that everything is rapports. There will be rapports between these limits, and you indeed sense that it's these rapports between these limits that will

be predicates. Predicates of what? We called extensions the first type of series; we call intension the second type of series, or if you prefer, extensity and intensity.

The rapports between limits define conjunctions. If you take a light wave, you will also have two types of series. What matters to me is this constitution of two types of superposed series. We saw how Leibniz baptized the internal limits of the second type of series with an extremely precious name: these are, he tells us, requisites. In this regard, the parallelism is very great between Whitehead and Leibniz. These are requisites. For example, timbre, height, intensity are the requisites of sound. [Pause] Harmonics are not requisites. Harmonics are the aggregate of rapports of whole-parts that define the first type of series. The requisites are the limits that define the second type of series, the convergent series.

Moreover, I could say that Leibniz added a third type of series, in relation to Whitehead. You recall, perhaps, the third type of series, for Leibniz, was convergent series that have for supplementary properties to extend themselves into one another, so as to constitute a conjunctive world, the world to be expressed by each monad. So, extendable singularities, or series extendable into one another, convergent series extendable into one another constitute a conjunctive world expressed by all the monads: this would be a third type of series which has no equivalent in Whitehead, and which allows Leibniz to define individuations. As a result, in Leibniz, we would have the three series, you recall, since each individual monad contracts, concentrates a certain number of singularities. So this would indeed be fine because in Leibniz, we would have a scale of three series, one upon the others: extensions, intensions and individuations. In Whitehead, we would only have two series. But that would already be very good; that would not mean that... Why? No doubt that in Whitehead, it's later, it's not at the same level that he will discover the phenomenon of individuation.

But for the moment we have only responded to one thing, which is: what are the conditions of the event? The conditions of the event are in the infinite series -- it's a possible answer -- the infinite series, provided that they are defined. You can choose two types, I would say: the conditions of the event are two types of series, or three types of series, your choice, of which the event is the conjunction, the event [as] conjunction of two or three types of series.

But while I have so defined the conditions of the event, I haven't yet defined the composition of the event, and what we had seen the last time was the composition of the event. We had begun to see it with Whitehead, and I remind you that we had said: yes, the composing element of the event is prehension, it's the farthest prehension, according to Whitehead.<sup>5</sup> For a notion so new as creating the logic of the event, he obviously needed relatively new words: the constituting element of the event is prehension. The prehension constitutes an event. Or rather, since an event is a conjunction that refers to several conditions, one must say that in its composition, it is itself a link, or as Whitehead says, a nexus. From the point of view of its composition, the event is a nexus of prehensions. From the point of view of its conditioning, it's a conjunction of series; from the point of view of its composition, it's a nexus of prehensions.

It's a question of knowing what the different aspects of the prehension are, or rather the parts of the event, what composes the event. We had seen five aspects. I am going quickly in order to save some time. You recall? Every prehension refers to a *prehending subject*. But the prehending



subject does not pre-exist; it's the prehension, to the extent that it prehends, that constitutes something like a prehending subject – or that is itself constituted as prehending subject. The prehending subject will be the first element.

Second element: the *prehended* (*préhendé*). Prehension constitutes what it prehends as a prehended. There again, the prehended does not pre-exist. You will tell me: ok, the prehended doesn't pre-exist, but what is prehended pre-exists. No. Because what is it that is prehended? Another prehension. The event can only be prehension of prehensions. It's another prehension, that is, it's another event; the event is prehension of other events. What other events? Either pre-existing events, or co-existing events. Every event prehends other events. [Pause] Example: the battle of Waterloo is a prehension of Austerlitz. These are two different battles, but I am looking exactly for the events; I am precisely looking for... I could invoke too easily some psychological events. What counts is that the system works outside psychology. It's not at all psychology; it's what things are made of!

We will come back to our example since we will encounter it again, the concert. The concert is an event. The piano is a prehension of the violin, and at a given moment, the violin is prehended by the piano. You will tell me: but the reverse is true as well? Yes, but at another moment. There are moments in which it's the violin that prehends the piano, and there are other moments in which... This is as I was telling you; it's what I mean when I say: a particular instrument responds to a particular other one, and what does a page of orchestration consist of when I distribute sounds to the instruments? The orchestration is the splendid repartition according to which a particular moment will be the prehension of another particular prehension, etc. ... How to organize prehensions? It's always a prehension that is prehender (*préhendante*), but it's always a prehension that is prehended. That doesn't prevent these being very different aspects.

According to the aspect under which a prehension is prehended, we will call it, following Whitehead, a *datum*. The *datum*. We will say that every prehension prehends *data*, that is, pre-existing or previous (*préalable*) prehensions. [Pause] We will say that the data, that is, what is prehended in a prehension, is the public element of the prehension, the public element of the prehension. A curious word, "public". I have a reason for emphasizing it in passing, you will understand quickly. Whitehead tells us that public element of prehension is what the prehension prehends, and which itself is a former prehension. So, the prehension that I am, when I prehend, I am not yet public. But when I am prehended by someone among you – when I prehend you, you are my public. When you prehend me, I am your public, which implies that the prehender is inseparable from a private element. But every prehension will be prehended in its turn, one of the great lessons from Whitehead. There is no prehension that will not be prehended in its turn, that is: there is no prehension that will not be a *datum* for other prehensions to come. Henceforth, I will always be the public of someone who will be private for himself, and will be anew the public of someone else. There will be a whole chain of private-public.

And then, in fact, what is the private element, in opposition to public data, that is, to prehended prehensions? You remember that it's what he calls *feeling*. What is *feeling*? [It's the] third part of the prehension, but after – from a purely logical point of view – after the prehending subject and the predated data, the *feeling* is the manner in which the prehender grasps the prehended. That's what the private element is.

And I tell myself, this is a rather strange usage of private-public; it's quite funny, especially as [Whitehead] attaches a lot of importance to it in *Process and Reality*. This usage of private-public seems really bizarre. And then one day – there must be reasons for this, otherwise we'd avoid it. I was preparing for our meetings and then I stumbled upon this strange thing, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, I was reading along rather superficially because I recalled it, telling myself, ok, it's just to jog my memory, and lo and behold, I stumble upon this, but that I wouldn't have rediscovered it, but my God, my God, my God, my God! *Discourse on Metaphysics*, -- I haven't noted it down... oh yes I did! Paragraph 14, everything depends on the edition, everything depends on the edition. It's at the beginning, at the beginning of the third paragraph of paragraph 14: -- "Now it is God alone ... who is the cause of this correspondence in their phenomena" -- between monads, otherwise there wouldn't be any linkage --, "So we could say that..." -- oh, no, I jumped ahead -- "[Now it is God alone] ... who is the cause of this correspondence in their phenomena, and brings it about that what is particular to one" -- that is, to a monad; we can't understand them, these stories of harmonies, that we haven't yet seen -- "about that what is particular to one is public to all. Without that there would be no connection between them."<sup>6</sup> It's funny; all of a sudden, this term "public". So I looked around and I don't see it elsewhere in Leibniz. Did he use it only this one time? You see, he means that all monads express the same world, that is, that what one prehends is prehended by another, that is, the prehension of a monad is the *datum* of the prehension of another monad. And there we have, [Pause] there we have ... that he has his special public story that seems to me very odd, something to reflect on, I guess (*c'est pour rêver, enfin*).

And in the end, what interests us more is that Whitehead really insists, regarding the matter of *feeling*, on this way that the prehending subject prehends the prehended, the *datum*. He really insists on the possibility of negative *feeling*, and that interests me enormously. These are phenomena of aversion, phenomena of disgust: I reject an event! Don't talk to me about that! We have to study negative *feelings*, the things that one must not talk about, the monads that crack up. You still find today monads that cannot stand you talking to them about 1936. [Laughter] These monads are very interesting. They cannot stand it. That [date] has remained like a kind of open wound, and I'd say that there you have a case of negative *feeling*. Here, that's a psychological example, but there are events that are entirely constituted for the expulsion of other events; they are created entirely to cover over (*recouvrir*), to vomit [onto] a particular event.

And in the end, this should remind us of something. I don't want to insist on this too much, but this should remind us of something. You recall the damned? [Laughter] But what is the damned? It's the man who hated God. And for the man who hated God, as Leibniz said: God is everything. The one who hates God is the one who has the greatest hate that exists. The one who hates all, since he hates God, has hate for all God's creatures, whether men, animals or plants, and even the little stones that hurt no one. He hates all. In other words, he vomits on it all. The definition of the damned in Whitehead would be: the man of negative *feeling*.

That was the third element. We say that *feeling* assures the fulfillment (*remplissement*) of prehension by the prehended. The prehending subject, through *feeling*, fulfills itself from what it prehends; it fulfills itself from *data*, and from this fulfillment *self-enjoyment* is born. I won't go back over that. It's indeed like a kind of contraction. If you will, it's to the extent that the

prehension turns back toward what it prehends that it fulfills itself from itself. [Pause] [End of cassette; Interruption of the Web Deleuze transcription] And it's this strange joy of self that we have seen. It's so frequent in English philosophy. And like, at the outside... If I say, what are the *data*, what are the *data* as limit? What is the *datum* limit of a prehension? I cannot say that it's a prehension to infinity. I could say that it's a prehension to infinity, but I have another possible response. The limit *data*, these are vibrations as a condition of prehensions. [Pause] Vibratory series, this is [Return to the Web Deleuze transcript] precisely the material of the *datum*. I can say that any *datum* is made of vibratory material. It's to the extent that prehension is a contraction of vibratory elements, and through this, it prehends data, it's the same thing, and it prehends data because it contracts the vibratory elements that condition the prehension – it's to this very extent that it fulfills itself with this joy of oneself. As Samuel Butler said – I told you about this the last time – in a splendid book, very English, very much of English philosophy, *Life and Habit*, wheat is thrilled with being wheat, but how is it thrilled to be wheat? Through contracting, and from the fact that it contracts the Earth and humidity from which it emerges. [Interruption of the BNF recording] It's the English version, the philosophical version of: Lilies sing the glory of the heavens, plants sing the glory of God, plants bear witness.

Why does all this matter? Leibniz will say exactly the same thing, the same thing concerning music, [Return to the BNF recording]

### Part 3

... for what is pleasure, in the most precise and deepest sense of the word? Pleasure is contraction of a vibration. You will find a beautiful text by Leibniz on music, “as being pleasure resulting” as he says, “from an unconscious calculus,” the calculus bearing on the vibration of the sound wave. In the *Principles of Nature and Grace*: “music charms us even though its beauty consists only in relations among numbers, and in the beats or vibrations . . . [of which] we are not aware.”<sup>7</sup> Literally it's by contracting the number that we achieve the highest pleasure, that is, the pleasure of being oneself. And what are we, we the living, in our organism? I was telling you, in the depth of our organism, and why is it that, even when ill, we have -- or we can have if we know how to find it and go all the way to this point of ourselves – this joy of being? What is this joy of being in relation to which... [Pause; Deleuze looks for a quote] the, -- I want to cite the author directly – to which all kinds of whining (*pleurnicherries*) are kinds of suffering? This joy of being is nothing other than what we call pleasure, that is, the operation that consists of contracting the elements from which we result.

And myself, [as] body, what does it mean to have a body? If I prejudge from what we have left to do, what does it mean to have a body, except contracting these vibratory series? What does it mean to have a body except contracting what? Miserable or grandiose things, that is, things that have always been Gods, specifically contracting the water, the earth, the salts, the carbon of which we are the result. And we fulfill ourselves with ourselves by turning ourselves back towards these series that we contract. It's *self-enjoyment*. It's what we will call the unconscious calculus of any being. In this sense, we are pure music. And if we are pure music, it's under this aspect, [that of] *self-enjoyment*. From which we are perhaps aware that in the history of what an event is, the concert is anything that you like, except a simple metaphor.

It's important to have done with – if it's possible, we're never done in this domain, and we really must not entirely finish this -- to do away with the stupidities about Leibniz's optimism. For it is well known and if there is an expression that has passed into posterity regarding Leibniz, it's the idea that our world is the "best of all possible worlds." You know what happened: at a certain date, Lisbon underwent a terrible earthquake. And this earthquake had a role, as strange as it might be – and one would have to look into whether this is a natural phenomenon that was then used -- in Europe of which I only see the equivalent in the Nazi concentration camps, to wit: the question that reverberated after the war, how is it possible to still believe in reason once one recognizes that Auschwitz occurred, and that a certain type of philosophy became impossible, that had nonetheless created the history of the nineteenth century, or seemed to create the history of the nineteenth century? It's very odd that in the eighteenth century, it was the Lisbon earthquake that took on something like that, where all of Europe said: how is it still possible to maintain a certain optimism founded on God? You see, after Auschwitz, the question reverberated: how is it still possible to maintain the least bit of optimism about what human reason might be? After the Lisbon earthquake, how is it possible to maintain the least bit of belief in a rationality of divine origin?

[*Interruption, a student starts to ask a question, possibly about a specific date*] Now there, listen, if you are asking a question to embarrass me... You know quite well that I don't know any [of that] [*Laughter; the student continues*]... And what do I look like to you?... Ah! "Catastrophe" !... Ah, my God, doesn't anyone have a *Larousse* dictionary ? No one has... ? It was in those years there... Aie, aie, aie [*Discussions among the students*] Ah, no, he's asking me if it's the year.... Oh, la la... [*To an amusing comment from another student*] Ah, yes, right, it was before the war! [*Laughter*] Refer to your basic *Larousse*.

[*Another student starts to ask a question, with : If I am asking this question, it's because...*] Ah, la la, this is getting into rough weather... Yes, why? [*Student: I wanted to know if it was before the schism between Catholics and Protestants*]... Ah! Well after, well after. It's after Leibniz, in any case. Leibniz was not aware, in my view... You know? [*Another student relates the date of the Lisbon earthquake: 1755 ; Deleuze continues by singing the date*] Sev-En-Teen-Hun-Dred Fif-ty-Five... So there we have it, very good! You're sure? 1755, right? And in Lisbon ? [*Laughter*] Of course, I knew that. [*Laughter*] I was just pretending ! So... well, you see ? That's how it is, right...

And that gives rise to Voltaire's famous text against Leibniz, notably the little novel *Candide*, in which there's a naïve young man indoctrinated by a philosophy professor. It's a catalogue of every human abomination, and there is the professor who always explains to Candide that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. This text by Voltaire is a veritable masterpiece. So it's not a question of saying that Voltaire was wrong, because understand, the grandeur of Voltaire's book is that it undertakes to rework a certain number of problems including, as one passes through this novel, the problem of good and evil, that can no longer be posed as it had been in the preceding century. I believe that it's the end of the happy and the damned (*les heureux et les damnés*). One must truly say that up until and including Leibniz, the problem of good and evil had been posed in terms of the happy and the damned. With Voltaire, with the eighteenth century, from 1755 onward [*Deleuze insists comically on this date*], that

[topic] was stated differently. So who will institute a new mode of thought regarding evil and the existence of evil?

Thus, I do not want to say at all that Voltaire is literature, not at all. I believe that *Candide* belongs to works that are at once literature and philosophy of the greatest importance. What I want to look into, it's just, and this excludes nothing from *Candide*, is what was the status of Leibniz's optimism? And it's true that it was an optimism founded on divine rationality; there's nothing more to be said about that. But what interests me is that, even from this point of view, one mustn't think that theologians of the period were saying: well yes indeed, everything evil that happens, the death of innocents, wars, atrocities, that's all been settled. They didn't wait for the Lisbon earthquake. It's very odd that the Lisbon earthquake occurred at a moment at which thought, and its way of considering the question of evil, was already undergoing change. So it had all its effect. But previously catastrophes and abominations both from God and from man were well known.

Therefore, in the history of Leibniz's optimism, I insist on this, it's that, about optimism, one must distinguish two correlative optimisms, a subjective optimism and an objective optimism. I mean that objective optimism is: this world is the best of possible worlds, and why? That refers to compossibility, and I won't return to the topic. It refers to the objective notion of compossibility, specifically: there are series of singularities that extend into one another, if you recall, and then there are points of divergence. So there will be as many worlds as divergences, all worlds being possible, but they are impossible within one another. So God chose one of these worlds. And the answer is that God could only choose the best, [it] could only choose the best; that's as far as it goes, this is optimism. Moreover, there's Leibniz's expression, you understand? Everything comes back; must we say: this world exists because it is the best? Certain of Leibniz's texts go in this direction. Or must we say the opposite: this world is the best since it is and because it is and because it is the one that is? But objective optimism cannot receive, it seems to me, does not contain its reason in itself; it implies a reason coming from elsewhere and which can only be given through subjective optimism. And I'd say, what is subjective optimism? It's *self-enjoyment*.

Whatever the abomination of the world might be, whatever the abomination of the world might be, there is something that cannot be taken from you and through which you are invincible. This is not your egotism; there as well it's full of... It's certainly not your egotism; it's not your tiny pleasure about being "me". It's something much more grandiose that Whitehead called precisely *self-enjoyment*, that is, this kind of vital heart in which you contract your elements, whether these are elements of a music, elements of a chemistry, vibratory waves, etc. ... and become yourself by contracting these elements and by turning yourself back toward these elements. It will be this type of joy, a joy of Becoming, this joy of Becoming self that you find in all thinking of the vitalist kind. And, you recall – I remind you of this just to make some necessary adjustments -- "let this joy increase!", that's the formula of subjective optimism, "let this joy increase!", that is, that it might become the joy of more and more people. And that does not mean that the world will go better, and that does not mean that there will be fewer abominations. It's something else. It's a question of something else. It is not a question of saying that abominations are going to leave me indifferent. On all these points, Leibniz expressed himself marvelously in the text to which I refer you and that we have already used quite a bit: *The Philosopher's Confession*. Being

content with the world, he tells us, that doesn't at all mean: take good care of your ego. That's not at all what it means. That means precisely finding in the self the strength to resist all that is abominable, and finding in the self the strength to endure the abominable when it happens to you.

In other words, *self-enjoyment* is being worthy of an event, knowing how or managing to be worthy of the event.<sup>8</sup> Who can ever predict: I would be worthy of the event that happens to me? Whatever the event might be, be it a catastrophe or falling in love, there are people who are unworthy of what happens to them, even when these are not very prodigious events. Being worthy of what happens! It's a theme that runs through philosophy. If philosophy is useful for anything, it's for this kind of thing : persuading us, not teaching us, persuading us that it's a problem, that one must know how, that it would be better to know how to be worthy of what happens to us, that it would be a great misfortune or that it would be a great good fortune. Because if you manage to be worthy of what happens to you, at that moment you will know very well what is unimportant in what happens to you, and what is important in what happens to you. In other words, what is important in an event? What has no importance at all in an event? It's not necessarily what one might believe. One must already have all these ethics of worthiness/dignity (*dignité*). Being worthy (*être digne*) of what happens, that's what vitalism is. In Leibniz, consider the entire end of *The Philosopher's Confession*, it's there.

And you recall Leibniz's idea, specifically that thank God the damned exist, for the damned having reduced the region that has devolved to them, having narrowed their subdivision (you recall: the small clear region that they expressed). Because they vomited on God, henceforth they have renounced this clear region. The damned having fallen into an extreme confusion due to hating God, it's an idea, once again, that seems sublime to me, the idea of the damned: it makes you want to be one! [*Laughter*] That's what they did, and henceforth it's thanks to them [that] they left fantastic unused quantities of virtual joy. Let us take hold of these joys, let us take hold of these empty, unfulfilled *enjoyments*. We must appropriate them to ourselves. Then the damned will be furious in seeing that their damnation serves us, and is useful for something. Yes, damnation serves to increase the total quantity of *self-enjoyment* of the aggregate of those who are not damned or not yet damned. There we have the fourth element.

And then there is still a fifth element. You certainly sense that there is a necessary fifth element that I will outline quickly. It's that everything asks for it, it's *feeling* that asks for it: *feeling* demands that there is a kind of conformity of one *feeling* with another in the same prehending subject, a kind of conformity of *feelings*. Conformity means: belonging to a same form, to a same subjective form. The prehended demands something else than an instantaneous or immediate presentation. [*Pause*] *Self-enjoyment* presents itself as the affect of a pure Becoming of self, a becoming oneself. All this implies a sort of duration into which the event plunges and of which the minimum is a junction of an immediate past and near future. I was telling you: that's what optimism is in the end, persuasion that it's going to last, persuasion that after one beat of my heart another one will follow. And if this persuasion results in telling oneself or reaching a point that, perhaps, it won't always be this way, but there will nonetheless be another heart, fine, perhaps there is a link among *self-enjoyments*.

In other words, what I grasp and what I feel is never reduced to an immediate presentation, including *feeling*. It's grasped by a prehending subject which, one way or another, plunges into the past and tends toward a future. It's what he [Whitehead] calls the fifth or final element that he calls: the subjective aim (*visée subjective*), subjective aim. He gives a very good example; what we perceive, we perceive it as immediate and instantaneous, for example: I turn my head and I perceive the window. But this window that I perceived when I turn my head, I perceive it with eyes, I touch it with hands that themselves plunge into an immediate past. You notice how this is going to create the unity of everything, for what is a sensory organ or, if you prefer, an organ of prehension? It's a process of contraction, and uniquely that, a surface of contraction (*plaque de contraction*), a process of contraction. Ears are surfaces for contracting sound waves and, in certain conditions, for explaining what I hear and I don't hear in the sound wave. Someone, whose ears are ailing, for example, might still contract the bass sounds very well and not contract the high notes: [the ear] doesn't hear the high notes.

I would like for you to contribute all kinds of things yourself, and that's an idea from Whitehead, that seems very, very important to me: that it's with organs coming from the past, however recent, coming from even a very close past, that I immediately grasp the present. And with this he is no doubt going to have the basis for subjective aim. Why can't I continue on this level? Because you sense that subjective aim is going to encompass both continuity and causality. Continuity and causality, we can only undertake the analysis, in Leibniz as well as in Whitehead, we can only undertake the analysis in the third part.

Let's summarize rapidly, ok? I sense that in Leibniz as with Whitehead, you not only have the three series that provide the conditions of the event, but the five parts of the event. Now I am going very fast. At Leibniz's level, I would say: the prehending subject is really the equivalent of the monad. The monad is prehension of the world. [Pause] The *datum* is the world itself, and I would say then, if necessary, that doesn't correspond and it's even better. That is, there are notions that have no equivalent in the other [author]. I would say, yes, for Leibniz, you see, that each monad prehends the entire world, but only prehends clearly a small portion. The entire world is public, since at the same time, it's [the world] that other monadsprehend. My small portion is reserved for me, why? Because, no doubt, it is prehended by others, but the others onlyprehend it in confused fashion. There is a portion of the world that Iprehend, that I express clearly. The others express it only in confused fashion. However limited it might be, don't take away my own goods, my private domain. Prehensions, he gives them a name, are perceptions, and Leibniz will create a splendid theory that we will see in our third part, a splendid theory of tiny perceptions to the extent that, on this point, Whitehead has strictly nothing to add. And no one will have... Wait, I take back what I am saying; [Pause] there will be almost nothing to add to such a theory as beautiful as Leibniz's theory of tiny perceptions, which are really unconscious prehensions. [Pause] We have seen finally how *self-enjoyment* was related to Leibnizian joy and optimism.

And finally, subjective aim is exactly, it seems to me, what Leibniz calls appetite. In the end he will say finally, to sum up everything: what are the deepest characteristics of the monad? The deepest characteristics of the monad are perception and appetite. And he will define perception by the detail of what changes; perception is the detail of what changes, and appetite is the internal principle of change. Begin, *Monadology*, paragraph... [Deleuze searches in his edition],

paragraph... "It follows from that what we said" -- paragraph 11 and after -- "that natural changes in a monad . . . come from an internal force . . . But in addition to the general force for change, . . . there must be the detailed nature of the changing substance, this being what makes it belong to one species rather than another. This detailed nature must bring . . .", and there you are, and he will baptize them perception and appetite.... [*End of cassette; interruption in the Web Deleuze transcript*] "The action of the internal force that brings about the change [or the passage] from one perception to another can be called appetite."<sup>9</sup> Fine, there, I won't say anything more since this enters largely into the third part [of the course]. I am just saying that here is the psychological criterion of substance. For Leibniz, the psychological principle of substance will launch us into our final problem. The psychological principle of substance is: perception and appetite are the elements of substance. Substance is an ego (*moi*); there we have the psychological criterion. Substance is an ego of which the component elements are perception and appetite, confronted with substance being a "I think, therefore I am" from Descartes. I believe that on this point, we will be led to create an opposition between the two [kinds of substance]. Fine.

Such that we continue to move forward, and now we have to draw conclusions... Yes, are there any points that... Ah, but no, oh la la... But no, I forgot something essential. Aie, aie, aie, aie... Let's go back, with a final effort. Yes, this is essential, otherwise I'd be angry with myself for having forgotten it. How did I manage to... Ah, yes, I know why I forgot it: it's because I didn't want to present it to you, right! [*Laughter*] Ah, this is idiotic, but no, one more effort then... I wanted to ease off on you, but after all, there's no... There remains a problem here. – [*Pause; interruption, Deleuze speaks to several students*] I am sure that you can be more comfortable by sliding over a bit... Yes, get yourself situated more comfortably, ok? ... And in fact, we can make some... Don't leave, ok, because when you leave, I have noticed that you only return in a very uncertain way, [*Laughter*] but we can stop for two minutes if you have questions to ask, on the condition that these questions imply no answers, [*Laughter*] and aren't of the kind "When did something occur?"... [*Noises of movements in the room; interruption of the BNF recording, then return, with the sound of Deleuze's successive groans, recalling the students to a certain order*]

#### Part 4

Fine, then, it's well known that Whitehead's philosophy rests on two great notions – he doesn't have only two! – The two great concepts are actual occasions and eternal objects. We have not said a word about eternal objects. I will proceed quickly; you recall what actual objects are, they're events, events insofar as they are conditioned by series, by vibratory series, and are composed by prehensive elements, the elements of prehension. It's what gives us the event. But it's odd – notice this -- because there's nothing that subsists in all that. Vibrations [*Pause*] never stop circulating. [*Pause*] If I think about what I cannot yet think, since it's our third part, if I think about the body, here I am jumping from Whitehead to Leibniz, but I beg you, since we are talking about their commonality (*communauté*). [*Pause*]

Paragraph 71 of *Monadology*: "Some people who have misunderstood my ideas" -- he's denouncing a misunderstanding of his thought, so that we no longer have to do so -- "have thought me to have implied that each soul has a mass or a portion of matter which is its own and is assigned to it forever." In other words, when I would speak to you about bodies, Leibniz tells



us, don't go thinking that each soul has a body that belongs to it. And why? "All bodies are in a perpetual state of flux, like rivers" -- he knows Heraclitus's phrase -- "with parts" -- corpuscles -- "constantly coming into them and going out", they never stop going out. It's the same for vibratory waves. But moreover, perceptions of the monad, details of what changes, all that never stops changing. You will tell me: fine, but we could foresee all that since we introduced the factor of duration as the final component, with the subjective aim, something that endures and that creates a synthesis of the present with the near past and the near future.

But duration, what does that mean? It could last a hundred years, but that doesn't at all answer the question. The Great Pyramid endures, yes, but in relation to what? It lasts longer than a fly, that's all. We mustn't confuse a something that lasts with true permanence, or if you prefer, with something eternal. I can say that a mountain lasts, but a mountain is an event, as much as a fly, no more and no less. It's an event, not on the same scale. To grasp the mountain as event, that is, as incessant folding (*plissement*), that never stops folding and refolding (*se plisser, se replisser*), since it loses its molecules at every instant, it also renews its molecules. So it recommences eternally its own folding. I only have duration, agreed, that's all.

And duration possibly gives me the similar (*le semblable*). A wave follows after a wave, a vibration follows after a vibration, which makes me say: it is the same (*même*). The problem of the same is not in the least exhausted by duration, however long it might be. The same is not the continuous. What is the problem of the same? What makes me say: it's the same wave? You will tell me: generality? No, since I say it even at the level of the individual. It's the same Pierre that I saw yesterday; moreover it's the same note in the concert. I was saying, I chose the example: Ah yes, it's [Alban] Berg's "si" (*le "si" de Berg*).<sup>10</sup> Ah yes, it's such a color. Ah yes, it's the green of a particular painter. [Pause] There you have all that Whitehead is going to call eternal objects. The eternal object is what I recognize as the same -- you see the difference -- throughout a plurality of events or actual occasions. I say: it's the Great Pyramid. Ah yes, there you have the Great Pyramid! You sense that there was something unexplained in events, actual occasions. How can I say that it's the same Great Pyramid? Ha, it's the Great Pyramid. Ah yes, it hasn't moved! Ha, you haven't aged at all, Pierre! Pierre, you haven't aged, it's you. I recognize you. I don't say: a wave follows after another wave, I don't say: Pierre follows after Pierre. I say: it's you, Pierre. I say: Oh, hello, O Great Pyramid! These are all the types of propositions that we have to take into account, eternal object and not actual occasions.

And Whitehead's vocabulary becomes very beautiful, very poetic. He defined the event as a concrescence. You can choose: it's a concrescence of series that condition it, or a concrescence of prehensions that compose it. Every event is a concrescence. But he is going to define eternal objects as ingressions: the eternal object makes ingression into the event. And it's in this ingression of the eternal object that I can say: it's the Great Pyramid! It's a "si"! Ah, the "si", you heard it?! Or else, did you see this Prussian blue! This very special blue that isn't even Prussian blue, that we only find... you saw it! There you have the eternal object that makes ingression into and causes waves succeeding waves. You say: but it's the same thing. Only you don't say "it's the same thing" of the wave that is no longer completely the same; you say it's the same thing of a certain type of object that you are going to call internal objects insofar as they make ingression into events. And you see, it's not without some coyness that Whitehead could claim a link to Plato in saying: ah well yes, eternal object are bit like what Plato called Ideas.

Only for Whitehead, eternal objects are nothing other than the components of the event insofar as they make ingression into the event.

So, what will these eternal objects be? He distinguished three kinds, at first glance. In the simplest text, he distinguishes three kinds. The Sensibles: this green! This shade of color! Useless to say: the color, it also is an eternal object, but it's not simply generalities. This blue! This green! This musical note! This group of notes! And in fact, think again of my example. We are at the concert, we hear Vinteuil's music, and there, Charlus prehends the little musical phrase, the famous little phrase by Vinteuil.<sup>11</sup> He prehends it and he looks at it, he listens to it with great emotion. It's Morel who is playing it. It's his [Charlus's] lover who is playing it. It's composed of a certain aggregate of very individualized notes that Proust details; it's extremely well analyzed. And there it's a prehension of the little phrase, but that Charlus has heard thousands of times communicated by other sound waves.

You see, the eternal object is the same that makes ingression into a plurality of actual occasions, all concerts in which I have heard this little phrase, at least in which I await the moment at which it will burst forth and when I say: ah yes, there it is! Or else I say: oh no, the bastard, he ruined it! [Laughter] And if I say, the bastard, he ruined it, I would have the equivalent... Don't be surprised, henceforth, that Whitehead uses the term: there are conceptual *feelings*. The conceptual *feeling* is the rapport of the prehension, how it's no longer to other prehensions, but to eternal objects that make ingression into the event. And if there are conceptual *feelings*, there are negative conceptual *feelings*, of the type like those I described: how can someone massacre such a work? It could happen that someone says, to the orchestra leader: but my God, how can someone massacre such a work? I would have a negative *feeling*, [Deleuze laughs] a conceptual negative *feeling*. If it's just the opposite, [then] I am waiting for it, I am waiting for it, and it's coming.

So, it varies; it's not beautiful, but I suppose that an eternal object has its fringe of variations, but it is completely individualized. It's not a generality. It's really: Which sound aggregate? There you have the example of a sensible eternal object. And you can imagine thousands and thousands and thousands of "concert" events, a thousand concerts, and it will always be this eternal object that makes ingression at a particular moment. So it's really something very different from actual occasions, the eternal objects with their ingressions.

And then there are scientific eternal objects: atoms, electrons, triangles, etc. It seems obvious to me; there are rare texts by Whitehead going in this direction. There also have to be eternal objects of *feelings*. *Feelings* also do not guarantee their identity. There certainly must be an eternal object [as] "anger"; why? Or else isn't it necessary? You get angry (*literally, tu fais ta colère, you are creating your anger*), or there he goes, he's getting his anger on. He's getting his anger on. It's time to get out of here, he's getting into "his anger"; "his anger" is what? It's not me that... As if anger were able to be individual. In fact, a hatred, an anger are perfectly individuated. People have a style of anger, and generally it's even for that reason that one doesn't recognize them. There are grand choleric about whom we will never know to what point they are choleric because they have a style of anger that precisely does not have – how to say it? – has no kind of tempo. There are people about whom one knows immediately when they are going to get angry; there are even more complicated cases. What is the secret of their anger? But "your

anger”, it’s an eternal object, provided that... Ah, yes, is this one of them? If it makes ingression into a plurality of events, into diverse events: imagine a very choleric woman, to change things since we always refer...! It’s certain that this woman’s anger, and not anger in general, is an eternal object.

So there would be *feelings* of eternal objects, just as there is the Great Pyramid-event, there is the Great Pyramid-eternal object, one is a concrescence, the other is ingression. Isn’t it the same thing for *feelings*, my most important problems? I mean, to define eternal objects, how does Whitehead define eternal objects? He says: these are determinabilities or potentialities. Why? Because, in fact, they only are actualized in events: Vinteuil’s little phrase is only a potentiality that comes into actual existence only in an actual occasion, that is, when it is performed. Otherwise it’s a pure potentiality. Yet, this does not keep it, as pure potentiality, from having a fully individual existence. It’s very important, all this. You have to play around... I mean, there’s no difficulty, but to get you used to this mode of thought, you have to play with it: “this green”! is a pure potentiality. Imagine: the world is haunted by potentialities. What is a ghost? How many little phrases are strolling around in the world, [phrases] that have never been actualized and will perhaps never be? And what is their mode of existence, do they have any? Is there a mode of existence for them? Perhaps. One must reflect deeply about that.

In any case, it’s quite insufficient. We cannot define eternal objects as simple forms of recognition. For the moment, we have to take account of this – [*Deleuze turns toward a student*] Are you the one eating? [*Laughter*] Do it, do it quickly, all at once, see? There... If people are arriving, they always arrive when someone is politely being really careful, and then it’s ten times more catastrophic than ... [*Laughter*] – So, I am saying, as simple forms of recognition, that just doesn’t suffice, that doesn’t suffice. Fortunately, we have the means... And it’s almost, I don’t mean that they just stay put there, especially since, given that Whitehead is above all a physicist-mathematician, he does not stay put there. An electron is not a form of recognition, it’s entirely something else. Once again, there is the electron, a particle carried by a wave, and that’s the electron-actual occasion. Then there’s the electron-eternal object. Strange, suddenly things have doubled in his works. You have the eternal object making ingression into the event, and the event with its components.

And I say, obviously not. Leibniz would give us what we want. – If you recall what we did... For me... As a result of our preceding analyses, if you don’t recall, it’s no problem, it’s of no importance. If you recall, so much the better -- there are three sorts of eternal objects. In my view, or in the manner of Leibniz, I would define them as follows: there is a first sort of the eternal objects, the definables or demonstrables. Definable or demonstrable objects: these are all those that enter into whole-part rapports. These are extensities. A second sort of the eternal objects: the requisites or limits and rapports between limits, all those that re-enter into the intensities. When I say the sound has a height, intensity, a timbre, these are three eternal objects. And finally, the third sort of the eternal objects: the singularities. You see that individuals who are very special compositions (*composés*) of singularities do not enter, I believe, into eternal objects. Individuals are transmitters (*porteurs*); they condense, they contract singularities, eternal objects; that is, eternal objects make ingression into the individuals. On the other hand, eternal objects are perfectly singular, but these are not individuals. So there you have it.... Yes?

Richard Pinhas: A precise question that falls into the framework being developed...

Deleuze [*while sitting and rocking*]: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah (*ouais ouais ouais ouais!*).

Pinhas: If we take the case of a green suit, or even the green of this suit, we have on one hand the potentiality and, on the other hand, its realization. In the case of writing a musical piece, it happens that we have, on one hand – and I would really like to know how you place it, because that interests me, the musical work thought through by the composer – we have stage 1, in his head, and second the writing of the musical partition, that is, the written work but not yet performed, and third, the work performed by the orchestra, that is, realized and audible. The sensation [is] that it is three domains, so a multiplicity of domains.

Deleuze: Yes, I think it's very interesting; yes, your comment is completely correct. In such a process of ingression, to speak like him [Whitehead], in an ingression, one must speak about several levels. If we say a potentiality is actualized, by necessity the actualization is not a homogeneous process. An actualizing thing is actualized on successive levels, and sometimes to short-circuit a particular level. For example, in fact, let's take the example of a musical piece: so how does that begin? What could one call the kernel, even before the piece exists? What is it? I'd say what there is -- but here I proceed from my own understanding – I would say, you know, at the base of everything in music, there is the ritornello/refrain. The basis is a little refrain. You might say: where is this little refrain? It could be in the air. It's not human; it could be cosmic. It might be a little refrain over there, in a distant galaxy. So a little refrain, everything starts with that.

Let's suppose that this little refrain gets seized... -- Ah, shit, I no longer have any memory, it's very odd: each time that I want a precise proper name, it slips away. That's aging; it's terrible. Mahler's "The Song of the Earth," that's it. -- It gets seized by Mahler. I insist on this because he really is a captor of refrains, but finally he's not the only one. Already nothing other than his prehension of the eternal object. You see, prehension is no longer prehension of prehension, it's prehension of an eternal object. The prehension of an eternal object [is] when it's Mahler who prehends the little refrain; it's not the same thing when it's you or me. Why? Because, without speaking about his particular genius, he apprehends already through an entire technical armature that, in some cases, some among you have, but me, I don't have it. Already these prehensions are different. [There's a] popular tune, at a Hungarian corner café; I'm having an aperitif with, -- ah, there's another name – next to Bartok, it's obvious that in the little Hungarian tune that we hear, Bartok's prehension is different. But I say a little refrain, that could initially be non-sound (*non sonore*), and the musician grasps it as a sound refrain. For example, a movement: you see two children walking along in a certain way. They don't need to sing in order for this to be a little refrain.

So there you have it. The eternal object, if you tried to define its kernel, it's the little refrain. And then what happens? Prehension is a first level of actualization, prehension not of the prehension, but of the eternal object. You see, then, each time it is forking: my prehension of the little refrain connects to other prehensions, and that's the actual occasion aspect. And on the other hand, it's prehension of the eternal object, of the little refrain bouncing along in the air. But you say to me: but where does it come from? I wouldn't tell you. No one wants to ask that! There are

philosophies in which there are reasons to ask that, but not here. There is no reason to ask where the little refrain comes from. At that moment, one would answer with insults, a blow from a stick. A blow from a stick is also a little refrain. So we will have answered as was required. [*End of the Web Deleuze transcript*]

Fine, so, it's Mahler who gives it obviously -- there, prehending, prehending his eternal object, this kind of pure potentiality -- who gives it a level of actualization. He goes back home and writes; he takes his music paper and he writes, he writes something. It's a new level of actualization. He's really going to compose; he notes down the little phrase there like Vinteuil no doubt noted his little phrase. He could have done it on ... on his shirt sleeve, [*Pause*] and he truly composes, a new level of actualization. And nonetheless, it's still potentiality. It will have to be performed. What is music that hasn't been performed? It's already at a high level of actuality, but there you will have to perform it. Yes, that's enough.

So, for all the examples you have, as long as it hasn't been performed, to some extent, it must be performed as if the process of actualization demanded this final thing. Specifically the ingression will not be definitive as long as it isn't created in an occasion that unites all the characteristics of the event. For I could perhaps show that, at each level, there are only certain characteristics of the actual occasion that are realized. But only the performance in concert will yield for music, what, what they called in the Middle Ages the ultimate act, the ultimate act of the form, the ultimate element of actuality. And then, for other disciplines, that doesn't seem to be the same thing. I don't have a feeling, for example, that exhibiting in a painting exhibition has the same meaning in pictorial actualization as performing for musical actualization. It's something else. It's not... Writing is something else again. What is the ending, what is the ultimate act of writing? There are many authors who thought, in the end, [that] the reading act was required, that is, one had to read. Fortunately, it's an idea that has disappeared because... because... yes, ok. Fine, you see? All these are problems that we have to ask ourselves.

As a result, finally, I am getting to these necessary conclusions about... Henceforth, if it's true that everything is event and that even eternal objects make ingressions into events, [*Pause*] everything always brings us back to this new conception. What is henceforth this new theory of substance that Leibniz proposes to us, a theory about which we saw in advance that we could call it Mannerist? And here, I'd like to tell you -- we won't have the time, we never have enough time, I don't know, I'll never get finished, if this continues -- I want to relate to you how I see things.

We could say -- this is just to give you some ideas; you must not believe what I am saying -- I tell myself the Greeks, you know, the Greeks in Greek philosophy, something strikes me, it's that they thought... What could define the Greek mind? And I'd say that it's a prodigious way of thinking as a function of an entire play of oppositions, and that Greek philosophy began like that: constructing the play of principal oppositions, perhaps. And this will go right to Aristotle, [*Pause*] although there was another element that already would be introduced, starting from Plato, would already be introduced, but anyway... About opposition, they have an extraordinarily supple notion. If you think -- a typical example -- I will state as reference point two. Reference point: the philosophers that were called the Great Physicists, the first, for whom

the great problem is to establish oppositions between primary elements: the dry and the wet, the hot and the cold, water and earth, etc., and henceforth, transformation, cyclical transformations.

Second fundamental point, for me, is the Aristotelian theory of oppositions. -- It's something that you have to learn by heart, but I don't have the time to teach it to you, the theory of opposites in Aristotle. -- And all of Greek thought seems to me... I am saying that there is another element, yes; I believe that this other element is what emerges under a rather different term, it's -- I've just said it -- it's the theme of difference. And it's odd how in Plato, perhaps the difference emerges as a function and in very complex relations with structures of opposition. [Pause] In Aristotle as well, it's on structures of opposition that the whole theme of specific differences is founded, the theme of difference. And then, with the neo-Platonists, I am saying, it's almost the end of the Greek world, and if you recognize it in this, what the theme of difference brings it, brings it of a [inaudible] symmetry starting with Plotinus. This seems obvious to me about the theme of opposition. [Pause]

I am providing a real bird's eye view. It's so... I am speaking solely for those for whom this might offer some ideas, but above all, don't believe me! All this doesn't go without saying; this will only be good if you know how to derive something from it. I mean it's not at all, ... I'm saying it like this, and the way I am saying it, it's even stupid, it's even arbitrary; it's like, take this as pure hypotheses, as impressions.

I am telling you, the whole Middle Ages, do you realize? They talked that way through the entire Middle Ages. What does one see? Provided that I can... Let's stick with the Gothic. What is the great Gothic thought? I believe that, of course, Christianity has passed on. But about the Gothic, we could say that it's a profusion; of course, the Gothic is a profusion, but a profusion of what? It's odd that... It's not a question of opposition; of course, we find great texts on opposition in the Middle Ages, and this is not what's central. The question is no longer: how do things oppose each other in a way that one can emerge from the other? And you sense well why? It's that the Christians don't particularly care for these stories of transformation. These Christians don't at all relate to something being able to emerge from something else. This is a Greek idea, things emerging and able to emerge from something else. Of course, they cannot avoid a physics of elements and their transformations, but it's here that they are the strongest. It's not by chance that they are going to make of movement, of local movement, something increasingly established because local movement is opposed to alteration, that is to qualitative changes. I don't particularly like that there is a relation between Christianity and mechanism. It's obvious that Christianity never cared for movements other than local ones, that is, movements of alteration, qualitative alteration.

But in the end, there's a great profusion. And what is in profusion in the Gothic? I'd say that what's in profusion are all the even craziest kinds of distinction, and that's what's in play. Here I wouldn't agree with -- well, "I wouldn't agree with", this is among the stupid propositions. -- There's [Wilhelm] Wörringer who is a fundamental critic, who has written on the Gothic, and then [Erwin] Panofsky as well. They agree that, they tend to say, yes, look closely, between Gothic architecture and the syllogistic in philosophy, there are extremely deep relations. [Pause] So, good, fine, yes, I'm not saying they are wrong, not at all, not at all. But, that's not what striking to me; that's not what's striking to me. I tell myself, ah well yes, certainly, but for me,

that doesn't finish this off... It's not at all that... I am not pretending to say something better; I am pretending to say something different, which doesn't exclude that...

But what strikes me is that the Gothic is not only the art of the syllogism; it's not the syllogistic. It's a very astonishing art, an art of invention of modes of distinction that is in all directions. It's teeming there; it's a profusion of modes of distinction. And the disputes between great philosophers of the Middle Ages appear to me less of the kind "And what about your syllogism?" than the kind "How do you distinguish this or that?" That is, fine, God is three persons in one. What kind of distinction [is this]? What is this? What is the distinction of persons in God? *[Pause]* What is the distinction between form and matter? You will tell me, but that's just pure Aristotle, what is the distinction between form and matter? Look, look at whether in Aristotle the question, "What is the distinction between form and matter?", if it's not necessarily [posed] through, first, in what manner are matter and form opposed in order that the question of distinction might be asked, whereas, on the contrary, the opposition form-matter that exists perfectly in the Middle Ages and that exists equally, but [where] it's the question of distinction that has become primary. What distinction is there between this and that? What distinction is there between the world... And you sense that for Christianity, it's necessarily a problem of distinction, that they are not going to say, for example, that the world is opposed to God. They will say this from certain perspectives; the world is finite, and God is infinite, the world is bad and God is good. They will say all this, but if Christians pushed the opposition, if they pushed this, they are going to reconcile it immediately.

Their problem is the problem of distinction. What distinction is there between God and the world? Is God in the world? Is the world in God? Is one exterior to the other? In any case, one must not confuse God and the world. But if I say, the world is in God, or if I say, God is in the world, or if I say, God and the world are exterior to one another, these are three different kinds of distinction. What are these kinds of distinctions? Let us reflect on the kinds of distinction. They will not cease multiplying distinctions. And if you take the two great philosophers of the Middle Ages, notably Saint Thomas and Duns Scotus, with a preference that you all have for Duns Scotus, *[Laughter]* you'll see! Scotus is someone who never stops adding continually onto the pile of distinctions. Oh, we have to add more still! There is no one who understood the innovation in Duns Scotus's words; there are some admirable pages, admirable about the necessity of introducing a new kind of distinction. In the end, I think that fundamentally this thought is a creative profusion on the modes of distinction and their distribution through God, the world and creatures. And perhaps, after all, the syllogism depends on this; we'd have to see, I don't know. I don't know if the two ideas, the one I am proposing to you and the one from *[inaudible]* are easy to reconcile or else if... Well, I don't know, but anyway, it doesn't matter.

And so, I'd say, still going quickly, the Classical is what? -- *[There's a noise that disturbs Deleuze]* Oh, that really pisses me off, that (*ça me fait chier*) ... This isn't even human! – The Classical is what? It's a return to order. You know the Classical; it's required, and I'm not saying that this is bad, it's fine and maybe necessary, and anyway, the Classicists are creators. But there is no doubt that you recognize Classical authors based on there being a kind of return to order, this is clear. And it's all finished, eh? Finished, the Gothic! No more of that silliness! *[Laughter]* No, no, no, no, that cannot last, no more inventing like that. No more of that kind of profusion. We are putting everything in order. There are no more of the x kinds of distinctions. And you

don't know how to think because you distinguish every which way, and you distinguish every which way because you are inventing humanity through this pile of distinctions, and this is properly idiotic!

And it's Descartes, and certainly, Descartes is the one who says, "I think, therefore I am", but it's also he that says "Let's deal with this problem of distinction". There are three types of distinction, and not one more, and literally, eat shit (*je vous emmerde*), that is, it's on this tone! Why are the Middle Ages horrible? Because they no longer know what is distinct from what and in what form! There's urgency in the logic of making and imposing a new logic that will be the logic of distinction. There are only three distinctions. One will be called "real", the real distinction; the other will be called "of reason," the distinction of reason; and the third will be called "modal", and all other distinctions are cut off and deemed to be valueless. [*Pause*]

Example: fortunately, fortunately, you know that Descartes's *Meditations* – there was a book by Descartes called the *Meditations* – and this book gave rise to objections, with Descartes's complete agreement. That is, a certain number of very important thinkers of the era read it and raised objections to Descartes, and Descartes answered their objections. And I don't mean that the second and third sort of texts are less important, but I say they are all equally important, and that, in fact, the *Meditations* includes two other books, that are inseparable as well as the objections made to Descartes and Descartes's responses to these objections. And, happiness of happiness! A disciple of Scotus belonged to those making objections to Descartes, that is, [Johannes] Caterus, the great Caterus, the very great Caterus, and Caterus is very poorly treated in his answers by Descartes who treats him, I dare say, it's an abomination. [*Laughter*] And Caterus goes and says – and this is why I am referring to this – But you know, the old formal distinction that Duns Scotus called the formal "distinction", this is decidedly better than what you are telling us, and this is very irritating for you [Descartes]! And so there, Descartes becomes very, very nasty, [*Laughter*] extremely nasty, and says that these are superstitions from the Middle Ages; the formal distinction is nothing other than having poorly understood the real distinction, and he refuses everything else, right?

Finally, I think that if Descartes can create this return to order from the viewpoint of distinctions, this is because he has two models that will allow him to do so, the two models of which he is perfectly the inventor, a geometric model and an arithmetic model. -- [*Deleuze turns to someone near him, perhaps his colleague in the math department, Marek*] I am not saying the opposite of you, but algebra is precisely in this case, a kind of Combinatory; that is, I wouldn't say algebra, he makes of geometry and arithmetic precisely into the Combinatory, the new Combinatory of the new arithmetic and the new geometry. This doesn't matter, I'll try to explain more or not explain... --

So grant me that perhaps this return to order is severe in the problems, in the mess of distinctions from the Middle Ages, the distinctions of scholasticism, [and this return to order] is made possible by Descartes's arithmetic and geometric criteria. And what happens after? ... And the whole Cartesian theory of substance is founded on the use of the three distinctions. We cannot say anything there... -- It seems to me, in my view, it's always bad to say that, you will correct it yourselves – it seems difficult to me to understand the Cartesian theory of substance if we don't take account of the exercise of the three kinds of distinction that Descartes proposes.



And what happens after? After, there is going to be a rather diabolical operation, it seems to me, a diabolical operation. It's that Descartes sufficiently imposed himself, notably scientifically; he has a position and it's impossible to react directly against Descartes, not at all possible. So, Descartes's successors are going to hold firm: fine, we are not restoring Aristotle; we don't return to the Greeks, oh no! We don't return to the Gothic, to the Middle Ages, oh no, no, no, no question of going back there! And under the name of Cartesian distinctions, they are in fact going to bring back the whole Middle Ages and all the Greeks, and even worse sometimes, [Laughter] even worse sometimes, that is, Spinoza [Pause] and Leibniz. What are they going to do? And this is what I will call the Baroque, the return of movement, beyond the Classical Cartesian world, the return of the process of distinctions, in kinds of discoveries with the Greeks, with Aristotle, with the Middle Ages, [Pause] but without, it seems to me, a return to, if you will.. As they moved back past, generally, back past Descartes, without returning to Aristotle and Duns Scott. The answer is nearly Leibniz.

And it's through this that I would already like to introduce the third part. What remains for me to do is: what is he [Leibniz] going to do? How is he going to retransform all the problems of distinctions, of recreating all the distinctions, with Leibniz's philosophy, and all the distinctions that are recreated without, however, this being a return to the Middle Ages? [Pause] And yet, he makes it entirely his own. You will see, we'll see the next time how Leibniz, in his theory of substance, reactivates all Aristotle against Descartes, how he reintroduces all the distinctions of the Middle Ages, seeming to say, being content to say – and here he pushes his cleverness quite far – he says that Descartes was completely right, but simply he never fully understood what one must understand by real distinction! And with this pitiless argument – Descartes was right to tell us that there are three distinctions, only Descartes never understood anything about these three distinctions – [Laughter] Leibniz suppresses the most prodigious distinctions of scholastic thought, but by also renewing them thanks to what? Thanks to his very own mathematics. It's these that give him the means, and his own mathematics, you think that I am going again to say, ah it's differential calculus or it's the series. No, there is something that is more important than everything, specifically – let's look for the domain.

I am saying that the Cartesian theory of distinctions rests finally on the arithmetic and geometric instruments that Descartes forges at the same period. As for Leibniz, if he is the man of infinite series and if he is the man of differential calculus and of infinitesimal calculus, this is for a much simpler reason – I am going to be saying childish things here – for a much simpler reason that makes possible his extremely complex discoveries in mathematics. It's because he discovers harmonics. The domain, I would say to complete this term, Leibniz's domain is harmonics in its dual difference with the arithmetic and the geometric, such that again, I am pleading to convince you of something: it is stupid, it is desperate; [there is] no reason to believe that one can understand Leibniz, and notably a famous theory of Leibniz that is called pre-established harmony and which is at the center of all of Leibniz's philosophy -- and that we will see in the third part -- if one does not question oneself on the simplest level and if one does not take seriously the term harmony. To my knowledge, Leibniz is the first philosopher who, on the level of the most rudimentary examples of mathematics, uses harmony, that is, the harmonic rapport or the mean called harmonic in distinction to the arithmetic mean and the geometric mean.

The goal for our discovery will be to help each other a bit. If I have asked several here with competence in music to consider with particular attention this problem of harmony, it's because I have this idea in mind as having to constitute the essential aspect of our third term, but this is obviously starting from the concepts of harmony and the harmonic rapport that we will be able to create the whole of, or to assemble all the elements that we have on Leibniz's philosophy.

So, what I want to say is that this is where we are. The next time, I still have two things left; I've moved forward a bit. For our return,<sup>12</sup> I still have to sum up a kind of presentation on substance in Leibniz, some very rapid conclusions that will be increasingly rapid, on what we must henceforth understand regarding philosophy, and then we will plunge forward into this question.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> As Deleuze announced during the 17 March session that the course would not meet until 31 March, given his absence from Paris on Tuesday 24 March, one might wonder why the class had to wait until 7 April to meet again. Although Deleuze says nothing at all about the extra week break, he perhaps had no need to given the events that took place on the Vincennes-St. Denis campus during the 27-30 March weekend, specifically the Estates General of Students that met and entailed the arrival on campus of some ten to fifteen thousand students from all regions of France. It is likely that the assembly's continuation into the start of the week produced a certain amount of disorder that required a few days before the regular schedule of classes could start. This session, therefore, serves as much as an extended review of much that Deleuze developed on 17 March as also a conclusion of what he refers to as the final session of part II of the year's work, preparing for the third trimester to begin after Easter break on 28 April.

The translation begins with a new transcription (approx. 5 minutes) from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) recordings, then follows mostly (with a few small gaps) the Web Deleuze transcript, ending with approximately 30 more minutes directly transcribed from the BNF recordings.

<sup>2</sup> The third section of *The Fold* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) has "Having A Body" as the global title, and Deleuze addresses this question immediately in chapter 7, "Perception in the Folds," cf. p. 85; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1988), p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, 1900; cf. the Bertrand Russell Society Library, online.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *The Fold*, p. 33; *Le Pli*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *The Fold*, pp. 78-79; *Le Pli*, pp. 105-107.

<sup>6</sup> Deleuze slightly modifies the order of this quote in his reading; Cf. *Discourse on Metaphysics*, <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/leibniz> (accessed 8 December 2019).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Principles of Nature and Grace*, <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/leibniz> (accessed 8 December 2019).

<sup>8</sup> Deleuze develops this reflection on being worthy of one's events in *Logic of Sense* (NYC: Columbia University Press, 1990), Twenty-First Series on the Event.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Monadology*, <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/leibniz> (accessed 8 December 2019).

<sup>10</sup> Reference to the note in Alban Berg's *Wozzeck*. Deleuze develops this elsewhere in the seminars, and notably in "O as in Opera" in *L'Abécédaire*.

<sup>11</sup> Reference to Proust's fictional character (Charlus) and fictional composer (Vinteuil) in *Remembrance of Things Past*.

<sup>12</sup> Easter break creates a 3-week hiatus.