

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 15, 28 April 1987: Principles and Freedom (10) -- “What is Philosophy?” and the Notion of Substance

Transcribed and Translated by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:47:15)¹

Part 1

[We have discussed] Whitehead, Leibniz, and so what concerned me in this confrontation was the version that Whitehead gave of a veritable exclamation, the exclamation, “Yes, everything is event”. So, you understand, I’d like for you to benefit from this also to reflect on what all this means for the philosophical enterprise. Whitehead is a great philosopher because, not that he uses the word “event” more often than another, but because he formulates an original concept that didn’t exist before him, which is the concept of event, that he thinks is capable of accounting for what? Well, for what concerns us or what happens to us. And happens to us where? In life, but also in science, but also in the arts, but also in thinking, not that all of these are the same thing, but because the components of the event are, according to him, capable of accounting for us, of making us understand its different domains and their rapports.

So what is it to be interested, if one does philosophy, what is it to be interested in Whitehead? Above all, it’s that you feel you have something in common with him; it’s telling yourself that, yes indeed, and you get what I am trying to say, it’s something that would be valid for other domains than philosophy. I could say, what does it mean to feel an irresistible interest for a particular painter or a particular musician? It’s obviously not saying that the artist is better than another, so what does this mean? It’s saying, yes indeed, I have something that connects with him (*quelque chose à faire avec lui*). Having something that connects you with Whitehead is already to have a kind of common base with him. This common base, perhaps you didn’t know that you had it before stumbling onto Whitehead. But what do I mean when I say, ah, these lines, I would like to have been worthy of writing them, or what do I mean when I say, these lines say something to me, other than that they speak from this common base that they awaken in me at the same time as they develop what Whitehead is telling you? I have a common base with Whitehead if, to some extent, I tell myself, why yes, I have always lived in this way or I have often thought in this way, that perhaps there are only events.

Inversely, what does it mean to put Whitehead aside? To put Whitehead aside, this is very simple. It no doubt means being enlivened by other problems, other kinds of problems that cause you to think, rightly or wrongly – but right or wrong, you get that we are in domains where this expression has even lost all meaning – you consider that the components of the universe or the components of thought aren’t determinable as events, but as something else, something else, which would be what? Fine, I am not saying that “everything is event” is the final expression, or was truer than another. All that we can say is that it’s an important, interesting proposition or, if you will, that it would have to have a particular weight. You could imagine units of measure, that there’s a weight to this proposition.

So, what attaches us to one philosopher rather than to another? And our whole effort here, before the Easter break, was to show that perhaps among us there are some who have no connection with Whitehead, although they are not at all doing philosophy, but they think and they live quite naturally in terms of events. What does that mean? You know, to think and live in terms of events, you understand, at once that occurs all by itself, but for someone who doesn't come from that world, it's strange. For at that moment, and I include myself, I was telling you, I don't think of myself as... I no longer think of myself in terms of ego, or of subject. I think of myself in terms of events, once I say that an event is not a huge thing. I mean, it's obvious that an event is not individuated (*ne s'individue pas*). There is an individuation of the event, [Pause] so therein lies a possible date for the event, a particular year this occurred, a particular day. I am saying that it goes without saying that an event's individuation is not the [same] kind of individuation as for a person. Are you sure of being individuated as persons?

I choose this example because those who think this, what are the reasons that they think this? Those who think that they are individuated as persons, if they are philosophers, they have to construct a concept of persons or a concept of individuation that will correspond to – what to call this? – this pre-philosophical belief. And between the two, those who, in a pre-philosophical way, think of themselves to be individuated as persons and those who think themselves to be individuated as, literally, as gusts of air, of wind – a wind is not something huge –, I ask you what sense there can be in the question of who is right or wrong between the two. And furthermore, I add, I ask you, hoping that you anticipated what it means to do philosophy, I ask you: what can it possibly mean to have an argument (*discussion*) between the two? And I ask finally: where do these affinities come from that each of us feels for one direction or another, one vector or another that results in one author communicating something to us and another author, no less brilliant, communicating nothing, that is, remaining abstract and dead writing? It's here, if what is philosophy has a sense, it's from here that arises our affinity for a particular kind of concept, when we have one. It's possible that we are horrified by the concept, so in that case, it's an entire domain, specifically philosophy, in which we have no business, but this is also totally fine. On the other hand, someone who is not at all a philosopher, what can he/she expect from philosophy? These violent affinities that shoot through him/her, but really, are like flashes of fire sometimes when he/she says, what is he creating in a painting? And yes indeed, this was something analogous or that has an expressible relation with a particular concept in philosophy. It's not a question of applying [the concept]; once again, the concept has its autonomy, you know?

So I come back to arguing, arguing, and I was telling you [that] there are never arguments in philosophy. What does that mean? Nothing more than... One can always argue. In a recent witty article by Serge Daney who is the most philosophical of film critics, he says quite correctly that there have always been sites for arguing, and that's the café (*bistrot*). The only thing that would be shocking is to believe that, at the end of two hours of arguing, one had done some work. One might say, I really want to relax so let's go argue for a while; one cannot say that I really want to do some work so I am going out to argue. And I think that, as far as relaxing goes, there are always better forms for relaxing than to argue. But arguing has strictly no meaning because there are two possibilities: either the problems posed by the discussants aren't the same, so at that point, there is no common base that would make an argument (or discussion) possible. At the outside, they can consider how that problem is not the same, and in that case, it's not an argument. It's a common task consisting for each of trying to specify each of their problems. Or

else, the problem is the same, and there is still no place for argument. If the problem is the same, believe me, this is why it's such a stupid idea to suggest that philosophers disagree more than others. I have never seen two philosophers pose the same problem, and they gave opposite solutions. This doesn't exist in philosophy any more than in mathematics. What happens in philosophy are mutations of problems that anyway have the common property of not cancelling out earlier solutions to old problems, to ancient problems, but that regenerate them, that return with them toward a horizon of new problems.²

There are mutations of problems, indeed, but as much as in science. But simply, it's not the same rhythm, and it's obvious that this is not the same kind of mutation. I choose an example that will be clearer. It's said that [concerning] the problem of knowledge (*connaissance*) in philosophy, there has been – I am saying some very scholarly things – there has been an empiricist solution, there has been a rationalist solution, there has been a critical, a Kantian solution, etc. You see how philosophers are different. But when I say "the problem of knowledge", I am saying absolutely nothing. "The problem of knowledge" means nothing. What is the problem of knowledge? It starts by being creative to the extent that it poses a problem in such a manner that the problem has not yet been posed. [Pause] Let's take an example, still on knowledge. For a long while, philosophers repeatedly tried to reach a position on the problem of knowledge with results that I could summarize as follows: how is it possible to have universal and necessary ideas? How is it possible to have necessary and universal ideas? That is, I do not have knowledge as long as I limit it to the level of contingent and particular givens. If I raise myself to necessary and universal relations, I can say then that I have knowledge (*je connais*).

How does one reach universal and necessary ideas, and where do such ideas come from? I can say, fine, this is a way of posing the problem of knowledge. You sense that, for example, the seventeenth century will attain a great refinement in this position on the problem of knowledge. [Pause] In other words, this comes down to saying, the given, what is given to me, is always contingent. Knowing means attaining something that goes beyond the given, notably the idea endowed with universality and necessity. Fine. I can say, good, it's a way of posing the problem of knowledge, but there is not reason to think that it's the only way.

It happens that in the seventeenth century, one heard some odd things. One heard this: when do I really have knowledge? I have knowledge when I myself go beyond the given – you see, this is no longer universal and necessary ideas – when I myself go beyond the given. And me, subject, I never stop going beyond what has been given to me. This is a kind of description. I go beyond what is given to me; why? But I don't stop. I say, tomorrow the sun will rise – philosophical examples are quite simple – tomorrow the sun will rise. [Pause] By what right will it rise? By what right do I go beyond the given? What is given to me is that, since I was born, I saw the sun rise every morning, and then my father told me it was the same for him, and in books I can read that the sun rose. But I am saying something a bit different. I am saying the sun will rise tomorrow. And, tomorrow, by definition, is not given. When tomorrow is given, it has become today. Therefore, as soon as I make a statement of knowledge, I am going beyond what is given to me. Do I have an idea of tomorrow? No, I have no idea. Thus, knowing is not attaining universal and necessary ideas. Knowing is an art of going beyond the given.

Fine, I imagine an argument. The former holder of the problem of knowledge will say, so what you are in the process of defining is not the problem of knowledge. What is it? It's belief. When

you go beyond the given, you do not have knowledge; you believe. I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. I started the argument off poorly because the other is going to answer me, but this is exactly what I mean, specifically that knowledge can only be defined as a case of belief. Every belief is not knowledge, but every [item of] knowledge is belief, is a kind of belief. The problem of knowledge becomes, under what condition is knowledge a belief? [Pause]

Fine. What do both of these have to say to each other? The problem of knowledge has changed; it's not going to stop changing. What is it that we call a great philosopher? [It's] someone who changes the nature of a problem. If I say "everything is event", it's first a handful of problems that I am tossing out. I reject a certain kind of problem; otherwise, why am I doing philosophy? In other words, the philosopher, mistakenly or correctly, is not someone who pretends to be seeking or pursuing or possessing the truth. If there were a notion that never had the slightest meaning in any domain at all, it's the notion of true and false. But I only have one idea about this; it's that the notion of true and false has but one application. It's in school, and its source is uniquely pedagogical, specifically, what is true and false is the solution of a problem that you have to solve. In school, when you are given a problem, there your answer is true or it's false. But in the life of thought, it's not that way because problems are not pre-given. You must invent them, these problems. And in science, it's the same: problems don't exist. One has to invent them. If Einstein gives new solutions to certain problems, it's because he started by inventing these problems. If Leibniz discovers infinitesimal calculus, it's because he poses a certain type of problem that precisely could only be resolved through these procedures.³ [Pause]

So I return to my topic as it concerns you – perhaps we will pick this up later if we have time – I return to my topic. You see, for me, what is most mysterious is this kind of, I think... In some texts that I can no longer locate – and in fact, this bothers me greatly [Laughter] – it indeed seems, from what I recall, that Nietzsche says something like this. He said, you know, concepts come to us from a strange taste (*étrange goût*). All of that is not true and false. When I tell you what matters in thought, it's not true and false because true and false do not strictly exist. What matters in thought is, in fact, the importance of what one says and of what one creates, of whether it has the slightest interest. There are thoughts that, I don't know, where it's strikingly obvious if one poses a problem like that, but one still must pose it like that. If you don't pose the question, "is this interesting or important, what's being said here?", you don't risk answering yes. One must still ask the question. If you ask the question, "is this true or false?", what bothers me greatly in this question is that generally what is called true are the worst platitudes. That might be a truth, an extremely striking truth, a weighty truth. The flatter it is, the more worthless it is, and the more it's true. [Laughter] I am not making a case for the false, or I am not acting like a Sophist. I am saying something else entirely. I am saying, the categories of true and false are perhaps very suspicious categories alongside the infinitely deeper categories that are "importance" and "without importance", "of interest" and "without interest". And about this I am saying, so fine, if I don't think, I feel an affinity for certain authors who can... [Deleuze does not complete this], and then for other reasons, I would perhaps not have an affinity for them because I tell myself quite suddenly, as I recall, hey, I have to go look in these texts by Nietzsche about the concept of taste in philosophy, which is a way of dissociating the concept of the values of true and of false.⁴ I would have to find these texts by Kierkegaard where he says some things like that.

But those among you thinking, for example, that thought is about, no, no, that it's about categories of true and false, at that point, they have no affinity at all with what I am saying. But God be praised, they have their own affinities. There are many philosophers, there are some very great philosophers who have thought that philosophy was about the true and the false, and we even still find them today. Fine. But I have my task. If I am saying, the real categories of thought are the important and the non-important, the interesting and the non-interesting, I must define these categories without having to reintroduce the subjects of true and false.

But I am going to remind you, what would “to argue” (*discuter*) mean? Each of us has so much work to do. I am saying, on one hand, we don't have time to argue, and on the other hand, I don't know what “to argue” means. Arguing in order to determine which is the best, thinking that knowing means having a universal and necessary idea, or even that knowing is going beyond the given through belief? Arguing about this, well, I confess that I don't even understand what that means. Once again, one either discusses while having a common base, and so there is no place for arguing because we are in agreement from the start, we clarify, right, we clarify things. Or else there is no common base, so there is no place for arguing since one person doesn't understand the slightest thing that the other is saying.

This is why the colloquium is truly the most comical among all intellectual activities, with its inherent character that, in fact, is a kind of fantastic enterprise where people come together to talk, talk, talk, and talk, and talk so much strictly within an absolute vacuum of any problems, since in fact, one can only argue from the outside of problems, from the outside of problems.⁵ If I begin to construct my problem well, you know, at that moment then, I encounter the worst thing, people telling me, ah fine, that problem is uninteresting, without any interest. Then we can try to tell them why it is of interest, but this isn't ... [*Deleuze doesn't complete the sentence*]

So, I come back and make an appeal. I am assuming that in this classroom, good, there are perhaps, there are perhaps some, I don't know, this is what interests me, five or ten or twenty people, let's say, for whom Whitehead has a connection. [*Deleuze laughs*] I am insisting on all these awkward words that I use because the question isn't, is Whitehead the truth? It's, do you connect with Whitehead? Does Whitehead propel you into something that, as may be the case, isn't philosophy, but that can be either music, or art, or anything, or ethics, or whatever you like? And I can imagine quite well that you might tell me... And the same thing: do you connect with Leibniz? And if you tell me, no, I bring you a message of hope: philosophers are numerous. There aren't that many, there aren't that many, but there are enough of them so that someone who has no affinity for this one will have an affinity for another one. I know of no one in the world who was born a musician, I know of no one in the world who was born a philosopher, no one in the world etc., if he is aware of what music is about, even quite sketchily, or of what painting is about, or what philosophy is about. Fine.

So this is why it matters to me so much to create this lineage in which, across all its innovation, there is always Nietzsche's expression: imagine a thinker as someone who shoots an arrow and doesn't know where it goes. And then, another thinker has to go find it.⁶ Adorno said exactly the same thing in a very lovely text. He said, well yes, in the end thinking is a bit like an activity consisting of tossing a bottle into the sea, right, and only, what someone has once thought, he said strangely, will necessarily be rethought one day. And I believe that this didn't at all mean that it's repeated, it wouldn't be that. He meant something else, that it will be recreated, that it

will be recreated, that is, there will be someone who picks up the arrow and sends it onward. This is exactly what happens from Leibniz to Whitehead, such that for me, the history of philosophy wouldn't be a kind of succession, as if after Leibniz, there's Kant, or after etc., but this would be these discontinuous paths in which Leibniz's arrow falls, dare I say, into Whitehead's hands, and Whitehead sends it onward. It's your turn to pick it up if that appeals to you, and if it doesn't appeal to you, you just leave all this. But a sky crisscrossed with arrows isn't just nothing. It's not simply intellectual taste; in a certain way, it's lots of aspects of existence that come into play. I see no reason to say... not to say that the great artists and the great philosophers belong, aren't its entirety, but are part of our reasons for living.

So there you have it, and get this, if you come back here, if you are staying here -- I can only understand this year in this way -- it's because Leibniz and Whitehead, to some extent, have something to tell you, even if for you, all that remains very unclear and very confused because understanding, you know, that's what it is. So, of course, the more we understand, the more we know how much better it is, but the initial understanding is this kind of jolt from the arrow when you have already understood something because you connect with it, you connect. You connect as a function of the way in which you yourself live. I always choose this example: do you live like an ego (*un moi*), or do you live as something else? Do you live... Do you see... It's not... It's still not at all the same world, the one in which I am saying not only that there are events, but even that this table is an event, [*Sound of Deleuze striking on the table*] and an entirely other world in which I'd say, there are things, and events settle on these things like I place a sheet of paper on this table. So you are crisscrossed... In the end, what are these affinities that we have with the concept, with concepts? Fine.

So, about this, about this whole topic that we have fortunately completed, Whitehead-Leibniz, are there any questions? [Pause] Or we call on philosophy, in one sense, it's also... Let's come back briefly to the Whitehead example. But it's a procedure (*démarche*), not at all one that I am calling scientific, but it's no less rigorous than the most scientific procedure that might exist. At the end of examining Whitehead, if I'm told, "ok, all this is very pretty, but what is an event according to Whitehead?", I can answer, and I am going to try to answer with three responses or three topics: an event is a concrescence of series; second, it's a nexus of prehensions; and third, it's an ingredience of eternal objects. You'll tell me, this is jargon. Once again we laugh; it's jargon exactly in the way that an abstract painting is a mishmash (*de la bouillie*). And ok, this is fine. Why is it fine? Because all these words mean something, and we have become capable of defining a concrescence, of defining series, of defining nexus and prehensions, of defining ingredience of eternal objects. If someone tells me, all of these are just occupations lacking the value of other occupations, like making the French economy competitive, [Laughter] I say, well, the idea of competition in the French economy is such a paradoxical idea that understanding the problem to which this idea corresponds is a philosophical operation of the highest urgency.... So, no questions?... Yes?

Georges Comtesse: [*The start of the question is inaudible, but it concerns putting into question Whitehead's concept, "everything is event"*] ... that serves to explain or to account for or to justify what is happening, so at that point, one can no longer simply oppose the event with either the ego or the subject. For if we've defined the event as that which takes account or justifies, that is, the principle of reason, we also at the same time must apply the principle of reason to the ego and the subject, and try to discern both the event of the ego and the constitutive event of the

subject, without remaining within the power of understanding, that is, our position is simply parasitic. If everything is event and if we don't define the event of the subject or the event of the ego, then everything is therefore not event, and in the "everything is event", there's an exclusion. That's where the problem lays, precisely the principle that the principle of reason would pose indirectly.

Deleuze: I do see what you are saying.

Comtesse: I choose another example: in the essence of Nietzsche's philosophy, for example, there is a Whitehead-type of proposition. He doesn't say exactly "everything is event"; but he says that one's life is to discern a unique world as folding it over ... *[The example becomes momentarily unclear]* So it's not a question of folding over a unique world with a world of events as a true world, but if this world is that of events of flow and counterflow, it's a question of discerning in this world the law's realization according to necessity, and this law's realization according to necessity is also an event, and which he [Nietzsche] will later call the event of the eternal return. In other words, if we speak of the event, we can no longer oppose event, let's say, to that which in the history of philosophy is what we call the great molar concepts, for example, the Cartesian I, the Hegelian subject, etc. We have to take account of events from this point of view so that precisely everything would be event.

Deleuze: Absolutely, absolutely, with this nuance. *[Pause]* It's that within the perspective of a philosophy of the event, you are saying overall that it has to take account, if the ego and the subject themselves are events, it has to take account of these events. So, in listening to you, I lean towards... There are so many possible paths. I can very well imagine a philosophy... Where you have said something quite correct is in saying, for example, that he maintains the principle of reason. That's your point of departure. In my view, this is true for Leibniz, and it's not true for Whitehead, and also what you are saying works more for Leibniz because Leibniz at the same time maintains an idea of the subject and must take account of what this subject is. I am not certain that this is the case for Whitehead. Once again, we have seen that there are great differences between them. Umm, we don't get there all at once, if you will; there are all sorts of steps of progression. Leibniz goes forward in a conception of the predicate-event, fine. There's lots left to be done in a philosophy of the event, but not at all. Here also, one does not have to go beyond Leibniz. One must say, fine, yes, once again, it's about picking up the arrow and trying to see where we send it.

So, it's quite possible that in a philosophy of the event, the ego and subject no longer strictly have any sense, so there would be no place for taking account of them as event since they will not be able to exist in the least within those coordinates. Or else then, as you say, it's a possibility. Or else then, as you say, we will have to consider them then as events, and events of a special kind, if only to reconcile two viewpoints, as events of the type belonging to the event, and there indeed, we will have to account for them. Yes, obviously, we will have account for them, but within a context such that all their components are components of events.

Such that – so, we might as well return here. I wanted to tell you this, I've started, as I see now. It's begun so we might as well finish it – I'd like to tell you rather quickly because Comtesse's question situates us fully within this. I'd like to tell you here the full situation currently in philosophy. Myself, I believe that there are two ways of doing philosophy; with this, I am

pleased about what Comtesse said. He situates himself as well... Or else, no doubt, there are lots of ways of doing philosophy. I choose two among them because they are what concern me right now.

But I tell myself that it's annoying that there's such a difference in the very conception of doing philosophy. I would say that there's a first conception of what it is to do philosophy that I would define by a first characteristic, specifically *the abstract serves and must serve to explain*. So here, I am really talking to you as in a conversation, a discussion, so, a café discussion, right? I can say, I'm not saying anything of... It's just this: the abstract serves to explain, the abstract must explain. In fact, this is a tendency of philosophy that consists in trying to explain phenomena or that which appears through *principles*. These principles can be, we will explain things starting from principles, for example, the first principle, the One or Being... The One, Being, you see, it's the first principle, [Pause] the True, lots of them. These are abstractions that explain. [Pause]

And then, without changing, always in this same conception, transcendent principles stopped being invoked, and you are going to see, in some ways, we can desire explaining through transcendent principles, but that perhaps didn't change much, this time they explained through *subjective abstracts*. I mean, it was reason that was called on to explain phenomena, reason as faculty of a subject, and no longer as first principle on the side of Being. In one case, I'd say that reason is defined as a faculty of discovering principles of the intelligible. In the other case, reason is no longer at all discovered from the rational, discovered from abstract principles. Reason becomes a faculty that pursues its own ends. [Interruption of the recording] [46:38]

Part 2

... of Ideas, with a capital I, but it's a faculty for realizing its own ends, and the question becomes, is reason able to realize its own ends in this world? And you see, in some ways, I'd say in both cases, whether it's the subjective abstract or the objective abstract, the abstract is called on to explain. Is the intelligible able to explain phenomena, or else is the faculty able to explain phenomena, in one case by discovering the first principles, in the other case, by realizing its own ends? [Pause]

In these conceptions of philosophy through the abstract, I believe, in which the abstract is always something serving to explain, it seems to me that there has always been an encounter of something that causes scandal. And I was speaking of this the last time: scandal can appear in a thousand ways. Generally, let's say, it's, and hasn't stopped being, the existence of evil in phenomena. [Pause] I was telling you that, in some ways, classical philosophy finds its kind of launching point (*butée*) with the famous earthquake of Lisbon (1755), [Pause] and there you have philosophers saying in some ways, how is this possible? How could a world present such phenomena and such a radical form of evil if it was explicable through the One, Being or Goodness? And this rings the death knell for Leibniz's philosophy. How can one say that God chose the best of all possible worlds once one admits that this world produces the Lisbon earthquake?

On the other side, a phenomenon was produced that was no doubt even more impressive, and when we seek the explanation on the side of reason able to realize its own ends in the world, we are told that the product of the Enlightenment was what? It was Auschwitz. How is it possible to

believe in a faculty of reason that would realize its own ends in the world while the coldest exercise of rationality occurred in the organization of concentration camps?⁷ And if you will, I see a certain similarity between Voltaire's reaction in relation to Leibniz that rings the death knell of the first kind of abstract, and the reaction, a truly enormous and beautiful reaction by Adorno just after the war, how is this possible, what is philosophy? Or from Jaspers, when Adorno and Jaspers pose the great post-war question, how is it possible – for one, Jaspers, in the world of the atomic bomb, for Adorno, in the world of concentration camps – to still imagine philosophy as the process of a reason that would realize its own ends in the world? [Pause] And I am saying that Adorno's texts are splendid in this light and Jaspers's texts as well.

That the situation then soured, when lesser talented thinkers began saying, which seems very different to me, that suddenly the concentration camps were Marx's fault, Hegel's fault, etc., going all the way to Kierkegaard, [Pause] I don't want to cite the author, but a recent text, nonetheless by a very admirable man, asks the question of knowing if Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity wouldn't be one of the distant causes of the existence of the concentration camps.⁸ There is something that is wrong here. As long as it was Adorno, the question was very specific. It wasn't a question of saying that the concentration camps were Hegel's fault or Nietzsche's fault, that it's someone else's fault. It was a question of saying: can we maintain the conception of philosophy that we inherited from the Enlightenment, that is, of a reason that works to realize its ends in the world when we see that rationality has had as primary product the strict and rigorous organization of concentration camps? And if philosophy doesn't ask this question, we don't need an hour of reflection, it goes without saying. So, I am saying that what weak thinkers in France made us discover about this, or believed to have made us discover ten years ago, was Adorno's focus – which wasn't yet translated at that point – it was Adorno's focus as well as the Frankfort school's in Germany right after the war, when they were able to pose the problem in terms full of dignity and philosophical rigor. Fine.⁹

You see, I am really saying something extremely simple, assuming that there have been two conceptions of abstract principles, reason as faculty of the intelligible and reason as faculty of realizing its own ends. The second conception starts with the Enlightenment – we are really doing a bird's eye view of history – the other is what we can call the Greco-Classical conception. And well, the two conceptions collide with something scandalous. But for me, this scandalous thing is perhaps above all that that question is poorly posed, and was this the good way of doing philosophy by starting from an abstract that was supposed to explain things and account for things? Since, at that point, this abstract was evidently going to collide with the concrete real, and the concrete real could only be the Lisbon earthquake, or could only be, worse still, the concentration camps.

And if there's another way of doing philosophy, I am telling you here, I am saying ... You will pardon me because this is, it's like this; it's only to ... I am myself saying, this has no ... I am saying, for me, philosophy has always been something else. This is why... There are a lot of authors who influenced me greatly, but that doesn't belong to... I don't believe that I've been unduly influenced by all those who relied on the abstract for explanations. This is to... And I am fully aware that I am not at all certain to be correct, and once again, I am bracketing the abstract, [since] I indeed think that for those who believe in this conception of the abstract as explanation, this abstract is not at all abstract. But I am saying that it is abstract anyway because these are

principles, right? These are principles and faculties that are confronting the real in the way it appears.

For me, philosophy has never happened in this way. For me, the abstract in its nature must be explained, and this seems to me to be the first great difference between two ways of doing philosophy. I am not at all saying that the abstract is nothing. I am saying that the abstract is itself what we must explain, the One, Being, Goodness, Reason. That's what needs explaining. How can all that explain anything at all? [Pause] The abstract must be explained, but then, what does it mean to do philosophy if we don't talk about the abstract? I would even say that Descartes's "I think" is abstract, and here, all principles are abstract; everything serving as principles are abstract, objective principle or subjective principle, and for me, philosophy has never consisted of this. It consists, yes, in how to explain the abstract itself, that which is incapable of explaining anything whatsoever. Fine, philosophers are those who make themselves responsible for explaining the abstract. How? How do we explain the abstract?

Well, I am talking about this second conception of philosophy. One must start off from experience, and I call that empiricism. You'll tell me that I am not the first to call that empiricism, except that experience, we all know, is very difficult to find. What experience, eh? What is experience? What are experiences? Why? Because usually it's covered over by abstractions. So, it's very difficult to grasp the experience; one has to remove all the abstractions that cordon it off. So I even think of attempts; there have been attempts in all sorts of directions. The different empiricist philosophers have made attempts. Bergson made a famous attempt by invoking a method that he called "the method of intuition". You see, on that side, there are no principles. These are not principles. Phenomenology – a completely different approach, [where] there's as much diversity in this... -- was seeking what Merleau-Ponty called "the savage experience". But this is very difficult because one must be really certain that with these terms, the savage experience or something else, abstracts aren't already slipping in. Notably, the savage experience as Merleau-Ponty defined it contains all kinds of acts that aren't acts of reason, but that are acts of consciousness, that are an entire organization that, it seems to me, presupposes abstracts, that I am not certain deserve the name of "savage experience". So, good, but what would this experience be? [Pause] Well, I think something very simple about this, and it's that here there is a link between pure logic and empiricism, specifically the determination of experience is much less solid than intuition, than creating Combinatorics, simply, and that there is only one exploration of what we must call multiplicities, that is, that which is freed from any principle, [such] principle being the principle of objective or subjective unification. There is only one exploration of multiplicities that can cause experience to emerge.

In other words, I believe that far from starting off from abstract principles, philosophy must proceed into cartographies, and whatever might be the given problem, creating a cartography is necessary. That is, one must trace the domain of experience to which the problem refers, these domains of experience not at all preexisting. We have to construct them, and the domain of experience is extraordinarily heterogeneous.¹⁰ We must create the map, and for me, this is an activity, a cartographic activity that is strictly opposed to the activity of principles. [Pause] So what is this, this cartography? That is, simply, in the end, [Pause] experience is what could be called a fuzzy aggregate (*ensemble flou*). It's a fuzzy aggregate, that is, a collection of disparities; we still have to choose them, the disparities. It's in this way that there's a Combinatory. We choose them in light of given problems. Fine.

But all this, it's just words. A fuzzy aggregate, how does one define it? Uniquely through what occurs to it after. It's an aggregate in which a series of consolidations is going to be produced. [Pause] Right here, I am proposing this: I define the fuzzy aggregate as an aggregate to consolidate; it's this "to consolidate" that interests me. What I am saying is as simple as this: problem, you want to make a box. [Pause] You look for some boards. I'd say, you look for some boards, and you don't even know how – and furthermore, you're clumsy – you don't even know how to put them together, and you correctly think, how can I consolidate this aggregate? Fine, you have to use nails, you know, then use a hammer, and from this, you are going to derive a box that will be an enterprise of consolidation. Fine. What does it mean to consolidate a fuzzy aggregate? Consolidating a fuzzy aggregate, I'd say, means discerning and determining the aggregate of the processes that occur in it. You see, I am not considering the question of principles. I am considering a question of processes immanent to the fuzzy aggregate. Experience, I'd say, is the aggregate of processes able to be produced in a fuzzy aggregate with the result being a consolidation of the aggregate.

There are all sorts of these processes, and they vary with the aggregates considered. I will list several of them: I'd say there are processes of unification; there are processes of centralization; there are processes of totalization; there are processes of subjectification. This is odd, you may notice, and in fact, it indeed marks the difference between the two conceptions of philosophy. What others called principles from which they started off, I myself can only find them in the state of a secondary process – thus, something else completely, these are not principles – being produced in a fuzzy aggregate in such a way that a consolidation of the aggregate results. But furthermore, these processes have no privilege – unification, totalization – and have their equivalent in abstract principles. But you see, I maintain my commitment: it's the abstract that must be explained, and I explain it by saying that in such an aggregate, there are particular processes of unification, particular processes of totalization, and particular processes of centralization. But there are all sorts of other processes obviously, processes that resist totalization, centralization. At that point, I'd say that the components of the aggregate that define experience, components of the aggregate, must be the object of an extremely varied study according to each case.

And can we discern certain categories of these and that then would have a completely different sense than the categories in the other conception of philosophy? I believe yes, yes, that it's possible to create a *logic of aggregates of consolidation*, and that this is empiricist philosophy. Thus, I'd say [that] reason has never realized its ends from above, that it doesn't realize them, and that it collides with scandal, the concentration camps... I'd say, in what fuzzy aggregate – I am finding an example – in what fuzzy aggregate did Nazism emerge? What were the processes moving through this aggregate? What operation of unification and centralization and totalization did Nazism operate in such an aggregate? And far from being surprised that rationality could have produced the concentration camps, they are, in fact, the result of a process of rationalization exerting itself within a particular aggregate and against which we could only struggle to the extent that this aggregate included other processes.

So, I was looking; such a conception of philosophy, can I say... You see, I am summarizing this first point. About this, I could ask myself, fine, what are the empirical categories of aggregates, that is, what are the processes capable of affecting an aggregate? But everything is process, and nothing is principle. There are only processes. There is no reason as principle; there are

processes of rationalization. There is no subject as principle; there are processes of subjectification. [Pause] There you are. I can say, in some ways, that all the empiricists, all the great empiricists, I could say, yes, they've gone in this direction, but often with many ambiguities. This is not clear, the two aspects. The two conceptions of philosophy can be highly mixed together. I'd also say that Whitehead went in this direction. For him, the idea resonated that it's not the abstract that ought to be used to explain, but that it's the abstract that he must explain, and the entire conception of the event stems from this. Fine.

So, I'd say – but if you remove any pretense from this; it's really to help me create a kind of clarification here, if you will, not to reveal anything shocking – I'd say that this was what Guattari and I tried to do, and that, we called it *assemblages* (*agencements*). And we started from assemblages, and we tried to see the processes that intervened into assemblages, and we thought that we were doing philosophy, and doing philosophy in the empiricist mode. [Pause] And it was thought that no principle was valid, for example, that there was no subject; there were processes of subjectification. [Pause] And fortunately as well, there were processes at work that undid subjectifications. It was even thought that the processes didn't stop colliding into each other, and since an aggregate can include the most heterogeneous givens, we opposed, for example, the processes of arborization to processes of rhizome, saying that this is nonetheless odd. You see, we indeed saw the difference between the two conceptions of philosophy. In the first conception of philosophy, that I am calling abstract, they have but a single image that haunts them, it's the tree. Everything is tree, and why? Because the tree is everything that you might want, notably it's coexistence, it's consolidation of a process of totalization, of centralization, of unification, such that the tree is a metaphor that indeed works everywhere, the tree of knowledge, the tree everywhere, it's the tree. We are even told that the brain is a tree.

And we ourselves said with, I believe, great conviction and, moreover, being very sure that we were right, we said, but no, the brain is not a tree; it's grass. [Huge laughter] What did that mean? That meant something quite important. That meant that you use a model that is the tree without ever placing it into question and that it's an absolutely abstract model, whereas trees are processes of nature, agreed, and if you don't confront them with other processes, for example, with the processes of rhizome, the rhizomes are not trees, well then, rhizomes are not at all processes of unification. On the contrary, they are processes of dissemination, processes of junctions of disparates, it's all that you'd like. Fine, I am telling you all that, but it was the whole meaning of our attempt, and in this sense, I believe that it was going toward the side of a certain tradition of philosophy that was violently opposed – well, not violently! – which was opposed to the other conception of philosophy. And I believe that here, I am saying this poorly. I am doing it almost on purpose to express myself at this level, if I can, of the most obvious language (*langage le plus courant*).

And so, I think of Foucault, and I tell myself, in some ways, I'd tend to say that Foucault was completely on the side of the empiricist conception. For him, he called that *apparatuses* (*dispositifs*). [Pause] Simply, a curious confusion occurred because Foucault allowed himself once to argue, and the one time he allowed himself to argue was with the Frankfort school, and notably with Habermas, a descendant of the Frankfort school. So that people believed that Foucault was posing the same problem as the Frankfort school, and just as the Frankfort school had asked the question, how can reason as pure faculty have engendered, one way or another, the concentration camps, so too Foucault had asked an analogous question, how could reason as

faculty of the Enlightenment have engendered the great milieus of incarceration, the prison, etc., or the psychiatric hospital. And in my opinion, this was all to the good because that [argument] enriched everyone, and the Frankfort school used Foucault, but that wasn't at all his thought. His thought was to start from experience, a very strong logical empiricism that opposed completely the other conception of philosophy; doing the analysis of what he called apparatuses, that is, discerning the processes, and not the principles, discerning the processes in action within a particular apparatus, processes of centralization, of totalization, etc., and the processes of resistance to these processes, processes of resistance that perhaps were primary in relation to those that they resisted; processes of flight, processes of, well, processes of resistance. [Pause]

So there, I mean, if it was true that there were two ways of doing philosophy, the first characteristic of these two ways, of these two directions, one would consist... [Deleuze does not complete the sentence] And then here as well, there are affinities, there are affinities. For all of you, I am trying to say, either you find yet other conceptions, or you are going to have confidence in principles, and you are going to watch with the greatest attention what a principle becomes when it is realized or accomplished in the world. And I announce to you that you will be the man of scandal, with what that risks at times. What brings a danger is that this scandal is something trumped up because you will be surprised by a thing that was understood from the start, specifically that the world doesn't obey pure reason. Or else, you will be tempted by the other path, that is, this philosophical cartography that consists in defining aggregates in which processes exert themselves.

Second characteristic to oppose the two philosophies: [Pause] I'd say in a first case, in the first case, philosophy is the search for the universal and the necessary. [Pause] Of course, this isn't a question of making them say nonsense, since these are great philosophers. It's not a question of a universal or of a necessary *in fact*. It's not a question of saying, for example, all men are alike, no. Philosophy has always presented itself as a search for a universal and a necessary *by right* (*de droit*). Kant wrote on this point, definitively, what is universal and necessary by right itself – and this is required since it's in the name of principles. It's well understood that the world does not achieve by itself and spontaneously the universal and the necessary. So, it's a question of a universal and a necessary by right about which one wonders under what conditions it [philosophy] could be realized in the world. [Pause] But if all philosophy is defined by the art of concepts, I'd say that in this first conception of philosophy, the concept is the universal and the necessary by right. [Pause] For example, we will be told that human rights are the universal and the necessary by right, [Pause] and we will be told that since Kant, the philosopher has been the guardian of human rights. [Pause] I'm going fast, because otherwise... It's just so you...

And the other conception of philosophy, I believe, occurs... is very, very different. It says, no, a concept has nothing to do with the universal and the necessary by right because [Pause] a concept is an object of a creation and not one of discovery. [With] the universal and the necessary by right, you see how these connect back to the preceding difference. The universal and the necessary by right are either the pure intelligible as principle, the One, Being, etc., or else [Pause] the subject as pure activity, that is, reason as pursuit of its own ends, the reasonable subject. Thus, it's either rationality or else reasonability. [Pause] At that point, in fact, in such a conception, philosophy is the arbitrator of true and false. The true is what is universal and necessary by right. My only remark is that this doesn't go very far. It's odd. It doesn't go very far because we immediately fall upon scandal, once again, the scandal being that the universal and

the necessary by right do not stop being buffeted by the concrete real and its conceptual presentation being rather quickly completed.

We have seen this, and that's why what we've done is so useful for me. I am saying that a concept is not at all about determining a universal and necessary by right. A concept is what?¹¹ It's a system of singularities. What am I calling singularity? The little that I have said allows me now to define it in more common terms. I understand fully that some more fully developed philosophical definitions are necessary, an attempt we have undertaken from the viewpoint of Leibniz all this year. But I am saying that it's an aggregate of singular points, it's an aggregate of singularities, and if I am trying to define these singular points quite superficially uniquely with what I have just said, I'd say that singularities are precisely that which marks out the start and finish of a process operating in an aggregate, in an aggregate of consolidations. [Pause] So, if in an aggregate you follow the trail of a process of centralization, you have a singularity, or perhaps even two, or perhaps even three or four because these can bifurcate. If you take, if you follow a process of dissemination, you have other singularities. The aggregate of singularities that will correspond to an aggregate will be called a concept, or a part of the aggregate will be called a concept. [Pause] I'd say that, far from this being the universal and the necessary that define the concept, it's the singularity. If you do not produce concepts that might be emissions of singularities, you are not doing philosophy, at least according to this second conception. Thinking is not meant for discovering the universal and the necessary. Thinking is for emitting singularities and hence – here as well, I feel myself being Nietzschean, notably... or Mallarmean – it's to produce a dice throw, if you assimilate the points on the die to singularities. From this viewpoint, it's no longer a question of true and false. A dice throw can be a winner or a loser; it's not true or false. A dice throw can be important if your existence depends on it. It can be unimportant if you just do it like that, mechanically. But I'd say that the concept in this second conception is the second characteristic that opposes the two conceptions of philosophy, the concept as singularity.

And here, obviously then, I'd like for someone to raise an objection for once, you understand, in order to show you the extent to which there's a... [Deleuze does not complete this] Someone might tell me, well yes, but we see that you could care less about law, and that you only recognize facts. The mere effort to imagine this objection already wearies me so much [Laughter] that I am exhausted because it's awful, so you understand? Put yourself in my place, with somebody telling me that. On one hand, on the other (*tantôt, tantôt*) here as well, [since] this depends on mood, it depends on mood, but may God act so that mood is not only a psychological given, but a philosophical one. If I am in a bad philosophical mood, I say, that's how it is, buddy, that's it, so long, see ya. [Laughter] If I am in a good philosophical mood, -- and besides, this isn't good; one must not be in a good philosophical mood – what am I going to try to explain? I am going to try to explain that law is not such a simple matter as that, that law is very, very complicated to undertake, and notably, I am saying, here as well then, [it's] our affinities, always bearing the deepest mystery of ourselves, that is what we... This is nothing compared to when one wonders how a woman can pursue the same kind of man in her intimate life or how a man can pursue the same kind of woman in his intimate life, something that doesn't always happen, but sometimes it does. But this is nothing compared to the deeper philosophical idea, on which the other depends, our affinity with ideas. What happens for me to connect with an idea?

So finally, law, law, I return to the law. Let's assume that among you, all of you are interested in the law. I doubt that, but anyway we can pretend, that a certain number among you are interested in it. But the law means nothing. What in the law are you interested in? What interests you in the law and in what is not the law? For generally, when I'm interested in something, it's above all because there's something dwelling in this something that doesn't belong to the something. I seem to be creating an opening to psychoanalysis, but I'm not opening up psychoanalysis [Laughter] since this something is precisely what we have just called an idea.¹² Fine. But I don't know; if I am assuming that you are interested in law, what interests me in law? I am going to tell you: a single thing interests me finally in the law, and it impassions me, and if I were to stop being a philosopher, that's what I would have done for a career, the law, to create... But not to create just anything at all; [it's] to create jurisprudence. You know generally what jurisprudence is. It's the juridical acts that concern the application of a law when its application is problematic, that is, when one doesn't know which law to apply. The legislator, how every skillful he may be, isn't expected to have foreseen everything, and the evolution of law can only occur... or perhaps, I don't know. No, I am already saying too much; perhaps the evolution of law occurs in part through jurisprudence.¹³

So there's a very beautiful example of jurisprudence. I follow these [cases] very closely; I even cut them out of the papers when there's a jurisprudence case that really attracts me, and the more insignificant it is... [It's] in the recent stories about alcoholic drivers, right? [Laughter] But there's a very interesting case. A prosecutor told himself, ah well, let's piss them off (*les faire chier*), these alcoholic drivers, and this created a problem in law. How? How to go about this? He told himself, let's take a look at whether we can't equate the car that plowed into some pedestrian, if we can equate it to a weapon. – Ah, this thrills me; the problems thrill me. This is so much lovelier than crossword puzzle, and it raises all kinds of problems. – Can it [the car] be equated to a weapon? If so, the car can be confiscated since, in our system of law, in fact, the car can be confiscated from the start of the inquiry, independently of any judgment, since weapons linked to a particular crime are confiscated. If I kill someone with the gun that I borrowed from you, the gun gets confiscated as part of the inquiry's evidence. So, if the car is equated with a crime, fine, here's a beautiful case of jurisprudence. [Pause]

An indecent act (*outrage à la pudeur*). This [law] is difficult to apply. It's a very complex notion, right? It's coming back more frequently because more things in this domain are occurring. Right? I'd like, I'd really like to write to [Charles] Pasqua [*Minister of the Interior, 1986-1988*] [Laughter] because I'd give him some advice. During the Vichy government, they wanted to apply... They had first created... No, it must have dated from just before the war, but it was interpreted in the form of an indecent act *toward others*, for example, exhibitionism creates an indecent act, an act harming your sensibilities (*pudeur*). But you know then, there was a jurist during Vichy... [Interruption of the recording] [1 :33 :19]

Part 3

... He wasn't able to. He said, there's certainly an indecent act against one's own sensibilities. So, he said that striptease – there already was striptease – [the case of] striptease. The jurists objected, how can striptease be condemned since we cannot call this an "indecent act" since the audience is consenting and they are paying for it, and this is opposed to other determinations of indecent acts? And the jurist said, well, be careful, it's not at all like that. The woman undressing

in public is inflicting harm to *her own* sensibilities. You see? The indecent act took on a whole different dimension. Henceforth, they could condemn it. That's very interesting.

There's an example that I cite all the time, so excuse me for repeating it – I am going quickly for the ones I cite often, that is, each time I talk about the law, because this one really thrills me. -- It goes way back when the question was being asked, could one smoke in taxicabs, or not? Law suits occurred because of the first taxi drivers who refused to accept smokers and announced this, as there are always people prone to sue – the French are very prone to have lawsuits; there's always a few people with a lawyer and lots of time to waste who say, so I am going to sue you, you don't have the right. -- And the smokers went on to win their lawsuit, at the start. [Laughter] And why did they win their lawsuit? Because the preceding jurisprudence was quite simple: the preceding jurisprudence had equated hiring a taxi with a rental, [like] renting an apartment. You rent, you create a rental contract with the taxi driver wherein you have the right of use and abuse of your rental, with the proviso that you are liable to the landlord's laws, that is, no degradation, etc. That's what the result was. It's a rental, so there's no question of forbidding someone from smoking at home. And then, this was a rear-guard movement because... But how were they able to balance out this matter, forbidding people from smoking in cabs? Solely through an essential juridical change. It was necessary for taxis no longer to be equated with a rental contract and for taxis to be equated with a public service rather than with a private rental. With the public service status, it is perfectly legal for a public service to issue its rules, in its rule, forbidding smoking, as well as in buses and metros. So it was necessary for jurisprudence to evolve, what I call an evolution of jurisprudence, through which taxis are no longer equated with an apartment, but equated with... [Deleuze does not complete this]

To return to the apparently much more serious questions like human rights, I think [that] it goes without saying, since 1789, human rights have undergone mutations as considerable, as enormous as this insignificant taxi story. And I am saying something very simple; I am hypothesizing – [if] I'd had to create a course on law, I think I'd devote myself to this completely. For me, I'd say that jurisprudence is not simply a juridical process destined to resolve difficult cases. This is the origin and finality of law. It's the creative act of law. It's not the law that creates jurisprudence; it's jurisprudence that creates law. You see why this both pleases me and why... But I believe in this independently of that; so I would have studied history, for example, of Roman law.... -- Anyway, I am pointing out, because it's been a long while since I've read it, there is a very great jurist from the end of the nineteenth [century] who was enormously interested in the role played by jurisprudence in the elaboration of law and was called, with a very lovely name, who was called Salé [*salted, in French*] – he is unfortunately quite forgotten – Salé, and the great Salé, would entirely go along with – perhaps we have to force this a bit – saying that the origin of law is jurisprudence itself.

See what I mean and why I am doing this development, this all too long development? It's because law itself proceeds by *emissions of singularities*: the taxi, private rental, public service, there we have a triangle of singularities. Which side will it be on? Does the taxi lean toward the side of private rental, on the side of the singularity of private rental, or does it slide over to the side of the public service singularity? I'd say that jurisprudence is the emission of juridical singularities or of singularities linked to juridical processes so that even the concept of law – it's why all this is of such great interest to me – even the concept of law isn't a concept of necessity and universality, whereas it was nonetheless the concept that we were given as the most

convincing from this perspective. On the contrary, it's a concept that perfectly validates the definition: every concept is an invention and a grouping of singularities.

Finally, there would be a third conception, and third difference rather, between the two conceptions, but here, I wouldn't have... This would be a radical conception of the philosophical rapport with science, art and politics. [Pause] And I believe that the other conceptions, even when they don't say it, even when they don't recognize it, maintain a certain conception about philosophy according to which philosophy would consist, in whatever sense you might take the word, of reflecting on universals and on law, of possessing a power of reflection. To the extent that it [this power] proposes to realize itself in the world, it proposes at the same time to reflect on the means and obstacles of such a realization, this realization occurring in art, in science, etc. Hence, the concepts of the first mode of philosophy were fundamentally reflexive. [Pause]

I personally hate any reflexive philosophy because that deprives it of being like all other disciplines, that is, a discipline of creation, and I proclaim this very strongly because I believe that this is what philosophy has to invent, and it invents concepts with the desire that the concepts it invents will be as beautiful as the paintings a painter creates, as the music a musician creates, or the discoveries that are equally creations made by a scientist (*savant*). As a result, between philosophy and science, there is no relation of reflection. The great principle of any discipline is that those who practice this discipline are entirely adequate for reflecting on it when they want to or when they are able to. Once again, it's no discovery to say that those who have reflected best on cinema are the filmmakers who have undertaken to make them and who have enjoyed reflecting about them. The most beautiful texts on architecture are texts by architects. The most beautiful texts on painting are texts by painters. This goes so much without saying that we're ashamed to say such things. Therefore, if philosophy proposed to reflect about whatever subject it might be, well then, its days would be so sad that I wonder who would need it at all.

On the other hand, on the other hand, it has its own work to do on itself, and the problem – and here's the mystery – is that philosophy can produce important concepts only when they have a certain mode, not one of resemblance, but when they have a certain mode of correspondence with the functions of science, with works of art. [Pause] As a result, through the rapport with science, the question of philosophy has always been never to reflect about science, but always to create the metaphysics that corresponds to the science of a particular era. Let no one tell us that metaphysics was fine for science back in the old days. During the period of ancient science, there was a metaphysics corresponding perfectly to this ancient science. Well, just as Bergson wanted it, it's up to philosophers to create the metaphysics corresponding to modern science. We must take literally Bergson's great text. Once again, he says something quite simple: what defines – he speaks very quickly – he says, what defines generally ancient science? It's that it defines movement with reference to privileged positions; it selects privileged positions out of movement. What defines modern science? It's that it defines movement with reference to any instant whatever (*l'instant quelconque*). [Pause] Ancient metaphysics created exactly the metaphysics of ancient science, specifically, how is it possible that it defines privileged positions? What do they consist of? Where do they come from? This was doing the metaphysics of science. Bergson believes himself to open up the metaphysics of modern science when he says... [Deleuze does not complete this], a conception of time is necessary to account for the time reference of any instant whatever, and he answers, my conception of duration, far from being opposed to science,

constitutes the metaphysics of this science. Duration is precisely the metaphysics that refers to the movement connecting to any instant whatever.¹⁴

Final point for distinguishing the two kinds of philosophy: I'd say there is a philosophy that always linked itself to the eternal, the eternal by right, etc., but at the same time that it became the metaphysics of modern science, philosophy was led more and more to change problems and to pose the opposite question, of what is the emergence of something new. And that seems to exist fully with Whitehead, with Bergson. That appears for me with Whitehead when he says, the problem is one of creativity. The problem is the emergence of the new.

But I can say that this was a bit what I wanted to tell you. This is linked to everything we are doing on Leibniz because I'd like for you to sense that Leibniz seems to me – if you've accepted this kind of grand distinction, these ways of, these two ways of doing philosophy – Leibniz seems to me strangely at the hinge point for both of them. There are all sorts of elements... And this is required! All of us are like this! All of us are deeply incoherent, all. We hold onto something from a tradition, and then we enter into something new. We never stop having, of being unbalanced. And in Leibniz, I'd like for you to be open both to the extent to which he enters into the entire stream of traditional philosophy, so-called traditional, and how at the same time he brings about such innovations, such innovations that the future of philosophy flows through him.

So, that's what I wanted to tell you, in this way, to see what you think of this, this mystery. I myself feel, you know, extremely... In philosophy, I believe that... First, it's very different according to whether I'm speaking to philosophers or to non-philosophers. Philosophers owe it to themselves to have read almost – not immediately, since this takes time – to have read almost all the great philosophers. That's not difficult because, you know, there's not a huge mass of great philosophers, right? That's not a heavy load in the end. [Laughter] If we say a good dozen, that's already not so bad, so it's not an infinite task. That doesn't mean one has to wait sixty years to be a philosopher, but still to have read them more or less... But non-philosophers are something else entirely. But where they link together, philosophers and non-philosophers, everything that I've just said is a concept of philosophy, -- and it's through this that it matters for me, -- where philosophers and non-philosophers are equal and are strangely linked to a kind of task in common.¹⁵

What I mean is that in any event, you will have your attractions, and this is, for me... You will have your kinds of affects, the philosophical affect, the philosophical affect that makes you say, for example, that makes you say this also for literature or poetry, ah yes, that writer, not that he belongs to my family (*est des miens*), but I belong to his (*je suis des siens*), I belong to his family, and perhaps if we discovered this, whatever strikes me in this way, but that's in fact the problem. And so, strange things can occur, and for a long while you might not be reacting. I mean, two kinds of reading are necessary; two kinds of rapports are necessary with philosophy. Becoming a philosopher is not about suppressing the non-philosophical rapport with philosophy. Philosophy is nothing if it isn't capable of inspiring a non-philosophical rapport, that is, a rapport that it has with non-philosophers as non-philosophers. To think that philosophy has a rapport with non-philosophers in order to make philosophers out of them seems to be itself an atrocity. It's not a question of this. Simply, and what is even more complicated, two things are necessary: the non-philosopher must have a rapport with philosophy, but in which he/she keeps his/her

quality of non-philosopher. And the philosopher must also have with philosophy a rapport in which he/she can maintain his/her quality and virtue as non-philosopher. It's only in this way, I believe, that we can pose the problem of a non-philosophical rapport with philosophy.

So there you have what I had to tell you on this point. Do you have any things, any reactions at all? I can very well imagine that you might tell me that two conceptions aren't really a lot, but these are not so much conceptions as practices. If you will, as regards certain people, I have the impression that as regards these questions of practices, they don't have the same practices as me, and me, I don't have the same practices as them, and that it would never occur to me to say or be able to say that they are wrong and that I'm right. It's really, I tell myself, but ok... This is why these are questions of practices and not questions for discussion, you understand. So here, yes, in any way, in any manner that might exist, yes, I cannot tell you... I know that among you, there are some who aren't philosophers and yet come here to listen. Understand, I believe that one of the reasons that they come here is that they feel, in any case in my heart, I have never wished for them to become this [philosophers] since I consider that their becoming can be entirely other and that if they take philosophy into this becoming, that will not be in order for them to become philosophers, but in order for them be able to use philosophy in a different way, and that's splendid, that will be really, really great.

So here we are, what do you think of all this? For me, yes, [if] I would have done a course on "what is philosophy?", I would have developed it fully. You understand that myself, I'm a bit vexed by the absence lately – and I must even say that this is in authors of genius like Heidegger, who considered what is philosophy and all that – and I don't find any practice. I indeed find a style, I indeed find all kinds of things, I find a great style, I find a great thought, but a practice of the concept, that is, what precisely is a concept? And I assure you, I read and re-read Hegel – well, I don't read him that much [*Laughter*] – but knowing what a concept is practically, I fully understand that he never stops saying what a concept is theoretically, but what a concept is practically, once we've said that Hegel is never satisfied with telling us it's something that works in threes, thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Nonetheless, this is greater than that. But I am struck in Heidegger that I see no practice of the concept, etc. I am telling you that if I have any value, I certainly tell you, let's call a concept an aggregate of singularities, and that's what a practice is. Here's how we can do it: constructing an aggregate of singularities, that's what one does with... etc. Are there any disciplines that consider this? None consider this, none. Yes. Do you have some things to add?

A student: [*The details of the question are rather indistinct*]¹⁶

Deleuze: Here I believe in this completely, I believe in this very strongly. One must give them a status, I believe. I cannot do so because that calls on... Here I'd look for the status of what you are asking; I would look for it on the level of concepts, that is, of singularities. There are singularities that, or groups of singularities that are absolutely transportable and that are not universals because they have no existence outside the locations where they are transported, and you suddenly find, in fact, you find... Let's take the Leibniz-Whitehead example. This is what I will call, if you will, grafts (*des greffes*). There are grafts of concepts, and grafts of concepts that are not done out of cleverness (*coquetterie*) or out of... For example, Whitehead makes a graft of Leibniz's concepts, yes, yes, almost each time... These are transports, if you will, transports that hardly need to be modified.

Really, and that, that occurs all the time, that is, we have to say it's beautiful expression that I'm quoting here – these are like summaries, all this – that I have quoted a lot because it appeals to me. It's a beautiful formulation of words. You ... Understand what I mean because [Deleuze coughs and swallows with great difficulty] I was telling you that it's not a question of making fun of philosophy's taste for giving birth to words because when it invents concepts, it has a choice of only two procedures: either to take an actual word by virtue of its etymology and recharge it in order to have it take on the meaning required by the concept. For example, Bergson takes an entirely actual word, duration, in order to draw something from it that the word had never designated. So what is better as a method? Either other philosophers who themselves use and invent a word as, for example, Heidegger does, as German philosophers have often been known to invent a word, rather than revitalizing an actual word. The French prefer to revitalize an actual word, but as for Whitehead, he's more on the side of inventing – concrescence, ingestion, etc., all that.

But this was linked to... Now, I don't know what the question was; I started off on this to say... In the graft of concepts... Ah yes! I was saying that there's an expression from [Charles] Péguy that seems to me very, very good, and one that philosophy had to appropriate. So, here it was a graft; there it was the word *Aternal* (*Internel*), that [with] the word Aternal, he designated something that is neither temporal, nor eternal. So, notice that in order to designate something that's neither temporal, nor eternal, Nietzsche had already constructed his concept, that of the *Untimely* (*Intempestif*). I find Untimely better than Inactual because Untimely, Inactual entirely have Nietzsche's active, dynamic, polemical aspect. So, it was the Untimely that arrives in an era against its era. He defines the Untimely exactly: what comes at a present moment against the present in order to prepare – and I add, modestly, I hope for – a future. It was a kind of disturbance of the era. And the Aternal in Péguy is something that is interior to the horizontal line of time, but that testifies in some ways to its encounter with another dimension, as something that has come from elsewhere. So, in the end, at the extreme, in Péguy, there is no eternal, there's only the Aternal.¹⁷

So I'd say, we could very well say, in the direction that you state, in fact, these grafts of concepts are not the eternal, these are not the historical, no. These would either correspond exactly, whereas you make the connection with Baudelaire, here this wouldn't be bad in fact to make the connection, the correspondence at this point, either with Nietzsche's Untimely or with Péguy's Aternal. But I completely agree with this phenomenon of grafting. I hadn't thought about this with Baudelaire, but you are completely correct. He is fully within in this, and into a new kind of rapport between thought and painting. Historically we understand what is happening in painting at that period, something not happening in fact in philosophy, the need for a mode of thinking... Yes, it's completely... Yes, yes... Anything else? [Pause] It's up to you to be asking. Obviously my concern is that, have I exaggerated, have I... ? As regards the other conception, the one I don't care for, have I captured it or not? It seems I haven't, it seems I haven't. [Pause] Fine! Well then... There you have it! There we are! How about a bit of a return back to Leibniz? [Interruption of the recording] [2:04:02]

Part 4

In conclusion, therefore, there remains for us in this second part to derive a kind of comparative study of a notion that has played a role in philosophy, specifically the notion of substance, and

among other things this year, I'd like for you to leave here with a few clearer ideas than you've had on substance.¹⁸ Perhaps then, substance is precisely a rather fine case of [something] that comes to support what I am saying. It's not a concept that has existed forever. [Pause] We have to take account, we have to consider the difference between the use of the term itself and its development into a concept. So, in Greek, in fact you have an equivalent of substance, since substance comes from Latin, and substance is *that which holds itself under* (*ce qui se tient sous*). [Pause] So, my examination doesn't consist in saying when the Greek word appeared for the first time, but it does consist in saying – it's more superficial – when do we consider that someone is truly proposing to constitute a concept of substance? And I believe that it's not an exaggeration to say that there were some predecessors, and indeed it's Aristotle. [Pause] Do you find this in Plato? [Pause] It seems not. We can't affirm this. I really don't see it, no, not really.

Why can I say that it's with Aristotle that the concept of substance appears? Because Aristotle offers two very solid characteristics – let's go back, two singularities, two singularities. [Pause] And starting from Aristotle, the question isn't if you agree or not, but you have no choice. Either you use another word, or you accept it in this sense, unless you provide very important reasons to change it. He kept the sense of the word. If you will, there is nonetheless a rigor in all his uses of the word, and the two characteristics are as follows: substance – I am not stating definitions, right, these are characteristics – substance designates a something concrete, determined, and individual. It's something concrete, determined, and individual. [Pause] You see immediately why he brings forth the concept of substance against what has been Plato's grand concept, of Idea, with a capital I. [Pause] Substance is something concrete; as Aristotle said, oh well, no, Plato, that's still way too abstract; let's go back to the concrete. Substance is something concrete, it's something determined, it's something individual. It's *that which is*, that is, that which we translate correctly with *Be-ing* (*l'étant*), with [Greek word], it's Be-ing, the participle of the verb "to be". Or again, he says: the something right here (*le quelque chose que voici*). I am saying that substance is the individual concrete. [Pause]

Notice that if I am now jumping to another great philosopher of substance, Descartes, I am jumping to him because we are going to see Leibniz's very complex condition both in relation to Descartes and in relation to Aristotle. So, Aristotle and Descartes are going to be Leibniz's two points of reference. If I jump to Descartes, I find the same thing. If you read Descartes's *Principles* – let me point out book 2, paragraph 11 – this is a very interesting text where he tells us, substance is not extension (*étendue*) in general, it's a stone, this stone, or something else. [Pause] Moreover, he doesn't stop saying [that] when we conceive of extension, we cannot separate it from some body, from any body whatever, from a particular body whatever, even if this body is perceived in a confused way. [Pause] At this point, this means that between Aristotle and Descartes, there is no difference. There's no need telling you that Leibniz will again state this more strongly. Substance is the individual. Substance is individual. [Pause] It's something completely determined. It's the individual concrete. Moreover, he will take all his precautions since [given] what occurred to the two others, he will say, there is no other substance. [Pause] Substance is individual, and there is no other substance than the individual.

Second characteristic: substance, that which holds itself under, is the subject of inherence, it's the subject of inherence, [Pause] that is, it's a subject such that it cannot be attributed to any other subject. [Pause] If you say, man is reasonable, you attribute reasonable to man, but you can still attribute man to another subject. For example, Socrates is a man. Socrates, who is the

someone right here (*le quelqu'un que voici*), can no longer be attributed to anything. It's the final subject; and through this, it's the subject of inherence. [Pause] Henceforth, how are the predicates of the subject – qualities, dimensions, colors, etc. – defined? It's what is present in the subject. We will therefore distinguish the subject or final subject, that which can only be subject, from what is present in the subject. If I say, the table is white, white is present in the table. This table, this table right here [*Deleuze strikes on the table*] is white; white is present in this table. The subject is therefore a subject of inherence since the predicate is in the subject and being inherent is being present within.

For Descartes, substance is said to be subject of its own determinations. [Pause] Everything that refers to substance as subject, and well, no tiny bit of all that, of what refers to it, can exist or subsist without the subject. It's inherent to the subject. Modes and attributes are inherent to the subject. [Pause] Here, among the numerous Cartesian definitions of substance, there is one that seems particularly interesting to me: substance is a thing, *res*, in which – *in which*, you see the inherence – a thing in which exists formally and eminently that which we conceive of, a thing in which exists that which we conceive of. What do "formally" and "eminently" mean? It matters little. Formally is, in the same form; eminently is, in at least a superior form. [Pause] For example, I can say that thought being God formally and that extension being God eminently, that is, in a form superior to the body's extension. Fine.

There's no point saying, as we've seen it, that Leibniz takes this up, and not only takes it up, but takes it onward to a point that has never been seen, this requirement that substance be the subject of inherence. We saw that this was the entire theory of predication. The predicate is in the subject.¹⁹ This very expression of truth in Leibniz has a reference. And we've seen that Leibniz will draw very particular things from this, yes, but sometimes he does so a bit coyly... To some extent, he is coy about... When he tells us, every predicate is in the subject, there are a certain number of texts where he says either, "as everyone recognizes" or else, "as Aristotle said". And Leibniz slides that into texts where neither Aristotle, much less "everyone", ever drew from inherence the consequences that Leibniz derives from it. [It's] his ways of pretending that all of this just goes completely without saying, and what he is saying, what's extremely paradoxical, goes so much without saying, at least everyone says so, well yes, the predicate is in the subject, everybody has always said this, only you'll see what I derive from this. And you understand, it's the same thing; I am asking, what causes Leibniz to derive from this the most paradoxical effect whereas, apparently, he is merely taking especially seriously the two characteristics that were recognized in substance since Aristotle and that Descartes proposed, specifically being an individual concrete and being a subject of inherence? What occurs that causes Leibniz to conclude something that's neither in Aristotle nor in Descartes, that is, thereby renewing the concept of substance?

It's because something very disturbing occurred. [Pause] What was so troubling for [inaudible] that occurred in Aristotle? In Aristotle, and in light of the two preceding remarks, Aristotle introduced some distinctions. He said, well take care, we must distinguish *what is* (*ce qui est*) in a subject from *what is affirmed* (*ce qui est affirmé*) about a subject. [Pause] What is in a subject, is what? Here we see, what is in a subject is the accident, and it's odd. He is in the process of introducing a nuance into... [Interruption of the recording] [2:19:29]

Part 5

... Man is reasonable: here, the predicate is not in a subject. It's not what is in a subject; it's what is affirmed about a subject, that is, it's the *essence*. We will therefore distinguish accidents that are *in* the subject and the essence about which we do not say it's in the subject, but that it's *affirmed about* the subject. [Pause] This is what the Latins -- essence, according to these terms, these are translations of Aristotle's terms -- and it's what the Latins will call quiddity, *quiditas*, that is, the *what* (*ce que*), the *what the thing is* (*ce que la chose est*). The accident is, if you will, the *how* the thing is: the thing is white, the thing has such a size, but *what the thing is*, that's its essence or its quiddity. So, I can say that the table has two meters of length, and is white. These are present in the subject. But if I say the table is a rectangular or square surface placed on four feet, that's what the table is. It's not in the subject; it's affirmed about the subject as its essence. It's the subject's quiddity.

Within all this, what remains there of Be-ing (*l'étant*)? [Pause] It's that essence introduces the necessary and the universal. [Pause] Being a flat surface on four feet is necessary for the table. There is a rapport of necessity whereas in being white, [there's] none at all. From the rapport of necessity, colors have a rapport of universality. All tables have this essence, which leads Aristotle to say -- and this is why it's not present or contained in the subject but is affirmed about the subject -- which leads Aristotle to tell us, quiddity or essence can be called second substance (*substance seconde*). [Pause] And you see that this second substance is going to be truly annoying since it has neither of the two characteristics of the primary substance. The primary substance was individual through its essence, and it was the subject of inherence through its essence. [Pause]

In Descartes, he arrives at the grand affirmation very quickly: substance is defined not through its modes, but through what its modes assume. It's defined through its essential attributes -- oh, excuse me, I'm made a mistake -- it's defined by its essential *attribute* since a substance has only one essential attribute, otherwise it would have several essences. For example, what is the body's essence? The body's essence is extension. What is the mind's essence? The mind's essence is thought. [Pause] But you see the same reversal as in Aristotle, something that's quite annoying, but specifically that the first two characteristics are placed into question again through the viewpoint of essence. It's that extension as essence of the substance-body is necessarily linked to the body and so corresponds to all bodies, [Pause] such that, at the extreme, one would have to say that individual bodies are no more than modes of the essential attribute, extension, that they're manners of extension.

In short, I am summing up. Descartes and Aristotle start off... What I am saying is obviously very much a summary; I... In general, I'd say that Descartes and Aristotle start off by assigning two important characteristics to substance, individuality and the subject of inherence, but they are led, a second point, they are led to establish an essence that is going to place these two characteristics into question. The essence is no longer *what is*, Be-ing (*l'étant*); it's *what the thing is*, what the Be-ing is. And well, here we see that the *what*, *what the Be-ing is*, is going to place into question the individuality of Be-ing and Be-ing as subject of inherence. For what Be-ing is, is essence; essence is not inherent to the subject. It's the essential attribute [of the subject] or what is affirmed about the subject, not that which is present. And on the other hand, it is applied to an open collection. [Pause] It's no longer this very table. It's the infinite series of tables. Good. Such that one often gets the impression -- this is why in Descartes as well as in Aristotle, the texts are so very difficult -- one never knows very well on what level (*plan*) they are.

Are they on the first level, that of substance, or are they on the second level, that of the attribute, of the essential attribute, the level of essence according to Aristotle or the level of the essential attribute according to Descartes? All this is going to get very complicated.

Henceforth, perhaps I can already simplify a bit by saying, what is Leibniz's enterprise? This will be to save the two characteristics at any cost, that is, there's going to be a great polemic against both Aristotelian and Cartesian essence, given that both of them, Aristotle and Descartes, each created a very different conception of essence. And so I'd like this whole polemic to be placed – I say immediately that this is why all this appears so important concerning the problem of Baroque thought – that what Leibniz is going to oppose to the essentialism common to Aristotle and Descartes, whatever their differences, is really what we must call a *Mannerism* about which we'll see what it consists of.

There you have my first introductory comment. I am making a second comment, and for anyone who can't take any more, eh?... So, this is because it's a comment that you must have well in mind to understand. I've discussed this a bit. It seems to me that all of ancient thought, Aristotle included, but especially Aristotle, Aristotle – there's a mania for the final word, I believe – passes through a theory and through conceptions of opposition. They have the idea that things are opposed, whether it's a struggle between hate and love, a struggle among elements, of the dry and the wet, of whatever you like, of water and fire, everywhere a struggle. It's therefore significant the way that Aristotle nearly ends Greek philosophy through one of the greatest theories of opposition, this theory of opposition that I'll tell you about briefly, but not too much because this would be an entirely separate subject which isn't necessary to understand.

But, but, but, [Pause] I am saying, what, on the other hand, in seventeenth-century thought is the great innovation? And here, I believe that it's an innovation to which we have to be attentive if we want to understand them. There's no longer opposition, you understand, because we are doing things wrong, because we present things poorly when we don't see the benefit that this presented. We only see the disadvantage. We are generally told, yes, the seventeenth-century understood nothing about the problem of opposition, and that falls back into an easy schema – I am not saying that mine is easier – that falls back into an easy schema, specifically that it was necessary to wait for young Kant, and it's at the beginning of Kant, to introduce real opposition, the reality of opposition, into the world and in philosophy with the concept. And that occurs in a small, admirable work by Kant, called "An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy." This little work of about fifty pages, "An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy", had a fundamental importance because it broke with the philosophy known as classical. So-called classical philosophy misunderstood, it seems, the oppositions and reduces all opposition, as it's said, to a simple limitation. There wasn't any real opposition; there were only logical limitations.

So that tells us a lot, but we forget the opposite side, I mean, the fantastic progress that this seventeenth-century thought represented. For, if the seventeenth century ignores this opposition when thinking of Kant who rediscovered it, on the other hand, Greek thought was perfectly familiar with it, not in the same way as Kant, but it knew about opposition perfectly, quite perfectly. [Pause] As a result, the Classics, especially starting from Descartes, knew perfectly well what they are doing when they break with the great Aristotelian theory of opposites. What did they want to substitute for it? For the logic of opposition, they wanted to substitute a logic of

pure distinction. [Pause] And here, we must reflect at length on this phrase to understand truly the importance it has from the perspective of a logic of thought. Starting from Descartes or for the Cartesians, things are no longer opposed to one another, but are distinguished one from another. This is it, in my view, to the point that I consider it as one of the misfortunes of classical thought, the rejection of opposition in favor of distinction. Things are distinguished and are no longer opposed. A little Cartesian, I'd say – a minor Cartesian, a philosopher of little importance; he created manuals, he created a Cartesian manual – had an expression that he himself found – it's odd, he's not great, just something from one of the small ones. [Laughter] – His expression is – I'm giving it to you in Latin because it's more respectable; so you will understand it on your own – *Non opposita sed diversa*, not opposed, but diverse. If you prefer, it's not opposed, but distinct.

What does he mean? He says it about substances, and about the two Cartesian substances, extended substance and thinking substance (*substance étendue, substance pensante*). Why is this essentially very, very important? They are not opposed, but distinct, but diverse. This is essential because, consider, it's easy to oppose extension and thought. For example, I'd say one is mortal and the other is immortal; the body is mortal, the mind, the soul is immortal. Or else I'd say extension is divisible, and thought is indivisible. I am proceeding through *opposita*. I can even say one wins out over the other, that one is – as was said at the time in their language – that one is *eminent* in relation to the other. Indivisible is more perfect than divisible; immortal is more perfect than mortal. So... And Descartes often recalls all that, all these simple oppositions, and what's important is that this is not how Descartes proceeds. What interests Descartes is not oppositions. And Descartes says it a thousand times: what matters for him is defining each substance through an attribute belonging to it properly and positively. One must define extension positively, not through an opposed characteristic. The attribute should be a *position* of substance, and not an *opposition* of another substance. One must define extension positively, and one must define thought positively in order to grasp them as attributes of corresponding substances that, henceforth, are diverse, distinct substances, and not opposed substances.

And I believe that the substitution of a logic of distinction for an Aristotelian logic of opposition is fundamental. And on this point, it only makes sense if there is indeed a logic of distinction. Well, yes, and I am telling you about it very quickly, and then you will reflect on all this. In general, Descartes tells us – this is the whole thesis of, all Cartesian logic – there are three types of distinction: [Pause] you have the distinction of reason, or abstraction; the modal distinction; and the real distinction. [Pause] A general comment concerning distinctions and an essential comment: distinctions only concern concepts and representations, not things; therefore, above all, do not believe that when Descartes says that two things are really distinct, that means that they are so insofar as [being] really distinguished things. As you will see, he means something entirely different. Distinctions are criteria concerning ideas, ideas, and only ideas as a function of which, we can provide the following three definitions:

There is distinction of reason when I conceive of two things [Pause] in such a way that I cannot conceive one without thinking, even in a confused way, about the other. [Pause] Example: body-extension, I cannot think about the body without thinking about extension; I cannot think about extensions without thinking, even in a confused way, about some body. [Pause] Other example: mind-thinking, [Pause] I cannot conceive of a mind that doesn't think; I cannot conceive of a thought that's not from a mind. You see it's a matter of ideas. I conceive. It's ideas that I have

about things. There are sanctions of reason when I have an idea of a thing that I cannot have without having, at least in a confused way, the idea of another thing. At that moment, there is distinction of reason between two things.

Modal distinction: there is modal distinction when I have an idea of one thing [*Pause*] by necessarily having the idea of another thing. I have idea *a* by necessarily having the idea of *b* – it's still a question of ideas – but I can have the idea of *b* without having the idea of *a*. [*Pause*] I'd say that this is a modal distinction. [*Pause*] Example: extension-movement, I cannot conceive, I cannot have the idea of a movement without getting the idea of an extension, but I can very well have the idea of an extension without the idea of movement, an immobile extension. I'd say at that point that between extension and movement, there is a modal distinction, and not one of reason. [*Pause*]

There is real distinction; you define it, henceforth, it's always – this is especially the misunderstanding that happens to us all the time and, in itself, it's a catastrophe – there is always real distinction when you think of things, and nothing else, but when you think of a thing while denying (*niant*) [*Pause*] all that belongs to the other thing, to an other thing, [*Pause*] and yet thinking of the first thing as distinct from any other. [*Pause*] You think of a thing, you think of *a* while denying all that belongs to *b*, and through this, you think of *a* as distinct from anything else, any other thing. [*Pause*] Example: [*Pause*] I deny in the idea of thinking all that belongs to extension. [*Pause*] But, by thinking in this way of the idea of thinking, or the idea of mind, by thinking in this way of the idea of mind, I am distinguishing it from any other substance. [*Pause*] You see that this is not explaining to yourself an expression that, otherwise, would be very ambiguous. Philosophers like Descartes or Malebranche, for them, to say that two things are really distinct does not mean that they are really distinguished. To say that two things are really distinct means that they are conceived – they are *conceived* – in such a way that one implies nothing about what belongs to the other. [*Pause*] Henceforth, these things, they're separable. Now, whether they are really separable or not, that's something else. I can say that they are separable. That's all I can say. Real distinction exerts itself over ideas no less than the two other distinctions.

So then, this is where we are: I'd like to show how Descartes uses his theory of distinction in order to determine the criteria of substance according to him, and how the polemic with Leibniz against Descartes will burst forth at that point on this level. There you have it! [*End of the session*] [2:47:18]

Notes

¹ Given that the preceding session, on 7 April 1987, served to summarize what Deleuze presented at the 17 March session and as conclusion, for what he designated as the final session on the second part of the course work for the year, here he first addresses his study of the very important question for him, "What is philosophy?", and then a final point for the second part of the course, announced toward the end of the 7 April session, a study of the notion of substance.

² On the place of discussion/argument in philosophy, see *What Is Philosophy?* (Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 28-29; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Minuit, 1991), pp. 32-33.

³ On the importance of problems in philosophy, see chapter 1, "What is a Concept?" in *What Is Philosophy?*

⁴ On taste and philosophy in Nietzsche, cf. *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 77-78; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 75-76.

⁵ On colloquia, see “C as in Culture” in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* (Semiotext(e) 2011) (*L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*).

⁶ This example from Nietzsche occurs often in Deleuze; see especially *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 106 and p. 201, note 31; *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (PUF, 1962).

⁷ On the possibility of thinking after Auschwitz, see *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 106-107; *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 102-103.

⁸ Given that this is a “very admirable man,” this could be Jean-François Lyotard.

⁹ Regarding “weak thinkers … ten years ago,” this no doubt refers to the so-called “New Philosophers” against whom Deleuze wrote a article in 1977, republished in *Two Regimes of Madness* (Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 139-147.

¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari describe this cartography in chapter 4, “Geophilosophy”, in *What Is Philosophy?*

¹¹ For a more developed definition, see *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 21-24; *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 26-28.

¹² On this topic, see “I as in Idea” in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* (*L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*).

¹³ On jurisprudence and some of the following examples, see also “G as in ‘Gauche’ (Left)” in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* (*L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*), and also *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 106-110; *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 101-105.

¹⁴ On Bergson’s theses on movement, see chapter 1 of *Cinema 1: The Image-Movement* (University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

¹⁵ On philosophical and non-philosophical rapports, see also “H as in the History of Philosophy” in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* (*L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*).

¹⁶ The questioner makes a comparison between the need to create a cartography of abstractions as Deleuze emphasized it, and Baudelaire’s aesthetic, not only the Baudelairian theme of correspondences, but also the creation of words in Baudelaire and his demand that art be absolutely modern. The question posed by the student is, in this constant becoming of innovation, are there processes that can be renewed without as such being universals?

¹⁷ On Péguy and the Aternal, see *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 111-113; *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 106-108.

¹⁸ Deleuze considers the Leibnizian theory of substance and its comparison in *The Fold*, pp. 54-58; *Le Pli*, pp. 73-77.

¹⁹ Deleuze considers this theory at several points of the seminar, notably in the sessions of 18 November 1986, 20 January 1987 and, in relation to Whitehead, on 10 March, 17 March, and 7 April. See also *The Fold*, pp. 41-43 and 54-56; *Le Pli*, pp. 55-57 and 73-75.