

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom**

**Lecture 16, 5 May 1987: Principle and Freedom (11) -- The Theory of Substance in Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz**

**Transcribed and Translated by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:44:20)<sup>1</sup>**

### **Part 1**

... and that, with great agility, he [Leibniz] constantly jumps from one criterion to the other. It goes without saying that these criteria are entirely coherent. I would, in my view, distinguish a logical criterion, [*Pause*] an epistemological criterion, a physical criterion or – to speak in a scholarly way – a technical or physicalist criterion, and a psychological criterion.<sup>2</sup>

So, what complicates the situation? It's that both – for this, it's very, very subtle, all this; you'll have to be especially perceptive – [Leibniz] both wants – and toward what? – on one hand, he both wants there to be two problems that are constantly, that lead things towards conveying some new criteria of substance generally, and at the same time, towards creating a way in which, in the name of these new criteria, it would evidently seem that extension cannot be a substance. [*Pause*] And the two problems are very interlinked, you understand? But on the other hand, -- [*Pause; the shrill squeaking of a door is heard and bothers Deleuze*] What is that? [*A student near Deleuze: It's the door in the next classroom*] Ah... I was thinking that there was a door in this very wall, and that... -- On the other hand, you understand, he wants to reactivate Aristotle – I was going to say, this might only be, literally, to provoke the Cartesians – he wants to reactivate Aristotle in his own theory of substance, but at the same time, maintain in contrast to Aristotle some of the knowledge gained from Cartesianism. [*The door squeak is again heard, with a groan and reaction from Deleuze: This is just not possible.*]

So, we are going to try to untangle all that, and I was telling you, well fine, we must start off from the Cartesian knowledge that was acquired. If you wish to understand a bit of what and how Descartes could appear to be the founder of a new kind of logic, I believe one has to consider less Descartes's explicit texts and more the consequences of what the (we might say) “little Cartesians” drew from them. The task of working through the logic of a philosophy is perhaps the work of philosophers who are more like commentators, and I was telling you [that] they were quite precise. What Descartes brings is a logic of distinction. What is there that's new in a logic of distinction? It's that it breaks with the Aristotelian logic of opposition, such that – once again, I insist on this point, if only to avoid undertaking bad history of philosophy – there's a notion (*schema*) in the history of philosophy stating that the seventeenth century knew nothing of opposition, of real opposition, and that it was Kant who discovered it in his famous text, in the small text that, in fact, is a wonder, “An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy”, where he discovers and opposes real oppositions that then will bring about all of post-Kantism, including Hegel, that's clear.

And I am simply saying, no, that's not how it is, that's not how it is. It's not like the seventeenth century knew nothing about opposition. It didn't just ignore opposition. Rather, quite

deliberately, consciously, it breaks with a logic of opposition in order to substitute for it a logic of distinction. And when the Kantians rediscover opposition, this will also quite obviously not be a complete return to Aristotle. It will be in a new form, specifically infinite opposition, which did not exist in Aristotle for whom opposition is always finite. No, one must be very careful in these evaluations of an historical evolution in philosophy.

And well, Descartes's logic of distinction is what I had done the last time. We ended on this point, and I only want to take it up again because you must understand it absolutely, and first of all, the following principle: distinction, the operation of the mind consisting of distinguishing, does not bear on things, but on representations. All logical distinctions are distinctions concerning representation or the idea. It does not concern things themselves. Of course, there will be consequences for things, but no distinction bears on things. It bears on the ideas that we have of things as a function of what Descartes told us, [that] there are three little distinctions: the distinction of reason, the modal distinction, and the real distinction. And understand – and here again, this would be a catastrophic misunderstanding – that even real distinction bears on ideas, and bears only on ideas.

In what sense? You recall the order of the three distinctions; once more, it's on this point that ended the last time. There is real distinction between two things – I seem to be contradicting myself, and you will see that I'm not – there is real distinction between two things when I can develop an idea of one – when I develop an *idea* of one – [*Pause*] while denying (*nier*) what belongs to the other. [*Pause*] In other words, two things are really distinct (*réellement distinctes*) when I conceive of one not only independently of the other because -- independently of the other, I can, for example, conceive of a triangle without conceiving that its two, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But what I cannot do is conceive of a triangle while denying that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Thus, there is no real distinction. But, according to Descartes, I can conceive of thought while denying all that belongs [to it], denying all that belongs to the extension (*étendue*) of the thought. I would say that thought and extension are really distinct, that is, are conceived as really distinct. This is strictly synonymous. To go more quickly, we say that two things are really distinct, but that you must understand that it's their ideas that are really distinct, that is, both things are conceived as really distinct at the point where the Cartesian reasoning is usually this – and it mattered greatly for Leibniz; yes, today, we must grasp this as a rather painful lesson, since it's again a terminology lesson. Descartes tells us exactly: two things that are really distinct are *separable*, that is, two things conceived as really distinct can be separated. Now, are they separated? For the moment, we have no idea. Are they effectively separated? I'd say, are they truly distinguished insofar as they are things? We just don't know.

Take the development of Descartes's *Meditations*. From the start of the *Meditations*, or rather quickly, he is going to show that thought is conceived as really distinct from extension, that is, I can conceive the thought while denying anything belonging to extension. Thus, thought and extension are conceived as really distinct, but as he himself says, he cannot yet draw from this the conclusion that thought and extension are separate. And as he says, perhaps it's the body that thinks; that's not his concern on this level. His concern on this level is showing that thought can be conceived while denying anything belonging to extension, nothing more. So they are separable, but not necessarily separate. In order to conclude that these are two substances separate in things – up to here, he has just concluded that these were attributes, that these were

distinct attributes – in order to conclude that these are two substances separate in things, he will have to make another step, specifically that God necessarily conforms to the distinct ideas he gives us. Notice that the Cartesian argument is quite simple: it's that if God gave us distinct ideas and yet didn't conform to them, that is, if he made non-separate something that he makes us think of as separate, this would be a lying God, who'd be trying to deceive us. And it is well known that God cannot deceive us, so fine.

But the end of this argument matters little. What interests me is that real distinction is defined at the level of representation. Once again, two things are really distinct when you can think of one while denying all that belongs to the other, period, that's it, when you can think, that is, when you create for yourself the idea of one that denies everything belonging to the other. [Pause] There you have it. [Pause] I would say [that] there is real distinction when you think *a* without *b*, and *b* without *a*. Henceforth, there is real distinction between *a* and *b*. [Pause]

There's modal distinction when you can think *a* without *b*, but you cannot think *b* without *a*. Notice that modal distinction is a unilateral distinction. [Pause] Example: extension and movement. According to Descartes, I cannot think of movement without an extension. On the other hand, I can very well think of immobile extension without movement. [Pause]

Finally, the distinction of reason that equally concerns or, what we call differently abstraction; distinction of reason is abstraction. And abstraction is an operation that concerns representation, that concerns ideas, that does not concern things. It's when you cannot think *a* without confusedly thinking *b*, without thinking at least confusedly *b*, and you cannot think *b* without thinking at least confusedly *a*. I would say that between the body and thought, between the body and the mind, there is real distinction; between the body and movement, there is modal distinction; between the body and extension, there is distinction of reason. Why? Because I cannot think of a body, that is, I cannot form the idea of a body, without thinking at least confusedly of some extension, and I cannot think of extension without thinking at least confusedly of some body whatever. You will tell me, yes I can, I can perhaps think of an extension without the body. Descartes says no. However confusedly it might be, you have the image of a body when you are thinking, but it's the limits of this body, it's very vague, etc. But all that, let's just assume it; it's not a matter for arguing. Fine.

So, everything depends on all that, is this understood? No... questions? [Pause] If you happen one day to read Descartes, and for those who have read him, obviously, it's a catastrophic misunderstanding to think that when he is speaking of two really distinct things, he means to be talking of two truly distinguished things. So, good, fine. From this point, let's move onward.

I am scrutinizing the criterion that we could call "logic of substance." And well, in Descartes there is indeed a logic of substance criterion, [Pause] and Descartes offers it, he offers it in some reflective texts. I already told you that the *Meditations* include objections made to Descartes, that a certain number of thinkers of the period made to Descartes, and Descartes's answers to these objections. It's much more in the objections and the answers that we find discussion about the logic assumed by Descartes's *Meditations*. And it seems to me at least, it seems to me that all of Descartes's texts are convergent. The criterion of substance is simplicity. In other words, [for] a substance, the logical criterion means that it's a criterion of thought. [Pause] Substance is

something simple, that's thought as simple. What does it mean to be thought in this way? In fact, he will quite willingly identify...

-- [*The noise from the door in the next room continues*] Why didn't it make that noise the other times? [*Several students offer answers*] It was doing that? [*A student: Yes*] Then why wasn't I noticing it? [*The student: It's gotten worse*] Ah, ah... [*Laughter*] So this is going to be good for us with Leibniz. Oh, hold on to this example! Hold on to this example! We're going to be able to use it. It will make everything clear for you. But, alas, for Descartes, that is of no use at all because for Descartes, very few things are useful. [*Laughter*] --

So, this is simplicity, and you are already equipped to understand. That doesn't mean without elements; that means something is simple when its eventual elements [*Pause*] are not distinguished except by a distinction of reason, that is, are distinguished neither by a modal distinction, nor by a distinction ... [*A student: Real*] A real distinction, but by a distinction of reason, that is, by abstraction. Something is simple when its elements are distinguished by abstraction. Example: the body and extension. [*Pause*] Example: the mind and thought. [*Pause*] You immediately see the consequences. Here I am jumping forward because the consequences immediately explode. I am solely seeking to draw forth a kind of logic of the theory of substance in Descartes, and a very simple logic.

I would say that, in Descartes, henceforth, substance is necessarily determined by an attribute that will be named the essential attribute. Why is substance determined by the essential attribute? Precisely because it only has a distinction of reason with this attribute. [*Pause*] The essential attribute is the determination of the substance as simple substance, as simple notion. [*Pause*] There you are. Why is extension a substance? Because extension is, in fact, the essential attribute of the body. Why is it the essential attribute of the body? It's the essential attribute of the body because it only has a distinction of reason with the body. Thus, it forms with the body a simple notion. Henceforth, it's a substance, the extended substance.

That seems simple, [but] it doesn't go without saying. It's necessary to have already constituted a logic of distinctions, and a logic of distinctions doesn't go without saying. Once again, this is properly Cartesian, the logic of distinctions, and not before [Descartes]. The whole Middle Ages used notions of distinction, but this was not in the name of a logic of distinctions. And in fact, in Descartes, this is all united, the constitution of a logic of distinctions and the refinement of distinctions as reduced to three. [*Pause*] Fine.

On this point, therefore, this isn't Descartes. We only retain from Descartes what we find necessary for Leibniz. If we read Leibniz, we notice something funny, even with a cursory reading. [*Deleuze casually flips pages of a text*] If we turn the pages, as we say, this is strange. For a long while, there was never the word "simple" in his writing regarding substance. You never found "simple substance" or "substance is simple." You are going to tell me that I shouldn't exaggerate. But it suffices, as you have all done because this is part of our pact, it suffices to open the *Monadology*, and we read in paragraph 1, not to go any farther, "The monad, of which we are speaking here, is nothing other than a simple substance." Yes, [but] this isn't bothersome because the *Monadology* is a text that came rather late. Starting from a particular moment, it's true that Leibniz deigns to speak of a simple substance. I ask, when? And I ask, why didn't he talk about it before? We'll see, henceforth, that this has a certain interest for us.

He begins speaking of the monad as simple substance when he moves farther and farther into a problem that we are not yet ready to understand and that concerns substances that he calls composite substances. Thus, there are composite substances. He insists on distinguishing between simple substances and composite substances. Henceforth, this means that any substance is not simple, that henceforth simplicity continues not being a criterion of substance. [Pause]

Next, [Pause] when he wasn't yet speaking of simple substance, how did he then define that it's substance? How did he characterize it from a logical viewpoint? *By unity*. He said, substance is *one*. He wasn't saying that it's simple. [Pause] In the Letters to Arnauld, in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, you will not find a single use of "simple substance." You will find "the one substance" (*substance une*). You'll tell me, fine, fine, you are interested in words, but one or simple. We'll have to see. André Robinet, who has worked extensively in the seventeenth century, you know, he uses computers on the occurrence of texts as applied to lexicons. This has considerable interest for philosophy, and so he can note very well the moment that the nominal group "simple substance" appears, for which he can provide a date, and, in fact, it's quite late. Before, there's no question of this. I am saying, I am adding, when Leibniz speaks of simple substances, it's in order to distinguish one kind of substance from another kind of substance that are composite substances, but what do the two kinds of substances have in common? Not simplicity. They have unity in common. These are unities. [Pause]

Let's then try to move forward. There are two solutions: telling oneself, oh, perhaps there isn't such a great difference between unity and simplicity, and then, telling oneself, by all accounts, the difference is huge. Why would the difference be huge before even knowing what these differences are? Well, the difference is huge because there's already a move occurring here, Leibniz is in the process of making a move. What is Leibniz's move? As I was telling you, it's that he is fully reactivating Aristotle. Who is it that was defining substance with unity? It was Aristotle. When Descartes defines substance with simplicity, we can consider that he's evening up the score with Aristotle, that Descartes's true thesis is: you will not define substance with unity. You must define it with simplicity, and this isn't the same thing. And when Leibniz defines substance with unity, we must understand, it's vitally necessary to return to Aristotle and to restore a definition of substance with unity in order to escape from the radically inadequate criterion that Descartes was able to invent, to wit, simplicity.

And a very odd passage from the correspondence with Arnauld affirms all that I am saying. He speaks a great deal there about substance in an exchange of letters in which Arnauld becomes, after having been... Arnauld was at the turning point (*charnière*), since he belonged to those thinkers making objections to Descartes, and in his earlier correspondence with Leibniz, he presented himself as Descartes's defender who he had nonetheless attacked previously. He becomes Descartes's defender, and he tells Leibniz, but in the end, you are giving a paradoxical definition to substance, implying a non-Cartesian definition. He tells him, and this is Arnauld's exact text, against Leibniz. He tells him, "You insist on defining" – in contrast to what usually occurs – "you insist on defining substance with unity instead of opposing it to mode". The text isn't simple! Let's translate: classically, one opposes substance to mode, then it's true, substance is what is, [while] mode is a manner of being. But to say that one opposes substance to mode means what? It means that one has defined it not with mode, but with the attribute, the essential attribute. The body is defined with the extended attribute. [Pause]

So Arnauld tells Leibniz: you are defining substance with the one; henceforth, you can no longer define it with the essential attribute. We'll see why. And then, Leibniz answers, and here, frankly, he's having a laugh – but finally, quite frankly, that's not entirely clear, [Laughter] especially since he is careful with Arnauld who isn't a man one jokes with. He tells him, but what you are telling me is very odd because I myself am defining substance as everyone has done, implying here as what Aristotle did it. And the other [Arnauld] tells him, you are defining substance like no one else, implying you aren't following our great Descartes. Leibniz answered, I am defining it as everyone else has; substance is what is one by itself (*un par soi*), [Pause] *unam per se*, that which is one by itself, there you have substance. And he says, that's how everyone has considered this.

So they are opposed... All this is to help you feel that we're already no longer... you see? We no longer have... At the point we've reached, I have spoken a lot, but what is the bit of progress that we've made? Earlier, we risked concluding, well fine, simple or one, it's the same. There's no great difference between saying something is simple and something is one. Now, we are in the process of discovering, not at all, it's not the same. Why? Let's hold onto to this: something simple, we can now say, is something that is determined by an attribute called essential, understanding this as that with which the thing has a distinction of reason. There you have it: something simple is something that is determined by an attribute called essential. The immediate consequence: there is not one thing that has two essential attributes. Why? Because the essential attribute has only one distinction of reason with the thing. If there are two essential attributes, there are two things. Hence, a substance will have an essential attribute, and only one. [Pause] Given this, it's something simple; it's something simple insofar as it's determined by one and only one essential attribute. Fine.

Here we're jumping ahead. Here's Leibniz telling us: substance is something one, [Pause] it's one by itself. They [Descartes and Leibniz] gaze at each other and understand the abyss of their differences. Why? What is oneness by oneself? Let's look for this. [Pause] I'd say, oneness by itself is that which by itself *unifies* a something. The one by itself is unity in action (*unité en acte*). [Pause] The one cannot be thought by itself, independently of the act through which it unifies a something. [Pause] In other words, the one by itself is active unity. [Pause] What does it unify? We can give different answers that still must be connected to some things that we have previously seen, that is, -- here we don't have time for review -- things we saw before Easter break. I'd say [that] it's the internal active unity of an event, [Pause] of a movement, of a change. The unity in action necessarily hangs on an event that it [unity] unifies. [Pause] If you will, to what does a unity refer, what does it demand? [Pause] Let's try to understand. What is the correlative of unity? Earlier, we were told [that] substance insofar as it is something simple has as correlative the essential attribute. If I define substance as unity, its correlative isn't the essential attribute. It's something that the one in action unifies.

So, whether this is an event, a movement or a change, what does that mean? A movement, a movement, well yes, a movement needs unity. Why does a movement need unity? [Pause] Did Descartes know that a movement needed unity? [Pause] In a very lovely text, a small treatise that is called *On Nature Itself*, [Pause; Deleuze looks in his book] Leibniz tells us this – the complete title is *On Nature Itself or the Immanent Force and Activity of Created Things* – so *On Nature Itself*: “The following argument that the illustrious author” – this is Descartes<sup>3</sup> [Laughter] “that the illustrious author draws from the nature of movement brings no more

necessity to his conclusion. He says” – Descartes – “He says that a thing’s moving is merely its successively existing in different places”. [*Here Deleuze coughs violently, saying, Excuse me*] “A thing’s moving is merely its successively existing in different places. However, let us grant him this” – let’s grant him that a thing’s moving is merely its successively existing in different places – “Let’s grant him this even if by this we are not entirely satisfied, and if it expresses more” – that is, if this definition expresses more – “what results from motion than its formal definition”. That’s the text, you understand? We can stop with this because we’ve earned it. We have spent so much, so much, so much time waiting for such a text. That it reaches us now – [*The noise from the door continues, and Deleuze reacts*] Oh... what shit this is!... But ok, no, this will be good for us later. [*Laughter*]

Understand that, to help you comprehend, I was making a connection with Bergson because I believe that, on this point, there is a rather deep Leibnizianism in Bergson.<sup>4</sup> Everyone recalls here the distinction that Bergson makes between movement over and done (*une fois fait*) and movement in the process of occurring, and Bergson says, we cannot understand movement if we substitute for the act of movement in the process of occurring the result of the movement over and done, that is, the trace in space. I am rereading in order to try to persuade you that this connection wasn’t exaggerated. I am rereading the text: “Descartes” – while correcting it slightly, while summing it up – “Descartes defining movement with a thing’s moving is merely its successively existing in different places. We are not entirely satisfied with this definition because it expresses more what results from motion than the formal definition of motion”.<sup>5</sup> It [the definition] expresses what results from motion (or movement); grant me that I am not translating, that I haven’t deformed anything, if I say [that] it expresses movement over and done. It’s once that movement is done that I can say that the moving thing has changed its site. In other words, if I consider movement in the process of occurring, it needs a unity that it absolutely does not receive in this definition, the change of place. There is necessity: this is the principle of sufficient reason. If you recall that we saw the principle of sufficient reason, there is necessity that movement in the process of occurring refers to unity. [If] you don’t insist on unity, you can never grasp anything except movement over and done. In other words, Descartes didn’t grasp movement in the process of occurring, and this is why his entire physics failed with movement. [*Pause*] For a dynamics of movement, he substituted a static conception (*une statique*) of movement already done.

And so, what is unity of movement in the process of occurring? [*Pause*] A bit farther on in the text *On Nature Itself*, Leibniz continues. Recall the definition; he’s taking Descartes’s definition to task, a thing’s moving is merely its successively existing in different places. He says, “For the body... For the body at any moment in its motion” – You see? When movement is in the process of occurring – “For the body at any moment in its motion is not merely in the present moment of its motion that which exactly fits it” – that is, that which exactly fits *its mass*, small m -- “For the body at any moment in its motion is not merely in the present moment of its motion that which exactly fits it in order to change its place, but it also encompasses an urge or tendency” – it also encompasses an urge or a tendency – “to change its place” – but it also encompasses, there you have movement in the process of occurring. At each moment, you will have determined, at each abstract moment in the end, well then, we have to take into account the urge or tendency to change its place, “so that its next state follows by itself from the present one” – hold onto “by itself” which we will greatly need --- “follows by itself from the present one through the force of its nature.” In other words, if I want to speak in more scholarly terms, mathematical or physical

terms borrowed from Leibniz's terminology, movement in the process of occurring implies a *differential*, a differential of movement. The unity of movement in the process of occurring is, in the first place, the differential of movement, that is, the difference between the movement that has just occurred and the one that's occurring, or between the one that is occurring and the one that is going to occur. We can call this differential *effort* (or *urge*); in Latin, we will call it *conatus*, that is, effort, or urge, or admit that Bergson is not far off when he calls it *tendency*.  
[Pause]

So, at each assumed instant of movement, movement can be conceived as a succession of places at different instants since movement in the process of occurring implies at each instant a unity that is the differential of the movement or the *conatus*, that is the effort to pass from one site to another so that the following state *emerges* from the preceding state. There is not a succession of the following state and of the preceding state. There is an urge through which the following state emerges from the preceding state. Grant me, here as well, that what Bergson calls a duration is nothing other than this urge itself. But that's not all. Or else, in other texts, he will say [that] there isn't any movement if you don't conceive of an interior spring (*ressort*) in the body, in the body being created. And you recall, this was where, entirely where we began. Back when we started [the seminar], we saw that Leibniz's physics is presented as a physics of elasticity, and the physics of elasticity as a physics of the spring.<sup>6</sup> And in fact, I am quoting yet another text from the same period, a very beautiful text, this time taken from *New System of the Nature*, paragraph 18: "We can say that when bodies collide" – that is, the movement in which two bodies collide -- "We can say that when bodies collide, each one suffers" – this is beautiful, this expression – "each one suffers only from its own elasticity (*ressort*)". This is why he criticizes Descartes for having conceived that bodies last and for having understood nothing about the communication of movement since he didn't grasp that movement referred to elastic force or to the interior spring of the body. "We can say that when bodies collide, each one suffers only from its own elasticity," comma, "caused ... by the motion already in it." And fine.

So there we have the first fact we've gained (*acquis*). Movement in each instant that you will be able to determine, whatever the instant might be, however close it might be to the given instant, demands a unity, demands an internal unity without which there would never be a movement in the process of occurring, without which there would be no movements over and done. In other words, there would be no movement at all, and this is what [Leibniz] explains at length in *On Nature Itself*. He explains something interesting: "The mechanism seeks to explain everything through movement" – this is going to be his great critique of mechanismism – "the mechanism seeks to explain everything through movement". Only, it's strange, [as] he himself [*presumably Descartes, not Leibniz*] absolutely does not manage to explain movement. He can only reach movements over and done. He is forced to assume movement. And moreover, if you again look at the definition, change of site, if you refer to the definition we just saw ... in *On Nature Itself*, "a thing's moving is merely its successively existing in different places," but we would have no means to distinguish a body in movement and a body at rest. There's no way to distinguish the two since, [if] you take the moving thing's existence in a place at a given time, no difference can be assigned between the distances of one moving thing in a site and the existence of a nonmoving thing in a site. In other words, you will not even be able to distinguish two places if there is not movement in the process of occurring; you will not be able to distinguish two bodies. The mechanism seeks to distinguish everything through movement, there you are, but it's unable to distinguish the slightest movement in the process of occurring. [Pause] And yet, this is valid



only for any instant whatever of movement. A movement in the process of occurring at any instant whatever demands unity. This unity will be what Descartes ignored, the *conatus*, that is, the differential of movement. But with all the more reason – [A student indicates that he has a question] Yes, right away, I’m completing this point and then it’s your turn – but with all the more reason, as instants deducted from movement are abstract, the aggregate of a movement obviously demands an internal unity, an act. [Pause]

What is this internal unity? What is this act? Leibniz will determine it in several ways; here, we are anticipating on future discussions. I am saying that he can give it a physical determination, and this will be motor action (*action motrice*). [Pause] He will be able to give it a metaphysical determination, and this will be substance, the monad, the monad itself. Why can he not give it directly, there, a metaphysical determination? We’ll see, we’ll see. We’ll see because here, we are only taking up this: if you consider and if you distinguish movement in the process of occurring and movement already done and movement completely done, you see that movement in the process of occurring refers to and requires an interior unity, either first an instantaneous unity, or more deeply, a unity for the whole of its duration. [Pause] As a result, movement is the predicate of a substance defined through active unity, or if you prefer, there is a spontaneity of movement, calling spontaneity the rapport of movement to the active unity which produces it, the interior unity which produces it. And it is there that spontaneity appears, always in two steps, active unity spontaneity that spontaneously produces movement or that produces a spontaneous movement, no matter, always in two steps, as unity in the instant and as unity for the whole of the movement’s duration.

Unity in the instant, I take up my text again, as I have time here, *On Nature Itself*, such a beautiful text this is. [Pause; Deleuze searches in his text] “For the body at any moment in its motion is not merely in the present moment of its motion that which exactly fits it, but it also encompasses an urge or tendency to change its place so that its next state follows by itself from the present one through the force of its nature,” -- through the force of its nature -- “so that its next state follows by itself from the present one through the force of its nature.” How to say this in Latin, how to translate it into Latin, for those who have studied a bit of Latin? We would translate exactly “by a force” by *sua sponte*, by its own spontaneity. [Pause] We should not be surprised that we perpetually find the term “spontaneous” in Leibniz, an active unity of movement at the level, once again, of the instant as well as of the aggregate of time taken by a determined movement.

There we have a first point. You sense that I no longer find myself faced with “substance-essential attribute equals Simple”. I find myself facing “substance-movement equal interior unity” that spontaneously produces movement. [Pause] We are in the process of confirming that the Simple has strictly nothing to do with the one by itself. [Pause] For the simplicity relation – substance, constant essential attribute – is substituted the relation of unity – substance, changing movement, the unity of which gives us active or spontaneous reason. [Pause] You sense immediately the conclusion. How do you expect extension to be substance? Extension is incapable of producing the slightest movement. It’s incapable of saying, even between two bodies – and Leibniz will look into this a thousand times – extension is incapable of saying between two bodies which one is moving. Is it my train or the train beside mine that’s moving? If I lack any reference points of extension, I cannot assign movement to one body rather than to the other for a simple reason: extension gives me no sufficient reason to distinguish rest and

movement. And you see why since extension only recognizes movement as movement over and done. [*Pause*] There you are. Our first conclusion is that, regarding movement in the process of occurring, it is movement in the process of occurring that demands a unity for itself as much in the instant as in the whole of its duration. There you are, that's it. [*Pause*] Yes, your turn, [*Deleuze indicates the student who had spoken earlier*] you who had something to say!

A student: [*Inaudible; it concerns a comparison of Descartes and Leibniz*] Is this clear?

Deleuze: It's quite clear, but it has multiple aspects. I'd say that, on some points, it seems false to me, but it's because I haven't had the time, and I don't know if you, if your knowledge of Descartes... It's not correct to say that Descartes doesn't have the means to define speed. He defines speed perfectly, but this, it would take too long. I'd have to try to lay out some of Descartes's physics, but he has no problem with defining speed. That presents him with no problem, even as a function of this definition of movement.

What there is, where you are more correct, is if this is the same conception of causality in Descartes and in Leibniz. I'd say, given the evidence, clearly not, it's not the same distinction of causality. So, furthermore, once we've said that, in movement, something is conserved, is it the same conception, I am saying, not only of what is conserved, but the same conception of conservation itself through a movement? In this, it's not the same thing that's conserved, it's well known for Descartes, and for Leibniz, but why there is it said... -- if we have time, we will try to see about this point – but your question is getting out ahead of us. You pinpoint a problem correctly; in any case, what I am taking up here is that, in fact, Leibniz... I wouldn't say that Descartes ignored speed; I'd say that Leibniz is already committed to proposing to us a new conception of speed and of presenting to us a conception of the unity of movement that calls on notions that are entirely new in relation to Descartes, and in relation to Cartesianism since I just want, I just want to indicate some things by saying, you understand, such a conception of movement... We mustn't wonder too much why Descartes isn't aware of this. [*A coughing noise partially covers Deleuze's voice here*]

The little that I've said ought to make you tell yourself... [*Deleuze does not finish*] You know, once again, we always get the solutions that we deserve as a function of the means at hand. It seems to me that the little I've said on this conception of movement in Leibniz should suffice to persuade you that it wasn't a question of being able to conceive of it without, let's say, an infinitesimal calculus. Must we say that Descartes was unfamiliar with this calculus? Yes and no, because some equivalents or forerunners of infinitesimal calculus allowing one to conclude from one instant to another, however close they might be, you will find it already in the Middle Ages. But precisely Descartes didn't want any of that, and besides, he didn't want it for mathematical reasons. And if Leibniz is able to bring it back, this is because he forged a new weapon that was infinitesimal calculus, the mathematical power of which couldn't be denied and which would allow him to speak of the *conatus* as a differential of movement. [*Pause*] But it's not a question, no question of being able even to conceive of something like this if one doesn't have the means, and the means symbolize... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:05:11]

## Part 2

... of movement in extension that demands an active unity, so we indeed see that it's an active unity. In the final instance, it's substance, the monad. Fine. But we don't have movement. We don't know where it comes from. Here we've just made a bet on the future. We haven't spoken

of this until now. We have only spoken about the whole series, world, monad, but not about movement as physical reality. We haven't spoken about physics. So, let's say that movement even in extension that demands a unity of another nature than extension, we have just seen [that] it refers in the end to changes that are not simple movements.

Movement is what we call local change, the change of place; we have just seen this. But there are other kinds of change, and not for Descartes perhaps. But classically, that is, coming from Aristotle, there are other kinds of change. Movement is a change, that is, it's only a case of change. It's also what [Pause] Leibniz says quite well, still in *On Nature Itself*. "Aristotle, who in my view is deeper than many think" – you see, this comes up again – "judged that there must be (qualitative) alteration in addition to change of place" [Pause] "and that matter is not everywhere the same in itself in a way that it doesn't remain invariable. So, this qualitative diversity and, consequently, alteration is not adequately explained by Descartes," pardon, "by Aristotle." What he takes from Aristotle is that local change itself refers to a change of another nature which is a qualitative change. When you say, for example, a thing that was black becomes white, it's an alteration; it doesn't change place, it changes quality.

Here you have another change, and what is Leibniz's idea? You anticipate it. You see, we've begun and it's quite complex, and at the same time, very simple to understand: movement as local change, we rise to necessary unity of movement in the process of occurring in the instant. One more step: unity of movement in the process of occurring in the whole of its duration. One more step: no longer local movement, no longer local change, but qualitative change. Why does this change us to qualitative change? Because qualitative change is interior to substance, interior to the monad. [Pause] And we start the same reasoning, but more and more deeply: it is qualitative change that requires an active unity that is going to produce it spontaneously, substance then defined as the active unity of qualitative change. [Pause]

Substance has two definitions that are linked to one another: interior unity of movement in the process of occurring in the instant or on the whole of its duration, [Pause] active unity of interior change; interior unity of movement in the process of occurring, active unity of change itself interior. In fact, you recall, the monad, the individual substance never stops changing state, qualitative state. And in a certain way, the states through which the monad passes have to refer to a spontaneity of production, exactly as movement in the process of occurring implies a spontaneity of production. [Pause] The monad has to contain the active principle of its own changes. Fine.

What happens to us as change? Let's look for an example. And here we have Leibniz confronting an example that is brought to him by someone for whom he has a great, great esteem, one of his contemporaries, with whom he will have a long correspondence, long conversations, and with whom, I believe, he will not speak in the same tone as with others. And this contemporary is called [Pierre] Bayle.<sup>7</sup> And Bayle is a very strange character in the seventeenth, eighteenth century. He creates the strangest dictionary in the world. He creates articles on one theme and another, and then, in the margins of these articles, he creates other articles. This is a method that, some notes that finally get lengthy. In the notes, there are notes. It's a very strange, very beautiful, very interesting book, and where Bayle, in his dictionary, in the article *Rorarius*, studies... no matter, at the article *R*, in the notes that finally take on more importance than the texts themselves, he criticizes Leibniz and creates an exposé of the strange philosophy of Monsieur Leibniz. And Leibniz is very interested by the way in which Bayle

presents him, and he speaks of this, or at least he includes this: “Monsieur de Leibniz pretends that a monad changes its state following a kind of spontaneity.” See, it’s enough to trace this. I am simply taking up Leibniz’s expression because, for movement, “so that its next state follows by itself from the present one through the force of its nature.” I’d say that unity of movement, you see, there’s a double spontaneity, in fact: unity of movement produces movement spontaneously; this is the unity of movement in the process of occurring; and the following state of movement results from the preceding state spontaneously, *sua sponte*. It’s the first spontaneity that guarantees the second. [Pause]

If you now place yourself in the individual substance of the monad – I am changing states – it’s the same thing. I have to prove, to show two things if I am Leibnizian. I have to show that substance is spontaneous reason of the production of change, and that the resultant state emerges from the preceding state spontaneously. The two implicate each other absolutely. [Pause] Eh? Are you following me? This is a final effort before we rest; this effort is going to be quite difficult.

And Bayle tells him, so there, explain to me anyway what’s going on. There’s a dog eating its soup – we can’t say that philosophers don’t speak with concrete examples [Laughter] – there’s a dog eating its soup. It’s enjoying pleasure, [a] state of the dog’s monad, for the dog is a monad just like you and me, a monad that expresses the universe, simply it doesn’t express it in the same way as we do. It’s a dog point of view. We will see what this is. And besides, this will be a problem for us, what a dog point of view is, and what a horse point of view is, since all monads express the world, including the horse monad and dog monad. Good, but before reaching such chasms, let’s assume, eh, you’re a dog, fine, and you get struck by a stick when you are in the act of eating your soup. You are changing states; this is a qualitative change. You pass from the state of pleasure to pain, a qualitative change.

Bayle say, so now, where’s the spontaneity? I get struck on the head with a stick, suddenly, and so then is there, in the monad, in my monad, is there something that produces the blow from the stick? But, no, no, stop exaggerating! In what way is this spontaneous? In what way is the passage... Bayle picks the best example. He says, strictly speaking we can say, you pass from pain to pleasure, there’s a tendency towards pleasure; there is an urge toward pleasure that explains that you pass there spontaneously. But when you get struck with a stick, when you pass from pleasure to pain, here, no, you cannot say things like that. Stop joking around. You cannot say that you spontaneously pass from pleasure to pain. This is an important objection.

And Leibniz adds, we are going to see yet another more moving example. It’s yet again the monad Caesar, and he says, there is no doubt that the same thing, that we can conceive of the same thing about Caesar. So, he nonetheless nuances the example which yields this: an insect, a wasp wanders about, and while baby Caesar is nursing, it comes to sting the cheek of the baby emperor. You see, this is the same thing. It’s like the stick landing on the head that causes him to pass from an extreme pleasure, little Caesar, who is quite happy to be... [Laughter], he passed from an extreme pleasure. And he [Leibniz] says, it’s like this in Caesar’s entire life. There will be passages like this. So fine, let’s move on. In what way can we speak of spontaneity? Here’s how.

So, let’s say... We are no longer in the case of movement. We are in the case of the internal change of the monad. But Leibniz says, what does internal change mean exactly? I am reading the text to you because, I believe... We can explicate it after if ... but there’s really no need to

explicate it. [*Deleuze looks in his book*] -- Ah, my God!... Ah, no! I thought I had taken the wrong volume then, that I didn't have my text, that's so beautiful. -- [*Pause*] Here we are. Leibniz's answer gets long, so pay attention: when I am saying spontaneous, I don't mean voluntary, deliberate. It goes without saying that one doesn't choose suffering, that one doesn't prefer pain, that one doesn't want pain. When we are in the process of eating our soup, we don't want to be struck on the head with a stick. Spontaneous never meant voluntary.

But, then, what does it mean? Here we are: "Each man is like a living being, representing the universe according to his own point of view, and especially in relation to his body." Notice that we haven't seen this. We haven't yet the means to see it. There we are, the monad expresses the universe, "especially in relation to his body," since we don't even know what the body is. We have just started considering it with the story of movement, but we don't know. This is not yet clear. So, we take note, we vaguely understand what it means. For example, I express the universe, but I preferably express what concerns my body; I only express the rest from farther and farther away, to the extent that it affects my body. I only express the sun to the extent that the sun affects my body. It's quite simple what he's saying.

This is how he connects this: "The causes that make the stick act" -- eh, on the poor dog -- "The causes that make the stick act" -- what is this? He gives the list, and this becomes extremely moving, as the stick doesn't arrive all by itself, that's not how it is. What he is in the process of responding to Bayle is this: you act as if the situation was like this, the dog is eating its soup, and then there's this stick that arrives and drops on its head. [*Laughter*] But Leibniz says, you are being abstract; this is pure abstraction. And then he is going to toss out a crazy idea, as you'll see, completely crazy, in this text, but that is so concrete. He will be right, as all madmen are, he will be right through the concrete, and we're the ones, with our poor reason, that will be abstract, deplorably abstract. We're abstract because of Bayle, right? No, but what about the stick? [*Deleuze strikes the table with something*] You'll tell me that could be a flower pot that falls on his head. But no! It can't be a flower pot falling on his head. This is abstract as well. Why? Because there is no flower pot to fall on his head without there being, for example, people. Bayle forgets this. What does he forget? That there's no stick that happens to strike you on the head.

Yes there is! Let's listen to Leibniz: "Such are the causes that make the stick act, that is, the man standing behind the dog": you see? The dog had to eat its soup, but there was a guy who, if needed, silences his footsteps to eliminate them, coming up behind the dog, a very, very auditory animal, but who so much into his soup that it's not paying any attention. "The man standing behind the dog, getting ready to strike him while he eats" -- eh? I love this text because there, that was my dream, to manage to strike a dog on the head with a stick while it's eating its soup. [*Laughter*] Yes! I have never been able to manage this because... [*Inaudible due to the laughter*] I would have preferred a cat, but there, a cat, you know, managing to strike a cat while its eating up its ron-ron, [*Laughter*] that's really difficult because they are so bad and always on the lookout.<sup>8</sup> -- The causes that make the stick act, that is, "the man standing behind the dog getting ready to strike it while it eats, and everything there in the course of bodies that contributes to dispose this man in this way". That is, nonetheless, we don't strike dogs on the head with a stick while it is eating its soup if we haven't had quite enough of this dog, [*Laughter*], or else if it's in conditions where it is... The dog, for example, I'm out in the country, and it's the neighbor's dog that has eaten my sheep. But all this is a very concrete aggregate.

Bayle says, explain to me how the passage from pleasure to pain is spontaneous, and he tosses us into a completely abstract situation. Here's the force of Leibniz's answer. He eliminates all jumps; he extracts pleasure from the soup, pain from the striking stick, but says: Show me that there's a passage, but he began by eliminating the passages. What is this passage? It's that – I come back to the example, completing it, but grant to me Leibniz's literality: "The dog is on my farm in the process of eating its soup. The neighbor sneaks up, someone with a heavy grievance against the dog and me. He has a stick under his arm." Fine. The dog vaguely hears the footsteps; let's even say that it goes, "oo, there's a stick," but at what level? "There's something on my back that I don't like," the dog tells itself. These are tiny passages. But it is entirely absorbed by the soup. It's not paying attention, or not enough attention.

Fine, so let's continue: "The causes that make the stick act," that is, "the man standing behind the dog, getting ready to strike it while it eats, and everything in the course of bodies that contributes to dispose this man to strike are also first represented in the dog's soul." That is, the dog's soul has tiny perceptions of this, simply perceptions as if drowned in its great pleasure of the soup that invades its entire consciousness. But it has some tiny, indifferent perceptions, minute sounds of gravel, someone approaching behind its back. It senses from this person's manner that there's nothing good here. All that is also represented, first, in the dog's soul, but weakly, by tiny, confused perceptions without *apperception*. What he's calling "apperception", is conscious perception, that is, with the dog noticing it because the dog's body is also only affected by it imperceptibly.

"And as, the course of bodies, these dispositions," that is, just as "in the course of bodies, these dispositions finally produce the precise blow on the dog's body," eh? "so too the representations of these dispositions in the dog's soul finally produce the striking stick's representation which, being distinguished and forceful, the dog then perceives it quite distinctly, and this is what causes its pain." [*Laughter*] Ah, this is a beautiful text, and let us render praise unto Caesar because this text, yes, it's all the more moving since it might be about a baby, understand? "We cannot understand," he tells Bayle -- we cannot stay limited to the animal – "We cannot understand that God could have placed in Jules Caesar's soul the principle of what I am going to say about this. He happened no doubt several times to be stuck by a pin" – I said "wasp" earlier, but this is because the wasp comes on the next page; here, it occurs frequently that a baby might be stuck by a pin from the nursemaid – "He happened no doubt several times to be stuck by a pin even while he was nursing." You see, [for] the "Caesar crosses the Rubicon" event, I can say "Caesar is stuck by a pin", all that is the same.<sup>9</sup>

"Pursuing the hypothesis we examine here, it was therefore necessary that his soul be modified by itself from a feeling of pain immediately after the agreeable perceptions of sweetness from the milk. By what *spring (ressort)*" – he knows quite well what he is doing by using the same word; of course, this is a metaphor in the case of the soul, but it's not by chance that he explained to us that physically, that physically the passage from one instant to another in the movement implied an interior spring within the body, just as there is a kind of spring in the soul – "By what spring was it determined to interrupt his pleasures and to be given suddenly" – suddenly – "a feeling of pain" – but it wasn't given suddenly – "without anything to warn him to prepare for the change, nor that anything new might have occurred in the substance?"

But he says, of course something occurred, and here, he introduces the wasp, but for the pin, it's the same. We can suppose that hardly, hardly had the pin begun to graze him before scratching

him once fully. But the wasp is like the man sneaking up behind with his stick. It [the dog] heard the movement, all that, but it simply stayed in the state of tiny perceptions. What happened? Literally, I'd say that pain, as noticed perception, [Pause] as distinguished perception, what does it do? It integrates, it results, if you prefer, through... It results from a series of tiny, unnoticed perceptions that prepare it, [Pause] and from these, it flows forth like a natural force, the pin approaching closer and closer to my body, and entering into my body, the man with his stick approaching closer and closer to me until the stick touches me violently.

In what sense is there spontaneity in the production of pain? Pain doesn't just reach you like that. Pain appears to you, reaches you as integral, if I dare say this – but for the moment, you are taking all these words as metaphors – as integration of a whole series of tiny, unnoticed perceptions about which you can say simply, “the striking stick happened suddenly.” It's not true. The striking stick is only a transformation of movement, specifically, the movement through which the stick approached, was raised, and is transformed into a blow that strikes me. It's a movement in the process of occurring in its aggregate.

Let no one tell me that the striking stick comes out of nowhere. It is itself the integral element of a whole series of *conatus*, of all the moments through which a movement has happened. And in my soul at the level of qualitative change, of qualitative changes, it's the same thing. My perception of the striking stick, that is, of pain, integrates the sum of tiny perceptions that I hadn't noticed, indifferent or unconscious tiny perceptions, such that I can say [that] the striking stick results *sua sponte*, spontaneously, from the movement, first, of the arriving stick, then raised, then violently dropping. The striking stick flows exactly from this movement in its aggregate *sua sponte*, and from instants of this movement, and from differentials of this movement, exactly like, on the other hand, in my soul, that is, in my monad, pain results *sua sponte* from all the unnoticed preceding steps. [Pause] As a result, what I was saying earlier about movement, I must now say about internal change. Just as – yet again, if I am summing up this aggregate – just as movement refers to the interior unity of a substance alone able to account for it, so too the qualitative change refers to the active unity, the qualitative change interior to the substance this time. The qualitative change interior to the substance refers to the active unity of the substance that produces it. Produces it how? By causing the integration of tiny perceptions. And, you recall, it [the substance] represents, it expresses the universe. [Pause] Fine. What have I just shown? It's that the theory of substance, the theory of the One, of unity by itself, implied for Leibniz a spontaneity of movement as event, a spontaneity of change as predicate. [Pause]

What can I... I would like to conclude quickly because perhaps you are already completely worn out. I get the impression that this is a great effort; trying to understand this theory, in a bizarre sense, is a great effort. But I'd immediately like to draw some conclusions from it that, for me, are essential because these are really conclusions close to our work, to the point that we have reached today.

I'd say, here... I am not concerned in this tale of the Baroque about distinctions, the complication of distinctions, for example, between the Classical, the Baroque, Mannerism, all that. We are sometimes told that Mannerism is part of the Baroque; [sometimes] that no, it's something before the Baroque; [sometimes] it's something else that... All this is... All this is because [Pause] people do not have the necessary concepts. I am simply saying that it's not complicated. The Classical conception of substance is like, for me, think about it, it's Descartes. I will call a Classical conception of substance a conception that makes of substance... that

responds to the criterion of simplicity, that is, that defines substance by a constant attribute, whose attributes are distinct through a distinction of reason. You have all the elements of Classicism: the use of reason, the constancy of the attribute, the determination of substance through the attribute, all that, Classical simplicity. I would say [that] the essential point of Classical theory of substance, is what? It's essence-form, which means what? Which means [Pause] [that] the only form of substance is its essential attribute. The essential attribute is the form of substance; extension is the form of the substance-body, of corporeal substance; the *cogitatio*, thought, is the form of the *mens*, or of the mind. That's what Classicism is. [Pause]

So you see here, at first glance, unity, simplicity, didn't seem to us such different notions. Now, at the point we've reached, we can say that an abyss truly separates them. Why? Because unity by itself is the unity that produces manners of being, manners of being either as movements like events, or as changes like predicates. [Pause] Substance is active unity of predicates, or the interior unity of events. [Pause] We discover a point that is the essential point of all our work this year. Contrary to everything that's been done to avoid understanding Leibniz, it's obvious that predication in Leibniz has nothing at all to do with attribution, and is even the opposite of attribution. Attribution is either a word used without any meaning or designates the determination of a something through an attribute. In Descartes... In Leibniz, something is never determined through an attribute, but something is determined as a predicate unity. What is determined of as a predicate unity? It's something that is capable of playing the role of unity by itself in relation to predicates presenting themselves as change that only this unity can account for, active unity, unity in action. The unity in action is the criterion of substance.

Henceforth, if unity in action is the criterion of substance, I am saying that Leibniz's conception of substance is a conception that eminently deserves the name of Mannerist. And if it's difficult to define Mannerism in painting, it's easy to define it in philosophy, ought to be easy to define it in... [Deleuze doesn't finish] such that philosophy could well be used at that point to clarify this question of Mannerism in the arts. What is Mannerist is a conception of substance that tells us [that] substance is the unity by itself of manners of being and not the determination of a something through an essential attribute. What is Mannerist is a conception of substance that tells us [that] it's the interior unity of movement in the process of occurring, event, or (which comes down to the same thing) the active unity of interior change, predicate. The predicate is not an attribute; the predicate is, your choice, a relation or an event, were it only – as we've just discovered – a relation to my body, but as we have seen earlier, in the form of other rapports. The predicate is never an attribute.

In other words, Mannerism in Leibniz's theory of substance is presented in the following way: the couple spontaneity-depth, spontaneity-depth, the depth of the soul. It's with Leibniz that this expression, the depth of the soul, appears constantly. The soul draws from its depth constantly, constantly. To convince you that this is constant, I choose an example. The Letters [from Leibniz] to Des Bosses, we sense their importance because... [Pause] "Monads draw everything from their own depth," and here I've selected one example, I'm satisfied with one example, but believe me, there are thousands, there's the word "depth". The depth of the soul emerges with Leibniz. I would say, literally, because it's true, the soul has a depth starting from Leibniz. "Monads draw everything from their own depth, but not like heat in the Scholastics's work produces its effects in a hidden manner." He does not call upon hidden forces; on the contrary, he calls upon a perfectly analyzable and visible mechanism which is that of the integration of tiny perceptions. They [monads] draw everything from their own depth. In other words, the



Mannerist couple is spontaneity-depth in opposition to the Classical couple which is essence-form. [*Pause*]

I continue repeating myself: that which is Mannerist are movements insofar as and as grasped in the process of occurring, that is, insofar as they refer to an interior unity, at once each of their instants and the whole of their duration. What is Mannerist are changes, passages, from one position to another, from one disposition to another insofar as referring to an active unity. And they henceforth emerge, everything that changes comes forth from a *depth* and what causes it to emerge is that its turn has come, in relation to what? What decides that the turn, that the moment has come? What decides that the moment has come is precisely the development of an active unity. In this sense, predication is the opposite of attribution since the predicate is fundamentally movement or change. Henceforth, substance is unity by itself.

So, I am ending by saying fine, let's get back to this noise we have here.<sup>10</sup> Here I am... Suddenly, I tell myself that I had to have been hearing it for two terms (*trimestres*) this year. For two terms there has been this noise, but I was within pleasure, within the pleasure of talking to you. And this pleasure of talking to you is so intense that it was the sole noticeable perception in my soul. And certainly it [the noise] was a tiny perception; from time to time, it bothered me, but I didn't even know what was bothering me. There was something bothering me, so I told myself, what is this? And at worst, I have perhaps reproached some innocents here [*Laughter*] by saying... But no, I didn't know, I didn't know. And then, a day arrives when, no doubt, that noise got louder. The noise became stronger; it changed its state, at last! This isn't spontaneous, the sound, all that. Yes it is! There's spontaneity in my passage. Something bothered me suddenly; suddenly? Not at all! I took the necessary time to create the integration of tiny concepts that I was dragging behind me for ages and ages, [*Laughter*] this little noise, this little noise, that was teasing my soul and that I hadn't noticed.

And it's the same thing for the dog. You sense henceforth how it appears, situated there infinitely ahead of you. But when we learn what a body is, we mustn't be too surprised that this body and soul are, as he says, in pre-established harmony since – and this is like two series – since there will be the body series that, from instant to instant, never ceases causing the following moment of movement to result from the preceding moment and creating the integration of differentials. So [there's] the stick that is carried, movement-translation, that is lifted, ascending movement, and that strikes down on me, the poor dog. And in the soul series of the poor dog, [there are] the tiny perceptions – you see, there is no communication, as Leibniz will say, there is no communication of soul and body – each one according to its series expressing a one and single thing. It's like two projections of the same thing. Fine, there we are.

But I believe that really, at this level, in our first criterion, this was seeking a logical criterion. You recall, the logical criterion was, in Leibniz, it was simple: what does inherence or inclusion of the predicate in the subject mean? We saw this. What we didn't see was in what way this was an absolutely new expression. We only saw that in Leibniz, despite appearances, the predicate couldn't be an attribute. But only today are we able to judge the consequences of the opposition between the Leibnizian predicate and the Cartesian attribute, and how, in a word, the Cartesian substance is located entirely under the Classical sign of simplicity, whereas the Leibnizian substance is under the Mannerist sign of the unity by itself... [*Interruption in the recording*]  
[1:52:02]

### Part 3

... You understand, what is bothering me a bit today is that I have had to bite into things we haven't yet considered since I have already granted myself the existence of the body, about which we don't know where it comes from, these bodies. Here... [Pause] So, it's your choice here, it really depends on what shape you are in, either I continue in [what we are doing], with it being understood that this is difficult, but only a bit, or else I develop more of something general, something easy... I prefer to continue some more if you aren't too... Are there any questions on this?... Yes?

A woman student: One question about a term. When you said that an apperception is an unnoticed perception...

Deleuze: Apperception, with a-p-p-e-r, is a conscious perception, in the sense of *apercevoir* (perceive), *s'apercevoir* (realize). For the text [reference], you'll find it in *Monadology*, the distinction of tiny perceptions and of apperception. [Pause]

So let's continue with the just a bit difficult. We've just seen the logical criterion, comparing substance in Descartes and Leibniz. In Descartes, once again, what I've said is obviously shameful to the extent that this was not my subject. I mean that I have only spoken insufficiently about it. Well, fine. I am saying, there's an entirely different criterion as well, another play of criteria, that we could call epistemological. This time, what is it about? I'd say that in Descartes, if you consider Descartes, just as earlier, he defined substance through a Simple facet, so too it happens that, in other texts, he defines substance by the *Complete* facet by saying not that substance is something simple, but by saying that substance is something complete.<sup>11</sup> [Pause]

So what does that mean? Here as well, he gives a very, very precise sense, and he especially says – and Arnauld doesn't understand. Arnauld doesn't understand what he means. -- In the objections that Arnauld made to Descartes, he returns frequently to this theme of the Complete, and he forces Descartes to explain himself, fortunately. And Descartes says, be very careful; don't confuse the Complete with the Entire. I am not saying that substance is something entire. I am saying that, in fact, for Descartes, it is not Entire because there are modes, and modes are not of the substance. The Entire is the substance is quite different. [Pause] The Complete is a something that, first, I can think of as really distinct from another thing small b, [Pause] and second, when I think of it in this way, I think of it as distinct from every other thing, and it's Complete in this sense. I think of it as really distinct from another thing small b, but by thinking of it as really distinct from another thing small b, I am thinking of it as really distinct from any other thing. Example... that is, it suffices unto itself as thought. Example: this time, I was telling you, the criterion of simplicity rests upon the distinction of reason, you recall; the criterion of completeness (*complétude*) rests on the real distinction. [Pause] The mind is substance, and what does that mean? From the point of view of completeness, that means [that] I conceive of it [the mind] as really distinct from extension, that is, I can deny in it all that belongs to extension, [Pause] and to the extent that I do so, I distinguish it from every other thing, [Pause] in this sense, the same as for extension. I'd say [that] extension and thought are really distinct. Descartes's reasoning is precisely [that] two really distinct things, that is, conceived as really distinct, can be understood, can be conceived without one another. Second proposition: two things understood without one another are separable. [Pause] There we are. [Pause]

And Leibniz is going to insert himself between these two propositions, with violence, by saying that there is something wrong here. Once again, it's always the same objection that Leibniz makes against Descartes: he goes too fast. Once again, he moved too fast. He didn't have the right to conclude the second proposition from the first one. Why? Because two things understood without one another are separable, it's true, says Leibniz. But what does that mean, two things understood without one another? It means that the requisites – you remember the notion of requisites – the requisites of one are distinct from the requisites of the other. [Pause] In the first proposition, let's assume two really distinct things can be understood without one another. No, it's not true. Two really distinct things, that is, conceived as really distinct, can be understood without one another, yes, but on one condition, the condition that they do not have the same requisites. And two things understood without one another... Two really distinct things can very well have the same requisites. Why? Because the requisites do not belong to the idea of two things or, in a certain way, don't belong to it. In fact, you recall [that] these are limits; the requisites are limits and relations between limits.<sup>12</sup> [Pause]

The Cartesians's response... Ah, this runs the risk of going badly because – see, here we have a topic for an argument, and what is the outcome of an argument? – The Cartesians's response: Leibniz understood nothing because he forgets that they are speaking of substance, that is, of simple things. And, simple beings don't have a requisite. [Pause] So, Descartes is right. [Pause] They run the risk of disagreeing as they aren't talking about the same thing. Leibniz's response: Substances are not simple beings. They are defined not by simplicity, but by unity, and that which is one by itself is perfectly endowed with requisites. [Pause] In other words, the second criterion of substance that, due to its usefulness, I am calling the epistemological criterion, consists this time, according to Leibniz, in defining substance by assigning its requisites, given that substance indeed has requisites, being not a simple being, but a being one by itself (*être un par soi*). This theme of requisites and of the argument between Descartes's viewpoint and Leibniz's viewpoint is located in the correspondence between Leibniz and Malebranche. [Pause] Ok? Is this ok so far?

So we are in a completely different domain. Now this is a matter of defining substance through requisites. We must expect to obtain from substance an entirely different definition than the first one. The first definition was unity by itself, that is, the interior unity of movement in the process of occurring or of active unity of interior movement. And so there we have that. We have to... It's here that we have to make a little detour through Aristotle since what emerges from his own language, the substance as one and being defined by unity, it was already in Aristotle. Only, he didn't understand unity, or change, or movement like Leibniz. And I return to our topic from the last meeting because it's going to become quite important, and I'd like you not to forget it. When Leibniz reactivates Aristotle, I was telling you, he doesn't undertake this resurrection without reason because, in fact, he completely changes Aristotle. He uses Aristotle, but in order to do what? [Pause] This corresponds completely to what I was telling you. I was saying that for me, at our last class when we were talking a bit about philosophy, about what it is to do philosophy, I was telling you that, for me, philosophy has never consisted in reflecting, for example, on science, but has consisted in creating the metaphysics of science. And it's not at all a reflection on science, but a metaphysics provides the concepts corresponding to the functions of science, a condition that doesn't yield concepts, but that discovers functions. And I was telling you, well it's quite simple. It's because there is a certain modern conception of movement in physics that Bergson elaborates his philosophical concept of duration. [Pause]

I find entirely the same theme in Leibniz. Leibniz says [that] physics has changed in very short time. Notably, Descartes's physics of movement no longer stands. There is an entirely new physics of movement that's in the process of being elaborated – this is a constant theme in Leibniz – with myself Leibniz, and with Newton, who are contemporaries. Newton and Leibniz are in the process of creating a new physics as well as a new mathematics, that renders, they say, where there are Cartesians givens (*acquis*), they base themselves on the Cartesian givens, but it's a mutation, a mutation of physics and of mathematics. And Leibniz says, but this is the least of things. Each new physics and each new mathematics demand a new metaphysics. And this is a new metaphysics that will need to resuscitate something from Aristotle. It will need to go back to Aristotle; this won't be a return to Aristotle. It will need some of the things that Aristotle discovered – and that Descartes was unable to conserve --, that he discovered as a function of his own physics, specifically that substance had requisites. So, this is why we have to make a small detour through Aristotle.

And how did Aristotle indeed proceed in his theory of substance, once he'd told us [that] substance is the unity of movement and unity of change? We'll have to see; we'll have to see in what ways this was not at all a version of Leibniz. But nonetheless, they had this point in common, indicating that they had an affinity, that they had connected with one another. Leibniz had a clear admiration for Aristotle; he couldn't stand the way that Descartes had treated Aristotle. And they coincide, at least verbally, in the expressions, yes, substance is the unity of movement in the process of occurring, and substance is the unity of interior change. So, on this, they agree, despite conceiving of movement and change in completely different ways. But precisely, why is this in different ways? And I am going to try to relate to you the concept of substance for Leibniz, but I am going to do so like a story about Aristotle; I am getting everything mixed up!

Aristotle say, yes, change, what is change? Change is something strange; it's the passage from one quality to another. Only there are quite a few philosophers before me, before Aristotle, who believed that what changed was a quality, that quality passed into its opposite, hot becoming cold, cold becoming hot. Aristotle says [that] physics, in the way he did it, excludes that completely. We've never seen hot become cold, nor cold become hot. As Aristotle says, this isn't true, not that there aren't other... [*Deleuze doesn't finish*] He says, [*Pause*] this is some thing that becomes, that leaves the cold that it was, and becomes hot. In other words, there's a third term. There are third terms, for the moment.

Why does this make me happy? You remember – now here, I really want to mix things up – you remember when I insisted, again in our previous session, when I tried talking generally about philosophy, and I told you [that] a concept, a philosopher is someone who creates concepts. It's not someone who reflects on whatever topic. He creates concepts as a painter creates some object, as a scientist creates functions, etc. A philosopher creates concepts. Fine, it's his *métier*. Someone who doesn't create concepts, he can be everything you wish, but not a philosopher. Eh, fine... Today there are lots of people, and I see no problem with this, that call themselves philosophers and have never spoken a word of philosophy because they would be incapable of pointing to the slightest concept they'd created, once it's stated that we don't consider human rights to be a concept created by these philosophers.<sup>13</sup> [*Laughter*]

So, this horizon is quite significant, but has nothing to do, either from near or far, with philosophy. If I were asked, in what way is Descartes a philosopher, I can explain it. If I were

asked, in what way is Leibniz a philosopher, in what way is Whitehead, all that, I can answer such questions. There are a certain number of cases in which one can say that they are [philosophers], that they're quite interesting. I don't really know what they are, but in any case, they are not without merit. If they cannot say they are, well yes, if they cannot say they are, well, nothing prevents one from being extremely modest, if they cannot say it with great modesty, "I've tried to create a particular concept". Even the great Albert Camus, I've never seen that he was in any manner a philosopher. But, in the end, all this is to allow me, I'd like to reach a sense of philosophy that allows me, not to say that philosophy is better than all the rest, on the contrary, it's not the best, but that it doesn't merit the... just as we don't call just anything a painting, we don't call just anything philosophy. And yet, and yet, this doesn't prevent people from thinking. A painter thinks; better still, my concierge thinks. Thinking is not necessarily doing philosophy. People think perfectly well without doing philosophy.

So fine, having said this... I was telling you, understand, a concept, inventing a concept is constituting a certain number of singularities. It's really to verify this. In a certain way, can we say that the concept of substance is a concept that Aristotle created? On this [topic] then, a lot of discussion would be required. What are we calling creating a concept, because the very word [substance], for example, does the word and the thing... Does the word exist in Plato? Well, perhaps it does indeed exist, but is it a Platonist concept? That would mean saying that there's a certain position in Plato's system that connects a certain number of singularities specific to Plato. I'd lean toward the opinion, no, it's not a Platonist concept although we can find... in any case, we can find the word [*Greek word*] or find [*Greek word*] in Plato, but this isn't the same...<sup>14</sup> Let's assume, I am saying – I don't insist on this, it's an idea – if I were told, I have the feeling that it's Aristotle who invents the concept of substance, that belongs to... If I say, if I ask Aristotle, what have you brought to philosophy? Why are you a great philosopher? He would answer me, my little man, I've at least invented the concept of substance, [*Laughter*] and many others. So, if I said, oh why would the world care about that? He'd say it's quite simple for you; it's not up to me to enrich it. Fine.

So, then, which singularities? I'm saying, here we are, I can immediately place Aristotle three singularities under the term "substance", at first glance, right? There are no longer two of them; that is, there is not one quality that becomes another quality. There is a thing that receives two opposite qualities or that passes one quality into another quality. So there is the thing and the two qualities, a thing and two qualities. That's what's necessary for creating substance. [*Pause*] You see, it's therefore three points. Obviously we cannot stay there. A second rather extraordinary analysis in Aristotle: what are the two qualities? – Ah, yes, let me be clear. At this level, let's give them names. We'll call the thing that passes from one quality to the other, the thing that receives and that is able to receive opposite qualities, we'll call it *matter*. [*Pause*] This is logical. There's no need to explain it. This works well. In fact, matter is what is able to receive heat and cold, white and black, all that. This makes sense. -- But, to my knowledge, no one before Aristotle had said this, I am distinguishing matter and two qualities, and matter is the power (*puissance*) of receiving the two opposite qualities and of passing one to the other. You sense that we are fully into philosophy because we are in the process of organizing singularities.

A second moment of reflection, because this is not enough; we sense that it's not enough. Second moment of reflection: the opposite doesn't pass into its opposite. It is matter that passes from one opposite to the other. But then, what is the rapport of the two opposites? You see that this is a

logic of contrariety. This confirms what I was telling you, and we already sense that distinctions will exist for Aristotle, but they will be subordinate to processes of contrariety. This is a logic of opposition, contrariety being one case, in fact, a privileged case. It matters little why; we'd have to explain the whole theory of opposition in Aristotle, that you will let avoid, that you'll spare me. [It's] not a question of being boring, but that I'd just talk about it too much. So, accept the idea that contrariety and opposition are the most perfect.

But in his taste for perfection as a philosopher, Aristotle wonders, but what is the most perfect form of contrariety? Is there a perfect contrariety? Yes, he says, it's the contrariety of possession and privation, the contrariety of possession and privation. It's the perfect contrariety. You'll tell me, what are other opposites...and me too, because that would take us three more hours. But it's quite fine; trust me on all this. Example: we indeed see what he means, I mean, because we're not going to comment on this in a scholarly way. We're looking for a very, very intuitive approach. It's quite simple. Here we have two contraries, death and the living (*le vif*), that are not equal. One is more perfect than the other. It's better to be living than dead. [Pause] Death is a quality according to privation, here, without life. But life is a quality according to possession. [Pause]

There we already have my three terms. I've made progress. My three terms are no longer matter and two contrary qualities. It's matter, privation, possession. I am dying; this means [that] my body passes from possession to privation. I am born, etc. It's the reverse passage, just like hot and cold. In Aristotle's physics, he shows that cold is only a privation of hot. It's hot that is the quality according to possession and cold is the quality according to privation. [Pause] In a splendid text, Aristotle will show that wine is a quality of water, and that the quality according to the corresponding privation is vinegar. [Laughter] This relates to an entire physics. If we're told that this physics is outdated, this comment has strictly no interest since, on the other hand, what isn't outdated is the concept. [Pause] So there he tells us, see that now, the three singularities interconnected through substance are matter, privation, possession. One is a quality according to privation; the other is a quality according to priva... according to p... Anyway, I don't know what I'm saying here; you complete it yourself.

A third degree of reflection: henceforth, matter is not only the power of receiving contraries. It's not only the power of receiving two contrary qualities. [Pause] Insofar as it is only a power, [matter] itself is privation. Privation of what? Well, it doesn't yet possess the quality according to possession. [Pause] And the quality according to possession, what is it henceforth? [Pause] It's form. [Pause] What possession possesses is form, or that which possesses possession, is form. Form of what? Form that is realized or not in matter, [Pause] the bronze having become a statue, [Pause] or that which is in privation of form when the statue is scrapped or when the statue is not yet created. [Pause] I would therefore define form as that which is actualized in matter, and I would say what the form is in action (*en acte*), matter is in power (*en puissance*). [Pause] Which then gives me such a complex of singularities for the notion of substance: now, matter, privation, possession, [Pause] form, action, form being precisely action that is actualized in power. [Pause] For the moment, then, I have... [A student whispers: Five] five singularities. [Pause]

From this results finally two other singularities, and that will be all. If matter in itself, insofar as it is matter, is privation of form, I will call *primary matter* that which in action has a form, [Pause] whatever it might be, primary matter, that is, a pure matter. [Pause] But is there pure matter? Any matter, no doubt, has a form, while still being in privation in relation to another

form. Example: it's fine that organs are made of tissue. This is Aristotle's biology. But tissue is already an unformed matter, already a matter that has a certain form. But it's still in privation of an organ. [Pause] For the man working with iron, iron is an unformed matter. It's a substance. It's a matter and a form. There, it's a pure matter, as if to be extracted. It's a pure matter in the mine. And he already gives it a form, but for an earlier stage, it's in privation of form. For example, for the artist who want to make a cup or a vase out of it, this will still be lacking a form. In other words, any unformed matter is still a matter in relation to a more elaborated form, right? We will call *secondary matter* the matter-form aggregate insofar as it lacks a more perfect form. [Pause] I am saying that any form, whatever it might be, actualizes the power of a matter. [Pause] In this sense, every form is an active unity.

I am summing up. I have, in order then, power (*puissance*)... Now, in final order: [1] power, something that is in power, and is defined by the power of receiving contraries, this is 1. Two: the contrary according to possession, this is form. [Pause] Three: [Pause] the form actualizes power, that is, form is an active unity. [Pause] – Have I already mentioned privation, yes? No? [Students' voices: Yes! No, no...] This will continue... -- Four, but I don't know where to put it; I'll put it... ? Oh, I don't know. You'll put it somewhere, privation, and primary matter, and secondary matter following the hierarchy of forms. [Pause] Besides, there are a few directions that this must turn: matter, power, action, form ... matter, possession, privation, primary matter, secondary matter.<sup>15</sup> There we have the aggregate of singularities that define the concept of substance in Aristotle.

Look at what there is in common with Leibniz. Substance is always evaluated in relation to change. Look at what there is in common with Descartes: form according to possession and the foreshadowing of an essential attribute. Something really strange is occurring here, and as a result, from Aristotle to Descartes, there are all sorts of currents that are already going to try to define substance through something similar to the essential attribute that will be Aristotle's form according to possession. There are all sorts of passages, all that. But the other aspect, unity, unity of internal change, there is form as unity of internal change. This will be fully the direction that Leibniz will take up, and with what costs? We shouldn't be surprised that Leibniz restores as well. You know, he says, I haven't finished restoring lots of things in Aristotle. He's going to restore the idea of primary matter and secondary matter, and in a completely new way. All this we can locate in... in history.

And what does Descartes want? Get a sense of the purge that Descartes undertook in relation to Aristotle. What does he suppress? He suppresses power (*puissance*) since he considers that it's a kind of nonscientific notion, everything is action (*en acte*). So, speaking of things that are in power, virtuality, all that is paganism, it's the Middle Ages. So, [there's] no question of there being power. Could there be any? No. [Hence] suppression of power. That's how it is with Descartes, no problem. There's no longer anything that resembles power. Extension is perfectly actual; it cannot be a power to receive forms, no. Therefore, suppression of power.

Second, suppression of privation. There's no privation. What is going to replace privation? This is going to be the great thesis, and it's what authorizes for him the theory of distinctions. There is no privation; there is delineation. There's delineation. A thing is only what it is. It is never deprived of whatever it is. It's limited. And this will be a thesis that you find everywhere. Or you very often find the word "privation" in texts of the seventeenth century, but you always find a context there that says, either explicitly or implied, that all privation must be understood as a

simple limitation, the limitation of the creature that replaces all privation. It's even why God is not responsible for evil. It's the limitation of the creature. Moreover, we will see why it's very important for Leibniz, this. So, no privation. We've reached: no more matter [*sic*], no more power, no more privation. So what's left?

What's left, yes, in a certain way, he would say this: form and matter. No more actions (*actes*), there are no more actions. What remains is form and matter, but so transfigured, so changed, since form will be what? It will be the essential attribute, essence, [*Pause*] and matter will be the thing, the *res*, that possesses this essential attribute and that cannot be deprived of it. You cannot deprive a body of any extension whatsoever. Simply, the body is limited, full stop, that's it. You cannot deprive the mind of any thought whatsoever. You see, the concept of... I am not saying that the concept of substance for Descartes is less rich. I am saying that it is made of two singularities, two singularities. It's not less rich because two newly adjusted singularities imply an entire critique of the other singularities. And the two singularities are: matter that is nothing more than a thing, and the essential attribute that is nothing more than an essence.

Henceforth, what is the difference between form and matter? It is not action-power (*acte-puissance*). A new type of rapport will have to be found. It's not form that is action and matter that is power. It's form that is [*Pause*] idea in the mind, idea in the mind that thinks, [*Pause*] and matter that is the position of the thing outside the mind. What is the difference between substance and the essential attribute? What is the difference between extension and the body? Between thought and the mind? This isn't difficult. Extension is the essential attribute, that is, the idea that you create in your mind, and substance or the thing itself, which is called the *res*, is uniquely the attribute's position outside the mind that thinks, that is, the position in existence.

What is going to happen for Descartes? There's no point saying it: primary and secondary matter disappears, [and] with what problems and what consequences for Descartes? Well, with the consequences known to those who've read some Descartes. It's the formidable problem in which he'll find himself when it's going to be a question of accounting for the intersection of soul and body, that is, must one introduce a third substance that will be the mix of soul and body, and what would be the status of this third substance? And with the third substance, aren't all sorts of things reintroduced that he thought he had eliminated in reaction against Aristotle? It matters little.

And here emerges Leibniz – you can just end on this point – and who is also going to tell us, as did Aristotle, substance has a certain number of requisites – which cannot be known – and these requisites have nothing to do with the essential attribute that pleased Descartes so much. Moreover, substances have requisites in common such that there is nothing separated in nature. Notice here, directly against Descartes, there is nothing separable, even in nature, but as the Stoics say, everything conspires. You'll tell me, but yes there are! Monads are separate since each contains the universe, they have nothing in common, and nothing passes between one another. But there is a prodigious idea and a very, very beautiful expression in a letter from Leibniz, a very, very beautiful formula, where he says, -- this cannot be translated, so... -- Individual substances are monads, but are not, *sed non monacheia*, [*Pause*] but are not cells, monastic cells, that is, they are separate from one another, agreed, they don't communicate with each other, agreed, but they express the same world, they each express the same world from its point of view. These are not monks' cells. [*Pause*]



So fine, what are the requisites of substance going to be? I am going to state them in bulk because at our next meeting, we will see how to organize them. Here [Leibniz] is going to take up the analysis where he looks at Aristotle in reverse; it's very odd. From Descartes, he keeps a fundamental point: there's no privation, [but] there are limitations. In this way, he's truly Cartesian, belonging to the seventeenth century. Only here we see, everything is power (*puissance*). Finally, there is only power. There is only power because far from power and action being opposed, [Pause] action is a power, [Pause] and the other power is limitation. There's a power, limitation, that will be called *passive power*, [Pause] and there's another power that will be called *active power*. Action is itself power. Every power is in action. Active power is action. In other words, form has become subject; it has stopped being essence. It has become one by itself. [Pause] So, we have primitive active power, primitive passive power. Primitive passive power is limitation or primary matter. It results necessarily, which he will show, it's very, very odd, it will result necessarily in a secondary matter. [Pause]

So there will be an entire complex of properly Leibnizian singularities -- active power, passive power, primary matter, secondary matter -- that will be organized as a function of a new physics and a new mathematics. Each time, if I can say, there is an original concept of substance in Aristotle, there is an original concept of substance in Descartes, [and] there is an original concept of substance in Leibniz. This is a function, it seems to me, of these singular points that he organizes under the concept. Why keep the same word? It's obvious that, in certain ways, it is called upon to fulfill the same function, a similar function, a function, I can say.

So good, I'd like you to reflect a bit on all this and the point we have reached, and the next time, I will try to explain this Leibniz organization. [End of the session] [2:44:25]

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> This session's recording, beginning in mid-sentence, clearly picks up the discussion from where Deleuze left it at the end of the previous class on 28 April, specifically with the theory of substance by considering how Leibniz developed it in response to versions of the theory in Aristotle and Descartes. As with the previous session, the recording is newly transcribed and translated from the BNF archive.

<sup>2</sup> See the discussion of the theory of substance and the list of criteria found there (to which Deleuze adds a fifth one, a metaphysical criterion) in *The Fold* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 54-56; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1988), pp. 73-76.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, Leibniz is responding to a German philosopher, Johann Christoph Sturm; cf. *On Nature Itself* <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/leibniz> (accessed 9 December 2019).

<sup>4</sup> See the 24 February 1987 session on the Leibniz-Bergson connection.

<sup>5</sup> The difference of this quote's translation from the previous paragraph comes from differences occurring in how Deleuze renders it here orally.

<sup>6</sup> For this physics of elasticity, see the 28 October 1986 session.

<sup>7</sup> Deleuze spells out the name; he had already indicated quite briefly this reference to Bayle in the seminar's opening session, 28 October 1986.

<sup>8</sup> On familiar and familial animals, see "A as in Animal" in *Gilles Deleuze from A to Z* (Semiotext(e) 2011), (*L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*).

<sup>9</sup> On the theme of spontaneity in the soul linked to the examples of the beaten dog and stuck Caesar, see *The Fold*, p. 56; *Le Pli*, p. 76.

<sup>10</sup> Deleuze refers to the squeaking door that is constantly heard throughout the session.

<sup>11</sup> On the Complete as criterion in Descartes, see *The Fold*, p. 55; *Le Pli*, p. 75.

<sup>12</sup> On the requisites, see the sessions on 17 March and 7 April 1987, and *The Fold*, pp. 46-52; *Le Pli*, pp. 63-70.

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<sup>13</sup> As he did in the previous session, Deleuze refers to the so-called “New Philosophers” against whom he wrote an article in 1977, republished in *Two Regimes of Madness* (Semiotext(e), 2007), pp. 139-147.

<sup>14</sup> The noise of students changing cassettes blocks the end of the sentence.

<sup>15</sup> See the previous paragraphs for this hierarchy: matter, privation, possession, form, action, primary matter, secondary matter.