

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 17, 12 May 1987: Principles and Freedom (12) -- The Criteria of Substance, and “Having a Body”

Initial Transcription by Web Deleuze; Augmented Transcription and Translation by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:38:28)¹

Part 1

So, let's get to work. Is everything ok? Well, we are into the theme, that you recall perhaps. There would be or we could distinguish – but the texts are quite scattered -- we could distinguish something like four great criteria of substance in Leibniz. Criteria of substance mean the ways of determining what substance is, and these criteria would be: the logical criterion, the criterion that I proposed to call (I don't know if I've already said this) the epistemological criterion; the physical or physicalist criterion; and the psychological criterion. [*Pause*] And, already, I can say that here all sorts of difficulties arrive for us. You will have them firmly in mind at the same time as we move forward a bit. These difficulties are only that these criteria often refer to one another and insert themselves into each other. And it's surprising for us. Why? Because we haven't yet felt any need to discuss the body. You remember? We felt the need to talk about events and monads, monads containing events specifically as predicates. But what are monads? They are souls or spirits. Why would the souls have bodies? We haven't even touched on that.

So where does it come from, having a body? And what does having a body mean?² We have shown that monads indeed had a point of view. And we remained for quite a while on the idea of the monad's point of view, and that a monad was inseparable from a point of view.³ And perhaps we felt that having a body and having a point of view are not different things from one another. But what we do not at all see [is] what this consists of and why; no doubt, having a body means something other than having a point of view, even if the two things are connected. And in the end, all these criteria are going to put into play not only notions that could be called corporeal, but some new notions for us.

And in this, I say frankly: we have to figure it out (*il faut se débrouiller*). Well, I am saying: we have to figure it out because it's not at all a domain devoid of commentary; there is a lot of commentary on Leibniz, and some very great commentators. And then when one reads some, one feels the need -- it's a bit true of all philosophers, but perhaps it's more particularly true for Leibniz -- that one will perhaps not be able to grasp what the commentators mean if one doesn't try to grasp it for one's own purpose (*à son compte*), to work out how strange the notions can appear. At the point where we find ourselves, Leibnizian strangeness is going to be doubled.

As a result, here again we will be led into taking risks in order to be able to say: that's probably correct. But what I could propose to you is that if you see something else entirely, if you see a thoroughly interesting commentator, don't necessarily believe him/her to be correct, but don't necessarily believe that I am correct. We can say that [the] one [that] is right for each of you [is]

the one that allows you to recognize yourself in this. And if you have another idea in order to recognize yourself, that's the one that is the best. As I was telling you, there are some things that cannot be stated, but there are a lot more things that can be stated.

I was telling you [that] the logical criterion of substance [is] the one we are familiar with, and we said farewell to it somewhat the last time, but we said farewell to it in such a way that it hurled us into the problem of the body. That is what I already want to introduce, this new problem of the body. One of Leibniz's most beautiful sentences is: "I thought I was in port, and I found myself thrown back into the open sea." What is more beautiful? This is the very statement of philosophical method (*démarche philosophique*): one thinks one has arrived, and then there you are thrown back into the open sea.⁴ I get the impression that "having a body" and the requirement of having a body operates precisely through this "being thrown back into the open sea". And what we saw the last time for the logical criterion of substance, it seems to me, is – I am summarizing – relatively clear. Today more than ever, you [should] interrupt me if there is something obscure.

I was telling you [that] in Descartes, it's relatively simple: the logical criterion of substance is simplicity, which is the same as saying that substance is defined by an essential attribute of which it is only distinct through a distinction of reason: body and extension, spirit and thought. And I was telling you at first glance – here, it's a very good case of a notion, the extent to which one must be sensitive to the tonality of concepts – I was telling you [that] Leibniz will never define substance by simplicity. [Pause] He will indeed use the expression "simple substance", but late in his work, and he will only use this expression when it's a matter of distinguishing simple substance and monads, other things that he will call composite substances (*substances composées*). At that moment, he won't say substance is simplicity, but will say: there are simple substances and there are composite substances. But he will never define substance by simplicity. On the other hand, he defines every substance by unity.

And we saw, in fact, that between simplicity and unity, there was a fundamental difference because unity was active unity of a something that moves or changes. Unity is interior to a movement or is the active unity of a change. One already senses that these two definitions are not entirely the same since, in the end, interior unity of a movement, what does that mean? Movement? Movement implies a motive (*mobile*). A motive is a body. What does the body have to do in all this, whereas up to now, we only talked about souls or spirits named monads? A soul or a spirit crosses through changes, yes, hence the definition: active unity of a change, active unity of a change interior to the monad, [which] causes us no difficulty. But the definition: unity of a movement that is necessarily exterior to the monad since it concerns a body – this creates a problem for us. The last time, we hid it, because we weren't yet there, but we will have to rediscover this difficulty. What can that be? All that we can say is that qualitative change, interior to the monad, is deeper than movement; thus if we manage to understand what movement is, we will realize that its purposes are qualitative change interior to the monad. But finally, here does this body and motive come from?

So I just say, let's keep the definition: active unity of interior change. This is spontaneity, and if the interior change is the predicate of the monad, this is what happens in the monad, [Pause] we must say that there is at once spontaneity, that active unity of change signifies a double

spontaneity: both the spontaneity of the substance that changes, and the spontaneity of change, that is, the spontaneity of the predicate. We saw spontaneity of the predicate consisted of: it was its property of moving into instant ‘b’ from instant ‘a’; the necessity for instant ‘a’ being full of instant ‘b’. [Pause]

And from this developed the opposition between Leibniz and Descartes, and in what form? You indeed see: the monad draws everything from its own depth through spontaneity. It draws everything from its own depth through spontaneity, an expression that you constantly find. And I remind you of the polemic with [Pierre] Bayle that seemed very important to us, in this respect.⁵ What was it? The dog’s soul draws from its own depth the pain it feels when his body -- again, its body being tossed in our faces -- when its body receives a blow from a stick. And Leibniz’s very beautiful answer was: but be careful, do not consider abstractions; the dog’s soul doesn’t at all draw from its depth a pain that would suddenly occur, but rather the dog’s soul draws from its depth a pain that integrates into the soul thousands of tiny internal perceptions that defined its disquiet (*inquiétude*).⁶ And I say here, weighing my words carefully, that I really believe that Leibniz is the inventor of animal psychology.

Animal psychology begins from the moment that, not only you believe in animals’ souls, but the moment in which you have defined the situation of this soul as the situation of being on the lookout (*être aux aguets*). When you take a walk in the country, you must play the following game, but also in the city: imagine that you are an animal. That means what, being an animal? That means that, whatever you do, being on the lookout to what might happen to you.⁷ I would say that it’s what Leibniz calls disquiet in the *New Essays on Human Understanding*, perpetual disquiet: what animal has eaten in peace? He can have some peace, but the animal’s peace is integration of a perpetual disquiet: who is going to come steal my piece of I don’t know what from me? Look at the hyena’s disquiet, the vulture’s disquiet. Look at how an animal rests, everything. In this light, we see the extent to which Leibniz is right; he’s the first to have seen that, to have said: obviously animals have a soul!

Why does he say that against Descartes? It’s not that we can consider animals as machines; for those who know Descartes somewhat, there is the famous theory of animal machines. We can always... these are models of construction. But what will the machine be missing? What will be missing is the animal disquiet (*l’inquiétude béstiale*), notably that one can reconstruct with artificial models anything of the animal that one wants; one can have a robot eat, etc.... One can also cause it signs of disquiet, yes, [and] at that moment, one will know in a certain way that the animal is something other than a robot.

And you can play this out in the countryside, it’s more suitable than in the city: you place yourself in a field, and you tell yourself out loud: I am a rabbit [Laughter] (or something else if you don’t like rabbits), and you try to imagine a little of what the life of these animals is like. But a gunshot doesn’t strike them, which is what confirms so much that Leibniz is correct: a gunshot doesn’t strike them just like that. The pain of a gunshot, but it happens suddenly, literally, like integrating a thousand tiny solicitations of ambiance, specifically: the confused tiny perception that hunting is underway. They heard the gunshots; moreover they heard the hunters calling out: “Hey, Toto, did you see one of them?” They don’t get it, but there is a special voice for hunting

and the hunters. They saw these people crossing [the field] in their own way, there is a particular hunter's gait; these animals are on the lookout.

And what Leibniz proposes to us, and also answering Bayle, is the idea that when I say that the soul spontaneously produces its own pain, I only mean, he says, it does not receive the same impression of pain as [one] coming suddenly with nothing to prepare it. The impression of pain comes to integrate suddenly a thousand tiny perceptions that were there, and that could have remained non-integrated. At that moment, the rabbit might have finished eating its carrot, that is, taking pleasure; but whether it's a man's monad or an animal's, you see this kind of change in the monad occur in its depth.

And I was telling you, henceforth, there is a way to provide the concept of Mannerism with a certain consistency in philosophy. And I was telling you, Leibniz is really the first great philosopher, I believe, to have initiated this theme of the depth of the soul. Through this, the Romantics will perhaps remember Leibniz, but before that, the depth of the soul was hardly discussed, or else when one talked about it, it was as an image, whereas it's in the status of the soul, "It draws everything from its very depth," [and] that's what the monad is. So I was telling you: the Mannerist couple is depth-spontaneity, in opposition to the Classical couple from Descartes: form-essentiality. [Pause]

But then let's continue a little more to finish up with this first criterion. This first criterion is inherence, as you recognized; we worked it over so much.⁸ This first criterion is inherence, you know, specifically the predicates are in the subject or, if you prefer, each monad expresses the world. Each monad expresses the whole of the world, or the world is in each monad. You remember [that] this is inclusion. And when I was telling you, we have an ultimate confirmation, I was telling you: but be careful [since] predication has generally been confused, in Leibniz, with attribution; it's precisely the opposite, it's precisely the opposite, since the judgment of attribution is the rapport attribute-substance [Pause] to the extent that the attribute determines the substance's essence. [Pause] Inherence is absolutely different: it's inclusion of the predicate in substance to the extent that substance draws the predicates and the succession of predicates from its own depth. The predicate is not the attribute; it is event. [Pause]

So I assume that all this is clear. That's what the logical criterion of substance is, opposed in Leibniz to the Classical criterion of substance such as you find it in Descartes, that is, substance-essential attribute. But I am taking advantage of this to push forward a bit. Henceforth, even at this level, I defined substance through inclusion: it's what includes the aggregate of predicates as events, or the aggregate of predicates as change. [Pause] So it's the active source of change, the active unity of change, change being opposed in Mannerism to the fixed and solid attribute of substance. In this, it's, on the contrary, a living source of change.

So therefore, here's the question that I am asking, so I ask it first in Latin, to convince you even more: and why wouldn't everything stop there, that is, why wouldn't every thing be a *percipit* of substance, of the monad? A *percipit*: what does that mean? It means a perceived being, *Percipere* means to perceive; *percipit* is being perceived.⁹ [Pause] The monad expresses the universe and includes it; each monad includes the universe. Its predicates are changes, or from one predicate to another there's change. Leibniz will tell us that perceptions are the actions of

substance. I insist on this because that will be important for us later. We might have thought it easier to say that perceptions were what substance received. You see that this cannot be said unless one understands nothing. No one can tell us that the substance receives: it receives nothing. It is whole in itself. Leibniz is the last philosopher who can say that substance receives perceptions; it's an active unity.

And in one among other texts, Leibniz doesn't forget it: [*Pause; Deleuze looks into his edition*] "The action characteristic of the soul" – action – "The action characteristic of the soul is perception and the unity of what it perceives" -- that is, the substance -- "comes from the link of perceptions according to which the ones that follow are derived from the ones that precede." We have seen according to which laws those that follow are derived from those that precede: those that precede have to be generated (*grosses de*) from those that follow. We have seen that the dog's pain wasn't... rather that the pleasure the dog has from eating was generated by the pain it was going to endure when it gets struck by the blow from a stick. On the other hand, the tiny perceptions that preceded the blows from the stick are generated by the pain [the dog] is going to endure.

So, why not say: there are neither things nor bodies? There is the monad and its perceptions. The world is what the monad perceives, that is, it's what is in the monad. Henceforth, the world is uniquely the "being perceived" of the monad; it's what is perceived by the monad. And I could say: "being" (*être*) is either being a monad or being perceived by a monad. Being is being perceived. This is what would be known as an idealist system. Everything pushes us toward it since, you remember, the world does not exist outside the monads that express it or include it. The world does not exist outside the monads. We have to hold onto this, we have to return to this. You recall our schema: the world is perhaps the virtual horizon of all monads; it doesn't prevent them from not existing outside such and such and such and such monad, [outside] the number = x of monads that it includes. It's what has been called for ages "idealism".

Henceforth, there are no things; there are perceptions. There aren't stick blows; there are pains. This is what Bayle says very well to Leibniz: but what's the need to bring in a stick blow? There isn't any stick; there aren't any stick blows; there isn't any dog body; what would be changed? [*Interruption of the Web Deleuze transcript*] You understand? What would be changed? Absolutely nothing. You'd have the dog's soul that would feel pleasure. There wouldn't be a meal, but it would experience pleasure, the same pleasure as the one it otherwise feels. [*Return to the Web Deleuze transcript*] God can do all, so why would God have made bodies, something very tiring, when he could have only made spirits and souls? Nothing would have changed: the dog would feel pleasure, it would endure all the tiny forms of disquiet we were talking about, and then the pain would integrate these tiny forms of disquiet. All of that happens in the soul, so there is no need for there even to be a real stick. There would be the perception of food, and the perception of food would not exist outside the perception of food. "Esse" would be for a body or an object, *esse*, being, would be *percipit*, that is, being perceived.

You understand? "I thought I had reached port". The monads give an account of the totality; they give an account of whatever you want. It's enough to say: there are only monads. And yet, Leibniz never thought of saying that, never. So that poses a problem for us: first, he could have said it, if it's true that he wanted to say it. Moreover, there's someone else who said it, so that

complicates things: it's [George] Berkeley. I will give you some easy Berkeley, but I'm not going to devote... [*Deleuze does not complete the thought*] But Berkeley is renowned for introducing the formula "esse est percipi" and for having founded a new kind of idealism according to which there are only souls or spirits.¹⁰

And at the start of his philosophy, he himself presents his enterprise by saying: there are only Irishmen – Berkeley was Irish; [*Laughter*] I find this very important because, first, this creates a link to Beckett, [*Laughter*] who was admirably familiar with Berkeley; he knows Berkeley very, very well, and yes then, since there's a little film by Beckett, the little marvel that Beckett created in cinema is placed under the sign "esse est percipi"; that is, this is Beckett's response to Berkeley, but this isn't why I am making this connection. Berkeley spent his time saying: you Irish, at least in his first works. He does not say this maliciously; he means: there is a thing (*truc*) in what I am saying that only an Irishman can understand. So, that interests me a lot because that would truly establish the relation of philosophers and philosophy with nationalities. He saw himself as creating a philosophy for the Irish, for the use of the Irish.¹¹

Fine, *esse est percipi*. This is what he presents in another way as a double transformation, the double transformation of things into ideas and ideas into things, or, if you prefer, into sensible impressions, and sensible impressions into things. What is the table? [*Deleuze raps hard on the table*] It's the *percipit*, it's being perceived. It matters little what Berkeley means; that becomes quite complicated, etc. ... No matter, that doesn't concern us. But what does concern us is that Berkeley's first books come out around 1714, and that, having a great mental curiosity, Leibniz reads them. What's really interesting is Leibniz's reaction from his reading, a very fast reading, I think; we have some [of his] notes. We have notes of Leibniz reading Berkeley who, at that moment, was a very young philosopher. Leibniz's first reaction is not good; he says: this is an extravagant Irishman! [*Laughter*] This young man is really extravagant; he is saying things to make himself interesting; he says "esse est percipi", [and] this is not serious. And then, in a more interesting way, in his notes, he re-writes them, he indicates that this [the expression] suits him entirely, and that he could have said this. I am not saying he said it, but he could have said it. We'd have to see in what sense he could have said it. But precisely, he does not say it and will not say it. My first question is: why doesn't he say it whereas the first criterion of substance would allow him to say it?

So this is how I end the analysis of the first criterion of substance; all of that has to be quite orderly so that you recognize how much all of it is very complicated. I end with: we are thrown back into the open sea. Why is it that as an outcome of this first criterion, Leibniz doesn't wake up, despite his old age, why doesn't he wake up as a Berkeleyian, that is, saying there are only monads and their perception, such that bodies and things are simple *percipits*? There are only souls or spirits, and their perceptions.

Here, I would like for you to remember certain things: [*Pause*] each monad, you and me, we express the entire world. Notice that Berkeley never would have said that, and you have to feel why Berkeley never would have said that. We express the whole world to infinity, each of us expresses it, and the world does not exist outside all of us who express it. But you recall: each of us has a tiny privileged region, what Leibniz calls one's subdivision (*département*), one's zone, one's neighborhood. But what is this? It's the portion of the world that we express clearly, or as

Leibniz says in a rather more mysterious way: distinctly; or as Leibniz says in a more general way: that we express specially (*particulièrement*). Here the vocabulary is already really interesting to study: especially, clearly, distinctly, a tiny part of the world, which is a finite portion: our subdivision, our neighborhood.

And on this point I told you: well yes, you have your tiny little zone, for example, the time in which you are living, the milieu in which you are evolving, etc.: that's the clear portion of what you express. And this, the particular regions, as much as you express the infinity of the world, you equally only express a limited portion clearly. This limited portion is your finitude [*Pause*] or, if you prefer, your limitation. Why is it your limitation? Because it's what distinguishes you from God. If God is a monad, it's because, on one hand, it expresses all the monads, even impossible between them, and on the other hand, in the world it chooses, it expresses clearly and distinctly the infinite totality of this world. [*Interruption of the recording; text from WebDeleuze*] [38:44] God has all the subdivisions at once. So what defines the limitation of a monad like you and me, of a finite monad, the finitude of a monad, is the fact that it only expresses clearly a tiny portion of the world. [*Return to the recording*]

Part 2

Let's translate; let's try translating. What do I express clearly in the world? [*Pause*] Perhaps you recall [that] I insisted on this quite a bit: in Leibniz, the predicate, what is contained in substance, is so much less an attribute since, in fact, it is always an event or a rapport. An event is an especially complex rapport, as we saw when analyzing Whitehead, in his relations with Leibniz. But a predicate is always a rapport. This is why it is not an attribute, which is always a quality. And this is why it's so disastrous: believing that the judgment of inclusion in Leibniz is a judgment of attribution, since one understands absolutely nothing at all about what a predicate is for Leibniz if one states that a predicate is a rapport and can be only a rapport. Fine.

What do I express clearly? There is an expression that summarizes everything, so why not use it? And here we're going to use it, and while it should simplify everything for us, it will also complicate everything for us. Tough (*tant pis*); we will be thrown back into the open sea. It would surely be very simple and precise to say: well yes, the zone that I express clearly is what concerns my body. What I express clearly, in the world, is what relates to my body. We again find the idea of rapport. The clear predicate included in the monad, or the aggregate of clear or special predicates that defines my subdivision, my zone, my neighborhood, is the aggregate of events that pass through my body. This is what I am especially destined to express, and to express particularly. It seems to us that this wasn't complicated to say. But precisely, why didn't [Leibniz] say it? Why didn't he begin by saying it? Why does he say it in the Letters to Arnauld, [where] he says, and yes: "What the monad expresses clearly is what has a rapport with its body."¹² There we note that the monad has a body. [*Pause*]

For example, the monad Jules Caesar: it clearly expresses all sorts of things but note well [that] everything it expresses relates to his body. Even for the monad Adam, everything that it expresses, all that it especially expresses -- being the first man, being in a garden, having a wife born from his rib -- all that is what has a rapport with his body. And you will find nothing in your clear expressions that doesn't have a rapport with your body, which does not mean that what you

clearly express would be phenomena of your body. That's how it gets complicated. That's where we start beginning to swim. For it seems incontestable to me that what I express clearly is what has a rapport with my body. But what happens in my body, my body itself, I don't express it clearly at all. I cannot say that I clearly express the movements of my blood, and moreover, if there is something that is obscure to me, it's my body. So it happens that here we have something so obscure that is, at the same time, [*Pause*] that which is in a relation with what allows me to perceive clearly.

You sense that one has to have a strange status of the body, and you especially sense that we have the embryo of an answer (*embryon de réponse*). Then, the fact of having a body means it must be in rapport with tiny perceptions, and the tiny perceptions are obscure and confused. What I express clearly, the clear, is when I integrate tiny perceptions. So I draw on something clear, from this whole obscure depth. Drawing on something clear from an obscure depth is a rather strange operation. In Descartes, that never happens. It's properly Leibnizian: the clear is what is drawn from an obscure depth. Moreover, there is no clarity that isn't drawn from an obscure depth. It's been said that it's a Baroque conception of light, in opposition to the Classical conception. But we're not going to get back into that; all of that is very coherent.

You see, invoking the body is going to cause us all kinds of problems, but what I am saying is this: Notice the order in which we can invoke it. Here's my question: can I say I express, yes or no? Can I say that me monad, me spirit, that I especially or clearly express a region of the world because I have a body and because it's that region that concerns my body or what is in rapport with my body? In other words, is it, or rather, in the same words -- I'll start this over --: Is it because I have a body that I clearly express a part of the world that has rapport with this body? Radical answer: No, impossible! Why impossible? Because Leibniz wouldn't be Leibniz, because we wouldn't be talking about Leibniz; we would be talking about something else. We'd be talking about a philosophy that would have long before already explained what a body was. And we saw that the path is even the reverse. What is it we have to say? Well I have no choice, but I really prefer the second proposition to the first; it's more intelligent. We have to say: I have a body *because* my soul clearly expresses a tiny region of the world. It's the only thing that I can say.

That I have a subdivision, that is, that my soul clearly expresses a tiny region of the world, it's the sufficient reason for having a body, enabling me to then say: yes, what I clearly express is what has a rapport with my body, for a very simple reason: it's that my body deduces from the clear region that I express. In other words, what I should create is a genesis of the body. This genesis of the body forbids me from starting off from [the body]. Someone could ask me: do I have a body all the time? Yes, I have a body all the time. You remember perhaps: before being born I had a body, after my death, I have a body. The question isn't if I have a body all the time. The question is: what derives from what? And my order is set. Why do I express a tiny little region, whereas I express the entire world, but obscurely? Why do I clearly express a tiny region? We saw that you can't respond: "because I have a body." On the contrary, it's because I clearly express a tiny region that I, henceforth, have a body. Genesis of the body. Hence the necessity of the question: why do you express a tiny clear region since it's not because you have a body; it's the opposite, it's bec... no, shit! It's the opposite... Anyhow, you got it! [*Laughter*]

We saw the answer, if you recall! We saw that each monad was constructed in the neighborhood of a small number of singularities; each monad is constructed around a certain number of singularities extensible (*prolongeables*) into other singularities, all the way into the neighborhood of other singularities. But each monad is constructed around a certain number of principal singularities. I express the world because the principal singularities, around which I am constituted, extend themselves in every direction toward the others, and into the neighborhood of other singularities. [Pause] But I am constructed around a small number of privileged singularities. For Adam, it's: being the first man, being in a garden, having a wife born from his rib, [we could] find some others. [Laughter] Each one's soul is a condensation (*condensé*) of a limited aggregate of singularities. Why does it express the unlimited world? Because these singularities extend themselves all the way into the neighborhood of all the other singularities, but each of us is constructed around a small number of singularities. It's because each of us is constructed around a small number of those singularities that I move forward a little: the answer is never given straight out by Leibniz, and I will alert you when... But what seems to me suggested by the texts, suggested in as strong a way as if I had said it, so he said it, [Laughter] but he said it in texts that haven't reached us. But they don't exist any less; they will exist one day. And then, then it's necessarily so (*forcé*); that's why because it seems to me that other answers are impossible. However, it's not far off. But in the end, it matters little. I should never have said that...

You see the genesis. First proposition: certainly each monad expresses the whole world, but each individual, what does being an individual monad mean? It's concentrating, concentration, a word that Leibniz uses: concentration of a limited aggregate of singularities. I don't express the world any less for this, because, once again, these singularities are extensible all the way into the neighborhood of all the other singularities. So, first proposition: I am constructed in the neighborhood of a certain number of singularities, or of a determined aggregate of singularities.

Second proposition: henceforth, that's the reason why I express a determined portion of the world, the one that links constitutive singularities. But I express the entire world in a confused way, that is, all the singularities of the world chosen by God. But I make my neighborhood, or my subdivision, from the portion of the world delimited by my constitutive singularities. Third proposition: I have a body because I express a privileged region, [Pause] and thus, I could say: my privileged region is what has a rapport with my body, [Interruption of the WebDeleuze transcript] the privileged region of my spirit, that which has a rapport with my body.

With this, I'm thrown into all kinds of problems, notably how to explain that my body is only perceived obscurely by my monad. I content myself solely with this: each monad has a body and must have a body. Each monad has a body, I don't know. No, all that I can say is the each monad *ought to* have a body. It ought to have a body since the requirement of having a body results from the clear portion that I express. There we are, I've completed the first point.

Henceforth, notice that when I introduced the monad in the first point as the unit of movement, it was justified to the extent that I have a body and that, henceforth, there are bodies. [Pause] Why not a lone body? That we shall see, because the law of the body is precisely to submit to the actions of other bodies. And it doesn't matter. There we have the first point. It has to be very clear. This is clear: if I reverse the order, in my opinion, this would no longer be Leibniz. If you

start off from the body, it's ruined. [Pause] Understand? This is a genetic deduction of the body that he proposed to us at this level. [Pause] No problems? ... Yes?

Question: [*Inaudible, due to ambient noise in the classroom*]

I am going to tell you that you aren't yet even severe enough. In all rigor, on this level, what I can say is that it's not even that animated beings have a body. What I can say is that reasonable souls have a body. I can't even say anything else; I can't say anything else because [*Return to the Web Deleuze transcript*] we started off from the monad. For the moment, the monad, for us, is a spirit that expresses the whole world under the auspices of reason, that is, it's you or me. We've encountered animals; we've encountered animals, but we don't know what that is. We have encountered them in some way because we made them intervene. We don't know what that is. And things... the example loved so much by Leibniz, for your pleasure: the rainbow, all that. Animals and phenomena of different kinds, light, rainbows, etc., for the moment, they're... – you sense that they have to belong, and your question is quite correct -- that they have to belong to the genesis. They have to emerge at a moment... which moment? We don't know, we don't know at which moment. [Pause]

Second criterion of substance, substance still being taken as a monad presented as spirit of a reasonable being. [Pause] We have just seen that by virtue of the first criterion, the monad as spirit of a reasonable being must have a body. And why must it have a body? It must have a body, once again, because it expresses a privileged subdivision in its total expression.

Second criterion, the epistemological criterion. Why do I call it the epistemological criterion? As we saw, it's because I insisted on the originality of Leibniz's logic that consists of calling for a definition as function of the requisites of the thing. And what are the requisites of the thing? It's already something very new: these are the constitutive conditions of the thing. We have to distinguish the constitutive conditions of the thing from the constitutive parts. [Pause] The requisites are not among the constitutive parts; these are conditions that the thing must obey in order to be what it is. [Pause]

And we saw, on this point as well, that Leibniz clashed with Descartes, since the second criterion of substance for Descartes was, you recall, real distinction, two things being conceived without one being thought while causing elements of the other to intervene.¹³ [Pause] For Descartes, two really distinct things, that is, things thought as really distinct, we saw that it was the same thing, that it was always a question of thinking within the real distinction, and well, that two things thought as really distinct were *separable*. [Pause] Descartes would be able add: furthermore, that which is separable is separated, and that's another matter. If what is separable is separated for Descartes, it's because, otherwise, God would be an imposter (*trompeur*); he would make us think of things as being separable, and he would not separate them. So he would be lying to us. [Pause]

Leibniz answers a second time: no! He says: what Descartes did not see was that two things can be really distinct, that is, thought as really distinct, and nonetheless have the same requisites, that is, have the same constitutive conditions. And two things that have the same requisites can be really distinct, and yet they are not separable. And Leibniz's grand idea is that nothing is

separable in the world. [Pause] Example: monads. They are really distinct; one can be thought without the other. That does not make them separable, and moreover they are inseparable. Why? Because they have the same requisites. Which requisites? The common world that they express: each from its point of view expresses a one and same world; they are really distinct since the points of view are really distinct. You can think the monad Caesar without thinking anything about the monad Alexander. That doesn't change the fact that they aren't separable, they have the same requisites; they express a one and same world. And this singular requisite, all the singularities of a same world, must indeed express itself in general terms, that is, from the point of view of a logic of requisites – what are we going to say?

We saw it the last time; we started to see it: this is where [Leibniz] creates his great reactivation of Aristotle in order to make fun of Descartes. Descartes thought that he had done away with Aristotle and with Aristotelian abstractions that consisted of telling ourselves: substance is composed -- you see it was rather distant from Leibniz, the component parts -- substance is composed from a matter, from a form and from an aggregate of matter and form. [Aristotle] added: matter is the power (*puissance*) of accepting opposites; that's what change is, hence substance is a unit of change. This was close to Leibniz: matter is the power of accepting opposites. One of these opposites is: possession of the form. Henceforth, form is the act that causes power to pass into act, it's the form that actualizes power, and matter without form is privation. Hence the condition under which you think the trio matter-form-component of both, this is the distinction, it's the opposition possession-privation. It's an entire aggregate of requisites of substance.

And there we see what [is] in [Leibniz's] project, which is both to hold onto, once again, the acquired elements of Cartesianism in order to turn them against Descartes and to reactivate Aristotle; that's how Leibniz is going to return to the problem and present it as a problem of the requisites of substance. This is the most difficult point of what I have to tell you today, so we are going rather slowly.

For substance to exist, there first must be an active unity. We saw that this was linked to the first criterion. But you saw this, we can draw it, we can extract it from the first criterion since unity could also be as much a unity of movement as a unity of change interior to the monad. For substance to exist, there must in any case be a unity, active unity of spontaneity. [This is] what we will call *substantial form*, or according to an Aristotelian term – that I don't have the time to define, otherwise we'd get all lost in this, but if you run into it, don't be disturbed -- *perfect act*, that is, *Entelechia*. [Deleuze spells it out] The perfect act or Entelechia, the completed substantial form or perfect Entelechia, the substantial form, Entelechia: it is this active unity, that is, what is called for the moment: monad. It's spontaneity. We will call it active and primitive power (*puissance*).¹⁴ You already see that power is no longer opposed to act, but power passes into act, and it needs nothing else than itself to pass into act.

Active and primitive power. Why? Because it does not cause a power or a matter to pass into act; it is in itself the power of action (*puissance d'agir*): this is going to be -- and Leibniz borrows it from the Renaissance, that is, from Aristotelians who have singularly changed the rapport power-action --, specifically, power is itself power of action (*puissance d'agir*). There is no longer an act that actualizes a power of action; there is a power that passes into action, if nothing blocks it.

This is why that it is called: power (*puissance*). If nothing blocks it, it passes into action. Spontaneity of active power.

Hence [there is] the splendid expression for Nicolas of Cusa, a Renaissance philosopher to whom Leibniz owes much, when he speaks of "possest". For those who know some Latin, *possest* is a word composed of "posse", power (*pouvoir*), and "est", is. That means precisely: the power (*puissance*) that is not power of Being, but the power which IS, the power which is act, the power in action, the *possest*. In Leibniz, once again you see this term constantly: active and primitive power. You see that it is not a form, substantial form, but this is not a form that acts on a matter; it is a form – Leibniz will say – of which all the actions are internal. If nothing blocks it, it passes into act. Quite often Leibniz will tell us that the monad, by definition, has only internal actions. It is active, and all its actions are internal. Why? By virtue of the principle of inclusion, by virtue of the principle of inherence.

Thus there is an active power (*puissance*) because the act does not exert itself over an exterior matter, but power is in act (*en acte*) since all its actions are internal. [Pause] I would say: substantial form was identified by Leibniz with the substance as subject, that is, with the monad, that is, with active power of which all the passions are internal. [Pause] You have seen it: what are the internal actions of the monad? These are its perceptions. The perceptions are the actions of the monad.¹⁵ [Pause]

Only there we are, the second requisite: it is true that our difference with God is that we are limited. And as we saw -- in this as well, this is entirely clear in itself -- we saw that in Leibniz, just as there was an absolute revision of the rapports power (*puissance*)-act, there is also a renunciation of the opposition privation-possession. To the benefit of what? Of limitation. [Pause] Our sole privation is that we are limited. We are limited because we are creatures: monads are limited. But it's not because we are limited that we still don't have infinite actions, Leibniz will say; this is something else. But in any case, because we are limited, as we've seen, we only have a very partial region of clear expression. The mark of limitation in the monad is precisely that we have a single subdivision.

Limitation does not prevent action. [In] another letter: [Pause] "I answer that even when it" – substance -- "is blocked" -- that is, when its active force, its active *puissance* is blocked -- "it simultaneously exerts infinite actions for, as I have already said, no blockage can completely suppress action". Afterwards considerations about the body come, etc. This is constantly marvelous. Fine. The monad is limited. This is the second requisite; the first requisite is: active and primitive power (*puissance*). To limitation, Leibniz will give the name primitive power, but now passive. [Pause]

Only here's the problem: how does he define the limitation? [Pause] That's very important because, staying with the point of view of genesis where we are now, out of [scholarly] rigor I refer to the Letters to Father Des Bosses, like a "bosse" [*hump*] in two words, letters from the end of his [Leibniz's] life, so we can consider that they express the final state of his thought. He never stops telling us: limitation is requirement. Limitation is requirement of what? It's the requirement of extension (*étendue*) and – a rather mysterious word -- of antitype, which is resistance or inertia. For reasons that we will perhaps see later, or perhaps we won't have time to

get to these, Leibniz thinks that extension is itself incapable of taking account of inertia and resistance.

So, these aren't two things, and we know about it since it's not the same thing. We saw this, you recall, so I remind you of it quite briefly: extension is a series, it's an infinite series whose parts are organized according to the rapports of whole-parts,¹⁶ and that tends towards no limit, [Pause] whereas resistance or antitype is the limit toward which something tends, in the extension, [Pause] that enters into a convergent series. But no matter. Leibniz tells us: limitation is a requirement, or it's the requirement of extension or antitype, or the requirement of extension and resistance. He will call it mass, but as one commentator notes, Latin has two words for "mass". What he calls mass, in Latin it's "moles", and he indicates: mass without form. In fact, this mass without form – you see why it's without form? It's not even extension, it's not even resistance, and it's a requirement. In other words, it's a requisite in pure state. And if you say, this is where extension intervenes, you would be wrong; extension surely does not intervene there. This is where there is a requirement of extension. Limitation is one requirement of extension and of resistance, understanding this as resistance to movement, but we don't know, or resistance to change. We will say, requirement of extension... [Pause]

If I remain here, we'll say: the monad as substance, as spiritual substance, has two requisites: [Pause] substantial form or Entelechia or active primitive power (*puissance*), and limitation [Pause] or requirement of extension or of resistance. If you want to draw more from this, you do not have the right, in my opinion; for the moment, it's blocked off. We cannot say more about it. A problem remains, you can always analyze this requirement. I can already tell you where it would come from, and that is going to commit us. Perhaps I'll need to repeat it to you.

Very quickly, I say, this story is quite significant, so that you will feel a bit of the deep coherence. You recall that each monad has a point of view. The point of view already allows [us] to define something that we have not talked about at all, which is what Leibniz calls space, specifically (we can only say it in Latin, otherwise we will get all mixed up) in Latin: *spatium*. The *spatium* strictly has no physical reality and does not concern bodies. The *spatium* is a logical order, the order of coexistent points of view, [Interruption of the recording; text from WebDeleuze] [1:25:30] that implies no physical nor geometric extension. The *spatium* is the order of coexistent points of view, or if you prefer, it's the order coexistent places, places being points of view. [Return to the recording]

Part 3

What is the requirement of extension and of resistance? It's the diffusion of places. [Pause] It's a consequence of *spatium*. It's still not a question of extension. It's a requirement of extension, a requirement of antitype. [Pause]

At the outside, I can say what? Limitation, this requirement of extension, in the end what is it? The limitation of each monad is the fact that there are several monads, the fact that there is an infinity of monads. I would almost say: my limitation is the shadow of other monads onto my own. Everything starts through the shadow. Notice that my situation is not brilliant! The shadow of other monads onto my own: wouldn't this be a way of getting back to something, [so] I repeat

the question: what is my limitation? I repeat the question each time to give another answer. My limitation is the fact that I clearly express only an entirely tiny portion of universe, and the rest lies in my obscure depths. My limitation is the obscure depth of my soul.

Fine. What is the obscure depth of my soul? I can start over: it's the fact that I cannot clearly express anything but a tiny portion. Why can I only express a tiny portion? We saw this. But the ultimate answer is because there are other monads. In other word, what causes the obscure depth of my soul? The shadow that other monads cast over me. It's your shadow that creates my obscure depth, *[Interruption of the WebDeleuze transcript]* as a kind of revenge. *[Pause]*

We don't communicate otherwise. It's really marvelous. This is Leibniz, you remember? Monads are without doors or windows. They do not communicate with each other because they have strictly nothing to say to each other. They have strictly nothing to say to each other; they all express the same world from their point of view, each from its point of view. Each has only a small portion of clear expression, a small subdivision, its neighborhood, fine. I have my neighborhood, you have yours. All the rest is the dark depth within each of us. We, we – what is the word when one gets one's feet really muddy? I no longer know -- anyway, we *[Return to the Web Deleuze transcript]* -- We wallow in this obscure depth, we slog. And what is this obscure depth of your shadow over me? The only thing that you might give me. Note that it's impressive: giving a bit of shadow to others, what's more beautiful?

A student: Diogenes wouldn't have liked that.

Deleuze: Diogenes, wouldn't have liked that? Oh, he'd have gotten used to it. I don't know. It's his... In any case, there's no reason to criticize, not at all, because it's... The dark depth is necessary. It is absolutely necessary to prevent me from being just any being (*un être quelconque*). *[Return to the WebDeleuze transcript]* I must have all that, all this shadow on me. You understand?

So I would say: the requirement of extension or antitype is so little extension or antitype; it hasn't yet become such, and in all rigor, it is the shadow that all the other monads cast onto each other. In this very way, it constitutes the obscure depth of each monad. You see that we never get out of it, always, we're always... I have to have a body, but in the genesis, we are not even at the requirement of a body, but the requirement of something *[Pause]* that I might be able to name extension and inertia. And I can only analyze this requirement. And I would say, with my first two requisites, I would say: active primitive power (*puissance*) and active passive power are the two requisites of the substance called monad, substance that I can call: simple substance, now that all danger is cast out since I know that "simple" does not define the substance. What defines the substance is the two requisites. I can add: limitation is not separable from active power. *[Pause]* All the simple monads are separable from one another; no, that's not good... I am saying stupidities. The simple monads are really distinct from one another, but they have the same requisites, and these requisites are themselves inseparable. And they are not themselves separable, the monads, since each one casts the shadow over all the others. There you are (*Voilà*).

What remains for us is the most difficult, and then what's going to happen? Specifically, we have a requirement; how is the requirement going to be realized? How are the requisites going to be

fulfilled? I add... Ah yes, I forgot the essential point: passive primitive power or limitation, that's it – beware of texts – or “moles”, mass in the sense of “moles”, mass that includes neither extension nor inertia -- that's a requirement of extension and of inertia --, this is what Leibniz calls primary or naked matter, stripped naked (*toute nue*), primary matter or naked matter. If you tell me to show that to you, I can't show it to you; it's a requirement. In any case, it still does not include anything of extension; it's pure limitation. It is a requirement of extension.

Third point, still in this second criterion – you can see here where this can no longer advance: how is the requirement going to be realized? -- [*Pause ; interruption, question from a student*] Yes, just a moment so I can look that up... -- Sense immediately what our answer is going to be, but that showing this will be complicated: the only thing that can realize the requirement of extension and antitype – normally, you must wait for me at the turn, or rather wait for Leibniz at the turn -- it would be for him to tell us [that] it's extension and antitype and to show us how extension comes to realize the requirement of extension. That [answer] would be worthless (*nul*); it would be worthless, it would not be philosophy, impossible. I cannot establish a requirement of extension and then answer that it's the extension that realizes the requirement of extension. This would be the worst verbalizing. And you sense what the answer must be here: one has to let oneself be guided by the necessities, otherwise we are lost! There again we have no choice because Leibniz had no choice: there can only be one answer for him. It's the body. It's when we have a body, and insofar as we have a body, that limitation conceived as requirement of extension and antitype is realized. The body alone can realize the requirement.

But then the body, it's not extension? That's not what it is? Or else it constructs it, it secretes it? Perhaps the body secretes extension? And it secretes antitype? Perhaps it does all that! It becomes possible to say, [but] I don't know if it's possible to prove. But the only answer is we are blocked, otherwise we'd have to stop, which would be nice: if Leibniz had stopped, we would have to stop there. We would say: he couldn't go any farther; he was swallowed up by the sea... Yes, like Nietzsche, he stopped... He had a little accident that made him stop. Otherwise our task is painful: we must continue, we must continue, we must continue! We know at least where we await our answer; we have no choice: the body alone can fulfill the requirement. [*Question from a student*] Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible – on the problem of evil in Leibniz*]

Deleuze: This is absolutely correct. Evil... But here we have to distinguish what is Leibnizian and what is general, what's a general theme in the period, -- this doesn't mean that it's not good to be general -- what belongs to Leibniz and what we find a little bit everywhere. What we find a little bit everywhere in the seventeenth century in philosophy is the idea that evil solely has limitation for its source. With limitation being the condition of any creature, God is responsible for Good, but is not responsible for Evil. Creatures exist only as limited; limitation is the source of evil. This is not Leibnizian, it's general. You find it in Descartes, in Spinoza, and that comes from a deeper operation (this is not simply a theological platitude): it's their conception according to which – it's their anti-Aristotelianism – there are no privations, there are only limitations. This is an extremely original thesis that occupied the entire seventeenth century, the attempt to reduce privation to a simple limitation. It's an initial point; it's general.

The second point that shows you are correct is specific to Leibniz: Leibniz has an original way of conceiving of the very rapport between limitation and positivity, positive power (*puissance*). This an original way -- so Spinoza is another one, then Descartes another, Malebranche another, I believe. Each in the originality of his philosophy has a certain way of conceiving of the rapport between reality, which is necessarily positive, between positive reality and limitation, the limitation of this reality -- Leibniz's original way, as we saw -- if we want to compare it to the others, this would be an entirely different subject, so I limit myself to this by saying [that] -- Leibniz's originality seems to me to be this: limitation is conceived by him as passive primitive power, that is, requirement of extension and resistance. That's what is specific to Leibniz. If you prefer, I'm looking into a text that is even more precise on this, in a text from *The Theodicy*, which will be very important for us, but when we get to physics. And I have to find this text because... I noted it down somewhere, but it indicates well the originality of ... [Pause] *Theodicy*, first part, paragraph 30 -- this will be good because I really would like to have some among you read it for the next meeting: "Matter itself . . . originally is inclined to slowness or privation of speed". It doesn't matter that this concerns physical matter, you'll see soon. So that's what he says, and so it is worth... I am allowing myself to develop this text now, because it is so beautiful, and as you will see, and I would like to situate it here precisely as an answer to your question.

Leibniz adopts an example from physics in which it's a question of the problem of metaphysics and of the metaphysical limitation of creatures. He says: for you to understand the problem of the metaphysical limitation of creatures, I have to explain to you something that concerns physics, which will help you. And here is what he says: "Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried along with it various boats, which differ among themselves only in the cargo, some being laden with wood, others with stone, and some more, others less." -- Notice, on the same river, at the same moment, there are some boats; we assume the river is the same for all the boats, the current is equal for all the boats; this is the physical hypothesis -- "That being so, it will come about that the boats most heavily laden will go more slowly than the others, provided it be assumed that the wind or the oar, or some other similar means, assist them not at all."

So they are following the current, more or less loaded down, the most burdened are going more slowly than the others. They don't have the same primary matter, I'd say; they don't have the same mass. So, first possibility: is it the weight that explains why the boats are going more or less quickly? Answer: "It is not, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this retardation" -- due to the fact that certain boats are going more slowly; it's not the weight -- "since the boats are going down and not upwards; but it is the same cause which also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density" -- one must certainly not bring in weight all alone in the bodies with greater density, that is, that are less porous and more burdened with matter than is proper for them. "It is therefore" -- here is the essential primary text -- "It is therefore" -- if the boat don't have the same speed -- "It is therefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or privation of speed, not indeed of itself to lessen this speed," [Deleuze repeats the whole quote]. Here you can invent what follows: not to lessen it by itself, when it has already reached this speed. He tells us: matter slows down, it is inclined to slowness or privation of speed "since that would be action" (*car ce serait agir*).

You have recognized [that] it's pure passive power, limiting passive power; therefore, "matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or privation of speed, not indeed of itself to lessen this speed . . . since that would be . . ." when it had already reached this speed, and it reaches it from the current. You see: all the boats reach their speed from the current, some going more slowly than others. Was this due to the weight, asks Leibniz? No, it's not due to the weight, since they are descending rather than going upstream. It would be weight intervening if it was a question of going upstream, with oars, all that: ". . . not indeed of itself to lessen this speed . . . having once received it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivity" -- what a beautiful text for those truly interested in finding Kant's premises in Leibniz's thought -- "the effect of the impression" -- the impression is truly the communicated movement, the movement communicated by the current: it's the current that creates impression -- "when it is to receive it." Do you understand, or should I re-read slowly?

I'll try to sum this up: boats variously loaded gather movement from the same current presumed equal for all. That is, they gain speed, or if you prefer, they gather movement of a certain speed. Some go more slowly, so why? Are they going more slowly because of greater weight? No! Yet again, they descend on the current, and weight would only matter if they were following the current upstream. So why do some go more slowly? Because the more it has matter, less will be its receptivity from the quantity of movement imprinted by the current; the less its receptivity will be in very little time, the more its receptivity will take time, the more its receptivity will be slow.

In other words, what is matter? Matter is precisely receptivity. When I say that Kant isn't far off: primary matter, primitive passive power, it's the form of receptivity. Primitive active matter is the form of spontaneity. Here things will become luminous. Listen to this beautiful text: "The current is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation" -- incontestable; here there's a beautiful distinction of two requisites. [*Pause*] "Likewise God" -- you put God in the place of the current -- "is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature." [*Deleuze repeats the entire quote*] The boat's movements = primitive active power. Yes, God is its cause... [*Pause*]

"But the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defects that are there in its action." He has dissociated on the physical level the current as cause of movements and receptivity as cause of the variation of movement, that is, from the greater to lesser speed... "Likewise God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature . . . [but which is] the cause of the defects that are there in its action," that is, that a particular monad might be good and a particular other one bad, the equivalent of going fast or going slowly. It's not God that is its cause, it's the limitation in the receptivity of the creature. And it is varied, the primary matter, the limitation -- we don't have the same. We have more or less of a shadow. Each one has its own; each and every one has its receptivity according to its mass. Each person has its mass, its "moles", at the level of the soul. Literally, what is receptivity? It's the quantity of shadow in one's soul.

And so I am ending; if you were here when we did this, that is, when we covered this point, you may recall, this reminds us... We return fully into the problem of the damned.¹⁷ What is a damned person? It's someone whose shadow has invaded its entire soul. So it's someone, as

[Leibniz] says in an expression that's so beautiful that – aie, aie, aie, aie, I've lost it! [*Deleuze looks in his texts*] -- In any case, insofar as [I am] soul, I have a limited receptivity. You see a limited receptivity; it's my zone of clarity, that is, insofar as it is limited by all the shadow. I would say rather: it's all the shadow that limits my zone of clarity because my zone of clarity refers to action. There are souls that have an extraordinarily limited receptivity, [where] everything is shadow. And the damned, you remember what happens: [*Deleuze announces loudly*] *There Is No Soul!* Or at least you feel it: we are confronting problems that are veritable abysses because I am still speaking about reasonable souls for the moment, and I was going to say: there is no soul without its zone of clarity. Perhaps? Perhaps? But is this true for animals even if they have a soul? And we saw that for Leibniz, it's obvious that they have souls. It's almost the point about which he most resents Descartes; he says: Descartes, no really, someone telling you stories of animal-machines, this isn't someone serious, even if yet again he explains that this is an explanatory mode, because afterwards, he no longer understands anything about what happens in men. He does not see that there is a depth of the soul.

The damned person is what? Do animals also have a clear zone? In my view, we can already answer Yes, necessarily. It's perhaps not at all of the same type as for us, but they necessarily have a clear zone since they have a body as well. They have a body and then they clearly express what happens through their bodies, what has a rapport with their bodies. When a dog receives a blow from a stick, to return to Leibniz's example, when it receives a solid blow from a stick, well, it clearly expresses pain; it has a clear zone of expression that has a relation to its body.

But the damned person, you remember? He has so much obscurity in his soul that the only tiny light still shining is: God, I hate you! And almost fortunately he has that, it's a tiny light, "God I hate you!" If he didn't have that tiny light, he would literally be senile. He only has that to live for and to survive. But he will survive for all eternity because he has that tiny light that he could enlarge. He could enlarge it, should he desire to, [and] he would cease being damned. As Leibniz says, there is no damned person who doesn't damn himself at every moment. The damned person is not a story from the past: it would suffice for him to abandon the, God, I hate you! But this is what he insists on the most in the world, so he won't abandon it. But even that one... So, the slowness or the limitation of one's receptivity is infinite. We even have the impression that it no longer moves. It can no longer move. You see, we fall back completely onto this problem of metaphysical limitation, and in which God is not responsible for metaphysical limitation, but is solely responsible not for passive limiting force, but primitive active force. So that's all that I wanted to say about this first aspect. [*Interruption in the WebDeleuze transcript*]

But again grasp hold of the problem; this is really a tough one. We've still made some serious progress forward. Those who, I'm saying... I was saying, why do bodies emerge? But here we are [*Return to the WebDeleuze transcript*] now at the start of an answer, but this will not be easy. We have the start of an answer.

We were asking: why do bodies exist? We were asking why does the fact of clearly expressing a tiny region result in me having a body? That was our problem. I must have a body since the tiny region is what will concern my body -- I place this indeed in the future -- once I will have it. And our answer now is that the monad had a passive primitive power, that this passive primitive power, or limitation, was the requirement for extension and resistance. What can...? For this

point, we pass on to another thing: what can satisfy this requirement, fulfill this requirement? The body and only the body, having a body. At this level, the monad sighs, it truly sighs: God, give me a body, I need a body. [Pause] So be it. [Interruption of Web Deleuze transcript] [A student asks a question]... Yes?

First student: There is something that bothers me in the text you read. There's a problem regarding the movement of the two objects in the same current. In a river's current, a ship and a dead leaf go at the same speed. I've never seen a dead leaf overtake a ship in the same current. This might be true for a boat like a trireme, but not for when boats are carried along in the same current.

Deleuze : So, here, [what you say] is troubling me... [Laughter] Suddenly, I'm telling myself, what's going on... So, let's stop and think about this. We can add something else.

First student: There are no distinctions to make between masses carried along by the water's current, and in fact, the experience of Galileo was to drop a weight from the Tower of Pisa, and the huge mass arrived at the same time as the lighter mass. Perhaps this is a special case of the facts about falling bodies.

Deleuze: But you have... You've done well in pointing this out to me. This isn't at all a special case. [Pause, different discussions are heard, near to Deleuze, and others farther off] It seems to me that you are completely neglecting the current, clearly. Let's take, for example, two... I choose a kid's game, two matches in a stream, leaving at the same time. They race each other. You'll tell me that one of the two matches doesn't encounter the same milieu. Let's assume that the current is equal for both, with one of the matches [alone] and a group of two matches connected together, and you don't have a vacant milieu. In my view, there is a particular difference from "you drop [the masses from above]." It's well understood that... [The first student tries to interrupt] We assume that the current is the same. This is not at all the case for Galileo. It's not at all a descent, not at all a descent because, in the case of the descent, you have here what is called in physics – here, I'm... This is not meant to drown you with science, it's just that I'm trying to regroup a bit because... Physicists, physicists would have a good laugh, either at your expense or at mine. -- But I'm saying that this story of the descent is what is called "labor" (*un travail*) in physics. So we can very well say labor is when an effect consumes its cause. For example, you raise up a body to a given height, and then you let it fall, so, in fact, in conditions of falling in a vacuum, well, it falls the same [as another]. In the case of my current, it's a completely different story. In this case, you have a movement that is imprinted from one body to another. I am looking for differences in this; here there's a current that imprints on a boat. It's not a body that's falling. You have movement because, otherwise, they'd remain fixed in place. If there were no current, they'd remain fixed. One cannot assimilate this to "you dropped [something from above]".

The first student: These are bodies with the current.

Deleuze : It's a body that receives its movement from the current, not from labor. [Objections are raised]. No, they [the boats] are place [into the water]. They don't have the same speed, eh? They are placed [into the water]; we are assuming small boats, some models, and they are placed

into the current. At first they have no speed. So they receive the movement from the current. Ok? You let me know if this is ok... If you will, this is therefore the case, how to say this, there is an expression that is slipping me; I am looking for it because Leibniz... It's motor action (*action motrice*), in fact. This is the difference between labor and motor action, in my view, because... [Different answers come at once from several students, with a second one speaking quickly; Deleuze listens] I don't understand. Here, I don't understand this.

A second student: [This student again presents the situation of the two bodies in the water; different discussions are taking place as he speaks. This student suggests that the difference between the two bodies is nil.]

Deleuze: But, no, it's not nil. It's equal to zero at the very first moment; it is set at zero at the very first, but it is printed on the bodies... [Pause] You're right. I sense that we are reaching something here. It's equal to zero in the first instance because this is exactly what Leibniz poses as an objection to Descartes. He tells him, your law is valid for the first moment of movement. It's true when you place the body in at the first moment, and there, in fact, it is zero. But, from the next moment small a , it has received movement from the current.

Richard Pinhas: [He returns to the example of the bodies falling in space; the student's speed of delivery here is increasingly rapid (and excited) as he presents his examples.]

The second student: [He again intervenes, returning to the boats in the water, but with another example of immobile water in a cooking pot, and his comment raises numerous objections from other students. A woman student then intervenes, responding to the second student]

Deleuze : Here are some texts, here we have some texts. Listen up, please. There is surely a way to discover something because... -- What a story! [Laughter] I have the impression that we possess two kinds of proof and that we're not going to speak about the same one. -- So, listen up: [Return to the Web Deleuze transcript] Leibniz distinguishes two cases for his laws of movement. In any case, this is his problem: how to define force or power (*puissance*). This is very good because it makes me move toward the physical criteria of substance. How to define force or power? He says: Descartes defined force or power by the quantity of movement, that is, by m . On this point, we must distinguish two cases. The first case is what is called since [Descartes] the case of work. The case of work is the case of a force that consumes itself in its effect. Example: you lift up – I'd like to finish today on this point, so this will allow us to make progress on the physical criterion -- You lift up a body to some height, so you furnish some work, then you let everything go. [Pause] There you have Leibniz's argument; you can find it mostly in... Yes?

The previous woman student: [Question regarding Einstein's physics. While she is speaking, Deleuze coughs quite deeply making small groans]

Deleuze: Listen, this is not a matter of Einstein. I assure you that it's elementary physics, because we are saying, him and me, that it's elementary physics. [Laughter] So, if we take up the slightest scholarly argument, it's obvious that it will be a means of escape.

So, first case, I lift a one-pound body A to four meters, a one-pound body to four meters. Then I lift up a four-pound body B to one meter. [Pause] I have to use the same force to lift them in both cases. [Pause] But – and here I have to verify this from my memory in the *Discours on Metaphysics*, there is a little drawing on this example – but according to Galileo’s famous theory, the fall in the first case has twice the speed that it has in the second case, [Pause] even though the height is four times greater. What does he conclude? He draws the triumphant conclusion against Descartes, therefore, that force and quantity of movements cannot be confused. That’s the first case. In my opinion, this is the one that you are talking about, but we’ll see.

Second case: it’s no longer at all a question of a force that is consumed in labor, notably, that must be it, I think. In the first case, time does not intervene. In fact, force consumes itself, as one says, in an instant. There is no consideration of time. There is physically no consideration of time, and in fact, if you look for what is conserved in both cases, you reach the Leibnizian formula mv^2 [squared], and not mv as Descartes believed, because Descartes believed and confused force and quantity of movement. [A student tries to interrupt] – You’ll let me follow this to the end? Is it ok, so far? You agree? Is that ok? ... Whew, I mean, what is...

Second case, it’s entirely different. It’s no longer, how to say this... [Deleuze listens to a student beside him] a question of a force that consumes itself in work, a question of a force that consumes itself in work. It’s a question of a uniform movement of a rolling body, by virtue of an acquired speed, through a hypothesis without resistance. Here, there’s no point in saying already that the case is entirely different since one has to introduce time. In what sense must one introduce time? It’s what we will no longer call work, but motor action (*action motrice*). Here is the example given by Leibniz: two leagues (*lieues*) in two hours. A mobile body. Everything is different. Perhaps I have expressed myself poorly since the body is assumed to be a rolling body by virtue of its acquired speed. For, in fact, in the first moment of speed, as he says, it’s Descartes’s formula that is valid, such that Descartes can only comprehend the movement as it initiates. But already he cannot understand the uniform movement. So the example that [Leibniz] gives is: a body traverses two leagues in two hours. Two leagues in two hours is twice one league in one hour. [Pause; voices again start to rise] One league in one hour is twice one league in two hours [Deleuze repeats this]. [Interruption in the WebDeleuze transcript] – [I hear] objections are coming in from somewhere... Who doesn’t agree?... Eh? Why?

A woman student: [Inaudible comments]

Deleuze: The first case – you don’t understand me – first case: two leagues in two hours is double one league in one hour.

The student: [She continues speaking]

Deleuze: A body that makes two leagues in two realizes... so, what must we say, in fact?... [Several answers are suggested] ... It’s not a labor exactly... -- Where did I put my book? [Pause] I must not have taken it with me. -- [Noises of movement and voices from different directions] Traverses! Yes, let’s say that: A body that covers two leagues in two hours *traverses* a space that is double that of one league. [Pause]

The student: [*She continues stating her objection*]

Deleuze: No, I didn't say that it's normal; on the contrary, we are looking for normal... So, a body that traverses two leagues in two hours traverses a space double to those or the one that traverses one league in one hour.

Second case... [*The sound of voices is still heard*], a body that traverses – second case, eh? A body that traverses one league in one hour, so here I'd say, takes twice less time (*met deux fois moins de temps*) than the one that traverses one league in two hours. Eh?

Third: A body that traverses two leagues in two hours – we're going back to the first one – so there, traverses a quadruple space, and not a double [space], than the one operating, traversing one league in two hours. [*Pause*] I will re-read this, abridging it since...¹⁸

Two leagues in two hours – first proposition – two leagues in two hours, double one league in one hour.

The woman student: [*She still voices an objection; Deleuze responds to her*]

Deleuze: Space and time... [*Pause*]

The student: [*She continues with objections*]

Deleuze: No, we aren't going to include speed. We will have speed intervene elsewhere since we are looking at space and time. We are going to apply the formula $e=vt$, and this is going to be important since, in this case, it's going to be the problem – ah, she's understood all of it – it's going to be the problem of uniform movement. This uniform movement is going to be mv multiplied by e . But e is vt so uniform movement will give you $mv2t$, mv multiplied by e equals mv multiplied by vt , $mv2t$. You rediscover mv .

What mattered to Leibniz is that there's transformation – we'll come back to this later; we're not done – there's transformation where, in all these equations, he is going to find mv^2 , but he cannot find it in the same way in the case of labor, [in the case] of cause that is consumed by its effect, and in the case of motor action, that is, uniform movement of a body rolling by virtue of an acquired speed since, in the second case, there will be $mv2t$ or $mvvt$ or mve .

So we return to... Here, you have two bodies; this is like your cooking pot example that you had. What's going to happen? I have a track, I have a track. Here, we mustn't exaggerate, I have a track. – Look at me because I need to follow in your mind as much as... And each of us has two little autos [*Pause*] and ...

A student: And we throw them! ...

Deleuze : What?

The student: We throw them!

Deleuze: We throw them, with a force assumed to be exactly the same. Yours is full of ... iron bolts, and mine is full of... [*The students start suggesting possible objects, and Deleuze doesn't complete the sentence*] The force with which we throw it is strictly the same, that is, Leibniz would say, we imprint on the two mobile objects the same quantity of words. He doesn't already say... Not what I thought.

The woman student: [*She interrupts Deleuze once more*] ...

Deleuze: What?

The first student: [*He intervenes again about the boats, suggesting that the boat example only works if it's all located in stagnant water; if there is a motor force, if it's the case of bodies carried in the current, that wouldn't work. Everyone in the class starts talking.*]

Deleuze: The current... No, in fact... But the mistake... The confusion doesn't come from what you are saying. [*Deleuze is speaking very loudly in order to be heard*] The confusion comes from, not what is made to intervene in the current, [but from] what causes the current to intervene as the first thrust.

The second student: There's someone who pushes the boat...

Deleuze: And after, he doesn't bother any more with the current, he doesn't bother at all.

The second student: I thought that it's the river that had the current.

Deleuze: Ah, this is an argument for another time.

The student: [*He continues, inaudible; lots of laughter*]

Deleuze: It's an argument, but I don't want to end on this point because it's a very broad argument. You could say just as well that, until now, I had never heard about there not being any resistance to movement. In fact, it's understood that bodies do not encounter resistance in the same way. The current intervenes to imprint a movement, and then no longer intervenes, that is, the slightest mathematician can no longer take into account a factor that has played out its effect. [*Different comments, indistinct*] No, no, inversely, it's me who read the text wrong, and as a result... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

So, anyway, in order for you to see where we are, suddenly, to create a short-cut, we took on the physical criterion of substance. What I'd like to emphasize after... For me, all this has been very useful because I was telling myself, suddenly, my God, what's not working here, and as if I hadn't thought about it, and I had some awful doubt; I told myself, Leibniz couldn't have made a mistake, so... Well, then here we are.

What I want you to retain is that when he substitutes mv^2 for mv , this substitution bears on a very precise problem, which is: [*Pause*] what is it that measures force? And his reproach against Descartes is... Because [*Return to the Web Deleuze transcription*] sometimes it is said that he

substitutes force for quantity of movement, but this is not true. The real physical problem that Leibniz poses is not at all that Descartes ignored force; it's that Descartes believed it possible to measure force as the quantity of movement, mv . In the end, it is entirely linked to his conception of substance. And Leibniz's idea is that this is physically false.

So remember that it's by virtue of actual science, by virtue of modern science – this is why it's very important – it's by virtue of modern science that he needed to reactivate something in Aristotle. And what will that be? He is going to consider the two cases that Descartes could not distinguish, the case of work that is, if you will – Leibniz repeats it often – an ascendant movement, a vertical movement. That's what is the case of work or the case of force that consumes itself in its effect. And the second case [is] the case of horizontal movement, that is, a supposedly uniform movement of a rolling body by virtue of its acquired speed. In the first case, force consumes itself in its effect in the instant. In the second case, there is the necessity of introducing time. [Pause] In the first case, the formula of force is mv^2 , and not mv . [Pause] In the second case, the formula of force is mv^2T , motor action.

In what way is this directly linked to the idea of substance? Notice henceforth that contrary to Descartes, extension itself cannot be substance. If I say mv , that might work, I can deal with extension as a substance; mv^2 , something has to be added to substance, and in the text *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz will say clearly: something is required that is a kind of Aristotelian form, that is, that would be an active force. [Pause] And we will say: work is active force in the instant [Pause] and motor action is active force in the unit of time. [Pause] In both cases, it's force. By nature, it is always positive, and Leibniz attaches to it a lot of importance. Why? Because a square is always positive. That is essential for Leibniz. It's essential: he sees in this a kind of prodigious accord, like a kind of additional proof of God's existence, specifically the force that conserves itself in the physical world, or mv^2 , since v^2 by nature is always positive. This force mv^2 [is] distinct from the quantity of movement, and whose extension itself cannot take account of an active force. This is what engenders movement in extension. Descartes, according to Leibniz, is incapable of taking account of the genesis of movement in extension.

Hence, Leibniz's great formula that you will find in *On Nature Itself*, a little text at the end of Leibniz's life: the mechanism pretends to explain everything by movement, but it is absolutely incapable of taking account of movement itself. This will be his perpetual objection against Descartes and against the idea of an extended substance. And this force mv^2 he will call derivative force. [Pause] Derivative force will be active force, you see, that engenders movement and to which a derivative passive force responds. The derivative passive force that we've just seen is the limitation of receptivity, the limitation of receptivity according to the law of motor action. And it's in this sense that he can say that physical bodies symbolize with monads or metaphysical substance, with spiritual substance since: just as spiritual substance presented to us active primitive force, [He corrects himself] passive primitive force or limitation, so too bodies will present to us active derivative force and passive force of limitation defined by the delimitation of a receptivity of the body, of the receptivity of the body to movements that it receives.¹⁹

Good. That [discussion] created some problems for me, but at the same time, it was indispensable. So then, what I would like to say is here's where we are. We are exactly within

the problem; we have been brought back to our problem. Simply, I have nearly completed the physical criteria of substance. I'll have very few things to add to what I've said today. This is where I am precisely: fine, the monad has and includes a requirement of extension and antitype, and of resistance. We feel that the only thing that can realize this requirement – to realize, and the word realize matters to me greatly; we shall see why – the only thing that can realize this requirement is “having a body.” If it is fine this way, the monad has a body. But we fall back onto the question: what does it mean “having a body”? This would be the third requisite of substance. [End of the Web Deleuze transcript] There wouldn't only be something like a requisite of primitive active force, that is, spontaneous unity of change. [Pause] There wouldn't only be something like a requisite of passive limitative force, of limitation. There will still be a third requisite that would furnish us with the expression of what “having a body” means. That is where we are. [End of the recording] [2:28:32]

Notes

¹ While this session was nearly complete in the Web Deleuze transcript, requiring somewhat fewer supplements than in some of the previous augmented sessions, there are two small but intriguing gaps that were left untranscribed, for whatever reasons. What makes this session fascinating is it's one of the few examples (the only one encountered in the 1986-87 sessions) in which Deleuze loses control somewhat of the discussion, rather due to some examples from Leibniz that he proposed and that raised problems and frustration among some students. However, Deleuze does manage to bring things together by the end. The slippage in the discussion occurs in the last 20 or so paragraphs.

² As noted in the 7 April 1987 session translation, the third section of *The Fold* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) has “Having A Body” as the global title, and Deleuze addresses this question immediately in chapter 7, “Perception in the Folds,” cf. p. 85; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1988), p. 113.

³ See the 18 November 1986 session on point of view.

⁴ Deleuze cites this Leibnizian phrase à propos of Foucault, in *Pourparlers* (Minuit, 1990), p. 206; *Negotiations* (Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 151].

⁵ During the session on 5 May, Deleuze discusses Bayle's dictionary.

⁶ Deleuze earlier defined “disquiet” in the 24 February 1987 seminar, referring to the German *Unruhe*, cf. *The Fold*, p. 69; *Le Pli*, p. 94.

⁷ Deleuze reflects on “being on the lookout” in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (*Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* [Semiotext(e), 2011]), notably in “A as in Animal” and “C as in Culture”. “Being on the lookout” also has an important link to harmony and disquiet: cf. *The Fold*, pp. 130-131; *Le Pli*, p. 178.

⁸ Cf. the discussion of inherence in the 7 April 1987 session.

⁹ For a discussion of perception in this light, cf. *The Fold*, pp. 94-95; *Le Pli*, pp. 126-127.

¹⁰ The French transcript has Deleuze saying *percipit*, whereas Berkeley's formula is *esse est percipi*.

¹¹ Deleuze refers to Berkeley and the Irish in *What Is Philosophy?* (Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 109; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Minuit, 1991), p. 105.

¹² For this quote and its context, see *The Fold*, p. 95; *Le Pli*, p. 127.

¹³ See the session of 7 April for Descartes's distinctions.

¹⁴ Deleuze discusses Entelechia in the 24 February 1987 seminar; cf. *The Fold*, p. 70; *Le Pli*, p. 96.

¹⁵ Deleuze emphasizes his particular understanding of power as *puissance* (power of action) in *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*, notably in “I as in Idea” and “J as in Joy”, with specific reference to Spinoza. In *The Fold*, Deleuze's discussion of *puissance* occurs in chapter 8, “The Two Floors,” notably pp. 113-115, *Le Pli*, pp. 152-154.]

¹⁶ Deleuze discusses this relationship in the 4 April 1987 seminar.

¹⁷ Deleuze discussed the damned in great detail in the 24 February 1987 seminar.

¹⁸ Please note: the three preceding paragraphs (first case, second case, third case), no doubt quite dense, have been especially verified as to their precision in relation to what Deleuze says.

¹⁹ Deleuze discusses “derivative force” throughout *The Fold*, but most notably in chapter 8, “The Two Floors”, pp. 114-118; *Le Pli*, pp. 153-160.