Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 19, 26 May 1987: Principles and Freedom (14) -- Review of the Two Floors, and the Rapport of Harmony

Initial Transcription by Web Deleuze; Augmented Transcription and Translation by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:01:30)[1]

Part 1

So, listen up, if you hear me. As I told you the last time, we have two sessions, and I ask you to forgive me for presenting them to you so quickly. And then, and then, for a thousand reasons, I can no long continue. So, [we have] today and next week, after which our work for this year is over. The other Tuesdays, I will come solely to take care of students in the *premier cycle, deuxième cycle, troisième cycle* for the assignments that some among you need to submit to me.[2] So I will set up meetings at the usual hours, or rather, a bit later, say, around ten o'clock. So, this will be of interest only for those who have some kinds of relationship with the university program, to take care of all the details. If there are any situations that we need to deal with immediately, because I received a memo saying that this is your business to be informed, all that, but the memo says some of you need certificates in advance. So I will come solely for that. If by some bad luck I weren't able to come, then those who need to see me for signatures, etc., or administrative details, I ask you to please phone me, but without taking advantage of this. My number is in the phone book. So there we are. What remains is today and the next time, and it's quite simple.

It's a bit as if this course on Leibniz, by moving forward a little and then especially often by moving back, had developed like a research project that should have lasted two years, such that what I am doing now is much more [than] what would have been the material for another year. And since we have today and next week, I am trying to make things as clear as possible today, and I want to propose to you a series, how to say, of pathways concerning the two floors since it was our departure point. This is a philosophy of two floors, a kind of visit of the two floors, or if you prefer, a collection, almost of musings (*rêveries*) -- I would really like for you to intervene if there is a point that… [*Deleuze does not complete this sentence*] -- some musings about this organization of Leibniz's philosophy, and notably about the role played by the living (*le vivant*) or the organic. And that should take us into the respective rapports of the two floors – summarily, rapports of souls and bodies – so we will have seen in the meantime that it's not the rapports of souls and bodies. That is why I say "musings" because each time that I pronounce a sentence, you have to wait for the moment to correct it, or for you to correct it yourself. It's not my fault; it's Leibniz's style.

And so we must get to these two floors: do they have a common law? What are their rapports? And we sense this rapport already: it's what Leibniz will call the rapport of *harmony*, harmony of souls among themselves, harmony of bodies among themselves, harmony of souls with

bodies. And where we wanted to end from the very start is precisely with this point, this concept of harmony, that's become fundamental for philosophy: what is its relation with what is taking place at about the same period in music? [*Pause*]

For example, someone gave me a little book by Rameau in which I read "the expression of outward appearance (*du physique*) is in the measure and the movement." If I read most stupidly, through association of ideas, I tell myself that this perhaps refers to the music that came before. The expression of outward appearance is in the measure and in the movement: we already know that, in Leibniz, -- although on this point, I haven't been far off – we know already that in Leibniz, it's not movement that matters, but it's a reason of the movement that he will call force. I continue: "The expression of outward appearance is in the measure and in the movement. The expression of the pathetic, on the contrary …" Is it with Leibniz that the pathetic arrives? Yes indeed. Here, I am editing, but no matter, we're musing.

Ah yes, pathos arrives. Why? Because he will tell us that beyond movement, there is something else. And beyond movement, what is it? It is alteration, variation, pathos. "The expression of outward appearance is in the measure and the movement"; we can now read almost, "the expression of outward appearance of music of the past is in the measure and the movement; the expression of the pathetic, on the contrary, is in harmony and inflections." Perhaps you remember [that] this was one of our first words this year, when it was a question of defining Leibniz's philosophy, saying: let's start from inflections. "[The expression] of the pathetic, on the contrary, is in harmony and inflections, that one must weigh before deciding about what must determine one's preference (*emporter la balance*)." What does this mean? Rameau tells us: Reflect well, musicians, about which determines one's preference: either measure and movement that constitute outward appearance, the musical constitution, or the pathetic that resides in harmony and inflections.

And if one agrees with the idea that, almost at the same period, harmony in music undergoes a very important mutation, [*Pause*] which already will concern Montiverdi and will fundamentally concern Bach, can't one also think that, when Leibniz presents what he gives us as one of its fundamental concepts – pre-established harmony, and his opposing Descartes and the Cartesians with pre-established harmony and, at the same time, reproaching Descartes and the Cartesians for have settled only on movement and, in doing so, to have understood nothing about the nature of movement – can't one tell oneself: yes, we've got something here, we've got something here? We might be shocked that the confrontation between Leibniz and music has not yet sufficiently occurred. [*Pause*]

So let's try to construct these floors, this history, the two Baroque floors. You recall, we had mentioned this: what is fundamental is a line in inflections. Why is that so fundamental? I am not starting over; I assume you have it in mind somewhat. Why is this… This is a line that is not straight line, but that presents singularities, intrinsic singularities, you recall, a line that represents, let's call it abstract representation of a line that presents intrinsic singularities: this is a line in inflections.[3] We saw it, for example, in Paul Klee's work from the start. We had said: that's it, you know, the Baroque line. [*Pause*] But, concretely, what does that mean? Concretely, that means: *Pause*] what matters, and almost the unity of the world, is the event. The event is an

inflection. Inflection is the abstract figure of the event: the event is the concrete case of inflection. [*Pause*]

And what is the world? It's an aggregate, an infinite succession of inflections or events that will be named: states of the world. To which you will tell me, perhaps: it's like a curious way of defining and beginning to present a floor that you already expected – by virtue of our past – in what would be the floor of souls, and then of invoking events and inflections. This is because already everything is mixed together. Socrates sits in his prison. You see, Socrates sits in his prison, that's a reference to a famous text by Plato. Why is Socrates seated in prison awaiting death? And Plato asks: does he have knees that could fold? [*Laughter*] Ok yes, he has knees that could fold. That doesn't prevent that it's not due to him having knees that could fold that he's sitting in prison. He is sitting in prison because he is quite fine with that. What is so fine? He finds that it is quite fine not to try to escape. He awaits his condemnation. What does that mean? Understand: every act must be connected to two things at once: efficient causes, Plato will already say -- but also Leibniz, and he will say it with more force -- and final causes. Socrates is seated in prison because he finds that fine: a final cause. Good.

I mean something very simple: every event is an event of the spirit, and I mean nothing else. Or if you prefer, it goes without saying that every event concerns bodies, and no doubt I couldn't cite a single event that doesn't concern bodies, but I only say: that aspect, we leave it aside for the moment. It's understood that we cannot say everything at once, so the aspect through which the event concerns bodies, we won't get involved with that at the moment because there is another aspect of the event. If you tell me: but isn't that a duality? No, it's not a duality, one is strictly in the other – but in what manner? What relation is there between the two aspects? The event is indeed in bodies, but it is not only in bodies.

So fine, that clarifies a little bit. That answers the objection that I posed to myself: how do you say… I am going to talk to you about the spirit, and then begin with an event like being seated in his prison. And we saw how Leibniz moved forward in this discovery of the spirit. It's that the line in inflections, or the line in events, is enveloped in a spiritual unity that will be called *monad*. We go from inflection to envelopment. I won't go back over that. As result, if it is true that every inflection is a singularity, an intrinsic singularity, we have to say that a monad is a condensation of singularities, or that, if you prefer, a monad expresses the world. [*Pause*]

In what sense does it express the world? Events are its predicates. And we have seen the extent to which it could be ruinous for an understanding of Leibniz's philosophy to think that predicates were attributes, attributes of judgment, whereas predicates were events as expressed by propositions. The type of proposition in Leibniz is not "the sky is blue"; it's "Caesar crosses the Rubicon". Understand why I insist so much on that: if we don't have that, if we don't grasp that in a very lively manner, then we understand strictly nothing of what Leibniz means. And if we linked Leibniz so strongly to Whitehead, it's for this reason: these are philosophers of the event for whom, in the end, everything is event, and in that very way, everything is a predicate of subjects, of individual unities that express the world. [*Pause*]

So, this is a first step that allows me to say at once, if you recall, well yes, you understand, that allows me to say, at once, we have to say at once each individual substance, each monad, each

soul or spirit – all that, let's take these as identical – each individual substance, each soul or spirit, each monad expresses the totality of the world. [*Pause*] And we have to say at once that monads are for this world that they express – if the world had been different, the monads would have been different since they would have expressed another world. So, we must say at once that monads are for the world that they express, but that this world does not exist outside the monads that express it. So as a result, what is the world? It is the common expressed (*exprimé*) of all the monads that God has caused to come into existence. He could have caused other monads to come into existence, fine, but at that point, this would have been another world. He would have chosen another world, and we have seen this strange notion of world's choice for Leibniz.

Let us take yet another step forward in examining this [upper] floor – you see [that] we are therefore on the floor, on a very odd floor, but I have insisted at least on us having completed this point from where we began: that the world is expressed by each monad, yes, and as the world does not exist outside the monads that express it, one has to say that each monad has an infinity of folds, the world is folded into each monad. And this theme of folding already appeared on the level of the spirit. But immediately the problem returned: good, so why not a single monad? Why [are there] so many monads? Why is there an infinity of monads that express the same world? The answer that Leibniz gave us is, why isn't there a single world, a single God, a single… Why was Spinoza wrong, according to Leibniz? Leibniz's answer is that there is indeed an individual reason, a principle of individuation of monads, specifically that they all express the same infinite world, to infinity, but they only express clearly a tiny portion of the world. Each of us only expresses clearly a tiny portion of the world.

As a result, from the start, you see, this floor of souls, independently of the body – that is what matters to Leibniz, that darkness does not come from the body. It's the soul, once again, it's the soul that is dark, it's the soul that is obscure. It only has a tiny region of clarity. Its tiny region of clarity is the privileged portion that it especially expresses. It especially expresses a privileged notion: you, me, someone who lived a thousand years ago. We don't express the same region of the world, as he says so well, once again: each has one's own subdivision, about which we say – and I won't go back over this – the extent to which it could be reduced or extended, the extent to which, for example, in the damned, it would be reduced to a nothing, and on the other hand, for the man of progress, it was going to extend. But finally, all of this is the notions that cause us to visit this floor of the souls.

A woman student (*seated near Deleuze, whispering*): [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible, she tells him that there is someone with a question*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, do stop me, indeed stop me. This is like a visit; it's as if I told you, there we have an apartment with two floors. So if you ask me: ah, ok, what is that good for? We can do a bit of administration (*gestion*). Go ahead.

Another woman student: There's a little something bothering me: is it only because all monads are in contact with each other that we can deduce that the world does not exist outside of these monads?

Deleuze: No, for that would be contradictory. If I was saying monads have strictly nothing to do with each other because they are in contact, that wouldn't work because this contact [*Interruption of the BNF & YouTube recording; text from Web Deleuze*] [23:09] would form just a bit of something in common, a common world. What happens is that monad, we cannot even say…, Leibniz says in a text: we cannot say that they are far off or distant, they have neither doors nor windows. [*Return to the BNF & YouTube recording;* 23:10] They are entirely closed in on themselves, they are closed off.

Part 2

The same student: But still, you once spoke about a rapport that they all had there, even if they are without doors or windows. Because with all this rapport, this seems to me… No, because it's still something strange to say that monads are for the world that they express, but this world does not exist outside these monads.

Deleuze: That's it, that's the essential point. This is essential. I mean, in fact, the question is very good because if you lose one of the two aspects, you are done for. I mean, we must at all costs maintain the two aspects. To say, we have to say… Of course, the world does not exist outside the monads. How would it exist? It does not exist outside monads for a very simple reason which is: every predicate is in the subject. We saw this long analysis; or if you prefer, all that gives rise to an inflection is folded into the monad, so there is no world that would not be folded into this kind of envelope: the monad, you or me.

You know, I am thinking of something completely different in saying this. I am thinking of a famous text by Proust about how a world can be folded into a character, into a person. This is the case [here]: for Leibniz, the world is perpetually folded into individual unities. Why? So, we are asking, why? So, if we answer, this is because, if you understand well that the event is always an inflection, [*Pause*] well then, the inflection no longer exists except as "enveloped in". – [*Deleuze talks quietly to the woman student near him who wants to reply*] So, excuse me, I'm not going to start all over. I am just completing this so that you can then speak. -- So I can say: the world exists only in the monads that express it; but I also have to say: monads exist only *for* the world that they express. Why? Because Leibniz constantly comes back to this -- a typical example -- : God did not create Adam the sinner; he created the world in which Adam sinned. He did not create a particular monad, a particular other world, a particular other monad, because at that point, they wouldn't express the same world. He created a world; he could have created another one. When he caused this world to come into existence, he made it pass into, and by creating, the infinity of monads that express *this* world. Otherwise, he can no longer do anything. If he creates a common world, if he creates a common world in which there would be individuals, subjects, etc., [*Pause*] we would be in a situation, fine, but [what of] the other worlds that he could have created? One has to, if you wish to… [*Pause*] He has the conception of an infinity of possible worlds, which are not, as [Leibniz] says, compossible with one another. He chooses one of these worlds, the one with the most reality, the one with the greatest quantity of reality, as [Leibniz]

says, that is, the most perfect. But this world has no existence in itself independently of individual substances, since individual substances are the very reality that has no existence outside the individual substances that express it. I insist on this because if we don't understand at this level, I believe that we will understand nothing there.

I am almost getting ahead of something: what does the notion of harmony mean? When Leibniz uses the word, and I am not talking in musical terms, nor philosophical terms, I am saying, on the occasion of this question: let's consider a hypothesis, already for the next session; that will be useful for the next meeting. Harmony, you understand, there is an enormous number of texts by Leibniz on harmony. So, we are looking at what they have in common, and I believe that if one brought together all the texts, as we won't have the time to do, one already sees that harmony is a rather odd rapport; it's a rapport that concerns expression. It's a rapport of expression, and it is expression as rapport. Indeed, I am saying that would perhaps suit us for music, because in a certain manner – maybe we will see it next time – it's with the Baroque that music calls for an expressive value. [With] the expressive value of music, there you already have the introduction of the Baroque. This is perhaps a bit what Rameau called "the pathetic", but we will see.

I am saying harmony is a rapport of expression, but what is the rapport of expression? Let's clarify this; this isn't going to help us go forward very far. I am calling rapport of expression a rapport between a term called "expresser" (*exprimant*) and term named "expressed" (*exprimé*). [*Pause*] Fine, [that makes] no sense unless I define this rapport, I would say, in what time? So, if expression is a rapport between an expresser and an expressed, what does this rapport consist of? I propose a hypothesis: it's double. On one hand, the expressed does not exist outside its expresser; on the other hand, and at the same time, the expresser is in a regulated correspondence with its expressed. [*Pause*] Oh, what joy! I wouldn't have believed to achieve something so clear and abstract at the same time. I believe that's it, that's what harmony is, and is unsuitable for anything else: two things are in harmony when they are in the same situation.

I refer, for example, to a text for those who might have considered this, but it's in Latin, and to my knowledge, it hasn't been translated. This is *Quid sit idea*, "what an idea is", in the seventh volume of *Oeuvres philosophiques*, *Quid sit idea*, in which Leibniz analyzes the rapport of expression. I believe that this text, I don't want to say too much, I can't say that this [quote] is in this text, but I am saying that perhaps the text supports this conclusion that I am drawing, this relation between expresser and expressed. Both of them are necessary, if you will, at the same time: what I express does not exist outside of me; it's a strange relation. That's why I was telling you: there is torsion, there's a torsion between expresser and expressed. There is torsion outside of me. What I am expressing does not exist outside of me, and at the same time, I myself exist only in a regulated correspondence with what I express.

What is this in mathematics? If suddenly, I dare everything, but you know, it's not far, it's not exactly far from what is called a function. And I don't know if in mathematics one couldn't say – I know who could tell us, but it bothers me to disturb him – if one couldn't already say something like that in mathematics, that a function is fundamentally expressive, if there aren't both characteristics, if one function is not a rapport between two terms such that one doesn't exist independently from the other and the other doesn't exist independently from a regulated correspondence with the first. I say at once: the world that God chose does not exist outside

monads that express it. Differently, we have seen that there are no two monads who express the world in the same way – we saw this, it's the theory of point of view, and we saw what the theory of point view consisted of: that each of us has his/her subdivision, his/her tiny portion of clear expression.[4]

A student: [*Inaudible, except for what Deleuze repeats*] Where does this limit come from?

Deleuze: Where does this limit come from? We are finite. Every creature is finite. There is only one being that does not have this limit, God, who expresses adequately and distinctly not only the universe that it has chosen, but the infinity of other universes. But our finitude means that we only express a single world among all the compossible worlds, on one hand, and that we only express clearly a tiny region of this world. What is this a result of? It's a result of our finitude, that is, of the fact that we not only have an expressive force, but that we have – we saw it in a previous meeting – a primary matter, primary matter meaning: power of finitude (*puissance de finitude*).

A woman student (*near Deleuze*): If all monads are finite, through God the world must nonetheless be infinite…

Deleuze: Yeah, since there is an infinity of monads.

The student: … that still lets one assume that there is a world that might exist outside the monads.

Deleuze: Why? [*Pause*] No, we have to find another word. I believe that it's… A long time ago, related entirely to something else, we happened to, I proposed another expression: the world does not exist outside monads – we have to say that it *insists*. It does not exist. -- This is really odd. In this, I was expecting there to be no difficulty, and I am always surprised. -- I am saying: monads are the existence of the world. I mean, for me -- not for me, for Leibniz. That goes so much without saying that the world does not exist outside of monads since if one asks, "what is the existence of the world?", he says, its monads.

The student: But God is more than the totality of monads.

Deleuze: Obviously… It creates them.

The student: Well yes.

Deleuze: It chooses the world.

The student: So, for me, that leaves me to assume there's one more.

Deleuze: One more, the monads? [*The student:* Yes]

The student: Yes.

Deleuze: It's God.

The student: Yes.

Deleuze: That's all. [*Laughter*] … At this stage, right? Don't make me say… At this stage, it's all. On this visit to the apartment where we are.

The student: That is, there's a part of the world that exists… Ah, no, you said one, one, one that…

Deleuze: Yes! It's the little drawing that… It's the little drawing, so maybe I have to redo it? We recall that… [*Pause; sound of Deleuze going to the board*] I am going to make a little illuminating drawing, but I don't know if this is very clear now.[5] [*Pause*] – Ah, that one was prettier, right? -- I will do it in dots because as world, it only has virtual existence. [*Pause*] But it becomes actual, it is only actual in the monads that express it and of which each one expresses it [the world] in its entirety. What differences are there between monads? They will express it [the world] in its entirety from a point of view – here this is getting complicated, it's not going well at all – from a point of view, that is, each has its privileged zone. And here, you ask me, does that exist? Yes, that exists, but that exists *there*! As a result, one can say: the world exists only in monads, but each monad has a regulated rapport with the world, according to its own point of view. [*Pause; Deleuze returns to his seat, and speaks to the student*] No? I sense that you are not Leibnizian… [*She begins to answer, but is interrupted*]

A student (*from the back of the room*): [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

The same student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, no, impossible. There are… Unless I've misunderstood, there is an absolute irreductibility of monads each in relation to the others. You see why? It's because what he [Leibniz] does not want is the idea of a single world. In some ways… --

A student [*Someone speaks to Deleuze quietly*]: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: There's a what? There's a machine? Oh, leave it, leave it… It's fine, that means it's working… Yes, yes, I'm always surprised… -- Yes, [*Deleuze speaks to someone near him, possibly Isabelle Stengers*] save me because…

Isabelle Stengers (*possibly*): In physico-mathematics, the problem is posed practically at the end of the eighteenth century; the physicists-mathematicians constructed global functions, for example, potential energy, the field – in fact, the ancestor of field theory today -- and at the beginning [they] were constructed starting from forces which had purely local definitions. But when one speaks of the definition of potential (right after Lagrange), force no longer appears other than as a function that is a local derivative of a function that represents the integral aspect of the system at the same moment. During this whole time, there was a perfect symmetry

between the idea that forces were, basically, only local derivatives of the integral field or that the integral field was constructed by integration starting from local forces. [Deleuze: yes, yes…] The rapport of symmetry was posed by electromagnetism. [Deleuze say: yes, yes…] The field gained its autonomy but there was always a problem: it didn't reconcile Einstein's relativity that is about the gravitational field and electromagnetism … [*The comments become unclear*]

Deleuze: So, we agree, and we who are Leibnizians, we can say -- of course, it's not he who resolved the problems of contemporary science – but if we try to…, that he would resolve the problem that you state at the level of the other floor, at the level of the theory of matter, which we are going to see if we continue this visit. So, [*Deleuze speaks to the woman student near him who asked the previous question*], agreed?

The student: Yes!

Deleuze: Are you a bit of a Leibnizian?

The student: Oh, I don't know why I would be.

Deleuze: Oh, you mustn't look too much for a why, don't go looking for a why… And I'm going to confess something: me neither. [*Laughter*] But me, I know why! [*Laughter*]

So let's just continue in this room – I'm calling that a "room" in a residence -- this room of souls. You see, it is enormous since it already contains the entire world, the world expressions, the incompossible worlds, that's it, freedom, in short, everything that we have seen. -- I am saying, a final effort. -- Each of us has his/her subdivision, and it's on this that I insist: we have not yet had the body intervene. What we have had intervene is, you remember? Primary matter, that is, every individual substance or monad includes a primitive, active force and a primitive, passive force, [*Pause*] a primitive passive force named primary matter and that's united with its finitude. [*Pause*]

In other words, that I don't express the totality of the world clearly, that I only have a tiny bit of clear expression, what is that? It's nothing other than a way of saying that there are several monads, that I am not alone in the world. The darkness (*le sombre*) in me is part of others. [*Pause*] Darkness – Yes you can open it [*the door*] now. It's too warm… You can, go open up from the back – [Shadow] is part of others; it's the plurality of monads that results in only God not being in shadows. But us, we have a dark part, a blackened part, we have a dark part that is the depth of our soul. And that does not mean Evil. This will be the possibility of Evil, but it does not mean Evil. It means that all truth must be ripped from this darkness. And the starting point of all ripping of the truth is the tiny clear region that each of us expresses. And we saw this: from that point onward, souls or spirits, but reasonable souls and spirits in fact have a manner of gaining access to the truth.

And the last time we especially saw this thanks to the analysis of perception. The interior perceptions of the monad, since in expressing the world, the monads perceive events; we saw that these perceptions consisted of drawing from darkness a clarity or tiny unnoticed perceptions – as [Leibniz] says, a remarkable perception. It's still the theory of singular points, the theory of remarkable points. And we saw how in each monad this constitution of a remarkable perception occurred. And starting from the constitution of remarkable perception, we gain access to other truths that we analyzed, I remind you, and that were analyses of series, of series converging

toward requisites that go beyond things, perceptible things toward requisites and infinite series that went farther, all the way to the idea of God. I won't go back over that, but all of it increases more and more the size of the apartment.

And well, we'll finish with this floor and immediately ask: what, what is happening? There's only this, in my opinion, in the first apartment, that's all there is. That's all there is. We have done it all, accounting for the enormous problems posed here: the problem of freedom, the problem, etc. And suddenly what is it that's going to define the other floor? Well, it's: "I have a body!" I must add, in my first floor, that there already is a great variety: it's because all monads do not have equal value (*ne se valent pas*). Not only did we see that monads had larger or smaller clear zones of expression, but aren't there already some that would be happy with a zone of remarkable or distinctive (*remarquée*) perception and would not achieve divine truths, would not reach infinite series? We have to leave this. What would these monads be? In other words, is every monad a reasonable soul or spirit? [*Pause*] At the floor we are on, one can only encounter reasonable souls or spirits.

So I say: go on, jump to the other floor, and what makes us jump there? Is it a kind of stairs? What is it? It's the announcement: I have a body. The announcement I have a body! [*Pause*] Understand how this opens me up… I was telling you, what is it that's going to open? What requires that I have a body? It is the event. The event is not happy with the first floor. So, I have to put it, if I attempt an outline, I have to put it [the event] between the two. And in the end perhaps, all will be between the two since what was it we saw as apartment on the first floor? It's the event as spiritual determination. And what is the event as spiritual determination? It's the event or the inflection insofar as it is actualized, insofar as it's actualized in an individual subject. [*Pause*]

You recall: the world is a virtuality, and it's here that the Leibnizian couple virtual-actual plays out. The world is a virtuality that is actualized in each monad that expresses it. If you prefer: the monad is the actual existence of the world, and the world exists actually only in the monads, otherwise it's pure virtuality. And what else does that event call for? It's quite beautiful! It seems to me very beautiful: so, finally, you say, ok, Socrates is seated in his prison because he finds it good. But then we must add other things. He must also have knees that fold. In other words, I see nothing more beautiful than to tell you such a simple thing: the event also must inscribe itself in the body. The event must also inscribe itself in the body. In other words, the event is not only a virtuality that awaits you and spies on you and that is actualized in your soul. The event is a possibility that is realized in your body, and that is going to be, that's going to be the lower floor. [*Pause*]

But "I have a body" – why? First reason: because, well it's precisely because I can only express a clear, reduced portion, precisely because I can only express a tiny portion. God has no body. [*Pause*] The body is exactly my subdivision. [*Pause*] And recall what we expressed forcefully: above all, do not create the change that would render Leibniz incomprehensible. It's not because I have a body that I have a reduced portion of expression. It's because I have a reduced portion of expression that henceforth I have a body. In fact, what I express, what my monad expresses clearly, it is what will be stated as concerning my body, and henceforth concerning the rapport of other bodies with mine. In other words, an event cannot be realized in a body that would not be

mine; it can only be realized in an interaction of bodies on my own. [*Pause*] That I have a body is a result [*Pause*] of my finitude, that is, of the passive power of action (*puissance*) or, if you prefer, due to my having only a very, very limited zone of clear expression.

A student: Is the realized event the deployment of time? Where is time?

Deleuze: The realized event is not the deployment of time; your question is quite correct since we haven't spoken about time and space at all. Time and space will follow this entire aggregate. There is a space and a time on the upper floor, simply this time will be uniquely the order of possible co-existents. For example, your monad, your spirit as spirit either coexists or does not exist, for example, with Caesar's. You are not of the same era. That is already completely understood. So time as order of possible successions, and space as order of possible coexistences belong to the first [upper] floor. This space, on the other hand, has nothing to do -- I am answering your question the best that I can -- this space and this time still have nothing to do with extension (*étendue*) and duration. Extension and duration belong to the other one.

The student: It's infinite.

Deleuze: What rapport would there… It's infinite? It's infinite time? No, not in the first sense. It's not an infinite time since it is second in relation to what fulfills it. It is only infinite as a consequence; there would not be an empty time and space that would be fulfilled by the action of God. What I call space and time is the order of coexistences and of successions between monads, so that to say they could change its location, its places in space, or moments in time, without themselves changing, would make no sense.

The same student: It would be infinitely virtual?

Deleuze: It's infinitely virtual? No, [*Deleuze laughs*] well, yes and no, yes and no. It is virtual if you identify it in the time of the world, of the expressed. It is actual if you take it as the order of succession of monads, of monads that are actual. The complicated problem will be mathematical, because you already sense that on the first [upper] floor, there is a logic of time defined as the order of successions, for example, or a logic of space, and Leibniz will insist a lot on the distinction of words. On this floor, he only uses the terms *spatium*¸ space, and *tempus*, time. When you see the word *extensio* or *extensum*, they never refer to that; on the contrary, they refer to something that already concerns the body. So the problem is what rapports are there between the *spatio* and the *extensio*, for example. This will be, I believe, one of the most audacious mathematical theories of Leibniz. But finally, there you are, this is all I can say quickly.

So, I am saying, you see: each of us has a body; each of us has a body, and at the same time, one has a body on which other bodies interact. [*Pause*] See *Monadology* for example. – [*Deleuze looks for his text, unsuccessfully*] I don't know… No matter, I've quoted them elsewhere, and so this is enough. *Monadology*, it's a tiny little text. [*Laughter*] [*Pause*]

And there is already a problem, you see, since you have two systems; two floors are subordinated to two completely different modes of construction. The first [upper] floor has for its mode of construction [*Pause*] a virtual world [*Pause*] that only exists actually in each monad; in other words, each monad expresses the totality of the world and includes the totality of the world. At

the level of bodies where you are, this is no longer that at all. Bodies are outside one another and interact one upon the other. Monads, on the contrary, are such that the world is interior to each of them, and they are without windows or doors, that is, they do not interact. Each expresses the world for itself, without doors or windows, whereas here, there is an interaction, an interaction of bodies. [*Pause*]

And I would say: what I express clearly in the world, these are bodies that affect mine; these are the bodies that directly affect my own, and it is through this process of affection, then, of the interaction of bodies, that something on that floor is going to respond to the interior perceptions of monads. We saw it the last time, when I tried to analyze the example of the drop of water and the wave, [*Pause*] and we saw that between the liquid body and my body, at the limit, a kind differential rapport, dx/dy, was constituted; on the other floor, a distinguished perception was constituted in the monad: I heard the sound of the water. You already see that there is a correspondence between the two floors, but each of them has its law – they do not obey the same law. There is a law that is the interaction of bodies upon each other, and another law that is: monads, [*Pause*] each of which expresses the entire universe, and that do not communicate with one another.

So, that creates a problem for us. I mean, how to take account of such a difference between the two floors? But what is there between the two floors? This is the same as asking: what is my body made of? If we asked that, that would almost be enough for us. So, make an effort: what is my body made of? What is the body made of? It's not easy to understand, in Leibniz, what the body is made of, and for me, this seems to be one of the greatest mysteries in all the philosophies of the seventeenth century. I would say that a body is made – not for everyone, in fact, but for Leibniz and for Spinoza; there's that in common between Leibniz and Spinoza perhaps. -- In Leibniz and Spinoza, a body is made of an infinity of infinitely tiny actual parts. Any body is constituted by an infinity of infinitely tiny actual parts. One cannot reach a final part. It's what we call the actual infinite (*l'infini actuel*). [*Pause*] You have to imagine it, that what's so great, you have to imagine it, and it's quite properly unimaginable. It's mathematisable, but it's unimaginable.

Follow me: that is opposed to two things. It's opposed, on the one hand, to atoms. With atoms, there is always, however far off that this might be, there is always a final part, an irreducible final part. There, on the contrary, it's an infinity of actual parts such that there is no final part, and any part still includes an infinity of actual parts. And on the other hand, it's not a divisible kind to infinity, it's not infinitely divisible since [there's] the infinity of actual parts such that no part can be said to be the smallest; [they] are precisely given actually, exist actually, and do not depend on the process of division that the aggregate is forced to undergo. [*Pause*]

It's what these authors will say or try to explain by saying: these are non-numerable multiplicities, that is, [*Pause*] that are not of the nature of the number. [*Pause*] They are, properly speaking, innumerable, which does not keep us from saying that a body is the double of another. A body can very well be the double of another, but it includes, no less than the other, an infinity of infinitely tiny actual parts. Is such a conception… It's what Leibniz will affirm ten times by saying: the only infinite is actual – and quite often, I believe I've told you this too quickly, but I repeat it -- quite often someone criticized other Leibniz texts where Leibniz says that

infinitesimal calculus, or even the calculus of infinite series, is only a mathematical fiction. But it seems quite evident to me that there is no contradiction, and that means that even infinitesimal calculus does not take account of this state of the actual infinite.

So, assume [there are] collections of infinite parts, these are parts of infinite parts, without your being able to reach the final one, and that nonetheless are actually given, contrary to what happens in a divisibility to infinity. Every body is of this type. [*Pause*] When I say, I have a body, I mean [that] I consist of an infinity of infinitely tiny parts, actually, actually. [*Pause*]

A student: Is it because they are actual that one avoids Zeno's paradox, that is… ? [*Deleuze's voice covers the student's complete question*]

Deleuze: That's it, absolutely. That's also why there is in this a particular conception of movement that depends on force.

The student: Movement in the process of occurring.

Deleuze: That's it.

The woman student (*near Deleuze*): So the soul is finite, but not the body?

Deleuze: No. The question is not about knowing whether the soul is finite but not the body. The question is that everything is at once, except God, finite and infinite. That is, for God, its account is covered, it is infinite. Whew, that's done, it's done (*fini*), if I dare say that, no more discussion. But everything that is finite is infinite from a certain aspect, and some infinities, I was telling you, that's it. [*Interruption in the BNF recording; text from WebDeleuze*] [1:09:46] It seems to me that the secret of seventeenth century thought is the distinction of orders of infinity. And, if God is infinite and if it is the primary infinity, it's because it is stated as: infinite through the self (*infini par soi*). It is infinite through the self. But immediately, there is a second infinity that is the infinite through its cause. [*Return to the recording*] [1:09:48]

Part 3

Infinity through its cause is that of creatures. So, monads are infinite through their cause. Why are they infinite? No, rather, they are finite; they are not infinite because these are creatures, created by God. But they are infinite, simply infinite through their cause, and why? Because God creates them in such a way that they express the totality of an infinite world. And their formula is that, henceforth, they will have an infinity of predicates, and this infinity through its cause has for expression, we saw this, 1 over infinity (*1 / infini*); whereas God through its cause would have for expression infinity over 1 (*infini / 1*), that is, infinity as individuality, infinity as personal being. So, on the first [upper] floor of monads, they are finite and they are infinite.

Now, when we reach bodies and aggregates of actually infinite parts to infinity, it's the third sense of infinity, specifically: an infinity that is caught in limits, a portion of matter, and whatever might be the limits and the narrowness of limits considered, that is properly speaking non-enumerable (*indénombrable*). So it's something finite (*du fini*) since it is caught between

limits; it is infinite since it includes an infinity of actual parts. It's the third infinity. Are there any others? Alas, there are still others, but we will stick with these because it's the three great, they are the three great modes of infinity. Once again, what I am saying is not valid for everyone, but only for Leibniz and Spinoza.

So I say: that's what it is, first, having a body. Fine, and what does that mean? You remember, so let us add: Why did I have a body? I had a body because I only saw, I only had a subdivision, etc., I only had a tiny clear subdivision. But why did I only have a tiny clear subdivision? Because I was a creature, because I was finite, in other words, because I have a primary matter, and a primary matter, as we saw, is not having a body; it's the requirement for having a body. And so, the requirement for having a body, so fine, there it's satisfied. [*Pause*] This is why Leibniz will say… These infinite aggregates of actually infinite tiny parts, you must not be surprised that he calls them secondary matter. I've barely said that, and I must tell you, expect me to have to correct this; it's not enough. But it's an aspect of secondary matter. Secondary matter will be the form through which matter realizes the requirement of primary matter, [*Pause; a student seems to pose a question*] … of finitude. It returns in our entire story: we are finite, so we can only express a finite part, so we have a body.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, there is an immanence of the monad in primary matter, absolute, completely. [*Deleuze speaks to the students nearby him*] – Hey, that's getting complicated, right? But at the same time, this should be concluded because… So you do see the problem that we are now facing? It's fine, but… -- What is my body? How is it my body? Something must constitute my body. [*Pause*] I have a finite aggregate of infinitely tiny material parts, but how does all that concern me? [*Pause*]

Secondary matter also has two aspects, and we have only given one aspect of secondary matter. It's that this infinite aggregate of infinitely tiny matter includes at the same time an infinity of tiny souls …

A student: The souls. [*Repeated for another student*]

Deleuze: … tiny souls, as if we were going back up to the first [upper] floor. The tiny souls, you will see, the tiny souls, but what? -- I hesitate between two things: if I go very slowly, we will get lost; if I go real fast, we will get even more lost. -- Secondary matter should include… I really don't know… Wait, yes! An infinite aggregate of actually infinite tiny parts, but they only belong to me under the hypothesis of an infinity of tiny souls.

But he's Cartesian nonetheless; there is a real distinction between soul and body. Yes! But you remember that it seemed to me to be one of Leibniz's most astonishing bold strokes: the real distinction does not imply separability. My body is constituted by an infinity of tiny souls animating an infinity of infinitely tiny organic parts – the machine going all the way to infinity. Are both really distinct? Yes, but that does not keep them from being inseparable, hence the astonishing theory of the living being (*du vivant*). That's it, the status of the living being. [*Pause*]

Fortunately – good, I prefer going quickly, but still we get the impression of losing it all. Then what? Where are we? Do we even recall where we are in this? Yes we do! -- Glittering formula, the light arrives: it will suffice to say that you, each of you, is a dominant monad, and insofar as you are a dominant monad, you have a body. Dominant monad means: you are a reasonable soul, [*Pause*] and as such, you have a body, with a brain – there is no soul without a brain – you have a body with a brain. Your body is made of what? Of an infinity of actually infinite tiny parts, [*Pause*] but inseparable from an infinity of dominated monads [*Pause*] that are themselves not reasonable but animal or sensitive. [*Pause*] Hence this extraordinary vitalism that can state at the same time: so there is no living matter, no, all matter is matter, that's all. Simply put, there will be inseparability of the secondary matter and of the tiny souls, that is, of the dominated monads. [*Pause*] Only, [what] if that were everything? That's not going to work so easily! For me, in my view, this is one of the greatest organicisms ever created in philosophy. As Whitehead liked to call his philosophy organicist, organicism, this is yet another reason to compare them.

You already see where that leads us if I wanted to save some time. It's no longer a question of saving time! If I wanted to save time, what is the situation of animals? It's complicated for animals because although we say that animals do not have a reasonable soul – that they don't attain necessary truths, they don't attain infinite series, they don't do mathematics, they don't know God, etc. – they nonetheless have a tiny clear portion. [*Pause*] And while they don't do reasoning, they register consecutive actions (*consécutions*), as [Leibniz] says, in their monads. And we saw that psychology of the animal was truly something fundamental for Leibniz. Fine.

"I am dying!" You recall what happens when I die. We have seen it because that good news elated us. [*Laughter*] We saw it right at the beginning: it's fabulous, when I die! My reasonable soul is reduced to a sensitive or animal soul, but it remains, it remains. [*Pause*] It's the famous folds, pleats, and unfolds, and it will be re-unfolded when God calls it to the last judgment. You recall this very strange idea that it had [*Deleuze bursts out laughing*] that the souls called to being reasonable were not so from the very start of the world – in fact, this would be idiotic. Me, my reasonable soul, you think, and yours as well, it was indeed necessary that we wait to be born into the order of time, into the order of succession, on the first [upper] floor. God had to call us, that is: unfold our own parts so that we might express the world. But before we existed, we existed as what? As an animal or sensitive soul, as a worm soul. Simply, what was it that distinguished us from a worm? One couldn't know the answer in that era. As [Leibniz] says: it's as if God had issued, in certain sensitive souls, an official document, a document that they were going to achieve reason, etc.[6] In the end, that's the Leibniz that affects us the most, not the one that… So fine, I'll stop on that note.

When we die, we again become a sensitive soul belonging to secondary matter. -- We have only a tiny effort to make – [*Interruption of the WebDeleuze text*] Let's take the law of the body: secondary matter and all the tiny, dominated monads, [*Return to WebDeleuze text*] what he [Leibniz] most often calls the substantial forms. All substantial forms never cease coming and going. Why? By virtue of the first floor. The law of the first floor, if you recall, [is] the universal interaction of bodies. Our body never ceases changing parts, and not only does it not cease changing organs, but through this, it never ceases changing souls, that is, substantial forms, since substantial forms or tiny souls are strictly inseparable from organs. [*Pause*] What does something so simple mean: you have a soul of your heart, you have your very own soul, you have your soul,

but you have a soul of your heart, you have a soul of your arm, you have a soul of it all? You have millions and millions of souls, but they never cease changing at the same time as the parts of your organism – all that never ceases changing. Leibniz found a metaphor more beautiful than Heraclitus's river to say everything changes. He says: it's like Theseus's boat, our body is like Theseus's boat that the Greeks always repaired, always a hole, always a hole. That comes down to saying that in every body, atoms never cease changing.

A student: From this angle, [Xavier] Bichat spoke of the infinities of partial deaths.

Deleuze: Completely, partial deaths, because… It's not difficult, to calculate a partial death in Leibniz, and at the same time, how is it that there is no total death? You take an organism, you take your organism at moment *a*, and here is what you are doing: all the parts of this organism and all the souls of this organism do not depart at the same time. So you have a first time marker, at moment *b*; let's say that region *a* prime subsisted and that region *a* second has disappeared, and more and more closely. And you wonder: in relation to moment *a* that you left, at what moment are all the parts renewed? But at that moment, in relation to the preceding moment, nothing prevents a certain number of parts, or rather of non-numerable parts, from still remaining. We can call "period of an organism" a time distance, the time difference in order to renew completely the parts and souls of the organism, once it is said that all this never occurs at once, that it never happens at once, and that, moreover, there is never a moment in which everything is renewed. If I could redo my drawing… I start off from moment *a*, to moment *b*, I can say -- I am saying anything at all: ten molecules have gone, to moment *c*, twenty molecules have gone. But ten new ones have arrived, and these remain. So that is one period. -- I see your fading and beaten gaze; well, that's understandable. –Your [organism] period never coincides with a disappearance or a total birth. It is always straddling one part that remains and another part that is departing.

But how do we conjugate, simultaneously, it's my body and it never ceases leaving? And in the end, Leibniz has a lot of difficulty, and if I try to summarize, I again stumble onto something that we began to discuss the last time. Yes, we must maintain the following two things: what is going to define a body, with its escapes and returns, with its new provisions (*fournitures*) and its new departures: what is going to define a body as my own, it's -- excuse the expression – it's a seam (*couture*), a kind of seam or knot, a link, that Leibniz calls the vinculum. [*Pause*] What corresponds to my dominant monad is a vinculum that links the dominated monads with the organs.[7] [*Pause*]

How did he conceive of this vinculum? This vinculum is called substantial, that is, depending directly on the substance. [*Pause*] It belongs to me, dominant monad; it's in the Letters to Des Bosses, it's to me that it belongs -- the texts are very, very difficult; I am only giving you an outline, although they have been very well interpreted, on one hand, by [Yvon] Belaval in his *Introduction to Leibniz's Thought*, and on the other hand, by a philosopher named Christiane Frémont who published the translated letters, the Letters to Des Bosses,[8] that still does not keep this text from being quite difficult. -- I am saying, it seems to me that the vinculum belongs to me as dominant monad. In this regard, all the organs and dominated monads that compose my organism, and that come and go, that is, arrive and leave, do not depend on the vinculum. They belong to me insofar as they enter in, but they leave and they take another vinculum, or else they

do not take any vinculum at all. [*Pause*] And that's what will produce the universal interaction of bodies. [*Pause*]

So fine, let's try to see this. -- I am speaking very quickly. All this is already quite difficult. -- I am trying to create an organizational structure; that's all very fine, you might say: try to create a structure of the great categories that you were just talking about.[9] I would reply:

First: events, [*Pause*] intrinsic singularities, inflections.

Second: monads, [*Pause*] active primitive forces [*Pause*] that express the world or fold events. [*Pause*] It's the actuality of the world. [*Pause*]

Third: the monads not only have an active primitive force, but a passive primitive force; it is their finitude, or their primary matter, as a function of which they only express [*Pause*] a finite portion of the world. They only express clearly a finite portion of the world.

Fourth: if I only express a finite portion of the world, I have a body, which is the same as saying: if I have a primary matter, it expresses a requirement (*exigence*): requirement of having a body.

Fifth, the body is the third form of the infinite, [*Pause*] the actually infinite aggregate of infinitely tiny and non-enumerable parts. [*Pause*] In this regard, it is secondary matter [*Pause*] and remains inseparable from an infinity of derived monads, of sub-monads of derived monads or substantial forms that are dominated souls in rapport with my dominant soul.

Fifth or sixth [*Several students say,* Sixth] – Oh, it's clear, it's quite ok, you cannot do any more… -- Sixth, fifth, two aspects. [*Pause*] The secondary matter belongs to me, belongs to my monad inasmuch as it enters under the vinculum, the chain, the substantial chain that belongs to me or that characterizes me. In this, I draw greatly from the text [the Letters to] Des Bosses: the vinculum belongs to me and is fixed, the *vinculum* is connected to the dominant monad. -- [*Deleuze perhaps reacts to someone who wishes to interrupt him*] I am continuing what I am saying because otherwise, I'll no longer understand anything. – On the other hand, the same ones, that is, the organic parts and the dominated monads, never cease coming and going, like Theseus's boat, according to whether they change to another vinculum … [*The woman student near Deleuze says something to him*] Yes, they pass to another monad, [*Pause*] or free themselves from any vinculum. [*Pause*]

Seventh : in any event, one gets situated here [*Laughter*] since, [*Pause*] at death, -- there is a problem in this, you know, since he didn't want, he doesn't want, [Leibniz] already created such a beautiful theory of damnation, so we can't expect everything from him; he didn't want to arrange one with the other, the problem of death and the problem of the organism, I believe. – For when we die, once again, we lose our reasonable soul that again becomes a sensitive soul, so it loses its vinculum. Does it lose its vinculum? If it loses its vinculum, everything is lost: how will one recognize the body that belongs to us? You get it? Oh, the problem is terrible [*Deleuze laughs*].

Fortunately there is this strange text: before we are called to become reasonable, and once dead, when we cease being reasonable, there is this strange thing: the official act (*l'appel scellé*). My soul has again become animal, but it contains the official act, and in my opinion, this is the only way for God to recognize his own, otherwise he could not recognize them. Unless one has to resort to a mystery, and as at the end, [Leibniz] says in the correspondence with Des Bosses, it's the mystery of transubstantiation: "this is my body, this is my blood." It's an example in which

monads, dominated monads – for it isn't Christ's monad -- the dominated monads are monads of the body and blood of Christ, and then the monads of bread and wine that enter into a strange relation.

Final point – It doesn't matter. We've done all we could. – Final point – But I would say, to satisfy everyone, on this point, we haven't yet completely finished, right? Have a bit more courage in this.

Final point, I am saying: well, you understand… what should you understand? -- Yes, our program from the start of the year is almost done, specifically: the soul is full of folds that it partially unfolds. So this was the first Baroque proposition: the folds in the soul. It unfolds them partially, something we saw it through the operations for seeking the truth, etc. Second proposition: matter is full of pleats, [*Pause*] and it's the other floor. Matter is full of pleats that shelter, liberate and cause to circulate infinities of actual parts and infinities of dominated monads inseparable from actual parts. [*Pause*]

Upstairs, in the events, there were singularities. Down below, if we had the time, we would see that in Leibniz's physics, a physics of *extrema, minima* and *maxima,* is going to develop, and in fact, in certain conditions, which are those of the physical world, singular points – but these are things that we would have had to consider [with] physics – singular points become *minima* and *maxima*, *extrema*. What is there between the two? There is this whole story of organisms; there is the whole story of vitalism that causes us to pass perpetually from one floor to the other. [*Pause*] What can we conclude about this? … Yes?

A student: That makes me think of Bergson because that helps us understand the question of difference between qualitative and quantitative multiplicities. One could say that the qualitative multiplicity is at the intersection of two infinite lines. These infinites would be the infinite of self and the [*inaudible*] infinite. What I mean… I can give an example: what most appeals to me is to arrive at considering space, or what he calls extension, under the category of something purely qualitative. Could we say that a qualified space -- that there is something that occurs -- is at the intersection of two infinites, an infinity which is that of the body in movement, at that point, it's the infinities of infinitely tiny actual parts, and the other infinite line, that would be light (*lumière*) which is a non-enumerable?

Deleuze: Yeah. I am going to tell you because I prefer the way in which you ended [the question] to the way that you began, because you are as sensitive as I am to the danger of creating comparisons. As concerns the problem of multiplicities, which is, in fact, a fundamental problem, we can say this generally: in my view, Bergson comes at a crucial moment in the theory of multiplicities and is going to attempt a powerful move in order to cause it [the theory] to emerge from the stage of mathematics. There are two authors who simultaneously undertake this move to cause multiplicity to emerge from the simple stage of the theory of mathematics in order to introduce it into philosophy: it's Husserl and it's Bergson. That's a first point. What interests Bergson is a particular point: the rapport between discrete multiplicities and continuous multiplicities. Fine. Is he interested? Yes, he's interested in the problem of the one and the multiple. Yes, since yet again, there is no one and multiple, there are only multiplicities, and it's through this that he is profoundly modern. There is no longer one and multiple; the question of the one and the multiple is no longer posed in philosophy, etc.

I would say for Leibniz, to avoid confusion, there is something missing in Bergson and that exists in Leibniz, and something missing in Leibniz and that exists in Bergson – that's why

philosophy is so beautiful. What is missing in Leibniz is the suppression of the problem of the one and the multiple. He will continue to think – he's a man of the seventeenth century – he continues to think in terms of a one and a multiple. Moreover, with his conception of harmony, you have multiples-to-multiples rapports, but the multiples-to-multiples rapports are fundamentally calibrated to multiples-one rapports, in Leibniz. On the other hand, you have in Leibniz an attempt and an exploration of types of multiplicities in all the senses that here go beyond, that do not at all correspond to the Bergsonian situation. So if I attempted the three, specifically the three simplest ones, it already is not some multiples, the three infinities; it's only two of them: the multiplicity of monads and the multiplicity of bodies.

So this is marvelous because you are giving me our ending. All I need to say is, but yes, just consider: what does Leibniz call harmony?[10] What does he call harmony? What he calls harmony is two things: all monads express the same world, but [*Pause*] this world only exists in the monads; they have no doors or windows, they have no communication, they exert no action on each other. Each monad has only internal actions, each monad acts on itself, in relation to its predicates; no monad acts on another one. They are closed off, and they simple express the same world. One might say that between the monads, there is no direct action, but there is a harmony. Still they must have expressed the same world once we admit that this world does not exist outside them. Harmony will be precisely this. There would be no harmony if they expressed a same world that existed outside them.

If a world is supposed to exist between all of us and we were in harmony, there would be no problem – what I see face on, you see from behind, period, point made. But that's not how it is. The world does not exist outside monads; henceforth, in order for this to be the same world, monads have to be in harmony with one another. As [Leibniz] says: it's the proof of God's existence. If there were no God, you expressing the same world would be excluded, or else the common world would really have to exist. But if it is true that the world is uniquely the virtuality that only gains actuality in each monad that expresses it, the world is nothing other than the pre-established harmony of monads among themselves. It's as if God had synched all the clocks with each other – understand the abominable misunderstanding it would be to believe that this means: everyone is on the same time; on the contrary, that means that when it's 1:05 for me, there is someone who is at 1:10, and that between the two portions of expression, there is linkage. That's the pre-established harmony of substances between them or monads. [*Pause*]

But second point -- you understand this; it's essential. I don't know what more to say for this to be concrete -- [*Pause*] I am leaving, you are staying. [*Pause*] If there's a hole, it's like a mirage, and if there is nothing in this hole, this universe hole (*trou d'univers*), there is no pre-established harmony. There must be a connection between what ends in a monad and what begins in another. So the connection is not direct since monads do not act upon each other. Thus, there is pre-established harmony of monads between themselves. All of them unfold in the same world although they do not communicate with each other, although none communicates with another.

But then, -- a final effort… final effort… This is some Leibniz in a rush. A final effort, that makes me think of the galloping visit through the Louvre in Godard [*in* Bande à part]. Final effort and here we go. – You remember? But, what is my body if not the shadow that you cast over me? The pre-established harmony, suddenly, is the harmony of souls and body, and in what way? [It's] not only insofar as it would be insufficient, not only insofar as they obey different laws, [*Pause*] and, above all, insofar as they have different natures. For, and it's one of the most fundamental points in Leibniz, [there is] the critique he makes of certain disciples of Descartes,

notably Malebranche and other Cartesians. [*Pause*]-- So there, really, fast, fast, fast. – I'm saying: there is nonetheless something odd in our reflection, that often we are told that philosophy has considered causes and that science imposed the sole idea that was truly scientific and which was [the idea] of laws.

And it's not true, these are things one must not believe. The notion of law came into being in the seventeenth century, and in the seventeenth century, it did so in the most theological systems in the world. In Auguste Comte, there is something that does not work well when he says that the cause is metaphysical – he meant something else, but it doesn't matter. Taken literally, Comte is truly catastrophic: one must not say cause is metaphysics and that science arrives with the idea of law, because those who first discovered and constituted a veritable concept of laws were the Cartesians. Why? Because God alone being the cause, Nature is ruled by laws. They are the ones that hoisted up a concept of laws defined essentially by generality and -- I am going fast, but still this is inadequate – but, principally by generality, and thus distinguishing miracle and law, miracle referring to particular desires (*volontés*) of God, and generality referring to general desires of God. God operates through general will, which will be Malebranche's entire theory, called occasionalism. No matter. [*Pause*]

And here is Leibniz's objection. I don't mean that he's right, because it's a huge discussion between Malebranche and Leibniz, and Leibniz's objection seems splendid to me. He says: fine, whatever you want, God operates through general laws, with one condition: it's that bodies, or souls, [*Break in the WebDeleuze recording*] that is, the terms that connect to general laws, must be capable of doing so. Malebranche's project, if you will, is the so-called occasionalist project. Malebranche's project: one must have an occasion, set by God: 212 degrees, right? It's an occasion like another. – [*Deleuze pauses a moment, saying:* Oh, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la] – It's the occasion, general law, liquid's passage to steam, transformation of liquid into steam, which gives us the law, water boils at 212 degrees, you see? It's the analysis between an occasion and a general relation. Or else, in the whole theory of laws of movement, you have shock and the occasion. Shock is an occasion, the shock of two bodies is an occasion, and the general law is the transformation of movement, the transformation of movement between the body that shocks and the shocked body, although the shock itself is the immobile body. It's precisely through this that there's an occasion. So this is the passage from one moment to the other. You understand? This will be, for example, the example that, applied to the soul and to the body, will be called occasionalist.

I find that Leibniz has an astonishing reply… [*Brief interruption of the BNF recording, then return*] [1:56:11] But what interiority enters into a body, [*Pause*] and at the extreme, what interiority into a soul? [*Return to the Web Deleuze text*] Leibniz was able to show us that there was an interiority in the body, and that the interiority in the body was force. And Malebranche is embarrassed since it was force in the sense of motor force (*force motrice*), or work, something that Malebranche and Descartes, that Malebranche coming after Descartes knew nothing about. So [Malebranche] could conceive of a definition of the body as a function of exteriority.

But Leibniz arrives and says: but by virtue of modern science – it's Leibniz's whole theme – you know, in the end he tells them: I really don't want to toss Aristotle in your faces, I don't really want to resuscitate Aristotle, whereas you believe that you are done with Aristotle, but in the name of modern science, [Leibniz] says, I must repeat to you: do not believe that Nature has lost all interiority. For a body to observe a law, there must still exist an interior Nature that makes this observation possible and necessary.

What does that mean? Water boils at 212 degrees, fine, you haven't said anything; you will have satisfied yourself with an extrinsic discourse, as he says, if you do not find in the interior nature of water, [*Pause*] why these 212 degrees? [*Pause*] That is, why does what you call "occasion" precisely make possible this transformation? You will tell me why, but science stopped doing so a long time ago. Not at all. There is a whole series of phases of transformative states, and all this leads you towards a qualitative physics that was present in Aristotle, that Descartes completely missed, and that Leibniz goes on to reconstitute as a new physics – it's not at all a "return to Aristotle" – but is like reprising Aristotle based on new data.

So, I mean, pre-established harmony, on one hand, will be the harmony of monads among themselves, the harmony of souls between themselves, on one hand, and on the other hand, the harmony of souls with bodies, that is, in the way bodies themselves include an interiority that might place them in harmony with the interiority of souls. That is, it is not enough that bodies be governed by a regime of interaction; a dynamic interiority is also necessary, a force of bodies that might be in harmonic rapport with souls as primitive forces, the forces of bodies in harmonic rapport and that, however, are forces of bodies. Work, mobilized action, is what he will call derivative forces, in distinction from forces of souls that are primitive forces.

So next time, that's what I would like to do, [consider] this precise point of harmony: how Leibniz, to have us understand this, precisely needed a concept of harmony, and the question: does this concept of harmony owe something, henceforth, to music? But, don't forget at least this theme of harmony; it must guide you. The hypothesis I am proposing to you is that in every sense of harmony as we have just seen it, in all the senses in Leibniz, harmony presents itself under this double aspect: first, the expressed does not exist outside the expresser, and you will see that this works at each stage. Second, the expresser exists only through a regulated correspondence with the expressed. At that point begins a kind of Baroque music that accompanies Baroque philosophy.

I thank you, and until next week. [*End of the recording*] [2:01:41]

Notes

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[1] While one more session, on 2 June, will follow this one, Deleuze will introduce the 2 June session by saying that "although final classes occur, they don't always occur when one thinks," that "final classes are always already done," thus implying that the previous one or two sessions were, in fact, the final classes. Hence, the session that follows here is, for all practical purposes, the final lecture session that Deleuze presents in his career, the 2 June session being oriented toward presentations by several students as a working group on the theme of "harmony".
[2] Roughly, these cycles corresponded to undergraduate, graduate and doctorate levels, respectively.
[3] Deleuze refers back to the start of his development on the Baroque in chapter 2; cf. *The Fold* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 14-17; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1988), pp.20-23, as well as in the early sessions, notably 28 October and 4 November 1986.
[4] On point of view, see the 18 November 1986 session.
[5] This is no doubt the drawing found at the end of chapter 2 in *The Fold*, p. 26; *Le Pli*, p. 36, the French version conforming better to the way Deleuze describes it here.
[6] On the theory of death and birth and on the "official document", see the 4 February 1987 seminar, and also *The Fold*, p. 153, note 37; *Le Pli*, p. 101.
[7] On the "substantial vinculum", cf. *The Fold*, pp. 110-111; *Le Pli*, pp. 148-150.
[8] In Christiane Frémont, *L'être et la relation*, Vrin, 1981.
[9] For a complementary summary, see *The Fold*, pp. 114-116; *Le Pli*, pp. 152-156.

[10] The final chapter of *The Fold*, entitled “The New Harmony”, addresses this topic, notably pp. 128-138; *Le Pli*, pp. 180-189.