

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 6, 13 January 1987: Sufficient Reason & the Three Forms of Inclusion

Translation and Transcription, Charles J. Stivale¹

Part 1

The general theme of this second part is something like Principles and Freedom. And as much on the level of principles as on the level of freedom, we should have expected that we would find these currents of folding, of the fold and the envelope. [Pause] The perpetual theme of principles, in fact, will be that of implication, and of course, implication is a logical notion that, we might say, circulates all over. But at the point where we find ourselves, and this is certainly why the first part of the course was so long and detailed, we now can expect correctly that when Leibniz uses even classical terms, expressions emptied of their proper sense as logical implication, we should expect that that the word completely regains its liveliest and most rigorous sense.

Implicate is to envelop, it is to fold into. Perhaps all sorts of words might be suited to resonate according to their most literal sense. If implication, to some extent, presents itself as a logics of the multiple, isn't this to the extent that the multiple is also... What is the multiple? It's what is folded in many different ways. In Latin, [it's] *multiplex*. [Pause] This is very important, the suffix, which is a suffix of folding. The labyrinth is multiple. What does that mean? It means not only that there are lots of paths. The labyrinth is multiple: that means that the labyrinth is this structure that is folded in many different ways. And when we say the word "multiple", today, we no longer think much about the suffix *-ex*, that is, the fold. But Leibniz is entirely correct to consider this and to cause us to do so as well.

And this is true for Freedom. When Leibniz tells us, you understand that freedom, this story of freedom is not very difficult. He will tell us that he was accused of suppressing freedom, of not taking freedom into account, of submitting man to a determinism or a causality that suppresses freedom, all that. But this is not at all true since, as I have always said, he tells us that to be free is to be inclined (*incline*) without being a necessity. We ourselves are therefore entirely prepared to take seriously this term from Leibniz, to incline (*incliner*). To incline is to fold oneself; inclination is inflection. Being free is to inflect oneself. Fine. It's probable in all that the most current terms – multiple, inclination, etc. – are going to be loaded by Leibniz – implication – are going to be loaded by Leibniz with a valorized and concrete content, and all of these valorized, concrete contents are going to be organized under the principle that Leibniz correctly thinks of himself as having invented, to the point that he presents his entire philosophy under the seal of this principle. And after all, what greater ambition [is there] for a philosopher than to invent a principle? Leibniz not only invents one principle; he invents all kinds, as

many principles as you'd like, and the principle that he considers himself to have invented and that constitutes the very illustration of his philosophy is what he names *the principle of sufficient reason*.² And it's from this principle that we should start for our examination of this second part.

What does sufficient reason mean, that Leibniz constantly invokes, both because he invokes the principle of sufficient reason and because he will reproach all his adversaries, without exceptions, that is, anyone not a Leibnizian – and there's only one Leibnizian, Leibniz – well, he reproaches everyone for violating the principle of sufficient reason? He will tell everyone: you just don't see it; you are violating the principle of sufficient reason. So what is this principle of sufficient reason? Here, the key word is obviously "sufficient", and fortunately, we also have for the principle of sufficient reason a common [*vulgaire*] formulation, an entirely simple formulation. The common formulation that we find in so many of Leibniz's texts, when Leibniz want to proceed rapidly, is "*everything has a reason.*" You'll say, "Everything has a reason"? Ok... Or more accurately, *everything that occurs has a reason*; everything that occurs has a reason.

And already here, this interests me greatly because we have no right to go too quickly on this level: that the principle of sufficient reason in its most traditional, most common, simplest expression refers to what occurs. Why? This I will tell you immediately; I have to say it immediately so that, if you will, you might follow my problem. It's that there is a traditional idea in... with many of Leibniz's commentators, a general idea, asserting that Leibniz reduced all judgments to judgments of attribution.

What is a judgment of attribution? It's a judgment consisting of a subject, the copula, that is, the verb "to be", and an attribute as an adjective: "the sky is blue" is a judgment of attribution. You attribute a quality to a subject through the intermediary of the copula "to be". You see? And they act as if it went without saying that Leibniz reduces judgment to judgment of attribution. We will be considering this problem for quite a while, but I'm emphasizing it from the start as a way to say that there's something disturbing here. What is it? It's that if we confront this judgment of attribution structure with the statement of sufficient reason, the principle of sufficient reason tells us "everything that occurs has a reason". What does "that occurs" mean? That which occurs, we call the *event*. In other words, sufficient reason presents itself as the reason of something that occurs or the reason of the event. But a quality is not an event, and event is not a quality.

Understand, I mean [that] I don't want to conclude more than this for the moment: specifically, it's not at all certain that the principle of sufficient reason – in any case, we have no reason to consider it as certain – that the principle of sufficient reason results in the reduction of judgment to a judgment of attribution. In its simplest statement, the principle of sufficient reason only says [that] everything that occurs has a reason. What occurs comes under the order of the event. What is an event? We have seen it. The entire first part of our course serves us here. An event is a fold, that is, an inflection. [*Pause*] That's the status of the event. To locate an attribute here seems to me already extremely exaggerated. The event is something that occurs, that is an inflection.

Henceforth, what does that mean, everything that occurs has a reason, every event has a reason, understood as a sufficient reason? Does it mean that everything has a cause? No, clearly not, because Leibniz could not in that case pretend to be the inventor of the principle of sufficient reason. Why? Because a cause is something that occurs and causes to occur. It's something that causes to occur and, if it occurs itself... If I heat water to 100 degrees [Celsius], it starts to boil. I would say about a cause that it is necessary, but not absolutely sufficient. *[Pause]* A cause occurs or doesn't occur. It is not the reason for what occurs. *[Pause]* To have a cause is not a reason but must itself have a reason, which is something we understand quite well in saying that causality is by nature hypothetical. If A is given, then B.

I would say about cause that necessary reason is not sufficient. Sufficient reason demands for the event and for its causes a reason that would be called sufficient. I say, cause is a category of the event. Cause occurs to a thing. Sufficient reason demands a reason for everything that occurs. It demands a sufficient reason for the event, for the causes of the event, for the constitutive relations of the event, for the moment in which the event occurs, for the location where the event appears, etc. It's possible that every event necessarily has causes, that is, necessarily has a location and a moment, but that is not sufficient reason.

So, henceforth, what will we say? We pass into a metaphysical formulation of sufficient reason, which will be what? The common formulation was, everything that occurs has a reason. The metaphysical or philosophical formulation, if you have followed me, will be...? Sufficient reason is the concept or notion of the thing insofar as it accounts for everything that happens to the thing. You see, all alone, quite spontaneously, I have passed from the common formulation to the metaphysical formulation: sufficient reason is the concept or notion of a thing insofar as it accounts for everything that happens to the thing, of everything that happens. I have conserved within the metaphysical formulation the fundamental notion of the event. So the concept, sufficient reason, is not the cause of the thing, or the cause of what happens to the thing; sufficient reason can only be the concept of the thing insofar as it contains the reason for everything that occurs to the thing.

This shouldn't surprise us, right, especially not us, since this metaphysical formulation is a new way of saying from inflection to inclusion, from inflection to inherence, from inflection to the fold's envelope, to the envelope. You recall, in fact, that inflection is the event that occurs to a thing. Every event is an inflection. I am born, I die, I write, I get cold, etc., are inflections. An event occurs to something or to someone. Inflection is the event insofar as it occurs to something or someone. Inclusion is what? We saw that what happens to something is encompassed, contained, included – here, follow closely the distinction of notions, not the thing, which would have no sense – is included in the concept of the thing. What occurs to something is included in the concept of the thing. What occurs to something is included in the concept of the thing.

In other words, the event that happens to the thing is a *predicate of its notion*. The predicate is what? The predicate is what is said about the notion, what is linked in the notion, what is included in the notion. The event that happens to the thing is a predicate included in the notion of the thing. Hence the metaphysical formulation that Leibniz gives of sufficient reason: every predication is a foundation in the nature of things. [Pause] From this we can easily conclude the third formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, the logical formulation. This time, the logical formulation of sufficient reason [is] every predicate is included in the notion of the thing. [Pause]

But you see? What little I have said, what I'd like you to understand, is solely... it's not for you to understand something special, but in fact, that you take part in my own sense of doubt. By what right in all this [can anyone] pretend that Leibniz reduces judgment to a judgment of attribution of the "the sky is blue" kind? The whole topic that we have just seen from Leibniz consists in telling us: the event that occurs to the thing – that is, something entirely different from a quality, entirely different from an attribute -- the event that happens to the thing is a predicate included in the notion of the thing, which absolutely does not imply that the predicate might be an attribute [Pause] that would be attributable to the notion of the thing by the intermediary of the copula.

I state [that] I write; to make of this a judgment of attribution, one would have to say, I am writing (*je suis écrivant*). This is well known. So we are often told that Leibniz, that Leibniz's theory implies this reduction, of I write to I am writing. That would be odd; there's something [*Deleuze looks for his words...*] of... which is quite amusing, that... You understand? There's a principle here, nonetheless.... Even for great philosophers, if that's what they meant, they would have said it. If he [Leibniz] had meant to say all judgment of the event, any event-al proposition (*proposition événementielle*) of the kind "I write" comes down to a judgment of attribution, this wouldn't be all that complicated. He would have said it. I am going to tell you why he would have said it because you know very well about these matters (*trucs*). It's a theory popular in that era, notably we find it in all the grammars of the seventeenth century. In all these seventeenth century grammars, we find the question of knowing to what extent I can reduce "I write" to "I am writing." Moreover, I can affirm that Leibniz is perfectly familiar with all these doctrines, and in the philological notes -- he wrote quite a lot about philology and grammar -- in the grammatical and philological notes, he explicitly considered this.

Fine. My question is quite simple: if that is what Leibniz meant to say, while he was perfectly aware of all this, why in his text on sufficient reason would he never refer to this reduction? And the fact is that, concerning sufficient reason, he never referred to any reduction whatsoever of the event to an attribute, never. In other words, what he considers as predicate is not the attribute through the intermediary of the copula "to be". What he considers as predicate is the aggregate of the verb – to write, to be born, to die – without ever reducing it to the verb "to be" plus attribute, whereas this reduction, once again, he considered it in his philological texts. But when it's a question of sufficient reason – all this, we will have to take account of this. Because, for those who know a bit about what occurred subsequently, all the criticisms made against Leibniz, with the great moments of a critique of Leib... of Leibnizianism [*Deleuze looks for the word*] – the first

great moment [is] with Kant, the second great moment [is] with [Bertrand] Russell, at the basis of modern logic – that consists in reproaching Leibniz for having reduced or having wanted to reduce relations and event to simple attributes. We have every reason to think that this critique is entirely unfair because, once again, no text by Leibniz goes in this direction.

So, all that we can draw from this at the moment is this: [*Deleuze speaks extremely slowly*] once it's given that something occurs to a subject, what occurs to a subject must be encompassed, included in the notion of this subject; in other words, inflection, the event, is a predicate of the notion, but predicate does not mean attribute. This predicate is the verb, and in fact, the verb is the sign of the inflection: I write, I'm cold, etc. ... Yes? Who's calling me?

A student: [*Question regarding the commentators on Leibniz, how they could repeat these propositions regarding Leibniz*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, because they had some evil intentions in mind. [*Laughter*] That's in his works; we have Leibniz's texts. Understand where the problem is: we have Leibniz's texts in which, in fact, he considers this famous reduction from judgment to judgment of identity. He isn't against it; he is... Logically, we will see, we will see what these texts mean. But precisely, he never refers to that, never, on the level of sufficient reason. So really, one shouldn't exaggerate. Never did he tell us, when speaking about sufficient reason, he says, I write, I write. My notion has to contain, to envelop the reason for "I write", that is, this act. But he never reduces this act, "I write", to "I am writing", that is, the copula plus attribute.

All that we can draw from sufficient reason is: everything that occurs assumes an inclusion in the notion. Everything that occurs to something has for sufficient reason the inclusion in the notion, the envelopment in the notion. Do you understand this? I don't need, it seems to me, to insist on this greatly since all this was the focus of the entire first part of our course, once again, from inflection to inclusion. Sufficient reason is inclusion as the reason for inflection. Everything that occurs is a predicate contained in the notion of the thing to which, to whom that happens.

You immediately see what this notion is. You recall the thing to which this occurs, the notion of the thing to which something occurs; it's what he called *the monad*. Fine. Hence, sufficient reason is: any predicate is in the subject where – now, when we say any predicate is in the subject, you'll correct this yourselves, rigorously, it's "any predicate is in the notion of the subject" – any predicate is in the notion of the subject, or if you prefer, truth has only one model; truth is inclusion. Truth is inclusion ; it's inherence. [*Pause*]

There we have it. Is everything good? I can continue ? There aren't any difficulties because this has to be clear, eh? All that I am suggesting is that he pushes us towards a logic of the event and not toward a logics of the attribute. It's a logic of the event. It's so little a logic of the attribute that it's the others who are creating a logic of the attribute. At

the outside, I can say, and we will see, we will see... It's quite odd, this whole story. In the end, it interests me a lot because... A logic of the attribute, truly, comes from Aristotle. I am not saying that Aristotle was satisfied with a logic of the attribute, but it's true that a logic of the attribute comes from Aristotle. But you know, logic is such a complex domain. A logic of the attribute goes so little without saying that, for example, it will be a very great moment in the history of logics when, in their reactions against Aristotle – and they're the ones, to my knowledge, that reintroduced all this – the Stoics invented a logic of the event. A logic of the event, on what basis? No, what occurs cannot be reduced to an attribute. [Pause]

And this small parenthesis, to finish up all this -- it's not a problem if this brings in a number of things -- the Stoics are the first philosophers to put into question the copula "to be" and to deny that the model of judgment is the attributive model, that is, subject-copula-attribute. For this, they will substitute the strangest and most unusual logic ever, that they themselves are going to present as a logic of the event. Fine. So I am simply saying, because it will be confirmed – I won't be able to confirm it until later – that Leibniz resituates himself within the Stoics' problem. In what sense? Precisely as a function of the logics of the event that they were in the process of establishing, Stoicism had to come into collision with a fascinating problem, and you are going to see henceforth how the principles and freedom form a problem in which everything is knotted, connected. They inevitably had to settle down to face the problem that concerns what was called future events. What is the sense of a proposition of the kind, "a naval battle will take place tomorrow"? This is the famous problem that, with the Stoics, will receive the name of *contingent futures*. In other words, is a proposition like "a naval battle will take place tomorrow" true or false, or else neither true, nor false? You see that freedom, the problem, it's a way of posing the problem of freedom. And, Leibniz will rediscover, and he will no doubt be the first to discover integrally, this problem of contingent futures, the extent to which it's a logic of the event and not a logic of the attribute.

And the great criticism that the Stoics make against Aristotle is to have completely misunderstood the status, the mode of existence of the event. The event is irreducibly an attribute of the thing. The event is inseparable from the verb as such. That also implies an entire grammar, an entire... If it's inseparable from the verb as such, I cannot translate "I run" with "I am running" (*je suis courant*); I cannot translate "I write" with "I am writing" (*écrivant*). You understand well that, in this, there is a way to reduce the event to what it is not, that is, a simple quality. Fine.

Is this understood? Where I am right now is uniquely with this: sufficient reason is inclusion in the notion, and above all, don't believe that inclusion in the notion implies the reduction of judgment to judgment of attribution. There is no reason to think this. Period, final. That's as far as I have gotten. By virtue of which I am telling you, are you doing ok? [Laughter] Yes? All good? I'd like this to be very clear, right? It's a bit abstract. Fine, so let's continue, let's continue. [Pause]

The truth of a proposition is the inclusion of the predicate in the notion. And here we see, Leibniz says to us – there, I ask you... It's almost... Our session today is to number the texts and... -- And here we have Leibniz telling us: only, only, there are two kinds of inclusion, there are two kinds of inclusion of the predicate in the notion, and these two kinds correspond to two kinds of proposition.³ [Pause]

The first kind – here arise questions of terminology, so we will indeed have to settle them, but you will see [Deleuze laughs], it's not, it's not entirely possible – he tells us: in the first case, inclusion is *express*. [Pause] In Latin, when in the Latin texts, he uses the adverb *expresse*. Inclusion is *express*. The corresponding propositions or the corresponding truths are *truths of essence*. These are truths of essence, an essence. They have this for characteristic: that the contrary implies contradiction. Example: 2 plus 2 make 4, or rather he doesn't say that; he says: 2 and 2 are 4. [Pause]

A second kind of inclusion: here, inclusion is, in Latin, *implicit, implicite*. It's implicit. In French, in French texts, [it's] *virtual*, and this time, it concerns what he calls *truths of existence* or *of fact*, or *of event*. *The fact is that...* Truth of existence or fact or event. [Pause] And the contrary does not imply contradiction. Example: Caesar crosses the Rubicon. I write. Adam sinned. See, all that, these are events. [Pause] Fine.

From here onward, this appears relatively simple. This distinction of truths of essence and truths of existence, two types of inclusion, we are again going to find ourselves faced with a nest of difficulties, if we look at the texts, if you attach any importance to the letter of the text. Why difficulties? It's odd the expression that appears in French, *virtual*, since if inclusion is *virtual* in the judgments of existence, that is, *if* crossing the Rubicon is a predicate, which is only *virtually* contained, included in the notion of Caesar, one must believe, on the other hand, that in the truths of essence inclusion is *actual*. How is it that Leibniz never said that? At first glance, if it's a question of developing an opposition between truths of essence and truths of existence, well then, the opposition *actual-virtual*, since inclusion is said to be *virtual* in truths of existence, we would expect there to be an *actual-virtual* opposition. And no, he does not at all state this. Fine, the opposition is exactly between *express* and *implicit*. *Implicit* is *virtual*; *express* is *explicit*. Fine.

There is already a tiny little something that bothers us: *virtual*, *virtual*, what is that, this word “*virtual*”? In Leibniz, he feels no need to oppose it to *actual*. I am going to tell you why he cannot oppose it to *actual* – so why does he use *virtual*, that would be another question. He cannot oppose it to *actual* because, for a simple reason, it's that in Leibniz's works, everything is *actual*, and everything is in *act*. But then, why, why then the *virtual*? He indeed says “*virtual*”, but we have to believe that he understands *virtual* in a very special sense, and it's up to us to find it. In any case, that does not mean an opposition with *actual*. So, if he doesn't oppose *actual* and *virtual*, it's for a simple reason. When he uses the word “*virtual*”, he doesn't oppose it to *actual* because everything is in *act*, even the *virtual*. So that relieves us, but it doesn't explain much. Let's continue.

We could say that to better understand, and it's been said a thousand times, to better understand the distinction between the two types of opposition, that of *express* inclusion,

or that of virtual, implicit exclusion, we could say, fine, it's not difficult. In one case, inclusion can be grasped as an outcome of a finite number of operations, and in the other case, inclusion can only be grasped as an outcome of an infinite number of operations. [Pause] This comes down to saying, in the case of truths of essence, the analysis that shows inclusion of the predicate in the subject – it's an analysis that shows this inclusion, obviously – well then, in the case of truths of essence, the analysis that shows inclusion in the subject is finite, and in the case of truths of existence, an infinite analysis is required in order to show inclusion of the predicate, crossing the Rubicon, in the subject Caesar, the notion of Caesar. [Pause] Well, yes, why not? So come on, this isn't right. We cannot say that... [Interruption of the recording] [46:33]

Part 2

... Even if we don't at all yet understand what that means, grant me that they [truths of essence] are very close to God. Why? They obviously belong to the understanding of God. In a certain vague way, I could say that they belong to God, much more closely, than the truths of existence. No doubt any truth belongs to God, but truths of essence belong to God much more immediately. They are much closer to God. They belong to his understanding, whereas [with] truths of existence, you sense already how it [God] is going to distribute things. The truths of existence no doubt belong to the understanding, but to another part of God's understanding, and especially they put into play its [God's] will, whereas the truths of essence don't put into play God's will. They belong to the deepest part of its [God's] understanding. And God is the infinite being par excellence. No matter; let's grant it all that.

Henceforth, how do you want truths of essence to be defined by the finite number of operations that their inclusion implies, that the initiation of their inclusion implies? It's not possible. I cannot say, the propositions of essence are those in which the predicate is included in the subject as an outcome of a finite number of operations. I can't. There is something wrong here. There's something that would be profoundly shocking since the truths of essence are in God's understanding who is the infinite creature par excellence and since, moreover, the infinite is a ... The finite for Leibniz is an imperfection. The finite is an imperfection. How do you want truths of essence that are superior truths, of the "2 and 2 make 4" kind, to be defined by their finitude? This wouldn't be serious. This wouldn't be at all reasonable. In other words, *I cannot define* the truths of essence by the finite number of operations that their inclusion solicits.

On the other hand, can I define truths of existence by the virtual, in the current sense of the word "virtual", that is, by indefinite? That would come down to saying that inclusion of the predicate in the subject within the truths of existence would go to infinity. There would always be an intermediary. Moreover, it's when I would reach the intermediary, there would be another intermediary. To connect "crossing the Rubicon" to the concept of Caesar, there would be an indefinite series. No, once again, I cannot say it. I cannot say it since, for Leibniz, there is only the infinite, and not indefinite. And furthermore, we must wait for Kant in order to give the indefinite a status, and he will do this against Leibniz. So, it's impossible to say that. And why is it impossible to say that? Because if I

said it's indefinite, I would mean that it's indefinite for me, but God *sees*. I would say [that] God sees quite well. The inclusion of "crossing the Rubicon" into Caesar, I myself don't see it because it's indefinite for me. But God does see, and it's here that Leibniz is rigorous. One cannot say that.

In a very lovely text called *On Freedom*, Leibniz tells us, well no, "God no more than us sees the end of the operation or the resolution." Why? Because by definition, there is no end. The inclusion of passing the Rubicon into Caesar or into the concept of Caesar goes to infinity, but it's this way for God as it is for man. That text is very important because, in fact, it's a... Leibniz here has the advantage of denouncing a misinterpretation that one might always risk making. The resolution, that is, the resolution of the predicate in the subject, in the concept of the subject, the resolution of passing the Rubicon into Caesar, the resolution proceeds to infinity, in the case of truths of existence. The resolution proceeds to infinity, that is, *God alone sees*. God alone sees. He [Leibniz] adds: "not indeed the end of the analysis (*résolution*)". See, if the resolution were indefinite, I could say [that] God sees the end, but no. The resolution goes to infinity; it proceeds to infinity. Henceforth, God alone sees, certainly not the end of the resolution, "since it has no end". If the resolution goes to infinity, it has no end. So no more God than we can see the end; simply, I can say that God is like a fish in the water in the infinite, whereas we are completely lost in the infinite. That's the sole difference. But [God] does not see the end any more [than we do]. By definition, the infinite is what has no end. So God alone sees, certainly not the end of the resolution, and end that does not take place, "but it [God] sees the connection of terms", crossing the Rubicon and Caesar, "it sees the connection of terms as the envelopment of the predicate in the subject," as the envelopment of the predicate in the subject.⁴

Fine, that gives us a small indication, a tiny glimmer. We already saw all the ways in which we weren't able to understand all that. And notice, these ways are beginning to add up. We cannot understand Leibniz as if he reduced the event to the attribute. We cannot understand the distinction of the two inclusions as if the first were finite – this is false – and as if the second were indefinite – this is false. But, according to this text that I just read, what must we say? Inclusion is an envelopment; 2 and 2 envelop 4. There are two kinds of inclusion. 2 and 2 envelop 4; Caesar, the concept of Caesar envelops the crossing of the Rubicon, envelops crossing the Rubicon. [Pause] I would say that in the first case, truths of essence, inclusion or envelopment is, it seems not to yield anything for us, so we can move on. I can say [that] in the case of truths of essence, inclusion allows itself to be unfolded. Inclusion is unfoldable (*dépliable*), developable. In the case of truths of existence, there is indeed inclusion, but it doesn't allow itself to be unfolded. It stays enveloped. It's non-unfoldable (*indépliable*). "God sees not indeed the end of the analysis", but he sees the envelopment. He [Leibniz] does not tell us that it develops, whereas on the level of truths of essence, the envelopment allows itself to be developed. There are developable truths and truths that remain enveloped. [Pause]

Fine, this is just a little... What are we going to be able to draw from such a thin and metaphorical clue, developing, enveloping, all that? What are inclusions that allow themselves to be developed, unfolded, and inclusions that do not allow themselves to be

unfolded? You sense perhaps that this orients us toward the necessity of creating a logic of inclusion in such a way that we might be drawn to distinguish some kinds of inclusions. And here it all returns to us. Henceforth, we will again have to examine the distinction of two kinds of truth. And there again, in the text *On Freedom* to which I referred earlier, we hardly reach... We thought that things were going to become a bit clearer. For us, something important (*terrible*) is occurring here, something important. [*Deleuze peruses the text while speaking*]

In *On Freedom*, he restarts his story; there are two kinds of truth, truths of essence and truths of existence, that is, there are two kinds of inclusion. So good, fine, and there he tells us generally that yes, there are unfoldable inclusions and non-unfoldable inclusions. Yes. And then, he tells us, we are going to look a bit at the first case, the truths of essence with the unfoldable inclusions. He tells us that it's necessary in this to distinguish some very different cases, to which we say, so much the better, the more distinctions there are, the better it is. He then continues, saying there are two cases, at least two cases, in truths of essence. Notice that it's not the two kinds – truths of essence and truths of existence --, but this is two cases in the truths of essence. He tells us that there is a case in which inclusion is explicit and a case in which inclusion is only implicit or virtual. [*Pause*] I am reading rather quickly because... I am reading quickly a first time because it's an initial grounding point. We will then return to the text, so listen closely.

"To demonstrate" -- this concerns the truths of essence -- "to demonstrate is nothing other than resolving the terms of a proposition and substituting a definition for the terms defined." All this matters little, so you can just let yourself go, not asking yourself at all what this means. "We discern therefore the coincidence of the predicate with the subject in a reciprocal proposition." Fine. "But in other cases", but in other cases, understand well, it's not a question of truths of existence; it's about another case in truths of essence. On this point, the text raises no problems since truths of essence [*logically Deleuze means truths of existence*] will be considered in the following paragraph. This whole paragraph explicitly concerns truths of essence. He begins by distinguishing two cases.

The first case: "to demonstrate is nothing other than resolving the terms of a proposition and substituting a definition for the terms defined." So in this way we find "the coincidence of the predicate with the subject in a reciprocal proposition." But in the other cases, "it's at least in order to extract an inclusion so that what is virtual in the proposition and contained within a certain power (*puissance*) becomes evident and expressed through the demonstration." He gives an example; for example, therefore, for these cases of inclusions called virtual, for example, "if we understand by ternary or senary or duodenary number that which can be divided by 3, 6, or 12" – a ternary number, is for example 9 that can be divided by 3. A senary number is a number like 24, for example, divisible by 6, etc. Well, "if we understand by senary or ternary or duodenary number one that can be divided by 3, 6 or 12, we can demonstrate this proposition: any duodenary number" (divisible by 12) – "we can demonstrate this proposition – any duodenary number" (divisible by 12) "is senary" (divisible by 6), and he goes on to the demonstration to which we will return later. You see, we are fully

within the truths of essence. And he tells us this is a special case of truths of essence in which the inclusion is only virtual or implicit.

So you understand that a huge feeling of joy arises when we come upon a text like that because there's nothing to be done. [*Deleuze laughs*] I tell myself, ok, we thought we had understood. If you compare – here, I don't want us to lose too much time with this -- but those who want to can refer to the *Discourse on Metaphysics* in which, in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, everything is very firm: “virtual” is used for propositions of existence, and explicit or express for propositions of essence, period, that's it. That's in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*. The treatise *On Freedom* returns to the distinction of two kinds of truth, but we must believe that it gets complicated since he distinguished as firmly as in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* two kinds of truth. Only he uses the word “implicit” or “virtual” for one case of the truths of essence. You understand? All this makes me state up front that there aren't only two kinds of inclusions. We will certainly have to find a third, three types of inclusion. [*Pause*] Three types of inclusion... Perhaps even more. Fine. Perhaps even more. It would even be better if there were more. So, we'll go on to find four... Four. [*Laughter*] Four types of inclusion.

There we are. Is this ok? It's very abstract, but it will become more concrete. Today I am in need of a lot of abstractions.

Do you see what he means? I am indicating [that] here we have the great distinctions, truths of essence, truths of existence. I haven't said it concretely enough. He says, well yes, in the case of truths of essence, the contrary is impossible, that is, the contrary is contradictory, contradictory in itself. That 2 and 2 don't make 4 is contradictory. This is impossible, whereas in the case of truths of existence, no, that Adam didn't sin is not contradictory. I can very well conceive of Adam not sinning. I cannot conceive of a square circle; I cannot conceive of 2 and 2 making 5. I can say it, but I cannot support it with anything, whereas I can very well conceive of Adam not sinning. This is something you must keep clearly in mind; it's one of the bases for the distinction of two kinds of truth.

So then, I come back to my necessity. It's just that... There is just a distressing moment here, today, this morning. I am confronting this distressing moment very fast, so that you... that I'd like to address quickly because it is indispensable. You'll see, if needed, what you can retain from this.

I am coming back to truths of essence. I say, fine, there is inclusion, but inclusion of what in what? 2 and 2 are 4, is what? What is the inclusion? Well, Leibniz tells us a very simple thing, and Lord, will this have importance for modern logic. He says, to demonstrate means what? Truths of essence are demonstrable truths. To demonstrate means what? To demonstrate is to define, that is, it's the linkage of definitions. And mathematics is the linkage of definitions. What is a definition? So here we have our first kind of inclusion; we hadn't expected to come to it so quickly. I'd say that a definition is a reciprocal inclusion; it's a *reciprocal inclusion*. There is a reciprocal inclusion between the defined and the definition. [*Pause*] Linking up definitions is demonstrating. What

does that mean? Well, it's unfolding a series of inclusions; [*Pause*] it's unfolding a series of *reciprocal* inclusions. An example – he really loves learned examples, learned mathematical examples – he says, how does one demonstrate that 2 and 2 are 4? [Look at] *New Essays on Human Understanding*, where we see in book IV, chapter 7, what a demonstration is, that is, a linkage of definitions.⁵ It's a matter of demonstrating that 2 and 2 are 4, that's it.

First definition: 2 is 1 and 1; 2 is 1 and 1. You'll say, what does that mean? He's putting us on here; this is the definition of 2, right, 1 and 1. That seems like nothing, and if you reflect on this, why then, why don't I say instead that 2, eh, 2 is 6 divided by 3? [*Laughter*] That could be the definition. I can even create an axiomatic, in which I define 2 by if it's divided by 3, on the sole condition that I could define 6 and 3 without all that, and in this case, that would be quite... I can always... I can do whatever. But no, this is not just any definition. When I say 2 is 1 and 1, why? It's a *real* definition, whereas when I define 2 by the product of dividing 6 by 3, it's not a real definition, it's a nominal definition, of the form: I am calling 2 this. What is the difference between a real definition and a nominal definition? All these things are what you have to know by heart. A nominal definition is a definition that allows us to recognize its object; a real definition is a definition that shows us the possibility of its object. Notice that in the complicated problem of the relations of demonstration and definition in most cases, we are led to demonstrate that a definition is real. One must show that a definition reveals the possibility of its object.

Why is “2 is 1 and 1” a real definition and the only real definition for 2? I am making you endure... Well it's quite simple! It's because you define it by *the primary numbers that 2 envelops*. You define 2 by its primary factors, 1 and 1. [*Pause*] Right? There is no other definition of 2 by primary factors, except by itself, as we'll see. This will be Leibniz's idea: to obtain real definitions for numbers, one has to decompose them into primary factors; one has to decompose them into primary numbers. When you decompose a number into primary numbers, you have the real definition of the number. So, definition, 2 is 1 and 1. There you are. You have to take notes if you want to follow me well because this very simple example... [*Deleuze doesn't complete the sentence*]

Second definition: 3 is 2 and 1; here we have a definition of 3. Why? Because it's the decomposition of 3 into primary factors. Third definition: 4 is 3 and 1, here again the decomposition into primary factors. These are three definitions.

I am saying that to demonstrate is a linkage of definitions. In fact, we are demonstrating that 2 and 2 are 4. How do we demonstrate this? First proposition: “2 and 2” is 2 and 1 and 1, by virtue of definition 1. – Yes, that makes no sense if you don't note it down; either you listen vaguely, or you note it down. Have you noted down the three definitions? Do I need to reread them? First definition: 2 is 1 and 1; second definition: 3 is 2 and 1; third definition: 4 is 3 and 1. -- Demonstration, first proposition: “2 and 2” is 2 and 1 and 1, by virtue of definition 1. In fact, in 2 and 2, you keep one 2 and the other 2, you insert the defined... [*Deleuze corrects himself*] the definer, that is 1 and 1. “2 and 2”

is 2 and 1 and 1, by virtue of definition 1. Second proposition: “2 and 1 and 1” is 3 and 1, by virtue of definition 2. Third proposition: “3 and 1” is 4 by virtue of definition 3.

So how do we make sense of that? Just grasp that we’re in a completely modern atmosphere. I mean that it’s really modern logics; indeed, it’s modern logics. One would necessarily need many pages; we’d need a storeroom of pages and pages in order to ... to demonstrate things of the “2 and 2 make 4” kind. And Leibniz is very important in this regard, I mean, because there are all kinds of polemics occurring with mathematicians of the era. Leibniz really maintains this, the attempt at demonstrating valid actions. So, lots of mathematicians of the era state that “2 and 2 make 4” is a valid action. No, not at all; he wants his chain of definitions, and he wants the idea – thus the absolutely modern idea if you think about all of logics currently – [that] demonstration is a linkage of definitions. One can even say that it’s like the founding act for modern logics.

So at this level, I’d ask, what have I done? Well, I am going from one definition to another. I am linking up definitions, each one being a reciprocal inclusion, the reciprocal inclusion of the defined and the definition. Ok? Fine, linking reciprocal inclusions is what demonstrating is. And up to what point do I link them? That gets complicated there. Why? Because I really have to attain some primary terms. I really have to reach some primary terms.⁶

What does “primary terms” mean, ultimate terms? And why does one have to...? Ultimate terms are terms that are no longer definable, terms no longer definable. What is a term that is no longer definable? It’s a term that is nothing other than identical with itself. I cannot define it. Why can’t I define it? Because *it only includes itself*. A term that only includes itself cannot be the object of a reciprocal inclusion. I would say that a term that includes only itself refers to an *auto-inclusion*. It includes nothing other than itself. A is A: it’s an Identical. An Identical is an auto-inclusion., and you must define and distinguish definitions that are reciprocal inclusions and the Identicals that are inclusions, auto-inclusions, henceforth undefinable. An Identical is undefinable, from which comes the subject in Leibniz, in the truths of essence, [in which] everything proceeds through definition and Identicals. [Pause] You see what he means? Well yes, it’s not definable; there will indeed be primary terms. An undefinable term is a term that only includes itself. Example, let’s see if we can give some examples. Well then, a term that only includes itself is what we call an Identical. Well why? I continue pondering on an Identical including only itself, an auto-inclusion. [Pause]

From the time he was very young, Leibniz conceived of something he called the Combinatory, and what is this Combinatory? It means not to define, but to determine the Identicals. We will see what that means, but I insist: in a domain under consideration, for example, the Identicals in geometry, in other words, auto-inclusions, the undefinable notions, he makes a list of them.

Let us take a point, [Deleuze goes to the board and draws] see, the point, let’s assume that this is undefinable, an auto-inclusion. The line would not be an auto-inclusion if I can define the line as or through – I’m speaking at random -- through a succession of

points. However, succession then, there is an undefinable unless I can define it [with] a succession. But at that moment, I could define succession provided that I discern other Undefinables, other Identicals. I can judge that in a domain under consideration, I indeed say that the expression I am using in a domain under consideration remains entirely devoid of sense for the moment; I use it nominally in order to try to clarify things somewhat. So I would say that there are geometric Undefinables, that I call *notions of primary class*. [Pause] Let's add, randomly: point, contiguity, distance – perhaps these are notions, but little matter what notions I add – unity. Perhaps these are undefinable notions, let us assume. See, I have my list. We have Leibniz's papers from his youth through which he creates his Combinatory, and [it's] the sole example we have of a Combinatory developed precisely about geometry in which there are, I don't know, I no longer recall very well, 25 or 30 undefinable notions as starting point. These are notions of class 1.

Notions of class 2: quantity, for example. Is quantity an Undefinable or not? All that... Once again, that changes nothing because you can choose. You can always say, for me, no, in my axiomatic, in my Combinatory, I am going to define quantity; this is possible. At that point, you will do so with notions that themselves are not definable to infinity. You will really have to stop because you only attain notions that only include themselves, for example, for numbers, 1. 1 only includes itself. 1, I would say, is the Identical for numbers; it's the auto-inclusion. But from 1 onward, after 1 come reciprocal inclusions. For example, 2 is 1 plus 1, 2 is 1 and 1, there we have a reciprocal inclusion. And in fact, notions of class 2 in the Combinatory are obtained by combining two notions from class 1. Here, with class 2, there will be reciprocal inclusions.

Notions of class 3 will be obtained – here, if you have understood this, you will really be dazzled; you are going to see the extent to which this is going to create a lovely Combinatory – the notions of class 3 will be obtained either by combining three notions from class 1 or by combining a notion from class 1 and a notion from class 2. [Pause] So there you have all of it.

Let's go back to the Undefinables. If we return to the Undefinables, what are Undefinables in auto-inclusion? Leibniz gives them a name. As we will need this name, they are *simple primitive notions*, simple primitive notions, that is, these are the originary concepts, the foundations of everything, or the roots of everything, or the source of everything, he says. [Pause] I am saying this because, understand, in this as well, if you understand it, you will understand a bit of everything. We are no longer, we are no longer at all... Please understand...

In philosophy, when it's not the philosophy of the great philosophers, we don't hear about the principle of identity. But that's not what the principle of identity is. A is A, we are told A is A, but see here, one must not say the principle of identity; one must say the Identicals. The principle of identity is immediately plural, in any case, for Leibniz, since identity is the characteristic of auto-inclusion, and so what is auto-inclusion? It's the characteristic of a term that includes only itself. So there will be as many Identicals as there are terms in auto-inclusion. One must not say the principle of identity; one must say

the Identicals. The Identicals are the notions of class 1, that is, the simple primitive notions.

You will ask me, what if there were no Identicals? Ah ha, hee hee, yes, [*Laughter*] if there were no Identicals. Well then, there are some, and why are there any? I am going to tell you why, I will tell you, but we must wait a bit because we can continue to contemplate the Identicals some more. When one does not know, it's very odd, these things, the Identicals, once again source of everything, at the basis of God's understanding. At the basis of God's understanding, one does not find the principle of identity. Otherwise, we would understand nothing at all about Leibniz's beautiful expression, "God calculates the world" ... The world, what more is there? The world, *mondus* in Latin, he tells us, *mondus fit*, that is, the world happens, the world creates the event. He doesn't say that the world is an attribute of God. That would be Spinoza, and he doesn't want to be Spinoza; he wants the world to be an event.

So good, let's get back to the Identicals, the Identical at the basis of God's understanding. At the basis of God's understanding, the Identicals in auto-inclusion roar. And what is that? What relationship is there between two Identicals? Precisely none, none at all. Why? Because relations begin there when two Identicals are combined. In other words, relations begin with reciprocal inclusion, with definitions. But Identicals, with each including only itself, an Identical has no relation with another Identical, which Leibniz expresses by saying in a number of very, very special texts, because he needed a word: they are *disparate*, absolutely disparate. In other words, one of them contains nothing that another contains. This is even the definition of the Undefinable. If one of them contained something that another contained, it could be defined. But precisely because each one only contains itself, they cannot even contradict one another. They are absolutely disparate. They can neither be contrary nor contradictory. They cannot exclude each other; each one only contains itself... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:33:10]

Part 3

... The individual notion is the term, the Leibnizian term. But at the other end of the chain, there are simple primitive notions. And you recall that individual notions are without doors or windows, that is, they tend toward including (*sont incluantes*). Nothing reaches them from outside. To Caesar, some things reach him from outside, but to Caesar's notion, nothing reaches from outside since everything is predicable on the notion.

And yes indeed, see how that occurs. Simple primitive notions have no relation with one another because each includes only itself and contains only itself. So they are closed off from each other. The individual notions at the other end [of the chain] *include the entire world*; each of them includes the world. They include everyone, the entire world, but precisely because the entire world only exists within each of them. They are also without relations with one another. They have neither doors nor windows, I mean, for two opposite reasons at both ends of the chain. The primitive notions and the individual

notions create an echo exactly like, from the start, I suggested to you this arithmetic echo, infinity over 1 and 1 over infinity.

Fine, but let us continue. These are the disparates. Henceforth, the Identicals or simple notions, the absolutely simple notions, the Identicals, well they cannot be incompatible with one another. Being absolutely disparate, they are necessarily compatible. Why? They couldn't be contradictory, they could only be contrary or contradictory if we could reduce one of them to a notion that would be affirmed by one and excluded by the other. So, in order to be contradictory, it would be necessary that this not be a primitive notion. Including only itself, the Disparates are necessarily compatible. Having nothing to do with each other, they are necessarily compatible.

So see, about the definition... But then the final point, completely essential: why go all the way to the Undefinables? Here as well, it's a long philosophical tradition: why go all the way to the Undefinables? Well, [Pause] these Undefinables, up to that point in philosophy they had a name. It was "ultimate predicates", predicates beyond which one can go back not farther, and this is what in philosophy since Aristotle was called *categories*. In fact, in Aristotle, what is a category? Categories are terms without links, terms without links, that is, Disparates. We can say of them that they're terms such that everything that exists is one or the other; everything that exists is one or the other, of these primary terms. Everything that exists, if you will, falls under one or the other of these organizing headings, these categorical headings. Or else we can say – and this will indeed be the definition given by Kant much later – that these are predicates of every *object*; these are predicates of any object whatsoever (*de l'objet quelconque*). Being green is a predicate. When I say the tree is green, it's a predicate.

But, but, but, but every object is not green, whereas when I say substance, causality, quality, quantity – every object is substance, that is, being something permanent that undergoes variations. Every object is substance. Every object has qualities; every object has a quantity; every object has a locus; every object is within time, etc. Predicates of the object whatsoever, in opposition to predicates of the determined object, predicates of the object whatsoever are categories. These are terms without links to one another. They are pure Disparates. Aristotle gave the list of categories, precisely in the treatise *Of categories*. That began with substance, quantity, quality, etc. There weren't many of them. These were Undefinables. [Pause]

So is this the same thing? Are these the categories that Leibniz calls simple primitives, simple primitive notions? There's a resemblance. And yet, something happened that dislodged everything. Why is this a necessity? Why don't we go all the way to infinity in the definitions? You're going to understand why. What has happened since Aristotle? Well, what happened is always connected to Christianity, the proof of the infinite.

What are the Disparates, the simple primitive notions for Leibniz? I have a sense that it's this, quite simple to see: if something... To understand any notion whatsoever, whether or not it's a simple primitive notion, a proof is required. What is it that is going to transform the problem of categories within Christianity? It's precisely the proofs of the

infinite, specifically simple notions, I think, which are forms directly able to be raised to infinity. It's the new definition, or the new determination. Aristotle himself wanted to seek out expressions without links, without links to each other, *Disparates*.

But everything occurs as if the idea of an infinite God changes the problem, it seems to me. The *Disparates*, the primary notions, are notions directly able to be raised to infinity. I say, directly able to be raised; all that complicates matter, indeed because, well, let's assume that there are all sorts of infinite. There are lots of kinds of infinite. Look at the famous letter by Spinoza on infinity, a letter about which Leibniz said that it's almost the best text by Spinoza and that one had to accept everything in it. Spinoza distinguished orders of the infinite: the infinite by itself, the infinite by its cause, the infinite because it was beyond all number, etc. There are all sorts of orders of the infinite.

Moreover, yet again, for the seventeenth century, there is no indefinite, and if there is no indefinite, it's simply because there is a whole series of orders of the infinite. So good, there are things... Whatever might be... You take a notion; it's a proof, and you ask, is it able directly – that is, by itself – to be raised to infinity? You say, the world. I can conceive of the world as an infinite series, an infinite series of events. Ah yes, but it is able to be raised to infinity, but – don't concern yourself with whether it's infinite or not; concern yourself with the notion, uniquely with the notion – so you tell yourself, the notion of the world, can I think of it as infinity without contradiction? You don't ask yourself what occurs, in fact; can I think of it as infinity without contradiction? Ah yes, but I can do so only through the order of causes, that is, this will be an infinite by its cause. Then, fine, yes, perhaps... So, good, if it's that, it's not a primary notion. I will call primary notion any notion that I cannot think of it, solely through thinking, that I cannot conceive of as directly infinite, that is, directly able to be raised to infinity.

Another example : white. Can I suggest an infinite white, something infinitely white? Well, perhaps not, but why? Because what would that be? In the end, something resists this, but I tell myself it really matters little. This very example is taken up by Leibniz in the *New Essays [on Human Understanding]*, which is why I... Perhaps there is no greater degree [of white]. Is this a degree? Ah, what is the relation... Finally in all this, it's a color, an infinite color, [but] maybe not. If I manage, in fact, to show that in the notion of color itself, there is a mark of finitude, that is, the reference of vibrations, oscillations to the sensory organs of a living being, I cannot think of a color as infinite, and that's marked by the finitude of a sensory reception (*une réception sensible*).

But then what does the color imply? You see that the primary notion is working; it implies extension (*l'étendue*). Can I speak of an infinite extension? Well, Descartes talked about it, and as if by chance, he considered infinity, extension as a substance. Can I speak of an infinite extension? Fine, but of what order of the infinite? If I can think without contradiction of a directly infinite extension, very good. It's a simple notion. Leibniz will show... That is, it's an Identical. Leibniz will show, [it's] nothing of the sort, that Descartes did not at all understand the problem of Identicals and that extension cannot be thought of as able to be directly raised to the infinite. Something else would be

required. Fine, but let's suggest... Consider the direction of this line of thought. So, I continue.

Understanding, will: are these simple primitive notions? Can I think without contradiction of an infinite understanding, and what would that be? When I say, for example, God has an infinite understanding, an infinite will, this is the proof of the infinite that allows me to define, to determine the Undefinables such that I can now say – understand my focus -- but if there are Undefinables, it's not at all simply because one must stop. To a great extent, that would be the Aristotelian argument. Aristotle's piercing argument is that one must indeed stop. There's a moment when one must stop. He says it in Greek, it's quite beautiful. One has to... can it... As it's been attributed to him, might this be a cry of hope? In Greek, it's really lovely, *anagkê stênai*, *anagkê stênai*, there's a moment for stopping.⁷ Leibniz isn't this kind of person, you understand? [Laughter] -- That's something that has never been created, the history of philosophical temperaments. -- Reason for him [Leibniz] is that one must never stop. The cry of reason is that one must never stop, and in Aristotle, it's rather one must indeed stop. No, one must never stop. And so why does Leibniz posit the Undefinables? [It's] not at all because one must stop, but because one must never stop. Very strange.

The Undefinables are simply infinite forms, infinite forms that are the primaries, the source of all things, the Identicals. They are directly linked to the infinite. You see, there's a fundamental relation, the Identicals and the infinite. Why? Because the Identicals are forms able to be raised to infinity. But if I say that, then there are suddenly things one can no longer say. [Pause] What does Leibniz do regarding the principle of identity? It's not a question of saying that this is a philosophy demanding the principle of identity. He makes the principle of identity undergo the strangest operations that exist, also the most admirable and the most bizarre. He pluralizes it and he infinitizes it (*l'infinise*) ... Yes? Why not? Yes, please oblige me, since he pluralizes it and he infinitizes it (*l'infinitise*). [Laughter] So that's what I said? Both at the same time, that is, all forms will be identical, whatever they are, [and] they go on to infinity. And why does he do that? Well, if we don't understand this, we no longer understand at all.

I am going to tell a story of something that happened later. Long afterward, the Kantians who reacted strongly against Leibniz said this: Leibniz reduces judgment to the principle of identity. There you have it. But this operation is not possible, and what the Kantians said was admirable, very, very beautiful; and their argument was as follows: the principle of identity is only hypothetical. If A is, then A is A. You cannot state it other than in this way. If A is, then A is A. Eh? But then, it cannot give us any... As the Kantians say in their language, the principle of identity cannot give us any categorical truth. It will only give us a hypothetical truth. If there is A, then A is A. Hence [we see] the Kantians's stroke of genius to say [that] the principle of identity cannot be treated as apodictic, as categorical. Eh? – Moreover apodictic means necessary. It isn't necessary; it's conditional. -- If there is A, then A is A, such that the only categorical and apodictic truth, the only necessary truth, is what? It's something that is deeper than the principle of identity, which is what? But if A is, A is any representation at all. If there is a

representation, if I represent A, A is A. What else is there other than representations? There's the *moi* [self, ego] that thinks of the representation.

In other words, the principle of identity goes beyond toward something else, which is what? *Moi = moi*, the auto-position of the *moi*. [Pause] And *moi = moi* is irreducible to the simple principle of identity which is always hypothetical. It's truly the *moi* that posits itself, the auto-position of the finite *moi* insofar as the finite *moi* accompanies any representation. Thus, it's the synthesis of the finite *moi*, *moi = moi*, it's the synthesis of the finite *moi* that encounters the principle of identity. The principle of identity is not primary, you see? And from this springs the great reaction against Leibniz. The principle of identity is incapable of posing itself by itself; only the *moi* is [in] auto-position. You see that in this regard, Kantianism expresses, in fact, a moment in philosophy in which they no longer believe in the concept of infinity. Henceforth, the foundation must be sought alongside the finite *moi*.

Well then, what did Leibniz do? This is it, the Kantians yet again, Kant and the Kantians, they have something quite different to do than our own much more modest task. The task that we have taken on this year is to understand Leibniz. The Kantians have something else to do; they have to say what they have to say. So we mustn't wonder if they have understood Leibniz well or not. But we can tell ourselves [that] to some extent, Leibniz was already sensitive to this problem, and what I can say about the question of Leibniz would be: under what condition can one attain an auto-position of the principle of identity? And his answer is: by placing the infinite into identity; by placing the infinite into identity. So identity is truly auto-position. In what form? In the form of the Identicals that include nothing else, each one including nothing other than itself. [Pause]

A quick parenthesis: I am saying that Leibniz is going to derive from this a new proof or rather a formulation of the proof of God's existence. Here, then, I am going rather quickly; I am relating all that you need. I believe I've already said it, but I am resituating this because it will become clearer: he reproached Descartes for having moved too quickly, to have proved God's existence by simply saying: God is the infinitely perfect being, that is, understand, I conceive it as the infinitely perfect being, God thought of as the infinitely perfect being. Well, if such a being didn't exist, if such a being that I conceive of didn't exist, this would be contradictory since it would lack perfection. So I could conceive of an even more perfect being, one that not only would be conceived of as infinitely perfect, but moreover one that would exist. So it would be contradictory to deny God's existence.

Fine. Leibniz answers: this proof is fine, it's quite fine, but it moved forward too quickly because Descartes didn't do, didn't show whether the concept of an infinitely perfect being were possible. What does he tell us? That the conception of an infinitely perfect being is not contradictory, to which Leibniz says, yes, Descartes is correct, that is, God exists, yes, *if it is possible*. The greatest speed or an infinite speed is contradictory. Perhaps the most perfect being, the sovereignly perfect being is also contradictory. Perhaps. So one has to show that God is possible. Descartes wasn't able to do so. Look at what he has in mind. Spinoza will say exactly on this point [that] it will be... Spinoza and

Leibniz are in complete agreement, and both are going to do the same thing, the same operation: how to show that God is possible? If it [God] is possible, it exists, but one had to show that this was possible. And how does one go about showing this? Well, it's [by saying]: God is surely physically simple, but it is not logically simple.

You know what [Leibniz] reproaches Descartes for; it's through this that Leibniz founds modern logic. What he reproaches Descartes for is to have confused two decompositions, the decomposition into parts, and the decomposition into notions. Descartes believed that when something wasn't decomposed into parts, it was simple, simple, by itself. No. Something might not be decomposed into parts and yet could be decomposed into notions. And the Simple is that which is neither decomposable into parts, nor into notions. For example, extension can be, or not be, decomposed into parts, it can only be, after, I mean prior to its own parts, but it remains decomposable into notions. Thus the notion of Simple is in relation to the notion, not in relation to the part.

But for them, Spinoza as much as Leibniz, they can think that they have proved the possibility of God. Why? Because God is the aggregate of forms, the aggregate of forms that one can think of directly as infinite, the aggregate of forms that one can think as infinite by themselves. You will tell me, but I have no idea about such forms. That doesn't matter; it has no importance. God has it, the idea. Or else you say, the idea of an infinite form by itself makes no sense, so that's quite alright. You are already like the Kantians. Or else you grant a sense to the idea of infinite form by itself; there are infinite forms by themselves. Fine, these are the elements of God; these are the constitutive forms of God.

What are these forms? For Leibniz, there are some that exist. What then are these forms? As we saw, these are simple primitive notions. Each one includes only itself; these are forms in which the content for each is only itself. They are absolutely disparate. In this, there is a completely twisted reasoning, very, very appealing, very amusing. Each of God's constitutive forms only includes itself. Each is absolutely disparate from all the others. Henceforth, each includes only itself. Henceforth, they cannot be incompatible. There is a tiny, three-page text by Leibniz in Latin, a Latin text, entitled "That the sovereignly perfect being exists", and he wants to show that God is possible. He says, "The primary elements are forms able to be directly raised to the infinite," that is, in this through themselves as infinite. "They are necessarily compatible," since absolute disparate. They cannot be contrary to each other (*se contrarier*) nor contradict each other. So they can be in a same subject; they can be in a same subject; they can be included in a same subject.

In other words, the proof of God's existence – this is what I was telling you at our last meeting, but I hope that here it's even clearer – goes from the aggregate of all possibilities, that is simple notions, the forms able to be raised to the infinite, it goes from the aggregate of all possibilities to the individual existence of a being that we will call God. This is the formula infinity over 1. It's the possibility of primitive forms that guarantee God's possibility; henceforth, God exists. We go from the aggregate of primitive forms, from simple primitive notions, to the singular existence of a God. Fine,

this is what it is to place the infinite into identity. The day that one can no longer place the infinite into identity, Kantian philosophy will be born, that is, the foundation that we can no longer seek other than alongside the finite *moi*, and then other things will occur, other thing will occur. Fine, generally speaking, we can say that.

So if you've understood that, I have almost completed this long and vexing passage. But for us, we know that there are infinite forms that are the very possibility of God. What is important in what I've just said is this passage, from the aggregate of all possibilities to the singular existence of a God, of which all the possible forms are the elements. We pass from the infinite through 1, but precisely, to place the infinite into identity means creating this passage of infinity over 1. All this is a large morsel, from all of Leibniz's texts that are being considered today. These are not the most enjoyable, but this is necessary.

So for us, our situation is: this is all fine, but the fact is that we are not familiar with these forms, and Leibniz will say it several times, well then, we don't get there. One can always create the logic of these forms, but knowing what they are, how do we do that? So here we are requiring a replacement solution since we do not have an infinite understanding, and the replacement solution, for the Combinatory that we can never push all the way to the end, is what Leibniz calls the *Characteristic*.⁸ On the other hand, we can only manage a variable Characteristic according to the domains under consideration... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:05:00]

Part 4

... I am saying very, very quickly... -- I apologize here for this session, but this is a great relief to have all this done. -- I am telling you now, fine, place yourself in a concrete situation. Our understanding is a finite understanding. We can be certain that there are entirely compatible infinite forms, entirely disparate that are constitutives of God. But at the extreme, we cannot even know what these are, these forms. So, how do we manage to proceed? Fortunately, we have the Characteristic there since if the Combinatory has as its ideal project to direct itself toward simple notions, that is, another name that Leibniz gives them, the primary Possibles, you see, the primary Possibles in God's understanding, well then, how do we ourselves manage?

I believe that here, there is a very important method. [Leibniz] says in general – here I am trying to speak as concretely as possible – he tells us, you know, in the end you find yourself faced with domains that you manage to divide up for reasons of perception, understanding, and at the extreme, domains that you begin by defining uniquely in a nominal manner. You say, the living exists – I am taking an example – the living exists. The living is a domain. And then, there is the inanimate. There's the inanimate and there's the living. You say, there's continuous quantity and there's discontinuous quantity. So you can nominally define some domains. These domains are populated with objects. So you see, you start from a certain complex group, I would say, a complex group that you can define nominally, a milieu, a domain populated with a type of object. There are loads of these. You say, well, the visible. The visible is a domain populated by

colors. [Pause] Life is a domain populated by organisms. So then this goes on to infinity, this discontinuous quantity. It's a domain of quantities populated by numbers. See, you can define all that nominally. That commits you to nothing, I believe.

And Leibniz tells us, what is our personal task? Given a domain, populated with objects, one must define the *requisites* of the domain, that is, pass from the nominal definition to the real definition.⁹ [It's a] very odd notion in Leibniz, the notion of requisite. What is this requisite? It's precisely *that which is required by*; it's the condition of the domain and the objects that populate it. [Pause] What are the requisites of a domain and its objects? These are relatively simple elements, there. These are not the absolutely simple [ones]; these are the relatively Simple about which he will say that they symbolize with the absolutely Simple. They are relatively simple since they are simple relative only to the domain of objects being considered. From which [we have] Leibniz's strength against Descartes; when he says, Descartes believed simplicity to be defined in relation to parts, the Simple is what wouldn't have any parts, whereas simplicity is defined in relation to notions. The Simple is the requisite of a domain, that is, the requisite is the notion implicated by a domain insofar as it is populated by objects.

I come back to my examples. [For] discontinuous quantity populated by the number, what is the requisite? Primary numbers. See the sense in which it's a requisite: it's with primary numbers that you will be able to engender any number. See, the requisite is – if you have followed [this], if you recall our work in the preceding trimester – I would say that it's very similar to point of view. This is what allows us to arrange (*ordonner*) the cases in a domain. For example, the arithmetic triangle in which, at the extreme, you can engender all numbers starting from primary numbers. Fine, if you engender all numbers starting from primary numbers, you have passed into the real definition, that is, you have reached relatively Simple [ones] that are absolutely sufficient in relation to a particular domain.

[For] the visible insofar as [it's] populated by colors, you have primitive colors. You are going to create primitive colors. There is an outline of all the theories of colors in Leibniz. The living and its domain, rather the domain of the living, is the object that is the organism. You compare it with the domain of the inorganic. What is the requisite? That depends on physics. You see, it's a relative requisite, it's a relative Simple. What are we to say? Here, I'm extracting -- so we don't get into all of Leibniz's theories of physics – I'm extracting a simple [element]. The reason is that if you consider the physical milieu as populated by bodies in movement, what is the requisite? The requisite is that the speed of a movement is lost and is gained progressively. He states this against Descartes for whom speed is instantaneous. So he [Leibniz] has already shown that something believed by Descartes as simple, in fact, is not simple, not simple from the viewpoint of notions. The whole domain of physics implies the acquisition and the gradual loss of speed in movement.

How do we take account of this? [It's] through the *summation* (or declaration), the summation of – how to say this in the simplest way? – of small quantities of movement that will compose speed and that Leibniz calls *conatus*, solicitations of movement. There

will be a summation of *conatus*, the *conatus* being relatively simple elements, and relatively simple elements of speed. By reaching the *conatus* that, in fact, are differentials – what is occurring is already infinitesimal calculus – by reaching the *conatus*, I reach the requisite of inorganic movement, that is, the summation of tiny homogeneous parts. By tiny parts, one must understand parts smaller than any given part. You see, I will have my requisite, the requisite taking account of the milieu and the objects that populate it.

I pass on to the living. What is the requisite of an organism? Well, to create an organism, the requisite of the inanimate body does not suffice, that is, the summation of *conatus* does not suffice. The summation of tiny homogeneous parts does not suffice. The summation of *conatus* does not suffice. It matters little why. Here I am summarizing enormously. Leibniz will invoke a new kind of force. The summation of *conatus*, in the inanimate domain, is what he calls – that is, the requisites of physics – it's what Leibniz calls *elastic forces*. He creates a very beautiful physics from elasticity. As we saw, this was very, very precious for our idea of inflection. These are elastic forces.

For the living, for the organism, it's a matter of something else. Elastic forces are not sufficient for creating an organism. What is required? Required are forces that Leibniz calls -- at least in one text, but an important text – *plastic forces*. And plastic forces are not defined by the summation of infinitely tiny parts that would be the *conatus*. Plastic forces are defined by placing *homologous parts* into correspondence. See: elastic forces – summation of tiny homogeneous parts; plastic forces – tiny homologous parts in correspondence. These [terms] matter little; you will look up what all this means in your dictionary, homologous, homogeneous; that will give you some practical exercises and it will be very interesting.

I would say that plastic forces are the requisites of the living milieu and of the organisms that populate it. Elastic forces are the requisites of the physical milieu and of the inorganic bodies that move there. Primary numbers are the requisites of discontinuous quantity, etc., etc. Primitive colors are the requisite of the visible. Each time, in any domain, and recall what I was telling you about point of view: if it's true that point of view is precisely the requisite under which cases of a domain are arranged, the Characteristic is precisely the determination of requisites in a domain being considered and in relation to the objects that populate this domain... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:18:17]

We dispose of relatively simple notions that symbolize with absolutely simple notions, with the primary Possibles. And understand what that means: one must not – I take this as a huge misunderstanding to say this – eh well, yes, there's still an inclusion there because the requisites are included in what results from it, specifically the milieu and objects, a particular milieu and a particular domain of object. For it's the reverse: these are requisites that are including, it's the requisites that are like fertilizer or seeds that contain the domain that is developed starting from them and objects that are unfolded starting from them. As a result, in 2 and 2 are 4, where is the inclusion? Well, in 2 and 2 are 4, the inclusion is obvious, but it's not at all where you think. It's not 4 that is in 2 and 2; it's not “2 and 2” that is in 4; it's “2 and 2 are 4” that is included in the requisites, that is, in

the primary factors, in the primary numbers intervening into 2, 3, and 4, following the linkage of definitions that we had earlier. The inclusion is the inclusion of that which is composed [*du composé*] in the requisites. The requisites are seeds in which the complex domain and its objects are included, such that I would say [that] the requisite is the notion of the thing. You see here, I have exactly, I am returning precisely... All that ought to be utterly dazzling because I would say [that] the domain is the same thing as inflection, the event. Any domain is an event. One must manage to think of the domain as event; that occurs. There you have what occurs.

The fact is... So the domain is an event, fine. The objects that populate the domain are the things to which the event happens. [*Pause*] So then, the event that happens to the thing is included in the concept of the thing. What does that mean? What is the concept of the thing? It's not the thing. The concept of the thing is the aggregate of requisites. It's not the requisites that are included in the thing. It's the thing and what happens to it that are included in the requisites of the thing.

As a result, a Combinatory of primitive colors is necessary. Moreover, Leibniz goes quite far here because he says that in this, obviously, it's uniquely a function of our senses that we speak of primitive colors. We say that green is a mixture, but yellow and blue are obviously mixtures as well. Why? [It's] always for the same reason: there is no infinite yellow, no infinite blue. So these are already complex notions, all this, [but] our senses simply are such that we grasp the mixture for green, but we don't grasp it for yellow and blue. But a Combinatory of colors, well, so, at least the finitude of our senses is useful for us, that is, it allows us to define relative requisites. But understand well, these requisites are really seeds, seeds of a domain and its objects.

And inclusion here... But then, I am getting toward the end, where I had hoped to arrive. It's that... [*Pause*] It's a third case of inclusion. I grasp it, my third case of inclusion. This is what I would like you to understand the misunderstanding to avoid. To say, well yes, I understood; in the judgment of the senses 2 and 2 are 4, 4 is contained in 2 and 2; or else, "2 and 2" is contained in 4. These would be two misunderstandings, two misunderstandings. Yet again, it's not that; it's "2 and 2 are 4" that is contained in the requisites of "2 and 2 are 4", and the requisites of "2 and 2 are 4" is the decomposition into primary factors given in the three definitions, such that the inclusion is never where you think it is. But when I operate through relatively simples, through requisites, what am I faced with? I am faced with what I could literally call a *non-reciprocal inclusion*, a non-reciprocal inclusion, of the part-whole kind. [*Pause*] Every... -- I must not get this wrong; I am saying every... Wait, every... "Every duodenary is..." What do I mean? "Every duodenary," that is, every number divisible by 12... -- I better not... I'm going to lose my place in this; I want to be so clever, but I had better refer to the text. It would be catastrophic if I made a mistake. Alas, everything is getting all mixed up in my head... I can't find my text; everything is going badly... *On Freedom*; there, *On Freedom*! Aie aie aie aie aie aie... Here we are.

"Every duodenary number is a senary", right? That is, every number divisible by 12 is divisible by 6. I am saying that there is an inclusion – you already get this, it's in the air

(*rien qu'au flair*) – there is a non-reciprocal inclusion here because every senary number is not a duodenary. Every number divisible by 6 is not divisible by 12... So every number, beginning with six, every duodenary is a senary. Every number divisible by 12...

How [does] he demonstrate this? Listen well: “For every duodenary is bino-binary ternary.” [Laughter] You’re laughing, but it’s what one does in formal logic, right? We never stop... That comes from Leibniz, all this, whereas myself, I no longer understand anything... Oh yes, “every duodenary is bino-binary ternary.” [Laughter] Why? Why? [It’s] by virtue of a definition. In fact, it’s by virtue of the decomposition into primary numbers, specifically 12 equals – in primary numbers – so a definition for 12: $2 \times 2 \times 3$, 2 bino, 2 binary, 3 ternary. Ooooooh. [Deleuze breaths out, relieved. Laughter] “Every duodenary is bino-binary-ternary”, by definition, since 12 equals $2 \times 2 \times 3$. That’s a definition, that is, a reciprocal inclusion, “and every binary ternary,” 2 multiplied by 3, “is senary”. That works; it’s the definition of 6, through primary factors, 2 multiplied [by 3], you see? I am operating on the level of requisites.

But I haven’t yet demonstrated that every duodenary is senary. One must have something special, eh? I will reread to you the whole of the text. I come upon “every bino-binary is binary.” [Pause] I have to introduce... I have two definitions, but between the two, I have something irreducible with the definitions, specifically – which nonetheless is typically an inclusion – “every bino-binary” – so, what am I saying? Oh, là là -- “every bino-binary ternary is binary ternary,” that is, 2 multiplied by 3 is included in 2 multiplied by 2 multiplied by 3. You will tell me that this goes without saying, but no. That goes without saying, ok, that goes without saying provided that you provide yourself with another kind of inclusion, a new genre of inclusion, non-reciprocal inclusions. When you start off from requisites, you are necessarily going to encounter non-reciprocal inclusions that will allow you to establish linkages between reciprocal inclusions. If you are following me, we are saved, absolutely saved. [Laughter] Everything is explained.

You remember? I had started off from this text, *On Freedom*, that concerned me. Why did he say that in truths of essence, there is a case of truth in which the inclusion is only virtual? He is going to tell us – and this isn’t regarding truths of existence, but indeed mathematical truths, truths of essence – he tells us: there are cases in which one has to “extract an inclusion so that what was virtual (*latent*) in the proposition and contained under [in] a certain power becomes evident (*se trouve rendu*) through the obvious and expressed [*explicit*] demonstration,”¹⁰ for example, his whole story of the duodenary. It’s when we operate not with the absolute Simples that escape us, but with the relatively Simples, [that] there is irreversibility and not reversibility, of the requisite to the domain. In other words, you are going to operate with, not only, with non-reciprocal inclusions. And this is the case, whereas the linkage of definitions can only give you reciprocal inclusions. Intervening here, with the method of requisites, are non-reciprocal inclusions that are going to justify the second case. It’s this that ought to be marvelous for us, if I dare say so, but anyway...

In the end, what are these requisites? I am going to tell you in all domains. But I believe that we will need the requisite, the definition later: it’s *the degree of unity, the degree and*

type of unity that a domain and its objects presuppose. And there is non-reciprocal inclusion of the domain and its objects in the requisites. Henceforth, henceforth I would say that the truths of essence propose to us three types of inclusion.¹¹ Here are the three types of inclusion:

The first type, and that will be our focus today: the auto-inclusions, specifically the Identicals, otherwise called dispartes, otherwise called simple primitive notions, otherwise called primary Possible. Second point: the reciprocal inclusions, otherwise called definitions. [Pause] Third, the requisites or non-reciprocal inclusions.¹² [Pause]

All these three types of inclusion concerning truths of essence have as common characteristic the ability to be developed – except obviously the first ones, the Identicals since the Identicals need not be developed; they are entirely developed in a sense, but they are developable insofar as they would constitute God – they are developable and, I would say, they are assignable. They can be developed. These are eminently unfoldable, developable inclusions. When I assign a requisite, I develop an inclusion; I am developing a non-reciprocal inclusion. There you are.

The truths of existence, then, Caesar crossing the Rubicon, what is that going to be? Here as well, there is going to be inclusion in the notion. This time, what is the requisite going to be since there is always inclusion in the requisite? It's going to be the individual notion. What is the individual notion? See? There is going to be a faceoff of these simple primitive notions, the primary Possible, or the Representor [*Représentant*], that is, the requisites. It goes alongside the individual notions that are themselves requisites, but requisites of truths of existence. What is an individual notion? This time, there is indeed inclusion of the event and of the thing in the notion. The thing is that which happens to it, [and] what's included in the individual notion, that is, in the requisite, fine. [Pause]

So, simply, I would say that the inclusion is not developable. God itself, the text *On Freedom* tells us, only sees the envelopment. God itself sees only the envelopment. What does that mean? But that means, in fact, that in a certain way this is what we have been saying from the start: the fold goes on to infinity. Envelopment goes on to infinity, agreed, but we saw this from the start. It's also true of truths of essence. There is only the infinite everywhere. So that is not sufficient.

At the extreme, I would say that with truths of existence, there begins another type of inclusion, a fourth type of inclusion, in which this time, the inclusion is no longer localizable. The reciprocal inclusion... Oh, sorry, the non-reciprocal inclusions were perfectly localizable. The non-reciprocal inclusions were transmitted along the demonstrative chain. The non-reciprocal inclusions were localized, localizable. Every bino-binary is binary. But here, we are going to enter into a domain of non-localizable inclusion. What is this going to be?

Good, here we are; I'd like to finish on this because you need to reflect on this for the next meeting. In the Letters from Arnauld, [there are] two strange topics -- Arnauld being a figure from Port-Royal who had a great correspondence with Leibniz -- two topics,

Leibniz mixes together two very odd topics. He jumps at the same time from one to the other and drives Arnauld mad. Arnauld doesn't know what he's getting at. [Leibniz] tells us, here's God – I want to show that God is not responsible for evil. He tells us, God didn't create Adam as sinner. That's his first great expression, God didn't create Adam as sinner, but he created the world in which Adam sinned. God didn't create Adam as sinner, but he created the world in which Adam sinned.

Second proposition: the world doesn't exist outside the individual notions that express it, Adam, Caesar, Alexander, you, me. You get the sense of this; first proposition: God didn't create a particular individual notion; he created the world in which there is a particular individual notion. Second proposition: the world doesn't exist outside the individual notions that express it. All this makes one dizzy if you try to... One feels that this is not contradictory, in fact. God created the world, but not the individual notions, well yes, but take care. Hardly have we understood this than Leibniz says, yes but be careful: the world doesn't exist outside the individual notions, which means what? Perhaps we could understand thanks to our work during the first trimester.

God begins through inflection. It creates the series of inflection called the world. In fact, it creates the world. It creates the world in which "Adam sinned"; it's a series of events, of pure events, sin, salvation, death, life, etc. It creates the world. [Pause] Only, in this, from inflection to inclusion, the world that God creates exists only as folded into individual notions. Each notion expresses the world. It doesn't exist outside individual notions. God does not create Adam, Caesar, etc.; it creates the world in which there is Adam, Caesar. But this world doesn't exist other than folded into the notion of Adam, the notion of Caesar, etc. So, in fact, this is non-foldable inclusion, you see? It creates the world, but it creates it *within* individual notions. And if I tell this to [God], ah God, you created Adam as sinner, you made a whole lot of trouble for all of us, God responds no, I didn't create Adam as sinner; I created the world in which there is sin, and this world only exists within individual notions, that is, I folded it into Adam.

So, this idea, this is a really strange that it [God] comes up with, that is, [that] this world is not foldable; it cannot move away from individual notions. But nonetheless, yes, then by what right does one speak of this world? [There's] a final point to correct: yes, in fact, we can unfold it, but *ideally*, ideally. Outside individual notions that express it, the world only has an ideal existence. [Pause] God creates the world in which Adam sinned, but careful, this world only exists folded into Adam and into other individual notions. So this is amazing. When Leibniz is attacked on this point, he [*Deleuze makes a dodging motion; laughter in the room*]; when he is attacked on the other point, he doesn't answer. He is told, come on, this world is still in Adam; he answers, it's possible, but what interests God is this world. It's the world that God created, that's all. But they say, fine, this world included sin... But careful, this world exists only within Adam, enveloped within Adam. That's what I mean by a non-localizable inclusion.

So, he is going get out of this problem; we get the sense that he's leading us, he's leading us... that he is too clever for us. Suddenly, we have to take him on a single point... Fine, he himself says that there is a large difference with truths of essence. It's that Adam as

non-sinner was possible, whereas “2 and 2 are not 4” is not possible. This [the first] is what you can readily conceptualize, but you cannot conceive that 2 and 2 do not make 4. On the other hand, you can conceive of Adam not sinning; if God grants us that, we have to ask, ok, come on then, Adam not sinning, what is this, some other world? What is it? What does that mean? And what is an individual notion? God does not create the individual notions, but it creates the world in which there are individual notions. And on the other hand, this world itself does not exist outside individual notions. So good, fine, what is an individual notion? Why is the opposite of an individual notion possible?

And here there is going to emerge the most beautiful of his concepts, the concept of *impossibility*, and that we will see at the next class, to wit, yes, Adam as non-sinner is possible, only he is *impossible* with our world, whereas 2 and 2 doesn't make 4, that's impossible. And is there an Adam as non-sinner? Yes, it's possible, only it's not compossible with this world. And he invents this very odd notion of compossibility, and it's the task, I assume, of every reader of Leibniz, at all costs, to give consistency to the notion of compossible and impossible. Adam as non-sinner is impossible with our world. What could that mean? Alas, [although] Leibniz frequently uses the notion, to our disappointment one single time he tells us [that] the root of impossibility escapes our understanding. [*Laughter*] This gets really strange because, on one hand, this is unacceptable, completely unacceptable. We want, we demand a root of impossibility that consists in what? To show us how impossibility is another relation than just contradiction. And this is essential, even from the point of view of logic. At all costs, a logic is necessary, a logic that might be able to show that the impossible and the contradictory are two completely different relations.

So we have to say that perhaps Leibniz, at the same time that he was telling us that the roots of impossibility escape us, he was leaving us enough signs and possibilities to give to the notion of compossibility a more positive sense. From which we have our task: what does that mean, what does impossibility mean, and what logical principle does it assume? What does it mean, Adam as non-sinner is not compossible with our world? [*End of the recording*] [2:48:26]

Notes

¹ Having finally completed the first part of the seminar, "Leibniz as Baroque philosopher", Deleuze introduces in the 13 January 1987 session the second part of the course, based on the foundation of earlier course material that roughly encompassed chapters 1 and 2, and part of 3, in *The Fold* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

² See chapter 4 of *The Fold* which has this principle as its title.

³ Deleuze considers this distinction in *The Fold*, pp. 42-43 ; *Le Pli* (Minuit, 1988), pp. 56-57.

⁴ On this precise point, see *The Fold*, p. 148, ch. 4, note 4.

⁵ Deleuze refers to this in *The Fold*, p. 43, note 6; *Le Pli*, p. 57.

⁶ This development is provided in much more condensed term in the *The Fold*, pp. 43-44.

⁷ From Aristotle's "Physics".

⁸ Deleuze introduces the Characteristic in *The Fold*, p. 47, *Le Pli*, p. 63.

⁹ On the requisites, see *The Fold*, pp. 46-49; *Le Pli*, pp. 62-65.

¹⁰ *On Freedom*; see this precise argument and this quote in *The Fold*, pp. 51-52, and note 22 (p. 149; I note variants from the text to Deleuze's reading here); *Le Pli*, pp. 69-70.

¹¹ Cf. *The Fold*, pp. 48-49; *Le Pli*, p. 65.

¹² Deleuze provides a summary chart for these distinctions, although differently organized, in *The Fold*, p. 57; *Le Pli*, p. 77, to which he adds a fourth category, “Individuals”, i.e. Existents or Substances, to which he turns a few paragraphs later.