

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Leibniz: Philosophy and the Creation of Concepts

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Translation and supplements based on YouTube video, [\[1\]](#) Charles J. Stivale [\[2\]](#)

Part 1

Today, I am going to end with a very general problem, but that will serve as conclusion for this introduction to Leibniz, and then all this will be done. And the other two times, I'd like – because this was asked of me in passing – I'd like [to do] a type of session – already as if on vacation, eh? – a kind of limited session. I am saying this first so that, if you come, you might know already what to expect, because that might not work, but it could work, in which several of you asked me – what both annoyed me and pleased me greatly – they asked me about the possibility of doing a sort of summary session on both my own word over several year, specifically how, for example, I now consider, how I now consider *Anti-Oedipus*, so there we are. So, obviously, that's only possible if I maintain the necessary and desirable modesty, and on the other hand, well, fine... So, that will take the form both of what I think about all that, and then with you posing questions that arise, all the questions you like. And no, it would be rather interesting, if you come, that you would have questions, in fact, because *Anti-Oedipus* is something that's already 10 years old. So, in the meantime, I'd like for those who have been coming for several years – without excluding the others – but coming here, who'd like to say – I'd don't know, coming four, five years – I'm writing on this particular topic, what was I expecting from this. It's good that you speak as well because there are questions on matters that might already outline what we could undertake next year, and that would be completely... So, that would be, the two sessions would be a kind of working reflection, eh? There we are.

So then, I would like to finish these meetings on Leibniz by presenting the problem that I indicated I want to consider. So, in order really to treat this problem, one would need, one would need a year, so, these are just conclusions I'd like to draw as a function of an example. I am returning to a question that I asked from the start, specifically: what does this image mean, that good sense often creates about philosophy, once we admit that good sense and philosophy often have had delicate relations, relations of rivalry, of hate, of provocation, of polemics. What does this image mean that good sense sometimes produces about philosophy, as a kind of locus of discussion in which philosophers are fundamentally not in agreement? In that case, I was saying, you understand, an opposition arises between creativity in art or truth in science and a kind of philosophical atmosphere in which people argue, they uphold theses, they fight among themselves, whereas at least in science, they know what they are considering, and in art there is a creation that escapes criteria for arguing. So, it's this idea, of course, that everyone can consider as having lost validity, the conception of philosophy in which philosophers confront one another, saying some very, very different things. Notice that “good sense” holds the same, almost

reversed conception. We are told as well that all philosophers never stop repeating the same thing, they all agree, or all hold opposite views.

It's precisely in relation to Leibniz that I would like to select some very precise examples. What does it mean that two philosophies do not agree? What could that possibly mean? Because finally, I am just stating that if we speak about polemics, once again, polemics like a certain state of things that runs through certain disciplines, I do not find that there are more polemics in philosophy than there are in science or in art. So, it's this role, what does it mean for one philosopher to criticize another philosopher? What is the function of critique? Fine, I believe that one should proceed very carefully and choose exactly what Leibniz offers us, Fine, he offers us the opportunity of choosing a very, very precise example. The example that I'd like to select is: what does the opposition between Kant and Leibniz mean, once we have said that it was a fundamental opposition in the history of philosophy, as if all sorts of things resulted from this? And what does it mean for Kant to undertake a critique of Leibniz?

And here as well, so that we proceed in an orderly fashion, I would like to number what I want to tell you. Well then, to commit to reflecting on what a philosophical argument or critique might be, I believe that it is first, it implies an initial task: to localize the oppositions. And I am not saying that there are only two; by saying that there are two oppositions, I am limiting myself to two fundamental oppositions from the point of view of knowledge. From other points of view, this would be even more complicated, but here, from the point of view of knowledge, and from the theory of knowledge, I see two fundamental oppositions between Leibniz and Kant that function then like thesis and antithesis.

So again, one would have to... It isn't enough to localize oppositions because already, a task, if we today give ourselves the task of commenting on philosophical opposition, well, I would say, when we manage to trace the great philosophical oppositions, on the level of the concepts used by particular philosophers, we also have almost to evaluate their relations to these oppositions, namely they [the oppositions] are not of equal value. Perhaps one does happen to have greater weight than another; perhaps there is a more decisive one. If you fail to organize the oppositions, I think that you are no longer able to understand what the subject is in a polemic. Thus, I start off by numbering: first opposition between Leibniz and Kant, from the point of view of knowledge. I will let Leibniz speak. Hence, you can imagine a dialogue of the dead in which the dead are having an argument.

A Leibnizian proposition: all propositions are analytical, and knowledge can proceed only by analytical propositions. You recall that we call "analytical proposition" a proposition in which one of the two terms of the proposition is contained in the concept of the other. Fine, you already see, if we remain here, this is a philosophical formula: every proposition is analytical, and knowledge proceeds via analytical propositions. I am saying, we should almost sense already that there is no point in arguing at this level. Why? Because there is already something implied, specifically that there is a certain model of knowledge. What is presupposed – things are presupposed, yes, and in the sciences as well, there are also presuppositions; in painting as well, in art as well, there are presuppositions -- what is presupposed is, it seems to me exactly this: a certain idea of knowledge, specifically knowing is discovering what is included in the concept. Knowing it discovering what is included in the concept; we can already hold onto this. It's a

definition of knowledge. This is a definition; I find it entirely interesting as a definition, but well then, I ask myself, why? Why would that be knowing? We are pleased! We are pleased to have a definition of knowledge, but why this one rather than something else?

From the other side, Kant arises and says: there are synthetic propositions. You see what a synthetic proposition is. We will call it, it's enough to trace it from an analytical proposition; we will call a synthetic proposition a proposition in which one of the terms is not contained in the concept of the other. Kant arrives and asks us: so, is this a cry? Isn't this a cry? Is this a proposition? Against Leibniz, he tells us, "no"; what he says after is "no"; there are synthetic propositions, and that knowledge exists only through synthetic propositions. The opposition seems perfect. [Pause]

Fine; at this point, a thousand questions assail me. What are they going to argue about? What would that mean to argue, to argue about who is right, who is right about what? Is this provable? Are we in the domain of what might be called decidable propositions? I am saying simply that already the Kantian definition must interest you because, if you consider it closely, it also implies a certain conception of knowledge, and it happens that this conception of knowledge is very different from Leibniz's. When one says that knowledge only proceeds through synthetic propositions, that is, a proposition such that one of its terms is not contained in the concept of the other, there is therefore a synthesis between the two terms, [Pause] someone who says this can no longer base knowledge on the Leibnizian conception. He can no longer accept the idea that knowing would be to discover what is included in the concept. He will tell us, on the contrary, you know that to know is not at all to discover what is included in a concept, that knowledge necessarily means leaving behind one concept in order to affirm something else. We call "synthesis" the act through which one leaves a concept behind in order to attribute to it or to affirm something else.

In other words, what is it to know? It's not to have a concept; it's always to go beyond the concept. In other words, knowing is to go beyond (*connaître, c'est dépasser*); knowing is to go beyond, it's passing on to something else. Understand all that is in play here. In the first conception, to know is to have a concept and discover what is contained in the concept. I would say about that knowledge that it is based on a particular model which is one of passion or of perception. To know is finally to perceive something, even if it's something mental, something spiritual; to know is to apprehend; to know is a passive model of knowledge, even if many activities depend on it. In the other case, to the contrary, knowing means going beyond; it's going beyond the concept for; it means leaving the concept behind in order to affirm something else. Here, on the contrary, it's a conception in which knowledge is brought back to an appropriate model. Fine, all kinds of things come into play when the model of know of knowledge is decentered to this extent.

But then, I return therefore to my two propositions, Leibniz's proposition, Kant's proposition. What is there to be done with them? Let us suppose here that we are like referees. We find ourselves faced with these two propositions, and I suppose here we then ask: what do I choose? It's like being in a game; what do I bet on, on Leibniz or on Kant? One still has to ask a load of questions in the question, and we haven't finished. First when I ask, is it decidable, can I decide which proposition seems to me even [word unclear]? What would that mean? It could mean that

it's a question of fact. One has to find the facts that allow one to say that one or the other is right. Good, let's try. Obviously, it's not that. Propositions that are to some extent philosophical propositions aren't justifiable on the basis of a verification of facts. But if we understand why, already this will be... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*].

That is why philosophy has always distinguished two questions, and this is rather important, it seems to me, and Kant especially, for example, will take up this distinction again. This distinction is classic, and it was formulated in Latin in the form: *quid facti*, what is derived from fact (*qu'en est-il du fait*), and *quid juris*, what is derived from principle (*qu'en est-il du droit*). And if philosophy is concerned with principle, it is precisely because it poses questions that are called *de jure* questions (*questions de droit*). What does it mean that my two paradoxical propositions, my two opposed propositions, Leibniz's proposition and Kant's proposition, are not justifiable on the basis of a factual response? It means something quite simple: it means that in fact, there is no problem, in fact, there's no problem because all the time we encounter phenomena that are phenomena of synthesis.

Indeed, in my simplest judgments, I pass my time operating syntheses. I say, for example, that this straight line is white. It is quite obvious when I say, "this straight line is white," that with this, I am affirming about a straight line something that is not contained in the concept of straight line. Why? Every straight line is not white. That this straight line is white is obviously an encounter in the experience; I could not have made such a statement beforehand, I couldn't say it beforehand, I couldn't say this line will be white, unless I had the firm intention of tracing that [*unclear words*]. But then, I encounter in experience straight lines that are white, period, that's it. It's a synthesis, and we call this kind of synthesis *a posteriori*, *a posteriori* meaning that which is given in experience, [*Pause*] or which is encountered in experience.

Why doesn't this take care of that? So, I would say, obviously there are syntheses of fact – this straight line is white – why doesn't that resolve the problem? That doesn't resolve the problem for a very simple reason: this "straight line is white" does not constitute knowledge. It constitutes what we can call a protocol of experience because I can state on a particular day, at a particular hour that I encounters a straight line that is white. Let's say that we call this a protocol of experience. Knowledge is something else; knowledge is something other than tracing protocols of experience.

So fine, when does one know? – Here, I am remaining in some very, very classical things; it's like a terminology lesson -- one knows when a proposition bases its claim in a principle (*se réclame d'un droit*). What defines a proposition's principle is the universal and the necessary. When I say that a straight line is the shortest path from one point to another, I maintain a proposition of principle (*une proposition de droit*). Why? Because I don't need to measure each straight line to know that, if it's straight, it's the shortest path. Every straight line, beforehand, *a priori*, that is, independently of experience, is the shortest path from one point to another, otherwise it would not be a straight line.

Thus, I would say that the proposition, "a straight line is the shortest path," constitutes indeed a proposition of knowledge. I do not await experience to discover that a straight line is the shortest path; to the contrary, I determine the experience since the shortest path from one point to another

is my way of tracing a straight line experientially. Any straight line is necessarily the shortest path; I can say, any straight line is necessarily the shortest path from one point to another. That is, this is a proposition of knowledge and not a proposition of protocol. So, let us take this proposition – I would say, it's an a priori proposition, and a priori, this will be uniquely independent from experience.

And I ask myself, fine, in this, are we going to be able finally to pose the question of separation, of division between Leibniz and Kant, specifically is it an analytical proposition or is it a synthetic proposition? [Pause]

Kant says something very simple: it's necessarily, a priori, a synthetic proposition, it's an a priori synthetic proposition -- Why? Because when you say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another, you are leaving obviously behind the concept "straight line." Ah, hey, this is really odd. Isn't it the content in a straight line to be the shortest path from one point to another? It goes without saying that Leibniz would say that it is the content in "straight line." Kant says no. So, there, we are in the process of tightening up our proposition. He says no. The shortest path from one point to another is not contained in the straight line. The concept "straight line", according to the Euclidian definition is: line *ex aequo* in all of its points. You won't draw from this the shortest path between one point and another. You have to leave the concept behind to affirm something else about it. We're not convinced. [Pause] Let's keep looking.

Why... What is... One cannot provide reasons, you understand, every time one says something. So what reason does he have? We'd have to interrupt him at that point. Why are you saying that, Kant? Why can't you find, by digging, by analyzing the concept of a straight line, why can't you find the shortest path from one point to another? Kant would answer, I suppose, think about this a bit: the shortest path from one point to another is, overall, a concept – maybe it's not one, but this to speak simply – it's a concept which that implies what? Which implies a comparison. A comparison of what? The comparison of the shortest line, the line determined as the shortest path from one point to another, with other lines that are what lines? Which are obviously lines that are either broken lines or curvilinear lines, that is, curves. [Pause]

Ah, ok, that ought to provide some clarity. I cannot say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another without implying a comparison, the relation of the straight line to curvilinear lines, to curved lines. For Kant, it suffices to say that a synthesis lies therein; you are forced to leave the "straight line" concept in order to reach the "curved line" concept, and it's in the relation of straight lines to curved lines that you say the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. It's a synthesis, thus knowledge is a synthetic operation. Fine, fine.

What would Leibniz answer? Would he be disturbed by that? No. First of all, he would not be bothered. We have seen enough of Leibniz. He would say that obviously, obviously, you have to keep in mind the "curved line" concept when you say that the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. Of course, one recalls this, but Leibniz is the creator of a differential calculus through which the straight line is going to be considered as the limit of curves. There is a process to the limit. [Pause] Hence Leibniz's theme: it's an analytical relation, simply it's an infinite analysis. The straight line is the limit [Pause] of the curve, just as rest is the limit of movement, etc.

Does this move us forward? We aren't moving forward much because we notice that this becomes inextricable. So, either one can no longer resolve this, or they mean the same thing. [If they say the same thing, what would this be? It would mean that, after all, what Leibniz calls infinite analysis is the same thing as what Kant calls finite synthesis. [Pause] Suddenly, it's only a question of words. Philosophers debate, they debate, but this is nothing more than a question of words. One calls infinite analysis what the other one calls finite synthesis. There's no reason for creating a... If this serves them, then there's no... As for continuing, this is not our concern since if, in the end, they agree, what are they agreeing about. They agree in order, it is said, at that point, they agree in order to establish a difference in nature, one of them between finite analysis and infinite analysis, the other between analysis and synthesis. It comes down to the same thing: what Leibniz calls infinite analysis; Kant will call finite synthesis.

You see, hence the idea of good sense that, simultaneously, a philosophical dispute is inextricable since we cannot decide who is right, and at the same time, knowing who is right is without any importance since they both say the same thing. [Pause] Good sense can conclude just as well: the only good philosophy is me. [Pause] Tragic situation. Because if good sense achieves the goals of philosophy, better than philosophy itself does it, then there is no reason to wear yourself out doing philosophy. Aaaah, so?

It goes without saying that we no longer have anything to do with this first stage. [Pause] I am saying, let's look for a kind of bifurcation because this whole story, infinite analysis or finite synthesis, is this as arbitrary as it seems? Isn't this opposition, this first great opposition between Leibniz and Kant, even if it now seems obvious to us, isn't this because, in fact, this opposition moves well beyond itself toward a deeper opposition, and if we don't see the deeper opposition, we can understand nothing. Hence our question: what would this second, deeper opposition be? [Pause]

I believe that our earlier sessions on Leibniz here have given us, here as well, the means to answer. We saw that there was a great Leibnizian proposition, called the principle of indiscernibles, notably that any difference, in the final instance, is conceptual. Any difference is in the concept. Any difference is conceptual. If two things differ, they cannot simply differ by number, by figure, by movement, etc., etc.; their concept must not be the same. Every difference is conceptual.

Notice how this proposition is truly the presupposition of Leibniz's preceding proposition. If he is right on this point, if every difference is conceptual, it is quite obvious that it's by analyzing concepts that we know, since knowing is knowing through differences. Thus, if every difference, in the final instance, is conceptual, the analysis of the concept will make us know the difference and will therefore cause us quite simply to know. Fine. We see into which task this drew Leibniz, an extremely advanced mathematical task, which consisted in showing the differences between figures, the differences between numbers, etc., referring to differences in the concepts.

So, what is Kant's proposition in opposition to this second Leibnizian proposition? Here, this is also going to be something pretty odd (*un drôle de truc*). – And I'd like for you to learn something even about the necessity for you to, I don't know, when you read philosophy, this is why I insist... I'd like, I'd like this to be very, very scholarly. – I am saying that Kant offers us a very

strange proposition, very strange. He says, you know, if you look closely at the world as it's presented to you, you will see that it is composed of at least two sorts of irreducible determinations. [*Pause*] What are these irreducible determinations? You have conceptual determinations that always correspond to what a thing is; I can even say that a concept is the representation of what the thing is. So, you have determinations of that sort; I am saying, for example, the lion is an animal that roars; that's a conceptual determination.

And then you have another kind of determination altogether. Kant proposes his great thing (*son grand truc*): he says that it's no longer at all conceptual determinations, but spatio-temporal determinations. What are these spatio-temporal determinations? It's the fact that the thing is here and now, that it is to the right or to the left, that it occupies in one way or another a certain kind of space, that it describes a space, that it lasts a certain time. And so, however far you push the analysis of concepts, you will never arrive at this domain of spatio-temporal determinations by analyzing concepts. Although you might – so here, you see the second opposition to Leibniz – although you might go to infinity, although you might push your analysis of the concept to infinity, you will never find a determination in the concept that takes this into account for you: that this thing is on the right or on the left. Fine.

What does he mean? He selects examples for himself that initially seem very, extremely convincing. He says, here we are, consider two hands, two hands. It is well known that, fine, you can think of two hands, even... -- It's not true, in fact, but once again, the question isn't... "what is this...?", you are perhaps going to understand the difference between "what is this in fact?" and "what is this in principle?". -- Each of us knows that one's own two hands, your little hands, don't each have exactly the same traits, for example, the same distribution of pores, the same outline of traits. Agreed. Leibniz wins. Fine, score one point, that's good for me – Come on, we have to imagine this as if they were in a casino, so one point for one, one point for the other. – A point for Leibniz; that's good for him. In fact, there are no two hands that are identical. He says, well then, I've said this all along; it's my famous principle of indiscernibles. If there are two things, they must differ through the concept. You can always assign a difference through the concept, in which two things are not the same.

Kant says, it is indeed possible in fact, but it doesn't matter, it's a remark of no importance, no interest. Well, this is odd. Already appearing, and this is perhaps not the only discipline, is the expression "it has no interest". "You say that? no interest", you know. Once again, to try to remove from our minds whether the discussions are true and false. Discussions never go through the true and the false. My question is never: do you say is true or do you say is false? My question is: does this have any interest at all or is it an irrelevant platitude, and who will say it. And I think about that because science, when scientists enter into controversies as deep as [*unclear words*] what is thrown at one's head, once again, when mathematicians do not agree, obviously, he doesn't blame another mathematician for making a mistake in his proof anyhow. They know just enough math not to talk nonsense; moreover, mathematicians don't even provide proofs, and it's still true today. There are guys who come up with propositions, and then they sketch a bit of a proof, and they drop the rest which has no interest, which is not interesting, really.

What is important? What is it? Does the proposition from which I'm making a theorem, or a proposition, or an axiom, or whatever, does that have any interest at all? What is a madman? A madman is not a question of fact, it is also a question of *quid juris*. This is not someone who is saying the false things. There are lots of mathematicians who are inventing completely crazy theories. Why are they crazy? Are they crazy because they are false or contradictory? No, generally, they are determined by the fact that they handle an enormous mathematical conceptual apparatus, for example, for propositions devoid of any interest, of any interest. There is a beautiful text by [Henri] Poincaré in which there is, precisely about a thesis, he says about a thesis of a mathematician of his time, well yes, why not? Mathematically, it's without interest. Okay.

I believe that in philosophy, it is the same. You have whole books of philosophy in which one wonders why this is done. That's not wrong, [but] it has no interest, none, none. You have to say, okay, fine. So, what's annoying is that there are surely people who find some kind of interest in it, starting with the person who wrote the book. So there, in fact, what does mean at this polemical level? One very quickly gets unpleasant; there is no longer even a point of arguing if ... if you have to say to someone, "it has absolutely no interest", of course, that is very offensive; that gets uncomfortable, you understand. If I could at least tell him, "that's false." It gets tricky there, having no interest.

We reach another story: Kant would dare to tell Leibniz, well, all that, what you are saying about the two hands with their differences of pores has no interest since you can conceive *quid juris*, "what is this by right", by right but not in fact, you can conceive of two hands belonging to the same person, having exactly the same distribution of pores, the same outline of traits. This is not logically contradictory, even if it does not exist in fact, it's not logically contradictory. Well then, says Kant, there is something nonetheless that is very odd: however far you push your analysis, these two hands are identical. And admire the fact that they cannot be superposed.

What does that mean? This is a famous paradox, the paradox of non-superposable symmetrical objects. Imagine: you have your two absolutely identical hands, you cut them off, you cut them off in order for them to have a radical degree of mobility, so that they are no longer held by your arms. Let them get cut off, fine, you can still do that [*Deleuze demonstrates*], you can do that, you cannot cause them to coincide; you cannot superpose them. Why can't you superpose them? It's simple. You're not going to superpose them; why? The Kantian clap of thunder sounds, and Kant harnesses a god, so it's quite simple because there is a right and a left; they can be absolutely identical in everything else, there is still one that is the right hand and the other the left hand.

That means what if there is one that is the right hand and one that is the left hand? We see what that means: that there is a spatial determination irreducible to the order of the concept. The concept of your two hands can be strictly, absolutely identical; [but] however far you push the analysis, there will still be one of them that is my right hand and one that is my left hand. You cannot cause them to be superposed. You can do this, you can do that [*Deleuze demonstrates*], and why can't you cause them to be superposed? It's simple. Under what condition can you cause two figures to be superposed? This is well known: on the condition of having access to a dimension supplementary to that of the figures since one has to make a figure turn within the

supplementary dimension. It's because there is a third dimension of space that you can cause two flat figures to be superposed. You could cause two volumes to be superposed if you have access to a fourth dimension. [If] you don't have access to a fourth dimension, they will not be superposed. There is an irreducibility in the order of space. The same thing holds for time: there is an irreducibility in the order of time. Thus, however far you push the analysis of conceptual differences, an order of difference will always remain outside of the concepts and the conceptual differences. This will be spatio-temporal differences. [*Pause*]

So, let's come back here. Doesn't Kant again gain the stronger position? [*Interruption of the BNF recording; the following text is furnished by WebDeleuze*] [39:12] Let's go back to the straight line. [Regarding] the idea of synthesis, we are going to recognize that it was not a matter of mere words for Leibniz. [*Return to BNF recording*]

Part 2

If we stopped at the analysis-synthesis difference, we didn't have the means of finding in what way this is something other than a discussion of terms. Here, we are in the process of discovering the extent to which this is something more than a discussion of terms. What is Kant in the process of saying? Kant is saying: however far you go in your analysis, you will have an irreducible order of time and space, irreducible to the order of the concept. In other words, space and time are not concepts. There are two sorts of determinations: determinations of concepts and spatio-temporal determinations. [*Pause*]

So, the straight line is the shortest path from one point to another. What does Kant mean when he says this is a synthetic proposition? What he means is, this is a luminous idea; what he means is this: the straight line is indeed a conceptual determination, but the shortest path from one point to another is not a conceptual determination, but a spatio-temporal determination. The two are irreducible. You will never be able to deduce one from the other. There is a synthesis between them. And what is knowing? Knowing is creating the synthesis of conceptual determinations and spatio-temporal determinations. There we have what he discovers; it's very odd. And so, he is in the process of tearing space and time from the concept; he is in the process of tearing space and time from the logical concept. Is it by chance that he himself will name this operation Aesthetics? [*Pause*] I mean, even on the most superficial level of aesthetics, that is, the best-known, the theory of art, won't this liberation of space and time in relation to logical concepts be the basis of any discipline called aesthetics? [*Pause*]

As a result, you see now how it is that, at this second level, Kant would define synthesis. He would say that synthesis is the act through which I leave behind all concepts in order to affirm something irreducible to concepts. Knowing is creating a synthesis because it necessarily means leaving behind all concepts in order to affirm something extra-conceptual in it. The straight line, concept, I leave it behind, it's the shortest path from one point to another; from this, I affirm a spatio-temporal, extra-conceptual determination. At that point, I am creating a synthesis.

What is the difference between this second Kantian proposition and the first? Here, just admire, because all that is very poetic; admire the progress Kant made. Kant's first definition – when he was saying that knowing means operating through synthesis – this is issuing synthetic

propositions, Kant's first proposition amounted to saying this: knowing means leaving behind a concept in order to affirm about it something that was not contained in it. [*Pause*] Fine, this is already quite interesting. But at this level, I could not know if he was right because Leibniz arrived and said, but no, there is always a possibility of an infinite analysis that I stop because I myself am not infinite. But, in the name of an infinite analysis, what I affirm about a concept will always be contained in the concept. So, there is no means to resolve this.

A second, deeper level: we take a step forward, but we cannot take two steps at once. Kant no longer tells us that knowing means leaving a concept behind in order to affirm something that would be like another concept. Rather knowing means leaving one concept in order to leave behind all concepts, and to affirm something about it that is irreducible to the order of the concept in general. This is another proposition; it's a much more interesting proposition. [*Pause*] Fine.

So, once again, we move onward (*on rebondit*). If you have understood this, we are perhaps reaching something important concerning comprehension. Once again, what I mean is for this to be like, if you accept, like practical concepts for comprehending philosophy entirely in general. So, it matters little if I've chosen a particularly boring example, the straight line. This is valid for any proposition in philosophy.

But at this level, I come back to my question about good sense: is this decidable? One of them tells us that every difference is conceptual in the final instance, and therefore you can affirm nothing about a concept that might go outside the order of the concept in general; the other one tells us that there are two kinds of differences, conceptual differences and spatio-temporal differences such that knowing necessarily means leaving behind the concept in order to affirm something about it that is irreducible to all concepts in general, specifically something that concerns space and time. [*Pause*] So, is it yes or no, really?

At this point, what do we realize? Well, we realize that we haven't left all that behind because we realize that Kant, quietly – and he wasn't obligated to say it, even since he could only say it a hundred pages later – Kant can only maintain the proposition he just suggested about the irreducibility of spatio-temporal determinations in relation to conceptual determination, he can only affirm that, this irreducibility, because he dealt a master stroke (*coup de force*). And once again, what interests me is this, the philosopher who delivers a master stroke in concepts, that is, if it's really a concept. For his proposition to make sense, that is, to have any interest whatever, because in all this, I am looking for what the interest is, he had to change radically the traditional definition of space and time, it's important. You might ask me, why is it important? Perhaps for our way of living because perhaps he sensed something changing. I mean that it's important as much on the level of science as that of philosophy, and as that of daily life.

What does that mean, to manage to say that space and time are not at all what you believed? That's where Kant has arrived, at the risk of being a great philosopher. What did he do -- and here, that's my third point --? So, we have already seen two stages of the Kant-Leibniz opposition; we arrive at a third stage. This opposition is stripped of any interest if we do not see that the Leibnizian propositions and the Kantian propositions are distributed in two completely different space-times. In other words, it's not even the same space-time about which Leibniz said

– so, notice why it’s undecidable! I cannot answer by yes or by no – it’s not the same space-time about which Leibniz said: all of these determinations of space and time are reducible to conceptual determinations, and this other space-time about which Kant told us: the determinations of space-time are absolutely irreducible to the order of the concept. This is what we have to show in a simple way, even at the risk of cutting out the practical consequences; we will perhaps come back to these, the practical consequences. But take note that this is a moment in which thought reels (*vacille*). Where am I going? What am I going to do? What experience do I have of space-time? Why am I myself going to be Leibnizian or Kantian, or yet neither one nor the other? So, I mean, this unfolds strongly by virtue of arguments that are thrown about, all that; it occurs underneath, it occurs in the more interesting undergrounds.

For a very, very long time, a long time – but why? Again, we haven’t finished retreating by asking why after the last why – for a very, very long time, space was defined as, to some extent, the order of coexistences, or the order of simultaneities, [*Pause*] and time was defined as the order of successions. And is it by chance that Leibniz is the one who pushes this very ancient conception to its limit, all the way to a kind of absolute formulation? For Leibniz adds, and he states it formally: space is the order of possible coexistences and time is the order of possible successions. By adding “possible,” why does he push this to the absolute? Because it refers to his entire theory of compossibility and of the world. Thus, he captures in this way the old conception of space and time, and he uses it for his own system.

At first glance, that seems rather good. In fact, it’s always delicate when someone tells, define space, define time, and if I don’t say even by reflex, well yes, not a problem, that space is the order of successions and space is the order of coexistences -- that’s nonetheless a little bit of something (*c’est quand même un petit quelque chose*); it’s worth... it’s worth [*unclear words*] [*Pause*] – So, what bothers Kant? For me, this is found in his most beautiful pages. I’d like for you to sense, the most beautiful pages, it’s when a philosopher arrives with, literally, huge stones (*pierres*) and then he begins to take a notion that seems to go without saying, and says, well no, not at all, discovering that it’s “good sense”, the blandest “good sense” that creates astonishing paradoxes.

Kant says, but no, that this just won’t do, and even over centuries and centuries, people were satisfied with this definition, which was entirely different from a definition; it’s a way of living; Kant says a very, very simple thing. He says that, on the one hand, I cannot define space as the order of coexistences; on the other hand, I cannot define time as the order of successions. And why not? Because “coexistences,” Kant says there – it’s almost childish what he says – he says, after all, in the end, that belongs to time. Coexistence means, literally, at the same time; in other words, it’s a modality of time. Time is a form in which not only that which succeeds something occurs, but that which is at the same time occurs as well. In other words, coexistence or simultaneity is a modality of time.

Notice that this is funny because here I am almost making a case against what I am trying to say. There’s a danger, it’s telling oneself then that everything is already in place. I am saying, nonetheless, at some far distant date and coming from entirely different problems, there will be a famous theory of relativity of which one of the fundamental aspects will be to think simultaneity in terms of time; I’m not at all saying that Kant invented relativity – that would be a bit of

nonsense devoid of any interest – I am saying that such an expression, from what we already found comprehensible in it, would not have had this comprehensible element if Kant hadn't been there centuries before, well, not many centuries before. But Kant certainly does not invent relativity, but he is the first one to tell us that simultaneity does not belong to space but belongs to time. So, that may not seem like much of anything, but I believe that it's really... If we are trying to explain what it is, it's already a revolution in the order of concepts.

In other words, Kant will say that time has three modalities: what lasts through time is called permanence; [*Pause*] what follows after something else within it is called succession; and what coexists within it, that is, what is at the same time and is called simultaneity or coexistence. Notice the conclusion immediately, the double conclusion: I cannot define time through the order of successions since succession is only a modality of time, and I have no reason to privilege this modality over the others. And another conclusion at the same time: I cannot define space through the order of coexistences since coexistence does not belong to space. [*Pause*]

So, I'd almost say against what I mean, if Kant had maintained the classical definition of time and space, order of coexistences and of successions, he couldn't have, or at least there wouldn't have been any interest in doing so, he couldn't have criticized Leibniz since if I define space through the order of coexistences and time through the order of successions, it goes without saying, whereas space and time refer in the final instance to that which follows something else and to that which coexists, that is, to something that one can enunciate within the order of the concept. So, there is no longer any difference between spatio-temporal differences and conceptual differences. [*Pause*] In fact, the order of successions receives its *raison d'être* from that which follows; the order of coexistences receives its *raison d'être* from that which coexists. At that point, it's conceptual difference that is the final word, over all differences.

But here we have Kant unable to say, no, no; he couldn't break with classical definitions, pushed to the absolute by Leibniz, if he didn't propose to us another conception of space and time. This conception – at once for us, and through this philosophy is interesting – it is, if you will, is the most unusual and the most familiar. If we take them as definitions, so how could he have reached that point? What is...? And you will see precisely the master stroke that this represents! It's an entirely new way of defining space and time. At the same time, this didn't occur just like that; it didn't just come into his head. Many things had to occur. At the same time, this something familiar for us, and so there... so it's very familiar. We can sense what he means even before understanding it. So you see he didn't allow himself to define space through the order of coexistence, and time through the order of successions.

He will say, there we are: what is space? Space is a form. Hey, it's a form. That's odd because that's the same... that's already been examined; why does he say the word "form"? That means that it's not a substance and that it does not refer to substances. When I say – I am still returning to this – when I say that space is the order of possible coexistences, the order of possible coexistences is clarified in the final instance by things that coexist. In other words, the spatial order must find its reason in the order of things that fill space. When Kant says that space is a form, that is, is not a substance, that means that it does not refer to things that fulfill it. It doesn't refer to things that occupy it or that fill it.

It's a form, and how must we define it? Well, here we are: he tells us that it's the form of exteriority. So, that gets strange: it's the form of exteriority? How do we understand this? It's the form through which everything that is exterior to us reaches us, OK, that's it, but that's not only this. It's also the form through which everything that is exterior to itself occurs. So, in this, he can again jump back into tradition. Tradition had always defined space as, in Latin, *partes extra partes*, one part of space is exterior to another part. But here we find that Kant takes what was only a characteristic of space in order to make it the essence of space. Space is the form of exteriority, that is, the form through which what is exterior to us reaches us, [Pause] and through which what remains exterior to itself occurs [Pause]. But just sense, I am saying, that must be for us at once very obscure, but also very familiar because a philosophical concept is that, a form of exteriority, so all that is odd. If there were no space, there would be no exteriority, fine.

Let's jump over to time. But we immediately sense that Kant is going to provide the symmetrical definition since he cannot define time through the order of succession any more than space through the order of coexistence. He hits us, and that becomes even more and more difficult, with time as the form of interiority. What does that mean? That means, first, that time is the form of that which happens to us as interior, interior to ourselves. But does that mean only that? Maybe not. Things are in time, perhaps; perhaps things are in time, but that implies that they have an interiority. There would be an interiority of things. Time is the manner in which the thing is interior to itself.

Good, so here as well, if we jump and make some connections, understand that much later, much later, there will be philosophies of time, and much later time will become the principal problem of philosophy. For a long time, things were not like that. If you take classical philosophy, certainly we can cite the philosophers greatly interested in the problem of time, of course. But why did they always seem so unusual? Why are the so-called "unforgettable" pages on time by Saint Augustine always shown to us? We cannot say that this is a fundamental problem, on time. What the principal problem of classical philosophy is, and we cannot look at all the problems, is the problem of extension (*étendue*), and notably what the relation is between thought and extent, once it is said that thought is not part of extension. And it is well known that so-called classical philosophy attaches a great importance to the corresponding problem, the union of thought and extension, under the particular term, in the particular relation of the union of soul and body. So it's: what is the relation of thought to that which appears most opaque to thought, specifically extension?

In a certain way, some people find the source of modern philosophy in a kind of change of problematic, in which thought commences to confront time and no longer extension. And in fact, in more recent philosophers, the problem of the union of the soul and the body is not raised all that much. Why? What are these huge displacements of problems? On the other hand, the problem of the relationship between thought and time has never ceased to cause difficulties for philosophy, as if the real thing that philosophy confronted was the form of time and not the form of space. Fine. Is it just like this now? No. Maybe not; maybe now, that's changed, it may be something else. But what is this kind of mutation existing in philosophical problems? It's obvious. So, you see? This is where I wanted to reach, finally, with some very simple terms. Here, there are no complicated terms.

Kant created this kind of little revolution. In fact, he ripped space and time from the order of the concept because he gave two absolutely new determinations of space and time, the form of exteriority and the form of interiority. A question that I don't even want to approach, because that would be too complicated, would be fine then, Leibniz is the end of the seventeenth century, start of the eighteenth, while Kant is the eighteenth century. There is not much time between them. What happened for this mutation to emerge in the conception of space and time? Obviously here, everything has to come into play: scientific mutations, so-called Newtonian science, and many other things as well, to simplify by saying Newton, so scientific data, political data. We cannot believe that when there was such a change in the order of concepts that nothing happened in the social order. Among other things, the French revolution occurred. Did it imply a new space-time? We don't know. What else? Mutations occurred in daily life. Perhaps man did not exist in the same relations with space and time. Fine, let us say that the order of philosophical concepts expressed these kinds of things in its own way, even if [this order] comes beforehand.

Here is where we have reached. You see? We've retreated twice. Once again, we started off from an initial Leibniz-Kant opposition, and we have said that it is undecidable. I cannot decide between the proposition "every proposition is analytical," and the other proposition in which knowledge proceeds by synthetic propositions. We had to step back. First step back, I have again two antithetical propositions: every determination is conceptual in the final instance, and the Kantian proposition: there are spatio-temporal determinations that are irreducible to the order of the concept. We had to step back again in order to discover a kind of presupposition, notably [that] the Leibniz-Kant opposition is valid only to the extent that we consider that space and time are not at all defined in the same way. [Pause] It's odd, this idea that space is, does it open us to an outside? Never would someone from the Classical period have said that. It is already a relation that would have to be called an existential relation with space. Space is the form of what comes to us from outside.

Literally, if you... If, for example, I look for the relationship between poetry and philosophy, what does that imply as space? It implies an open space obviously. If you define space as a milieu of exteriority, it is an open space, not an enclosed space (*espace bouclé*). Leibnizian space is an enclosed space, it's the order of successions... no, excuse me, it's the order of coexistences. Even infinite, it's a closed aggregate; it closes over itself. Here, Kant's form is, on the contrary, a form that open us up, opens us to what? To an x, it is the form of eruptions. It's the form of emergences, of entries, of emergences. It's a new space. It's not difficult to say that there's already, that there's already Romanticism in this, that it's already a Romantic space. It is an aesthetic space since it is emancipated from the logical order of the concept. It is a Romantic space because it is the space of eruptions. It is the space of opening, of the open (*l'ouvert*).

And when you discover in works of certain philosophers who came much later, like Heidegger, some great themes and great songs regarding what he calls "the Open", with a capital O, when you see that Heidegger perpetually claims himself to be linked to a great post-Romantic poets, to Rilke, who himself owes this notion of the Open to German Romanticism, you will have a kind of small lineage there, a true lineage of thought, from Kant to German Romanticism in which the lineage is very, very strong – all the German Romantics pass through Kant --, you will better understand why Heidegger feels the need to write a book about Kant. This is not for the pleasure

of doing history of philosophy, but earlier, it is going to base its entire interpretation of Kantism then by deeply valorizing the theme of the Open by saying that in the end it's Kant who invents the form of the Open. Obviously, he's the one who invents the form of the Open as philosophical concept. At the same time, poets invent it as a rhythmic value or as aesthetic value; at the same time, researchers are inventing it as a scientific space. All these mutations do not occur entirely at the same moment. This is very odd. Understand? So, that becomes very difficult to say who is right and who is wrong, or why? Because here, at the point I've reached, we almost would like to say, well then, yes, even better, Kant corresponds better. That better suits our way of being within space (*dans l'espace*), or of being toward space (*être à l'espace*). In the end, I am not within space (*within space*); I am toward space (*être à l'espace*). Space is my form of opening. [Pause]

So, while we wait, we are led to say, so about Leibniz, can we say that Leibniz has been left behind? That's just wrong, right? Was that old philosophy? Perhaps it is not that simple. I don't think that it's like that, and if, if it's always good to read and also [if] some people feel the need to read Leibniz, this is not how a bit of [*unclear word*] will be created.

So, I'll continue to a fourth point. We first have to continue about Kant in order to perceive what he brings that is entirely new. But here is what I mean already as a principle. It is perhaps at the farthest extreme of what is new that, in philosophy, occurs what we call "the return to" (*le retour à*). After all, it is never up to an author to push himself as far as he can. Why? Because it's already extremely tiring to have created something, you know, so that one never takes it all the way, right? It's others that force you to take it all the way, so let them take matters in hand because that's not so bad, it's fine. And it's not Kant who is going as far as is possible for Kant; it's not by chance that this leads to a race of philosophers known as post-Kantians who are the great philosophers of German Romanticism. And they are the ones who, having pushed Kant as far as possible, feel the need to create this strangest of things: undertaking a return to Leibniz. [End of the WebDeleuze recording; the BNF recording continues] This becomes funny, this tale with its zigzags, knots, kinds of spinning, breakouts. I mean that there are two ways of undertaking a return: there is the very, very vexing way, when something new is not desired; and there is another way of undertaking a return, when the reason for undertaking the return is discovered at the extreme point of what had just been returned to [*enormous noise of someone blowing his nose*]. [Pause] So, ... yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: Yes, we can say that perhaps, mmm yes [*Deleuze seems rather doubtful*]. What is bothering you? ... They [*perhaps the post-Kantians*] say this; I always like to take literally what people say.

A student: [*Inaudible commentary*]

Deleuze: Okay, we can say that; we can say that they did not go to the end of Kant. They don't think of themselves that way. So, a rule, since discussions in philosophy are so complicated already, I think a rule is to take into account a bit what people say about what they are doing. Not that they are necessarily right. They say ... and on the other hand, who would have pushed Kant

all the way? Maybe no one, but if it's not them, I don't see who. They say that's what they want to do. They say, Kant did not go all the way with Kant himself. Kant took very badly, since he lived to a very old age, he took this kind of proposition very, very badly. He said, I don't need you to go all the way, [*Laughter*] so as a result, this just happened quickly, eh? Relations were turning sour. But you see, it wasn't just about temperament (*humeur*). So, finally, I place this in brackets, he went all the way. Let's say this is purely hypothetical.

So, let's try in a fourth point to see in what way there consists... because here, we only have a tiny seed of the changes brought by Kant in the definitions of space and time. Well then, second, second, so I am looking in my fourth point, I am looking for the deep changes that Kantian philosophy was to bring about both in relation to so-called Classical philosophy and in relation to Leibniz's philosophy.

I am saying, into the disorder, I am trying to organize this. So, we have seen a first change concerning space-time. It's already very important. I am saying there is a second change, a second change this time concerning a concept very, very well known for ages, the sense of which was singularly changed, namely the concept of phenomenon. And you are going to see why one results from the other. [*Pause*] For quite a long time, I mean, the phenomenon was opposed to what? And what did it mean, a phenomenon, when philosophers would speak of a phenomenon? For example, it's a word coming from Greek; Plato used it, in fact; it was already in Plato. Fine, phenomena. Very often phenomenon is translated as appearance, appearances. And appearances, let's say that it is the sensible (*le sensible*). Appearance is sensible. And appearance is distinguished from what? It forms a doublet, it forms a couple, it forms an opposition with the correlative notion of essence. Appearance is opposed to essence. And Platonism, perhaps not Platonism itself, but the Platonist tradition, will develop a duality of appearance and essence, sensible appearances and intelligible essences. A famous conception results from this that causes a problem throughout Antiquity: the conception of two worlds. Are there two worlds, the sensible world and the intelligible world? Are we prisoners, through our senses and through our bodies, are we prisoner of a world of appearances? Yes, there we are.

Kant uses the word "phenomenon," and strangely, the reader gets the impression that when he/she [the reader] tries to situate the old notion of appearances under the Kantian word, it doesn't work, it doesn't work. For finally, a philosopher is not required to complete his themes; it's the context that imposes this. And moreover, to be legible, one cannot be defining all the time. One cannot spend one's time doing that. And it's odd: isn't there going to be as important a revolution as for time and space, on the level of the phenomenon? When Kant uses the word "phenomenon," he loads it with a much more violent sense: it is not appearance that separates us from essence, it is apparition, that which appears insofar as it appears. You will tell me that this isn't all that much; I don't know if it's not all that much. Perhaps it's enormous. The phenomenon [*several unclear words*] in Kant's work is not appearance, but apparition. Apparition is the manifestation of that which appears insofar as it appears. Why is it immediately linked to the preceding revolution? Because when I say that what appears insofar as it appears, what does the "insofar" mean? It means that that which appears does so necessarily in space and time. This is immediately united to the preceding theses. "Phenomenon" means that which appears in space and in time. It no longer means sensible appearance, it no longer means sensible appearance; it means spatio-temporal apparition. You will say that this is perhaps linked; it's

perhaps linked, but in any case, it does not mean the same thing. We don't place the accent at all on the same thing when we say a sensible appearance or when we say a spatio-temporal apparition.

What reveals the extent to which this is not the same thing? It's if I look for the doublet with which apparition is in relation. We have seen that appearance is related to essence, appearance-essence, to the point that there are perhaps two worlds, the world of appearances and the world of essences. But apparition is related to what? It's odd. [Pause] Apparition is in relation, we are told, with "condition". Something that appears, appears under conditions that are the conditions of its apparition. Conditions are the making-appear (*faire apparaître*) of apparition. These are the conditions according to which what appears, appears. Apparition refers to the conditions of the apparition, just as appearance refers to essences. But it's not at all the same opposition, apparition-condition. Others will say that apparition refers to, and is nearly the same thing as, sense. The doublet is: apparition and sense of the apparition. [Pause]

So, the phenomenon is no longer thought as an appearance in relation to its essence, but as an apparition in relation to its condition or its sense. So, you will tell me, another thunderclap. Henceforth, there is no longer any problem about "are there two worlds?" There are not two worlds; resolutely, there is no longer only one world constituted by that which appears and the sense of that which appears. What appears no longer refers to essences that would be behind the appearance; that which appears refers to conditions that condition the apparition of what appears, conditions who condition the apparition of what appears *in this world*. In other words, essence yields to sense. The concept is no longer the essence of the thing, it is the sense of the apparition.

Understand that this is an entirely new concept in philosophy from which will unfold philosophy's determination under the name of a new discipline, that of phenomenology. Phenomenology will be the discipline that considers phenomena as apparitions, referring to conditions or to a sense, instead of considering them as appearances referring to essences. From this, phenomenology will take on as many senses as you want, but it will at least have this unity, specifically its first great moment will be with Kant who himself pretends to undertake a phenomenology, precisely because he changes the concept of the phenomenon, making it the object of a phenomenology instead of the object of a discipline of appearances.

The second, and finally, the first great moment in which phenomenology will be developed as an autonomous discipline will be in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a famous text. And the word is very peculiar, the second great moment, and *The Phenomenology of Spirit* being precisely the great book, the great book of philosophy, that announces the disappearance of the two worlds; there is no more than a single world, as stated by Hegel's beautiful expression is: behind the curtain, there is nothing to be seen, so behind the curtain, there is nothing to be seen; that's a beautiful poetic expression that a German Romantic was able to create, but which means, philosophically, that the phenomenon is not a mere appearance behind which an essence is located; the phenomenon is an apparition that refers to the conditions of its appearance (*appearance*). There is but one single world. That is perhaps the moment when philosophy breaks its final links to theology. And then phenomenology's second moment will be the one in which Husserl renews phenomenology through a theory of apparition and sense. He will invent a form of logic proper to phenomenology. So, there we are.

At the same time, I tell myself, these things are so complicated. This is not in order to add new things; it's really because it's so very complicated because, by dint of simplifying in order to try to find some types of great ruptures (*coupures*), we risk neglecting numerous things because things are obviously more complex than that. We don't want to break with everything; you know, it's quite fatiguing, all that. It's very wearing; it's perhaps as wearing as working at I don't know what. It's work on the concept and work... People, they get old; there are some that only invent concept when they're young. There are some who wait for when they're old. Generally, philosophers aren't very young. There are cases, the case, there's the exceptional case of Hume. He created his genius turn, his book of genius when he was twenty-five. After, he only did repetition, only simplified it because it was too complicated for people, so he simplified it. He found everything at twenty-five. It's the only case that I know of philosophical precocity...
 [Interruption of the recording] [1:25:31]

Part 3

So then, it's tiring, all that. There really have to be younger philosophers who arrive and who push things in another direction.

So, how will, how will that come about? I am saying that it's still more complicated than that because I will offer you an extremely simple schema. Kant is the one who broke with the simple opposition between appearance and essence in order to establish a correlation [between] the apparition and conditions of apparition, or apparition-sense (*apparition-sens*). That's it; it's not false, it's not really, because separating oneself from something is very difficult. In a certain way, we have to introduce two little correctives in order to be honest. It's that Kant preserves something from the former opposition, notably there is in Kant a strange thing, the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself. Phenomenon-thing in itself, for Kant, preserves something from the former opposition. I am not saying that this coincides; it conserves something from the old phenomenon-essence opposition, appearance-essence. So, it's more complicated than I am saying. Simply, there is also the really innovative aspect of Kant is the conversion of another set of notions, apparition-conditions of the apparition. And the thing in itself is not at all a condition of apparition. It's something completely different. It's another concept.

And inversely, a second corrective, nonetheless: from Plato to Leibniz, we were not simply told that there are appearances and essences. We were certainly told entirely something else. Moreover, already with Plato there appears a very curious notion that he calls the well-founded appearance, that is, of course, appearance hides essence from us, but in some ways, [appearance] expresses it as well. And what is the relation between appearance and essence is a very, very complex one that Leibniz will try to push in a very strange direction, specifically: he will create from it a theory of symbolization? The Leibnizian theory of symbolization quite singularly prepares the Kantian revolution. The phenomenon symbolizes with essence. And precisely, this relation of symbolization is very, very odd; it's no longer that of appearance with essence. It's a very, very different relation. All this to tell you that it's always very, very complicated.

So, I am trying to continue in this way. So, there occurs a new upheaval at the level of the conception of the phenomenon. And notice just how it immediately links up with the disturbance

of space-time, finally I believe there is a fundamental upheaval at the level of subjectivity. [Pause] I'd just like to start with Kant. Have I tired you out? All that is very abstract. If you are tired, it might be better to take a five-minute break. [Some indistinct words to student nearby him] [Pause] Yes, shall I continue? [Pause] We're going to finish this quickly.

So, there as well, it's a very strange story. Because we have to determine when this notion of subjectivity takes off... as a philosophical concept. There you have what I'd like to say. In a perspective still of classical philosophy, pushed even by Leibniz all the way since, for the moment, I am based in the hypothesis that Leibniz will only push to the end and down the paths almost of genius and almost delirium the presuppositions of classical philosophy, and then I was saying earlier the opposite, that in Leibniz, there was already this kind of radical revolution. It's because I cannot state all the aspects at the same time; there can only be several aspects at the same time.

I am saying, from a perspective like that of Leibniz, one really has very little choice. These are philosophies of creation. What do these mean, philosophies of creation? Well then, that means that these are philosophies which are certainly quite independent from theology, but that have maintained a certain alliance, to the point that even atheists, if indeed they are that, will pass by way of God. Their resource will be to call God by something so bizarre, so bizarre, that they don't even get burned; that doesn't help anything, eh? That doesn't help anything, but it's like that when Lucien Febvre wrote a whole history book to try to mark when the word "atheist" emerged, when it appeared, and for example, it does not appear at the time of Rabelais, so that Rabelais was not an atheist, we feel that he is both right and completely wrong. Spinoza never stops talking about God; well, okay, he talks about God, he doesn't stop talking about God, but once again, God is a thing where one really has to say: tell me the face you give him, and I can tell if you believe in him or not because... good. [Pause] It doesn't function at the word level, God, because I can talk about God very well for a long time, eh? but there we are. [Laughter]

Well then, I am saying, they have this alliance, whether they are atheist or not atheist, they have this alliance with theology that results in their departing from God in a certain manner, that is, what? That is, their point of view is fundamentally creationist. And even philosophers who do something other than creationism, that is, who are not interested or who replace the concept of creation with something else, they fight against the concept of creation as a function of the concept of creation. In any event, the point that they start from is infinity. This is why, once again, I had already quoted it, that I find very, very fine Merleau-Ponty's phrase, who says: if we had to define classical philosophy, we would have to say that these philosophers had one manner, it was their secret that we have completely lost, we have lost it both because we are no longer capable of it and also because we no longer want it, [*a few indistinct words*] we no longer are able and we no longer want it any more.

But [philosophers] had an innocent manner; for them, there were no problems; this is their own thing in order to respect people. They were thinking starting from infinity, an innocent manner of thinking starting from infinity, and they gave themselves to infinity. For them, that created no problems, infinity. There was infinity. There was infinity everywhere; there was infinity in God, but there was also infinity in the world. That did not make them naïve because that allowed them to undertake things like infinitesimal analysis; that allowed them to do many things. An innocent

way of thinking starting from infinity means a world of creation. You will tell me this doesn't go without saying, but here, I am creating some leaps. [Pause] And what does that mean? That means that they could, furthermore, they could go very, very far in a certain direction. The discovery of subjectivity. They could go quite far; they couldn't go – so here, I am placing this in quotes to signal this – they couldn't go “all the way”. Understand? These are the most beautiful moments of a theory, when a theory pushes its concepts onto a path in which... these are the moments of affliction, these are the most moving moments. We know this well, they cannot go very far; they cannot go all the way to the end of that direction because the entire concept blocks them from going in that direction. To push that direction all the way to the end, a completely different aggregate was necessary. In fact, why can't they go precisely all the way of a discovery of subjectivity? Nonetheless, they do go quite far.

The famous philosopher, Descartes, you know that he invents truly his own concept, signed Descartes, the famous “I think, therefore I am,” notably the discovery of subjectivity or the thinking subject, the discovery that thought refers to a subject. It doesn't go without saying that the idea refers to a subject. The idea of a thinking subject is very, very odd. I believe that a Greek – what I'm going to say is obvious – a Greek would not even have understood what that meant. He understands when he's told that the soul thinks, but the idea of a thinking subject... In any case, Descartes brings this forth; Leibniz will not forget it, for there is a Leibnizian subjectivity, not the same as Descartes's, but there is a Leibnizian subjectivity. With Descartes, generally, this was prepared beforehand, always by St. Augustine, but there is the discovery of subjectivity, and generally, we define modern philosophy with the discovery of subjectivity. It's not a good definition, but that doesn't matter, that doesn't matter, anything at all, it's possible to state.

So, so, why can't they go all the way to the end of the discovery of subjectivity? For a simple reason: it's that this subjectivity, however far they might go in their explorations, this subjectivity can only be posited as created, precisely because they have an innocent way of thinking starting from infinity. [Pause] It can only be thought as created, that is, the thinking subject, as finite subject, can be thought of as created. Created by whom? Created by God. Thought referring to the subject can only be thought as created: what does that mean? It means that the thinking subject is substance, the thinking subject is a thing. *Res*. It is not an extended thing, as Descartes says; *res cogitans* is a thinking thing. It is an unextended thing, ok, but it is a thing, a substance, *res* or substantial, and it has the status of created things, it is a created thing, a created substance. You see? Does that block them? You will tell me that it's not difficult; at that point, they had only to put the thinking subject in the place of God. [There's] no interest, no interest in exchanging places. In that event, one has to speak of an infinite thinking subject in relation to which finite thinking subjects would themselves be created substances. Nothing would be gained. That's not how one creates a revolution in concepts. Thus, if you will, their strength, their strength, specifically this innocent way of thinking according to infinity, leads them to the threshold of subjectivity and prevents them from crossing through. What a situation! [Pause]

So, what does Kant do? What contributes to his rupture with Descartes? When the Kantian cogito is mentioned, in what way is it not the same thing as the Cartesian cogito? It's simple; we're being told something very simple. We are being told, you know, that for Kant, the thinking subject is not a substance, not determined as a thinking thing. It is not determined by a thinking

thing, so it's what? [Pause] It is determined as what. A new Kantian thunderclap: it is going to be pure form. The thinking subject is pure form. Pure form of what? It's the form of the apparition of everything that appears. In other words, it is the condition of apparition of all that appears in space and in time. This is going to get annoying because to whatever Kant commits himself to finding a new relation of thought with space and time, it's going to be ... [Deleuze does not complete the sentence] Fine.

Pure form, empty form; with the "I think", there Kant becomes splendid. He goes so far as to say of the "I think" that it is the poorest thought. In fact, I can say "I think", I think nothing at all. Only, it is the condition of any thought about any one thing. "I think" is the condition of all thought about any one thing that appears in space and in time, but itself is an empty form that conditions every apparition. That becomes a very severe world, a desert world. From that movement onward Nietzsche's famous expression begins to become true, "the desert grows". In fact, what has disappeared is the world inhabited by the divine, the infinite, and it became the world of men. For in the end, what disappeared is the problem of creation; what disappeared, what was the problem of creation replaced with? In the place of a completely different problem that will be the problem of Romanticism, specifically the problem of foundation (*fondement*). It is no longer a question of knowing how the world was created, which implies innocent thought starting from infinity. Now there arises a clever thought, a puritanical thought, a desert-like thought, that wonders, once it's admitted that the world exists and that it appears, how to found it?

The question of creation has been rejected; it's considered to be a false problem, fully creating the joy of seventeenth-century philosophers. Now comes the era of foundation (*fondement*). Philosophy ceased taking God for a model. Leibniz speaks in a certain way, and that's the great innocence. The classical great innocence is speaking in God's place, and Leibniz pushed his genius all the way to the end of that. Here, really, if there is a philosopher who spoke the discourse of God, it was Leibniz. Now the model of the philosopher has become something very strange; it's not that this goes any better, right? He's become the hero, the foundational hero (*héros fondateur*). He is the one who founds within an existing world, not the one who creates the world. [Pause]

And what is foundational? What is foundational is that which conditions the condition of what appears in space and in time. Everything is linked there. Space-time, a change in the notion of space-time, a change in the notion of phenomenon, a change in the notion of subject. The thinking subject as pure form will only be the act of founding the world such as it appears and knowledge of the world such as it appears. This is an entirely new undertaking. I believe that it's something completely, completely new.

For those who have been taking this seminar, if you recall our work over the past several years, a year ago – that must have been last year or two years ago, I don't know -- I tried to distinguish the Classical artist from the Romantic artist, as generally, in this way, on the level of music. And for those... Once again, it's good sometimes to review material because, in my view, for five years we have really been working on topics that reverberate together. And all that I had been trying to find is that music shows well... I wasn't able to make any distinction between Classical

and Baroque. The Classical and the Baroque are strictly the same thing; they are two poles of the same enterprise. They're absolutely two correlates.

And I was saying that the Classical artist, it's not difficult; he is one who organizes milieus. He's the one who organizes and who, to some extent, is in the situation of God -- this is creation. The Classical artist never stops undertaking creation anew, by organizing milieus and by passing from one milieu to another, by never ceasing to pass from one milieu to another. He passes from water to earth, he separates the earth and the waters, exactly God's task in creation. That's what the innocence of the Classical artist is, and if there is Baroque, it is because in opening out (*la ventilation*) the milieu, there is the entire Baroque, of milieus, in the way of moving from one milieu to the other, the fish that comes out of the water, that leaps, the bird that dives into the water, etc. You have the strangest, the most unusual operations. The Classics are not typical of serenity at all. They confront the milieus; they confront the task of recreating the world, and they pose a kind of challenge to God: they are going to do just as much, and that is what the Classical artist is.

And then, I was saying, the Romantic is not that at all. To some extent, even at first glance, the Romantic would be less crazy, because he's not that at all. His problem is that of founding; it is no longer the problem of the world, I was saying, but one of the earth. It is no longer the problem of milieu, but one of territory. To leave one's territory, to move from one's territory in order to arrive, to find the center of the earth, that's what founding is; it's no longer creating. The Romantic artist renounced creating because he thinks that there is a much more heroic task, and this heroic task is foundation. And the whole Romantic artist then, at the extreme, musically he plays on the very deep gap between the territory and the earth, and no longer on this other gap between creation and milieus. It is no longer creation and milieu; it's: I am leaving my territory, farewell, I depart, I am going to the center of the earth. That's why Empedocles throwing himself into his volcano will be, in Greek legend, the character who most pleases the Romantic artist. He leaves his territory in order to hurl himself into the center of the earth. He undertakes the great operation of foundation, but the foundation, the base is in the bottomless (*le fondement est dans le sans fond*).

All post-Kantian philosophy from Schelling onward will be developed around this kind of abundant concept or the bottom, the fundament, the base, the bottomless. This will be a very beautiful philosophy; here, this is very Romantic. He was saying that if you really want to make correspondences in art, obviously, the *lied*, you certainly see, that is always what the *lied* is, the *lied* and the song-melody relation in the *lied*. It's exactly the tracing of a territory haunted by the hero, and the hero leaves, departs, always a song of departure. Where is he departing for? He doesn't depart for the heavens; he departs in order to find the center of the earth which is never in correspondence with the center of the territory. He deserts, he chooses a kind of line, the Romantic hero traces a very strange line. If you take Schubert, Schuman, the entire history of the *lied*, if you reach Mahler's *lieder*, that's it, that's it, Mahler, "The Song of the Earth" [by Mahler], that's it. The history of the *lied* establishes this tense opposition, which is the heroic opposition, which is that of the hero between the tune (*chansonnette*) about the territory and the great song of the earth. Mahler's words are splendid, when Mahler says, in order to create nature, it doesn't suffice for there to be a birdsong, a cowbell, a Viennese waltz, while all that is there,

all that is there. But as a kind of counterpoint, a musical correspondence, all that has to be carried away by the song of the earth. You see?

And if you will, it's almost, this musical doublet territory-earth, you sense it corresponds exactly to what in philosophy is the phenomenon-apparition and the condition of apparition. Moreover, to show that I am not exaggerating, I point out there in a preface to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, there is a very, very odd text, in which Kant distinguishes a relation to any concept. He says a concept has a domain or a territory; he gives the Latin words. It has a concept and a territory, and then it also has a domain... Non, yes, he doesn't say a domain or a territory; he distinguishes the territory, the domain and also something – [*Deleuze speaks very softly, saying he has to find the text*], yes, that's it. --

You understand, I'd like to finish this up because, there we are, this difference is enormous, because why do they abandon the point of view of creation? Why is the hero not someone who creates, but someone who founds, and with the stories that this opens to us, why isn't it the final word? After all, if there were a moment in which thought, in any case, Western thought was a bit tired of thinking itself and taking itself for God and of thinking in terms of creation, it is not enough to say that one is tired with all that. The seed must still be there. If some rich seeds arrive within a period, it's because the period itself works on concepts. There is a great work of concepts that cause us to say, ah, no, there is something that no longer suits us in these ways of thinking. But does art still suit us, this image of thought, heroic thought, this foundational thought, this thought that substitutes heroic fundament for divine creation? It's not certain that this suits us; do we still believe in it? See? The philosopher who had begun by taking himself for God, he took himself to be a kind of hero. Today, I believe that all that is finished. That doesn't mean that one doesn't remain Kantian. Here this question takes on its full meaning: what does it mean to be Kantian today? What does it mean being Leibnizian today?

Well then, understand the enormous importance of this substitution of the form of the ego by the thinking subject. I am saying, the thinking substance was still the point of view of God; it's that thinking substance is a finite substance, but created as a function of the infinite, created by God. Whereas when Kant tells us that the thinking subject is not a substance, is not a thing, he well understands a created thing, a form that conditions the apparition of all that appears in space and in time; that is, it is the form of founding. What is he in the process of doing? He institutes – but it's enough for him to say that in order for this to become crystal clear, I suppose; as an operation, that gets strange – he institutes and constitutes the finite ego (*le moi fini*) as first principle. Aaaah, he did that! Aaah. Doing that is frightening. For a guy from the XVIIth century, once it's said that this isn't a question of being burned or not because perhaps in the XVIIth century, perhaps the Church would have accepted more, everything would have been accepted by the Reform, that depends a lot on the Reform, this tale from Kant. Without the Reform, he couldn't have undertaken his thing; he wouldn't even have had an inkling about it, that's obvious.

The finite ego is the true fundament, whereas before, it was God that was the veritable creator. Thus, the first principle becomes finitude. But that's truly a revolution. For all the Classics, finitude is a consequence; finitude is the limitation of something infinite. The created world is finite, the Classics tell us, because it is limited. Well, then, no! It's not that! Finitude has become

constitutive. The finite ego founds the world and knowledge of the world because the finite ego is itself the constitutive founding of what appears. In other words, it is finitude that is the founding of the world. [Pause]

The relations of the infinite to the finite shift completely. It will no longer be, it will no longer be the infinite... [Pause] no! no! The finite will no longer be a limitation of the infinite; rather, the infinite will be a surpassing (*dépassement*) of the finite. Moreover, it is a property of the finite to surpass and go beyond itself. The notion of self-surpassing (*auto-dépassement*) begins to be developed in philosophy. This notion will in fact become poison. It will traverse all of Hegel and will reach into Nietzsche in order to be transformed in the Nietzschean form, “man must surpass himself by himself”. The infinite is no longer separable from an act of surpassing finitude because only finitude can surpass itself. These were absolutely incomprehensible propositions for a Classical philosopher. [Pause] The entire dialectic, everything called dialectic is the operation of the infinite to be transformed therein, the infinite becoming and become the act through which finitude surpasses itself by constituting or by founding the world.

This is how the infinite is subordinated to the act of the finite. And is this possible? Well then, what results from this? There’s a page that’s very, very... One of the first philosophers who followed Kant and pretended to push farther than Kant through his own efforts, who named Fichte. And there is in Fichte a page that seems exemplary to me precisely for the Kantian polemic, Kant-Leibniz. Here is what Fichte tells us; he tells us this – if you’ve understood this, you will understand quite well; if you haven’t understood, but since you are going to understand this you will understand everything [Laughter] – The great philosopher Fichte tells us: I can always say A is A; I can say A is A. You see immediately what the great Fichte is alluding to; he is alluding to the principle of identity. [Pause] But this is only a hypothetical proposition. There we are. Why? Because it presupposes, if there is A, if A is, if A is, A is A, but if there is nothing, A is not A. Fine.

You already see in what way it’s very interesting what he says [*several unclear words*]; it’s very interesting because, very sneakily, he is in the act of overthrowing the principle of identity. He says that the principle of identity is a hypothetical rule. Certainly he says “A is A”, yes, but again on the condition that A exists. Hence, the great theme he proposes: to surpass hypothetical judgment going toward what he calls “thetic” judgment (*le jugement thétique*), the thetic judgment, going beyond hypothesis toward thesis. And he asks, why is it that A is A, if A does exist? Well then, because finally the proposition A is A is not at all a final principle or a first principle. It refers to something deeper, specifically: one must say that A is A because it is thought; A is A because A is thought. You’ll tell me, fine, what precisely does that add? It’s quite simple: he develops his thetic proposition A is A because it is thought, specifically, what founds the identity of the thing thought is the identity of the thinking subject. And the identity of the thinking subject is what? It’s the identity of the finite ego.

Thus, the first principle is not A is A; it’s ego equals ego (*moi égale moi*). German philosophy will encumber its books with the magic formula: ego equals ego, ego equals ego which will be developed through all the great German Romantics. And this “ego equals ego”, why is this expression so bizarre? Notice that A is A surpasses itself toward the true expression of the principle which is not A is A, but which is “ego equals ego.” And why is “ego equals ego” a very

different principle from A is A? Well then, because it is a synthetic identity. [Pause] Aaaaah! As a result, we find the beginning. And why is this a synthetic identity? It's a synthetic identity because ego equals ego marks the identity of the ego that thinks itself as the condition of all that appears in space and in time, and [inaudible] that appears in space and in time itself. [Pause] In this there is a synthesis that is the synthesis of finitude, notably the thinking subject, primary ego, form of all that appears in space and time, must also appear in space and in time, that is, ego equals ego. And here we have the synthetic identity of the finite ego which replaces what? The infinite analytic identity of God. Aaaaah, so you see? Understand, it's all this that's in question.

I will finish with two things; in fact, we aren't up to continuing any longer. First thing that I should have developed but that would take me three hours; this for your reflection. So what could it mean to be Leibnizian today? If all this is true, if... it's not difficult to understand. It's that Kant, what did he do? He absolutely created, but truly a kind of conceptual aggregate that can be said to go in a radically new direction. He doesn't say that there are no influences, that there aren't... He didn't do that all by himself, all that, but it's a conceptual reference grid. These are completely new philosophical conceptual coordinates. Once again, I believe it is not about raising questions in different languages, but in the same language: a Classic would not understand the propositions exactly. He doesn't have the means to understand it. How could he? He lacks the conceptual means; if you don't have the conceptual means and if you don't build the conceptual means yourself that give sense to what you are saying, what you are saying is nonsensical, it's that simple.

So, say what your concepts are before you speak. I mean, it's not necessary to speak, on the contrary; you should not say them when you speak because otherwise, it will be boredom. But if you are doing philosophy, let your task extend to the concepts you need, and if you do not find them ready-made, invent them; even don't wait for them to be ready-made. It would be better to find something already that has been created than to wait. So, hurry; this is your business. So, do you understand? But in the case of these new coordinates, once again, understand, the philosophical [indistinct word] is extremely [unclear word] all of this, you can't be attempting this all your life, not possible, that's not possible.

Fine, so then, Kant in one sense renews everything, but precisely, what he brings to light, there are absolutely all sorts of things that are not elucidated. An example of a thing that's not elucidated: what exact relation is there between the condition of the phenomenon and the phenomenon itself insofar as it appears? Good, so finally, I will review: the thinking ego, the finite ego, conditions [and] founds the phenomenal apparition. The phenomenon appears in space and in time. And all that works well together. How is this possible? What does this relation of conditioning mean? In other words, the "I think" is a form of knowledge that conditions the apparition of all that appears.

But how does that work? How is this possible? I mean, what is the relation between the conditioned and the condition? The apparition is the conditioned; the condition is the form of "I think." Kant is nonetheless quite annoyed. He says, well here, that this is a fact of reason. He who had so greatly demanded that the question be elevated to the state *quid juris*, now he invokes what he himself call a *factum*: the finite ego is so constituted that what appears for it, what appears to it, conforms to the conditions of the apparition such that its very own thought

determines it. And Kant will say that this agreement of the conditioned and the condition can only be explained by a harmony of our faculties, a harmony of our faculties, specifically our passive sensibility and our active thought.

Ah, so then, what does Kant do? You understand? It's pathetic; as a result of this splendid effort, he is in the process of sneaking God in behind our backs. What guarantees this harmony? He will say it himself: the idea of God. Ah, really? So, here we are moving forward. There's a need to...
[Deleuze does not finish the sentence]

What will the post-Kantians do? I am summarizing enormously, but I am selecting a very, very precise point. The post-Kantians are philosophers who say above all that Kant is magnificent, he's inspired (*génial*), fine; but still, we cannot remain in an exterior relation of the condition and conditioned, of the conditioned and the condition, because if we remain in this relation of fact, specifically that there is a harmony between the conditioned and the condition and that's that, then we are obliged to resuscitate God as a guarantee of harmony. So, it's said, Kant still remains – and this is the great expression from the first post-Kantians – Kant still remains in a viewpoint which is that of exterior conditioning; he does not reach a true viewpoint of genesis. It would require showing how conditions of apparition are at the same time genetic elements of what appears.

So, at that point, what is necessary to show that? One has to take seriously one of the Kantian revolutions that Kant had completely left aside, notably that the infinite is truly the act of finitude insofar as it surpasses itself. Kant had not developed that because he was satisfied with a reduction of the infinite to the indefinite. We have to return to a strong conception of the infinite, but not in the manner of the Classics. One must return to a strong conception of the infinite by showing that the infinite is an infinite in the strong sense, but as such, it is the act of finitude insofar as it surpasses itself, and in so doing, it constitutes the world of apparitions. Fine, to do that, one must substitute the viewpoint of genesis for the viewpoint of the condition.

And doing that, understand, means returning to Leibniz, but on bases other than Leibniz's because at that point, all the elements to create a genesis such as the post-Kantians demand it, all the elements are virtually – not actually because Leibniz's problem was something else – they are virtually there in Leibniz. The idea of differentials of consciousness, at that point the "I think" of consciousness must bathe in an unconscious, and that there be an unconscious of thought as such; there must be an unconscious of thought as such, whereas the Classics would have said that there is simply God who goes beyond thought. Kant said that there is thought as a form of the finite ego. In this, one must almost assign an unconscious to thought which would contain the differentials of what appears in thought, in other words, which performs the genesis of the conditioned as a function of the condition. That will be Fichte's great task, and then taken up again by Hegel on other bases. You see henceforth that, at the limit, they can rediscover all of Leibniz.

And us, and us, and us? I am finishing on this point because it would really take too long then to give... What has happened since? What would it mean to do a history of philosophy? What happened? A lot took place. First, what have I not considered here? Enormous things. I am defining philosophy as an activity that consists in creating concepts. Fine, to create concepts is

very special mode of creation; it's as creative as art. There is creation, fine; the creation of concepts is very special. But like all things, the creation of concepts occurs in correspondence with other modes of creation. Fine, I've tried to outline, for example, German Romantic philosophy, of kinds of Romantic music; there are plenty of correspondences. We must especially not flatten this out, especially not. There we are; there's all that. There are all kinds of reasons why concepts are literally demanded, are needed.

In which sense do we need concepts? Understand, for me, in any case, a concept has nothing to do with ideology. A concept is not ideology, not at all, truly not. It's also material; a concept has a material existence; it has an existence as real as... It's like an animal with paws. We find new animals, so they have, hey... And there are strange kinds of butterflies, they're as huge as that, or else a crocodile with two jaws, all that, new animals; there are animals that disappear, there are new animals. Well then, concepts are spiritual animals (*bêtes spirituelles*), they're like flies. There are concepts of elephants, there are concepts of flies, there's all that. Fine, so, you understand?

So, take a great question: how do these kinds of appeals to concepts occur? In any case, a philosopher is someone who creates concepts, but at certain moments, what forces, what occurs that ancient concepts... ? So, that doesn't mean that old concepts are no longer useful. It means that they will only again be useful, they will be useful on the condition of literally being recharged, of being resituated within new conceptual coordinates. So, then, what occurs... ? What is a great philosopher? It's easy to recognize. It's someone who creates new concepts, so... And here, this greatly concerns feelings; there is a philosophical sensibility. The philosophical sensibility is equal to the pictorial and musical sensibility. There's a musical sensibility, there's a philosophical sensibility, and the philosophical sensibility is the art of evaluating, not at all the contradiction and the non-contradiction that exists between concepts; that has strictly no importance. It's the art of evaluating, and this is why, looking for a word that I used in previous years, it's seeking to evaluate the consistency of an aggregate of concepts. Do they have a consistency? Does that work? How does it function? Fine.

So, there is that; there is this whole problem. What are the relations between concepts, and through things other than concepts, under what influences are concepts created? In what relations with other creative disciplines? What does a painter do, what does... ? It goes without saying that philosophy does not have a history separate from the rest, and that it's odd, as a result, modern music, modern science, it is obvious that there is a modern philosophy although there are periods of desert, there are periods ... It's like all activities. So, there are times when it works, there are times... The emotion when a great book in philosophy comes out because it takes us out, we have the impression there... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:12:00]

Part 4

... And today, it's obvious, I don't know, when I think about what I've just said, the model of the philosopher, if it is a little bit true, even the model of the philosopher or even of the Classical artist who, in a certain way, takes himself for God. It's nothing wrong, I mean, it's even very technical things. Obviously, a musician like Bach has a certain connection with God. I don't mean by virtue of his personal faith, [but] by virtue of this conception of music, including

conception, his practical conception. He makes music like God creates or is supposed to create a world, and technically it means something, technically it means something. I believe that it means precisely, the creation of sounding forms (*formes sonnantes*).

Obviously, a Romantic no longer created music the same way, and that doesn't mean he went beyond Bach; he didn't go beyond him. He did a thousand other things, and it was better for him to do something else. What do you think of a novelist -- I'll give an example to end this -- what do you think of a novelist who writes today like Balzac? It's shit. [*Laughter*] Shit. It's not that he has to write in a weird way; it's not that Balzac is out of date either. The only thing, the only thing that is outdated, is the person who continues to write like Balzac. Balzac is not out of date because he did not write like Balzac, precisely. [*Pause*]

So, fine, we can say, of course, not to kill in order to create because it can be very, dangerous, empty creations can be very dangerous. Obviously, I don't know, everything important occurring in the novel is precisely people who loved Balzac so much that, for them, there was not even a problem. They could no longer write like Balzac, and not that Balzac's writing is outdated... Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: Well, that only means that. How does he call himself a Marxist if he filtered out a set of concepts that were simply to be called Marxism? [*Pause*] Balzac is not Balzacian, yes, yes, yes, and that does not prevent being Balzacian from meaning something, being a Marxist from meaning something. It is when, depending on your sensitivity, in order to think or to feel, you need, you need a certain number of concepts or melodies or rhythms, which are signed Balzac or which, with all the more reason, are signed Marx. It goes without saying that in what is currently happening at the level of a social field, well, fine, there are many people who think that Marx no longer has anything, no longer has anything to teach them. Okay, that's their business. There are others who say to themselves that even when facing current banking mechanisms, economic mechanisms, we hardly risk understanding them if we do not use concepts, concepts signed Marx, and that if we do something new, well then, there will in any case be a revival of, just as there is this return to Leibniz that I was talking about, a revival of or return to Marx, a return to this or that.

So, I am saying, today, well, you understand, I believe that it's not that nothing, no one ever is outdated, no one ever, but the only ones who are outdated are those who don't surpass anything; I mean, the only ones who are outdated are the ones who create "in the manner of" (*faire du 'comme'*). Every time you speak, at your own peril, every time you create your little concept, even if it's a small bit of a concept, you cannot be surpassed. I mean, one is never surpassed in what one creates. We are always surpassed in what we do not create, by definition. So, fine, the body of novelists who write like Balzac, published in many copies, in the history of literature, is worth nothing, nothing; they will never write as well as Balzac. It would be preferable for them to do something else.

But what I mean, for us, what's going on? How has philosophy been constituted, let's say, recent philosophy, quite modern philosophy? We should ask the same kind of question. I believe this

happened, that the philosopher stopped thinking of himself as a founding hero, in the Romantic way. What was fundamental in what is called, generally speaking, modernity, for the sake of convenience, it was precisely this kind of bankruptcy of Romanticism on our behalf. Once again, that doesn't mean that Novalis, that Hölderlin are outdated. But they no longer work for us, Hölderlin, Novalis; they can no longer work for us and only fully work for us within the framework of our new coordinates. We can even give them some very, very strange profiles.

So, what happened was that we stopped thinking of ourselves as heroes too. So, [*a few indistinct words*], I don't know, what you take oneself to be depends on what you do later. But it seems obvious to me that the model of the philosopher is no longer at all ... and the model of the artist is no longer God at all insofar as it sets about creating the equivalent of a world; he is no longer the hero at all as he sets about founding a world. It has become something else again, it has become something else. And for the artist, the same. The artist is no longer at all... And for those who would be interested, I think it is good to make the link with other [seminar] years, for example, the texts, there is a small text by Klee, Paul Klee, *Theory of Modern Art*, which appeared in *Livre de poche*, in which Paul Klee, insofar as being painter, tries to say how he sees his difference even from previous paintings, and Klee admired the great painters of previous eras.

He says, here we are, this doesn't present itself quite in the same way for us. What does a painter mean today when he says, we can no longer paint ... we can no longer "go to the motif"? You know Cézanne's expression, "go to the motif", taking his canvas and then ... In painting, this doesn't happen anymore. That interests me greatly because, you know, there's a kind of continuous flow that shrinks, that is one with history. And this flow, there are twists, stuff (*trucs*), some ... eh? [*Deleuze does not finish*] So there is a moment when painting proceeds by "going to the motif"; it had not always proceeded that way. Cézanne's great phrase, "I'm going to the motif," he takes his easel out, and then his brush, and then he goes looking, searching for his apple, his sunset. He doesn't make copies, right? "Going to the motif" is not reproducing.

Today, well, a painter's attitude, taking pictures, the pictures that show him working, the very beautiful pictures that show how ... [*Pause; Deleuze seems to be looking for his sentence*] I forget his name, well, how a painter, for example, paints while spreading his canvas out on the floor, eh? That's not "going to the motif" there, [*a student reminds him of the name*] [Jackson] Pollock, yes, Pollock, the pictures of Pollock in his studio. This is a painting that no longer means anything to ethics; everything happens as if the flow no longer passes through that. There are painters for whom this has become a secondary activity. That doesn't mean Cézanne is outdated. Obviously, not, he isn't outdated. It means that the coordinates of the painting have changed greatly. On the contrary, it makes Cézanne someone who is unmatched. But then, Klee says it very well, today, that the problems change in that way, fine.

I would say, yes, they said, I've been brought to this, how very happy it is to end on this point. Leibniz is infinite analysis. So, to present some truly [*Pause*] simplistic statements, Kant is the finite synthesis, he is the great synthesis of finitude. Okay, let's assume we're really in the age of synthesizer today. It is no longer either infinite analysis or finite synthesis. It's, it's something else. And if also, isn't the synthesizer, isn't there any synthesizer in philosophy, which like a musical synthesizer, is a philosophical synthesizer? Hasn't that become our principle, [*a few indistinct words*]? What would that be, a synthetic thought, in this new sense? Okay, I don't

know, but you see, just as a painter can say, the artist is not in the same condition today in 1980 as he was in 1920, or as he was in 1700, what is obvious, the philosopher can no longer... So, it is obvious there, he can no longer, in his own way, "go to the motif", he can no longer sing the philosophical *lied*, he cannot no longer create his game of the song of the earth. No, that's not it; it's something else. It's something else, but what is it? [*Pause*]

There we have it! The end! [2:21:00]

NOTES

[1] Cf. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-OweD1YPeI>

[2] The French transcript of this seminar, based on the YouTube video, currently has an extremely truncated version that remains available at the WebDeleuze site, omitting approximately 9600 word (or 11 manuscript pages). These omissions have been eliminated to the extent possible.