Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on
A Thousand Plateaus I
RAI-3 recordings

1975-1976

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Deleuze su molteplicità molare et molteplicità molecolare, **Parts I, II, III: Molar and Molecular Multiplicities**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni

[*This recording contains segments from three successive Tuesday sessions given the evident shifts, from one part to the next, of camera locations, blackboard drawings, students near Deleuze, and classroom configurations. Moreover, Part I begins with Deleuze's review of specific points covered in several preceding sessions for which we have no recordings, followed by shorter, successive segments. Hence, we situate the approximate session dates as I, starting on November 18, 1975, II continuing on November 25, and ending with a brief segment III, on December 2.*]

[*Deleuze, with Guattari in attendance, reviews the concepts of molar and molecular aggregates and multiplicities, thereby developing their ongoing collaboration which will result, in 1980, in A Thousand Plateaus.*]

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

[Part I, 0:00, to 1:14:59; Part II, 1:15:00, to 1:31:09; Part III, 1:31:10, to 1:40:51, of YouTube recording, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oM2IAFRhe54&t=24s

[*Deleuze entering the room very slowly, due crowd blocking his path*]

Deleuze: How are we going to manage?

A woman student: We can just stay here like this.

Another woman student: It's not complicated… you just have to lift your leg…

Deleuze: I can't. It's stuck... [*Pause*] It's not just to be able to move, it's so we can breathe… [*Pause*] It's a life question! [*Pause*]

A woman student: Can you put out that cigarette?

Deleuze: Aaaah! [*He lifts his legs and continues trying to enter*] [*Pause*] Hello, Félix. [*Pause; Deleuze observes the crowd, looks at the blackboard for chalk, slowly takes off his coat, then places his books on the table*] I'd like to raise a problem, an interesting one. Over there, [*He points to the left, his right*] there's glass fiber there. Imagine if a fire broke out. [*Pause*] You see the door? [*He points over to his far left*] We would all die. All of us. [*Nervous laughter*]

A woman student: Unless we jump from the window. [*Pause*]

Deleuze: Except me, perhaps... [*Laughter*] But all of you will perish. Which is to say you shouldn't come to class; I have to be quite honest! The working conditions here don't conform to safety norms. So when the fire starts, don't panic. We don't move, we don't worry...

Guattari: Have you seen Narboni who was waiting for you...

Deleuze: Sorry?

Guattari: Tu as vu Narboni ?

Deleuze: Yes, I've seen Narboni. [*Pause; Deleuze speaks to students behind him quite softly perhaps to ask that they not smoke*] … That will make me choke. [*Pause*] That's better. [*Pause*] Does anyone have a piece of chalk? [*Pause*] Some chalk? [*Pause*] Some chalk? [*Pause*] Thank you... Ok, so, as usual I will summarize the topics we have already covered because... what is it?

A student: I can't hear very well.

Deleuze: It will come. My voice is always a bit low to begin with. It will come. So, the topics... I think we began with... I'll always recapitulate like this, so that when we go back to a given topic, those who were present...

A woman student: Louder!

Deleuze: Oh no, shit, really? -- … those who were present will be able to recall it. So, there's a first topic that we will put aside for the moment, concerning a certain number of figures of *segmentarity*. And then there's a second topic, which concerns at the same time *molar aggregates* and *molecular lines*. And, of course, these molar aggregates and molecular lines become mixed. We also briefly mentioned two complementarities, two relations of complementarity between the molar aggregates and the molecular lines that mix with them.

First of all, there is a direct complementarity: the bigger the molar aggregates become, the more the molecular lines become enmeshed with them, trace movements of flight etc. And there is also a second complementarity that is... Did I start with the direct one? I don't remember…

A student: Yes.

Deleuze: There is an inverse complementarity. Last time, we also sketched out a third topic which was a rapid analysis, or rather a rapid effect of the analysis, of the verb "to be" as a principle of the molar aggregates and their elements. And, on the other hand, we made an analysis of the conjunction "and" as a broken-line type of movement, a movement of the molecular line. And we imagined a kind of... tension – which is not contradiction - but a kind of tension between the *"est"* (is) of the verb "to be" and the *"et"* (and) of the conjunction, and we said that this tension would, for different reasons, traverse language as a whole, or at least certain languages.

And some of you raised the objection that apparently, in some languages this tension between *"est"* and *"et"* doesn't exist. Not only does it not exist but also the very structure of these languages denies it. This really unsettled us and yet, at the same time, we noted that a certain play of the conjunction "and" defines minor languages, or the minor use of certain languages, in opposition to the imperialism and hegemony of the verb "to be" in so-called major languages. And we also realized that we would have to return to this objection for the themes for which we had no answer at the time, thinking we would devote a lesson to it, and those who had made objections, namely that this wouldn't work, at least in the cases of Arabic or Chinese.

But we were reassured by the fact that it did work for languages I proposed to call neither minor nor major – languages eroded from within by strong minorities, such as British and American English. British and American English as a whole are traversed by a very peculiar use of the conjunction "and". There we are. You may have found all this a bit dispersive, but I think you've understood that... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

Today, I'd like to start on a fourth topic and this fourth topic would consist more or less in saying that we will try to establish a certain status typical of what we could call "molecular multiplicities". You see, this could be considered a different topic but at the same time it's the same as the previous ones because it implies a certain rapport between multiplicities that we call "molar" and multiplicities that we call "molecular". And, together with Guattari, I have sought... I don't want to go back to things we've already covered but I would like to tell you how we have managed to advance on this somewhat. We looked for a certain number of variables that could be considered variables of a particular type of multiplicity, which we will call "molecular". I pronounce these first of all for the pleasure the words give me, but also so that all of you can bear them in mind and to situate them in aggregates, in masses, in multiplicities.

The variables we wish to propose today are those that correspond to the category of *bridges*. A bridge. A bridge might not seem very molecular but it doesn't matter. A bridge... Second variable: *ring*, or *network*. Third variable: *borderline*. Fourth variable: *threshold* and *door*. Fifth variable: *fiber*. Sixth variable, which is obviously the most beautiful: *rhizosphere*, or *plane of consistency*. Good. I'll say that for the moment I would roughly like to place them, while avoiding anything to do with axioms or structures. I want to place these variables within a certain type of multiplicity.

Obviously... obviously these multiplicities or these masses don't exist on their own. I think again of the objection we began with yesterday, that all this is anyhow a form of dualism. Molecular multiplicities, when they are present, spread or stretch out, they spread together with multiplicities of large aggregates, multiplicities we shall call "molar". They are inside, they slip underneath, spread out on the surface, they always exist one within the other, according to what we previously defined as a double complementarity.

So, we have to begin again from the schema we proposed at a certain point that concerned - and here I'll be brief - multiplicities of a primarily molar nature. How do we recognize a molar multiplicity? Molar multiplicities include both aggregates - large aggregates - and the elements of these large aggregates. You remember how we were convinced that the distinction

molar/molecular doesn't correspond to that between aggregate and element? So, molar multiplicities are a certain type of aggregate comprised of certain elements.

How do we define them? We proposed to define them through the schema of arborescence. Each time you have an arborescent schema you have the formal pattern of a multiplicity that we can call a *molar multiplicity*. The simplest arborescent schema - because arborescent schemas are extremely complicated - the simplest arborescent schema is that which proceeds -- I'm not brave enough to go to the blackboard, so please follow my finger -- is that which proceeds by a succession of dichotomies. But there are others that are more complicated. If I try to express the arborescent schema in its most general form... -- perfect, perfect [*Deleuze reacts to someone on his right who has brought in a tree branch, soon to be visible on camera; Deleuze stands and goes to the board*] But the one you've got is simple -- [*Pause*] More or less it, would be this. [*Pause*] I can't continue because… well, we don't need this. [*Pause*] So, there we have an arborescent schema in its most general form.

If I try now quickly to list its characteristics, even if this means connecting them with things we looked at last year, I would say that in this aggregate, in this type of multiplicity - the molar multiplicity - their first characteristic is that *binary machines exist in their own right*. Every time, you have a dichotomizing operation that exists in its own right. Once again, either you're a man or a woman, a bourgeois or a proletarian and so on. It's all a play of binary machines that exist in their own right.

Second characteristic: there is... these multiplicities that we call molar are *centered multiplicities*. Here, the center is shown by the small circle. In other words, if I try to connect it to the things that we looked at last year, there is a central black hole. And this central black hole is not the only one. On the contrary… All the other black holes spread around the multiplicity, resonate together with the central black hole, which in this way is able to move in all directions. Last year, we would have said: All the eyes resonate in a kind of central computer-eye, a single eye, a third eye, which organizes the multiplicity as a whole.

Third characteristic: I will say that these multiplicities are *evolutive multiplicities*, even if they don't actually evolve. But if they don't evolve, what happens to them? If they don't evolve, they end up regressing. Yet both regression and progression are characteristics – directions - of evolution itself. By evolutive multiplicities I mean that they undergo a progression or a regression. In other words, what determines these multiplicities are lines of filiation or lines of lineage.

It's not by chance that the doctrine that was called Evolutionism began - and I stress that this was just a beginning because it wasn't limited to this - it began by posing questions in terms of filiation and lineage. In this regard, Darwin's key text speaks of how the novelty of Evolutionism consists in raising the questions of filiation and lineage that had never been posed by previous natural historians. However, this doesn't mean they ignored other phenomena. So what are these phenomena? We shall see, we shall see... These other phenomena, which we'll look at later, are treated as categories that have to be subordinated to phenomena of filiation and lineage.

Other characteristic, and now I'd like to read you a text. "In an arborescent system, only a single neighbor is admitted: the hierarchical superior." [*The text is by Pierre Rosenstiehl and Jean Petitot, "Automate asocial et systèmes acentrés",* Communications *22 (1974); see* A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 16-17*] It's all in the schema. You start from a branch, this point that I call "small a" admits only one neighbor, the one from which it receives information, and which in the arborescent series of ramifications is its hierarchical superior. Or, if you prefer, from the perspective of filiation, its ancestor. The genetic ancestor, for example.

The text goes on: "In an arborescent system, the channels of transmission are pre-established. Arborescence pre-exists the individual, who is integrated into it at a precise point." In computer science, this is called "a regime of centered automata". It goes without saying that if I try - from the point of view of evolutive multiplicities - to define what is progression in opposition to regression, I would say that progression is the passage from the least differentiated (like you have there for example) to the most differentiated. In fact, when biologists of Darwin's epoch were asked what was the single criterion for organic progression, they would say it's an organism that becomes increasingly differentiated.

The last feature I wish to insist upon is that in these molar multiplicities… -- I'm not fully committed here; we could really… these are questions that I'd like almost immediately to pose to you; we could trace a genesis, a passage from one characteristic to the other; it would be easy to consider how they end up, but it's not worth it; let's just consider them as characteristics -- So the last characteristic I will consider for the moment is that, in this type of multiplicity, there must be a principle of what we will call *organization* or *structuration*, which conducts the increasingly advanced game of differentiation or which distributes the binarities, the dichotomies, or which makes the black holes circulate throughout the entire system. But what is interesting is that this organizing or structuring principle is always hidden. It lets us see but is itself unseen.

So, for molar multiplicities what is invoked is an intelligibility that is deeper than sensibility. Or we have an interior - for example an interior of life - deeper than the manifestations of life. For example, as far as we know... I would almost say that if we can recognize in a multiplicity one of the aforementioned characteristics... I hope that in today's seminar it will all become clearer and more concrete. But if we found one of the aforementioned features at a concrete level in a multiplicity, I think we could say: however small it may be, however minuscule the elements at play, what we have is a molar multiplicity.

I'll give you an example: so-called Western music, and by this I'm not referring just to contemporary music but to classical music. In a way, we've always been told that there was a principle that we can also call... that for a musical work considered as a sonic multiplicity, there was a principle that could be called, no matter, a structuring principle or an organizational principle, and it was this principle that gave us to hear or listen. It was this principle that let us hear what we heard. But in and for itself, it went unheard. And if we consider what certain composers – even contemporary composers like Stockhausen or Boulez – refer to today as *structure*, it's clear that a musical structure *makes us hear*. But the structure itself goes unheard. And perhaps, if we take this term in a wider sense, it can be understood only through what it lets us hear.

Now, here's the question I wanted to ask without any need of an immediate answer: I wonder if, for example, what we could broadly call the Western conception of the unconscious doesn't depend precisely on this type of molar multiplicity. We shall see... For the moment, all this is still quite abstract, but I would like to speak about things of a more concrete nature. We don't even need to mention now that there exist multiplicities of another type -- *molecular multiplicities* -- but let's just say that in this schema of molar multiplicities you have all kinds of other phenomena slipping in, making irruptions, mixing with, penetrating molar multiplicities and constituting within them - in a completely immanent manner - another type of multiplicity that will perturb them from within. This is an important thing to bear in mind for the future because, if there are such workings from within, if molar multiplicities are affected by multiplicities of a different nature, you'll see that we will be able to find a better order for the topics we covered in the last few lessons.

I would like to demonstrate this by mixing almost everything together, which is to say by invoking a little bit of science and a bit of... not exactly dream, but I don't know, let's say literature. But I won't mix them, because otherwise none of you will give it credence. I would like to identify some poles - a certain number of poles - pertaining to what certain experts are researching. And this is important for us because in every field today... Guattari and I, when we find a specific example that we can't fully understand, because the scholars can be extremely difficult... the only thing we immediately understand is that each time they say: "What we apply are above all arborescent schema", which incidentally are much more elaborate than my little schema. You would need specialized mathematicians to make sense of them. But for example, in mathematical statistics - which is an extremely difficult, highly complex field – they have a method called (and it's not by chance they've given it this name, since scholars don't use metaphors) *counting trees.* Today mathematical statistics uses it all the time, but counting-trees methods don't account for the kind of phenomena I'm interested in.

We have to find a completely different model – I don't care what term we use - a completely different model or schema or type. And everywhere you look -- in biology, mathematics, physics, chemistry, linguistics, everywhere -- in every field, arborescent schema that for a long time have been dominant, and which according to me are still completely tied to the axiomatic period of science, are in the process of being overturned. Because science has ceased to be, or has ceased to take up, any kind of axiomatic or structural ideal.

But let's try to be more concrete. First of all, we have to confront the existence of what we can only call *bridges.* Bridges... and so what would a bridge be? Actually, we don't really need to depart from my schema on the blackboard. It's enough to simply add it in. And the question I want to pose now is: will this schema be able to answer or account for what I wish to add here? And what I wish to add is... this and this. Twice. Two bridges.

So how should we define these bridges? As *whatever connection between two heterogeneous lines or lineages*. These are things that all of us know, and that we've already looked at, so I'm going to speed things up a bit. Let's go back to some examples that Guattari and I have already developed at length. There's an odd story we keep going back to, which is quite fascinating: wasp-orchid. [*See* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 10-13, 293-294*] In simple terms, the orchid reproduces a sort of image of the wasp in such a way that it can wed itself to the wasp's image. A

kind of transversal bond is created between two realms, between an element of the vegetable kingdom and one of the animal kingdom. This is what I would call a *bridge*.

You see what we're attempting to derive. You can never derive a bridge from a filiation. If I was to seek a common filiation, my whole schema would collapse because I placed the bridge between two series, two differentiated lines. But here at the top of the board we have a common filiation, and the bridge makes it collapse. We would have to find a common filiation, a common ancestor of the wasp and the orchid. We can actually go as far as saying that a bridge is always *between realms* [*inter-règne*].

So already here, we have no choice if we accept all this, that there are bridges. Bridges don't only exist in biology. Physicists and chemists too speak of having to introduce bridges into piles. In current theories regarding polymers, for example, there is a need to introduce bridges - while classical schemes don't acknowledge this.

I would say that the bridge is always a term of alliance, an alliance between two realms, so the living world is no longer understood – I'm exaggerating - so the different parts of the living world are no longer understood in terms of filiations and lineages but of alliances, which suits us perfectly. Because if we try to define Neo-evolutionism, which is to say Post-Darwinian evolutionary theory, we would say that it's a theory that has increasingly been forced to renounce the primacy, the hegemony of the theme of filiations.

So can we say there is a wasp-orchid alliance? We know there exist phenomena of vital alliances in the aggregates of so-called symbioses or parasitisms, but more generally in the domain of symbiosis. It would be interesting if evolution occurred through alliance rather than filiation, at which point perhaps it would no longer be evolution. So what would it be? Another kind of multiplicity: *molecular multiplicities*, micro-multiplicities.

Bridges define and bring into play a whole system of micro-multiplicities. But in what sense? For example, in contemporary genetic research we are told that beyond any filiation there may be communication between two lines, two completely independent series, through a virus. A virus that connects both to the genetic inheritance of a given species and to that of another species that has nothing in common with the first - so the virus functions as a bridge between two species with no common filiation and which have absolutely nothing to do with one another.

Viruses are interesting because they introduce us more closely to a molecular schema: alliances that go against nature… but, even if there are other types, aren't all alliances *interkingdom* in nature, made between two realms? So that's what we call *a bridge*, and that would be the first feature of this type of multiplicity: connections of whatever type between independent series or between lines irreducible to a filiation or a common lineage.

A student: More slowly please!

Deleuze: What?

The student: Not so fast…

Deleuze: Am I going too fast for you? On the contrary, I'm going to go even faster! … [*Tape interrupted*] [37:43]

There… now my schema is perfect. Good. See? I've got bridges which are themselves connected to each other. Why is this interesting? Because… it's not that interesting? Why is it interesting? Because it's a state where there is a swarming of black holes, a multiplicity of black holes that doesn't let itself... that doesn't resonate within a central black hole. Why is this?

Well, in contrast to a feature of molar multiplicities that we saw before, here each element - each black hole if you will -- each element is at once emitter and receiver. In the theory of automata – and I insist on this point – everything that cannot be reduced to an arborescent schema implies that each element is both emitter and receiver. So that's what our schema looks like, and it's not reducible to an arborescent schema. You see? I have my network, my ring, and my connecting bridges, each time with a black hole that is both receiver and emitter of each element, of each black hole. As a result, you no longer have a hierarchical arborescent structure but a ring.

Now I'm going to read something by a contemporary specialist who researches certain phenomena in physics. It's a text that I'd like Guattari to comment on later, if he feels like it... [*Pause*] Page 906: "If we suppose that clusters have a simple ramified structure like a family tree, we omit the possibility of cyclization". You see… the phenomenon of cyclization that unites all the elements in a network, such that each is at once emitter and receiver.

You see that up until now -- I wish I had spoken in more concrete terms; I started badly; I should have begun with some concrete examples but now it's too late -- Up until now -- maybe I can get back on track -- I've limited myself to a single multiplicity. But something is happening here. I'm trying to show how in any molar multiplicity something of another nature begins to insinuate itself. It's still a molar multiplicity but something odd is slipping into it, laying down its bridges, connecting them in networks and rings. But what is this? Don't be surprised if we have to turn to horror stories as much as to science in order to figure this out. In fact, with my first two notions of bridge and ring (or network), I've remained within the context of a given multiplicity, one that is single and determined, a particular multiplicity.

How do we define it? This is my third notion. How do we define a multiplicity? In the case of a *molar multiplicity* we define it through - as we saw - a structuring or organizing principle that isn't given as such. Here, at least, the answer is simple. But in the case of these crafty multiplicities, these discreet multiplicities that insinuate themselves, that we are trying to catch as they insinuate themselves… I can't say they have an organizing or structuring principle since that's how I defined molar multiplicities. What defines this kind of multiplicities -- and this too is something we covered last year so I'll be brief -- what defines these multiplicities is a certain number of dimensions that they have. These multiplicities are defined through their dimensions.

But how do you understand how many dimensions they have? Well, they have a maximal dimension. A maximal dimension, each of these multiplicities has a maximal dimension, and here's where it gets interesting. It's by determining the maximal dimension of a multiplicity that I am able to say how many dimensions it has. It will have as many dimensions as are contained by the maximal dimension.

Now what is this maximal dimension? It's what we can only call *borderline* and there it is, all at once we're saved! The maximal dimension of a multiplicity is called *borderline*. It's a strange thing, [*Pause*] it's a strange thing, this notion of the *borderline…* as that which allows us to define a particular type of multiplicity, a *molecular multiplicity*, as opposed to the molar type, which is defined through a structuring organizing principle that remains secret, hidden.

It's a bizarre thing... If we take say a "fly" multiplicity or a "fog" multiplicity, or a "mosquito" -- finally we're down to the concrete, while still remaining within science -- what are these multiplicities? A fly by itself means nothing. A single fly is a lost fly, that is to say, it's not a fly. What means something is when we say "flies". Félix and I said that the same is true for other beasts, but it bears repeating. One wolf doesn't mean anything. "Wolves" means something. Or, rather, "wolf" means a lone wolf but the loner, well, isn't he the border of the wolf multiplicity? Very good.

If the loner were the border of the multiplicity constituted by the pack of wolves, then we wouldn't have to think of him as we do normally: as an exceptional individual. But simply, as the *borderline* determining the maximal dimension of the multiplicity, we shall call the "wolf multiplicity", which is different from other multiplicities. And what about Moby Dick? Moby Dick, the great white whale? What is he, if not the *borderline* of the school of whales? Perhaps it always takes a monster to make the borderline, and we have to ask ourselves why this is.

You may think I have totally abandoned science, but what I'm saying is completely scientific. It's not surprising that neo-evolutionists think solely in terms of populations. They no longer distinguish species or types. Evolutionary theorists no longer speak of species or types but only of populations. There is no animal species or type, only animal populations or vegetable populations. In any case, the borderline is merely, I'd like… [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

And here I have a text by a famous mathematician called René Thom. Oddly enough, René Thom writes... Thom loves opposing military-type aggregates or societies to those of a more fluid nature. Which suits us fine. Military societies are typically arborescent - this too was part of last year's seminar - power apparatuses are essentially ramified arborescent structures. So we're OK with Thom's premise. And he speaks of a multiplicity that suits us perfectly, a *micro-multiplicity* or *molecular multiplicity*: a swarm of mosquitoes.

Here's what he says: "Every individual in the group moves in an random manner" -- that's not what happens in molar societies or aggregates – "to the point where it can see the rest of the swarm in the same half-space". [*René Thom,* Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, *trans. D. H. Fowler (Reading, MA: Benjamin Fowler/Cummings, 1975), p. 319; see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 245)*] This is perfect for us, you'll understand... Every mosquito -- and here Thom says something extraordinary -- every mosquito is the borderline of the multiplicity of a mosquito swarm, and every mosquito in the swarm functions in its turn as the swarm's borderline. That's what can happen.

We saw another case, where a small military-type principle emerges, where the borderline is assured by a chief, a leader of the pack, a squad or gang leader. But in the mosquito's case,

every member of the group moves in a random way, unless it can see the others in the same half-space. Which means that if you follow the route of a mosquito or a fly - obviously it would be different if it was attracted by blood or a piece of flesh - but if you observe its random path, the rule of chance is that every mosquito will move up to a limit position. What is this limit position?

If we imagine a closed space, the limit will be the point where the mosquito finds itself so as to have all the others on its right, for example…You follow me? At that moment, its position will be on the borderline, and Thom says: "At this point it hurries to re-enter the group. In this example, stability is assured in catastrophe…" -- an important concept for Rene Thom, who has a mathematical concept of catastrophe -- "In this example, stability is assured in catastrophe by a barrier…" There's no better way to describe the borderline. A gang or band has a number of dimensions determined by a maximal dimension: the borderline. In the case of the mosquito swarm, the borderline can be precisely defined as the line in function of which a mosquito situated on it will see all the other members of the swarm on one side, at which point it re-enters the swarm.

It's interesting, this position of being on the borderline… we should take advantage of it. Being on the borderline, being on the borderline… Being on the borderline means to be part of the gang while not being inside the gang. Being on the periphery, then re-entering the gang before going back to the periphery. But I wonder… isn't it typical when you are part of a gang, this fact of occupying the position of the borderline? At the limit, as Thom says of mosquitoes [*Pause as Deleuze tries to find the quote*], as Thom says of mosquitoes [*Pause as he continues looking, then sits back trying to remember*] ah, yeh, yeh, yeh [*Pause as he continues reflecting*] … oh I don't remember, I don't remember… As Thom says of mosquitoes [*A woman student says something*] Yes! It's that every mosquito, insofar as being part of a swarm, occupies the borderline position.

In a novel – and here I'll pass quickly on to literature, since I don't see any difference between a phrase of Thom and one of a novelist, though I see the difference in treatment.

- Yes… what is it? There are two books by Thom which are easy to find, then there's an article… let's see if I have the reference... and a book called *Morphology*...

 A student: *Morphogenesis*?

Deleuze: *Morphology*... he's got it wrong… it's called *Structural Morphology*… He's wrong, it happens to everyone… it's called *Structural Morphology* and... I can't remember, I'll tell you later… [*Tape interrupted*] [54:00]

In *Mrs. Dalloway* we have what Virginia Woolf presents as an extraordinary walk. [*On the "walk" in* Mrs. Dalloway*, see* A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 263*] Each word here is important… and in the words of her heroine she says that following that walk her problems had dissolved, disappeared, she had had many worries, a lot of problems and she realized that these problems were of little account, they concerned the choice of who she should have married, who she should have left etc. And they didn't make much sense anymore.

It's curious that a walk could resolve her problems. It can happen… maybe it's no longer the same scale, maybe it's not just a simple walk but a fantastic molecular adventure that have swept away or transformed the burdensome molar position of these problems. Should I marry or remain single, should I stay a man or become a woman, should I finally grow up etc. All kinds of molar problems, but in the end, maybe, there's a small particle that can make all this collapse.

And Virginia Woolf, because it's clearly her, and we'll see why, she says that during this walk, which strangely takes place among taxis – there's a continual passing of taxis… It's interesting because taxis - and I'm not making this up – here I go back to science, and those scientists who have studied the matter closely… Taxis run on what are called semi-random routes, that is, the scientists… Yes?

A woman student: Can you speak louder? We can't hear anything.

Deleuze: Really… you can't hear me? …

The student: [*Inaudible reply*]

Deleuze (*He pauses to reflect a moment*]: The route a taxi takes on a day's run is like that of a mosquito in its swarm: it's a semi-random route, because how it continues its trajectory is in part determined by the point where the previous client got off. When a taxi is drawn towards a point on the borderline, where it has all the other taxis on its right, you'll hear the driver say: "Here I'm going to get lynched!" - which is to say he is in a rough neighborhood where he wouldn't normally venture. Actually, I hadn't thought of that, it will be useful later on because we'll be dealing with a story of criminal machines… but we haven't got there yet, but we'll get there.

So, here we have Virginia Wolf's walk among the taxis but she's not *in* a taxi, she runs into a number of people, and she walks in a way that's literally the way they say only the English and Americans walk. You know, a walk by Henry Miller -- we've already talked about this -- isn't the same as a walk by Michel Butor -- which isn't to badmouth Butor… but they don't walk in the same way. Americans, English don't stroll in the same way. Henry Miller doesn't take a stroll around Clichy the way a Frenchman would in New York -- unless he has a particular gift for it -- it's different, neither better nor [worse]. Usually, a French stroll would be more molar. The molecular stroll is a curious thing. [*On Miller's stroll, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 482*]

So anyway, Woolf says, I sliced like a knife through everything… It's a lovely phrase in a walk, "like a knife through everything". Then she says -- I know it almost by heart since I memorized it last night, [*Laughter*] since the book was heavy, and I didn't want to have to bring it along -- She also says: "I am a mist". There you have a molecular multiplicity. "I am a mist laid out among the people I know". A beautiful phrase that… even more so because it's not just literature - that really is how she lived, like a mist laid out among those she knew. I'm like a knife that slices through everything, that plunges into things, cuts between things. I'm… I don't know what, a mist laid out between people. But then she says: "and at the same time I'm on the outside", [*Pause*] and at the same time I remain on the outside. [*On this quote from* Mrs. Dalloway, *see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 264*]

This is an odd kind of position… it has to be explained. How is it possible? It's strange because I don't have the words to describe it in terms of a molar multiplicity. If I try to describe it in such terms, what will the binary machine of the molar apparatus say? It will say: "what you doing is pure literature." You're either outside or inside - or you're on the periphery. You are either one of us or a foreigner from elsewhere - or you've been placed on sentry duty to make sure outsiders don't get in.

And although here we have a third term – we've seen it so I won't go back over it; we studied at the beginning of the year – this third term refers to a binarism, in the form of successive binary choices. First binarism: You're either inside or outside. Second binarism: You're (either inside or outside), this time in parenthesis - or you're a sentry. So there is a first level of choice, then a second, but each time the choice is binary, so the three terms don't change the binary nature of the choice.

Thus in terms of a molar multiplicity we will always have to say that this position cannot even be expressed, which is why we need three pages of a writer like Virginia Woolf to try to let us *feel* it and to try to reawaken a small particle in us - I'm weighing my words here - literally a tiny particle that can say "But of course, this is how I live". The particle that is always on the borderline of the multiplicity to which it belongs -- I can't think of a more precise formula for the moment -- a particle that is always on the borderline of the multiplicity to which it belongs. [*On the borderline linked to Woolf's walk, see* A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 29*]

Yet we still have a small problem. We have two cases: it can be any particle whatever, as in the case of a mosquito, any mosquito whatever, since every mosquito will take up this position. Or it can be a monster mosquito, a mutant. Moby Dick, the head wolf. Ok… for the moment I'm done with the story of the borderline. You can ask me questions in a minute if you like. But I just want to finish this.

For the moment, I will say that the borderline is perfectly embodied in any particle whatsoever, molecular multiplicities are a kind of multiplicity whose elements remain on the borderline of the multiplicity so formed. So it's by determining the position of the borderline that you know the number of dimensions the multiplicity has. If you don't keep to the position of the borderline, you remain stuck in the molar, in the big molar aggregates.

But keeping to the borderline -- you know where I'm heading… -- perhaps there is a relation between what we called lines of flight and the borderline. Perhaps there's a rapport, since the particles on the borderline, and whose path is the borderline... what can we say about these particles? It was through these particles that I defined the multiplicity in question. I can say that they function as a provisional stabilizer, a temporary stabilizer… Moby Dick functions as a temporary stabilizer of the school of whales, the head wolf serves as a temporary stabilizer of the pack. Remember what Thom said? That stability is assured in catastrophe by a barrier that assures a discontinuity in behavior. It's a question of assuring stability. [*On the borderline and the question of stability, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 245*]

So I'd say that it's a local temporary stabilizer, but it's not only that. There's a whole other aspect to it, namely, it causes the multiplicity slip inside another, that is, through the borderline, on one

hand the multiplicity is stabilized, on the other the borderline is in relation with other borders, it prolongs itself through other borderlines, which, since they contain other dimensions, provoke a metamorphosis, a transformation of the molecular multiplicity in question into another molecular multiplicity.

We began from a single, determinable multiplicity without yet knowing how to define it. Then we noted how it is the borderline that determines a molecular multiplicity. However, molecular multiplicities transform into each other, since their own borderlines communicate across the border, they form with one another. As though they were thresholds, doors from one border to another, such that below a certain threshold the border defines a given multiplicity as a local stabilizer. Whereas beyond the threshold you already have another border defining another multiplicity, and these multiplicities are such that one is transformed into the other. At the limit, we would have to regard this as a kind of slippage of borders, a superseding of thresholds.

To take a rough example from science that refers to an important question: physicists and chemists are now saying that no ramified arborescent schema takes these kinds of phenomena into account. As an example, they refer to transformations of the type "sol"-"gel", which is to say the transformation from the state of a solution to that of a "gel". In "sol"- "gel" transitions, the solution state is actually a type of multiplicity, while the gel state constitutes another type of multiplicity. It's a question of showing how a borderline surpasses a threshold. They call this the *percolation threshold*, to employ an admirable term that Félix Guattari learned from some of his specialist friends. [*See Guattari,* The Machinic Unconscious, *trans. Taylor Adkins (1979; Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Semiotext(e), 2011), p. 345 note 11, where Guattari refers to "effects of percolation" as synonymous with "phase transitions"*] We have to know why this is. They claim that it's impossible to translate it in terms of arborescent schema. It's interesting how here they require a sort of machinic notion in contrast to the arborescent model. This is important but I'll leave it aside for the moment, though I'll come back to it in the context of literature, or if you prefer, but… [*Deleuze does not complete his thought*]

In chemistry and physics, in the whole field of phase transitions, we see one molecular multiplicity passing into another just as one borderline approaches another. Crossing a threshold, passing through a door - whether a threshold of percolation or something else, it doesn't matter - but it doesn't just happen at random.

I'm almost done so I'll be quick… This slippage of borders doesn't happen in all fields but only on condition that the bordering molecular multiplicities change their nature, are transformed into one another. You'll tell me that we need to provide some examples, fine… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:08:05]

… so I'll take a seemingly fantastic example -- so much the better -- that of werewolves. Werewolves, werewolves… when they die they turn into vampires. So what! - you might say - that's nothing, it's not science. But here I'm giving you a foretaste of the literature we will need. Werewolves turn into vampires -- I'm not exaggerating -- werewolf and vampire stories are of interest to us because the werewolf multiplicity is also a question of the pack. One werewolf is meaningless. It's a question of epidemic, of contagion. Not filiation. It works. There's no

filiation, we already saw that when we were studying it. There is always a pact of alliance. [*On werewolves and sorcerers as well as pacts and alliances, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 245-247*]

But a pact of alliance with what? Here's where demonology can serve us as a transition, a bridge between science and literature. What is the pact of alliance that is made by someone who becomes a werewolf? It occurred with the devil, or a sorcerer. Now what is the devil? With respect to our dear Lord, the good molar creature, the enormous molar creature, the devil is typically molecularized, he's even named on account of this. The Devil, in his molecular aspect, let me think… he's called Beelzebub, Lord of the Flies. One of the Devil's main functions is to be Lord of the Flies, that is, of molecular multiplicities. They didn't have the term for it then but when they said Lord of the Flies that's what they meant.

He has many other names, having many functions, but in the end, what is this alliance with the Sorcerer? I'd say that the Sorcerer or the devil occupies the position of the borderline. It's the monster, it's Moby Dick, the Moby Dick of the universe… An alliance is formed, a bridge type of phenomenon an alliance is formed, a bond -- we can use several different words -- an alliance is formed, and one becomes a werewolf… But the werewolf is at the same time a full member of a multiplicity. And because this multiplicity is a molecular multiplicity, even if the werewolf is big -- I say this because we're defining our multiplicities through different references of scale or size… -- because it's a molecular multiplicity, being a member of this Pack or multiplicity, the werewolf is always at the borderline of the multiplicity he forms with other werewolves. [Pause] And the werewolves are themselves at the borderline; the aggregate of werewolves, they are at the border of the multiplicity they form with other wolves, the multiplicity of wolves. [*Pause*]

But here is where things get complicated. Because when they die, according to many traditions, werewolves become vampires. And vampires belong to a completely different multiplicity. Researching this, it's interesting how, for example, the werewolf multiplicity, or gang or pack, differs from the multiplicity of the vampire set. Here we have a nice example of the transformation of one multiplicity into another through the prolongation of a borderline where the devil, the sorcerer etc, don't perform the same function.

However, one border can slip inside another and there can be a rupture and then another into yet another. Each time you have this meshing of borders... we can speak of fiber - hence the expression many physicists use today, when they speak about the fibers of the universe. This is interesting because the current theory of fibers in physics has established itself in opposition to a typically molar theory: brick theory. Generally speaking, brick theory states that what is most material -- physical matter -- has the form of brick that enters into the construction of more precarious fragile structures, such as living structures. The theory of fibers is completely different. It consists in establishing lines of continuity between elements that are taken up in terms of their own individuality. For example, the lines of continuity that run from a higher living organism to atoms, which we are told are too tiny to be subjected to the law of large numbers – "too tiny", we've seen this in Schrodinger's formula – too tiny to be subjected to the law of large numbers. This is important because the law of large numbers, statistics, is still a molar method… [*On the theory of fibers, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 249-251, 272*] [*Tape interrupted, end of Part I*] [1:14:59]

Part II

[*Given that a seemingly different drawing is on the board and that different students are sitting behind Deleuze from one part to the next, this segment could be occurring on a different day, despite its evident connection to the previous discussion*]

… I would say that gangs are molecular multiplicities. Not because they are small but on account of their non-molar type of organization. A gang is first of all defined through its borderline and the way that each of its members conducts their business at the borderline: the members of the gang leave, and then they re-enter, each bringing in the swag, and the swag is redistributed. Obviously, there is also a central position. There are centers and it's because of these virtual centers in the gang that it risks becoming arborescent, going over to the other side, towards a type of organization that resembles a molar aggregate.

But, generally speaking, everyone in the gang conducts their own business and at the same time it's everyone's business. There exist contractual rapports, relations by contract or by alliance, relations of debt, counter-debt, all kinds of weird relationships. I'm told that even in groups of drug addicts there are odd relationships of debt and alliance.

But what is strange is the way the gang is always threatened, not only from the outside by pressure from the molar aggregates, but also from the inside. Gangs are threatened from the inside by phenomena of massification or leadership, the reconstitution of a central leader or worse, of a kind of group Oedipus. For example, when a woman in the gang takes on a maternal role, she institutes a kind of group mothering. I've seen this happen in certain communes, this fascinating phenomenon of group mothering that reconstitutes a center in the group. In this case, it's as though the molecular multiplicity tended literally to arborify, to molarize itself, to attain the status of a molar aggregate. And this is always the way with molecular multiplicities, not because they are particularly fragile, but because it's something that occurs in their very movement.

So, if we define molecular multiplicities by the segments that we've looked at - segments of a becoming-animal, a becoming molecular and so on, through the phenomena of the borderline, or of flight -- I'm not going to go into that now… -- we see they're always in danger of vacillating, of being had, of going back to the side of the molar aggregates, the way the nomadic war machine went over to the side of the state apparatus even if it had a wholly different nature and function. But it's the same with today's gangs, like the War Machines of ancient times, it's all as though finally... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*]

There are women in gangs who create a kind of... I don't know, I imagine many of you have noticed things like that, these phenomena, literally, both how there's often the two-fold danger of gangs and communities reconstituting both a kind of group mothering and a leadership... which is the reason gangs are always on the verge of becoming fascist, of recreating fascistic formations. In other words, it's always like this but nothing is certain... You can't say: "this is where the real revolution is happening", not at all. There could be a reconstitution of a molecular Oedipus, and a molecular Oedipus is no better than a family Oedipus, a molar Oedipus. In fact, it

can even be worse, so for example, you might have a female body that becomes the center of the gang. [*On these kinds of reconstitution, see* A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 214-216*]

I'm thinking of those American gangster films where the gang is led by the big mama. This is the danger the gang faces, that at its center a big black hole will begin to form. Usually this is how a gang collapses, either that or by rupture or a scattering of its members who get fed up, cross over the borderline and become part of another multiplicity, or else reconstitute a molar-type aggregate, even if it's a small one. Once again you see how our molar-molecular distinction isn't one between large and small numbers… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:20:47]

… I would say that leaders in molar aggregates have an organizing function. In molar aggregates we recognize the boss from the central position they occupy, the central black hole. Or, if you prefer, the face, the function of a central faciality. I'm not at all saying it's an individual; remember that the face function is never a individual function but a social production.

So there is the central face, like that of Hitler, for example, at the center of fascism, with its little orbiting satellites, little black holes around the big black hole: Goering-Goebbels. There's this organization, the leader is essentially in a central position, to the point that the law of molar aggregates is always, it seems to me, of a type that tends towards the center, assuring legitimate ambitions, since it's only by advancing in one's career that one gets closer to the center. Otherwise, one remains far from the center.

Here the center is on high because you always have a supplementary dimension in molar aggregates… there is a supplementary dimension in molar aggregates which is of course that of the profile or position of the leader. But it's an interior and central position to which all the underlings try to get closer, except for those who are under orders to keep watch at the borders, although they'll be relieved and their compensation will be to be able to see the leader and be led by him, that is to go back towards the center. So this is the position the leader occupies.

I'm not saying that molecular gangs or groups, molecular multiplicities, don't have leaders, but not surprisingly we need another word to describe them. There's one excellent word that I hadn't thought of last term and here I open a parenthesis. I spoke about Lovecraft because he's an author I really admire, as many of you do, this American author, American - not English. Anyway, this great American author... what was I saying? Yes, he once wrote a book, no it was a story called… and I know I won't be able to pronounce it properly -- "The Outsider", "Outsider", as is said "outsider". [*See* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 245*] It's translated in French, very badly as usual. Translators do things... you just need to know a little bit of a language to understand when a translation doesn't work.... he translated the title as "Je suis d'ailleurs" ("I'm from elsewhere").

This is important for us, for what we were saying about the becoming-animal in molecular multiplicities, quoting some passages from Lovecraft. [*On Lovecraft's animals, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 248*] Because in this story, the *outsider* is what Lovecraft calls "the thing", the "unnamable", the human being in its becoming-beast, the becoming-animal of the human. He presents the outsider both as the thing and as a swarm. Remember our couple? The guide and the

pack, the two together, Moby Dick and the school of whales, the devil and the pack of wolves and so on... And we understand what *outsider* means and that it doesn't mean "I am elsewhere".

So what is the outsider? Even in French I have the impression that it means, "the one you don't expect". But in what sense? I don't even need to force language. Literally, it's the one that exceeds or overflows, that arises from and spills over the border. The border-dweller, the being of the borderline is the unnamable, the one who literally delimits the swarming multiplicity. And if the multiplicity is superseded, it changes its nature and acquires another borderline. That's what the outsider is.

I'm saying, this is the position of the leader, but "leader" from the perspective of a molecular multiplicity, which is quite different from the leader's position in molar aggregates. Here, the leader or guide of a molecular group is the one who is always at the borderline, as in the case of animal packs, where that's found. We'd even have to see if we didn't find the two-fold position of the leader in certain packs, already a kind of central leader, or central female, and then the border chief, a border guide who pushes back and guards the frontier. The border chief who stays at the borderline is the great Nomad. The one who stays at the center is the Chinese Emperor, if we want to refer to literature. Operating in a completely different way the nomad is the head of his war machine, which is itself a becoming, a molecular multiplicity, whereas the Chinese Emperor is the nominal head of the State apparatus.

Although I'm here to defend thought, if someone told me that we need a leader… no, no, I'm… If I tell myself that a leader is necessary – and especially in certain circumstances, it can't help but occur -- it's a statement that doesn't mean much to me since, for me, the real question is what kind of leader will it be. Will it be the border-dweller, who will always occupy the position of the outsider? Or will it rather be the one who, in opposition to the outsider, we can call the "champion", the man of central power who has a faciality function, whereas the border-dweller is typically without face, has literally lost his face? Perhaps he's the one who makes greater use of secrets.

So, at this level too, we have to distinguish not only between two types of leader but between the way a molecular multiplicity refers to a pack leader, a peripheral chief, who we could define as an "outsider", while molar aggregates refer to another type of leader. And we should also add that, faced with certain dangers or in certain circumstances, molecular multiplicities reconstitute leaders of the molar type and do so completely - even if they do it in a different way, depending on whether they rely on a border chief or else reconstitute a central leader typical of a molar aggregate… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:28:56]

… I find it amusing how we are presented today with the history of psychoanalysis as supposedly beginning it creation, by recounting a number of little tales about what happened inside the school. They're still cheating, of course. There was a first period which was more or less a period of censorship concerning what happened around Freud and his early disciples. But now we can finally understand what a mess all this was, quite a marvel. It was really one of these groups with Freud was the central leader. Fine.

But what interests me, once again – this is what I wanted to say earlier -- I have no interest in the disciples; the disciples deserved what they got. What interests me is what was happening on the outside during that period. I have the impression that we still don't really know. What was happening in Vienna around the time of the birth of psychoanalysis… what psychoanalysis, as it began to institutionalize itself, crushed in the different Viennese movements.

History is normally examined purely in terms of geneses, as though on one hand you had the institution of analysis with its internal problems, and on the other a hostile external environment. But in my view this isn't what happened. I just want to mention it… but there's an Austrian scholar who's been working on the matter for ten years - either he's given up or there's too much to say concerning the myriad groups that existed at that time. I'm not saying that Freud was plagiarizing what these groups were doing. I'm just saying that there was a flood of research. We only know of one borderline figure, Groddeck, but it seems there were many types of Groddeck around then, many, many, many. Psychoanalysis, perhaps without meaning to – without pretending to demonize it – was to crush all these movements. I can't say it was necessarily a bad thing. I'm not saying, "Look what they did." It rather a question of saying that's how history always works… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:31:10]

Part III

[*Again, as with the start of the previous part, Deleuze is surrounded by a different group of students in a different classroom configuration; hence, this seems to be a third, brief segment from another seminar session, which we have situated on the following Tuesday*]

… "They [the waves] told him that every figure of space" -- every figure is a multiplicity, that's what mathematicians say; a triangle is a multiplicity on every side, on all three vertices -- "They told him that every figure of space" -- therefore every multiplicity -- "is but the result of" -- I change my tone of voice when I'm quoting -- "is but the result of the intersection by a plane [of some corresponding figure of one more dimension—as a square is cut from a cube or a circle from a sphere. The cube and sphere, of three dimensions, are thus cut from corresponding forms of four dimensions that men know only through guesses and dreams; and these in turn are cut from forms of five dimensions, and so on up to the dizzy and reachless heights of archetypal infinity.] [*Tape interrupted, citation below*] [1:32:09]

… The world of men and of the gods of men is merely an infinitesimal phase of an infinitesimal thing -- the three-dimensional phase of that small wholeness reached by the First Gate, where 'Umr at-Tawil dictates dreams to the Ancient Ones." [*This citation is from a story by H.P. Lovecraft and E. Hoffmann Price, "Through the Gates of the Silver Key" in* The Dream-Quest of the Unknown Kadath *(New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), pp. 191-192*; *cites several times in* A Thousand Plateaus, *see p. 251*]

You understand? We're saying that every multiplicity, every molecular multiplicity, can be defined by a number of dimensions. This number is determined by the position of what functions as the borderline of the multiplicity. [*For this definition, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 249*] I mean to say that the square and the circle are two-dimensional figures in function of their borderline, which is to say a line. Everything that is bordered by a line will have two dimensions.

These are already multiplicities. There will also be three-dimensional multiplicities bordered by a surface and multiplicities of four or five, even ten dimensions. Here are examples of a multidimensional multiplicity, however varied: man, domestic animal-sheep, rat-bacteria, which creates contagion-plague, multiplicities with three types of werewolves, three types of vampires, and so on.

So, we have multiplicities of any type of dimension that transform into one another. This we've already seen. What we call *plane of consistency* or *rhizosphere* is the common intersection of all these multiplicities by a plane. You might say, "but the plane too has its own dimension." No. It has to be a zero-dimensional plane. Not because it doesn't have dimensions, but because it is able to cut through all the dimensions in such a way that the multiplicities that transform into one another never cease transforming. [*Deleuze coughs*] And their way of communicating is through this plane. Therefore, on the plane of consistency everything becomes abstract, in the cultural sense of the term. That is to say, the plane of consistency is the bearer of what Félix and I have been turning around this past year: the *abstract machine*. The universe is a Mechanosphere, not a noosphere or a biosphere. It's a hypersphere, a Mechanosphere…

What was I saying? The plane of consistency... ah yes, it's the abstract machine because it gathers the ensemble of all the assemblages, of all machinic assemblages, of all multiplicities of whatever dimensions - and the dimensions of all these transformable multiplicities must exist precisely on this plane. The abstract elements of a single machine: a single Mechanosphere… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:36:02]

… Virginia Woolf constructs the unity of her work [*The Waves*] on a single plane of consistency that advances and gathers all the multiplicities: the Bernard multiplicity, the Neville multiplicity, the Jinny multiplicity. And we have the impression that Percival is the extreme borderline, that Percival, the admirable Percival, almost merges with the plane of consistency. And yet, no. This is not what happens although some might think so. And Percival dies. He dies. [*On* The Waves, *see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 252*]

I brought you this wonderful page of *The Waves*. One of the characters is Rhoda. Following Percival's death, she looks into what is a kind of lake where she sees forms appearing. She has the impression that one of these forms on the lake is Percival, even if she knows he is dead. And this is what she says. She describes the form she sees: "When the white arm rests upon the knee it is a triangle; now it is upright - a column; now a fountain, falling. It makes no sign, it does not beckon, it does not see us. Behind it roars the sea. It is beyond our reach."

Great, don't you think? Do you see this kind of curve? The same applies when it's upright. It passes through all these multiplicities of increasing or decreasing dimensions, of variable dimensions. But they all somehow belong to the same plane of consistency. They're all there, on this plane of consistency, but in the most abstractly real form, in the forms of pieces and cogs of the abstract machine. So Percival's white arm will no longer be a knee or an elbow: it will be a triangle. This will no longer be… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:38:47]

… I didn't want to present an example from Kafka, but very quickly, I'll tell you that she [Josephine] occupies exactly the same borderline position. What's more, we learn that she is

undoubtedly a singer, but that she doesn't sing. [*On this Kafka tale, "Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk," see* A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 233-234*] These are Kafka's flashes of brilliance. So we shouldn't confuse becoming-musical with making music, [*Pause*] just as we shouldn't confuse becoming-mouse with imitating a mouse. Man becomes mouse and mouse becomes musical, but it's man who makes music, and what does the mouse do? It's a mystery. We'll follow what it does.

This is what I call a *bloc of becoming*, the simultaneity of these two asymmetrical becomings. [*On blocks of becoming, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 237,* 307] When I say that there is a becoming-woman of man I don't mean that symmetrically there is a becoming-man of woman. This was already almost the objection or question that was raised the last time. When I say that there is a becoming-animal of man, somebody said there was also a becoming- human of the animal. Yes and no. In fact, there is a bloc of becoming in which both becomings, both currents, are never symmetrical or parallel. – [*Someone passes a sheet of paper to Deleuze*] This is some kind of greeting… -- Never parallel, never symmetrical, and in which each becomes something different from the other.

This is extremely complicated, this business of becomings, and we'll have to explore it further. But in the case of Kafka, there is always a strange music and there's a precursor for this. And yet he didn't know the music of his time well, it didn't interest him. But there are concerts in Kafka... Josephine sings and yet she doesn't sing. It's magnificent… [*End of the recording*] [1:40:51]

ATP I, session 2

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze at Vincennes, 1975-76

Part 1 -- Surfaces of Redundancy, Black Holes, Language and Orders

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcription: Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

Félix Guattari: … to get an order of the world to function, systems of orders that order the world - the same type of promotion of invariants that constitute the co-ordinates of a single social, cosmic and affective plane…

Gilles Deleuze: Excuse me… Can everyone hear? Don't you want to sit here? If you speak from the front everyone will be able to hear.

Guattari: So I want to return to the example you proposed of the societies studied by Clastres... [Tape interrupted] [0:48]

Guattari: … the supposed capitalisation of information through distinct units like letters, a highly purified articulation of phonemes with a policed syntax. But there's also a whole series of semiotic components that contribute to something that isn't a transmission of information but an expression of the libidinal life of the group. And this can express itself both through words and through mime, dance, tattoos, rituals and so on. This is what I call the different *semiotic components*.

At the end of the chain, we arrive at an order whereby we can transmit something through a series of messages that are conveyed by computer. Today, to designate someone means taking a certain type of data and passing it through a computer. This will tell us not only a person's physical location but also information about their various behaviors, degree of freedom, earning and spending power etc. I would say that there's been a semiotic collapse in the sense that collective modes of enunciation which inextricably wove and articulated together the various semiotic components have found themselves reduced to the point where they can always be translated in terms of a quantity of information.

The learning of language - the passage from infant to school to professional language and so on - is a process whose aim is to make individuals, however polyvocal their desires, capable of arriving at this possible reduction, which is essential to systems of production and exchange that can permit the circulation only of people who are *translatable* in terms of information. Otherwise, they must be mad, marginals, poets and what have you. Special tools are used to treat them and they are institutionalized in facilities specifically created to deal with these marginal phenomena.

This process of semiotic collapse makes it possible nowadays to enunciate any element of one's desires or lifeworld, provided that it is compatible with the informatics machine of the system as a whole, whether that be socialist, capitalist, bureaucratic, all the state systems - to borrow [Pierre] Clastres' classification. [*On Clastres, see the A Thousand Plateaus seminar V, session 3 (November 20, 1979*] So, all of a sudden, the only subjectivity possible is that which renders you compatible with the human species in general, the species of state-controlled societies and of citizenship. Therefore, you don't have the same rapport with the particularization of enunciations which consisted in saying.... for example, Amerindians… Amerindian tribes say that the only "people" are Amerindians, and when they see white people they say they are not "people". Their sense of belonging to a community of expression is delimited by the place where there is a mesh of the various semiotic components.

Excuse me for this awful generalization. I know I'm taking two extremely different points in the social field. So what happens? One can submit to this system of computerized reduction only insofar as territorialities are constituted, what I call *surfaces of redundancy*, where we can articulate this type of opposition. To give an example: choosing a woman in the kind of societies described by Clastres isn't simply a question of trying to have sex, or of reproduction, or of possessing somebody... it's always a matter of the meeting of two social subgroups, implying different systems of exchange, systems of multiple semiotic composition.

Today, we can say that the selection of a sexual partner - which seems to be a free choice - is in fact determined by systems that compel people to correspond to specific socio-economic profiles. To the point that there are some who try to facilitate this through a computer program that matches people's preferences. However, one no longer chooses someone from a certain clan with all that this intricate semiotic dance implies. Perhaps one no longer chooses - and here I'm jumping ahead - a body, the possession of the other's sexual organs - if we want to define it like that - but the possibility of finding a certain type of redundancy: redundancy of survival, redundancy of faciality. We look for someone in the enunciative field that allows us to say something of the order: Tristan-Isolde, Isolde-Tristan. But in a much more sad and sinister way, as in an endless conjugal scene that consists only in the person one is talking to. [*On this topic, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 132-133 where Deleuze and Guattari speak of redundance and conjugal love*]

When I return, announce my name, and my objective, who is it that resounds the echo of what I'm saying? On which surface of redundancy can I express myself? In territorialized societies you have large surfaces of redundancy and multiple possibilities of semiotic composition. In the case of conjugal relations, in a deterritorialized, miniaturized subjectivity, one can only latch onto this someone and say: "Do you recognise me when I speak to you?", "I'll be back at such and such time", "That's what I'm doing". But the same system operates with children. Even in rapports of faciality, there's this dissociation, this type of imprinting that ethologists refer to. The rapport of visual contact, the "eye to eye" contact of which Spitz and a number of other Americans speak. [*On Spitz, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 169*]

There's always a need to frame things. I exist only as long as there is a certain point that serves as a surface of reference and black hole where I can go on articulating my enunciations. If this last

surface of redundancy or reference is taken away from me, the whole system of my informational coordinates literally collapses.

Strangely, we see that this thing psychoanalysts call the partial object -- the eyes, the face, the eye-nose-mouth triangle -- constitutes an extraordinary safeguard with respect to different individuals, since not only have the various semiotic components (dance, mime, gesture, group rituals and so on) largely disappeared, but also the possibility of the sexual act itself. We get to the point where one can conceive of falling in love with a trait of faciality in a woman, without having the chance to bring into play the various semiotics of love, sexuality and so on. The essential thing is that there be this last hold, this hook of territorialization. So there you have it.

The second thing we can sketch out for the moment is this: either you have informatics redundancies that latch onto surfaces with black-hole systems such as faciality, state power... In every system of power there's always a system of black holes – the eyes of Giscard d'Estaing, the eyes of the leader... Something like, "In any case he's one of us", "There's a chance, at least it's France!", "I recognize myself there because I've already seen him, I can continue speaking, producing meaning" ...

Either you have this system of redundancy-black holes – which is precisely the arborescent system, because wherever there's a black hole there are trees – and, as we said in the case of dreams, you have the dream's umbilicus, a place where everything is organized around a central point, a blind spot. Or we can think of another system of redundancy, though in this case it wouldn't be a redundancy of orders or of subjectivity but a *rhizomatic system* where there is no black hole or else where the various black holes are bypassed in such a way that we return to a semiotic polyvocality - one no longer subjected to arborescence and the stratification of the various semiotic components, but where every type of expressive element (verbal, bodily, dance, sexual and so on) rather than contributing to the organization of a subject or a couple produces something that I think you (Gilles) are going to unpack, another type of semiotic organization, one that is no longer informatics-based but which we could roughly call *diagrammatic*. One that wouldn't be centred around a black hole or pass by way of the mediation of a subject or relationship with another person, but through direct connections between the different semiotic components… [Tape interrupted] [11:00]

Deleuze: … since these redundancies of resonance with their faciality, the traits of faciality that compose them, find their outlet, their organization, in this whirlpool system that I called *holes*... Here, Félix adds a qualification, that we should call them *black holes*. And I remind you, for those who may not know this... but then you should try to find out more for yourselves, because that's how we can work together... I remind you that black hole is an expression taken from astronomy. What *black hole* designates - and Félix will correct me if I'm wrong - is more or less, in the field of relativity… though it depends on which theory of relativity… it's a star that has passed beneath its critical radius and in so doing, by diminishing this critical radius, surpassing a threshold, has acquired a strange property: it captures what are in this case photons passing nearby and retains them. It captures them and nothing gets out any more. And this is the reason that it doesn't emit... it doesn't emit light, it doesn't emit photons... hence the expression *black hole*.

When Félix plays on this, and this is true of our method as a whole, what we're formally saying is: these are not metaphors. And if we say the face, the eyes are black holes, if we say that consciousness, I-equals-I, is a black hole, then the problem is how to get out of this. As I said before: how do we break through the wall, how do we get out of the whirlpool of the hole?

It's not a question of saying black hole in a metaphorical sense. It's a question of stealing a word, in this case a word from astronomy, ok we'll take it, we'll pick it up and we'll keep it for our own uses but not as a metaphor. We will proceed neither by metaphor nor by metonym. We will proceed by using an inexact term to say the exact thing. Which is: the eyes, the face, consciousness… And we will say: consciousness is a black hole, the eyes are black holes and many other things besides. Memories are a black hole.

As Félix said, with regard to Proust's *madeleine* when somebody raised the matter... "What is this business of the *madeleine*"? Félix put it admirably. He munches on his *madeleine*. It's a redundancy, a type of redundancy perhaps. He has plunged into a black hole. The black hole of memories. How will he get out? Don't think this is a victory for him. You recognize Proustians by the way they regard the story of the *madeleine* as a victory. And we recognize the anti-Proustians, those who really love Proust, who suffer for him, saying "Oh no, what a mess he's getting himself into. How is he going to get out?"

Well, he'll get out in his own way, by making a hell of a din. He does what Félix has just said: He makes a *line of flight* out of the black hole, he bursts, springs out from the black hole exactly the way others manage to break through the white wall, the way Gherasim Luca does. So I think that in the last part of what Guattari said what will be fundamental for us, and he will have to develop it further, is both the topic of faciality and that of black holes… [Tape interrupted] [15:00]

Deleuze: … In the conception of power that we require everyone, in a certain sense, is a messenger. You're right, everyone's a messenger, there's no front line, it's clear. So, it's language itself that is the messenger of a pre-existing order, which nonetheless doesn't exist outside of language.

Yolande Finkelstein: Regarding the categorization I was thinking of a parallel with what your friend whose name I don't remember… who recites his poem...

Deleuze: Yes, I'm happy to repeat that. I would add that, not by chance, he's called Gherasim… a well-known first name… Luca, L-U-C-A. He's written many poems, a number of wonderful collections published by Soleil noir: *Le chant de la carpe* (*The Song of the Carp*) and another whose title escapes me… [Tape interrupted] [16:25]

Deleuze: Today I want to begin like this. I've quoted some fairly unremarkable examples of redundancy. But we're not even sure that this is redundancy. [Tape interrupted] [16:46]

Deleuze [*He reads a text apparently by André Martinet, but it is often difficult to grasp when the reading stops and when Deleuze speaks in his own voice*]: "Units of information that are

independent and then probable, faced with which we are obliged to make choices. So at the other pole what is there? At the other pole you have what computer scientists call *noise*." Already we're wary and with good reason. We're not doing computer science here. So it's good to be diffident. We know that when computer scientists use the word *noise*, they're talking about a very particular type of noise. It goes without saying that they oppose to information a noise that is presumed to be non-informative, or that contains the minimum of information, like radio or TV interference. But the noise of a beast that hides in the undergrowth is a noise that is rich in information. Even the noise of interference contains a minimum of information. For example, it could be the enemy seeking to disturb a transmission. Even if we assume that it's a random noise burst, it's never completely fortuitous. We might consider the *pole* noise as the opposite of the pole *maximal information*. [Tape interrupted] [18:38]

Deleuze: … Redundancy is presented as the diminution of theoretical information that is supposedly *a priori* by right. But something else appears at the same time. Redundancy is the only way of fighting against noise. Which is to say it's the only way to save the information from crumbling, from disintegrating into noise. [Tape interrupted] [19:23]

Deleuze: … Whether it be at the level of letters or that of phonemes makes no difference. A language contains a more or less large frequency of any given letter or a certain phoneme that it uses. For example, the frequency of a given letter or phoneme are not the same in French as they are in English. So we can already begin a table of the comparative frequencies of letters or phonemes in a certain number of languages. We'll call it a *zero-order estimation*. After which, the following estimation is already a redundancy: the frequency of a letter or phoneme in a given language.

And then there is another estimation that we can call the *first-order estimation*. This time we study the frequency of a letter in a given language with respect to the preceding or subsequent letter. In this case too, depending on the language, the frequencies are different. I'll give you a random example. In French what is the frequency of... we could also imagine a computer performing this kind of research... What is the frequency of the group B-A? That is an A preceded by a B. We could do similar studies in the case of phonemes.

For the second-order estimation I can look for frequencies concerning three groups of letters. This series of estimations will therefore define a certain type of redundancy… [Tape interrupted] [22:20]

The diminishing of absolute theoretical information and the struggle against noise… why are these two functions linked? Nothing would prevent absolute theoretical information from falling into pure noise if there wasn't this regulating force of redundancy, which assures the struggle against noise by diminishing the level of absolute theoretical information.

So, we have a first schema, a schema of redundancy, where at the top we will put "maximal theoretical information" and below "noise" and between the two "redundancy". And Martinet concludes: "The presence of redundancy is a way to permit the transmission of signs", and this

happens through the series of estimations of which I just spoke. [*For this reference, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 530, note 30, to Martinet's essay "Redondance", in* La linguistique, guide alphabétique *(Paris: Denoël, 1969), pp. 331-333*]

Then Martinet identifies a second type of redundancy. He says: "Not only is redundancy a way to permit the transmission of signs but there is nothing to prevent it itself from becoming a sign". There… you see how it constitutes a sign in its own right. Redundancy not as regulator of the transmission of signs - a regulatory process in the transmission of signs, or code for transmitting information - but it itself as a sign. Why is this?

He says: "It must be so that the user can seek out the redundancy for itself." So users can look for the actual redundancy. "A means of expression for the individual, of manifestation of group consensus. We will therefore identify a principal function of combating noise, without which any communication would be impossible". And this is our first case of redundancy. "And then there are secondary uses," secondary uses, "which are left at the subject's disposal. Means of expression, of action upon others, of enchantment"… [Tape interrupted] [25:34]

Deleuze: … Reducing the second type of resonance to a secondary use of the first type may be correct from the perspective of informatics, but we're not sure that what we are dealing with has anything to do with informatics. And perhaps we can even say that it isn't correct from any perspective, particularly since it actually forms part of very different systems of signs: the subjective redundancies of resonance and the signifying redundancies of frequency. It's by no means sure that they form part of the same system of signs. It's by no means sure that the latter are simply a secondary use of the former. [*Pause*]

And there's another thing that disturbs me and that might disturb us all, but this time it's not related to the second type of redundancy but to what popular informatics tell us about the first schema. For the moment I'm only going to speak vaguely about this… because I'd like to focus on it later. So you can clearly see that what I want to say about redundancies is that we still aren't even sure what all these redundancies are. So far so good… [Tape interrupted] [27:22]

Deleuze: … There's a lot that can be said about the informative nature of language. A number of linguists have already spoken extensively about it. It's interesting because the idea that language is by its very nature informative is one that corrupts us to such an extent that... I think of a case like that of Sartre, who at a certain point felt the need... and I don't think he would say this now... to identify what it was that characterised language, or to be precise, poetry or literature. And he said that literature and poetry begin when there is information. Barthes too once said something similar. It's very odd to make this kind of affirmation. [Tape interrupted] [28:21]

Deleuze: … What is it that has completely corrupted, compromised, putrefied even, the question of language-power relations? It's the bad choice we've been left with, which is to say the very conception of power that has been proposed to us. When we were told, "ah folks, it's either infrastructure or ideology", we were already pretty irritated. We were irritated for language's sake, we were really irritated for language to be stuck with this alternative, even if it was presented in the most sophisticated way imaginable. Although sometimes it wasn't presented in a very sophisticated way, yet in the end the more sophisticated the presentation the worse it turned

out. Because we realised that this question of language was extremely complicated. It's not infrastructure. No, it can't be infrastructure. Language doesn't produce anything. It produces only words. It doesn't produce goods. No aspect of infrastructure coincides with language.

So, we wondered if it was rather a superstructure. In other words, is it the state apparatus that decides on language? Difficult to say. As Stalin said: "No, we've changed everything but not Russian, not much at least. Of course, we've perfected it. But within certain limits". So, it's not the state apparatus. We don't change language the way we change a constitution or a police force. So, is it ideology? "No", he said. "It may be the vehicle of ideologies, but it can equally well be the vehicle of other things besides ideology." So even ideology isn't a strong candidate.

So, they said, so really, what is language? We always have to go back to this text because it's both short and rather wonderful, the text Stalin wrote on linguistics, [*See* A Thousand Plateaux, *p. 525, note 21, in* Marxism and Linguistics *(New York: International Publishers, 1951)*] where he says: "Comrades, you're wrong. There are those among you who say that language is infrastructure and they are mistaken, they are not looking at the question rationally. Others say that language is ideology and there is a language of the people, a proletarian language, a bourgeois language. I say that this not the case and that you don't really see what is at issue, comrades."

And Stalin goes so far as to say that language is the *common good* of a nation, and that it ensures the communication of information. It suited him to say that of course, since it implied a conception of power related to our well-known themes of infrastructure, superstructure, ideology and so on. If we were to say instead that language has always been a system of *order* and not of information... that it is orders we are given, not information that is communicated, it would seem to us that we were saying something obvious. We turn on the TV news and what do we get? In the first place, we don't receive information, we receive orders. And at school, what goes on? Here too it's obvious. At school the children don't receive information... The example of school is... Félix puts it well in a text he wrote... we put language in the mouths of children exactly the way we put shovels and picks in the hands of workers. [*See* A Thousand Plateaux, *p. 76, for this same formulation*]

So, fine, that doesn't mean that language is an infrastructure but that it relates to the field of orders. When the teacher gathers the children together it's not to inform them about the alphabet, it's to teach them a system of orders. And we have to add – and here prepared to settle our accounts with the Chomskians which we'll have to do later [*Deleuze and Guattari undertake this in* A Thousand Plateaus, *plateau 4, "Postulates of Linguistics"*] -- that their famous phrase markers are above all markers of power. And that a syntax is a system of orders, a system of command that will allow or force individuals to form enunciations that conform to dominant enunciations. And the function of school is primarily this. So, language must be conceived first of all not in terms of information but in terms of order. Not in terms of communicating information but of transmitting orders.

Clearly, for us, this implies - and I would say this is simple and obvious - that we have to look for another conception of power, because, after all, Stalin is quite right in his remarks. There's no

one who decides syntax. Which means that power is undoubtedly something completely different to the properties of individuals or groups in a given moment. For the time being let's just say that language is a formalization of expression. Not all expressions pertain to language. Language is a particular formalization of expression whose function is to transmit orders in a society. We know that this implies giving power another conception different from the Marxist conception. In this sense, language, including syntax, is… we can't even call it an instrument… it's an element and component of power. So, in this sense, it's not informative.

And yet, in a certain way it is. Which is to say that it provides the minimal information and guides the minimum choice necessary for the correct understanding of relative, limited information, relative to the orders that are given. It goes without saying that when someone on the street shouts "There's a fire!" (*Au feu!*)*,* it's better if the kids don't understand it as "Go and play!" (*Au jeu!*). So, there is of course information and there are choices and approximations, but which are nonetheless relative to the orders communicated by language. [*Deleuze and Guattari give this example as well as the Carroll anecdote that follows in* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 76*]

There's a letter… you know how Lewis Carroll used to write letters to little girls, never to little boys. And there's a famous letter to a little girl he wrote - which is well known and well translated so we don't need to read it English which would be difficult for some, myself included. This admirable translation by Jacques Papy that works by equivalences, you can find in various editions of Carroll's Letters. It describes a situation that corresponds perfectly to what we've been discussing. [*In fact, the translation into French is by Henri Parisot; Jacques Papy translated* Alice in Wonderland]

During one of his lessons in a high society context, the teacher is at the bottom of the garden. And there's a first servant who repeats his questions. Everyone knows that a teacher's questions are really orders. When a teacher asks a panicked child what 2 and 2 are, it's clear he's not asking for information, he's giving an order. And you will tell me, but the child would have to be informed first. Indeed, the child *has* been informed by a previous system of orders. It's always the information that presupposes the order and not the other way round. I don't mean order in the sense of organization or ruling but in the sense of a command.

So, the first servant repeats the teacher's question, then there is a second servant who repeats the question repeated by the first, and then a third and so on. And to mark the hierarchy that runs through language, the pupil is at the other end of the garden. And then he sends back his answer. And in Carroll's letter, which I deliberately didn't bring with me... you can look for it yourselves if you're interested… the question is passed down the line, each time completely transformed, because the first servant didn't hear properly. It begins with "what are 2 and 2", the first servant deforms it and the question changes, the second deforms it further and the third even more. So what the pupil hears is a completely different question to which he anxiously responds, and the answer goes back up the chain.

Here we have a whole system in which the choices are always wrong but are nonetheless determined by a chain of order and command. And so the obedient response is sent back up and

is more and more wrong. The conditions of information are conditions of reception of orders and commands… [Tape interrupted] [40:23]

Deleuze [*He stands in front of the blackboard, and throughout this sequence, writes the terms between each response to the students*] *The* schema has three heads – [*Someone tosses him some chalk from the back of the room*] Thank you for the chalk -- The schema has three heads -- Maximal theoretical information -- Noise which completely disturbs the emission and reception of information – Redundancy [*Deleuze inserts arrows between each level*] There we are. A struggle against the noise, letting us defeat the noise which diminishes at the cost of also diminishing the maximal theoretical information.

The two go well together, since without redundancy the maximal theoretical information would itself be noise. We are trying, in a crafty, underhanded way, to replace this with another schema. The orders-commands schema… You see immediately where I'm heading. I still don't know exactly how but I feel... no, *we* feel... we all feel, that orders-commands - I'm not saying that these are different –that orders-commands contain, comprise and in fact result to be the same thing as redundancies, that an order doesn't need to be repeated -- if we repeat an order, it's because the order is already redundant -- so, redundancy or one type of redundancy is the form of the order as such; it's the form of command.

And generally speaking, it shouldn't surprise us if this is the case. We shouldn't be surprised when an order is repeated, if this is the way an order is given and received, for no other reason than to show that I have understood well. Like when someone says: "Come on, go and do such and such!" and I reply: "Yes, I'll go and do such and such!" In this case I am superfluous. I *redund*, so to speak. But what do I *redund*? Redundancy… it's the order itself. "Go and do such and such!" or "Go and play!" *(Au jeu!)* no… "There's a fire!" *(Au feu!)* no… "Open fire!" (*En joue le feu!)* "Open fire!" The order has to pass down the line. So the general says "Open fire!" or "Weapons at the ready!", or something similar, and the captain says "Weapons at the ready!" and the sergeant says "Weapons at the ready!" until the order arrives at the poor guys who have to prepare their weapons. But if the order is repeated, it's because, in itself, it is redundant. The order, the command are forms of redundancy in themselves. Maybe.

So, [*Deleuze turns to the board*] we were saying that language is not information but order or command. And we also said that the pure order, the order-command in its pure state, is pure redundancy, absolute redundancy. And this is what we put at the top of our schema. Redundancy is the same thing as an order. So, to repeat: if order becomes redundancy, if it is repeated, it is because it is in itself redundancy. So, repetition as a practice with respect to the order would simply be a consequence of redundancy as iden… [*Deleuze corrects himself*] as within the nature of the order. It's not certain, but that's the sensation we have... there's nothing we can do about it.

Here, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] between the two... -- the two what? I don't know. Between the two... it's just to make a well-balanced schema. We'll see. -- Between the two we'll put "information", which is always relative. If it's true to say that redundancy is the absolute form of order, we will say that relative information is the limited content of an order in as far as it differs from another order. ABC is not the same thing as BCD. Ok, so we have relative information.

You see that the form of order is absolute redundancy. So what follows is relative information. If the order didn't communicate a piece of relative information, "Do this rather than that", we would be in the same situation as Lewis Carroll's teacher and pupil where we have the order that is passed down the line, an execution of the order - and an act of obedience which is completely different.

Information is merely the relative condition whereby the execution of the order corresponds to the order itself. It's like an inversion of the informatics schema. Actually, it's even worse. It's a completely different field. So anyway.

Here in this third position what can I put? It's clear, it's obvious, it's obvious, and it's also clear that this is how it works. Fine. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] It's not noise that is an informatics abstraction. [*Pause*] It's silence. But what silence? What does that mean? Why introduce silence here? Silence. [*Pause*] Silence is ambiguous. Because it could be the state of the person who obeys - but that is a silence of language, a silence of language itself that is included in language itself. It's [*Deleuze writes on the board*] before, it's before… it's what happens between the reception of the order and the response to the order. The captain says: "Load your rifle!" and what follows is a silence filled with the sound of a rifle's bolt action. And then the soldier says: "Ready, captain". [*Laughter*] But there's another silence, a silence that consists in something quite bizarre: an escape [*fuite*] from all this. We know this silence. When the captain says: "Ready, take aim, fire!" [*Pause*] And there's nothing. [*Laughter*] Silence… [Tape interrupted] [49:24]

Deleuze: … There's no great composer who doesn't have their techniques of silence. Here we can say something that everyone who listens to music will already be familiar with. Which is that music is traversed by a sort of vector of abolition. A vector of sonic abolition. As though it was completely intrinsic to music. The will and the movement to be extinguished [*s'éteindre*], and to extinguish us with it. Like a kind of tracing of abolition. And sounds - which are not a language, even if in music too there are orders but music flows underneath these orders that are properly musical - trace a line of abolition that is fully part of the music… and they do so in many ways.

This first system of signifying redundancy, or redundancy of frequency, inscribes itself on a semiotic wall. And the attempt to pierce this wall... we'll call this attempt exiting from the signifier, from *signifiance*. Just as Gherasim Luca does.

And then I'll make a brief mention of the second type of redundancy. Obviously, once again, these are not secondary uses of the first type. This time we're dealing with redundancies of resonance. Of course, we already know something in advance: that everything mixes, everything is mixed. There are no frequencies that don't have resonance and vice versa. So it's not a duality, even if it would be easier to proceed as if that were the case. Though if you tell me that it's not a duality, I'll say, no it isn't. But at the same time, yes it is. And if you tell me it is, I'll say no it isn't. Let's try to work things out from there.

Redundancy of resonance: what is it? As we saw, it's not a secondary use. To use the language of linguists we would say that it's neither a *phoneme* nor a *morpheme*, nor is it a word. So, what are we dealing with? Not surprisingly, the last two examples of redundancy that I quoted refer to

something linguists call... something we've talked about at length… something they call "shifter". Which is the redundancy – I-equals-I – of the personal pronoun. And the Tristan-Isolde / Isolde-Tristan redundancy of the proper name.

And you know generally what the linguists call shifters. These are terms that designate those who are literally their bearers. The "I" designates the person who says "I". This is not the case for other words, it's not the case for common names. The dog in this case is not the word "dog". But the word "I" designates the one who enunciates "I", and we speak of this as a "shifter." The proper name designates its bearer. Therefore, the proper name - like the personal pronoun, the "I" - are very special things that animate the second of the categories of resonance. And we've seen that our two examples of categories of resonance are probably closely connected - just like our two examples of categories of frequency. We have this consciousness that says "I-equals-I", or we have this couple who say "I love you - I love you" or "I hate you - I hate you" or "I love you - I hate you" or "I hate you - I love you". A redundancy. Or "Tristan - Isolde" … [Tape interrupted] [54:39]

Deleuze: … Is this schema the same? Once again, what we had in the first schema was: redundancy of frequency, signifier inscribed on a semiotic wall, and the problem was how to pierce this wall to arrive... at something that might no longer even be semiotics. In any case, it will be an unformulated semiotics. In the other case – here I take up a hypothesis that Guattari is currently developing… is it the same case? Perhaps, but for our purposes it's better to make distinctions. [Tape interrupted] [55:25]

Deleuze: … This time the schema seems to me a little different. -- Oops, I've lost the chalk… Thank you! -- Tristan - Isolde. Or else we have "I-equals-I" … I would say that this time, in the redundancy of resonance, the resonance is assured by the elements in question – I and I… or in more technical terms "the subject of enunciation" and "the subject of the enunciated". Tristan and Isolde, successively "subject of enunciation" and "subject of the enunciated" in their respective mouths. "I, Tristan, enunciate you Isolde", but also "I Isolde enunciate you Tristan". The subject of enunciation and the subject of the enunciated in the two cases of redundancy of resonance were as if attracted in a kind of vortex, a true hole. [*Pause, he draws a circle with a spiral within it*] They started to whirl around, to heat up inside this hole, [*Pause, he begins whispering slowly while making a circular movement with his hand*] I, I, I, I, I, I, ... Tristan, Isolde, Tristan, Isolde, Tristan, Isolde, and the boat sails on, and the boat sails on, Towards what? Towards death. [*Pause*] The cogito doesn't have a very bright future ahead of it. [*Laughter, he turns toward the board smiling*] In appearance, it's a formally different system.

I had, and here I would like to end: redundancy of frequency, signifier operating on a wall, a semiotic wall, with the crucial question of how to break through the wall. And here I have redundancy of resonance or subjective, that refers to a hole. [*End of recording*] [58:03]

ATP I, session 3

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 2 - Proust, Faciality and Power**

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcription and time stamp: Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

[*The film starts with Guattari in the process of discussing the scene in Proust's* Swann's Way *when Swann deepens his understanding of the musical phrase in the composition by Vinteuil; Deleuze and Guattari discuss this novel in terms of faciality in* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 185-187*]

Félix Guattari: … He was fleeing from everything. And this backfires on him. He's completely terrorized, but at the same time fascinated because something appears: the little phrase no longer functions as a node of resonance that would fill in the wall of daily life but begins to live and throb in another way. First of all the musician plays it in its entirety, while traditionally only some elements of the phrase were kept, and a whole part was lost.

Proust, or rather Swann, says that "there were marvellous ideas" in its development. At first there was the repetition of the little phrase. The rest was a bit blurred, and he couldn't really seize it. For the first time he realizes that regarding the rest of the piece: "There were marvellous ideas in it which Swann had not distinguished at the first hearing and that he perceived now, as if they had divested themselves, in the cloakroom of his memory, of the uniform disguise of novelty."

An example of deterritorialization are certain musical signs that don't function in systems of morphemes or phrases or systems of mathematical signs that function in equations, but that refer back to phrases or realities like those we experience in perception. I won't go into this right now because I don't want to dwell too much on deterritorialization...

Gilles Deleuze: Regarding this question, I'll take up the example that Félix has just quoted of the monocles in the second part of *Swann in Love.*

Up to then Swann had seen some faces, like the face of Odette. He needed to feed Odette's face with pictorial reminiscences. A face by Botticelli. Then there was a kind of layering of the one on the other. One might say, looking for a logical definition, that the faces were seized in their territoriality. They were understood at first as faces - either faces on a canvas or faces in flesh

and blood. This is the state of territorialization of the face, which like everything else has its territorial states.

In the second moment, at the end of the love story, Swann becomes immersed in something completely different, when he goes to a reception. There what he begins to see are no longer the faces of the valets but an actual defection of those valets' faces that forms a kind of line. And he says this in the text, I remember…

Guattari: I'll read it afterwards.

Deleuze: Yes, you can read the quotation later. What he more or less says is that those faces lost the normal faculty they would have had - it goes without saying this means territorially - of making someone recognizable... "Oh, it's you, how are you?" They were just a system of lines. Let's just say this for the moment. It's a kind of state in which the face becomes deterritorialized. Then Swann enters the salon, and the same thing happens with everyone there. Here you have the series of monocles.

The monocle or a scar or a pair of glasses are normally themselves part of the cycle of ordinary redundancies. Glasses as a redundancy of the eye, monocles as a redundancy of the eye. They're both ways of territorializing the face. Here, on the contrary, a line of deterritorialization is created, in which the whole of art is brought into play, as well as a new comprehension of Odette. It's no longer art that falls back on her face, it's her face that ends up dissolving. So, in this sense, we use the expression *line of deterritorialization* when this upending of the face occurs. The face is wrenched from its territoriality. It's no longer a face. But as Félix says, it melts into traits of faciality. And that's not all. What will these traits of faciality become?

A student: Isn't this portrait a bit like a mode of disinvestment?

Guattari: Oh, no, not at all. Precisely not!

Deleuze: There's the same degree of investment in the other.

The student: You mean in Odette. But what about disinvestment in Swann?

Deleuze: Ah… That's accompanied by the disinvestment of Odette herself.

The student: But the final word of Swann's love for Odette isn't something we can take for granted, after all he marries her, actually after the conclusion of *Swann in Love*.

Deleuze: Ok, I'm going too fast. Thanks…

Guattari: Ok, listen, I just want to link that with what I've prepared, and then we can pick up again this particular discussion about investments. Even if Proust sometimes has the temptation to refer to things as entities of a black-hole type - such as memory - here suddenly he's tempted to step into the shoes of the musicologist, as he attempts to make a dichotomous analysis of the little phrase. And he says: perhaps what gives me "that impression of a frigid and withdrawn

sweetness" is the "closeness of the intervals between the five notes" and the "constant repetition" of each one of them. Then he stops and says, no it's a "mysterious entity," it's something else, a different universe. [*Proust,* Swann's Way, *trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, revised D.J. Enright (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), p. 496*]

There are different universes, species of bodiless entities created by artists like Vinteuil. And he accepts them as such. He says it's an experiment. They're not ineffable beings. He evokes the experiments of Lavoisier and Ampere. [Swann's Way, *p. 499*] Vinteuil has experimented with something quite extraordinary here. Proust says, "even when he was not thinking of the little phrase, it existed latent in his mind on the same footing as certain other notions without material equivalent, such as our notions of light, of sound, of perspective, of physical pleasure." [Swann's Way, *p. 497*] And here he has a kind of anti-cogito reaction. He recovers, he doesn't fall into the black hole, and he says how usually the soul is something we think about as similar to nothing. But then certain composers show us the theme they have discovered, of showing us "what richness, what variety, lies hidden, unknown to us, in that vast, unfathomed and forbidding night of our soul which we take to be an impenetrable void." [Swann's Way, *p. 497*] And at this point he says, we can't doubt the existence of this kind of, I would say, machine, of this machinic bloc, we can't doubt it any more than we can "doubt the luminosity of a lamp that has been lit". [Swann's Way, *p. 498*] It's as if he was questioning the reductionist procedure of Descartes. He says that what is at stake here is "an order of supernatural beings." [Swann's Way, *p. 497*]

The last point regarding this deterritorialization beginning from the musical phrase is the loss of the subject, the loss of the subject that is already sketched out in the iconic component through the redoublings, the lines, the proliferation of character portraits. Here, all of a sudden, the little phrase becomes the subject of the enunciated. It's the phrase itself that begins to speak, and the little phrase looks at the people around it, judges them, has its own opinions about their state of mind. It completely changes position with respect to the previous subject. There's a new assemblage. It's the little phrase that reorganizes the subjectivity of the people gathered in the salon and that of Swann himself… [*Tape interrupted*] [8:20]

Guattari: … He describes a dream; in the dream we see the traits of faciality completely collapse: at a certain moment, he sees Mme Verdurin "who fixed her astonished gaze upon him for an endless moment" - so he goes back to the Verdurins as if nothing has happened - "during which he saw her face change shape, her nose grow longer", and he sees her sprouting a large moustache. Swann is horrified, he turns and sees Odette who is as she was before, tender, loving, her eyes are in tears "eyes welling with affection", and he says, these eyes "are ready to detach themselves like tears and to fall upon his face." [Swann's Way, *p. 539*] The eyes are just about to fall on Swann.

Everything is replayed in an enormous wave of tenderness. But then Odette says: "I have to go." Swann is speaking to Mme Verdurin, and Odette leaves without fixing another appointment with him. She leaves together with Napoleon III who happens to be there. The series of monocles continues, the series of generals, of moustached faces. And in that moment, the whole of faciality collapses, and with Odette, it's over, and Swann says: "he hated Odette, he would gladly have gouged out those eyes which a moment ago he had loved so much, have crushed those flaccid cheeks." [Swann's Way, *p. 539*] [*Tape interrupted*] [9:46]

Deleuze: How does his life fall into a hole all of a sudden, without him foreseeing anything? Why all at once? It could have been something else and not Odette and Swann. Last Tuesday we spoke about black holes. [*Tape interrupted*] [10:04]

Deleuze: … Let's imagine that there's a moment that functions like a black hole and like subjective redundancy. We will have to go back to the text... If you're interested it's a good chance to reread some passages of Swann. It seems to me that the system of redundancy: Odette-Swann continually reappears… [*Tape interrupted*] [10:37]

Deleuze: … In Swann's case, what interests him above all is painting. When he sees a little maid, he thinks of... it's a strange thing, because this really is redundancy, redundancy of resonance. I need it to remind me of something. If it doesn't remind me of anything I'm lost. For him the essential thing is that a thing reminds him of a great painting. Then it works. So, what does he do? In the centre you have... I'm simplifying... in the centre are the two faces. But there's a crisis here. It's not so simple. Once again, let's not forget our method. There's no good or bad. We can't say black holes are no good. It's not easy to make yourself a black hole. It's love-passion. [*On love-passion, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 133-133, and for Swann, pp. 186-189*]

So, we have these two faces: Odette and Swann. And it doesn't entirely work. It envelops, following a line of life. Swann resorts to his procedure, surrounding it with another line, the line of art, so as to close it in completely, and to constitute the black hole of love-passion. So, we have Odette-Botticelli, Botticelli-Odette. This changes everything. She reminds me of something... Redundancy. The redundancy of Odette's face and Swann's face. The redundancy of the flower given by Odette and the flower given by Swann. [*Tape interrupted*] [13:00]

Deleuze: … The line of art intervenes to surround and to guarantee the enveloping of the lived line, in such a way that it clearly reminds me of something. Swann is really sucked into the black hole. But then he makes this astonishing encounter, which doesn't form part of his procedure. All this is part of lived experience. Our procedures are always surpassed. We use them to surpass what doesn't work in experience and then they themselves are surpassed by something that is perhaps like a proper name. Swann hears Vinteuil's little phrase. It's a third line, a musical line. Vinteuil's little phrase has moved him.

But in which form has it moved him? It has moved him because he says to himself: "All this is unexpected. It'll allow me to go right to the end of love-passion. And he uses it as a kind of third line that will bind all the lines. It will assure the love-passion black hole and will have, to go back to my drawing from earlier [*Deleuze moves to the board*] -- I don't know, what was it I did here, well anyway – [*In what follows, he traces with his finger across the previous drawing*] Swann, Odette, their tumbling towards the black hole of love-passion through the lived line of the two faces, the necessary pictorial line, the musical line - and there has to be a system of perpetual redundancy from one line to another. To the point where, at this level, Vinteuil's little phrase will be ripped from the piece it belongs to. It will have a value, like a signature tune on the radio or TV.

Vinteuil's little phrase springs up and Swann looks at Odette. Odette looks at Swann. The phrase makes redundancy with the pictorial signs; it makes redundancy with the faces to the point where it becomes a sign between the two, to the point that he doesn't give a shit about the rest of Vinteuil's great sonata. "Ah, my little phrase!", Odette winks. "Do you remember our little phrase," and he says: "Yes, the little phrase". It's the system of subjective redundancies… [*Tape interrupted*] [16:07]

Yolande Finkelstein: I'd like to say something.

Deleuze: About the drawing? Ok.

Finkelstein: There's a drawing I'd like to make.

Deleuze: Ah, you have the chalk…

Finkelstein: It goes like this: Odette, Swann, and from then on it's the same drawing as the one you did. Meaning that from now on… I can't even say it.

Deleuze: You feel you want to add a vertical line.

Finkelstein: I mean there is a separation…

Deleuze: Ok, ok.

Finkelstein: There's a separation, here's Odette, here's Swann, and on each side, we can make the drawing you made but there's a moment when...

Deleuze: We'll deal with it like that.

Finkelstein: … when there's a terrible fracture, which isn't of the same order as the relation between art and music.

Deleuze: Indeed, we need that for the second moment. We can add it. Without further commentary. Like that it's perfect.

Finkelstein: Yes, those are across. [*Referring to the connecting lines that Deleuze draws*]

Deleuze: There you have it. That's the cowardice of women for you.

Another student: Let's suppose that Swann's signs of love for Odette, let's suppose a superposition of sense for the signs of the Verdurins' salon. In that case all the signs of love emitted by Swann towards Odette enter not into a deterritoriality, but in a territoriality of the signs of Verdurin. So, well no…

Deleuze: Fantastic! I think that suits me perfectly. We need this. As you said, in the first moment it's the system of black holes that belongs to the territoriality of the Verdurins, with some nuances.

The student: But this screws up the possibility of speaking of aesthetics and of Swann's aestheticism. What does Swann's aestheticism mean? For us Beethoven, or Wagner for the Verdurins relate to a single sign of communication. And the same occurs in the case of the Guermantes. That's why we can't speak about deterritoriality.

Deleuze: You're going too fast; you're going too fast.

The student: The things is that Swann plays alone when the real refuses to play. Or he plays in his own way perhaps. A lot of words like "aesthetics" or "reality" become pointless.

Deleuze: Wait a minute… Why do you think that Swann at this level, why is Swann always presented as a dilettante and not as an artist? Swann isn't Vinteuil or Vermeer - he's a dilettante. A dilettante is someone who makes a territorializing use of aesthetics or art. He's interested in it only insofar as it reminds him of something. On this point, you're completely right - he's in the territoriality of the Verdurins.

But even more so his love for Odette is seized by the Verdurins' territoriality. What characterizes Swann's aestheticism is that he still makes territorializing use of art. The little phrase – he makes a territorializing use of this phrase – ends up being bound to the perfume of the chrysanthemum… of a flower, so he makes a territorializing use of it between himself, Odette and this flower. So, from one end to the other, you're completely right as far as this moment is concerned.

But then there's another moment where we wouldn't say the same thing. What happens in this second moment that Félix described, if I try to connect it to the first? A strange thing happens. For a million reasons beginning with the sorrow or whatever Proust describes at length. And here the line - in this case it happens to be the pictorial line - begins to flow. And it's then that Swann begins...

Another student: Can you erase the rest of the blackboard?

Deleuze: It's not worth it. It has one advantage, it's quite clear like that. It wouldn't change anything if... And so… it's at that very moment that Swann begins... not to become an artist, he will never be one, but to understand what an artist is.

The student: Which is to say?

Deleuze: Which is to say that the musical line announces it, more and more. This other line, no longer pictorial but musical, will have a value in itself. It no longer depends on instruments. Instruments may embody it, but they don't bring it into being… [*Tape interrupted*] [21:50]

Deleuze: … It starts to flow of its own account, *sine materia.* Proust, who by the way rarely uses Latin, uses a Latin word here. If he uses a Latin word, it's clear he's deterritorializing himself. So it's the instruments that depend on music and not the other way round. Painting begins to fall away; it's not even painting anymore and the faces become deformed. There's a deterritorialization of faces, a deterritorialization of the musical phrase. And also, a deterritorialization of the love for Odette, and this deterritorialization of the love for Odette will be expressed in the idea of Odette at the other end of the world… [*Tape interrupted*] [22:44]

Deleuze: … The problem we posed from the beginning, whatever digressions may have occurred -- though I would add that, today, they aren't really digressions -- the problem we've been dealing with from the very beginning is to try to understand how a particular type of power -- the power of the face -- is constituted and how it functions. For this reason, I found it opportune to briefly mention earlier how a society doesn't just function through the cop's truncheon. You have to be an idiot if you think that. It also functions through a cop's face; it functions through the teacher's face. Kids at grade school say: "Ooh, the teacher looked at me".

The student: And what about the blackboard?

Deleuze: Be quiet and let me finish. [*Pause*] The blackboard isn't me. [*Laughter*] "The teacher, the teacher looked at me, she looked at me!" There's a power in that. It's not a matter of generating power from the face but of saying that the face or faciality is caught up in systems of power. We have to analyze it like -- but no one's forcing us, we could speak about something else if you like, fine -- we have to analyze it as a cog in certain mechanisms of power… [*Tape interrupted*] [24:27]

[*During this break in filming, someone seems to have insisted that Deleuze respond rather than another student, to which Deleuze reacts with astonishment, although seemingly with good humor*]

Deleuze: [*Noises of students around Deleuze*] … Incredible. [*Laughter*] Incredible this reaction that consists in telling me that it's my responsibility to answer when someone speaks. I don't see why I should. Sibony, go ahead and speak, go ahead. Don't let them treat you like that.

Daniel Sibony: I don't really see the problem. Actually, there is no problem. We're trying to speak about how things really function, how they really work. Speaking about the face of the teacher, I have a feeling that this is really new! This is speaking seriously about power, and power, that is, that functions really, how that, how that, when you are inside it, how we operate within it, how we are within it, how that works… [*Tape interrupted*] [25:18]

Sibony: I was speaking about the face of Giscard d'Estaing… Will you listen? Let me… either ask a fucking question or let me finish my sentence!

Another woman student [*shouting at Sibony*]: [*Indistinct, repeated command*]

Sibony: Let me finish! Please, let me finish, I won't take long. I simply wanted to say that we can speak about the face or the voice of Giscard d'Estaing in a way that can be very useful, and it

certainly doesn't mean, I don't know, being interested in what's happening in the metro or what's happening currently in prisoners in jails.

Another student: That's a topic for practical class sessions, my friend.

Sibony: No… [*The students make even more noise, preventing him from speaking*]

A woman student: Can't you stand up so we can see your face? [*Laughter and noise from students*]

Another student: His face. [*Tape interrupted*] [25:58]

Deleuze: … What Félix and I are proposing are things we have already written. We're giving back to you our old tricks. I am saying this is defamatory [*Deleuze laughs and sits down*] … [*Tape interrupted*] [26:18]

A student: The inspectors on the metro, the people in prison, the CGT [General Confederation of Labour] ...

Deleuze: These people don't have faces in your view?

The first student: In a Fascist kind of way but one finds faces that are only visible … [*indistinct words*] And at Vincennes, compared to how it used to be, we just have pointless conversations. I don't know why I came.

Other students: [*Indistinct comments*]

The first student: Whether the conversations are pointless or not, compared to other conversations…

Another student: I mean, we're all in the metro, we all take the metro.

The first student: Yes, but there, Vincennes in relation to what it was seems to me particularly hard to bear.

Another student: No, come on, listen, we're fed up with this.

Deleuze: No really what they are saying is good, for someone to say… sorry, you'll speak in a minute...

The student: [*He continues while blocking Deleuze, unclear words*]

Deleuze: If he says... in fact, if he says…

A woman student: Why do we bother closing the door, we're being watched all the time, by spies. Everybody's spying through their face.

Another student: The problem is that the spies… [*unclear words*]

Another student: Everyone judges through faces…

Another student: It's been two years that I've wanted to say that.

Another student: All that's been said already, it's stupid…

Students: [*Different voices, unclear words*]

Yolande Finkelstein: No, but I mean, for me, it's the first time I've come to this class. I haven't been coming for two years. I mean, I don't know, what's going on here?

Another student: We are coming here… [*Unclear words*]

Yolande Finkelstein: When I say "here" I mean... [*Pause, voices*] Anyhow, when Deleuze talks, he talks about certain things, and then suddenly, one day something happens and all hell breaks loose, about Power relations, stuff like that, another thing… what's going on? So, there's some individual thing which suddenly is about power relations, other stuff, vague, ambiguous stuff. So, how does that work as well? everyone functions as well…

Another student: Well, that is the question! … [*Diverse voices, unclear words* [*Tape interrupted*] [28:01]

Guattari: … [What we're trying to do here] is to dismantle things and to find tools and modes of orientation different from those of psychoanalysis or Marxist principles, with the result that we sometimes take certain liberties gabbing about Proust or whatever without having to censor ourselves like what goes on in the army. Maybe we're even taking the shortest route. I've no idea. [*Tape interrupted*] [28:23]

Yolande Finkelstein [*addressing the student who spoke about metros*]: No, but I'd like to answer him…

Guattari [*speaking to the student who has mentioned the metros*] You're saying that that works, so let's talk about it. I don't think that it's …

Yolande Finkelstein: But I want to say something to him… Considering what you were saying about the street, the metro, the prisons… there are some interesting things happening now. On the bus a few years ago, there used to be a driver and a ticket inspector at the back that you showed your ticket to. Now there's just one person on the bus. And what does he do? He's both driver and cop. And the other day I heard a driver say quite explicitly: "I have eyes everywhere. That's why I'm here!" If you don't show him your bus pass or whatever, he knows it, you see. In the same way that when you go to a store or supermarket, the cashiers and the salesperson don't just sell you their merchandise, but they also know why you're there, meaning whether you're going to buy or shoplift.

And in relation to this it seems to me, I don't know, that in the Communist Party, for example... I'm probably talking shit, but I don't really give a fuck about the PC… but it seems to me that in the places where we meet to talk, we don't really talk, and that, for example, there don't seem to be certain moments, in the bus or in the supermarket, or, fine… to deactivate these mechanisms. That's extremely important. After all, what is it that we are living every day?

Deleuze: For myself, I'd say that, actually, what we are living every day is...

The student [*to whom Yolande was speaking*]: You're saying that it's visible from one's face?

Yolande Finkelstein: No, I'm not saying that it's visible from someone's face… [*Pause, voices*] I'm not saying it's visible from someone's face because when I walk into the supermarket, all the shopgirls are going to move in on me before I've taken anything at all! [30:00] [*Huge laughter; Deleuze stands rubbing his face*] [*Tape interrupted*] [30:08]

Deleuze: … The faces of the cops are not just the ones behind their truncheons, they're not just in the street. And there doesn't even need to be a teacher. There is a presence. That's why we use this word, faciality. It's not metaphysics, so what is it? It serves to indicate that the face doesn't need to be present in flesh and blood. The teacher can very well leave the school. There will still be something. A cog of power that doesn't need to be embodied in actuality. So, we might wonder, does it function as a super-ego? A number of psychoanalysts would say it does. Or you too might think so... But what about us? We think that notions such as super-ego are completely worthless and that cogs of power don't function in this way. So how do they function? And then, some people ask, where does all this lead to? It leads to a choice. To make them function or to make them dysfunctional. To analyze the power relations that are established in a room and not only these. We'll have to wait until the next lesson which will be of an entirely different nature. All that, as they say, is politics… [*Tape interrupted*] [31:48]

Georges Comtesse: Considering what you say, what you think, what you think about Proust… in your view, what is it, at the moment of the face collapsing, of the rupture of the anchoring point that fixes it to the territory… what is it that in that moment, in that collapse, makes hatred arise?

Guattari: Roughly speaking, it happens when the eyes go blind... [*Tape interrupted*] [32:23]

Guattari: … At the last moment he tries to reconstruct Odette's faciality, and all the facialities take off, with the business of the monocles, the nose that elongates, etc. At that moment, in this way, he knows he has to reconstruct something else, to recreate a world, and hatred arises out of the fact that he doesn't have the talent to make lines of flight. [*Tape interrupted*] [32:46]

Eric Alliez [*screaming much of what follows*]: We are all in ideology! That's the first point, as soon as we engage in culture! First of all, we have to consider the question we are posing. And here I'm going to quote a woman, the adolescent, Colette. Naturally… I'm quoting this stuff, the decors, the unrequited dreams, the castles in Bavaria. I'm talking about Colette, because what is Colette?

Comments off-camera, perhaps Deleuze: [*Indistinct words*]

Alliez: No, no, no, no, no. I'm taking about that. Panaït Istrati, Kazantzakis. These three guys are not at all... neither left-wing nor... I don't know what Colette was; nobody talks about Colette… and this guy there [Deleuze], *he* talks all the time! How you talk! [*Laughter*] I've had it up to here! [*Noises of student voices reacting, Alliez's words get lost momentarily*] I've seen *The Travelling Players.* That's what I'm talking about. It's beautiful and open. But it's true that everything is contaminated by the plague. There's something that has to be said. At the height of fascism, in a musical or something, she started to say: "Long live happiness." And I oppose Colette to Kafka... [*Tape interrupted*] [34:07]

Alliez: Yesterday there was a writer on TV, Didier Decoin on Jacques Chancel's show [*Radio show, "Radioscopie" on France-Inter*], who said "It's marvellous being a priest and giving God orders". So, the left, like Guattari, you want to give orders to God, to the party? What the fuck is that about? Are you priests? That's not the problem, of course. [*Pause*]

Discussion off-camera, perhaps Deleuze: [*Indistinct words*]

Alliez: You... you... the thing is..., it's that, the thing is, it's that… [*Pause*] Zorba, he dances confronting the fascism in Greece! What is that all about, eh? And not at the level of madness, the problem is elsewhere. [*Pause*]

Discussion off-camera, perhaps Deleuze: [*Indistinct words*]

Alliez: It's very important. I pose the question because everyone is... I don't know what we should do... There are two solutions: suicide, which is the bungled act, and resistance, which is the obscure. And between the two, dance! There are no other situations worth speaking about. Because if we talk about the system, it's the Fascists that get discussed… And Pasolini, according to some his films are brilliant, but for me something's wrong. He's in Christ. Opposing Christ to the Church is fantastic, it's pure Dostoyevsky, it goes back to guilt and absolution… The revolt of [*Indistinct name*], the father of the Tzars, it must have been really hard for him! [*Tape interrupted*] [35:35]

Alliez [*screaming*] … hey, will you let me…? The PC represents half the workers in France.

A student [*attempting to respond*]: [*Indistinct words, cut off*]

Alliez [*screaming*]: You, you're not in touch with the workers!

Another student: What are you talking about?

Alliez [*screaming*]: Absolutely not!

First student: [*Unclear words, perhaps*]: So, I'm a conspirator?

Eric Alliez: No... [*Tape interrupted*] [35:49]

Alliez: … I'm posing a question, the question of war. You, Deleuze, said that Freud got it wrong! He was in ideology and talked about the death drive of war. It's backfiring on us! What is this shit? Today in France there's a war psychosis. We don't even know where the enemy is. Once it was China…

A woman student: You're just saying the same thing that they said. They were talking about [*Voices block her words*] and so on. If you had listened, maybe you would have... [*Voices block her, everyone speaks at once*]

Sound recordist: Did you film everything?

Marielle Burkhalter: Yes!

Sound recordist: The sound isn't great… [*Pause; noises of students*]

Deleuze [*Image of Deleuze standing with arms wrapped around himself*]: There we are, let's say … [*Noises of students standing and leaving*]

Marielle Burkhalter: It wasn't bad. [*End of the session*] [37:01]

ATP 1, session 4

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 3 - Faciality, Landscapity, Despotic Power**

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

Deleuze: I'd like you to reflect on this… There's the strike today, so there aren't many of us here. Which is good. But how should we proceed? I would suggest that, apart from what you might want to propose… either you can speak about what we've done so far - if you have anything to add or go back to - or else, considering that the things I wanted to talk about today are not yet clear in my mind, I can recount them in a calmer, more relaxed fashion than last time… In this way, next time, I can begin again, and everything will be clearer… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:01]

Deleuze: … Anything that might spring to mind… Think well. I have an idea… I have an idea but it doesn't work, it's no good. It doesn't matter…

A student: Can I ask you a question to clarify something?

Deleuze: A question to clarify? Yes. Yes. I say yes with a certain melancholy because I always find it sad. So, some questions, yes… but not many. [*Tape interrupted*] [1:38]

The student: Is faciality something basic, and in a certain sense a more important point than the other two, or at a first level, are they all the same thing?

Deleuze: It depends on the level... I'm sorry if I answer you this way, but obviously it depends on the level. At a certain level everything is seized by, and refers to, faciality, while at other levels faciality comes completely undone, and it's these levels that naturally interest us the most. But it requires a lot of effort to arrive at the levels where faciality slips away in favour of a faceless being… and then problematizes the question of the rapport between faciality and animality -- in fact it problematizes a lot of things…

The student: What about the role of music?

Deleuze: Music? Yes, oh yes, oh yes. Here I plan to regroup a certain number of notions that encompass your question and that put into play somewhat a lot of what we will be covering this year because faciality comes undone as much to the advantage of what we've called *becoming-*

animal as to that of *musical lines*. But isn't there a rapport between becoming-animal and musical lines? As in the case of Mozart's birds… What's do we mean by Mozart's birds? It doesn't mean that Mozart makes the little birds sing. It means that his music, in a certain manner, has a rapport with birds that aren't actually birds. So what are they? What is the relationship between becoming-music and becoming-animal?

The student: It's the exact opposite of Wagner's music, the moment in the forest.

Deleuze: Is it the opposite? Regarding the problem of music – it's a good moment to speak about this now – the rapport between musical forms and things that can be defined neither as subjects nor themes but which are actual becomings... The becoming-child in music, the little refrain…

Think of an extraordinary case, a real genius, one of the greatest composers who ever lived: Schumann. His modes, his forms of musical expression are radically new, and are caught up in a series of child becomings with blocs of childhood. The story of Schumann is a good pretext for biographical-aesthetic assemblages. It's no small matter, the becoming-animal of Schumann. When he dies, having gone mad, he has a rapport with animals that is... he hears notes only as animals. But these aren't real animals... he doesn't hear lions... he doesn't hear... These are Schumann's lions, Schumann's hyenas… [*On Schumann and blocks, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 298-304, and on Mozart's birds, pp. 304-305; on Schumann and the refrain, see pp. 347-350*] [*Tape interrupted*] [4:56]

Deleuze: While Mozart's birds are the most spiritual birds in the world. There's no contradiction between becoming-animal and becoming-spiritual. There's no opposition. What's more…

A student [*trying to interrupt Deleuze who just continues*]: … there's a difference between becoming-spiritual and … [*words lost due to Deleuze speaking*]

Deleuze: … What's more, at the end of ascesis, you are, you haven't yet become, but you are within the becoming-animal. The great ascetics of Syria actually grazed…

A student: I had pointed out… [*words blocked as Deleuze continues*]

Deleuze: … in their struggle against the Church… when they said the Church is taking a wrong path, and they were hoping to return to the desert. You know how the ascetics lived on their columns, well when they came down, they grazed like cows. What we have here is a becoming-animal caught up in a becoming-ascetic, which is really fascinating, fascinating… [*Deleuze and Guattari briefly mention the "grazing anchorite" in a list of becomings,* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 247*] [*Tape interrupted*] [5:52]

Deleuze: … Roughly speaking, we see how animal, spirit, man, woman, child are distinguishable as terms at the level of becomings. The becoming-animal, the becoming-spiritual, the becoming-child, the becoming-woman, the becoming-man, the becoming-woman of man, the becoming-man of woman and so on. All this is caught up in a kind of line that is an abstract machine, a sort of abstract line. But I'm saying too much, we haven't even started yet… [*Tape interrupted*] [6:30]

Deleuze: Shall we proceed? Any questions on the previous topics? They're not really precise yet so let's try to move on a bit... [*Tape interrupted*] [6:41]

Deleuze: … Both in Lacan and Sartre, though in two completely different ways, the question of faces and gazes is situated - and I would add extremely actively so – in function of a certain position and a certain problem of subjectivity. I would almost say that our desire would be to do the opposite. And that should we discover processes of subjectivation, these must be in function of the face, rather than the face being related to functions of the subject. In Sartre it's self-evident, the whole theory of the gaze is at the service of the Sartrean conception of the *cogito*.

In Lacan, if you go back to his essay on the Mirror Stage... broadly speaking I would say that the Mirror Stage seems to me to imply - and here I'm expressing myself in a very crude, rudimentary way – a kind of capture of the image which encloses it, so that in the end it is placed in relation to the so-called symbolic order, or what Lacan refers to as the symbolic order, and to a split subject in the symbolic order.

Why is it that we… when Guattari spoke the other time about faciality, are faced with a different problem? It's because what we are mainly interested in are the relations between faciality and power and not the relations of the face and the gaze to a subject, however it might be conceived.

What do we mean by face-power relations? I will speak of the role and function of the face in power apparatuses. I'm improvising slightly but we can agree that power apparatuses are not reducible to a unified entity. Political power is the face of the leader. I don't know if this is the case now for Georges Marchais, but at the time of Thorez, when Thorez arrived at a party meeting people would say, "Ah, here's Maurice!" The first name is indicative of a face. "Look, it's Maurice, hello Maurice!" So political power is the face of the boss.

And suddenly it's no longer only the first name. There's the whole role of the poster, the portrait. The portrait has its own history: painting. And painting is complicit with power apparatuses, even if it is so in its own way, as for example in the case of Goya or Velasquez... [*Tape interrupted*] [10:22]

Deleuze: … One of the functions of painting itself is to establish the official portrait. The portrait of the king, the portrait of the leader… or today it's photography. Can we get shut of all this, by saying that they are simply ideological phenomena? Perhaps we will have the chance to see how bad a concept ideology is, not because it defines phenomena of illusion but because the concept of ideology itself is a completely false one. Ideology doesn't exist. What exist are components in power organizations. Thus, the face of the leader, political faciality, is perhaps a component of the political power apparatus.

Second example, I continue… passional power. If there is a political power, there is equally a power of the passions. It's a classic theme. Passional power and the face of the beloved. When did this happen? It's not a simple matter… It occurred when the face of the beloved took on the appearance of a piece in a power apparatus. The passion-power. When did this occur? Broadly speaking - perhaps there are precedents – this happens during the time of courtly love. It's then that the face of the beloved takes on a role – it begins around the 11th-13th century – that

compared with previous epochs really seems like a bout of madness. We can say that something new made its appearance. So, this is my second example: passional power - and with it a second form of faciality: the face of the beloved… [*Tape interrupted*] [12:44]

Then there is a topic that has become a commonplace of psychology, of neonatal psychology, which is the baby's reaction to the mother's face. It's interesting… they don't talk about the reaction to the gaze, it's always the question of the maternal face. The baby that is being breastfed reacts to mummy's face. The power of family is the mother's face. So, there we have a third form, or a third case, of faciality. One expert on this question is a paediatrist and psychoanalyst called Spitz. S-P-I-T-Z. He has shown the importance of a certain illness that he regards as quintessential in the development of a number of schizophrenic phenomena in children. The baby, when deprived of the mother's face, reacts through a strange malady characterized by schizoid disorders.

Then we have the face of the "star". The star's face is interesting. For the next time - seeing as how there aren't many of you at today's class and we're limiting ourselves to sketching out some new topics... The star's face... we'd need someone familiar with the history of cinema to do some research on this topic which must be really interesting... What role did the star's face play in silent cinema? And with the advent of the talkies, did anything change in the function of faciality at the level of the star's face? Did the voice really have the role that's been attributed to it at the beginning of the talkies? It certainly did have a role but not the one you might think. When the talkies began, did the individuation of the star occur through voice or not?

A student: There are examples of stars who made the transition from silent to sound cinema...

Deleuze: Yes, although there aren't many for whom it worked. But I'm thinking more of the question: silent star, sound star. Does the faciality function work in the same way?... [*Tape interrupted*] [15:52]

Yolande Finkelstein: All of discourse, the whole of literature is situated in relation to the desire of the other. And the other's desire means the other's gaze. Which means that suddenly the only things that can exist do so through the other's gaze. And what I wanted to talk about in the last lesson in relation to a certain type of spectacle... I suddenly have the impression that, in the same way that money circulates, so too do gazes. I mean… at the level of merchandise, how desire is imprinted... and besides... you were talking about the boss's face... well, I want to speak about woman's face. Because woman's face doesn't exist either, and...

Deleuze: Sorry, I did make an allusion to courtly love and the face of the beloved.

Yolande Finkelstein: Yes, ok, but I mean even woman, even speaking about 'woman' in general. I mean, in the spectacle there is always a certain division of roles, of functions. And seeing as how the other day we were speaking about the semiotic wall, to be honest now I'd like to speak about doors. I mean… there's always a kind of unfolding of events that takes the form of a trial, and therefore you have a whole category of illusory doors. And… well, anyway, that's it.

Deleuze: Yes? Yes? What you are calling, perhaps it is relatively close, if these are illusory doors, they are perhaps quite close to what Félix was calling *black holes*. There could be a connection there. But we'll see. But I think that goes entirely in the direction of… – [*An abrupt sound of movement*] Don't fall down! – That goes entirely in the direction of… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

Yes, so let's suppose that these functions of faciality, these facialities pertain to apparatuses of power, and are distributed throughout them with different functions. And maybe even through different figures. Let's chance a small verbal link with some previous matters. Wouldn't the face be one of their key forms? But of what, you may ask. One of the key forms of redundancy… or, better, isn't the face a knot of arborescence? And to enter into rhizomes, don't we have to undo the face? And what would it mean, "to undo the face"? Well, it's just a question, a point of reference that will maybe help us locate things… but let's be more precise.

Let's suppose that power needs, or rather powers need - each in their own way - to produce face. There is a production of face. In the story of how Hitler… and here Félix was right in speaking in general about micropolitics... when we think of the story of how Hitler came to power: why should it be Hitler and not the high command who was ready to seize power? Why Hitler? What took place at the micropolitical level? There were traits of faciality that provoked redundancy, a resonance that had political and economic dimensions. This is why we're well beyond simple ideology. What was it that made Hitler's face literally rewarding, not illusory, not ideological, but profitable and rewarding? There is an economy of faciality.

Let's try to formulate this... For the moment all we have is a rough schema, I'm not saying we have an answer. But let's try to advance with this topic. Where does the link between power and faciality derive from? Once again, we can't say that faciality is at the source of power. That would be a nonsense, to ascribe everything to psychology or I don't know what. Faciality has its place, as a component piece of power apparatuses.

So then, where does the link derive from? For sure, there is no genetic link. Again, we cannot say that power derives from a face that imposes itself. That's not it. So where does this intimate rapport faciality-power apparatus originate? We can conceive of systems where it doesn't feature. Let's imagine... let's proceed by an imaginative experiment, which is the best way because it's always there that we can vary things. There are different semiotics, the face is obviously part of a type of semiotics. The face, faciality, is a semiotics of power or it forms part of certain semiotics of power.

But there are other semiotics that don't function through faciality. The mask... the mask is a very complicated notion. We have to think about masks the way Levi-Strauss considered totemism, which is to say that the mask as such is a false concept. Masks have such a multiplicity of functions that speaking about *the* mask doesn't mean anything. But there are cases where the mask, rather than constituting a phenomenon of faciality, constitutes a phenomenon whose role is to make the head into an actual function of the body - which is to say, its role is to avert all risk of an autonomous faciality. This helps us advance a little...

In other semiotics of power, in other systems, there needs to be autonomy of faciality but to whose benefit, and for what? Sorry, we're going too fast here… Every time a semiotics of power will have the tendency to deny or suppress references of corporeality, coordinates of corporeality, it will at the same time tend to replace the semiotics of corporeality with a semiotics of a wholly different nature: that of faciality.

Let's take the example of what we could call, just to be simple, primitive peoples… or rather - to use a more useful word that will help us lose the evolutionist baggage - we can even talk about *pre-signifying semiotics*, primitive semiotics. [*On this point, see in* A Thousand Plateaus *the two plateaus, on signifying regimes and on faciality*] What goes on in primitive semiotics? All the components are interwoven in such a way that they never find themselves dominated by a signifier. That's why we can refer to them as pre-signifying – semiotics that aren't distributed in line with signifying chains, but which refer simultaneously to gestural, rhythmic and oral components - which doesn't mean components of the face… by oral components I mean the mouth as a cavity, and that has nothing to do with the face.

If I seek to characterize these pre-signifying components, to attribute certain features to them, I would say: corporeality – including in their power apparatuses… So, corporeality, animality, an intimate rapport with animal-becomings, collective enunciation, a collective mode of enunciating... At the same time these semiotics are heavily territorialized, these power apparatuses are heavily territorialized. So, to sum up pell-mell: corporeality, animality, collectivity, territorialization… [*Tape interrupted*] [25:43]

Deleuze: … We reterritorialize on the face, the face of the leader. "Hi Maurice, Maurice, you're here!" "Hello Georges!" And Maurice, having nothing more to say, replies "Good morning comrade." And there are murmurs of "Here's the boss!" "Did you see? It's the boss." Then you have the face of the star. It's Greta Garbo... "Hello Greta Garbo!" We're light years away from questions of the gaze, with her dark glasses, the black holes of Greta Garbo. So, we have Greta Garbo. And then, "Oh, it's mummy!"

So, anyway, this is our hypothesis. Unlike what occurs in semiotics of corporeality, or in corporeal power apparatuses of the primitive, pre-signifying type, faciality becomes, or would become – other than this we can't say anything yet, we don't know why… But faciality would perhaps become - it's just a hypothesis - a key element of power apparatuses, when power apparatuses become disembodied, abstract, when they are deterritorialized, and therefore what happens is a reterritorialization on the face. What would this hypothesis mean? Maybe we'll realize it's false, but I'd be surprised... it's not possible. We'll realize that it is true but for reasons we don't yet know. It's clearly true; it cannot be false.

So where does this lead us? It leads us to say something quite simple, which is... when primitive codes break down, when they collapse, when pre-signifying codes - with their polyvocality, their mixture of gestural, rhythmic, corporeal, animal, territorialized components - when this collapse occurs... in brief, when the savages disappear to the profit of the great empires or whatever, you name it… feudality, certain forms of feudality -- African, Asian -- and later capitalism and so on... what happens is that sexuality, or even phenomena of desire in general, undergo (if we want to continue with this terminology) a vast *decoding*. They are literally *decoded*. Their codes

lay in pre-signifying semiotics. Women, the collective character of marriages, children… it was all in place, well framed. Obviously, there was a decoding of desire, of sexuality, women, children. Decoded flows of women, children. Our hypothesis consists simply in saying: faciality is what rises up as a means of *overcoding*. It's not by chance that the face, unless it's swollen, right, unless it's swollen, is the least sexualized component of the body. And is the face part of the body? Yes, no… we don't know… we shall see.

In any case, when primitive codes collapse, when desire undergoes this trial of decoding, it becomes overcoded by the face, which therefore takes on a function that is not at all that of sublimation - it won't be directly sexual - but which will nonetheless form a part, an integral part, of sexuality. On a formal plane, the face will become the overcoding of sexuality. It becomes our way of overcoding sexuality, in line with the will and the directives of incorporeal, deterritorialized apparatuses of power and so on… It's the face, the eyes of your beloved, your leader's gaze. All these faces... the face of a star…

Georges Comtesse: The eyes of Elsa… [*Reference to a collection of poems (1942) by Louis Aragon, as well as the name of his wife*]

Deleuze: The eyes of Elsa. Yes. The eyes of Elsa…

Yolande Finkelstein: Even if…

Deleuze [*responding to an inaudible comment*]: It's not the same? It's even another case? Fine… [*Inaudible response*] You'd better not mess around with the eyes of Elsa!

A student: But he messed with them!

Yolande Finkelstein: But even if we take all these examples...

Deleuze: And what happened then? What happened?

Yolande Finkelstein: But even if we take all these examples… there's something I want to say… The other day, after the little accident, I heard someone say, well yes, but the guy who got into that fight, he spent the whole night with the woman he was with, next to whom he was standing…

Deleuze: Great. That means it was a good subject. It's clear that all these problems concern us, problems of the couple, of faciality, these concern us. Except for those holy spirits who have set off on a becoming-animal that consists in grazing. But I am the only one here... actually, I shouldn't have said that... Okay, so this is our first hypothesis. Is it clear to everyone? There aren't any… [*Tape interrupted*] [33:03]

A student: … I was very uneasy at the beginning, when you started talking about power. I would prefer if we just continued what we were doing… and when the subject came up, we could discuss it directly… but not to begin with it, because, I don't know, the concept of power in this lesson has become too structured, so it's… anyway…

Deleuze: Just now, you mean?

The student: Yes, now we were speaking...

Deleuze: So, we'll stop.

The student: I hope so, but...

Deleuze: Oh, we can't talk about Proust all the time! [*Laughter*] And when we do talk about Proust, we're discussing [*unclear words*] …

The student: But I have the impression that this matter... before the symbolic structuring Lacan speaks of, for example, you have aspects that connect to musculature, parasitism, the rapport with the mother... something that also reminds me a bit of a text by Marx on what a number of economists including Rousseau were saying about the state of humanity before capitalist society. I mean, what Marx calls the *Robinsonades*. When we speak about rhizomes or non-faciality or making faciality collapse, aren't we perhaps falling into an idealist, even ideological discourse? And wanting to unmask something, falling into another schematization?

Deleuze: You're bringing up a lot of different questions here. Obviously, I am wary of any confrontation with psychoanalytical topics such as narcissism, pre-narcissism, Lacan's topics in "The Mirror Stage"… I'm wary of them simply because they are none of our business. There's room for a lot of kinds of business in the heavenly kingdom! Maybe we'll come across what you're saying. We'll encounter it, but indirectly. I don't know. Perhaps.

When you say that it's unnecessary to focus all our attention on power, grant me that we've only been discussing this for fifteen or twenty minutes, based on a single question. If you agree and no one has anything further to add, we'll go back to this question, alas, we'll go back to it because we need to; for Félix and I, it's necessary. We're trying to settle the issue, and it extends from the power of the star to that of Hitler, so it's sufficiently varied, it's quite varied -- not to mention Odette's power over Swann – the question is extremely varied. But for the moment we're blocked. However we've established one thing, a hypothesis that I've tried to summarize… Yes?

Anne Querrien: The first congregation of teachers that was deterritorialized and that attained a national scale was that of Jean Baptiste de La Salle. Curiously enough *The Rules of Christian Decorum and Civility*, which teaches correct comportment, and was written by de La Salle… millions of copies of which were distributed in France… is the first to say something positive about the face.

Deleuze: Interesting... What date is that?

Anne Querrien: The first edition is from 1713… and in the previous *Rules* - which is closer to de La Salle in terms of content - the only mention of the face is this: "Since it is upon the face that signs of the spirit of wisdom and modesty especially appear, which cause one to be well or

favourably judged, we must ensure that it is always well composed" … [*Tape interrupted*] [37:15]

AQ: … "To be agreeable to others, do not assume a stern or a forbidding countenance..."

Deleuze: You all hear that, right? [*Laughter*]

AQ: "It should not be stern or forbidding but nor should it show anything too giddy or resembling a schoolboy. The whole face ought to reflect an air of seriousness and wisdom. Nor is it according to decorum to have a melancholy or a peevish countenance, and your face ought never to reflect any passion or ill-regulated affection. Your face ought to be happy with no sign of..."

Deleuze: I interrupt you, Anne, just to stress one of Félix's concepts - which is the enumeration of traits of faciality and their associated norms with respect to a model-face.

Anne Querrien: And it continues... "with no sign of either intemperance or dissipation. It ought to be serene but not too easygoing; open, without giving signs of too great a familiarity; gentle, without softness, and never suggesting anything vulgar. To everyone it must manifest your respect or, at the least, your affection and goodwill. It is, however, proper to allow the expression on your face to reflect the various business matters and circumstances that arise."

And then he goes on to explain that on a sad occasion, one must not obviously appear cheerful [*Laugther*] The wise man seeks to "maintain a tranquil countenance that does not readily change its disposition or expression, no matter what happens, agreeable or disagreeable... It is something very improper, something that shows great vanity and is not at all becoming in a Christian, to apply beauty spots and paint to your face, covering it with powder and rouge. The vain person who resorts to such artifices performs an unnatural gesture since nature is our reference."

Deleuze: Obviously classical, not romantic nature…

Anne Querrien: Yes, classical. It also says that one shouldn't frown as a furrowed brow expresses melancholy. [*Laughter]* "It is impolite to knit your eyebrows; this is a sign of haughtiness. Instead, you ought to keep your brows relaxed all the time… To raise them indicates scorn, and to let them droop over the eyes is characteristic of the melancholy person". The part about the eyes is also very interesting. The rules of modesty insist that the eyes should be soft, serene, demure, etc.

What I find fascinating is that all this is contained in *The Rules of Christian Decorum and Civility* which was distributed to the entire population and then taken up by teachers… "Modesty being the only external quality that can be controlled", which is to say modesty is what keeps body and face as they should be. Every two months, the friars of Christian schools had to write a letter to their superior recounting everything they had done - meaning if they had been modest, well-behaved, if they had been ill, if they'd had evil thoughts and also how they'd behaved towards the children. It was a literary system created to account for one's own behaviour by the master friars of the Christian Schools.

Deleuze: Not, literary but a programmatic system…

Anne Querrien: Yes, yes,

Deleuze: There was a program of the face, a program of faciality.

Anne Querrien: Also… with respect to landscape, to *landscapity*... the Jesuits speak about this. In ascesis, in the spiritual exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola, the first phase is the composition of a place: meaning that one always has to be represented in a place or landscape. There is a series of key landscapes, I have to look for the reference, because I just discovered about this… He ordered a collection of engravings, placing himself in landscapes where Christ had apparently lived. And this is how he began his spiritual exercises.

Deleuze: In the landscape?

Anne Querrien: For the Jesuits, it was in the landscape…

Deleuze: So, in the Jesuit order the exercises...

Anne Querrien: Historically speaking this is a century before…

Deleuze: … the landscapity of the Jesuits, and the faciality of the scholars who followed, who take up the Jesuits' methods… but in order to invent something specific of their own.

Anne Querrien: More specifically for the people.

A student: What you've just read... in 1946, in a Catholic school in Gerson where I studied... I was fourteen... somebody read that to me. I haven't heard it since then. And they pointed out what you just said. I mean, I was at boarding school and in our classroom, we had images of Saint Ignatius of Loyola... this was 1946.

Deleuze: Images of landscapity, landscapes. But In Loyola's writings, as far as you know… was the landscape already presented as something that had to convey certain sentiments of the soul that could be expressed on the face, right?

Anne Querrien: On the face ? [*Unclear words*] … I haven't researched it, so I don't know.

Deleuze: Perhaps it only passed by way of the soul's sentiments… Yes?

Robert Albouker: In one of his seminars, Foucault was speaking about confession during the classical age, and he spent the entire hour talking about how confession worked with the Jesuits.

Deleuze: Yes, he takes it up in *Discipline and Punish*.

Robert Albouker: Confession has to be carried out point-by-point for the whole body and especially in relation to the eyes and what one hears. Half of confession concerns the face… What did you see, what did you hear, what did you smell? You have to tell them everything.

The previous student: I want to say something else – excuse me -- regarding confession that left its marks; all this reminds me of it. I was on the steps of the Gerson staircase in Rue de la Pompe, before my confession, with my confessor nearby – I had a master-confessor --, I was looking at an issue of *Cinémonde* with a photo of Martine Carol, half-naked, and that I hadn't even had time to sneak a look at, [*Laughter*] and I was looking inside at the section on films, and my confessor came and told me: "Don't spread [*diffuser*] that image around!" Those were his exact worlds, "Don't spread this image around!"

Deleuze: "Don't spread that image around!" That's very important, and we'll see why. Remember these words! "Don't spread that image around!" Note them down; [*Laughter*] We'll need that... "Don't pass this image around!" Note it down… Ah yes, otherwise, I won't remember it. [*Regarding De la Salle and Loyola, both raised in this discussion, Deleuze will indeed recall this as he and Guattari refer to both pedagogical principles in* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 533, note 7*]

Anne Querrien: Concerning the landscape...

Deleuze: Yes?

Anne Querrien: I want to go back to the text…

Deleuze: It's important this sequence: landscapity-faciality, obviously.

Anne Querrien: According to the book I read, which is unfortunately just an abridged popular edition…

Deleuze: It's a what?

AQ: An abridged edition; it's part of the Seuil editions, the Spiritual Masters series, I believe. In any case, the Loyola citation I mentioned says that it really aims at creating a deliberate case of redundancy. That is, it's a question of inscribing…

Deleuze: Really, does it say that?

Anne Querrien: Yes, well, not exactly like that, if you will, but it says that it is a question of inscribing the imagination within such limits...

Deleuze: You're a fraudster, like us! [*Laughter*]

Anne Querrien [*laughing as well*]: More or less... [*Pause*] It's a question of inscribing the imagination within strict limits, in such a way that it becomes completely fixated on the desired object, thereby yielding something similar.

Deleuze: It is redundancy, redundancy of frequency because I'm sure they carried it out several times a day. That works for us, perfect, perfect… [*Tape interrupted*] [44:20]

Deleuze: Yes, did you want to say something?

Yolande Finkelstein: Yes because, a while ago, people thought about setting Jacques Martin straight because he hosts a TV show every Sunday morning called "Le petit rapporteur"… and every week his aim is to demolish a figure on the left. And his main argument is "Did you see that guy's face?" Really…

Deleuze: Yeh, yeh…

YF: "Did you see that guy's face?"

A woman student: [*Inaudible remarks, but apparently regarding actions by Sartre*]

Deleuze: Unfortunately, Martin did something like that, but we have to forgive Sartre everything. [*Laughter*] I think he explained himself later. He said he had been rushed; he'd spoken too quickly. At least I think that Sartre said something like that. [*Pause*]

So… ok fine. We're done with this first point. I'll pass on now to a second point that at first glance seems completely different… I haven't forgotten, Antoine, we can talk later if you don't mind… [*Tape interrupted*] [45:32]

Deleuze: … I would just like to have the right to dream a little, with Félix and all of you. I say the words, "There it is, I see!" And it's as if - and it's not by chance that I'm saying this, because it'll be useful later - it's as if we pretended to fall asleep. As if we were in the *phase* of falling asleep, as psychologists say. And then we start to see strange things.

The first thing I see, and I really do see it, I'm seeing it… is the face of the despot. The despot's face is highly significant. I would even say that in this first figure we have the very substance of the signifier. He has knitted his eyebrows; he has a hidden smile. The despot's face as signifier, you can find texts everywhere, on all the despots, where they talk about their facial tics, they had their… [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*] [*On the despotic face as signifier, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *plateau 5 on regimes of signs, notably pp. 130-137, and plateau 7 on faciality, notably pp. 180-184*]

This face of the despot… allows me to dream, maybe I'm mistaken, we don't know yet. It's a face that imposes itself upon us, at least when we are falling asleep, and it's always facing me. A frontal face. You could say to me "And what about yours?" Well, I don't have that. I tend to be bowed over, though I obviously look at that face, sometimes bowed over, sometimes with my eyes raised. It's a face on high. Facing me.

So why this face? There must be a reason. Because for all of us… it doesn't matter if you realize it or not, you'll always see it as you're falling asleep… Why is this face, facing us, projected on a white wall? As though the wall had windows. It's similar to the techniques of graffiti. A man

facing us on a white wall, on a white background. The white wall and the signifying face seen frontally. Like the face on the Shroud. The face imprinted on a handkerchief. This face facing us on a white wall seems to me something terrifying, something terrifying. While we're in peaceful conditions for falling asleep, it's terrifying. Maybe it doesn't exist, maybe it does, maybe...

Anyway, there's a first point, let's put it aside for the moment. It already forms a schema. A white rectangle, a face. Is this face already a black hole? A black hole on a white wall, that would suit us. But let's not rush things. Let's just say: a face on a white wall. And that's the face signed and frontal. That's the signifying despotic face. In fact, it doesn't act by means of the signified. It acts through a series of rhythmic lines on a white wall. What it means, which is to say what it signifies… is of no importance. Whatever it signifies, it will always signify something, and this something will never be any use to us. It's pointless to concern ourselves with it.

Second figure... I've already developed this sufficiently so I can just remind you of it. Two faces facing each other… that approach one another as they descend. The first figure was, as we would say today in specialist language, synchronic. It's synchronic: face on white wall. The second figure: two faces facing one another that move closer, following a line. As I said, I've already developed this at length, so I'm not going to insist: Tristan-Isolde, Tristan-Isolde, Tristan-Isolde up to an exaggerated proximity of the two faces - which means what? The plunge into the black hole.

This figure is diachronic. There's a whole becoming of the two faces, which are not necessarily facing each other. They might even be back-to-back. In any case, they are in profile, two faces in profile that descend, approach one another, brush against a black hole… faces that will plummet into a black hole, the black hole of passion. Tristan and Isolde. This time it's no longer the signifying synchronic face of the despot on the white wall. It's the passional face. Or, to stick to a convenient term, one without the slightest hint of evolutionism, it's the "post-signifying" face. The passional face of the beloved, not with the function of *signifiance*, but with one that we could call the function of *subjectivation*.

But you see, following our method, this doesn't mean that we refer the face to a subject but, rather, it is from a figure of the face that we generate the function of subjectivation. And when I refer to the two profiles that don't necessarily face one another, in this diachrony, in this falling towards the black hole, this time, what we have is no longer a face seen frontally on a white wall but a face in profile that flows along a diachronic line, a diachronic line, in opposition to the surface of the white wall, that moves towards the black hole.

But not necessarily; I'm saying they are not necessarily looking at one another, as I said before. They might half turn to observe each other. You see, from passional love they're already tending towards a kind of conjugal phase. They observe each other. Or else they turn away. God turns away from my face as I turn away from his. There was a time that gods didn't turn their faces away. Which god invented the turning away of the face? Who was the god that turned his face away from his devotee, just as the devotee turned his face away from his god? Who invented this diachronic line that heads towards a black hole? It's the history of the Jewish people, the story of the double turning away. A history that will have its own unfolding and that will end with the

antisemite Heidegger... in his reinterpretation of the double turning away, that he calls categorical, and it's not by chance that all this comes from Kant, passing by way of Hölderlin.

This falling asleep is opening up a lot of material, it's becoming too erudite, so I'll stop there, but it's clear that here we have another figure… [*Tape interrupted*] [55:00]

Deleuze: … You can see that our strongest desire is to make the black holes and the white walls function together. Because they have to. And this is where terror is born. A black hole in a white wall, there's nothing more terrifying. Any other kind of death would be preferable to that.

Okay, so here's the third image we see while falling asleep. The previous ones were modes of organizing the traits of faciality. And as Anne quite rightly said, there is a list of traits of faciality that will be overcoded by the face.

The third figure of falling asleep that I see... and here things start to get more disturbing… what happens is a kind of freeing up of the traits of faciality that escape the face, as though the face melted and the traits of faciality became like birds, sometimes heavy, sometimes light… and began to interact with other traits, traits of landscapity… "Hair in the wind", as Félix calls it. [*End of recording*] [56:33]

ATP I, session 5

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 4 - The Novel and Courtly Romance, the White Wall Black Hole of Passional Faciality, Demonism of the Negus, Art Brut, Henry Miller, Quanta of Information and Quanta of Possibilities**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcription, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

Deleuze: … We had to find a way to break through the white wall or - which amounts to the same thing – to get out of the black hole. It's not easy knowing how to get out of the black hole or how to break through the white wall. So here is a second grouping, not even of notions in this case but of dreams, of fallings asleep.

And to conclude this second part, before I let you speak and tell me what you think, I would just like to say... There's a strange story, a text that I think is wonderful. Here I open a parenthesis, but one that is inherent to the second notion. I number them so things will be clearer when we go back to them.

I know I seem to be going off the subject, but when people speak about the novel, or the history of the novel, there's something that isn't right. Because we're so horrified by origins, by the return to origins, we've got into the habit of beginning from the end. Initially, this was a good thing, when the method worked, but then... We employ the *rhizomatic method*, which is different, we examine things from the middle. That way, we're at no risk of making a mistake. This is the Kafka method, or the ant method. The *rhizome method*. An ant seizes things from the middle. We are ants.

I was talking about the novel and how we had the habit of beginning from the end. We discover, for example, and here I make a concrete example… we experience the end of the novel, or we have experienced it, through a catastrophic text like Camus's *The Stranger.* Or other marvellous novels, like those of Beckett that mark its limit point. The novel is over. Or else we're told... that in a certain epoch there was the chivalric novel. And then that came to an end with the famous *Don Quixote. Don Quixote* marked the end of the romances of Chivalry because it's the moment when there is no longer any sense in the figure of the knight, and he can only be embodied by someone like Don Quixote who is completely mad, mistaking windmills for who knows what and so on... It's a well-known story. *Don Quixote* is considered the end of the chivalric novel. [*On the chivalric novel in this context, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *pp. 173-174*]

A student: The horse is no longer a horse.

Deleuze: What?

The student: Above all, the horse is no longer just a horse.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes. Yes, it becomes more important. And these endings, to what do we attribute them? They are attributed when, and here again I roughly sum up, we are shown the hero to be a poor guy who is completely lost. What I'm saying is: of course there is an evolution of the novel – I'm not saying the novel has always remained the same - but if there is such an evolution then this is certainly not what it focuses on. Because the appearance of a character who is completely... I can't think of a better term… completely *lost*, who doesn't know what he's doing, who doesn't know his own name even, who is a stranger to everything, who is completely deterritorialized, who wanders along his line of flight understanding nothing, who stops, and when he's not on his line of flight becomes completely catatonic, you see here what psychiatry defines as catatonic, a person who remains for hours on end in a movement that can be quite intricate, involving all the muscles, and who spends maybe 6 hours, 24 hours in this state. So then…

A student: Are many of these people around?

Deleuze: Not many of them are around, unfortunately, because the psychiatric hospitals were demolished, but at the time when there were psychiatric hospitals, you could see a lot of them about. You could see a lot of them! [*Laughter, unclear for what reason*] Whereas now, you see people lying on couches, [*Laughter*] in comparison, the catatonics were much more active. So anyway…

The student: But some of the shrinks fucking their patients!

Deleuze: Catatonics?

The student: No.

Deleuze: Ah… the others! It's possible. Though the idea disturbs me… So, I was saying. This was the inauguration of the novel. This is it. If I have to define the novel, I'd say that it appears at the moment a certain type of character emerges. And if someone said to me, "but your definition of the novel is based on characters, that's not the way to proceed, it's the signifier that counts", that just makes me laugh. The novel appears with a certain type of character who has no idea of his own name, of what he is doing, who is a complete idiot, utterly lost, completely just standing there and looking. And what is he looking at? He doesn't even know. Someone comes up and taps him on the shoulder.

I'd say that the real Albert Camus is Chrétien de Troyes. He's the first great novelist. And the line runs from Chrétien de Troyes to Beckett who, it should be said, knows the Middle Ages well, all the Celtic novels and the romances of courtly love. And what do we find when we open a courtly romance? A romance of the courtly love cycles, or of Chrétien de Troyes. I'm not even going to

read a passage because it would be too long, and you can find them in paperback editions. If you haven't read them, buy them. They are wonderful.

For example, you'll find a knight, who's just there sitting on his horse. In the distance is a peasant who says: "Look, do you see him? A knight asleep on his horse!" But for him this is nothing exceptional. In fact, that's how he recognizes it's a knight. "It's a knight, do you see him?" He's leaning on his lance like this. And he's fast asleep. He sleeps on. And then another knight comes along. They have brief waking periods... [*Laughter*] He arrives on his errant line, his line of deterritorialization. Or else, the knight who has fallen into a catatonic state and is asleep finds himself in the territory of another knight, who suddenly awakens. And the awakened knight says: "Don't move!" There's no danger of him moving in his state. "Don't move! You hear me?" The other knight hears nothing. There's a second and then a third call. The three summations of chivalry... On the third call, the conscious knight says: "You have gravely offended me. You don't answer me." And he whacks him over the head with his lance or with his broadsword. The other is astonished, the sleeping, catatonic knight wakes up. "Hey what's this? You hit me!"

For those who don't believe me, I'll just read you a short extract: "You hit me!" "Three times I addressed you and you made no answer!" "Had you spoken to me, I would have heard you. I didn't hear anything" "Too bad. You offended me in any case. We must fight!" "Why must we fight?" "I've no idea…"

The search for the Holy Grail is wonderful: they don't know what they are looking for. They don't know their own names. They pass the time forgetting their name. Molly is nothing in comparison to Lancelot. He's really incredible. In one of Chrétien de Troyes's finest romances, there's a knight who sees a cart... The story is called "Knight of the Cart." He looks at it and gets onto it. He doesn't have any reason for doing so.

It's like, many centuries later, Dostoyevsky with his great characters who go out onto the street with a precise objective. They say: "I have to go and see Ivanovich, there's no time to waste." Then, when they go out, they suddenly wonder: "What was it I had to do again?" And they set off in the opposite direction. Here again we have faces turning away from one another. A curious game of faciality and landscapity. They no longer know. Or else... Kafka. K wants to go to the Palace of Justice and gives the address of the bank, or maybe it's the other way round, I don't remember... He goes in the other direction. Bizarre things happen.

But in the case of the Knights who forget even their name and are completely catatonic... Seeing as you are correct in not believing me… [*Tape interrupted*] [10:50]

Here is a lovely phrase: "The Knight of the Cart is occupied with deep reflections, like one who has no strength or defence against love which holds him in its sway." You see, it happens very quickly. This is connected to the face of the beloved. "He totally forgets himself, and he knows not whether he is alive or dead, forgetting even his own name, not knowing whether he is armed or not, or whither he is going or whence he came. Only one creature he has in mind and for her…" -- which is to say his beloved's face -- "his thought is so occupied that he neither sees or hears aught else. His horse takes him on tortuous paths" and so on. The Knight on guard arrives and he says: "Don't move!" etc. Three times. And the knight of the cart, who is called Lancelot –

it's the romance of Lancelot – gets whacked on the head. He's furious, they fight... no it's not that passage. [*Laughter; Deleuze looks through his text*] I had noted it down, thinking I would need some evidence… P.153... No, I haven't underlined it… It's p.112-113. Maybe... 112-113. No, it's not that either. Okay, so as I just demonstrated, you won't have any proof. You're not going to get it.

Here then is the passage that I would like to read in its entirety because it's so beautiful and moreover short. And it seems that I've lost that too. In the paperback Folio edition… Chrétien de Troye. *Perceval, the Story of the Grail.* Page 111.

Perceval "saw, before he reached the tents, a flock of wild Geese, dazzled by the heavy Snow" -- no need to comment here -- "dazzled by the heavy Snow" -- I'll just say straight off that the snow is a white wall. -- "Did he see them? Yes, because they were fleeing as fast as birds can fly from a diving Falcon dropping out of the sky." -- The black hole of the falcon, the white wall of the snow. -- "It struck at a single Goose, lagging behind the others, and hit it so hard that it fell to the earth. Perceval arrives too late without being able to [*unclear word*]. Without waiting he uses both spurs to where the Goose had fallen."

You see his line of flight? He set off in search of the grail, he sees some wild geese, and one being struck and falling, and immediately he goes to see what has happened. An epic or dramatic hero would never do such a thing. But this is the specificity of the novel, beginning with the "poor guy". It's the ballad of the poor guy who doesn't know his name, who doesn't know… When Achilles retires to his tent, it's a whole different story. It's an epic. It's not the same kind of faciality. The faciality of the novel, tragic or dramatic faciality, and epic faciality are very different things.

So, he goes to take a look. "The bird's neck had been wounded, and three drops of blood had come rolling out on the snow, dying it vivid red. The bird had not been badly hurt, just knocked to the earth, and before the knight could reach it, it had flown away in the sky, and Perceval sees at his feet the snow where it has been resting and the still evident blood. And Perceval, leaning on his lance, contemplated the sight of the blood and snow so mixed together."

He leans on his lance and looks. I'm saying this is landscapity. That "fresh color" - he looks at the three drops of blood on the snow, instead of carrying on with his knightly tasks. But this is precisely his task. The line of deterritorialization.

That "fresh color", the three drops of blood on the snow were "just like his beloved's face", and his beloved - if I'm not mistaken - is called Blanchefleur, and she continues to abandon him because he always has something else to accomplish although he doesn't know what it is. And you know that, historically, courtly love was established as a line of flight with respect to conjugality. It was the great movement... the great social line of flight in an active reaction to conjugality. Or should we say the reverse?

"Blood and snow so mixed together created a fresh color, just like his beloved's face, and as he stared he forgot what he was doing and where he was. The red stain against the white snow

seemed just like her complexion. Before the king awakens…" – the king too is always asleep in the novel... King Arthur is fantastic, in this sense… Again, he's nothing like the kings of epics or the king of Shakespearean drama for example. He sleeps so deeply that a valet can pass by and knock his crown off with his elbow and he says: "You didn't do it on purpose? Very well." [*Laughter*]

So, "hey you over there"… ["Before the king awakens"], another guy appears, actually, several guys, "We've seen an knight out there, sleeping on his horse." – "Is he bearing arms?" -- "Oh yes, indeed!" -- "I'll go and talk to him… I'll bring him to court!", to the court of King Arthur. He has to bring back Lancelot… No, Perceval, but it won't be an easy task, as Perceval doesn't hear anything. He fights once again. Then they bring him before the king. And he explains, "oh, I just didn't hear anything", or something of the sort... [*Tape interrupted*] [19:16]

… In courtly love, there is a whole overcoding that happens through the face in reaction to conjugal relationships. So, we have this theme. And there's also the theme of the two faces. Perceval thinks of the face of Blanchefleur. Perceval-Blanchefleur. Perceval-Blanchefleur. So, we have this kind of passional faciality. There's the white wall – the snow with the three drops of blood on it – the black hole, which is both the falcon that attacks the geese and the catatonia, the black hole of passional catatonia into which Perceval falls.

And, lastly, there is a system of decomposition where traits of landscapity, traits of faciality, the exit from the black hole – all this becomes mixed to form a very curious thing. And we shouldn't be surprised, because if we take this complex -- in the most ordinary sense of "complex", that is, the combination of a group of things -- if we take our complex: white wall, face, white line, black hole, face inscribed on the white wall flowing towards the black hole, if we take all this together, we can say that each of the various elements pertains to very different semiotics, very different systems of signs.

Yet on the other hand, the whole forms a mixed semiotics. It's no surprise that the signifying face of the despot on the white wall already contains, already comprises, several black holes. Nor is it surprising that the passional system of black holes still contains a residue of white wall, if only in the form of the diachronic line. This melange shouldn't surprise us. It can only be seen at the third level... of a more elaborate study. Not by chance in courtly love is the lady often referred to as the "white lady." The white lady. Blanchefleur. The knight's catatonia functions as a black hole, the lady as a white wall, with the vermillion of her cheeks daubed on the wall. Or, perhaps, her eyes are already black holes. Everything is mixed in a semiotics that involves all the components. And our task is to unravel it. So that's the second remark I wanted to make… [*Tape interrupted*] [22:37]

And now, to finish, before you start to speak, I want to show you a proof without saying where it comes from. Here is a face. There's no question this is a demon, a demon from afar, from Ethiopia. The eyes are black holes. The black hole is surrounded by a coiled serpent. Each time you have a coiled serpent, you can – though it's not obligatory, there are no rules in magic – you can place an eye in it. So, what's the result? -- The figure is a bit small, but I'll try to show it to you. [*Pause*] I'm annoyed that I've lost the most beautiful of the Ethiopian demons I had. [*Pause ; he keeps looking, then finds it*] The most beautiful one is this one … [*Pause*] It's a masterpiece.

[*Pause*] Can everyone see it? [*Pause*] It's really so beautiful. [*Pause*] You can get a better look later… I'll pass it around.

It's on papyrus, so it's yellowish. White wall, black hole. But what is it? You remember the stories of Ethiopia? And here we return to the question of power. It's true what they say. The Negus, before being deposed, had an extraordinary court of magicians and his black hole-like gaze was well-known. And the Negus had descended from a whole series, a whole lineage, beginning from Solomon in which the eyes were defined as black holes. The magic power of the black hole. And the Negus, when making his rounds of the peasant villages, relied on this magic, which is typically Ethiopian - which is why I wanted to show you this example.

There's just one other case I can think of like this, but which is very different: certain documents published in the *Cahiers de l'Art Brut*. For example, for those of you've heard of an artist like [Adolf] Wölfli, who was for a long time interned in Switzerland, I believe… he made only faces composed of a circle and eyes like black holes. Or else another famous exponent of Art Brut, Aloïse [Aloïse Corbaz], who also makes black hole-eyes... Today I had too much to carry but next time I'll bring you some of her drawings. She was also interned for a long time. In different ways the drawings of both Wölfli and Aloïse are pure black holes placed against a white background that is full of miniatures, etc.

So here is my second observation, which is a bit confused. And I repeat: "Don't pass this image around!" Why did I want to say that? [*Deleuze refers here to a student's comment in the first part of this session, under ATP I.3*] Because there's an error, a risk of error in what I said. One might think that the first figure of face, which I called signifying despotic face, a single face viewed frontally, is like a unity that gathers together the different traits of faciality, while in the other figure there are at least two faces that are seen in profile, or that turn away from one another, and flow towards the black hole. At a certain level, one can say this.

But at a more rigorous and profound level, we have to admit that every face, whatever its figure, is by nature a multiplicity. It's just that I believe the first type of face – the signifying despotic face - is a multiplicity of frequency. That's why in the Ethiopian etchings, the Ethiopian scrolls, each time you make a circle you have the possibility of inserting an eye. The face of the despot is a multiplicity of frequency. While the face of the beloved, the passional face, is a multiplicity of resonance. That is, our two general types of faciality correspond to our two forms of redundancy, and the reason for this is simple: faciality is on one hand the substance of the signifier while, on the other, it is the attribute of subjectivity. So, it's normal that our redundancies – the way we have distinguished them – are found precisely at the level of the face, as both substance and attribute of redundancy. Okay, so here we have a second grouping of things to investigate… [*Pause, then tape interrupted*] [28:37]

Deleuze: … There's a wonderful example -- I add this because I would like speak at least once about this author -- in Henry Miller, who has always confronted the question in these terms: Can I break through the wall? Which wall are we talking about here? Even at the level of universal history, Miller hallucinates. He's one of the great delirious writers. There are two peoples who've confronted the wall. We don't know what this wall is. He doesn't need to tell us. American writers do better than philosophy here. He says there are two peoples: the Jews and the Chinese.

What a surprise! The Jews failed at the last moment. They rebounded onto a phenomenon that was invented by Christ: subjectivity. And there are some fantastic pages on this. They bounced off the wall and fell into a black hole. The black hole of Christ and the passion of Christ. The Chinese, thanks to Buddhism - Miller says - passed through the wall, by way of a series of metamorphoses, animal becomings, musical becomings, all kinds of weird things, because you can't break through the wall without becomings. [*Tape interrupted*] [30:08]

… He throws himself into a kind of becoming masochist. And this is what happens. He bounces off the wall and falls into a black hole, which is the lesbian couple whose slave he becomes, and from then on he speaks only in barks: *woof woof, bow wow*... It's the end of *Sexus* and the beginning of *Nexus* that are expressed through Miller's barking. When he doesn't manage to break through the wall, rather than becoming-animal, he becomes a little dog. So, what's going on here? It's all very ambiguous. Because *bow wow wow*… becoming a little dog is also a becoming-animal of sorts... We no longer understand anything... But it's better this way, everything is mixed up. [*Pause*] Yes… [*Tape interrupted*] [31:05]

Georges Comtesse: Concerning marital conjugality in the 12th century, which was extremely strong, with its virility and all the phallocratic power of past epochs towards, let's say the "forced" bride… There was all this. And the lady constituted herself as a lady with this demand for love, making conjugality collapse by demanding a courtly lover. But also, the reverse happens because at the same time as she makes conjugality collapse, while not recomposing it, she nonetheless confirms another conjugality from which, it seems to me, we haven't yet managed to free ourselves and which might have a role in what you were saying when you spoke about falling asleep… which is perhaps a kind of awakening after all.

What I want to say by this is that, in order to constitute herself as the lady that demands love and imposes upon the Knight, the lover, a virginal surface of voluptuousness, that of whiteness for example – Blanchefleur, who might fascinate an obsessive like Bresson - whatever you like... The lady, the so-called subjugated woman, is above all fascinated by her rebellion which at the time could only be on the sly... she's completely fascinated - and anyone who has studied courtly love understands this – by a certain type of conjugality which perhaps still exists, the conjugality of male brotherhood. Male brotherhood, the couple formed by two men linked by a male friendship or love: this is what fascinates the courtly lady and provokes her becoming-lady or her attempts to recompose, or remake conjugality, by removing one of the partners of that couple to her own benefit… [*Tape interrupted*] [33:26]

Deleuze: … Regarding the specific question of blood brotherhood and courtly love, that was the only moment when your own intervention became a bit sly, because you were invoking scholarly authority, and doing that is always a bit maladroit… because at that moment everyone senses that what you're saying isn't completely true. You said that all the specialists of courtly love know it, and this isn't the case. They have animated discussions on the rapport between different customs of blood brotherhood. But we can't take for granted what you were saying in that regard, even if the rest was very stimulating and fruitful, and we should add it to our reflections.

But I interrupted Félix for a moment [*This reference is probably to early in the session, in the previous segment of ATP I.3, unless some omission occurred in editing the current session*] and,

before he begins to speak again, I just wanted to quickly read -- and I'll read this again later so you can think about it for next week – a short passage by Henry Miller, which is very apt since it contains certain words... I admit I've sometimes cheated a bit with citations but this time all the words are there, I don't need to add any. I also checked the English version, which is almost identical. [*Deleuze reads here from Miller's* Tropic of Capricorn *(New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 239*] He's speaking about his relationship with a woman he loved, and he says:

"She was never a being, such as might finally be caught in repose, but the mechanism itself" – that is, she was the mechanism itself -- "relentlessly operating the myriad mirrors which would reflect the myth she had created. She had no poise whatsoever; she was eternally poised above her multiple identities in the vacuum of the self... In the dark, locked away in the black hole with no world looking on…" Here he's trying to describe the black hole of love-passion, and he asks himself how he's going to get out, without becoming the dog who goes *bow wow*.

"In the dark, locked away in the black hole with no world looking on, no adversary, no rivals, the blinding dynamism of the will slowed down a bit, gave her a molten copperish glow…" -- the floating of the face -- "gave her a molten copperish glow, the words coming out of her mouth like lava, her flesh clutching ravenously for a hold, a perch on something solid and substantial, something in which to reintegrate and repose for a few moments. It was like a frantic long-distance message, an S.O.S. from a sinking ship."

And here we get to the essential: "At first I mistook it for passion, for the ecstasy produced by flesh rubbing against flesh…" -- Hence, love-passion, thrown into the element of passion -- "At first, I mistook it for passion, for the ecstasy produced by flesh rubbing against flesh. I thought I had found a living volcano, a female Vesuvius…" -- and I don't think there's anything phallocratic in the following phrase -- "I never thought of a human ship going down in an ocean of despair, in a Sargasso of impotence. Now..." -- he says of this woman that he loved -- "Now I think of that black star" -- black star, black hole -- "gleaming through the hole in the ceiling, that fixed star which hung above our conjugal cell, more fixed, more remote than the Absolute, and I know it was her, emptied of all that was properly herself: a dead black sun without aspect."

That's beautiful. It really is the path of love-passion into the black hole that it traces, passing by way of faciality. I wish I had written that. It's beautiful. So anyway, I interrupted Félix...

Guattari: I would like to sketch out... to take up again one aspect of the problem, because I think that if it might seem like nit-picking at the moment, maybe later this will become more significant, this oscillation that you were speaking of, between the two and the three which, by the way, forms part of the dimensions of structuralist ways of thinking. The question is... wait, let me finish, otherwise we'll never get anywhere.

Comtesse: I meant in the sense of an entanglement, not a progression...

Guattari: Listen to me… [*Tape interrupted*] [39 :12]

Guattari: The deterritorializing movement provoked by the semiotic collapse that brings one to latch onto not merely the face, but even just a hole in the face, can happen because the

coordinates, the "natural", ancestral territorial references have collapsed. So, the decoded lines of society, desire's lines of flight, throw themselves at the available hooks and holds. They race towards the abyss, towards nothing. We have to reconstitute artificial points of reterritorialization, which will be faces, couple relations, identities, roles, functions, nationalities, you name it.

This fabrication of subjectivation isn't merely a disaster, a race towards the void that we could define in Goethe's words as a function of the *demonic* in which different numbers follow a regressive path. It's not merely a Romantic-style catastrophe. It is, at the same time, a positive function of the construction of a certain type of society - whether capitalist, socialist, bureaucratic, whatever... It's the condition for setting in motion an operation of juncture, work, fusion between semiotic systems, systems of production and social systems, which may also have a diagrammatic function different from the post-signifying regime Gilles was speaking about.

To be able to pass to these sign machines, which will function in science, production, social organization, through the worst despotism ever seen within territorialized systems, there must first be an operation of *tabula rasa*, blank page, a sweeping of the beach, the crushing of all previous semiotic features, all the old territorialized semiotic components. And once we've attained this kind of collapse, like the crumbling of... I don't know, like a kind of semiotic atom bomb or else cosmic black holes that lose all their normal coordinates... what is it that happens?

In the background of this beach-sweeping operation, there will be a system of overcoding, a system of seizing power over all the old semiotic components and materials of expression. That is to say, all the old forms of organization will be swallowed up by a particular new system of semiotic power grab, which will be the instrument of all other power grabs corresponding to capitalist formations – and these will no longer function through a more or less rhizomatic co-existence of systems of semiotization (through body, space, tattoos, word, ritual, dance and so on) but through the overcoding of *quanta of information*.

These *quanta* organize, subsuming within a single formula or machine, the different quantities of formalisms that are prefabricated everywhere else - unlike all other types of organization that bring into play systems of signs which maintain openings: that is to say, *quanta of possibility*. In the quanta of information, the only possibilities available are always pre-formatted. In diagrammatic systems – that is, when we break with this flattening of all the different semiotics on a single plane: the signifier - there are *quanta of possibility* that consist in passing from one stratum of coding to another. For example, we can pass from the world of the orchid to that of the wasp, from the world of energetic strata to that of semiotic strata, from one functioning of desire to another, without all of this being pre-programmed and ordered by the system… [*Tape interrupted*] [43:42]

Deleuze: Kleist never ceases making programs, his programs are very peculiar. He calls them programs but we're not sure that's what they are… [*Tape interrupted*] [43:58]

Deleuze: As workers say and feel, they are sick and tired of clocking in at 8 o'clock, 8:30 in the morning and so on… [*Deleuze turns toward a student*] And what were you saying about this preprogrammed life? Are you saying programs don't exist, that they don't work?

A student: They work, the workers have mistresses, or even others…

Deleuze: But having mistresses can be programmed, conjugality with a mistress can be programmed…

The student: Then they'll do something else, that's it! That's it! There's a possible opening...

Deleuze: But of course! What do you think we're saying? Of course, there is a possible opening...

Guattari: The workers might have mistresses, but…

The student: But even if there is an opening, they immediately fall into [*unclear word*], they fall into [*unclear word*], they fall again into dialectics.

Deleuze: They do what?

The student: They fall into dialectics.

Deleuze: Why?... [*End of the recording*] [44:53]

ATP I, session 6

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 5 - Faciality, White Screen, Three Theorems of Deterritorialization**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcription, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

There's an article by Lewin... You can find it in this issue of *Nouvelle revue de psychoanalyse*, just after the Isakower text. [*See* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 169 and p. 532 note 4; the reference is Bertram D. Lewin, "Le sommeil, la bouche et l'écran du rêve",* Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse*, 5 (Spring 1972) pp. 211-224, and Otto Isakower, "Contribution a la psychopathologie des phenomenes associes a I'endormissement, » ibid., pp. 197-210)*] In this article, Lewin discovers a *white screen of the dream*. We could also call it a *white wall of the dream*. The white screen of the dream, that one normally doesn't see... Why not? According to Lewin, we don't see the white screen of the dream because it is usually covered by the dream's visual contents. And seeing as how Lewin is nonetheless a Freudian, just as one might predict, the dream's visual contents express the desires – but it's the white screen of desire - that come to trouble sleep. However, for Lewin this white screen expresses something else, not the desires that trouble sleep but the desire to sleep. This is obviously why we don't see it. There's only one case where we see it: when the dream lacks visual content, that is when the dream is for the most part, or else entirely, made up of vague *proprioceptive* sensations. You see how he's trying to catch up with Isakower. The white screen of dream appears to the dreamer only when the dream is without visual content, when its only contents are those of a proprioceptive nature – manual, cutaneous and so on, as Isakower defines them.

Spitz adds the white screen. The white wall. He too being a Freudian, and always adding something to Isakower while preserving his theory, Spitz wonders what the white screen is. And he says that the white screen is again the mommy's breast. The white wall, the white screen are mommy's breast. It's odd... How can the white screen be mommy's breast? It's not difficult, says Spitz – no, sorry… I meant to say Lewin. Spitz will have something else to say. According to Lewin, it's when the suckling baby experiences the approach of its mother's breast, getting larger and then pressing flat.

Bizarre, wouldn't you say? The mother's breast approaches the baby and, as it does so, it gets larger and flattens. And it loses its volume... I always get this wrong: concave or convex? Convex? I don't know... you work it out! And then it forms a white screen. As you see, Lewin adds two points to Isakower's study: a white screen appears precisely when the dream still lacks visual content. And then this white screen represents the breast that approaches and presses flat… [*Tape interrupted*] [4:10]

… Spitz says that the white screen has a role that Lewin hasn't noticed. It's not at all the breast approaching and flattening out. That's not what it represents. It's the face of the mother, which the child uses as a guide to find the breast. In this way, he manages to combine Isakower's sensation of contact with visual perception from a distance. And like many other pediatricians, he concludes that from very early on, the child uses the mother's face as a guide. But what are the conditions of the face it sees? It sees it from the front, though blurred, a white stain on which some kind of holes are vaguely defined: the holes of the eyes. And this takes on crucial importance with regard to feeding… [*Tape interrupted*] [5:26]

As long as the mouth and eyes are treated as... volumes or cavities, they are not yet... and here we need a new word: *facialized.* In more simple terms I would almost say that they still form part of the body. The facialization of the mouth and nose perhaps imply certain operations that presuppose the white wall, or the white screen, the eyes as black holes. A whole facialization that is not pre-established. So, in saying this, we must also say that there is a facialization of the breast… [*Tape interrupted*] [6:32]

… The third phase of organization of the face might consist in a series of genetic stages. But this doesn't really tell us anything. We have the impression that it isn't like that, it isn't true, that's not the way it happens.

Nor do we wish to see it in terms of phenomenological positions. That's not what happens either. It's not like that. It's not a confrontation of gazes, the gaze of the baby seeking the gaze of the mother. In such an approach, we hear the galloping hooves of spiritualism approaching. That's not it. And the proof of this is that for the baby it functions even when the mother is masked. A mask with two holes. Or else, when the mask has eyes, it tries to pull at them, to tear them off like two little balls.

So, we won't bother with phenomenological positions. We're tired of all that. And, naturally, there's another approach we also refuse. We absolutely do not want this to be a question of partial-object integration. And yet we feel that there is that danger; it's … ooo, there's danger here; the baby's hand, the mouth, breast, eyes, the white wall to integrate them all. Why don't we want this? Because we're extremely distrustful regarding partial objects. We have the impression that that's not the way our machine functions because what is this business of partial-object integration anyway? Here we see the return of the baby's split-up body that would be integrated little by little and then... this list of objects: hand, breast, mouth, eyes... one could add others to the list. We could make a list of such objects. Fine, we'd prefer not to; no, it's not that we don't want to, but we'd prefer not to do this.

And, as a last point, neither do we wish to have anything to do with a structuring-structural organization. Because even in this case, imagining there is a beginning, if we consider our abstract machine without knowing what it does, knowing only that it works, that the little balls move and there is the white wall and the black hole... then we can say it works, even if we don't know to what purpose. It's a whole different field to that of partial objects or of structuring-structural organizations or of genetic axes and what have you.

So, what might it be for? How can be pose the problem? To gain more clarity, I'll try to give you the answer, otherwise if I pretend to discover it, the whole thing becomes too confusing... Perhaps we can say the following: The body is endowed with movement. It shouldn't be thought of in terms of objects but in terms of its movement. You will tell me I'm not saying anything new. Everyone knows the body moves. But it's not these movements we want to talk about. What interests us are movements of a more secret nature. The body is endowed with *intensive movements*. [*Much of the discussion that follows is developed somewhat differently in plateau 3, "The Geology of Morals", in* A Thousand Plateaus]

What are these intensive movements? Even if we've already often used this formula – for the moment we won't seek to justify it – compared to the animal body, the human body is animated by *movements of deterritorialization*. The human body is a deterritorialized animal body. Remember that wonderful passage in Nietzsche when for the first time the fish leaves the swamp and breathes air… Little by little, it raises itself on its hind feet. The whole story of the human body's arrival at vertical stature is a vast tale of deterritorialization.

Let's look at some examples, let's not think in terms of partial-object integration but rather in terms of composition of relative movements of deterritorialization. I need only go back to my list: the hand. The hand, as is well known, is a paw. It's generally agreed that the hand is a deterritorialized forepaw, literally ripped from the ground. This at least is a fact.

What's more, primary school textbooks distinguish between the so-called *musculoskeletal hand* – that of the monkey swinging from branch to branch - and the *prehensile hand*. And it can be said that the musculoskeletal hand represents a second degree of deterritorialization in relation to the paw, while the prehensile hand represents a third degree of deterritorialization. So, this free hand... at the same time has a correlative. Interesting... We never deterritorialize alone, but we deterritorialize at least in two.

And this, [*Pause, Deleuze writes something on the board*] this means it's important, this matter, it is important for us. We will never treat the hand as a partial-object. That's a butcher's idea, to say that the hand is a partial object. It's pure Frankenstein. Or that the eyes are partial objects. It makes no sense. It's no good, it's for those who chop people up into pieces, the anatomists. They'll have quite a job making the body function through partial-object integration. It's a disgrace. For us the hand isn't a severed hand, it's not a partial object but the support of a movement. Let's try to find a better word. It's the *agent* of a movement of deterritorialization that must literally be qualified, measured, quantified. There are speeds of deterritorialization. I said that one never deterritorializes alone.

So, what does the hand's deterritorialization have as its complement? The tool-object, the use-object. When the hand ceases to be musculoskeletal and becomes prehensile what does it grab hold of? What it seizes, even if it happens to be a breast, is the use-object. The tool. What we will call *machine* is already this. I'm not saying it's the machine in its totality, but it is the assemblage of the two. So that's the first level.

Second level: the mouth. Is it a partial object? Note how I don't yet posit a face, I haven't posited a face. I treat the mouth as a cavity that is part of the animal body, part of what we call the

muzzle or head. But it doesn't belong to a face. It wouldn't be good if I already gave myself a face.

So the mouth... [*Pause, Deleuze points again to the drawing on the board*] here as well, it's not a partial object; it's an agent of deterritorialization. And why, and why is this? Obviously, it's not the same as for the hand. This is why we have to compare all these movements of deterritorialization and constitute a body, not like some idiot partial object integration but – no, I erase this last remark – so not like some partial object integration, as Melanie Klein so elegantly said, but like... – non, I erase that... -- the simultaneous place, the simultaneous agent of a vector and a movement of deterritorialization, with different intensities and velocities. And everything happens at once. There's no primacy in the connections, they all link up with one another.

So why is also the mouth swept up in a movement of deterritorialization? Because – and I hope this is true since I only found it in a text written by a German professor called [Hermann] Klaatch [*See* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 533, note 6*] – who says something quite splendid. He studied to be a vet and he says: Humans, not even hominids, but only humans have lips. What a revelation! Only humans have lips. Even if some humans don't, but this concerns faciality. What does this mean that only humans have lips? He doesn't say much about it but there's one very lyrical passage. I'll read it to you later because it's quite charming, like a little ballet of the face. He speaks so well that you can tell this is someone who knows his subject.

But what does that mean? The lips, which are so important for the human mouth, are the mucous membranes that extrudes. It's rare, it's very singular, a mucous membrane that extrudes. If I'm not wrong, animals don't have lips. Which means that their external skin hardens, I hope. And yet I'm disturbed when I look at a cow because it seems like it has lips, but it surely isn't the case. It's the external skin that hardens. In this sense the cow's head is part of its body. I have the impression that apes... but sadly the professor doesn't speak about this. I don't know but if you look closely at an ape, it seems to have a kind of... hardening of the skin. It's not at all the inversion of the internal mucous membranes.

I implore you… if anyone has an objection, please keep it for yourself. [*Laughter*] It's essential. In any case, we would have to ask a vet: if any of you know one, ask them. But they will only say yes, and if they say no... look hard until you find a vet who says yes. However, it's not that important. Let's suppose that next week someone tells us it's false. It's not important. You have to understand that there are two types of lips, which are completely different. I mean to say, there's a point at which an idea cannot be false. It becomes impossible.

I'll say that the human mouth has lips and that the lips are a deterritorialized mouth. The mucous membranes which form the walls of the bodily cavity, in extruding themselves become deterritorialized. The deterritorialization of the muzzle, the head, I don't know what to call it, through the human mouth, is very different from the deterritorialization of the hand… but that doesn't mean they don't go together. It too has a correlative. But what is it? The same professor teaches us that only humans have a mouth endowed with lips but only women have breasts. Irrefutably so.

What do animals have? They have what are technically referred to as mammary glands. Any vet will make a distinction between mammary glands and breasts. And the difference is the following: the breast is a deterritorialized mammary gland. Because of its vertical stature. But why is this? What is the difference? The technical difference appears to be that the breast is a mammary gland surrounded by adipose and muscular tissue. Therefore, while the mouth with its lips is a deterritorialized muzzle, the breast is a deterritorialized mammary gland. Here I would add something quite significant: already in my two couples, *hand-tool* or *hand-use object* and *mouth-breast*, we can identify a first law of deterritorialization. It's fun to make a series of laws, or theorems of deterritorialization.

Here is the first theorem of deterritorialization: when two organs are deterritorialized in a complementary rapport, one reterritorializes on the other and vice versa. [*This list of theorems differs from the list given in* A Thousand Plateaus *starting on p. 174*] So, a theorem of great clarity. The hand is a paw, the prehensile hand is a deterritorialized paw or a deterritorialized musculoskeletal hand that has become empty, ripped from the earth or the trees. Its correlative is the tool, which at a lower level is a deterritorialized material… [*Tape interrupted*] [24:13]

… Territoriality, deterritorialization and reterritorialization constitute three notions that are not reducible to each other. Reterritorialization is a highly specific operation. Usually, it occurs in the context of what we call artifice or artifact. An artificial tool. The breast... okay, if we don't yet have an artifice in vertical breastfeeding, the baby bottle is in any case an artifact. So, the mouth's reterritorialization on the breast and that of the breast on the mouth constitutes breastfeeding.

And here we have a further deterritorialization. Notice that I remain within the dimensions of the deterritorialized body. Even the mouth I consider a cavity. I said that the mucous membrane extrudes: the mouth still pertains to the body. Third deterritorialization: the face, which here is fully the deterritorialized animal head, following which… I will tell you later. Obviously, it's not the genetic axis, the paw which became a hand, vertical stature, a thousand other things.

The face I will define not through the mouth but precisely through the eyes, the eyes that see. The story of the gaze is valid for animals. It's animals that look. It's the human face that sees without looking. Which is why it's so horrible. It really is a horror story that I'm recounting. The partial object is nothing by comparison. The real horror. The eyes, the face... what do they do? In any case, I am saying, we have a movement of deterritorialization that is perhaps more... much more intense... which doesn't mean it isn't much slower than the others. By being slower it arrives at its goal, at its aim, less quickly. Hence, the illusion of the genetic stages… [*Tape interrupted*] [27:21]

… The second theorem of deterritorialization: faster deterritorializations do not necessarily come first. What's more, faster movements presuppose slower ones… [*Tape interrupted*] [27:44]

… What is the first landscape, after all? As many authors have shown, the first landscape is the steppe. It's there that for the first time the gazeless eyes see. On the steppe. Before, we had to look. Why? The old evolutionists explain it well. The first environment, the real animal *Umwelt* is the forest. Note that in the forest there are no hands, no prehensile... no, sorry, I meant

musculoskeletal hands. The ape swings from one branch to another. Perhaps we have the beginnings of a prehensile hand, but very, very limited. There's no mouth, no face. Nor is there a voice. There's too much noise in the forest to be able to speak. They can't speak. The apes have, to use a nice expression, laryngeal sacs that don't enable them to speak. You need a supple larynx to be able to speak, and in the forest, they don't have that. It's not possible. The supple larynx is a deterritorialized larynx. Everywhere we are traversed by movements of deterritorialization. And I was saying that the steppe is the first landscape. It's the complement of the face. The face reterritorializes on the steppe and the steppe reterritorializes on the face. But what is the steppe? It's a deterritorialized forest.

And here we come to my third theorem of deterritorialization. Up until now we've only considered complementary reterritorializations at the same level. The hand reterritorializes on the tool and the tool on the hand, the mouth on the breast and the breast on the mouth, the face on the landscape and the landscape on the face. But in the other sense, I make a scale, an intensive scale. An intensive scale that I define in function of the relative speed and intensity of the deterritorializing movements that take place at each level. I've already looked at three, one, two, three.

And here I would add that those that take place more slowly are the first to occur. The last to arrive are the first to occur. That's why genetic psychology gets it wrong, as do theories of partial objects. This way, we can get rid of them all in one fell swoop. Good. And, in this case, all this happens from lowest to highest, from fastest to slowest. A reterritorialization of the faster movements on the slower… [*Tape interrupted*]
I'm almost done with this... and now at least we have the solution to our second set of notions. Sorry if I spoke at such length... I will stop before the third -- what time is it now? -- so as to let you speak a bit. We have a solution, or at least the confirmation of a solution: this business of power apparatuses.

If I go from one to two to three, I can say that the third – face-landscape – is at the same time the slowest movement and yet the most intensive, and therefore the most deterritorialized. That of the hand is the fastest. It is already a deterritorialization with a complementary reterritorialization. And it is the least deterritorialized. Reterritorialization occurs from the least to the most deterritorialized. And that's what the artifice is. So, third theorem: we call artifice a reterritorialization of the least deterritorialized on the most deterritorialized.

So then, [*Deleuze laughs*] everything works out fine! No, I'll stop there, you're fed up with all this. [*He continues laughing, pause, he turns toward the drawing on the board*] So, yes, everything works out fine. We shouldn't be surprised that certain power apparatuses need both face and landscape. It's the same forces that establish faces and make environments. So, are these the same forces that need to keep us attached to a white wall or to plunge us into a black hole? Without doubt.

So, these power apparatuses would need both the abstract machine of faciality - white wall-black hole - and the concrete movements of deterritorialization, that is: the most deterritorialized on which everything artificially reterritorializes - just as we said at the beginning when we began this study of the face - will overcode that which has lost its code.

And what is it that has lost its code? Everything that pertained to territoriality, that is to say the animal body or human corporeality which has never ceased to deterritorialize, more and more, and to reterritorialize by artifice and which, having lost the codes of corporeality, must be overcoded, thus so many that we have lost corporeality with maintenance of territorialities, even if these territorialities are of a nomad type – what we call "primitives"… nomadic, semi nomadic or sedentary peoples -- there is absolutely no need for faciality, nor for power apparatuses that produce face, nor for their abstract machines. These peoples have their own, but not of that type. They have other abstract machines: abstract machines of dance, abstract machines of gesture…
[*End of the recording*] [36:28]

ATP I, session 7

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 6 - Rhizomes, Assemblages of Power and Territorialized Assemblages of Enunciation**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; revisions and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

[*From the tenor of Deleuze's opening remarks, in the first two minutes, as well as from his clothing and from the drawing that dominates the blackboard – the fourth, four-cornered drawing reproduced in* A Thousand Plateaus *(p. 183) --, this session's start is in all likelihood the end of another session for which we lack what precedes, marked distinctly from the session that opens after the first session interruption at time mark 2:19*]

Deleuze: I can say that since we began, everything we have done up to this point, from the start, is to consider three topics. The first of these was the *rhizome* in opposition to the tree. The second topic was to investigate or sketch out a sort of *theory of redundancy*. Thirdly, we looked at a particular problem: the problem of *faciality*. Do I think there is something that links all of this? In a way, they relate to the same thing but in a kind of magma because, behind the screen, behind the wall, or outside of the black hole, when the different lines enter into new relationships... landscapity... that is… when faces come undone to the benefit of their traits, when landscapes are unmade and no longer hold in place their traits of landscapity, everything enters into new relationships. That's when the *rhizome* begins. Black holes are like knots of arborescence.

Everything we've said up to now is connected. This is obvious, since we've seen how necessary the face is in building redundancies – whether redundancies of resonance or redundancies of frequency. I would say that the redundancies of frequency were the first figure of the face. If you multiply the black holes on the white surface... Redundancies of resonance constitute the second figure. Faces flow towards the black hole, that is, all faces will come to resonate in a single black hole. So, there you have it. Next time we'll look at a different topic… [*Tape interrupted; here ends the summary of the five preceding sessions, quite possibly in a sixth session for which the recording is missing*] [2:19]

[*Here begins the next session, February 3, 1976*] … [We'll continue], if you bear with me, focussing on two essential points. Firstly, the face-power assemblage, because in this rapport there's something we still have to consider, something I still can't figure out. Why do power

assemblages need faciality? The second topic, if we don't have time, I would like some of you more qualified than me to speak about it next time… is the question of the close-up… the question of the close up in the history of cinema and the role of both the face and the close-up in cinema. What worries me... do you really want to say something?

A student (near Deleuze): No, no…

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

A third student: A question, may I? I'd like to ask a question.

The second student: [*Inaudible*]

The third student: The next time, I want to talk about the French language!

Another student: Ah, we know all about that.

The third student: No, no, no, no, no. Will you let me have just one minute?

The other student: Just one minute?

The third student: Yes, yes… [*Comments lost in the general noise*]

Deleuze: Will you stop bickering all the time? It's exhausting!

Another student: I'm not asking a question. I want to tell a story if you let me…

Another student: So, let's hear your story then.

The first student: Thank you! Are there others who want me to tell it? [*Deleuze is heard laughing; pause and relative silence of students*]

Deleuze: Yes, there's… I don't know, there's a problem that worries me... It's the story -- I also have a story -- the assemblages of power, you recall, we began with a very simple idea. On the white wall of the signifier, the signifier inscribes its characters, which are not information but orders. "You will do this!" and it's at this point that the face intervenes. The face intervenes because it guides us in what linguists famously call binary choices. These binary choices are for example: What did I hear? Did I hear "old *billiard*" or "old *pillager*"? What was it? What did I hear? [*On this example, see Michel Foucault,* Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, trans. Charles Ruas, (New York: Continuum, 2004, 15). Deleuze adopts his example from Roussel frequently, notably in Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles J. Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (1969; New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 38-39; new ed. (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 41. See also sessions 14, 15 and 16 in the Cinema seminar 4 (March 5, 12 and 19, 1985), and session 7 in the current seminar (December 12, 1985)*]

And if the face makes redundancy with the redundancies of language, it's because I let the face guide me. What does it mean when traits of faciality escape the face? For example, all at once a teacher who appeared serious and had the trust of the headmistress starts acting crazy. Or, and this is stated by a famous name [*The phrase cited next is one that Deleuze attributed to Kierkegaard,* Traité du désespoir, *although according to Ronald Bogue, the phrase is not found in the Kierkegaard text; see Bogue, "The Art of the Possible,"* Revue internationale de philosophie, *24.3 (2007), p. 278*], a respectable man sitting at the dinner table with his wife and children suddenly blows it, undoes his collar and screams: "The possible or I shall suffocate!" The children fix their black holes on daddy while the mother says: "The possible or I shall suffocate? What?" And we look at his face and we see that he no longer has one. The traits of faciality have freed themselves from the face's domination.

Facial tics are very moving. A tic, a tic… it's a kind of gentle effort, an effort that enables traits of faciality to subtract themselves from the imperialism of the face. A tic arrives out of the blue but is, at the same time, always controlled. That's what characterizes a tic, otherwise it wouldn't be a tic. It's always controlled by the face that recomposes itself. There are some admirable tics. Specialists of tics give them a bad rap. But it's good to have tics… though not too many. And then… there's no time to go into it more.

So, we were saying that there are traits of faciality, that the face guides us in binary choices, as linguists call them. This is very useful for power since binary choices are actually orders. To make a mistake in a binary choice, to mistake a v for a p, what does this mean? It means being a bad pupil... and why? Mistaking a v for a p, or 100 for 10, none of this is information, it's the transmission of orders - both at a social level and at that of the most obvious power assemblages.

So, the question I can't manage to figure out is: we would have a more flexible and precise hinge between power assemblages and faciality if we managed to show how and why the face has a fundamental rapport with binary choices: that is to say, how and why the face instigates dichotomies in every direction. You are a man or you're a woman, you're rich or you're poor. Look at your face! You're a woman. Why do you dress like a man? But you're poor, look at you! And you expect to have the right to come in here. Here… a poor guy like you. Rich, poor, boy, girl. You'll tell me that it's not just a question of the face. But yes! In certain power assemblages, in certain semiotics, it's the face that will function, it's the face that will be in charge of enunciating and assigning places. As though the face instigated dichotomies that are actual knots of arborescence. The face is a tree, the black hole is a tree, the wall is a tree. That's it.

But in what way does the face create dichotomies? I don't know... Guattari has understood this better than me, he's gone farther on this point, and that pisses me off because there's something I don't fully understand, there's something that escapes me. I completely understand binary choices, for example in language, and the role of the face with respect to the binary choices of language, and I know there wouldn't even be language if a machine of faciality didn't connect to the axis of signifiance. But here there's something that escapes me, I don't get it… In what way does the face dichotomize everything? And why does it do so? It's not enough to say: "Because we have two eyes, two nostrils." Please tell us… I can't figure it out, I'm blocked.

Guattari: I don't know whether this is the right context...

Deleuze: So, forget about it. Let's speak about something else. We can discuss this next time…

Guattari: I'm sorry… I've got a bit of a cold. I just want to say a couple of things for the moment. The question is to know how, in its most general form, a machine of faciality contributes to establishing what I call capitalist flows, what in *Anti-Oedipus* we called *decoded flows*. Decoded flows, because they can exist outside of "capitalist" societies, while also menacing primitive societies. I wasn't planning to intervene during your presentation. It's a bit annoying because I'm introducing some ideas that we've not already discussed together. I need to explain them to myself before I can explain them to others.

Anyway, in what I would call *territorialized assemblages of enunciation* -- for example, "primitive" societies, or a group of children and so on – faciality doesn't have the same function. It doesn't function as a reference of a place, as Gilles said, around which the point of arborescence of the ensemble of coordinates, or of the world, is organized. In societies typified by capitalist flows the face is a bit like… as they tell you at primary school, the support polygon with its centre of gravity. The face is a kind of polygon of all the coordinates, with a centre of gravity in the form of a black hole around which everything is organized.

This support polygon of general coordinates in a territorialized assemblage of enunciation is the territory itself. The territories and the most territorialized semiotics had to be deterritorialized in order to produce a face and a landscape, to constitute a *facialization* and a *landscapification*, as Gilles said last time - these are the result of this operation of deterritorialization. And this is accompanied by a general semiotic collapse. Meaning that all the semiotic components – gestural, ritual, corporeal, whatever you can imagine - no longer operate on their own account but must always refer to the point of arborescence.

In primitive societies too, people referred to a point of arborescence. However, this wasn't centred on the face but on the territory. So, there was a translatability, a redundancy, a comprehension of all these components in relation to a territory, whether it be through a tree, a ritual, a sorcerer or whatever... What was outside the territory was considered an outland, a non-world, something that implied a negotiation and an exit from the territory. With the advent of the faciality machine, we will no longer have a rupture marking "our" world, "our" territory – where corporeal traits are inscribed among the other elements – for example Native Americans who paint their faces form part of a landscape ensemble. It is neither face nor landscape, but part of the ensemble of the territory. Here, we have a double operation. On one hand you have a concentration of the elements of signifying redundancy on the face around the black holes of the eyes. On the other, you have a universalization of the ensemble of territories. Hence, it is presumed that nothing escapes comprehension through the face. A face is always the centre of signifying coordinates. And, what's more, the territory is vast. We tend to say: it's France, the world, white people, civilized people, normal people, men and so on. It's clear that all this constitutes a fascistic conception of universality. The signifying coordinates impose a very specific type of world.

Here I'm speaking quite generally. How do we get to the problem Gilles has posed? If I manage to get there... it's that when you look at a face... We introduced the idea of a four-eyed machine.

The four-eyed machine consists in looking not at the eyes but at a point determined by the symmetry of the eyes. If you give me a moment, I'd like to tell you a dream I had so you can understand me better. One day, I dreamt about a woman who was looking at me. It was in a crowded space. Suddenly, I was captured by what I would say was her gaze - not her eyes. Then, I noticed that the way this woman was looking at me was quite bizarre. I was completely fascinated. And, suddenly, there was a flash. A very strange thing... a third eye appeared, very big, in the middle of her forehead that centered the two eyes. We can say that the black hole is not an eye in particular but rather the operation of symmetrization of all values, which permits there to be a central point for the organization of the coordinates.

To return, if you will, to the system of alternatives, a face functions like a kind of oscillograph establishing what is allowed and what is forbidden. There are always standard deviations around which a face oscillates. You can smile but not too much because if it turns into a grimace, you must be mad, delinquent, stoned or whatever. The ensemble of corporeal attitudes themselves, other semiotics continues to exist. We're not saying there is just the face. But these are captured by the arborescence of the face. They're recorded on a central computer, on the central oscillograph, which tells us what they're supposed to mean.

Deleuze: Actually, clothes are a facialization of the body…

Guattari: Like make-up and what have you... Starting from this point, we are in a better position to understand the operation of binary either/or systems. In territorialized assemblages of enunciation, what I will call "the possible" -- what it's possible to do, possible to say, in whatever register, marriage, ritual, play etc. -- is framed, organized according to a territory. If one leaves this territory, if something foreign appears, it requires a whole semiotic effort, a process of semiotization to be able to interpret and reframe this within the frame of the possible. If you leave your territory, there's a whole series of steps you have to take because you're entering a world in which the possible is no longer framed. For example, a cow dying is a strange event that we will try to frame within the possible – had it become rabid and in what conditions, whether this was caused by a certain act -- then we reintroduce the event of the death of the cow within the new frame of the possible.

In the other figure of the individuation of enunciation, or the power of faciality, the whole of the possible is already framed, nothing can escape the double articulation, or the signifying rupture - to employ an old expression we're not too fond of – that the face performs. In fact, in a primitive society, we have the feeling that what occurs in terms of inscription upon the face takes place upon the territory. Outside, are the others. But in these others, there is space for a whole possible world to open up. Nowadays when a white person looks at a black person, or an Algerian, they don't situate them in another territoriality but in a racist movement as a "non-other". Fascist or racist universality wants all people to be adult, white, normal, heterosexual, phallocratic and so on. And you see this immediately, you see it on the face, you see it from whether he got it, was he crazy, etc.

So, the aggregate of the possible – he has a strange face, a weird complexion, he's a suspicious guy… -- is attributed and centrally coded on the machine of facialization. At the same time, [*Pause*] the machine where there were not yet faces and landscapes, where there were

territorialized rhizomes within territorialized assemblages, had only a local ambition and left a great degree of liberty to the other components of expression. With the machine of faciality, all components of expression become unified and depend upon a single expressive substance. So no matter what comes up can be seized and divided by this machine of faciality. Nothing can escape the universal white power of the normal face.

Now what is this dichotomizing operation that takes place for example in informatics, when a message is decomposed into "bits" of information? It's the fact that we can take the whole message and cut it a first time, so as to obtain a first division of bits, then a second time, obtaining a further division and so on. This will give us the formula of the quantity of bits corresponding to the number of divisions performed in the message. Thus, the ensemble of what arises can, on one hand, be unified, flattened on the white wall, while on the other, it can be divided up.

What accounts for the power of this division? What is it that permits anything to be divided up in this way whatsoever? If I pronounce judgement on the face of someone who belongs to my tribe, it's possible since they are part of my framing of the possible. But a primitive tribesman would never say that the other's is a "foreign" face. It's not even a face for him. It might be an animal, an intensity, or something else. It's not his business.

The principle of faciality on the other hand always gives one the possibility of dividing any enunciation or anything that presents itself. It's like the TV news. No matter what happens, even if it's the most extraordinary event, the presenter will always be able to say, and will always say: "But none of this is surprising to us... We knew it was going to happen". If the Martians landed tomorrow, "oh yes, that's not at all surprising", because there is always the possibility of reframing it within the signifying message's capture.

Therefore, the fact that a face is always interposed, and that it's always able to divide and give a vertical and horizontal axis, a weight to enunciations, means that we see the world, we see the enunciations only in relation to this position of the face. The face can insert itself everywhere. And this is what allows this operation of potential dichotomization - not to mention the fact that all possibles are continually at the mercy of this system of divisions and there is no space for a rhizomatic "possible." The possible is always subjected to a potential law of arborescence.

A rhizomatic possibility existed in its territorialized form within territorialized assemblages of enunciation. A machinic, rhizomatic possible will appear when the face is undone. And at that point the divisions performed by faciality will refer to something very different from territories, which is to say machinic assemblages. Or, as Gilles was saying, there will be an end of the face, a becoming-imperceptible, where there will be a dissolution of both landscapes and faces. Because the face always implies a nationalism, a regionalism, a familialism, a space of redundancy, and where faces and landscapes will plug into a series of intensities that will no longer be reterritorialized but this time, caught up in machinic connections. I don't know if this is clear…

Deleuze: It works! [*Deleuze smiles at Guattari*] It works! [*Deleuze breaks out laughing*] … [*Tape interrupted*] [23:47]

Eric: I'm thinking about something…

Deleuze: I remind you that for two years you mistook me for Derrida. [*Laughter*]

Eric: Now I'll send it back to you! I'm for the forbidden garden! [*Unclear words*] I don't know ...

Deleuze: You're always addressing someone else!

Eric: I'm calling to you from far off...

Another student: I'm on a mountain. I'm very cold…

Eric: Oh yeh? Then you're in the wrong spot! [*Laughter*] Wait, in fact, you are very kind! Fine, I'm saying, your story about the face is a marvellous invention. But I'm not doing that... I want to raise a question regarding the film camera. It's the Marxist question. It's only matter, it's movement, it's the death-drive. So, what is the death-drive? It's your famous holes and I'm really upset! Here nobody says anything about castration and that's what I want to talk about. The borderlines, you understand? That's where the main point lies. And I'll speak in French... I would really like to speak French, but I can't manage it. The French language is in a triangle. It produces Oedipus. It's not for nothing that Lacan exists, right? Fine… [*Tape interrupted*] [24:55]

Another student: Can I tell my story now? [*Brouhaha des voix*] … I've got the priority.

Eric: You think you can give information like that. You have to shout it out!

The student: Then I'll shout it out, for fuck's sake!

Eric: You have to fight!

An Iranian student: Iranian students, in protest at the Shah's latest crime – the execution of 19 revolutionary militants in Iran in the last few days, and last night there were others – have occupied the seat of the Iranian Government's press agency in Paris. Following the occupation, the students were just about to leave the premises when the police burst in and arrested around twenty of our comrades. Giscard's government has signed trade agreements with the Shah's regime. Three billion francs worth last year alone. Farah Diba, the Shah's wife, at the moment of the executions... Moreover,

Deleuze: Sorry, can I interrupt you a minute. We began our seminar exactly on this point. There is conflicting information… Some of us wish to be present at the trial, which begins in a short while. I was told it will take place at 1.30 pm in Courtroom 23. Is that right, 1.30, Room 23? Is it at 1.00 or 1.30?

A student: All the trials start at 1, but that doesn't mean we'll manage to get in.

Deleuze: Yes, but we have to be there on time so we can at least try to get in. We have to go at 1 o'clock, it's very important. We have to hurry.

The Iranian student: Can I continue reading now?

Deleuze: Yes, of course.

[*The Iranian student continues reading, sound inaudible*] ... all the fascists.... And the revolutionaries are defending the military from the regime.

Another student: We can't defend the *military*!

The Iranian student: I mean, defending Iranian *militants* against the Shah's regime and his accomplices, the Giscard government. The militants will appear today, February 3, after being arraigned on January 28, before the Paris Correctional Court. Last piece of news: following a hunger strike, our comrades asked that the prison authorities feed them, and the prison guards responded by systematic sabotage, a regime of pyjamas only in cold cells. We ask for your active support in the liberation of our student comrades from the French authorities. So, there are also some final details: according to the law, they risk from one to five years of prison or direct deportation to Iran - which means certain death as soon as they arrive. So your support is of the utmost importance in this trial.

Deleuze: Besides what they've already suffered at the hands of the French police before detention.

The Iranian student: People are asking if there's going to be a meeting.

Deleuze: There's a meeting at six here in Vincennes. But it's very important that anyone who wants to go to the trial goes, even if they don't manage to actually enter the room, so that at least there will be a lot of people around the room at the Palais de Justice.

So, I'll see you all next Tuesday. But if I understand properly, nobody knows whether there's going to be a holiday or not…

A student: We'll find out tomorrow.

Deleuze: We'll find out tomorrow?

A student: There's a general assembly tomorrow.

Another student: Apparently there's a philosophy meeting.

Deleuze: The holidays are from the 9th to the 15th aren't they?

A woman student: We're not sure yet… [*Various voices*] … [*End of the session*] [29:15]

ATP I, session 8

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 7 - The Close-up in Cinema, The Conditions of Study, Two Forms of Delirium**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions. We should also note that according to Deleuze at the start, the topic of the previous discussion, the close-up, needs to be reviewed and revised; however, as Deleuze mentions below, the discussion occurred between him and several students after the session, hence we have no access to the details*]

[29:16, start; 2:23:06, end of YouTube recording, total length, 1:53:50; see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1Po2tIgeD4]

Deleuze: We've now begun a fourth grouping of research. But we're going to suspend it for the moment, though not for long, not for the entire lesson... I'd like to suspend it because something didn't work last time, so we need to do a collective auto-critique - personal auto-critique is a bad idea but collective auto-critique can be useful. We all agreed that it was just about time to close the chapter of faciality, that we had spoken enough about the matter. But perhaps we should be able to get something more out of the close-up in cinema.

And then I had the feeling - that I imagine many of you shared - that while many interesting things were said, we had failed to get anywhere. Something wasn't right. And it was just as well to go on because things might have become clear all of a sudden, though it was by no means certain... I'm sure I'm not the only one but I had the feeling that something wasn't working. And I asked myself why that was. How come we didn't manage to get anything out of the close-up? Seeing as how that was the case... even if we were well placed... what I mean to say is that what we have to be wary of, always and in every field, are specialists.

Specialists are a really horrible thing, because they know so much, they know too much, and they're so caught up in problems already coded in function of their speciality that, if you pose a question to a specialist, you'll discover to your astonishment that there's absolutely no chance of them giving you an answer. We could have asked someone from the cinema department, or else a critic. But in my view, it was better to avoid doing so. However, we were well placed to do something, whatever that might have been.

So why didn't it work last time? I think that it's because, even if it was interesting, what many of us said was linked to some kind of reminiscence: "Ah, I remember, I remember…" - and in a certain sense those memories weren't completely out of place - "I remember there was a close-

up..." It's interesting, because I said to myself afterwards, our method - or the method that you accept or pretend to accept, me too - this *rhizome method* could have as its motto: "I hate memories. Nothing good comes of memories. Memories are actually a knot of arborescence." But at the same time, how can we speak about the close-up without referring to specific films, which is to say filmic memories?

Nonetheless, I think that we failed somehow, because we got stuck in an exchange of memories, like old fools. So, we weren't being specialists - which was a good thing - but we replaced specialism with a conversation of the type: "Ah yes, that film..." At the same time, of course, we have to cite particular films if we want to talk about the close-up.

I don't know... I would just like to ask you for the next half hour, before going back to our new research topic on the two types of delirium, to forget what wasn't working. Although at the same time I found everything you said quite interesting. But as I said, something didn't work. In exchange, I would like it if somebody, maybe in a week or a fortnight's time, told me that I got it completely wrong… I'll just say, on behalf of us all, that we screwed up a bit, not much, nothing serious. We could very well say that, even if the situation were different, we would have screwed up anyway, or that maybe our ideas will be clearer next year. Anyway, let's try something.

What I propose we do is almost... I have some topics... but I'm not at all sure... and then I would like you to react and propose things yourselves. And then we'll stop there. And if things don't work out again, it's no big deal, we can just say that maybe this year it's too soon to speak about the close-up.

We just need a few basic notions of cinema so as not make any howling errors. It's not my case, of course. But perhaps there are some here who don't know anything. And we just need a few memories, just enough to say: "Ah yes in that film, there was something of that nature." You could go and rewatch it. Yes, but in any case... So here is my first proposal. And sorry if I seem... no forget it, I don't need to apologize.

First proposal: as a theorem, a general proposition regarding the close-up as I found it... because I was so unhappy... though I liked some things that were said… I wasn't happy with the way we failed to really get anywhere. So I did some research. And I'm sure that you know this great director, who boasted about having literally created Marlene Dietrich from nothing, and perhaps worse than nothing - and it's with great bitterness that he says that – this director called Josef Von Sternberg. Josef Von Sternberg published a memoir, which is translated in French as *Souvenirs d'un montreur d'ombres* (*Fun in a Chinese Laundry*) with Laffont. [*Pause*] [*Deleuze returns to von Sternberg's cinema in Cinema seminar 1, notably sessions 8, 9 and 15, winter/spring 1982; he refers to this Sternberg text in* Cinema I: The Movement-Image, *p. 231, note 10*]

And here we are, in this book, I found a lovely passage that seems to me perfect for our purposes. Because considering where we are, and all that we have said so far about the face, this text completely confirms our theory of the machine of faciality to the point that we could say: "We can take it as our general proposition regarding the close-up."

And I quote, it's page 342-343... "The camera has been used to explore the human figure and to concentrate upon its face as being its most precious essence." This works for us, there's no need to comment on it. We have tried to say the same thing using other terms. We wouldn't have said "its most precious essence" but that's okay.

"Monstrously enlarged as it is on the screen, the human face should be treated like a landscape." It's getting better and better! So, for Sternberg, the close-up contains not only what appeared to us to be a fundamental correlation – the correlation face-landscape - without which there wouldn't be a close-up, exactly in the sense that we developed it previously. But also, the close-up consists in the very treatment of the face as a landscape. If you want to treat a face like a landscape – Sternberg seems to be saying here - you can only do it by using the close-up in cinema.

"... the human face should be treated like a landscape, as if the eyes were lakes, the nose a hill, the cheeks broad meadows, the mouth a flower patch" -- he's obviously thinking about Marlene -- "the forehead sky, and the hair clouds. Values must be altered as in an actual landscape by investing it with lights and shadows, controlled with gauze and graded filters and by domination of all that surrounds the face. Just as I spray trees with aluminum to give life to the absorbent green, just as the sky is filtered to graduate its glare, just as the camera is pointed to catch a reflection on the surface of a lake, even so the face and its framing values must be viewed objectively as if it were an inanimate surface. The skin should reflect and not blot the lights, and light must be used to caress, not flatten and wipe out that which it strikes."

"The skin should reflect..." So what Sternberg is telling us is that the close-up's function is to treat the face like a landscape in conditions in which the surface of the face reflects the light. So, there we have the first major characteristic of the close-up. There are already so many observations we could make at this point, but let's stifle them for the moment and try to put things in order.

He continues and here the text gets a bit bizarre: "If it is impossible to otherwise improve the quality of the face..." -- here he's speaking about the second aspect of the close-up, as a kind of alternative – if it's impossible to do what he was talking about before, that is to say, transform the face into a landscape that is able to reflect the light, we see that he has a preference: he prefers the first aspect, but says that there is a second aspect, and I don't see why other filmmakers might not prefer this... He says that if you can't manage to attain the first solution, there are other approaches you can take... -- Is there a dog here? I heard a dog? First of all, I hate dogs and secondly, I'm afraid of them. Is there really a dog? At least it's better than a cat, that's all I can say... --

"If it is impossible to otherwise improve the quality of the face, deep shadows must add intelligence to the eyes, and should that not be enough then it is best to shroud the countenance in merciful darkness and have it take its place as an active pattern in the photographic scale. Before I allow light to strike a face, I light its background to fill the frame with light values, for included in its photographic impact is everything that is visible in the same frame. This principle of containing all values within a frame of values applies also to the human body and its movement through space is to be as a dramatic encounter with light. But whether face, body, a

letter, a toy balloon or street, the problem is always the same: lifeless surfaces must be made responsive to light and over-brilliant and flaring surfaces reduced to order...”

You see the two aspects? Make light reflect through the face-landscape, or else if the surfaces are over-brilliant, attenuate and, if need be, darken it. Okay… If we decide to select this as our main proposition regarding the close-up, it's obviously because it works for us. Here we find fully, [*Pause*] the close-up either makes the face reflect the light or else resorts to deep shadows, up to and including “merciful darkness.” So that suits us, since we find our white wall-black hole system. And if we might dare to correct Sternberg's text, we could say that choosing the first aspect over the second is merely his own technical preference. We must recognize that there are also many directors who privilege the second aspect.

So, I ask myself, couldn't we say the following... making some rapid comparisons? The screen is for sure, a white wall. The camera is for sure a black hole. So, couldn't we say that there is a close-up when… – and here I'm moving towards a more abstract definition, but maybe it's stupid, I don't know – when the face tends to merge with the whole or part of the screen -- which leads us to suppose that there are also partial close-ups that don't occupy the entire screen; I'm pretty sure of this, but I don't know, we'll see... -- when the face tends to merge with the whole or part of the screen considered as a white wall? So, it's the face itself that functions as a white wall and is therefore identified with the whole or part of the screen. And similarly, when the face on the screen tends to be identified with or to function as the black hole of the camera. So here we have a first very general proposition regarding the close-up based on Sternberg's meticulously precise text.

Second proposition: summing up quickly, I'd like to say that there are close-ups of things other than the face. In what conditions? We already have the answer, but we can verify it in the case of cinema since for the moment we've only considered faciality at a very general level. Naturally, we can have close-ups of all kinds of things. Though perhaps not everything… perhaps not just any old thing.
We can have close-ups of all kinds of things on the condition that the thing in question is caught up in a process of facialization. And this is the reason cinema is a modern art form and that the power of cinema requires the production of faciality, even if this faciality is abstract. I'm not saying that its production of faciality condemns cinema to a kind of realism or representation. We have already seen how facialization goes far beyond actual faces. However, in order for there to be a close-up on something other than the face, that thing has to undergo a process of facialization.

And regarding this point I've been given a very nice text by Eisenstein, where he says, again in relation to Griffith of whom we've already spoken a little... Eisenstein's text begins like this, speaking about Griffith's close-ups [*Deleuze cites this Eisenstein text in* The Movement-Image, *p. 91; this development on the close-up corresponds to chapter 6, “The Affection Image, Face and Close-up”*]:

“The kettle began it . . . Thus Dickens opens his Cricket on the Hearth. The kettle began it…”
So immediately there are new aspects to the question that emerge, when Dickens writes at the beginning of ‘The Cricket on the Hearth’... “The kettle began it.” Is he making a close-up here?

Which leads us to ask: are there equivalents to the close-up before the cinema? Can we speak of an equivalent to the close-up in painting? Or in writing? And Eisenstein employs Dickens to comment upon all of Griffith's close-ups.

And he says: "What could be further from films! Trains, cowboys, chases... and 'The Cricket on the Hearth'? The kettle began it! But, strange as it may seem, movies also were boiling in that kettle. From here, from Dickens, from the Victorian novel, stem the "first shoots of American film aesthetic, forever linked with the name of Griffith."

Here we would already have some guidelines, if we could show that in fact the novel typically performs processes of facialization that concern use objects, which in a certain sense it contains like a precursor to the cinema close-up – if it's true that the close-up either concerns faciality or produces facialization. The close-up could be of a knife. We'll see... or of a kettle. Provided that in a certain sense the kettle looks at me. There, the kettle is looking at me, not in the grotesque sense of having two eyes, or maybe also in this sense, why not – the black hole of the kettle spout. Not surprisingly, Griffith's interiors always look at me. They look at me in the sense that I'm caught up in these interiors, they regard me. Even if it's not my kettle, it's someone's kettle. At the same time, we can ask ourselves if there are things that resist the process of facialization. And here too our theory will be confirmed. We can say that something that resists the process of facialization cannot be the object of a close-up.

So, the last time we weren't too happy with what we did regarding the close-up. And it's by no means certain that we'll be any happier today, it might not go any better. At the end of the lesson, a number of you stayed behind, and Mathieu Carrière told us about a text he remembered by André Bazin on animals, that now becomes very interesting for us. [*In* A Thousand Plateaus, *Deleuze and Guattari twice refer briefly, without reference, to "an unpublished study of Kleist by Mathieu Carrière" (p. 542, note 50; p. 553, note 11), regarding becoming-animal in Kleist*] It's a text where Bazin explains how we cannot make a close-up of an animal. But there's a problem with the text. Carrière lent me the book which I read but I didn't see the same thing he saw in it. I don't think Bazin said anything of the sort... and in a way I'm happy. Although it seemed like a nice idea, it's even better if it's not in the book. Or at least I didn't find it. But let's suppose he says that: We can't make close-ups of animals. What does that mean? You'll tell me, yes there are, there are plenty.

The answer we gave the other time at the end of the lesson was this: that if you make a close-up of an animal in cinema it's a way of suppressing the animal, of facializing it, of attributing certain things to it and therefore introducing a dimension of anthropomorphism. We often see a big lion's head. But the great animal films don't include, or include very few, close-ups. Which doesn't mean that there aren't worse techniques. What normally replaces the close-up for animals, for example, is the use of slow motion. In Rossif's last film there is a terrible use of slow motion in which the animal is no less destroyed than it would be by close-ups. It's unbearable. The use of slow-motion applied to animals might work a little, but overusing it, that's ridiculous.

So why would it be useful for us to say. "Okay… no close-ups of animals, it's not possible." As we have seen, the animal is defined by a certain state – which by no means implies that it lacks spirituality, however its spirituality involves a system where the head is strictly part of the body

and therefore is not organized through a face that overcodes the body. On the contrary, the head is part of an entire corporeal code. So, there can't be any close-up of the animal if it's true that the close-up is either faciality or process of facialization. That suits us. But we would also need to demonstrate that each time we have a close-up of an object, as in the case of Griffith's kettle, there is facialization.

Third problem: The way to obtain – and here we might finally need a specialist who is able to tell us... no, it's out of the question! – I ask, would it be inconvenient, and here I'm asking a question... would it be inconvenient to say that, as far as we're concerned, we use the word close-up in a very general sense to account for effects that are produced by very different means? Because in the discussion that followed the last lesson, there was something that disturbed me. Among those who stayed behind, there were some who, if I've understood correctly, went as far as to suggest that the close-up doesn't require or doesn't necessarily require enlargement, that one could conceive of something that functioned as a close-up without any relative enlargement. I didn't fully understand this... and then we stopped there.

So, as a way to orient ourselves a bit more clearly, might we not propose certain means, understanding that someone more competent in the matter might tell us: "no, this isn't what we call a close-up"? All we know for the moment is that the close-up doesn't necessarily imply immobility. A close-up can perfectly well be part of a tracking shot. Nor it does imply occupying the whole of the screen. For example, a face in close-up might occupy only one side of the screen. But doesn't it imply a relative enlargement with respect to the other elements in the shot? I would say: yes, it does, but this is obviously just a question of means, it doesn't help us to define its function. But I recall some of you saying that it doesn't necessarily imply enlargement.

Let's try to imagine some different means. The first, the most famous, for which the word close-up is normally reserved refers to a mobile camera approaching a character or object. Another means is the reverse procedure. And the reverse procedure is, I think, frequently employed by the expressionists…. [*Tape interrupted*] [1:00:18]

The close-up considered as a scale of intensity has a completely different function. It implies introducing in the two-dimensional space of the screen something which is not reducible to two dimensions but which in this case is no longer time but intensity. Basically speaking, this allows us to say that the close-up has nothing to do with either depth of field or perspective. The question of how to add a third dimension to the two dimensions is a completely different one. The same goes for painting: if we find close-ups in painting, they shouldn't be confused with problems of perspective. Otherwise, we'll get everything mixed up.

And Eisenstein talks about his own intensive close-ups. Except that there's something bizarre – I don't know if it's the English translation or the political constraints to which Eisenstein was subjected -- Eisenstein says: my intensive close-up is a signifying close-up, it's a close-up that has a meaning whereas Griffith's close-ups are purely descriptive. It's funny the way Eisenstein defends himself, as though he were talking to Stalin or Zhdanov, when he says: "I haven't forgotten, I'm not simply showing things, I mean something by them, I haven't forgotten the imperatives of the Party!", whereas in actual fact one would have to say the opposite. If there's a

signifying close-up it's that of Griffith, in its anticipatory values, whereas the close-up as scale of intensity is absolutely non-signifying, a-signifying.

And Eisenstein proposes examples from his own films such as *The Battleship Potemkin,* where there is what he himself calls "the line of mounting despair" which passes through several faces. You see this has nothing to do with anticipation, it's very different... The mounting suffering or rage that passes through numerous faces, whether simultaneous or successive, creates a scale of intensity on the screen but we have no idea what it concerns. It doesn't signal something which is about to happen. Here the process of mounting intensity is completely immanent. Are soldiers going to appear who will fire into the crowd? Or will something else happen? It's very different from the knife close-up [*Pause; here Deleuze slips implicitly toward the example of Pabst's* Lulu] in which the close-up's function is to anticipate what will happen. At this point we know that Lulu will die, she'll die, and that nothing will prevent it. In the intensive close-up, there is a sort of interiorization of the intensive scale that leaves what is going to happen off-screen.

So, were we to accept these two functions of the close-up, I'm saying that would be fine for me; were there only these two, that would suit me fine because they would respond perfectly to our two types of faciality as we have distinguished them: the despotic face and the passional face. So that would work well. The passional face is essentially caught up in an intensive scale while the despotic face is anticipatory. On the despotic face I read my destiny: "I'm going to die."

But let's imagine that between these two functions of the close-up there are multiple combinations. And on that point, I'd like to conclude with a quotation from Lotte Eisner, who speaks about an extraordinary scene that unfortunately I have no memory of. I saw it just once in my life, as usual at midnight at the Cinémathèque. It's in Pabst's film, *Lulu*. And you will immediately see how useful Eisner's expressions are useful for us.

"Many times, Pabst films Lulu's features on a slant. Her face is so voluptuous that it seems almost deprived of individuality..." This works well for us. We've seen how individualization is an extremely secondary function of the face. It's a distant consequence of facialization and faciality. And here I skipped a phrase because it didn't really fit our needs. In fact, here she got it wrong, it's obvious... To be honest what she actually writes is "Her face is so voluptuously *animal.*" What a clanger. This is false. Lulu is not... it's completely stupid. Well, everyone makes mistakes... Especially as the next part shows that she's not at all an animal.

In the scene with Jack, she's inhuman which is completely different from being an animal: "In the scene with Jack the Ripper, this face, a smooth mirror-like disc slanting across the screen" - that's much better... - "a smooth mirror-like disc slanting across the screen" – like a disc collapsed on the diagonal – "is shaded out..." – remember, that's Sternberg's second method - "the shining surface is toned down..." -- that's exactly the second type of close-up Sternberg describes - "that the camera seems to be looking down at some lunar landscape of which it discovers and in a way explains the curves."

And here I'm skipping another phrase where she gets it wrong: "Pabst just shows, at the edge of the screen…" -- if I understand correctly, this is the edge of the screen following the slant. And what we have here is a partial close-up that doesn't occupy the whole of the screen. So, he shows

this lunar landscape from awry. -- "Pabst just shows at the edge of the screen the chin and a fragment of cheek belonging..." -- Oh, no, it was me who was wrong there, he's on the other side of the screen -- "belonging to the man next to her" - Jack the Ripper - and then she says: "with whom the audience automatically identifies." Here she makes a personal and rather forced observation, employing an abject concept of "identification", which is completely pointless… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:08:22]

So, we have everything we need. There are the two functions of the close-up. The anticipatory close-up: the knife. And the intensive close-up: the face of Lulu consumed, aged, falling apart, and Jack the Ripper walking towards her with what is in this case a reverse close-up of Jack the Ripper's face which traverses a scale of intensity. Everything happens as though Lulu is the *zero intensity*. The zero intensity is the matrix. It's negative, it's not nothing. The zero intensity is the pure white wall. And with the black silhouette or the reverse close-up of Jack the Ripper's face; there you have the other function of the close-up. The close-up as intensive scale is no longer the element of anticipation. What's more, you have the two modalities of the close-up that respond more or less to Sternberg's text. Which is to say: one in treating Lulu's face as a landscape, which means making it reflect the light. Or contrariwise, attenuating over-brilliant surfaces by plunging them into merciful darkness. So, in this sense everything is here.

To conclude, here is the last proposition, which I've already mentioned: we would need to see to what extent the other arts have their own equivalents to the close-up. This would allow us to objectively define these equivalents in terms of both anticipatory-temporal and intensive values. In a text... And in my view, well why… we'd have to do some research, we'd perhaps have need to consider – I'm again speaking at random once again – both the novel and painting. You shouldn't be surprised at my saying this. I'm regrouping some notions here. In all we have said so far regarding faciality and facialization, we have seen that painting had a fundamental role in its use of face-landscape complementarity and correlation. And that the courtly novel had a no less fundamental role in the white wall-black hole system of the face-landscape.

So perhaps we could... I don't know whether I've already mentioned this but I'm going to go back to it. I'm thinking about some relatively modern painters. Irrespective of problems of perspective, which are of a completely different nature, I have the impression that often in what we call... when we have a still life that doesn't occupy the whole of the canvas, but which intervenes in the painting, very often it is oddly facialized. We are at the level of the kettle that looks at me.

There's a painter I really admire, Bonnard… If you look at Bonnard's paintings, you'll see that many of them are of his wife. There are many Bonnard paintings depicting his wife having breakfast. Bonnard's cups are something extraordinary. There is a kind of facialization of the cup. And once again, everyone will grant me – here I feel a bit guilty -- we've never used facialization in the sense of anthropomorphism. That doesn't consist in attributing a human head to the cup. Facialization is an abstract function. Just as there is an abstract machine of faciality. Facialization doesn't consist in transforming the cup into a man or woman but in making a white wall-black hole system. Or you even have dogs in Bonnard's paintings, or cats, which are facialized in a quite bizarre way, and without a trace of anthropomorphism. I'm pretty sure of it. Or as Eisenstein wrote, we should take the example of Dickens, which is quite exemplary in literature. [*Tape interrupted*] [1:13:56]

[*After the interruption, a discussion in progress unfolds, concerning issues of classroom space in Deleuze's seminar*]

A first student: If we 're going to go on working like this, fine, but I'm leaving, and I won't concern myself with why… [*Inaudible comment*] [*As this unnamed "first student" will lead most of the discussion, he will be designated as such below*]

Second student: It's been 6 months! What do you want us to do? It's been like this for 6 months!

The first student: I've made some concrete proposals!

Second student: [*Indistinct comment*] … Wait! Will you let me speak?

Third student: It's more like three years that's it's been this way.

Several students: [*Indistinct comments*]

The first student: You're wasting your time. It would take only a couple of minutes to sort it out. [*Deleuze is visible quietly listening*] Well, my problem is for him to move his ass!

Several students: [*Indistinct comments; Deleuze is seen listening quietly*]

Mathieu: If we remove the tables, 50 more people will come in and we'll be back where we started.

The first student: Well precisely, that will create a problem, but maybe we might organize the space better than me, and at least 50 people have already left.

Deleuze: Please, allow me to respond in my turn. I'm not in any hurry, but … [*Pause*]

A student: This isn't a criticism, eh? [*Pause*]

Deleuze: Yes, I think everyone has something to say, but we've already discussed it a lot, but you're right to come back to this and to raise the question again, but we have spoken a lot about it. [*Pause*] So, if no one... [*Pause*] he's right about one thing. The whole class has something to say, I too would like to say something...

Third student: But what cannot be denied is that most days this room is almost empty! There isn't even a table normally. There are dozens of chairs stacked up. There really are some and in such a way that… [*Indistinct comment*]

A student: You think you're in South America? [*Deleuze laughs*]

Third student: It's true, that's how it is... In that regard, we could at least organize it a bit better.

Several students: [*Indistinct comments*]

Another student: But the more places there are, the more people there will be!

Another student: Yes, but that's not a good reason.

Another student: Instead of going on about it, why don't we turn the seats around? [*Indistinct words*] Then you can see!

The first student: Now I'll play like [*unclear word*] seeing as you were talking about cinema. Your idea is completely stupid. [*The student stand on a table and begins crossing the room going from one table to another*] These are our working conditions. [*Applause from some students*] It really is cinema, it's playing at [*same unclear word*] ...

Another student: Why are you getting so worked up about it?

The first student: It's three minutes I've been trying to get in here.

Another student: Me too!

The first student: Hey, you guys there in the corner, aren't you getting worked up about it? [*Pause*] Hey, I don't want a chair.

Another student: If a fire breaks out… [*Indistinct comments*]

The first student: If a fire breaks out, I'm dead. [*Explosion of laughter and comments making fun of the student's comment, general brouhaha; the first student begins walking back across the classroom on tables*] What I did there at least is without risks. All of you would rush for the doors.

Another student: That's not true. There's also a window where I'd go. I'd prefer to break a leg!

Deleuze: I'd die the first!

The first student: You're right!

Another student: I know someone who has a different solution altogether. He doesn't want to say it, over there, but he knows that by passing through the window, he can reach you over there.

Another student: Not anymore; it's closed. Even today we couldn't manage. The room's full. The room's full. [*Pause*] This has already occurred twice this semester. [*Pause*]

The first student: Instead of wasting our time arguing, we really could just push all the tables against the wall. There are three walls, three sides, which equate to as many as 100 places!

Another student: So that's where we'll really die! [*General brouhaha*]

The first student: So, what we have is exclusion, selection... Anyone who's late can't get in. In these conditions if there are 200 or even 3000 guys who want to get in, we'll have to queue up like at the Opera, like the theatre. We come here at 7h30, and whoever isn't here by 7h45 doesn't get in. And if you don't see Deleuze, he won't get in himself because he'll be stuck in the crowd. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: That's my dream… [*Pause, laughter*] I just want to say something, because it's my turn, to respond to you, my point of view independent of the room, seeing as how you've raised a question we've already discussed many times. In any case, there is something which I would say he's absolutely right about: the tables crept back in very recently. Before, there weren't any. Now we'll move on to other questions but it's true that these tables occupy a lot of space... It's not normal for the conditions we have in this room that there are tables. Up until this week, you permitted me a small table because I need books, but it was really tiny. All those tables and this big one were not here... I think that the first to arrive at the lesson should be so kind as to remove the tables, if there are any. More generally…

A student: But we need to keep two, one for the tape recorders.

Deleuze: Yes, of course. But more in general, the problem of this room has already been presented. I've already said I don't want a lecture theatre. And not at all for the reasons that you impute to me, meaning lack of space to breathe, even if I do have certain problems in that regard, but that's not the reason. It's because I believe, and please don't laugh, that trying to do what we do here in a lecture theatre would radically change the nature of the work. And no matter how uncomfortable things are here, everyone is free to intervene, anyone can interrupt me to speak about something else -- and here we have the perfect example -- none of which would be possible in a lecture hall. Because if we go to a lecture hall, I'll be attached to a microphone – here' it's even worse, I'm connected to lots of other things, and I can't even move - but the lecture hall would change everything. Because I would be in the situation of a formal lecture [*cours magistral*]. Of course, you might say: "But what is it you're doing here if its not lecturing?" That opens another question but, in my view, no! that's not what I'm doing. And if according to me I'm not giving a lecture it's partly thanks to this room, which I cling to more than practically anything else.

If you tell me that things are bad, especially for those who get here after a certain hour, that conditions are unbearable and yet we have to bear them for three or two and a half hours... please believe me that I'm not trying to be funny when I say: I'm perfectly aware of this. I know everyone feels more or less uncomfortable, starting with myself, and I assure you it's no picnic. I remember the good old days when I had a small corridor where I could walk. I like speaking when I'm walking, that's how ideas come to me... But that's all over now. I know, I'm not stupid... I know conditions here are pretty unbearable. Still, they seem to me better than the conditions of a lecture hall for what we're trying to do. And I know some of you are suffering more than others, but I also know that everyone, me included, is terribly uncomfortable in this room.

I just want to say that I think there are advantages to it, and that a certain number of you here find it advantageous enough to want the situation to go on like this. So, I respond, without rancor, truly, or provocation, that if someone finds that the advantages this room offers – meaning the possibility of a certain kind of intervention, avoiding what would befall me in a lecture hall, avoiding the form of a lecture, all of that, being able to say anything at all... It's clear that we wouldn't have the same rapport in a lecture hall as we do in a room like this. Here the rapport passes by way of discomfort, but in a lecture hall, it would no doubt pass by way of a horrible embarrassment, even if we would be physically better off. Or even despair: "My God, we've ended up in a lecture hall!", "Shit, what is this?" There are many different ways of being uncomfortable. I just want you to know, I insist that I don't ignore the fact that the conditions for the people at the back are extreme.

Having said that, I fully agree that there are some stop-gap measures we can take. Getting rid of the tables seems an obvious solution. Make sure that those of you who are late getting here can move freely. I can even stop, if someone needs to pass this way. I'm perfectly okay with that. But I cling to the conditions of this room for reasons linked to the nature of what we're trying to do, which would completely change in a lecture hall. And quite simply, if someone says to me, you're being selective, I would respond in the same way as Mathieu: if we create 50 more places here, there will be another 70 people who arrive and we won't resolve anything that way.

We gave ourselves a relatively small room for a working environment, not at all out of masochism or because we like to be uncomfortable, but because, and I'll say it once again, what I want to say and what others want to say can only pass by way of these bad conditions. I don't see any way we can avoid that. If someone tells me that the working conditions here are so unbearable that they can't stand them anymore, once again my answer, without the least provocation is: too bad it means we can't work together. Too bad, in any case I'm staying here. And I would stay here even if it meant being alone. Which would be a dream!

Sorry if I answer you in this way, but I really don't think you could say: "Thing would be the same in a lecture hall. We would be more comfortable, and you could do the same as you're doing here". I said it. Things are as bad for me here as they are for you. I know it's not a good argument but I'm not here to take a break.

The last question you raised, and that we've already discussed, is that of cigarettes... They don't solve anything, actually they make things worse. I've always said that if we reached a point when it's better to ban cigarettes, I would deny myself this as long as it was possible. Obviously, if I had an asthma attack, that's tough for me, and I would stop for the day. And I would ask you not to, but if you didn't agree, I would just go out. It's simple, it's not hard to understand.

Allowing or banning cigarettes from the room has to be a collective decision. So, it's not up to me. Except when I have physical problems. Of course, anyone could have physical difficulties and say no, you have to stop. Or they could go out. Or we stop. Anyway, that's what I wanted to say. But I insist on the fact that – I would almost like to strive to convince you, even if for me it's clear – I assure you that if we go to a lecture hall everything will change. Everything. In the name of enhanced physical wellbeing, which I'm not even sure about - because lecture halls here

are like coffins and they're not so comfortable - everything would change including and especially the nature of what we're doing here… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:26:46]

The first student: So, if I want to go over there, how do I go about it? I have to start the same rigmarole as before… [*Reactions from others*] Maybe that's funny, but I'm no longer amused, I can tell you. For what I can understand the problem remains. You presented it fifteen minutes ago, and Deleuze gave his view. And there's still a minimal density over there [*on the far side of the classroom opposite him*] and a dense population here [*behind him near the door*]. There's still lots of smoke. There still are tables. This is perhaps a poor composition. I'm not trying to seize power; I believe what I said, these were some suggestions. You said: "even if I end up alone"; what causes me despair that that's what might happen. I asked myself whether I should go or not. It would be ideal if you found yourself alone. Maybe only then would we really do something. The working conditions aren't good, so if students say: "working conditions here are no good, we'll go and do something else", perhaps the situation would change.

A student: What occurs in the general population, I think, [*unclear words*] about people's motivations that you're talking.

The first student: Ah no, you think I'm an idiot?

Another student: [*Inaudible comments due to student voices*]

Another student: You've got a seat; you enjoy the system. [*Pause, laughter, brouhaha*]

The first student: You're the privileged and we're the excluded. [*Pause, brouhaha*]

Another student: It's thirteen and a half minutes now that we've been talking about chairs. I've counted them. Thirteen and a half minutes. I've counted them. [*Pause, brouhaha*] So where are we going with this? [*Pause, brouhaha*]

Another student: We can get rid of the tables if that's the problem, but let's not take two hours about it. [*Pause, brouhaha*]

Another student: It's clear this lesson is over! [*Pause, brouhaha*] [*Tape interrupted*] [1:28:32]

A new first student: What is this Vincennes mystique anyway? Can you explain it to me? Is it a new church? I don't know it.

Another student (*softly*): There is no Vincennes mystique.

The new first student: So what is this mystique?

A woman student: There's no mystique of Vincennes, there's just the reality of Vincennes.

The new first student: So what is the reality of Vincennes? [*Different voices, answer lost*]

Different voices: Aaaah! Aaaah!

The new first student: So you see? There's the real problem.

Another woman student: You're really [*lost word*]. You sat down in a chair a while ago.

The new first student: Why don't you sit down? Take a seat.

Another student: So, in the morning, I like to sleep in. [*Pause*]

Different students: Aaaah! Aaaah!

Another woman student: And what about us? You think we don't? [*Pause, different voices*] [89:00]

The first student (from the beginning): I come here, and I want it to enjoy myself, not get all this hassle.

The new first student: There are those who like to sleep in get up at 6:30 to have a chair.

Another student: You get up early!

The new first student: There are those who get up at 6:30 just to remain standing.

A woman student: It's completely stupid what you're saying. Is this a *struggle for life*?

Another student: Yes, yes, yes!

The new first student: No, come on! Don't be so stupid! We don't have more than 400 seats in this room. [*He tries to continue but the woman student speaks over him*]

The woman student: There is one single chair and 100 people who want it. Only one's going to get it…

The new first student: When there are 400 people here, they'll be piled up to the ceiling. [*Pause*] Is what I am saying right or not? [*Pause*] So you see, that's the way it is.

The woman student: I don't follow your logic.

The new first student: What a shame. [*Laughter, applause; Deleuze is visible laughing and smoking*]

Another student: We have to divide the space into… [*Indistinct comments*]

Another student (*near the microphone*): Can I please have a cigarette?

The woman student: And the workers who get here late, what do they do?

The new first student: In any case, I agree with Deleuze... let's stay here! [*General laughter*]

Another student: There are people standing who don't say anything! [*Laughter continues, including Deleuze*]

A woman student: Can't we all move a little bit over towards the window there, so this can all be done? [*Pause*] So can everyone… Can't we move a little bit to the left? Can't we try to squeeze up a bit. So, we can get this over with. Stop being stupid.

A student: [*Inaudible response*]

The same woman student: There are still another 50 people outside the door. So, let's squeeze up! [*Pause, different voices, inaudible*]

Another student: We can swap places! Those who are now sitting can stand. [*Pause, different voices*]

Deleuze: Yes, well… I remind you that one thing is true about what you've been saying, Before, the tables weren't there. [*Pause*] So until now… [*Pause, someone makes a comment to Deleuze*] No, non, but if possible next time... [*Pause*], this is the first time, it's the first time the tables have reappeared.

A student: It's sabotage! [*Pause*]

Deleuze: Yes, this is a sabotage of the classroom. Maybe it was you who put them there. [*Laughter, pause*] So, is there any way… [*Pause*] Right now, I think trying to get rid of the tables, that would really be a mess because... [*Pause*] Is there's no way we can make a rotary movement that will allow us to …? [*Pause*]

Another student: We can break off for 5 minutes to move the tables outside! [*Pause, different reactions*]

Another student: Are you crazy? It's already 12.10. To have everyone leave and then remove all the tables will take two hours!

Another student: We could put them...

A woman student: Those who are seated could pass their chairs over…

Another student: Why don't we have a 10-minute break?

Another student: It's not possible!

The preceding student: Are we having a break or not?

Another student: Everyone has to go out now… [*Pause, diverse voices*]

The preceding student: Are we having a break or not?

Another student: The lesson finishes at 1. [*Pause; Deleuze is seen silently reflecting*]

Another student: There is no pause. We're just not continuing.

The preceding student: Everyone goes home at 1.

The preceding student: But we've been arguing like this for half an hour already…

Another student: If we go out … [*Pause*] if we go out, it will take until next Wednesday to get back in! [*Pause, diverse voices; a dog barking is vaguely audible*]

Deleuze: It's all the dog's fault! I told you… [*Laughter and pause; tape interrupted*] [1:33:11]

A student: I'd like to ask Deleuze if, hypothetically, we could take out the chairs that are already there. There would be much more space.

Other students: No, no, no….

Another student: No more on this topic; let's talk about something else… [*Pause; diverse voices*]

A woman student: [*She is speaking to someone in a low voice, inaudibly, then*] … if there are no chairs, it becomes a room like any other... [*Pause, diverse voices*]

Deleuze: What? [*Inaudible comments*]

A student: No, it's the same thing. [*Pause, diverse voices*]

Another student: Let's stay here!

Deleuze: I think, at least in part, [*Pause*] following what you said… I am feeling things here; I can't even think any more. I am feeling things, and I think: "My God! I feel worse and worse…" [*Pause*] So you arrive here [*Deleuze indicates the first student who spoke at the start of this section of the discussion*], and you say, "What is this? It's my first time here, what is this? How awful we feel here! How awful you poor chumps must be feeling! What's the matter with you? What is it with you that you want to feel like this?" So, someone says this, points this out, and I listen, and I tell myself: "That's right, it's true, we feel so bad…" [*Pause*] On the other hand – and in saying this, I'm not saying that you're exaggerating – there are cases in which I'm sure that, even over there in that abominable corner [*Deleuze indicates the area near the entrance where the first student is located*], when things are working… [*Pause*] -- I'm not saying for everyone, or for everyone at the same time – [*Pause*] we forget our discomfort, [*Pause*] we don't think about it anymore. [*Pause*] Because, at that moment, things are really working well. We feel

uncomfortable, but we forget about it… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:35:28] [*On the video, a new title sequence appears, as if this were a different day, but the same session and the same discussion in progress continues*]

The first student from the beginning: Simply it seems to me that...

Another student: … what's more, they weren't even listening; you have to start over…

The first student: I just want us all to be able to work in an egalitarian way, all of us seated in the same conditions. If it should happen that the group doesn't agree that we should work in an egalitarian way, with everyone having a seat, and putting the tables against the wall so people can sit on top of them, if would only take 5 minutes to do that, instead of half an hour of arguments… if the group doesn't agree to that, then I'm leaving.

Another student: So what do you do with all those who can't get in when the others are all seated?

The first student: We'll see about that later, that's in the future!

Another student: The future has already been going on for years!

The first student: Let's give the experiment a try, and then we'll see!

The previous student: We've already tried it!

Deleuze: Yes, once more, I am responding to your proposal, but only…

The previous student: We've been working without tables here for years, and people always end up standing in the back.

Another student: But there are more people this year, I think…

Another student: That's not true; there have been as many student for the last two and a half years…

The previous student: Listen to me…

The previous student: … It depends on the period. When the weather is nice, there are fewer here.

Deleuze: I would like to answer... Considering the hour, it is out of the question to try to remove the tables now. [*Several students say, "Yes, yes"*] As I said, it's the first time the tables have resurfaced, and I insist on this point because... [*Interruption, diverse voices*]

A student: It's not a question of removing them… just of moving them out of the way!

Deleuze: Yes, but even just moving them will take half an hour!

Another student: There's not just this classroom, Deleuze's class…

Another student: At 1 o'clock, there's another class; at 4 o'clock, another class, and at 7 o'clock, there's another class here, every day… [*Pause, diverse voices*]

Another student: Where do you want to put the tables?

The first student: I want to move them so we can sit on them! … [*Tape interrupted*] [1:37:30]

Deleuze: This is what I propose we do. He made a suggestion and so here's mine. I repeat, we won't have the tables anymore just as we didn't have them before. The tables will be gone, starting from the next lesson. It won't be hard to get rid of them. If there's a [*Deleuze indicates the entrance or the hallway*] there, a room where we can put them, those who need them for other lessons can go and get them there. Those who don't want to remove the tables don't have to do it. Those who want them gone can do it when they arrive and can put them either in the room next door or in the middle room. Starting from next time, no tables will be here except a small one for the books. There you have it… [*Tape interrupted*] [1:38:36]

A student: It's a question of adding some tables, not taking them away.

Another student: It's not true because rats have no resentment against tables.

The first student from the beginning: I don't give a shit. You can judge my level of resentment when I'm gone.

Another student: Speak simply!

Another student: You should be ashamed of yourself, listen, you're not so important! [*Laughter; pause, diverse voices*]

Another student: What's the reason… what's stopping us from putting the tables against the wall? [*Students groan at this question*]

The first student: That's what we were talking about earlier. Are you thick? This isn't possible!

Deleuze: The answer is quite simple, which is there's 20 minutes.

The first student: That's what I proposed! Aaaah!

Another student: We only have 20 minutes left. It's not worth it.

Deleuze: It's true. There's 20 minutes, and the time it would take is 20 minutes because… And where do you move the tables if these guys don't go out first?

The first student: 20 minutes to push the tables against the wall?

Deleuze: Obviously, because everyone would have to go out.

Another student: And in 20 minutes the lesson is over. It ends at 1. There's a half an hour left.

Deleuze: [*Brief, indistinct remark*]

The first student (*answering someone's question*): So that we can sit on the table… [*He continues, indistinct words*]

A woman student: If we have to take the tables out, let's do it!

The first student: But we can do it now. Why wait until next week?

Another student: We just explained to you that there are other courses in the meantime.

The first student: Let's leave the tables here and push them against the wall.

A woman student: Don't you want to talk about something else? [*Pause, diverse voices*]

The first student: But of course! Of course!

Another student: He's a mystic… that guy.

Another student: No, he's nice.

Another student: Oh, you're a clever guy, a clever guy!

The first student: The question I raise is why is it such a problem for the group to move the tables...

A woman student: Because it's impossible!

Another student: What a mess!

The first student: If it was possible, we would have already done it.

The previous woman: It's impossible! [*Pause; diverse voices; Deleuze is visible, smoking, waiting*]

A student: How about we continue?

Another student: Continue what?

The student: What were we saying?

Deleuze: Aaaah! [*Pause*]

A student: It's about delirium! [*Silence in the classroom*]

Deleuze: Fine. [*Pause, he continues smoking*] Okay, so we can agree [*Pause*] to make the tables disappear for the next time.

A student: Yes.

Another student: Yes, we're agreed on that!

Deleuze: Fine. Isn't there some way for someone to slide over a little… [*He makes gestures toward the crowded entrance*] there, along the wall?

A woman student: We can make a corridor. [*Pause, diverse voices*]

A student: Of course, as long as they make the effort to move. [*Pause, diverse voices*]

A student: But there's space on those tables over there, or do you prefer to continue suffering? Either you can either grin and bear it in your corner or sit on those tables as has not yet occurred up to now. Because, you see, no one is going to move the tables.

The first student from the beginning: There's a lot of space on the window ledge.

The preceding student: So that your ass will be in our faces! [*Pause, diverse voices*]

The first student: If they sit on those tables, those behind will have their noses squashed against their backs. So that won't work on the tables, I agree. I'm fine with that.

The preceding student: So now it's a question of the schedule. That's it. Either we go now or we continue; if we continue, either you guys just grin and bear it, like that, voluntarily…

Another student: And shut your traps!

The preceding student: Or you park your carcasses on them [*the tables*]. For the moment, there's no other solution, to do it voluntarily.

The woman student (*near the first student*): In any case, I don't feel like sitting down, I don't feel like doing anything now. I'm finding all this so delirious that …

The preceding student: Ok, we've understood. You're disgusted. There's only one thing left for you to do, that's to get out!

The woman student: And you can stop being such a pain in the ass! Wait for me to make my own decision.

Another student: It's always the same rigmarole. How is it that you're in France and you … [*Indistinct words*]

The first student: You're entirely correct. I'm a fascist pig! I just wanted to say it.

The preceding student: Ok, then, there you are!

The first student: Thank you. I was expecting that. That works for me. It took 22 minutes for it to come out. No, sorry, 32 minutes. [*Pause, diverse voices*] By the way, I really enjoy being a fascist!

Another student: But anyhow, [*Deleuze is visible listening and smoking*] there are people sitting and people standing.

The first student: How about that!

The preceding student: Normally one comes here alone, and now we're not! [*Pause*] It's interesting you can find all these comrades so quickly. [*Pause*] Don't you think so? You're all standing over there, and now you are standing there together, and you tell us you don't have seat, and you say with such attitude.

The woman student: Ah, you're being a pain in the ass!

The preceding student: Fine!

Another student (*the one who suggested she leave*): Time to go, darling…

Another student: And the same goes for you!

The preceding student: Why?

The other student: You ask why? Because your being such a pain in the ass.

Deleuze: Oh… things are going badly. This is getting ruined. [*Pause, diverse voices, then a silence*]

Another student: Where do you see all these empty chairs since there aren't any?

The first student: We would need 50 chairs to accommodate everybody. How is that possible? [*Pause; diverse voices*] Count them. Be realistic. Count them and see if there are 50... [*Pause, diverse voices*]

Another student: Oh my God! Not again!

The previous student: [*Unclear words; subtitles:* Shut up!]

The first student: How do you explain that you're standing and I'm sitting? I think someone should find him a seat so see if it's reasonable for him to sit, and if there is a reasonable solution left. [*Indistinct words; pause*] I'm just blowing smoke out of my ass... [*Diverse voices*]

Another student: If you are, then stop blowing it out your ass?

Another student: Go ahead, that's ok! You're unblocking yourself! [*Laughter*]

The first student: I came here to listen to Deleuze, but I didn't imagine any of this.

A previous student (*who gave the woman student the choice to leave*): And maybe that's your problem. You came to listen, and you spoke up plenty. Since you came here to hear him. That's your problem. You came to listen.

Another student: [*Inaudible comment*]

The previous student: There you go! It's better already.

The first student: Hey guys, when you'll get finished speaking about my problem! [*Laughter, pause*] I know what my problem is. I don't need others to speak about it. Speak about your own problems. All you guys sitting down for the past half hour, don't you have a problem?

The previous student: Not at all.

The first student: Not at all?

The previous student: We're really fine!

The first student: Bravo! [*He applauds*]

The previous student: None at all!

The first student: Guys without problems! Bravo!

The previous student: Thank you, pal!

The first student: I've read things [*He points toward Deleuze*] about microfascism...

The previous student: It's not enough to read about it, you have to live it...

The first student: … I'm making some connections now…

The previous student: Hey, fascist number two!

The first student: [*Some lost words*] … There's something that's missing here. [*Pause, diverse voices*] I myself prefer to understand and be aware and try to exclude microfascism...

Another student: That guy hasn't understood anything!

The previous student: We're sick of your infantile power! [*Pause, diverse voices; the first student appears visibly annoyed*]

The first student: What? What? You think you're a responsible adult maybe? [*Pause, diverse voices*] What kind of power do you think you have? [*Pause*] Do you have a solution for the 50 guys who are still standing? You and you're responsible power?

The previous student: We're having a great laugh, and then talking…

The woman student (*near the first student*) Hey, that's not fair! You're all sitting, you having a laugh! [*Pause as she smiles, diverse voices*]

The previous student: [*Indistinct comment*]

The woman student: You have everything… how unfair! [*Pause, diverse voices; she bends to listen to something the first student tells her*]

Another student: Will you allow me to decide for myself?

The first student: You want to regale us with your problems?

The student: We've had it up to here with your problems!

The first student: My problem is also yours? On that I agree. [*Pause, diverse voices*] So the solution to solve everyone's problems… is for me to leave.

A woman student: No, no, stay. Stay! [*Pause, diverse voices, laughter*]

The first student: Are you only inviting me, or the others too? [*He indicates the crowd behind him*]

Diverse voices: Everyone! Don't go! Stay with us!

The first student: So, are you inviting just me or everyone? There's 40 or 50 of us here. [*Pause, diverse voices*]

Another student: Are you acting as their spokesperson?

Another student: Stop that!

The first student: No, I speak only for myself. [*Very long pause, diverse voices, laughter*]

Dog: [*Barking is heard, also much laughter; voices of students in discussions, more barking*]

A student: So, give him a chair! [*Laughter*]

A woman student: We can't manage to find it. [*The pause continues, also the barking*]

A student: It was Deleuze who mentioned the dog.

Deleuze: In any case, we must be precise: our lessons don't lack variety. [*Pause, laughter*] So, there we are… I'd like to… The chairs, all at once the chairs became... [*Pause, Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] Everything's fine for me, everything's fine, I mean… In fact, I have a confession to make; I'm feeling a bit sickened. Two times we've had, we've really had a bit of internal variety during a lesson. The first times we spoke about the face... [*Noise, laughter; Deleuze and everyone turns to Deleuze's right to someone near the board, off camera*]

A student (*near the board*): The close-up…

Deleuze: That's right, the close-up. [*Pause*] And then when we spoke about the close-up, [*Pause*] And suddenly... -- There's this unbearable cur -- and suddenly, these chairs have become, they've become a kind of proliferation: the fewer there were, the more... Well, that's okay. So, I propose again what I was saying regarding the chairs, everyone will maintain the same discomfort, if you don't mind, and I'll speak again for another five minutes, and then I'm done for today. For the moment, we've finished with the close-up unless you have something else, and then we'll consider it next time. We can still carry this [*A sudden brief high-pitched microphone sound from the film team*] *incompleteness* of the close-up with us.

I want to end today, going back to the topic we touched upon the other day, which consisted in saying this: in the end, there are two types of delirium – no, it wasn't at the end' we started with this -- aren't there actually two forms of delirium in the classification that concern something fundamental, which is to say forms of delirium without...

The first student: We haven't resolved the problem, so I'm going!

Deleuze: Okay! [*Pause; voices of students complaining about the student's words*]

The first student: This is the complicity of a group unable to resolve its problems…

A woman student: No, really, listen… [*Pause*]

The first student: Ciao!

Deleuze (*Pause for a small coughing fit*): Aaaah… And so…

A student: The man without a face.

Deleuze: It's funny the way things happen, don't you think? It's funny… In this group of deliriums with no intellectual impairment, with no intellectual deficit, we identified two forms. And as we said, it wasn't by chance that psychiatrists of the 19th century tried to confront this problem and in the end were poisoned by it... I'm speaking on one hand about the group of so-called *paranoid delusions*, *delusions of interpretation*, and on the other about the group referred to as *grievance delusions* or *passional delusions*. Next time we'll look at some texts.

[*Let us note that the distinctions developed here appear in Deleuze's "Two Regimes of Madness", from which the collection of essays takes its title,* Two Regimes of Madness. Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, *ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (2003; MIT/Semiotext(e), 2006), pp. 11-16. The text was first presented, with Guattari, at a conference in Milan in 1974, and then was published in the edited volume* Psychanalyse et sémiotique, *ed. Armando Verdiglione (Paris: 10-18, 1975). On the paranoiac-passional distinction, see also* A Thousand Plateaus, *plateau 5, "On Several Regimes of Signs"*]

I'll remind you that the difference, even in terms of the schema, consisted in this: the paranoid delirium or delirium of interpretation was constituted around a centre, a matrix, a dominant idea and proceeded by way of circular networks, seizing upon everything, the most heterogeneous elements, a bit of this, a bit of that... [*Deleuze makes gestures left and right*] the chairs, a guy passing by the window; it seizes upon everything, everywhere, everywhere…

A student: The dog…

Deleuze: The dog! [*Laughter*]

A student: The man without a face…

Deleuze: And all of that... [*He makes a circular gesture*] it all forms a kind of expanding circular irradiating network in which everything is captured. And paranoiacs... proceed in this way. And not only paranoiacs.

On the other hand, you have a completely different form of delirium. In this case it's as if a little packet – and here I need to use the word "packet" -- a little packet of signs starts to flow along a line and then arrives at the end of a first segment and begins another segment. And after the second a third... In this case we have, in a single sector, signs that flow on a segmented line waiting for the first segment to be completed before beginning the second. It's a limited delirium, beginning from an isolated packet of signs that pour onto a segmented straight line. A succession of linear proceedings instead of an expanding, irradiating network.

I know you'd like me to quote some examples at this point… but we're not there yet. We're not there yet. These are two very different figures. The passional is someone who has an extremely localized delirium, that doesn't at all seize upon everything. And what's more, they continue to be perfectly reasonable. There's just one thing, a sign. In erotomania, which forms part of the passional delusions, there's a sign that flows along its line and that has its history. After which the first proceeding comes to an end. And then a second proceeding begins. There might be a pause between the two. The passional remains calm, regains their strength and then starts over,

and then it starts over. In this case, we have a linear schema. Are the two figures opposed or can they unite?

Today, I just want to say something more about these two figures. So, in the case of the first, the situation is quite simple: we have a kind of expanding spiral. Whereas in the second, we have a straight line segmented in one, two, three or four parts and so on. We began from delirium in general, and we discovered two types of delirium corresponding to these figures. But we could very well have taken up other matters, and that's the point we reached the last time. We're considering an historical figure: the Hebrew and the Pharaoh, the despot of Egypt, the Pharaoh and the history of the Jewish People.

What does it mean? I suppose that in terms of the despotic formation, whether Egyptian or otherwise, we find a figure similar to that of paranoid delirium. That is: an idea-matrix, a center, beginning from which, through the conjunction of the most diverse, heterogeneous signs, a kind of expanding spiral is created with either concentric circles or veritable spires. Regarding the history of the Jewish People, we discover a succession of proceedings.

Once again, let's recall the basics of our method: this obviously doesn't mean that the despotic regime is paranoid and that the history of the Jewish People is passional. In our method, they mean something completely different. Perhaps it's a good occasion to valorize what we have been saying from the beginning according to a rhizomatic method that implies a cartography. This means that in maps of delirium… if we make the map of a delirium, not the structure, the map of a delirium, keeping in mind all its coordinates, this can be partially, or more or less partially, superimposed on the map of a historical proceeding, all the while bearing in mind the latter's own coordinates. Therefore, it's not at all a method of reduction.

I would just like to say at this point that next time, without the tables, we will try to frame all this in a more concrete manner, both in terms of delirium and of the history of the Jewish People. I would just ask… and it's quite obvious that despotic-paranoid regimes with their double map paranoid delirium- despotic formation… it's quite obvious that they proceed like this. Everyone can recognize a part of themselves in it, though we will have to furnish a lot of details. They proceed through this type of expansion, of circular irradiation, which captures signs of the most diverse nature in a continually expanding network.

In fact, if we look at the Old Testament, it's striking what happens when the exodus from Egypt begins. We witness a succession of linear proceedings. Venturing into the desert, guided by Moses, there will be a succession of segments, linear proceedings marked by catastrophe. And each time he will remain sufficiently Jewish to recommence a new proceeding. And I'm happy that from the very first pages of the Old Testament we find Moses' formula: proceeding or grievance, proceeding or grievance, punctuated by a number of segments. In the Old Testament, there are some interesting passages that will be important for us. But we would need to know Hebrew… it's somebody who knew Hebrew who says this. And you feel it in the translation in the curious oscillation between plural and singular forms.

Here's an example: a passage from Exodus says more or less... sorry I don't know it by heart... they crossed the desert and arrived at the mountains of... I don't remember where. "There, Israel

made camp." Apparently, it's a very common phrasing in the Old Testament. I think it's interesting because it could be said - and I think this would work, we could make a whole list of similar phrasings. I use the plural: *they* crossed, *they* walked, *they* arrived. And there, *Israel* made camp: all of a sudden using the singular form. It's as if this passage to the singular marked the end of a segment. And then a new segment began.

What is this linear thing? I would like to continue with a point that will be of great importance, I think, for literature, psychiatry, politics, the more of a mix the better. If I tried to qualify in a negative sense - and for the moment allow me to use whatever words I use with caution – if I tried to qualify the two systems, I would first ask: what are they doing here, what is the *evil* of the first system – I say the evil – how do they spend their time in the despotic system or the paranoid delirium? In a certain sense, if we were really trying to describe what they do, the best word would be: they cheat. They pass their time cheating, duping.

Why do they deceive and cheat? It's well known that the interpreter or the diviner spends his time duping and maneuvering the face of god. From ancient times, mobile masks and statues were maneuvered by priests, they had mobile statues so that the voice of god would appear to issue from one of the channels and so on... they cheat, they deceive. What's more, in the irradiating circular system, to go back to that, one passes the time jumping from one circle to another. I'll try to explain why we're in one circle and then jump into another. There is a whole system of trickery and imposture. After all, the man of State is a deceiver, an impostor, not in any pejorative sense. I mean, you understand this is connected to what we are saying. We don't wish to treat anyone as an impostor. We could care less about that. Rather, we want to arrive at a definition of deception.

There's a book by Borges with an admirable title, *A Universal History of Infamy*. But when you read it, you can't help but be disappointed because the book is terrible, completely worthless, I'm convinced of that. He completely blew it. You expect prodigious stories of universal infamy. What might those be? Someone should rewrite it, rewrite the whole book... Or at least try. Because on the other side, if we take our schema of linear successions, linear proceedings – we begin with one segment, we continue with another segment, etc. -- what happens? There's a completely new figure. We will have to see if it is *the* something new that arises. In attempting to use some words, I would say we're no longer in the field of deception. It's about a completely different field: it's the field of betrayal. [*Pause*] So, we have two notions here: deception and betrayal. Deception is always an affair of State. But what about betrayal? Universal infamy concerns both deception and betrayal, but these are not at all the same.

Why am I speaking about betrayal? It's one of the most fabulous themes of the Old Testament that I think has no equivalent. Take for example a character from Greek epic. Ulysses… it's not hard to show that Ulysses is a great deceiver. And once again I use the word deceiver in a highly positive sense. The deceiver is perhaps the man of State. Take Shakespeare's kings... We should reread Shakespeare's great historical tragedies. They're all deceivers. They all seize power by murdering someone - whether it be a brother, a brother-in-law or someone else - and then they say, that's it. It stops here, we're no longer going to kill anyone. From here on justice begins. And then they themselves are deceived. But in this process of the conquest of power through murder and the reestablishment of justice, there is a kind of fundamental deception.

But aren't there also traitors, of a totally different nature? From the very beginning of the Old Testament, something surprising happens. Which is to say that God turns his face away both from one of his faithful and from his people. And in the same movement the figure varies: man or the people turn away from God, as in a kind of double turning away. It's interesting... What's happening here?

Let's take a first example, almost from the beginning: Cain. I summarize the story of Cain. It's very short but I hope you will reread it: Abel and Cain each make a sacrifice to God. We shouldn't forget that Cain is God's favorite. His favorite. God has always preferred traitors. Why? In any case… the two brothers make their sacrifices and bring them to God. The text says that God accepts Abel's sacrifice but is indifferent to Cain's… [*Tape interrupted*] [2:08:04]

… Death indefinitely postponed. What does it mean? A slow death? No, not even slow death. Survival, life suspended following a linear proceeding. What does God say to Cain? Cain comes to him and says: "My crime is too great for me." My crime is too great for me. And God replies: "But I shall not kill you. I shall even give you a mark such that no one dare kill you. You will be kept alive. You who are my betrayer. I who have betrayed you. And you who are my favorite."

I speak of the prophet in opposition to the diviner. The prophet is an interesting figure. He is always someone who turns away from God. Which is to say that he is a traitor and is understood as such. The finest case, even if there are many, is one of the fundamental texts of the Old Testament: the story of Jonas. Usually, prophets have no wish to be prophets. God arrives and says: "This is what you're going to do!" And immediately there is the turning away: "Oh no, no, no!" He turns his face away. The prophet is the one who turns away from God. "I run away from the face of Adonai. I run away from the face of Adonai."

I am saying that Jonas's is the finest case because God arrives and tells him: "The city of Nineveh is in sin. They are all sinners. They live in abominable voluptuousness. Things can't go like this. You're going to save Nineveh." And Jonas says: "I can't." He turns away and what does he do? Here too you have to go back and read the text, which is short and rather wonderful. The beginning of Jonas is almost a great comic text. In the Old Testament, there are a lot of comic texts. And this is a great one.

He goes in exactly the opposite direction. He literally does a runner. He runs in the opposite direction to Nineveh. God sends him to Nineveh and instead he boards a ship to Tarshish, which is cardinally opposite. So, he flees, he traces his segment of flight. Eventually, God will catch him and there is a whole part of the story where he keeps him in suspension in the shelter of a little tree. In the text, it's called the tree of Cain. The tree of Cain… a connection is forged with Cain.

We'll see there are other examples, many other examples. But you will also see that Christ, the story of Christ, can be understood only through and in function of this long history of betrayal. Why have you abandoned me? Why have you abandoned me? Meaning that God turns away from Christ just as Christ turns away from God. And what happens in this double turning away? There's a kind of long errancy, a suspension of life.

There's a film I'm sure many of you have seen - perhaps betrayal has a long history -- a wonderful film called *Aguirre, Wrath of God*. *Aguirre* is the story, in a completely different epoch -- his story could be considered part of universal infamy - it's the story of a traitor who wants to be the only traitor. He says: "No, I am the only traitor." What does he mean by this? "You can have as many deceivers as you want but I am the only traitor."

In the dramas – and not surprisingly the film is very Shakespearean -- in Shakespeare's historical dramas and those of his contemporaries, there's always, or at least very often, a bizarre guy who appears denouncing all the deceivers and tricksters. And the deceivers and tricksters are always men of State or men of the Court. And there's someone who says: "Instead of ending up like that, I will go further in my infamy. I will go further in my infamy. I will be the traitor." And he opposes betrayal to deception.

And Aguirre is exactly like that. If you recall, he sets off on a linear proceeding which will be one of betrayal. How is it possible to betray everything at the same time? That's a good question. How is it possible to become the universal traitor? How do you betray everything, to found in the end a pure race with his imbecilic daughter? And you recall when he looks at one tall guy and says – it's pure Shakespeare -- "He is tall, he has an extra head. I'm the only traitor here!" and his aid understands and chops the guy's head off. At every moment in the film the theme of betrayal is key.

So, I'm saying, Hölderlin wrote a book that is a, is really great, called "Notes on Oedipus" and "[Notes] on Antigone", two short texts that have been translated, though I'm afraid they are out of print, in the paperback collection 10-18. And he says something much more profound than what Hegel has to say about Oedipus. Hölderlin says something magnificent. He says that Oedipus is a modern tragedy, the only modern tragedy of the Greeks. Actually, in this he's not saying anything exceptional. Even Malraux said something similar. He hadn't yet honed it down, what he wanted to say precisely. But why does he say that it's a modern tragedy? Because it's the tragedy of slow or indefinitely postponed death.

And in fact, usually when a Greek hero commits an act of hubris he is struck down, or condemned, by a god. That's not the case of Oedipus. Oedipus is exactly like Cain. He's a Greek Cain. Oedipus, following the part of the story we know well, doesn't meet a violent end. He encounters a long linear proceeding, the line of flight along which he wanders, keeper of a secret. And Hölderlin defines Oedipus as the man he calls the double turning away or the categorical turning away. Hölderlin was a bit Kantian, not excessively so, but he remembered the Kantian expression we all learned in high school, the categorical imperative, which in Hölderlin's words becomes the categorical turning away: when God turns his face away from man and vice versa. And that's where betrayal begins. What did Oedipus betray?

So, I'm thinking about a text by Nietzsche: *The Birth of Tragedy*, paragraph 9, in which Nietzsche makes a very interesting observation which goes in a similar direction. He says that bizarrely enough the history of Oedipus is not really Greek. He says more or less that *Oedipus* is the most semitic of the Greek tragedies. Because there is a passion of Oedipus, a passivity of Oedipus. And he goes as far as to say that there is a femininity of Oedipus.

All I wanted to say today, to begin the analysis we shall develop next time, is that we will need both these two figures: the circular irradiating figure, whose complement is the face viewed head on, the signifying despotic face, violent death or expulsion. And the other system, that of successive linear proceedings where we have a completely different form. In the first figure we also have trickery and deceit, if you like, whereas in the second figure we have faces that turn away, passional faces, life suspended on the straight line, whether in the wandering of Oedipus or the flight of Cain. Here we have a double turning away that defines something like a system of betrayal.

To add to the mix, there's a play by Shakespeare that doesn't represent a king or a man of State who seizes power by deception. It presents something else that might pose certain problems for the *mise en scene*. A great tragedy: *Richard III*. Richard III, in spite of appearances, doesn't care about the conquest of state power. That's not what interests him. He's not a deceiver, he's a traitor, and the great scene of betrayal is at the same time a scene of complicity, as though the double turning away were complicity itself. It's the scene between Richard III and Lady Anne. Lady Anne, who completely understands Richard III, is terrified by him and says to herself: "This man has exceeded all limits." And she already consents to the destiny that awaits her. There is a face-to-face encounter between Richard III and Lady Anne, in which the two faces never cease turning away from each other. [*On Hölderlin, Cain and Jonah, Oedipus, Nietzsche, and* Richard III *in this context, see* A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 123-127*]

We will have to ask if later the Reformation, in its return to the Old Testament, didn't seize upon this figure of the double turning away, the universal betrayal. How much did Luther have to say about betrayal? You understand that an abstract proposition such as "good works cannot save you," this is fundamentally linked to the theme of betrayal. Meaning: even our good works betray us, and we betray our works.

So, I say all this simply to reinforce the two forms we have studied, once again, on one hand, we risk encountering: signifying face, violent death or exile, and trickery and deceit; on the other, the face turning away; life or death indefinitely postponed; double turning away that determines a betrayal.

I would be very happy if some of you could reread the stories of Cain and Jonas in the Old Testament. So, there we are. No more tables next time! [*End of the recording*] [2:23:06]

ATP I, session 9

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 8 - Dimensions and Coordinates of a Multiplicity, the continuum of Signifiance and the Deterritorialization of the Sign**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; transcript, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions. Also note that the session titled "Il Senso in Meno 9" belongs to the same session as this one, and we present it under Part 9*]

[2:23:07, start; 3:45:46, end, total, 1:22:39, of YouTube recording, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1Po2tIgeD4]

A student: … With the tables it was more like a buffet…

Deleuze: Do you miss having the tables?

The student: [*Unclear words*] … Oh, no…

Deleuze: It's no longer the same, eh?

Another student: It's more practical! [*During these exchanges, the camera slowly pulls back revealing the participants, stopping at Guattari seated opposite Deleuze toward the back of the room*]

Deleuze: [*Unclear words*] … It's not bad this way; it's a bit like a waiting room. It's not bad. [*The camera returns to Deleuze*] Okay, enough dreaming. To work right now. No more pauses. [*Pause*] So let's get started! [*Tape interrupted*] [2:23:57]

Deleuze: So, it's good like this today… because I have to make some drawings... I have to make a few drawings because the last time I proposed a number of themes which were very disordered so you might reflect on them and so we might go about trying to organize them. So… at least we have chalk, but the blackboard is a bit dirty… [*Tape interrupted*] [2:24:32]

[*For what follows and the drawings that Deleuze develops, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *plateau 5 and specifically the drawing presented on pp. 135-137, the first one pertaining to "signifiance"; as the recording begins again, Deleuze stands at the board having already drawn a version of the initial illustration*]

Starting from what was said the last time - and we've spoken about it a little – let's call this the *schema of signifiance*. And we can immediately say why we have called it the schema of signifiance. Let's imagine that we can reduce it to a point... Here, perhaps, we have a centre of signifiance. And around it we have a number of concentric circles… concentric circles or spires, spires of a spiral. And on these spires, we can place any kind of sign.

I want to go back to something that struck me during the last lesson. How did it begin? At the beginning, there was a dog barking at the back of the room. A dog where there shouldn't have been a dog. So I'll put it on the outermost circle: it barks, it's a sign like any other. Or it would be a sign like any other… but in what conditions? If we were, for example, paranoiacs… The dog barks. He's right to bark. And what happened afterwards? I was over there. I raised my head and suddenly I was afraid. This is an entirely different circle. I haven't drawn enough of them. I saw someone masked, who was wearing a kind of S&M mask. I hadn't noticed him before, [*Deleuze makes a gesture toward the back of the class*] I wasn't expecting this. [*Pause, he turns back to the board*] A dog barks, a mask can emerge…

I said to myself that I was going to need all this for later. I was thinking that here there was an atmosphere, a phenomenon of *mundanization* or *atmospherization*. I saw it and I wasn't the only one. Something was going to happen. I didn't know what. I didn't know where it would come from. And then on another circle there… someone who arrives who makes a sign, who emits his own sign saying: "It's the first time I come... what are all these tables doing here?" [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze is referring to the circumstances that occurred in the previous session's discussion*]

On one hand, there is a redoubling: there's a girl who appears to be taller than him because she's standing on a table and for that reason she emerges. She makes a speech… which is at times quite violent... and I'm thinking: "Let's take that route". And at that point, the tables take on an enormous importance, and they park themselves on all the circles. The tables... And then I turn to see somebody entering the room through the window. That's a whole other experience, different from the one with the dog. So, all I'm saying is: there is a center of signifiance -- and we will see what this consists of – of numerous heterogeneous signs distributed across concentric circles or the spires of a spiral.

And what else is there? Maybe, to complete the schema, there is something I'm drawing now with a broken line: a *line of flight*. At the top of the outermost spiral is a line of flight. There may be different ones: those who leave because they're fed up. The door is more or less blocked. So you pass by the window, I don't know how... But I'll draw this broken line of flight, and there I have my first schema.

You will, I hope, recognize the point where we began, namely, the schema of "a something", and I am indeed saying of *a something* because we need to ask ourselves what this "something" is. There's "a something" that is defined through a kind of matrix or center which produces a sort of circular irradiation, an expanding circularity accompanied by a broken line of flight. So, beginning with this type of matrix, an expanding development occurs, which summons to itself, or regroups or redistributes along its spires signs of a most diverse and heterogeneous nature.

And then we had another schema. [*Pause; Deleuze starts working on a second schema on the board*] In this case it was no longer a schema of significance. We called it a *passional schema*, or a *schema of subjectivation*. And this schema is clearly very different from the previous one since, rather than proceeding from a center through an expanding circular irradiation, it proceeds from a point – *a point of subjectivation* rather than a center of significance. In fact, I might be able to subjectivize myself from any point of departure. A fetishist is subjectivized -and is therefore defined as passional – beginning from a pair of shoes or a single shoe or even just a heel. A lover can be subjectivized beginning from the eyes. We've already seen things of that sort, or maybe we haven't, no matter.

This point of subjectivation is like the beginning of a straight line. And this straight line is segmentarized. What form does it take? It's segmentarized through a certain number of successive proceedings. Remember how the two schemas were formally opposed - even before knowing to whom and to what all this referred, even if we've already looked at it? But we can put this aside for the moment...

The formal opposition of the two schemas consists in: irradiating circular expansion beginning from a centre that will distribute the most heterogeneous signs. And, in the second case, a small packet of determined signs fleeing along a straight line that is segmentarized in successive proceedings. So, we oppose the idea of a succession of linear proceedings to that of irradiating circularity. Just as we oppose the idea of a fleeing packet of signs beginning from a point of subjectivation to that of a group of heterogeneous signs subsumed by a center that organizes their distribution, expansion and irradiation.

So, I would just like to pose three questions, starting from these two schemas. First question. Supposing that here we have two semiotic schemas... for the moment, we still don't know what a regime of semiotic signs consists in… we are using the words approximately... Suppose that what we have on one hand is a semiotic of significance and on the other a passional semiotic or a semiotic of subjectivation: can we make a connection between them, even just on an abstract plane? To be able to do so would be reassuring. Reassuring, because we could say that, in concrete terms, they are continually mixing. In concrete terms, our semiotics of these things are mixed. They borrow a group from a certain system or regime and from another regime.

Can we link one of these schemas to the other? Clearly, we can. But only at a certain cost, and in certain conditions. I say "clearly we can" because this broken line [*at the end of the first schema*] is clearly the irradiating and circular system's line of flight. Isn't this line fully realized in the passional system? To the point that to link the two schemas, it would be enough to place this line [*the straight line, second schema*] right here [*to the end of the first schema*], [*Pause*] making the center of significance descend to this point which now becomes a point of subjectivation. It seems to me that that would work perfectly. I'm simply holding onto the possibility of linking the two schemas as if they were two little trains.

Second question: What do these two schemas refer to? That we already… Actually, it's up to you, and this poses the problem of method that we touched upon at the beginning. I would say: they refer to whatever you like. Because each of these two schemas is a *multiplicity*, even if we talk about a center of significance, even if there is an instance of unification. In any case, such an

instance functions within a multiplicity. So, we have a multiplicity of signifiance and a passional multiplicity, or multiplicity of subjectivation. Actually, I cannot say that one of these characteristics is more important than the other. They are all on the same plane. I can say that each of these multiplicities has *n dimensions*. We'll see what dimensions we find. Here, for example, for the moment – and I insist on this point to convey how simple it is – for the moment, here… as I will try to explain… we have 7 dimensions. If someone tells me "I see 9…" or "Among your 7 some can be reduced…" it doesn't matter. What matters is that it there is never a fixed number of dimensions. It proceeds by 2, by 3… There are 2, 3, *n* dimensions, whatever you want.

Here too, I have to define my schema [*the second one*] through *n* dimensions. And this is what defines it. Which is why I don't need to ask myself beforehand what it refers to. The question isn't what it refers to; the question is: how many dimensions does this one have [*the first schema*] compared to the number of dimensions of the other? On this point, if I openly enumerate my dimensions, it doesn't matter if someone comes along and says: "I would add one". On the contrary, it's even better. What's more annoying is if someone arrives and says: "Here I would remove one or two". But that's okay too.

When we have our number of dimensions, I suppose... it seems highly abstract but, in reality, it's just a kind of recipe. It really is a recipe. We should write a cookery book! Let's suppose it has two dimensions. For example, I take three. When I limit or else augment the number of dimensions, when I vary them, it's only then that I can say what it is they refer to. Before that, it could be anything… a determined multiplicity but of whatever character, an unassignable multiplicity. If you take a precise number of dimensions, then you can ask what it refers to. So, let's do that. What does this refer to?

We can call these dimensions the system's *coordinates*. In function of the coordinates we take into consideration, we can attribute the schema to something specific. Today I can say all this in abstract terms because the other time, we looked at it concretely. In the schema of signifiance, if I consider certain dimensions, whether or not I state which these are, if I consider certain dimensions, I obtain this particular schema, this multiplicity which refers to a type of delirium. What is this type of delirium? We've already seen it: it's the paranoid delusion and delusion of interpretation, or a delusion of ideas. Why is this? -- We've already looked at it and I don't want to go back to that -- Because this delusion is constituted upon a matrix idea, a center of signifiance; it proceeds by way of irradiating circular expansion, and reunites, sutures or distributes the most heterogeneous signs.

If I consider other coordinates, you will say: "Which others?" We will have to look at them in detail. But please grant me that if I take other coordinates into consideration, the multiplicity's frame of reference will change. I would say this is important as a way to be able to avoid pointless objections. It will no longer be a paranoid or interpretive delusion, it will be a social formation, the type of formation we may call despotic. If I consider or privilege – because it isn't simply a question of keeping or jettisoning but also of emphasizing a given dimension – if I consider another dimension of this system, this multiplicity, I would ask, based on the other dimensions, or on this one, is this a system? I mentioned this to you yesterday while trying… no, I mean last week, while trying out different terms, especially since these terms don't come from

Guattari or myself. It's an idea someone proposed, that someone suggested to us. -- And that's the way to proceed: if people give you ideas, at some point, you'll give them back in return. -- Someone suggested to us certain noticeable differences between the two systems as a function of particular dimensions. I would say that this multiplicity can be called the system or multiplicity of *deception*.

Why does one spend one's time deceiving in this system? It's not so clear cut. I said some things last week that we will have to go back to and try to develop further. I call that *common work* when, for example, on Monday I make this multiplicity the multiplicity of paranoid delusion. And we say, okay, you hold onto that. I make the multiplicity of despotic power. And then another person, man or woman, arrives and says: "I'll make the system of deception out of it…" So, you understand that it wasn't a schema after all, but a map, a map, a map of variable coordinates. You could turn it upside down, refer it to a particular coordinate, and then it becomes delirium. You could refer it to other coordinates, and it becomes instead a social formation. You could refer it to further sets of coordinates, and it became something of the order of deception and trickery. [*Pause*] There you are. Each of us can do the same for the other coordinate.

And we saw that for other one, it was the same: the same method applied. You should never ask at the beginning to whom or what something refers to. Establish your own multiplicity! Calculate it well or badly… and for each case it must be different. Don't do as Hegel does. Don't proceed 3 by 3. Don't proceed 2 by 2. Open yourself to all numbers! Say: if it's 7, then let it be 7. If 90 then 90. And in this sense, it's also by following the dimensions you take into account that you assign the multiplicity to this or that.

And we've seen how the multiplicity of passion-subjectivation could have been assigned - depending on the dimensions taken into consideration - to a type of delirium. You see clearly how I'm already lying and playing tricks with everything because, in fact, in a real method, this shouldn't be same now. I wouldn't have the right to find two sides, two forms of delirium. Nor would I have the right to find two sides in terms of two social formations. Except that, if I proceed in another way, we would be lost. It would be too difficult for you as it would be for us all. So we approximate, but it goes without saying that all this serves simply to cause the collapse of the pseudo-unity of delirium just like the pseudo-unity of social formations.

So, we have to pass by way of this point. Therefore, if you consider certain dimensions of the second schema, you will extract a form of delirium, passional delusion or delusion of action, [*Pause*] and they are not the same thing. I won't spend much time on this because I've already developed it extensively... I just remind you that passional delirium, which is always opposed to, or assumes another figure with respect to paranoid or interpretive delirium, has been given different names throughout the history of psychiatry - all of which more or less refer to Esquirol's notion of monomania. The monomanias that Esquirol divided into three types: erotic monomania or erotomania, incendiary monomania...

A student: That's a good one!

Deleuze: It's not bad, not bad… and then homicidal monomania, reasoning monomania. Not bad... They more or less equate to what others would call sticklers. People who stick to procedures. A kind procedural delusion. And Esquirol had already defined monomania as a different form of delusion, not from paranoia, because he didn't yet know the word, but from mania. There wasn't an ensemble of things that undermined the exercise of faculties that otherwise remained sane, but a succession of acts, a delusion not of ideas but of acts. [*On Esquirol, see the Foucault seminar, session 3 (5 November 1985), and on psychiatry of the era, see* A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 119-120*] And this, particularly in Germany, was called a *querulous delusion.* And this is where the legal procedural aspect came in. It was a delusion of querulants. They start a proceeding that arrives at its conclusion and then they embark upon a second and then a third and so on... Other psychiatrists would call them grievance delusions. And yet others would refer to them as passional delusions. And they were grouped into three main forms: jealousy, erotomania and redress.

So if you consider certain coordinates of the second multiplicity you will have, for example, a delirious formation: the group of passional delusions. While if you consider other or more coordinates, you will have – it's what we touched upon, perhaps rather hurriedly, and it will still have to be proved -- you will have something quite strange, no longer the despotic formation but something quite different we will have to find a name for this but maybe we will just look for a general name. Since we're talking about attributions and without seeking to be too symmetrical, we could call it the history of the Jewish People. [*Pause*]

But to what extent? Quite generally, since we tried to get an idea of this the last time, and naturally the history of the Jewish People raises a number of other questions. It's not by chance; I'm really glad that I first made the connection, the Jewish people with the exodus literally going off on a tangent from a despotic system, the system of the Pharaohs. [*Pause*] Everything happens as if they took upon their shoulders, and inserted themselves into, the line of flight… [*Tape interrupted*] [2:53:50]

[*While several details seem to suggest that what follows occurs in an entirely different session – Deleuze now wearing a dark coat (that he removes at the end of this section) and a hat – the following 36 minutes is the result of an interruption in the work in progress, with the same schemas on the board evident in the subsequent part. Since this segment opens in mid-discussion, it is important to explain the substance of the debate which is revealed only gradually. Apparently during a break in the filming, a woman student made some unclear accusation to Deleuze concerning a "stolen text", and Deleuze stated his refusal to continue and even threatened to leave, hence the coat and hat. Following this unrecorded part, the debate unfolds on two tracks, on one hand, on what basis could or should the assembled class members exclude the student in question, and on the other hand, if the material that Deleuze developed earlier – concerning despotic power, etc. – might prevent any such move. As the session opens, a student (designated here as "the first student") is speaking on behalf of the second position*]

A first student: … first of all, you can't eliminate, for example, the despotic system. It's there. One has to admit that. You can't get rid of it. It's not that we don't want to, it's that we can't do so…

A woman student: What are you trying to … [*Indistinct comments*]

Another student: Wait your turn, darling!

The woman student: [*Unclear remarks, pause*] … It's not true what you're saying.

Another student: Shut up! [*Diverse noises, pause; the first student is visibly waiting*]

The first student: I'm not saying that we don't want to do it [*presumably, exclude the woman student in question*]; it's that we can't; we can't because the mode of repressive power is impossible to... it's everywhere. It can't work, it's unfeasible. I mean, that here, in this theatre where we are, we … there are…

Another student: But we're not in a theater! We're not in a theater!

The first student: We cannot…

The previous student: [*Indistinct comment*]

The first student: It's truly impossible! How can it be done? [*Diverse voices, including the first woman student's*] What would we have to eliminate? By what means… [*Indistinct comment*]

Another student [*Philippe*]: I have a proposal to make. In my view, we're all being cowards. I'm doing something I've never done before in my life, and I take responsibility for it. I'm throwing you out! [*Pause*] I've never done anything like this in my life. [*He starts walking towards the students standing near the door; diverse voices, noises*] What you're doing is completely unacceptable.

The first student: No it's not, I'm saying…

The second student: I've never done this before.

Another woman student: You don't have the right to do that.

The second student [*Philippe*]: Otherwise, every Tuesday, we're the ones who are getting thrown out. Do you want it to be the same every day? And just because we're trying not to be repressive, so everyone lets themselves get aggressed. For us, that makes us… [*Indistinct comment; diverse voices; Deleuze becomes visible in his usual seat, wearing a hat*]

Guattari: Philippe! Oh! Philippe! [*Diverse noises, voices*]

Eric: Nobody is taking responsibility in this classroom!

Guattari: Philippe! Listen to me a second!

Deleuze: Philippe, don't touch her! Don't touch her!

A woman student: He has to calm down!

Guattari: He is calm. He has the same right to be as sane as you.

The first student: The problem is that this is nonetheless an interesting place to be. Even if it gets upset, even when it's upset, there is an effect created, and here we produce a perfect outcome. It really is an extraordinary example.

Another student: It's making a straight line on the circle. [*Reference to Deleuze's two schema's earlier*]

The first student: Before, we were discussing it but now we're no longer doing so. We're just suffering it. What's at stake is something completely different. It's not a question of analysis. It's about what we're living, you understand? It's an unimaginable mode; I mean that there isn't a problem of exclusion. We can't exclude anyone.

Guattari: Giovanni Jervis talks about these things on the radio all the time. They discuss boring stuff like the situation in Italy, and then there's someone talking about an amazing thing, like all these marvelous things that Éric mentions even if they're seemingly off topic. So, you're saying we're condemned to cut off any intervention like that, just to have a bit of logical coherence. Jervis has spoken about this problem. What is this "tolerance" of ours towards certain forms of discourse, where we can spend an entire lesson arguing with someone? It's possible, it can be done... it would be great to be able to spend a couple of hours talking to Eric and his woman friend who must be dying of anguish right now. Fine.

But since our goal is to speak with a certain logical coherence about a series of connected ideas, we can't accept it. We are prisoners of a certain representation of "spontaneism", of a certain freedom of expression, a kind of absence of constraints that comes back to assault us… as though we were walking towards the riot police carrying bunches of flowers as they attack us. It's completely stupid when you think about it…

A student: We've had it up to here with therapy!

Guattari: Therapy? It's not a question of therapy. If we say: "One day we're going to clear things up with our friend here, what happened with Deleuze? What occurred? Why did she talk about stolen texts?" Yes, okay, fine. We'll come to an agreement there. But if we accept that anyone can walk in here and throw boiling oil on us, pile on a load of crap with all that stuff, we can't function at all   anymore anywhere, we're prisoners. Unlike Philippe, I don't think we can find a solution by crucifying ourselves with violence. But we have to confront the problem. We are ourselves... we secrete this reaction. We lay ourselves open to this reaction.

The first student: Does one have to say about what you just said that…

Eric (*interrupting, screaming throughout his interventions*): You're making an analysis of the institution. You're describing how it functions. And on that point, we'd do better to reread… uh, [Bronislaw] Malinowski…

Guattari: Malinowski or [Vladimir] Mayakovsky?

Eric: You embody the institution as a professor!

A student: [*Inaudible comment due to the screaming*]

Eric: Deleuze…. [*To the student*] That's not the question... I'm trying to say something, idiot! There's always... I'm speaking to her... there's always a difference between what I say and what I live. And at Vincennes, there is always a difference between what we say and what we live.

Guattari: Eric, Eric!

Eric: And this is what I call contradiction!

Guattari: Eric, do you want Deleuze to leave Vincennes for good?

Eric: No!

Guattari: That's what you want!

Eric: No it's not!

Guattari: So why are you behaving constantly like an idiot?

Eric: [*Indistinct comment at start*] … I'm saying that you embody the institution!

Guattari: You're going to succeed. That's what's going to happen. Is that what you want?

Eric: No, I have nothing to do with this business.

Guattari: Yes, you do, because you're creating a shit storm (*tu fous de la merde*).

Eric: No, I'm not! [*Tape interrupted*] [2:59:15]

… Guattari: So can we continue now?

The first student: Yes, well, but I can't accept this. I mean, I can't accept that we go on analyzing a model in this way. We can't build a discourse on this model, saying: "Let's analyze it and see what we find," all that. No, … [*He tries to speak while Guattari answers*]

Guattari: Then we won't do anything. There'll be nothing to do either next week or the following week. So it's now that we must decide. [*Silence, pause*]

The first student: I mean that…

Guattari: I'm not talking about Deleuze. He can say what he wants, but I can't go on like this.

The first student: It's not possible! Anyway, the proof is right there, that there are lines everywhere, everyone's always arguing all the time, no one is getting along, we can't understand anything about anything. And that explains everything.

Another student: That's not true! I understand perfectly well.

The first student: No, we don't understand anything…

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): I don't give a shit about what he says. That doesn't interest me at all, at all, at all. And you know why? It's because [*indistinct words*] I am quite pleased, but all the [*indistinct words*] in this matter doesn't interest me.

A student: If we raise the question of exclusion, we have to understand how it happens, if there are any rules.

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): There are no rules. That's why we're all here…

The first student: There aren't any. That's just the point. There aren't. And if there aren't, what are we supposed to do? And here I'm following all the lines. We'll never get out of it.

A woman student: No, no, I don't see that.

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): Of course we will. We do it every morning, that functions every day, every single goddamned day, like fools, at work, at school. It works. And we even have to smile about it.

Another student: Oh, no, no, no…

The preceding student (*Robert Albouker*): What do you mean "no"? Look at me, I'm here!

The first student: At the Elysée asylum, that works as well…

The second student (*Philippe*): I propose we vote… Does the course continue as is, that is, next week or does it not continue? We have to take responsibility and decide once and for all whether to exclude this girl who's been disrupting the lesson and who will continue to do so every Tuesday until we're left with nothing, we have to accept our responsibility!

A woman student (*whose voice and protests are audible in the preceding student's statement*): No, that's not true! [*Pause, diverse voices, all indistinct*]

The first student: We have Deleuze here, and this question concerns Deleuze and her before it concerns us, that is, there's something going on there [*he makes a gesture linking Deleuze and a woman student*]. It's not at all… I mean, even if we vote, Deleuze can always say, "No, she 's here, she makes it impossible for me," I don't know. [*Deleuze sits listening in silence*] If he can work it out with her, I don't know… it's something between Deleuze and her.

The second student (*Philippe*): No, it's not just between Deleuze and her. It concerns all of us and her.

The first student: Not at all! Not at all!

Guattari: We're reaching a level of idiocy now that's unbelievable! [*Diverse voices, brouhaha*] We've descended to the state of stupid cattle, [*Pause, reactions*] stupid cattle pulling wagons into the camps. [*Pause*]

Deleuze: I would just like to say a couple of things now... I awake from my catatonic state, and I would say...

A woman student: But Guattari already…

Several students: Shut up!

Deleuze: [3:02:17] I'm asking two questions. Firstly, what are we doing here? We are quite modest. So what are we doing here that is of so bizarre in nature that it triggers a certain type of aggression? [*Pause*] We've seen a lot of examples. Today's is one that seems particularly painful. Second question: what is it that makes us – and maybe with some reasons, though I won't say these are good reasons – what it is that makes us so defenseless when confronted with these acts of aggression? In a sense, it can be useful to learn something from the outside. What we're doing here must not disturb anywhere; I don't know, I'm not saying "anyone". But suddenly we are disarmed in the sense that it becomes very easy for a single person to create havoc in the classroom, considering that the balance of power normally favors the individual, unless he or she happens to be in a classroom with a whole army, a security team available.

Personally speaking, I feel a bit lost today. And it interests me so little that I can say my only strength – and here I'm not speaking on behalf of the rest of the class – my only strength is an extreme obstinacy. Three Tuesdays would be sufficient to accomplish a very simple thing: completely destroy the work we've done. I'll come back every Tuesday. I don't give a shit; I don't give a shit. [*Je m'en fous*]\

There are two elements that come together in this affair. This girl arrives. She has a certain relationship with all of us in that she prevents us from doing what we're trying to do. And as you said, she obviously has a certain rapport with me. Of which I understand nothing. I only know -- and this is no secret because the same problem has occurred in other situations -- I get calls at night when I would normally be sleeping. Silence on the other end of the line, or insults or obscenities... Usually very confused. They always mistake me for someone else.

It's very similar in a way. In the case of the phone calls, as Félix says, what should we do when people like that are so obstinate? They call you ten, twenty times in a row. I pick up the phone, and I hear noises. What should we do? One day, we might even find someone on our doorstep, standing there saying "I want to see you!" What do we do then. Call the police? Don't call the police? What do you do after three months of this? It's strange how it always happens to the same people. Lacan is lucky in this sense. He would have resolved the problem in two seconds.

But in my view, it's a kind of strength, nothing exceptional, but it's a strength that we are so, so… even if now we might be forced to change tack... though not much. What is it that makes us so defenseless faced with someone who comes in here saying: "You stole that from me!"? The same way I'm defenseless when they call me up at night. What is it that produces this? I would almost say, at the risk of sounding vain, I would almost say that it's the novelty... a certain novelty in what we're doing. It's a certain novelty in what we're doing here that permits someone to turn up...

I think of a recent book that I find quite repellent where they refer to us as "the current trend". The current trend... That's a bit exaggerated because -- and I stress that Lacan has nothing to do with it -- but it's a bunch of Lacanians, Lacanian Marxists, as Eric would say, who speak of us as "the current trend." But to be frank… if there is an organized "current trend", it's not us. We are nothing. We just work in our little corner.

Once again, what can we summon by way of response if they want to prevent us from working? I'd like to imagine some responses we could give. I would say it's partly the nature of what we are doing here that renders us so defenseless, and yet at the same time, I consider this a means of defense. Therefore, I'm not going to leave. I was wrong to say that I would leave... I'm not going. I'll just wait until you leave. That's all. And then if this goes on much longer, and you stay, then probably I will end up leaving. There we are. [*Pause*] But I think the only way to resist is to stay on the defensive when facing cases like this. Perhaps we ought to find a better solution, we might find a better solution, but for the moment I can't think of one. So, now I slide back into my catatonic state...

A student: I think she left! [*Pause*]

Another student: Actually, she left ten minutes before all this [*unclear word; then to Deleuze*] You hadn't seen her face before? [*Pause, Deleuze makes no response*] What makes you think you didn't start all this? I'm not accusing you.

Deleuze: Ah yes!

The student: I'm not accusing you, ok? [*Pause*]

Deleuze: I'm afraid of myself!

Another student: I've never saw her face at all… [*Pause, several comments from other students*]

Deleuze: Oh yes, she was here last year. [*Pause*] Has she gone? [*Deleuze stands up*]

Another student: Well, yes she has.

Deleuze: Really? [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze slowly takes off the hat and coat he has worn throughout the discussion, that he no doubt put on when he was planning to leave; noises of chairs while he prepares*] … [*Tape interrupted*] [3:10:02]

… Deleuze: One can always speak through dualisms. In the end, it's the easiest, the most convenient way. Once again, the base 2 binary system is the most convenient. Parenthetically, that's what computer scientists are always telling us. Computer scientists, who always work through binarisms, say they do it because, from the computer's point of view, it's the easiest method. For a computer, we know, base 2 is the easiest way. [*Pause*] So much the better, we say, since considering what we have done up to now, in the way we've considered the question, we've learned something.

When we spoke about the face, we thought we'd discovered that binarisms, the establishing of dichotomies and binary rapports, the whole aggregate of dualisms, had served us well for reasons that were far from mere convenience. They were connected to the exercise of a certain type of power, and there were forms of power that couldn't tolerate the polyvocality of bodies and had to produce face, and that in producing face, established major binarisms, given that the face is caught up in binary relationships. And beginning from this, the signifying elements were distributed according to a series of dichotomies.

We also saw how an exercise of power is something that completely defines the dominant language and that profoundly defines the way that language and words are used. As a result, it's not a question of saying: "I will invent a language without dualisms." There's only one thing at stake here: not only are dualisms convenient but language itself as a form of expression of a particular power *imposes* dualisms. As a result, our only response, both in speaking and writing, is to continually open a kind of passage *between* dualisms. And each time we make a dualism collapse – a dualism is like a piece of furniture, it's something that is always being moved around… – we're inevitably going to run into another one and so we'll have to open up a new passage in that dualism. And each time we'll try to do so.

As a result, of course I am saying there are two forms of delirium on each side. It goes without saying that we will try to open up a passageway between these two forms, we will try to arrive at something that will obviously no longer deserve to be called either reason or delirium, nor one type of delusion or another. However, we're not going to be able to open this passageway using a predetermined method and every time we will have to regain the multiplicities, passing by way of these dualisms.

So as I can only respond like that, I am saying, let's try to look for the dimensions, the coordinates of the first system that we call *signifiance* and which, based on the coordinates contained therein, will be located both at the level of a delirium and of a social formation, a system, for example, a system of deception.

So the first coordinate -- I number them because there are many and this will help us to orient ourselves -- the first coordinate, to return to my example of signs, which in the meantime has become more complex as we have added others, is a system in which a sign refers to other signs *ad infinitum*. There's a whole network of signs that are completely heterogeneous. [*Pause*] Everything is captured.

What does it mean when we say that a sign refers to another sign? After all this emotion, we have to let loose... The sign refers to another sign. It means at least that some things can no longer happen. When a sign refers to another sign of which I know nothing in advance, a kind of atmosphere has already been born, an *atmospherization*, as I said before. What do we understand here? The sign refers to another sign. I should say that in our method we should never practice free association of ideas. What we have to do is produce redundancy. We have to make resonate not words but bits of phrases [*Pause*] until a kind of jump occurs. The sign refers to another sign. We feel that we're not going to get anything worthwhile out of that. We can say, yes it's true but it leaves us in an impasse... No matter what sign refers to no matter what sign. This is the system of signifiance. Nothing to be gleaned there, we're saying.

Then suddenly a glimmer of light appears. If the sign refers to another sign, it means at least that it doesn't refer to something else. And what would this something else be? I can conceive... maybe it will help us get out of these dualisms. I can conceive of a sign that refers to something other than another sign. A sign can refer to a state of things. An extremely variable state of things. For example, smoke is a sign of fire. Of course, fire could be just another sign, and then we fall back into the same trap. But fire can also be considered a state of things.

"A sign refers to a state of things" is a very different proposition to "a sign refers to another sign." A painting, a corporeal painting on the body of a member of a tribe, appears to refer to a very particular state of things. It's a code that refers to a territoriality. Are all states of things of this nature? Animals, it's well known that animals emit signs. For example, excrement, which equates to states of things, is often used by animals as signs. Signs of what? Signs of the limits of their territory. The sign may therefore refer to a state of things that, generally speaking -- I don't have time right now to ask whether or not every state of things is a territoriality -- but I'll just say that a sign can refer to a state of things that can, generally speaking, be reduced to a territoriality. [*Pause*]

But I see something else. The sign may also no longer refer to a state of things that it designates. It may refer to a signified, as they say, to something that it signifies and which is not of the same nature as a state of things. So, while I say that the sign refers to a state of things, that is to a territoriality, generally what the sign signifies is not a state of things but rather a concept. The sign signifies a concept. We're not demanding... We're not looking for anything extraordinary here. So, it signifies a concept. We can in some way say that it no longer *refers* to a territoriality, but that it *leads* to a kind of reterritorialization, a reterritorialization that is in this case spiritual or mental. [*Pause*]

So there we have it. We've opened our passage. What is the sign that refers to another sign, *ad infinitum*, a sign that refers to a sign that refers to a sign that refers to a sign… to the point that in the end one can no longer even call it a sign, but rather an infinite or unlimited realm of

signifiance, an infinite or unlimited realm of signifiance which is precisely the state of a sign that refers to any sign whatsoever? So I can say that the sign that refers to another sign, insofar as it refers to another sign, is a deterritorialized sign [*Pause*]. No longer referring to a state of things and not yet referring to a signified, it is caught up in the moment of its own deterritorialization.

Suddenly we can say, at the risk of including everything in what we're discussing, there's a famous author, Peirce, who proposed a terminology that had a certain success: *index*, *icon*, *symbol*. We don't really care what he meant by this. That's not our business. We just imagine that we might be able to make use of these terms. We will say that the *index* is the sign insofar as it refers to a territoriality whereas the *icon* is the sign insofar as it leads to a reterritorialization, and the *symbol* is the sign insofar as it is deterritorialized, that is, the sign that refers to another sign.

But how can there be a network in which any sign can refer to any other sign? Once again, at this level there are no longer different states of things. Or, as is often said, there are no longer referents. Nor are there signifieds. Quite simply, the sign becomes a signifier when it refers to another sign *ad infinitum*. This status of the sign is rather bizarre. What is implied by this network of signs become signifiers? It becomes signifiers precisely by the fact that they refer to another sign *ad infinitum*.

In what conditions does such a network become possible? There isn't yet a given signified, rather this network of signs is established on a sort of *continuum*, a sliding continuum, a slippery continuum. Which means that all possible contents, all signifieds are fused in a kind of atmospheric continuum… [*Tape interrupted*] [3:24:10]

A kind of amorphous, slippery, revolting continuum... like quicksand. A point, a sign... takes up another sign. Everything occurs as though the continuum had slid. As a result, these signs don't even require the links of free association. Free association is a complete idiocy. There's no need. They are drawn towards one another by the slow sliding of the continuum. Once again, there is nothing that associates the dog and the mask. [*Reference to the example given toward the beginning of the session*] There is just a movement of muddy terrain, of sticky terrain. It's not surprising. Both paranoid delusion and the despotic formation are traversed by terror. [*Pause*] And that's the first characteristic. I have to go faster.

Second characteristic... The first, as we said, is simply the reference from sign to sign that implies a deterritorialization of the sign and supposes an amorphous, sliding continuum. Second characteristic: the circularity of the system. Indeed one of the most well-known and celebrated representatives of the signifying system, Lacan, says, for example, of the signifying sign that it is "at the risk of a circular return". Why "at the risk of a circular return"? You see the signifying chain that is constituted on the amorphous network. -- He doesn't present its constitution in this way, but it's of no importance --"at the risk of a circular return", in fact, redundancy already belongs to the system, signifying redundancy, each sign passing into another sign. The dog has become this. It has become. What does it mean that it has become another thing? It means that a slow slippage of the terrain has occurred, causing it to pass into something else. It's not a happy world. Nor will this be a happy world. [*Deleuze indicates the second schéma*] To find gay, happy worlds we'll have to go off on a tangent… "At the risk of circular return", the sign that passes into another sign, that will pass again on its own account... This impression of eternal return

forms part of this sticky atmosphere, the impression of the already lived. A sad impression…
[*Tape interrupted*] [3:27:36]

… When Nietzsche has this impression he leaps with joy, but not for long. He's dragged under by the quicksand. He trips up in his dance. If nothing else, he was happy for an instant. That's already something.

Therefore, what we have is a kind of redundancy - not only of the sign with another sign but of the sign with itself. The sign doesn't enter into relation with another sign in the sliding continuum without entering into relation with itself as that which will always make its return. This is what it is to feel the sign of the despot. The whole of the despot is already there. But we haven't seen it yet. So that's the second characteristic. Sorry if I have to rush on, but otherwise we'll never get finished.

Third dimension. If I keep to my schema and let it guide me… I can say that I've roughly accounted for the circularity of the system. But why are there several circles? Why all these spires of the spiral? Why these distinct circles? This is very important for us. Why? Because from one circle to another – and you see how the signs are distributed on these distinct circles... Once more I go back to the example we encountered in the last lesson. With the atmosphere there was that day in this room, the signs weren't at all on the same circle. We could always say that I was the one who brought it in with me, but I wouldn't be happy with that, since it implies an operation of redoubling that would put us in mind of certain notions...

A student: But wasn't it more like the second figure?

Deleuze: You think so?

The student: Yes. [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze pauses to consider this*]

Deleuze: The various signs didn't arise on the same spires or the same circles... The dog, I repeat, was part of the outermost circle. To be specific, insofar as it was a sign pertaining to this formation, it was a deterritorialized dog. It didn't have its territoriality here. It was a deterritorialized dog. Friendly enough but deterritorialized all the same… [*Tape interrupted*] [3:30:42]

… In this system of signifiance [*Deleuze indicates the first schema*], one never ceases... you see how I'm still developing my first point, even if we're at the third. I'm still developing the first point. Because the sign refers to any other sign, one never ceases to jump from one circle to another. An example is the girl [*He refers to the woman who caused the preceding lengthy discussion*] She obviously had an account to settle with me. There… a whole private scene was in play, although I had never done anything to her. And she for her part had a public intervention to make. She was making a jump. I think that's why Félix said – for which someone accused him of being a psychiatrist – that's why Felix said: She feels anguished. She too... She makes us feel anguished, but she feels it too. She was jumping from one circle to another.

It's strange... Because in the system – we still haven't spoken about the despot, but you can feel he's always there in the background. In what form? There are his two eyes – in the system you have regulated jumps, ones that are tolerated and others that are forbidden. Regulated jumps are when one can pass, I suppose, from a certain private event to a certain social situation. In other cases, this kind of jump is not permitted. Think for example of the time when military men who were officers didn't have the right to divorce. What does that mean? If I take a circle which I nominate completely at random, considering I have no particular reason for it to be here or there. It varies… it can be extremely variable. Everything depends on the point of reference. If you take the family home as the center of signifiance, the private circle will be the closest to the hearth. If you take the State apparatus as your center the private circle will be very extrinsic. So we have to put everything into play. To respond to your question, it explodes in every direction.

So, anyway, I named it very randomly. Let's imagine that *this* is the circle of private signs, and *this* is the circle of public signs. Private event: divorce. The jump is forbidden. The officer is stripped of his rank. It's a jump you can't make. You cannot be both an officer and divorced. Of course, things have changed since then... But in what way have they changed? Which jumps are still not tolerated? Which ones?

What is it that the Greeks call *hybris*? [*Deleuze writes it on the board*] You recall that in Greek tragedy, you have two elements: firstly, there's the theme of the gods who give a *lot* to each, who assign lots, as in a lottery; and then you have the man of *hybris*, who is someone who jumps too far and who overleaps his lot. He has literally jumped too far when prey to a demon. In general, the Greek hero is possessed by *hybris*, a word usually translated as "outrageousness". Having failed to measure his jump, he attempts a forbidden jump.

Then there are jumps that are well regulated, for example, when a boy from good family goes to study at the *Polytéchnique*… this is allowed... There's a whole system of regulations. One particular example is found in very ancient despotic formations in South America, where passages between private and public signs are strictly regulated, for example between the event of a woman who betrays her husband and the right the husband has to withdraw to the outskirts of the village to pray for a calamity to descend upon the whole village, until such time as purification rites have been performed. Here we have a typical regulation of the jump: a woman betrays her husband and the husband rebounds on a given circle of signifiance to which he has the right. On another circle, he moves to the outskirts of the village and prays to the gods to wipe out all the villagers. So you sense all this... It's again the sliding continuum that permits him to do so.

But at the same time, there are forbidden jumps, the ones we're not supposed to make. This is why I say our schema works by means of a multiplicity of circles. But there's no need to say where this multiplicity of circles derives from. It's simple... We have the answer in our last two points. The multiplicity of my circles derives from the following: the sign that refers to another sign, whether on the same circle or on another, is the deterritorialized state of the sign. And I will try to explain to you why this is. It's the sign in its deterritorialization. Otherwise, it refers to something other than a sign.

However, deterritorialization is never a state. It's a movement. Now, in function of their origin, in function of the territoriality from which they derive… signs do not have the same speed, nor the same nature of deterritorialization. As a result, it's inevitable that there isn't a single circle but rather spires of a spiral. These spires or different circles are distinguished according to their speed and to the nature of deterritorialization of the signs that are assigned to each circle or spire. It seems complicated, but actually it's quite simple. One has to just let oneself go.

Good. Here we already have three coordinates. First coordinate: the sign referring to another sign *ad infinitum*. This is the sign's signifiance and state of deterritorialization. Second coordinate: the system is circular, and necessarily so. Third coordinate: it involves a plurality of distinct circles or spires of a spiral, with both regulated jumps from one circle to the other and also forbidden jumps between circles. In a certain sense, Oedipus, the despot... it sometimes happens that the despot himself makes the forbidden jump. And in *Oedipus,* there's a famous line, when Oedipus asks in relation to his own case: "Which demon has leapt the longest leap?" That is to say, which demon led me to make the forbidden jump? A jump in the sense of... [*Deleuze makes a jumping gesture with his hands, but does not finish the sentence*]

Fourth coordinate: it's not enough that we have several circles. Each time we add a dimension. In the second coordinate, we obtained the idea of the circle, and in the third, the plurality of circles. But we don't yet have a sufficient number of dimensions. Fourth coordinate or dimension: we need something that assures the expansion of the circles, that assures their perpetual expansion. What prevents the signifying regime from dying of a sort of *entropy*, as physicists would say? What prevents the entropy of the system from growing to the point that everything is annulled in the indeterminate and anonymous continuum? This continuum is very dangerous because it is at the same time the quicksand that carries the sign to another sign and also what rises up and risks drowning everything in an atmospheric continuity where one can no longer distinguish anything. At which point the whole system would suffocate.

Therefore, something is required to continually recharge the circles. To recharge the signs on every circle. Something is required to be able to assure the circles' expansion. What assures it, therefore, is the fact that all at once, in another dimension that I can't even represent, every sign, or group of signs -- it hardly matters -- will be made to correspond to a signified. We are no longer in the domain of signifiance, we are in the domain of what we could call *interpretation*. To interpret means to make a sign or a group of signs, presumed to be signifiers, refer to a signified.

It's not the same situation we had in the first dimension where the only signified was the amorphous anonymous, atmospheric continuum itself. Now, on the contrary, the continuum is cut, in such a way as to make every group of signs correspond to a signified. Here we no longer have the figure of the despot but that of his accomplice, the interpreter, the diviner. The diviner will interpret the signs which is to say he will make them correspond to a given signified.

Fine, but how does that suffice to recharge the system as a whole? I'm going even faster now! It's not a modern discovery to say that no interpretation ever arrives at an ultimate *interpreted.* What the diviners interpret are always other interpretations. The diviner emits signs… but what do they interpret? The signs of the goddess *ad infinitum*. In other words, if someone asked us what is the

ultimate signified, we would have to respond: the signifier. And I'm not the one making this up. All the champions of the signifier agree on this point. Which is the best interpretation? They also say it or perform it: it's silence.

This is what psychoanalysts have discovered: no longer to interpret but to keep silent. And it's this silence of the analyst that gives the patient something to interpret. Each time the interpretation, since it can do no more than replace another interpretation, recharges the signifier and refuels the sign with signifiance... And so here we have a first way to defeat the entropy of the system. It's the diviner, which is to say the man with the delusion of interpretation, who has the task of recharging the entropy of the system with signifiance.

As a result, at the extreme, parenthetically, what we have is a way to distinguish paranoia and interpretation. Though they are in the same group, they are not the same thing. This means that since the signified continuously refers to the signifier, and is in the last instance, the signifier itself, the interpretation that assigns the signified to a group of signs always recharges signifiance. Thus the machine of signifiance will constantly be recharged from within.

So we can say that the two maladies, because that's what they are, the two maladies of humanity are finally signifiance and interpretation. [*End of the tape*] [3:45:20]

[*Let us note that this discussion on the same day continues into session 9*]

ATP I, session 10

Gilles Deleuze

Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76

Il Senso in Meno, **Part 9 - Faciality as the substance of the Signifier, the Two Scapegoats and the Line of Flight**

Translated by Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni; revised translation, Charles J. Stivale

[*Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions*]

[3:45:50, start; 4:21:40, end; segment total, 36:50; session total, 1:59:19, from YouTube recording, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1Po2tIgeD4]

… The signifier with a capital "S" is pure redundancy. It's no longer the redundancy of a sign with respect to another sign, nor of the sign in relation to itself, it is redundancy in its pure state. The Signifier in its pure state is *fort da.* The bobbin game. That one chews on... Why does one chew on it? Because the Signifier in its pure state is so pure that we no longer even know what it is, whether it's in its place when it's not, or not in its place when it is. Very good... perfect.

Now that we know something about it, we can go faster. We saw this on other occasions, that the Signifier wouldn't be anything if it didn't have a substance to stabilize it. And this substance is faciality. This substance is the black hole of the eyes on the white wall. And if the Signifier can establish itself and establish its dichotomies and establish its signs and organize them in binary relationships where the sign refers to another sign, it is only in function of the organization made possible by faciality. And faciality is precisely the mainstay of the Signifier, otherwise there wouldn't be one.

Which is why the champions of the Signifier hide their faces. No, they don't hide their faces exactly, but they appear to say that the Signifier has no real need of their face. But at night they laugh... They're impostors. Who laugh while looking at themselves in the mirror, perfectly aware that by virtue...
[*Interruption by a student*]

A woman student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze (*laughing*): Yes, that arrives quite well… [since they know well] that without the face the Signifier would simply merge with the amorphous continuum.

Therefore, the black hole - white wall system is constitutive of the Signifier and of its operations on signs, which are the establishing of binarisms, binary relationships, dichotomies. And what I

call dichotomy is this very movement. I'm just making the gesture [*points to the blackboard*] to go faster... What I call binary relationship is this movement, the relation of sign to sign, with the dichotomy being rooted in the Signifier. Here we have the binary distribution of signs.

We're going really quickly now. So, at this level, once again, there's no secret. In the despotic formation or the paranoid regime, you will never find secrets, only publicity. The despot says: "Here is my face, I won't hide my face." And I've already quoted to you from a text that I find very interesting in this regard. I don't have time to quote it again in its entirety… it's on pages 20-25 of a book by Luc de Heusch, *The Drunken King, Or the Origin of the State* [Le roi ivre ou l'origine de l'État *(Paris: Gallimard, 1972); on this specific example, see* A Thousand Plateaus, *p. 353*]

According to Bantu myth, the myths of the Bantu people... the despotic Bantu emperor eats in public, he doesn't hide his face. But then a disturbing man arrives: the man of the State. The man of the State has no army. I say this to remind those of you who were here two years ago, of things that we touched upon then but didn't develop... In any case, they're still a bit hazy. He doesn't have an army, but he has a police force, a bureaucracy, but no army. He undertakes major public works. He shows his face everywhere, his eyes like black holes. To each of his subjects he says: "I am here."

And now another figure arrives from who knows where: a little guy who has come from the exterior, the man of War. Who will conquer everything and destroy it all. The man of War isn't a paranoiac, nor is he a despot. He's from another race, no better but different. He's something else. He arrives. And in the Bantu myth he doesn't eat in public. He wears a veil, he eats in a tent. We're not supposed to see him. He's the secret. The regime of the secret was invented by the Mongols. Or by this Bantu who was not really a Bantu but... It was invented by the Mongols, meaning the nomads, the guys of the war machine. For them, speaking of State secrets is a nonsense. There is no such thing. The State doesn't need secrets. It's the military machine that needs and invents secrets. It's the warrior chief who eats veiled and who invents them. In this there's no publicity. And meanwhile the despot continually repeats: "Look into my eyes!"

So, well then, we must add that if the Signifier requires the wall and the black hole of the face, it is for all the reasons we have looked at concerning the face. We don't need to go back to that. Sometimes we just have to accept the things we've acquired, you see? After all, it's that all this thing is linked up. We just notice suddenly, as we're thinking that we're heading in one direction, we then stumble upon something else and say, hey, that's fine, we've seen this. So, it's perfect.

Why? What roles does the face play with respect to the signifier? Returning to the distinctions I proposed between index, icon and symbol, the Signifier, which is the most deterritorialized of signs -- since it makes sure that all other signs refer to all other signs -- requires any form whatever of reterritorialization. The face is the form of reterritorialization proper to the Signifier. This is why we have to undo the face. The face is the icon of the Signifier. So, there we have the fifth dimension.

A sixth one [*Pause*], a sixth dimension: there aren't many left. So now the sixth dimension. A new adventure begins in which I'll need another dimension. So, we already have a six-dimensional multiplicity. What is this exactly?

Imagine the following; let's dream a bit. Through his interpretations, the diviner-priest continually recharges the system of signifiance. He prevents the growth of entropy. But it's not enough. The system is nonetheless menaced. Several other related operations are required. It functions but only up to a certain point. It needs something else. The entropy that menaces the system is also a line by means of which the irradiating circular system would escape, escape into the quicksands of the amorphous continuum, tracing death in a shallow stream. The system's line of flight has to be blocked. And this is something that no diviner with his interpretations can do. The line of flight has to be barred. Which is why it can only exist as a broken, dotted line. So, what can be done?

In Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, there's a marvellous page where he says that the body of the condemned man is like the inverted, symmetrical image of the body of the king. The torture victim's body is the symmetrically inverted image of the king's body. We can also say that it is the symmetrically inverted image of the despot's body. Indeed, the condemned or tortured man has above all else lost his face. He hasn't lost the *id*. He has become the man without a face. What does that mean?

To be a torture victim is not the last word. Although in a certain sense it is, since he's going to die... But here the logical chain is very strange. Torture is never the end. In the logical chain, the historico-logical chain, torture is always followed by something else. It comes before expulsion. And Oedipus, to cite him again, begins by blinding himself, meaning that he loses face. And he runs away. He runs away, or rather he is sent away. He is cast out by Creon on the system's line of flight: "Go, get out!"

There exist two goats. In the ritual of the goat, there are always two goats that assure the logical chain, otherwise it couldn't be assured. First of all, there is the goat we call *scapegoat,* which will be killed. But following this, and only following this, is another, much more significant, goat called the *emissary* goat which is chased away along the line of flight. You understand why the system needs two goats… because they must first kill and then chase away. And this is the true logic. To be able to proceed, two goats are required.

Now what is this emissary goat? It is the anti-face... The goat's anus is the inverted image of the despot's gaze. The goat is made to flee along the line of flight. And what does the goat carry with it? It carries everything that has compromised - during periods of ritual, for example - the signifiance of the system, that is, the load of forbidden jumps, and everything that has threatened the signifiance of signs. And everything that has threatened the face... the face of the Signifier. It takes upon itself all these evils. And the goat is cast out into the desert.

So, the last dimension of the system is the presence of a line of flight but one that is afflicted with a negative value. On which the emissary goat will be forced to flee – or we could call it the exile, or the damned, which is an essential cog in the system of signifiance. It's as though everything that threatens signifiance has to be cast out.

Last dimension: in other words, what does it represent, this broken line of flight along which the goat is cast out? We just need to connect up all our dimensions. It represents the following: the line that, through its tenor, exceeds the level of deterritorialization permitted by the system of signifiance, however high or advanced may be this deterritorialization, however far the system of signifiance enters into the deterritorialization. In reality it doesn't go very far. It reterritorializes on the face, it reterritorializes on overcodings, it reterritorializes in every way imaginable.

Therefore, what surpasses its own level of deterritorialization will be as if barred, marked by a negative value, a negative sign. And this is it: the minus sign that marks the ritual of the emissary goat. Or else, this is the ritual of exile.

So, I'm almost done. Perhaps you would you be so kind as to share your thoughts with me on all this. I would say that now at least, [*Deleuze indicates the first schema*] we won't have any problem linking -- this will occur almost in a concrete way -- linking our second figure, the successive linear figure of proceedings, to the first one will happen almost as a matter of course. It won't be difficult because... let's imagine the following story – I'm go back to some themes I quickly threw at you last time -- imagine the following story:

One day a people are forced to leave or abandon their temple, or even to see their temple destroyed. In the case where they have to leave the temple, they carry with them a small ark that is at continual risk of falling… a small fragile ark. Naturally they dream of rebuilding a temple. However, this temple is again and again destroyed at regular intervals. To simplify we can say that they lost their temple.

The whole system of signifiance trembles. Also, for other reasons, but we're telling a story here, the whole system of signifiance risks crumbling to dust. The master Signifier, the eyes, the face, nothing works any more. Aside from which, this people or this person - we don't yet need to know which of these it concerns - will precipitate onto the line of flight with the ark. Except that… and what is the stroke of genius, the radically new thing here? What will be his momentous words? "Let misfortune befall us." But since we no longer have a temple, we no longer have a scapegoat. *Unless we become our own scapegoat*. Unless we become our own sacrificial lamb. The goat and the lamb are the same thing.

In John of Patmos's *Apocalypse* – yes, John of Patmos… he can't possibly be the other John... In the *Apocalypse* there is the lion, the lion that roars, but we never see this roaring lion. What appears is a lamb. In the system of signifiance, the immolated God will take the place of the immolating God. The lamb… even if the lion continues roaring over him, and God knows it's a lion-lamb, but the lion takes the skin of the lamb. We shall be our own lamb, our own goat. We no longer have a temple; we cannot cast out what was menacing the system because we no longer have a system. Therefore, we shall be the ones who take the line of flight. We shall be the goat and the lamb. "Let misfortune befall us."

So, they leave for the desert, the narrow passage. The extraordinary thing here is that the line of flight has now taken on a positive sign. And an astounding abyss opens up between the two systems. The line of flight has become positivity, while in all other despotic formations it was

marked by negation, by a negative value. It was the place where what menaced the system was made to take flight. Now a whole group, a whole people sets off on foot in the narrow passage of the desert, having lost their temple, having become their own scapegoat and lamb. And they flee along the line of flight, which for that very reason becomes positive.

From a certain perspective, it's a new step, a new level… a new threshold of deterritorialization has been passed. The deterritorialization of the passional system will be infinitely greater and stronger than the deterritorialization of signifiance. So you understand that, beginning from this first dimension of the system, other dimensions multiply.

I'm just saying – because we've had enough of this; I would like to discuss this a little with you -- I will just add that the function of faciality, of the face, cannot be the same here. But I've forgotten to mention something that will complete our framework. Here I don't even need to... anyway, in what way is this as much the system of deception as one of paranoid delusion, a delusion of interpretation? It's both a social formation and a despotic formation. According to – this is almost a practical exercise – according to the characteristic I proposed to you – and you might want to add others, combine them, subtract, underline some – and what you will obtain is a delusion in hospital, a social formation, a system, what kind? A system of groups, of individuals, a system for which we've had proposed the name "system of deception." Why?

Because everything it contains is deception. Everything is deception, trickery, at every level. In the centre, you have the face of the despot. The despot's face, this type of mask that priests manipulate when necessary, making it speak. The impotent despot and so on... Therefore, you have deception at the centre of signifiance, and deception in interpretation.

It's well known that the diviner is essentially a trickster. Deception at the level of the jumps. Deception at the level of forbidden jumps, whereby whoever makes a forbidden jump deceives. But deception reigns also at the level of jumps that are completely regulated. My wife has betrayed me so I will pray for a calamity to strike the whole village.

And in a certain sense, this is the way the State apparatus functions. And with it the man of the State, through this widespread deception in which also humble subjects deceive, the despot deceives, everyone deceives. It doesn't mean anything, it's not against the law. Deception really is an integral part of the functioning, one of the cogs of the system. The same goes for the courtier who stays close to the despot, or for the man of the State -- the despot's functionary -- as for ordinary subjects, and so on, everyone is engaged in deception.

So here, not only should we expect there to be a manner of functioning completely different from that of the face and faciality, but also one that is completely different from that of deception. So, from this point everything will change. But it's quite random. I began from this dimension [*Deleuze indicates the first schema*], but I may as well have begun from another. A new sign is attributed to the line of flight or the line of deterritorialization. Rather than having a negative sign, which is already occupied by the goat, it takes up a positive sign insofar as a whole group... So here we have the abandoned temple, from which the people carry away a packet of signs, a little packet of signs that they will carry with them as they head off into the desert. And there will be a succession of proceedings. One, two, three, four and so on. All of which will be punctuated

by pauses. A small packet of homogeneous signs flees along a segmented line. Or it's the figure that's completely different from the previous one.

So, we need to expect, and we will see this after, in what sense the face changes both its figure and function -- which suits us perfectly since we discovered there were two types of face with respect to the question of faciality -- in what sense is this no longer a regime of deception but a different type of regime? What happens in this system?

Let's not forget that we, "modern" people, how can I say, we people of Christian... Greco-Christian background, and I've no idea why we're called that, or more simply we could say those of us who belong to a capitalist system or a certain social formation, we always live in mixed semiotics.
Concrete semiotics are always mixed. A piece of this system bumps into a piece of this other system... It's always like that and the contrary, and everything all mixed up. In the mechanisms of banking, to take a random example, we have the system of rotation and circular expansion and at the same time bits of proceedings. And concrete social machines function by means of this mixity not only between the two systems – since we looked only at two examples of semiotics… But to go on answering your question, there can be infinite numbers of semiotics: 8, 10, 12... we will see...

I can only say that in what we did before, for example, the semiotic that for convenience's sake we called "primitive", the corporeal semiotic of "primitive" peoples, doesn't refer either to this system [*the first schema*] or that [*the second schema*]. It's a very specific type of semiotic, and even when we say "primitive" semiotic, that encompasses semiotics that are completely different from each other. And the nomadic semiotic I just mentioned doesn't equate either with this one [*the second schema*] or that one [*the first schema*]. So, you can never have enough semiotics.

We "moderns" live -- and here, I could cite one of Nietzsche's most wonderful phrases, if only I could remember it [*Laughter*]… I can't, but it was great anyway [*Laughter*]... "*a variegated painting of all that has been thought*" [*In fact, "ye who are pictures of all that hath ever been believed", from* Thus Spoke Zarathustra, *"The Land of Culture"; see also* Nietzsche and Philosophy, *V.11, "The Sense of Affirmation"*] And by that, he didn't mean to define us merely as people but as a social formation. "A variegated painting of all that has been thought" -- And this is what we live from. All the old semiotics are fine for us. I think that money, the semiotics of money, has made a syncretism of all the semiotics there have ever been, whether primitive, signifying, passional, nomadic, whatever... So, what do you think? Does that suffice? Have you had enough? [*Laughter, scattered applause, Deleuze chuckles*] … [*Tape interrupted*] [4:15:15]

[*Although this could suffice for the session, the film recording continues with six minutes of discussion with one of Deleuze's frequent interlocutors, his student Georges Comtesse*]

Georges Comtesse: … Not at all... the system of this face-substance centre, the face as signifying substance, not only what is at the heart of things – I don't mean *heart* in the sense of provenance [*The camera, moving right, shows Claire Parnet standing and smoking*] but on a given surface, given line of divergence of sense, which is the paranoiac line. I think there is a becoming. In encounters, there is always a very intensive becoming that seems to me the becoming which

provokes an excess of signs, almost as the defect of the sign, of this excess of concentric circles… and that has a profound relationship with the becoming-paranoiac. Becoming intense, isn't that... so what is it?

In the case of president Schreber, it's simply a becoming-woman. How great it would be to be a woman who submits to coupling. Paranoid femininity... But already, in all paranoias – and this is the rule of paranoia – right from the beginning no paranoiac can bear a becoming intense or this kind of femininity. Every paranoiac, if he's not a philosopher, if he doesn't recompose a line of reconvergence of sense… every paranoiac, as soon as they experience it, even just for an instant, a fleeting instant… every paranoiac want to arrest this becoming at all costs, "police" the becoming, stop it at all costs and start again for example, from a sign, the sign of sex as it happens, because sex is also a sign – and perhaps it's the sign of becoming intense that makes the jump. At which point there will be a deterritorialization, which won't just be that of the concentric circles or the signs on them that you spoke about. What will be produced in this arrest of becoming as a centre of signifiance, a surface not at all like the one you described... it's not a white surface with black holes, because this seems to me a secondary effect, even if it's true that it is there…

Deleuze: Ah… that's rich…

Comtesse: And there is…

Deleuze: That's rich that you call it a secondary effect!

Comtesse: And there is continually a surface of the arrest of becoming, or of the excess of signs, that I would call… the virginal surface of voluptuousness with a black abyss which does not…

Deleuze: Oh well, shit! Give me a break! [*General laughter*]

Comtesse: … which does not at all equate....

Deleuze (*standing up*): You'll excuse me, I'll let you finish afterwards, but now you're really having a laugh. You tell us: "Your white wall-black hole system doesn't work". You tell me, what works for you is a virginal surface with a...

Comtesse: A black abyss...

Deleuze: With a black abyss. [*Deleuze chortles with everyone*] Fine, fine. Given this, I understand what you are saying – no, no, I'll let you continue in a second – in saying, which you add, there's a becoming in paranoid delusion,

Comtesse: Yes!

Deleuze: … except that, here's the point, it's entirely blocked off…

Comtesse: Exactly!

Deleuze: This isn't… So, here you're providing a confirmation…

Comtesse: Certainly!

Deleuze: And I add to confirm what you are saying that, as you know better than I do, President Schreber's rapport with God occurs through rays, and these rays interest us in terms of the white wall-black hole system, because through binarity, arborescence and binary relationships, they divide the world into a higher and lower sphere. And in its turn, the lower world is divided in two and so on. Everything you said – and this is not a retort to your observation – makes me happy because it absolutely confirms everything we said – it's a benediction for us!

Comtesse: Perhaps there isn't just the landscape-face system but also a mirage-shore type of pictorial splitting…

Deleuze: You're saying *mirage*… now I understand!

Comtesse: I want to continue! I'm saying virginal surface of voluptuousness... You speak about God, for example.

Deleuze: Yes, yes?

Comtesse: Eventually, President Schreber perceives his own voluptuousness as though it were that of God in his virginal surface, which is a surface of the scream…

Deleuze: Now you're bringing us back to castration!

Comtesse: … a scream. [*Pause, laughter*] I'm not at all bringing it back to that; I'm not at all bring it back to that. I'm saying that you go too fast when you talk about the signifier. I'm just talking about becoming, arrest of becoming, virginal surface of voluptuousness with a black abyss of desire…

Deleuze: I think we can work this out.

Comtesse: It's clear that the virginal surface and the white surface...

Deleuze: I wouldn't call it virginal…

Comtesse: They could be linked…

Deleuze: Okay if you prefer virginal to white, we can agree on that.

Comtesse: Absolutely! Perhaps the line of flight you inserted there flies off on the passional delusion... Let's take Pierre Rivière. [*Note that Michel Foucault's book on Pierre Rivière appeared in 1973*] With Pierre Rivière, in the beginning there seems to be a binarism. For example, he opposes himself to the father, mortified, humiliated disgusted, and against

matriarchal power, which is mortifying, almost vampiric, all that, the infinite indebtedness of the father, its power which provokes his suicide, and so on. It seems there is a binarity there. But in fact, in fact, he is experimenting. Through this pseudo-binarity, he is experimenting with a becoming-woman of the father… [*End of the recording*] [4:21:39]