# Gilles Deleuze

# Seminar on

# A Thousand Plateaus V

# Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980

## November 1979 – April 1980

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 01, 06 November 1979**

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**Part 1 (45:12 minutes)**

This year I have several things to propose to you. The first thing concerns today alone: we will finish very early. We will finish unusually early, because I have to stop at midday. Because at two o' clock there is an important meeting which everyone should be able to go to if they want. Above all foreign students, but not especially. You know we already talked about these questions, I won't take it up again: the Department of Philosophy at Vincennes will carry on functioning as it functioned before, but in addition and at the same time, it will become an institute of Philosophy with a very particular function. It can work: we'll see. It can work. If it works, it will be very important for us, for Vincennes. Now, the presentation for this institute takes place at 2 o'clock, 14.00 hours, on the side of staircase E, room 210. So since I have meetings beforehand, I'll have to stop at midday on this occasion. Because it's an introductory session, it's not too serious.

Second point. I propose that at the start of this year, that is to say, for one semester or a little more than one semester, we take up what we did last year – if you weren't here last year, that's no problem – we take up what remained for us to do and what we didn't have time to do. I'll explain myself a bit more in a moment. But what was left over for us to do was: a certain conception of the State Apparatus, a series of studies and analyses on the State apparatus, with the stipulation that I don't want the analyses to reduce themselves to what is going on now, but rather to include and above all to flow out onto what is happening now. Each of is well aware that the year is beginning, in every respect and in this respect in particular, in a sombre mood, even very sombre. So what will occupy us for a while, if you don't mind, are some analyses concerning the State apparatus in relation to what we did last year.

And then what will happen? Well, that will depend a lot on you. For my part, I hope that subjects will come from you. State apparatuses, that will take us one trimester, or at the maximum a semester, but for the rest of the semester, we can do, at your request, things on any authors you're interested in. For myself, I'd like us to return a little to literary authors; for example we could do three or two sessions on Beckett, two sessions on someone else … It could be me or someone else, according to our competences. We could also do something on particular philosophers or on concepts.

Anyway, we'll always find something to do. But I'm saying that I want you to be involved. Already for the State apparatus I will have a great need of you because, last year, something happened that worked very well, that worked better and better … What we did last year, above all at the end. There were many of you who brought me many things. Now, if that could happen in the same way for the State apparatus …

So today I would just like to content myself by very briefly recalling what we did last year, why the State apparatus locks into that, and at the same time to reassure those who were not here last year that they can be persuaded that there is no need to know what was said last year in order to follow this year. But it's right that they should have the basic principles of the hypothesis in which we were ensconced.

So I start with this. The way we had been induced to pose – but we were constrained, we didn't have enough time (happily, happily) to resolve any of the problems S – to pose a certain problem that appears to us to be the problem of the State. That one can pose it in a million other ways goes without saying. But we were induced to start from – and we were occupied with this for almost the entire year – a kind of abstract opposition (to say 'abstract' is right because it goes without saying, it is not an objection to say: 'but concretely everything is mixed in together' – obviously it is all mixed together), a kind of abstract opposition between what we called, broadly speaking, 'the war machine', and what we called 'the State apparatus' … or (we already gave it a name to pinpoint it better) 'apparatus of capture'. And we said: the war machine and the apparatus of capture or the State apparatus: these are not at all the same thing.

And this was just that, a hypothesis. We attempted to develop this hypothesis by observing that even historically the war machine was quite literally the invention of nomadic organization. They are the ones who invented the war machine. I do not say – understand immediately where we are heading – above all, I do not say that they invented *armies*. Armies and the war machine are surely linked, but there is no reason to believe that it is the same thing. We supposed that it is the nomadic organisation or composition which invented the war machine. Whether it's good, whether it's bad – we already renounced the choice of which was worst, the apparatuses of capture or the war machines. Nothing could have been very good in any of that.

But what struck us was that, if it is true that the nomads invented the war machine, it is in specific environments, in determinate conditions and directed precisely against State apparatuses; and that the war machine was a kind of riposte, of parade, with regard to the State apparatus, to the apparatuses of capture. Even if the two entered into very complex relations and a very complex intimacy. For example, the nomadic war machines formed States, or the States appropriated war machines. But that is not what we wanted to focus on. This was our subject: that they participated in concrete mixtures that must indeed be concretely analysed, but from the point of view of polar oppositions, with a view to a certain kind of abstract opposition. I recall (because this is what preoccupied us for the whole year) the objection was raised that the war machine first of all implies … The question was not to define it through *violence*.

Why? Because you can find violence everywhere. One of our objects this year evidently will be – and there are a lot of authors who discuss this, these are not matters we have discovered, there are many authors who concern themselves with this – one of our subjects this year will be to try

to distinguish, in our own way, the forms, the types, of violence. An issue that obviously touches us and that touches on many historical problems: the violence of the police is not the same as the violence of the army. The violence of the State is not the same as the violence of war. No. Of course, they can become mixed in together.

But then what did our polar oppositions consist in? They consisted in saying that the nomadic war machine develops itself in a very particular kind of space. That was one of our major focuses, and I found it very interesting – and if I'm making this summary today instead of directly starting afresh, it's because thanks to you it was necessary to return to and recast from the ground up one of these ideas. If in the meantime some of you have had the chance to reflect, and have other things to [add].

In any case, from the point of view of the first polar opposition, I arrived at the point of saying something like this: the nomadic war machine develops in a space that one could call a smooth space. And smooth spaces are very particular spaces. And we gave a lot of time to the definition of smooth space, whereas one might say that at the other pole, the State apparatus, things were still very abstract, but necessarily so. At the other pole, the State apparatus operates and organizes a space it was necessary to call a striated space. And to striate space is a fundamental operation of the State. Isn't this already the case to the extent that it organizes agriculture? But does the State organize agriculture? That remains to be seen. We will have to see if there is an agriculture that is organised without a State, and I can say straightaway that what will confirm our analysis of the intimate relation between the State apparatus, agriculture [*Deleuze starts over*] and striated space is precisely that it is the State apparatus that creates striated space. We shall see. So we had a first polar opposition: smooth space/striated space. I won't go back over that, but we'll see if we're led to take up another point of view than last year.

All this was from the point of view of space. You see, the war machine develops a kind of smooth space. It is not by chance that it develops itself in the desert, the steppe, the sea, etc., which are types of smooth space. While the sedentary State apparatus passes its time by striating space, by organising a striated space, which also implies operations of an extreme violence, but precisely a violence of the State. Then there is a second point, no longer from the point of view of space, but from the point of view of composition. … [But first] I anticipate straightaway a possible objection, above all for those who were not here last year: surely, however one frames smooth space and striated space, they are mixed together the whole time. And yes, there is a way of striating the sea, even though the sea is a smooth space. They're mixed in together all the time, okay. And on their side, moreover, striated spaces can yield up smooth spaces. Okay. They form part of concrete mixtures, and each time we had to analyse these concrete mixtures, because it is not in the same way that a striated space yields up smooth space and that a smooth space is striated. For example, the whole history of navigation involves a certain way of striating maritime space, but there are more or less closed ways of doing it; obviously, non-astronomical navigation does not end up striating the sea in the way that astronomical navigation made the sea into a striated space.

Second polar opposition, between the two machines, between the war machine and State apparatus, this time from the point of view of composition. For it is well known that the State apparatus proceeds towards and through – everyone remembers this, every textbook says it – a

territorial organization or composition. I would say that from the beginning – since we'll need to make appeal to this theme, I'll recall it here – the State apparatus proceeds via a territorial composition; but in a certain way this should not be taken literally, because it also means that the State is profoundly deterritorializing. Why does that go without saying?

It is because the territorial organization of men – in other words, organization under a State – is defined by this: that it takes land [*terre*] as object of organization, *through which* it brings about a deterritorialization. The land ceased to be the active agent and becomes object. Object of what? Object of production, of circulation ... of the limits of territory, frontier, etc. So when one says *the State is fundamentally territorial*, that also means that it is deterritorializing from another point of view. In all cases it is a composition ... the composition of the State is not exclusively but *above all* territorial.

On the other hand, we looked into whether there wasn't a composition proper to the war machine, some very particular composition. We tried to discover it and we said: well, what is new in the war machine is a very specific kind of composition of men. And to my understanding this is important because for as long as there have been men, they have only found three ways of composing themselves amongst themselves. And the war machine, for its part, operates through a composition of men that is no longer territorial in the slightest – necessarily, because it moves in smooth space the whole time, it is nomadic [*The sound of a motor interrupts*] – it has a space, It has a space … yes … and the war machine moves towards an arithmetical composition of men. And the idea of organizing men arithmetically is very curious. I would say it is necessary to understand what that means, an arithmetical composition of men. It is quite simple -- shit, shit, shit [*Again, the motor sound interrupts*] What's going to happen? -- its source was to be found in a point which appeared to be insignificant. -- [*Again, the motor sound interrupts*] What's going to happen? -- In a point which appears to be a small detail, namely the need for marching orders and displacements in the desert. That was it. And the Bible backed this up over and over again: In the famous Book of Numbers, Moses inherits numerical organization from the nomads.[1] He inherits it from the nomads in order to do what? Precisely when what is required is to displace oneself in the desert. As if by chance he finds himself, in a sense without having wanted it (which is curious in itself), more or less despite himself, in the position of having constituted a war machine. So, the Book of Numbers was an absolutely essential book for us last year.

But you see that here as well it is necessary to take account of concrete mixtures the whole time. I mean, it goes without saying that someone will say to me: hang on, States also attach a great deal of importance to arithmetical composition. Of course, of course. You will say to me: nomads also have principles of territory. Obviously, obviously! But this is not that which interests me. What interests me, from the point of view of the poles, is to isolate in a sufficiently abstract manner the autonomy, the primacy, of an arithmetical organization of men in the nomadic war machine and the primacy of a territorial composition of men in the State apparatus. Assuming that is the case, as a consequence and at the level of consequences, the mixed formulas will be numerous.

That was our second point of view. Following the polar opposition of spaces, a polar opposition of the composition. Our third point of view concerned activity. And we said: well, it is not at all the same type of activity even though the two types of activity end up being confused in concrete

mixtures. It is not the same type of activity because the State apparatus invented a very curious mode of activity, which didn't just come about by itself. And I didn't elaborate the discussion of this mode of activity last year, although I did elaborate it on certain points, but in any case, we will rediscover it from another point of view; it's because of this problem that I need to make this recapitulation. Because there are things that it will be necessary to elaborate from the new perspective we will take this year. The mode of activity that the State apparatus invents and imposes is *work* [*travail*].[2] 'Work' meaning any activity whatever. I mean that it is a mode that is defined not simply through the object on which it bears, the means that it employs, tools, for example. In fact, it is a very particular *mode* of activity.

Now, one of our hypotheses last year was that labour could not emerge … here I would like to propose something for those who are familiar with these things; I will be coming back to it, don't worry. For those who don't know, it doesn't matter. For those who know and are familiar with the Marxist distinction of labour and surplus labour [*surtravail*], I would precisely like to deepen or attempt to deepen one hypothesis this year: *it is surplus labour that constitutes labour*. It is surplus labour that is constitutive of labour. That is to say, it is surplus labour that makes activity into labour, or that submits activity to the rule of labour. With the result that we better understand the connection … If this hypothesis is true, we better understand that labour fundamentally belongs to the State apparatus. It is the State apparatus that puts people to work. There is no labour outside the State apparatus. There are other things, there are other activities, but labour never exhausted …

And I'm saying this already because we are going to have to confront some problems … I'm doing this to pay homage to – at present, they are all in prison, or almost all of them – that seems to me to be the considerable contribution -- [*A motor sound interrupts the class again*] shit, shit, shit, shit [*Deleuze strikes his fist on the table*] It seems to me to be the considerable contribution made by the Italian autonomists, starting with Toni Negri, to have pushed very far with a Marxist analysis (but of a new kind) of labour in the contemporary State; and being well placed – that is to say the case of Italy being very particular with regard to the modern problem of labour – I think they pushed very far a point of analysis that was simultaneously Marxist and completely novel (two things which are certainly not opposed ) which will turn out to be of great importance for us, when it comes to new forms of labour and the new relations of labour and the State apparatus. We will therefore have to talk about all this.

So, you see, I would say that the third bipolarity is: activity becomes labour in relation to the State apparatus. And it is not by chance. There is a fundamental connection between the man of the State and the worker, which does not mean that the man of the State works. It means that there is a complementarity between the worker and the man of the State, and that the problem of labour is always posited in relation with a State apparatus, even when it doesn't appear to be the case, as well as inversely. So, labour in a way had to be redefined.

What type of activity is labour then? I would say: labour cannot be defined through the tool for the very simple reason that it is exactly the contrary. Namely: it is the tool that is defined through labour. It is when there is labour that what activity makes use of can be called a tool. Therefore, one could say the contrary: that another problem is indeed involved at this point. We could put the problem otherwise. We have ended up posing the problem in this way: the impossibility of

defining labour by the tool; the opposite is the case. Again, we could give as a definition of the tool: the tool is what activity makes use of when it is determined as labour. Then how to define labour since one cannot define it by the tool? One could say, finally, that work is the center of gravity; displacement, center of gravity, displacement of forces. Yes, linear displacement. Center of gravity, linear displacement. You see that everything is connected. I'll persist in this recapitulation one more time, in order to try to suggest that we have in fact constituted a totality that is finally, in spite of ourselves, rather coherent.

Why is all this connected? You can see what the problem 'centre of gravity, displacement, linear displacement of forces' refers back to. I don't need to explain in order to say that this is a very profound factor in the striating of space, that this constitutes a striated space. Fine. Force through displacements equals work. And work, what is that? It is irreducibly a social and physical concept. And it is not by chance that it is at the same time, in the physics of the 19th century, that this physico-sociological concept of 'work' is constituted. Work, as it is explained in all the physics textbooks used in the baccalauréat, you see, is: relations weight/height, forces/displacements; and then you have the elaboration of the status of work at the same time, in the 19th century, by the same people. And on this, certain amongst you have contributed very fundamental texts on the engineers of the 19th century who are precisely at the hinge point of the elaboration of the physical concept of work and the sociological concept of labour. All that is the same thing. On the side of the Mines, the school of Mines, and of all kinds of schools of engineers, one of the tasks of the civil engineer is a double elaboration of the physical concept and of the sociological concept.

Whereas on the side of the war machine, as activity … Of course, in the war machine, one works as well. It goes without saying that one works. One cannot say that one does not work, one can say: yes indeed, one works. But again, that is only the case in concrete mixtures. Everyone works, of course; again, this is not what interests us. What interests us is to isolate the poles or the prevalent potentialities, the prevalences, the preferences, the primacies. Thus, at the level of mixed formulas, everything is confused by definition. Necessarily. But this does not get in the way of the fact that the war machine is not defined [in this way]. Even if it involves work, this is not one of its constitutive elements. Why? Because the activity it governs is of another type than work, or rather it does not govern activity under the form of work. Under what form does it govern it? I would say, making use of the words of 17th century and 18th century physics, that it is much rather under the form 'free action' – on condition that one does not give to 'free' a democratic sense, but gives it a physical sense.

And what is free action? Well, this is closely studied in the physics of the 17-18th century, and in the 19th century there will precisely emerge the great distinction between free action and work. A purely physical distinction, purely of the physical sciences. And the [notion] [*unclear*] of free action, it was found – although I can't pursue this recapitulation in too much detail – almost in a model, a privileged model, namely: a vorticial [*tourbillonnaire*] movement that simultaneously occupies a maximum of points of space. It is not by chance that the movement that the war machine invokes is always … [*unclear word*] always … is *very frequently* of this type. From the vortex of the nomadic tribes right up to the whirling character of war machines properly speaking; from the Greeks onwards (namely Democritus, Archimedes, etc.), a vorticial

movement always appeared bound to the theme of the war machine … no, not always, but *often*, to the theme of the war machine.

Here again I rediscover my points, for a whirling motion whose points occupy a maximum of positions in space raises the problem, what is the nature of this space? It is obviously a smooth space. It is obviously a smooth space [Deleuze repeats]. The whirling movement traces a smooth space. On the contrary, the criterion of labour, which we have seen was 'centre of gravity, linear displacements of force', defines a striated space. So everything went well for us last year. The important thing is that that continues this year. That was the third point. I hope this recapitulation is not useless.

Fourth point: here too, we had a fourth bipolar opposition from the point of view of expression. And we would say, look, because one gets the sense more and more that the State apparatus is in a very fundamental relation with labour, or rather labour is in a very fundamental relation with it, and in fact the State apparatus, you understand (and this is not very complicated): its fundamental elements of expression are what? I should say of 'action-expression', or rather 'expression-expression'. The answer is: tools and signs. And after all, that gives us a new direction: yes, there will indeed be a fundamental relation between tools and signs. In fact, everyone knows it, there is no State apparatus without an apparatus of writing. And when it comes to organizing surplus labour, when it involves making people work, there is a whole bureaucracy. There is no labour without bureaucracy [*unclear word*]. And what is bureaucracy? Well, it implies a whole accountability, a whole system of writings. And this is a true conceptual couple that constitutes 'signs/tools' at the level of the State apparatus. To the point that it even constitutes the strongest unity joining the man of the State with the worker. The man of the State emits signs, while the subject activates his tools. So here too there are all sorts of combinations, but the necessity of writing is inscribed into work. Just as the necessity of tools is inscribed in semiological systems, in systems of signs.

And the first signs are signs of the type: 'Go over there', 'Are you ready?', 'Go to your work'. These are the great signs. We saw this last year, namely that the basis of language is the word of command [*mot d'ordre*].

And on the side of the war machine? Here again, you are already used to this mode of reasoning, so you cannot object to me, 'well, here there are also signs and tools'. Obviously: there are tools in the war machine as well, but for it, it is not what is essential. Moreover: where there are signs and tools in the war machine, the nomadic war machine, for its part, is quite happy to very freely borrow signs from neighboring State apparatuses. Not so much the need for writing, they pass that by completely. Last year, I did not have the necessary information, so I did not have the example of the Mongolian war machine, but there is an amusing piece of writing (a password?), where they borrow Chinese writing and other more bizarre modes of writing: they make a phonetic transcription of their language into Chinese characters. They do not have any especial need for writing, they didn't need it. Tools? Yes, of course they had tools like everybody. Yes, they worked, they had tools, but I say: that is not what defines them. Whereas, you understand – and this is the point that I'd really like to make very clearly for you – 'signs-tools', that is one of the defining and determining characteristics of the State apparatus. You will of course also find it

in the war machine, but that is not what determines it, it is not that which defines it. That is another couple.[3]

For clarity, solely for reasons of clarity, of symmetry, it was necessary for us to search in the war machine for a couple, a distinct couple, to aid our comprehension. And we grasped hold of a quite distinct couple, we said: the war machine has a very bizarre couple, it is 'weapons' and 'jewelry'. Weapons and jewelry. 'Jewelry', why does that come in here? First, because it pleased us, and then in order to allow us to advance on several points. With regard to 'weapons', I made the same remark as I made earlier for the tool, namely: 'weapons', what will define 'weapons'? If you try to define 'weapons' and 'tool', taken in themselves, you will not succeed, because they are the same. They are the same thing. A pitchfork, such as the peasant's pitchfork, is it a weapon or a tool? It depends on what he does with it, eh? There are wars which are fought with weapons that are the tools of the peasantry. It was even the case that for a long time, the distinction *weapons – tools* was remarkably vague. So it is not at the level of objects that one can make a distinction *weapon/tool*. It is at the level of what? This confirms to us that it is always at the level of the type of activity. There will be 'weapons' as opposed to 'tools' when, instead of being taken as an object, of an activity defined as labor (that is to say, as 'center of gravity, displacement of force'), the same object is taken up in the other type of activity: the vorticial motion occupying a maximum of points in a smooth space. This is why weapons are fundamentally projective and that the gesture of the weapon is always a whirling gesture that leaves behind the dimensions of the center of gravity, the exigencies of the center of gravity.

Okay, but none of that tells us why 'jewelry'? Well, because, you understand, signs of writing and jewelry can be compared with each other. It is not 'jewelry', simply 'jewelry', that was just a handy word. In fact, it is everything in the domain of decoration and goldwork. Goldwork-decoration. Now, what was striking to us, I recall here, because perhaps here we would have a new need, is that goldwork and decoration form a system that does not enjoy a single degree less abstraction than signs of writing, even political ones. The only thing is that it is, quite literally, a completely different abstract machine. It is not less abstract. The abstraction in the decoration of goldwork has a power that is at least equal to the power of the most abstract signs. But it is an entirely different kind of organization. And it is clear that decoration, goldwork and jewelry [*joallerie*] do not constitute a writing. It is almost, if you will, the semiotic of weapons, whilst writing is the semiology of the tool. At the same time I take back this formula precisely because it is too easy. Nevertheless, it will do for the purposes of clarification.

Then of course there is also the minor objection: but jewelry exists in States. Obviously jewelry exists in States. Only, they have a comical history in States. It is in war machines that jewelry finds all of its – if I can dare to say this – splendor. Because these are the true signs in the war machine; in States, they only have derived utilizations … how to put it? Decadent, degenerate. One can even speak through jewelry, there are languages of jewels. The languages of jewels are not … [*unclear word*]; it is not that at all, it is not that. The force of jewelry, the force of decoration, the force of ornamentation, this is, once again, to direct a system of abstraction no less great than the most abstract signs. And why? In order to be a completely different kind of abstraction, with a completely different object in view. Good: that was our fourth point, from the point of view of expression, then, 'weapons-jewels'. The coupling 'weapons-jewels' of the war machine and the coupling 'tools-signs' of the State apparatus.

Finally, from the point of view of feeling – war machines and State apparatuses putting feelings into play – we attempted … we will see whether later on this year, with regard to certain authors, we might not be able to take up this theme or elaborate it in a different direction. We attempted to distinguish two sorts of feeling: the *sentiments*, which refer back simultaneously to the theme of a development, of a formation, and which were really the feelings circulating in the milieu of the State apparatus, of work, of signs, etc. And on the other hand, something which is of another nature (although the two exist at one and the same time: on the one hand, the other hand), on the other hand, the *affects*. The affects, which for their part, are the feelings proper to the war machine. And in the two cases, it is no longer necessary to choose where the worst violence is, all of that is violent in every way, or it is not violent at all, that depends, that depends. I mean that in the war machine, there is another compassion, two justices. There is an admirable page of Kafka on the two compassions, the two justices. An author I discussed frequently last year, namely Dumézil, has greatly elaborated this difference between the justice of the man of war, or his injustice, insofar as it is quite different to the justice or the injustice of the man of State. It is not the same compassion, nor the same graces, nor … It's not at all the same emotional system. In one case, for convenience sake, we talked of affects. And in the other case, we talked of sentiments.[4]

In fact, from the point of view of violence, which we have scarcely broached, it is again indeed because of this that one cannot say that the war machine must be more terrible, however terrible it can be. It is not more terrible than the State apparatus. Can one say that the army, that an army, however close to the absolute it might be, a global army, should be any more terrible than a global police force? There is no reason to confound these notions. There is no space for thinking that the war machine proceeds in the same manner as the police. The State apparatus, for its part, has need of a police, well before having need of an army. There are very curious things in what one has a presentiment of in certain archaic States, like already having a police and a developed bureaucracy, but not yet, it seems, having an army, an army in the proper sense. And what is the difference between these types of violence? The violence of war … It could be in one sense that there is nothing worse … But what is special in the violence of the State? Certain modern authors have invented a concept in order to give an account of this violence of the State, namely the concept of structural violence. We will have to ask what it is that one can call a 'structural violence'. In any case, structural violence, is what rests with the police or what only has need of a police. Everything happens as if it was in the mode of the 'already there'. It is always 'already there', it is always as already applied, it constantly presupposes itself. So that, in a certain manner, it can say: 'who me? I'm nothing, I'm not a violence.' Whilst the violence of the war machine is a violence that is perpetually on the horizon.[5]

And what does that mean? It is to conclude this enumeration [of points] that there would therefore be at the end of the account a distinction between two violences, of the war machine and of the State, in the same way as we distinguished other poles. And here there is something that appears very striking to me, on the issue here also precisely of certain passing remarks by Dumézil … Dumézil says on this, in some texts that are unfortunately very short, that from the point of view of mythology, it would be very interesting to study the role played, even in mythologies, by the double character of policeman and jailer. And that, above all, it is not the same role, even mythically, even in the most ancient myths, it is not at the same role as that of the man of war. Dumézil insists on this – I think we talked about it a little last year – on a

characteristic found very often in the myths, in the mythology of political sovereignty, he insists a great deal on the *mutilated* character of the man of State. The mutilated character of the man of State, to the point that he explains there is an alternation between two types of man of the State and that this alternation between the two types of men of the State, between the two great political sovereigns, is often represented as an alternation of the one-eyed man [*le borgne*] and the one-handed man [*le manchot*]. The one-eyed and the one-handed man.[6]

In Scandinavian and Germanic mythology, you have Odin the one-eyed and Tyr – *t-y-r* [he spells out] – the one-handed. These are the two poles of political sovereignty. Amongst the Romans, you have Horatius Cocles and [Mucius] Scaevola. The one is one-eyed, the other one-handed. This is a very frequent theme: the one-eyed and the one-handed. This is interesting, by the way, because the one-eyed man, you understand, is the man of the sign. From his single eye, he emits … and in fact, in the mythologies, the one-eyed God is he who emits signs at a distance, who strikes down, who, with a sign, strikes with stupor. He looms up, his eye blinks … This is the signifier. The one-handed man is the man of work. The one-handed man is generally the chief of those strange characters in mythologies, in many mythologies, who appeared as the 'hundred-handers' [*cent-mains*]. But not 'sans', *s-a-n-s*, 'cent', *c-e-n-t*. He who has only one hand is at the same time the leader of those who have all sorts of hands. So the man of the State is a kind of mutilated man, mutilated but … [*Deleuze does not complete the thought*] And the worker too is a species of mutilated man.

It is curious … In what sense? Everyone, in so far as they are in the State, is one of the mutilated. I mean, I don't want to put forward a facile anarchism, but, independently of Dumézil, it brings to mind a beautiful text by the German novelist [Ernst] Jünger (ambiguous, nevertheless). In his novel *The Glass Bees*, Jünger says this: it's quite curious, but when I read Homer and the narratives of combats between the Homeric heroes, I never see the least narrative of mutilation. It is necessary not to exaggerate … You will say to me: surely one does see it in the narratives of war. But let's leave that aside. In Homer, one does not see it. And in fact, the gods of the war, strangely enough, are not mutilated, while the gods of work *are* all mutilated. They limp, they have only one hand, they have only one eye. And Jünger proposes a formula that I find apt, he says: in work everyone knows that there are workplace accidents, and it is true that there are accidents at work, but more profoundly, what is terrible about work is that a mutilation already precedes any accident. And that is perfectly valid in the coupling of State apparatus and work. There, it is as if the mutilation has already been done. Mutilation precedes the accident. There is already mutilation in the posture. Of course, this is not to say that mutilations in war are a pleasure or are worth more. Once again, certainly not. It is to say that maybe there is a regime of violence … to suggest that there is perhaps a totally different regime of violence.

So, that was where we had got to. I add that we continually had the concern of … [*Interruption in the recording*]

**Part 2 (45:06 minutes)**

… They cease to communicate … and how? And we attempted to specify the milieu of communication. And we stated – and this greatly interests me, and we did not elaborate upon it, but we won't develop it any further, because I don't know … well, not unless you want to – that

communication is something we called matter-movement. It is a single and same matter-movement into which State apparatuses and war machines are plugged.[7] And by 'matter-movement', one must not just understand 'the inert', 'the inanimated'. Matter-movement can just as well be a human matter. It is finally (making use of or borrowing a word from biology) what we proposed to call a phylum, *p-h-y-l-u-m*, a veritable phylum that would traverse both the war machines and the State apparatuses, that is to say, into which both are plugged and from which both, the war machines and State apparatuses, do not borrow the same characteristics. Nevertheless, a same phylum would traverse all of them, a same phylum, inanimated, animal and human. And this phylum, by nature, for its part, would no longer be nomadic like the war machines, nor sedentary like the State apparatuses, it would be fundamentally – and this was the occasion for us to distinguish a third concept – it would be fundamentally *itinerant*.

And the situation of man in relation to this phylum – this would precisely be itinerance. And this phylum which would simultaneously traverse the State apparatus and the war machines and which would be the object of a kind of itinerance seemed to us to put into play a whole set of problems that have already absorbed our attention for some time, namely, the problem of metallurgy and of the history of metallurgy. And if this sort of phylum into which everything was plugged was fundamentally metallurgy, which does not mean 'inanimated', but is simultaneously made up of metals and those who follow metals; namely: the itinerant forgers and their metallurgic lodes. Okay, but is any of that valid today? Certainly, but it will depend on the phylum. There is absolutely a phylum of petrol. What happens when the phylum of petrol is immersed in the sea, that is to say, when petrol becomes maritime? What does that imply for spaces, and for maritime space in particular? What is … well, these are problems that remain for us this year. Which is to say perhaps we will come across the history of this particular phylum again.

And this phylum has its own space, no longer either a smooth space like the war machine, nor a striated space like … all that. It was a space we attempted to define, and what was said was fine, but something else could be involved, we might need to find something else. What we said was that it was a space with holes. And the space of mining is indeed a holed space, it is the space of what is beneath the earth. And it is a holed space that holes smooth spaces and striated, sedentary spaces alike. It is a space riddled with holes, and which in a subterranean way traverses things and makes … Maybe this is what ultimately determines all the concrete mixtures between the two poles.

Okay, from all that we will now draw one conclusion. The conclusion we draw from all this was: we do not know much about what the State apparatus is, but at any rate, if one allows us the characteristics we attempted to pinpoint in defining the State apparatus, then the State apparatus becomes a prodigious mystery, all the more prodigious – how can that be, such a thing! – all the more prodigious, at least, in that we only know one thing: it does not derive from the war machine. The war machine cannot explain it. In fact, if all the abstract characteristics of the war machine, including its space, including its human composition, including its means [*moyens*] etc., etc. are opposed point-by-point to the characteristics of the State apparatus, one can at least conclude: no, every explanation which would try to engender the State apparatus from a pre-existing war machine, for us … – it might be quite satisfying for someone else who poses the

problem in a different way, but that's their affair – for us, in the way we posit the problem, it has become impossible.

Understand: that does not mean to say that there is not all the same a fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that, at the point we are, we say to ourselves: we have no idea how a thing like the State apparatus could constitute itself. We didn't know at all. But, if it is constituted, it is not through the war machine. The war machine even has a fundamental goal, namely: to destroy State apparatuses. It is understood as directly targeted against the phenomenon of the State, the urban phenomenon and the agricultural phenomenon. Then, of course, it is integrated into it. But it is integrated at a secondary level. But we will see how it is integrated and why it is integrated. But the ultimate explanation lies elsewhere. In order for the war machine to be integrated into the State apparatus, there already has to be a State apparatus. It is not that which explains the State apparatus. And in fact, at the other extremity, one can say to oneself: why, of course, everything that is known of the most ancient State apparatuses, or everything that archaeology reveals to us about the most ancient State apparatuses, seems to confirm that they did not dispose of an army.

Again, they did not make use of the war machine, they already made use of a bureaucracy – I talked of the most ancient States, we will return to that – they already made use of a bureaucracy, they already had a police force at their disposal, they already had prisons at their disposal, indeed they had many things at their disposal, but bizarrely, they did not make use of the war machine, nor even the army properly speaking. It follows that, if one accepts that, the fundamental question of the State, once again, will be: 'But then where does it come from?' Again, that is, if we are led on our account to say: no, for the reasons we already attempted to give, we refuse every explanation that would derive the State apparatus from a war machine or from war.

The problem we fall into is that, assuming there are war machines which assert themselves and which are first of all directed against the State apparatus … one of the fundamental problems will become: how to appropriate the war machine. But, once again, this problem can only be posed if there are State apparatuses. So, yes there is a problem, there is an enormous problem, which will traverse all States. If they do not appropriate the war machine, they are lost. And how to otherwise explain the brutal disappearance of a certain number of very archaic States, which archaeology tells us disappear from one day to the next, leaving no trace, razed to the ground, only to reappear centuries later under other forms? Unless it is precisely because – no doubt one of the main reasons invoked by archaeologists – they find themselves completely liquidated by nomadic war machines, at a moment when they have not at all managed to appropriate the war machine yet. Although this will be a vital problem for the State: to appropriate the war machine, with the inconvenience that the war machine will create a huge amount of concern and will be enormously mistrusted by them, and that they will always be led into giving an immense power to this war machine, while they also have to control it, to ask themselves how to control this war machine.

And I mean, what happened in history? I'm asking that just in order to conclude this summary – no, I've already gone beyond the summary – but in history, how does this take place? We can see that it is indeed as if there are two great poles, two attempts by the State apparatus to make itself a war machine. I would say, broadly speaking, that there is the *mercenary* pole and the *army*

pole. ‘National’ army –in quotation marks, since I’m talking of peoples for whom the word ‘nation’ is obviously anachronistic – ‘State Army’, if you prefer. Hired mercenaries, paid mercenaries on the one hand, and the territorial army, the army coming from the territory of the State on the other. Now, in both cases, it is terrible, you know, that it should be either the system of the mercenariat or the system of the territorial army. These are two ways. I would say that the first way consists in *encasting*, literally ‘encasting’ a war machine in the State apparatus. The second way, obviously much more subtle, much more complex, consists in the State apparatus appropriating a war machine. I would say that armies of the State or military institutions have nothing to do with a war machine – if we rely on my definitions for convenience’s sake – but that armies and military institutions are not the form under which the State apparatuses appropriate a war machine and put it to their service.

Therefore I will never identify a war machine and a military institution. If you like, the war machine appears, according to the preceding hypotheses, to be much more on the side of the nomads without a State, but with a strong war machine, than from the side of the State apparatuses. The State apparatuses appropriate the war machine, and makes armies out of it, makes military institutions out of it. But these two poles – to encast or appropriate, as you see … the maximum of appropriation will only emerge much later in the forms of national conscription. We encounter the problem much later and even still today: the craftsman’s army [*armée de métier*] versus the army of the nation. The craftsman’s army – the army of the people … One sees that everywhere, everywhere. There will always be these two poles. Two special bodies. The famous special bodies that animate in their singular way modern armies and then national conscription … all that will be in play in the most fundamental political problems on the interior of the State. Oh yes. But then, in both cases, I would say, moreover, that this is not the only problem, because if one reduces things to the relation *State apparatus – war machine*, how is it then that the State can *encast* the war machine under the form of the mercenariat or *appropriate* it under the form of the army known as ‘national’? If one reduces the problem to that, one can end up letting all sorts of things escape.

Because in fact, what is the really big problem? It is not so much which formula to choose, because whatever the case, be it mercenaries or soldiers who are called ‘national’, one must do something with them, one must take them into the system of the State apparatus. If not they quickly turn against the State apparatus. So how to do this? There is a broadly universal solution, but whose concrete figures are very varied, namely: one must give them pieces of land [*terres*]. They will literally have to be *territorialized*. It will be necessary to accord them territories, whether it be under the form of colonies, or internal territories. But what will the status of these military territories in the State apparatus be? In other words, I think it is less through the technical form ‘mercenariat – territorial armies’, than through financial, economic and territorial correlates – the distribution of territories, systems of taxes, codes of service – that the State apparatuses will succeed in assimilating war machines; but always still with the risk that the war machines will regroup themselves against them.

And this is not the happy day we have all been waiting for; this day is not yet the day of the revolution. When war machines turn against the State apparatuses, these can be very ambiguous moments, and it can occur under the form of certain revolutionary movements, but it also comes about under completely different conditions, as we also must try to see this year. In any case I

would say: the problem of the appropriation through the State of the war machine is all the more important in that it is a question that traverses all of history, at least all of history for those historians who are interested in the formation of the development of capitalism. The question is very simple: how does it come about that the development of capitalism should have to pass through the 'State' pole? When in capitalism there are so many factors which go against the State, that even proceed as a function of the abolition of States, how come capitalism triumphed by way of States and through the intermediary of the State apparatuses? It is not obvious. So you ask me: how could it be manage to triumph?

Well, at any rate, there is another obvious solution: it could triumph by way of the 'town' pole. And town and State are not at all the same. The proof: at the beginning of capitalism, there are towns without States, and amongst the factors of capitalism, these are the most decisive factors. There was no absence of banking towns, commercial towns, and these did not at all belong to States. Any confusion between town and State would obviously be extremely annoying for us: they are completely different social formations. But here too they are found in [concrete] mixtures. I mean: sure, States are made up of towns. That doesn't mean at all that they have to involve the same social function. So why is it that capitalism isn't developed and formed as a function of a network of towns that have not yet passed through the State apparatus? After all one can say that in some respects, that failed to happen. Here one would touch on points of contingency in history which would of course be very interesting.

You see, none of this ever goes without saying. What took place so that the State-form won? A real struggle was necessary; and first of all, a bloody struggle, for the State apparatuses seized control of the towns. For example, in Europe, this doesn't just happen by itself. They resisted, the towns. But all this is to say that I think, before going into the differences between the 'State' form and the 'town' form any further, that one of the fundamental reasons was precisely this: it was because only the 'State' form, only States were able to literally afford the cost of appropriating the war machine. For a town, for the towns, it would be much more difficult. We will have to look further into that. But I mean: when the triumph of the 'State' form over the 'town' form takes place at the moment of the development of capitalism, it is at the same moment that the appropriation of the war machine implies a very heavy investment of capital, which the commercial towns, even the richest, were not capable of providing. We would have to understand why. There could be a very simple explanation: that the commercial towns needed wars; commercial wars are an important kind of war. … They needed wars, but they needed wars that were quick. They needed the quickest possible kind of wars, and finally, the least expensive types of war. We would have to look again at wars, like, for example, the war of Carthage. Carthage is a typical town. While Rome is already much more of a State apparatus. But Carthage: it cannot support Hannibal. Hannibal won everything he wanted, but he did not get any reinforcements. There was no investment in war. They needed a war of mercenaries; and a war of mercenaries, that needs to be be carried out very quickly, if not it's not going to work. It is the States that will invent, that will truly invent, the means of appropriating a war machine, by transforming war into a war of materials, that is to say, by investing more and more in the industry of war. At that moment, yes, they will appropriate it … Except that it is never a definitive solution … Except that what is reconstituted from the apparatuses known as 'military-industrial' is so complex and also ultimately international, so States can no longer control them without difficulty. All that is somewhat complicated.

So you see, I would say: okay, there is indeed a problem of the relation of the State and the war machine, but the problem is how it appropriates it. Whatever the case, it cannot be that the State apparatus comes from the war machine. Now, in fact what is terrible is that, wherever one turns, wherever one turns in this story of 'what is the State apparatus and where does it come from?' wherever one turns, wherever one looks among the numerous theses on this subject, one comes up against the same thing, the same impression, namely that these theses are, as one says in logic, tautologies, that is to say that they presuppose what is in question. If I attempt to group together the classical theses on the origin of the State, I can observe that they are all found in one of the most profound authors on this question, namely: they are found, not at all in a confused state but under distinct headings, in Engels.

Now, the first kind of thesis involves invoke war, or (which is the not the same thing but which is in the same current) phenomena connected to the war machine. It could be the act of war or the organisation of war. There were several theses along these lines. Engels deploys it when discussing the Germans. He doesn't deploy it for any old case, he doesn't present a hotchpotch. He focuses on it in the case of the Germans. That's a first series of theses. If you don't mind, for greater simplicity I will call them *exogenous* theses (if that helps to simplify matters); that is to say, theses accounting for the formation of the State apparatus through reference to an extrinsic factor: the war machine, war. The State apparatus would be born, would be the product, of war.

Second kind of thesis: theses I call, for convenience sake, *endogenous*. They consist in invoking phenomena interior to economic and political development in the widest sense to give an account of the formation of the State apparatus. These theses are well known, these are factors which ... these are theses that mainly invoke two principal factors: how, starting from, and within, societies known as primitive, the elements of private property are constituted, the privatization of property and the monetarization of the economy. It is the emergence of the phenomenon of private property and of monetary and mercantile economics that would have brought with it the formation of the State apparatuses. Engels invokes this thesis notably in relation to Greece and Rome. Neither of these theses exclude each other; one can mix them together.

Third sort of thesis, which to me seems the most interesting but … What for now we could call theses invoking specific factors. I hope you'll be able to see the very profound difference between these and the second kind of theses, the endogenous theses. If you look for these theses in Engels, you won't find them in *The Origin of the Family and of the State*, but in another book, namely: in the *Anti-Dühring*. They appeal to another stratum of cultures, to other geographical places. This is why it might seem at first sight that all these theses can be combined. And they consist in saying that what explains the formation of the State apparatus is the progressive emergence of public functions. The celebrated formula of Engels: "It is public functions that are at the origin of domination." What are these public functions? Well, with the advent, or rather with a certain development of agriculture, problems would have been posed that would have transcended the framework of primitive agricultural communities. In particular, one great problem: that of irrigation. And these are problems common to several communities, which would have engendered public functions of the type: keeper of the waters, organizer of irrigation, and, from that moment on, the entrepreneur of works. You see: the organizer of irrigation, the entrepreneur of works, and if need be, the inspector of taxes, etc. These are public functions that

are progressively singled out and which would have armed the State apparatus, brought with them the State apparatus.

Where do we stand in relation to these three types of theses? It's up to you to go and look at the books; as I said, Engels lays it all out very nicely. And well, I don't know, but for my part I have the impression … but you know how it is, there will be some amongst you who say: yes, sure, one of these, these works for me. Once you've thought about it for a bit, or maybe you have already reflected on it. If one of them suits you, good, that's fine. Then you will switch off [laughter] or just carry on listening to me all the same, in order to see how I arrange things. That's quite possible! But for my part, I just say this: what is it that makes me think these theses presuppose what is in question? With regard to the first theses, the theses making a derivation from war, the thesis I call 'exogneous', it's not that complicated. It's not complicated. Under what conditions, in fact, can war machines manage to produce a State? On the condition that one already exists. I would say that, yes, these are factors of the State, but they are secondary factors. They can only produce States in a derived form. It is to the extent that they are first directed against a pre-existing State – and again it is necessary that there be a pre-existing State – that, as a consequence, they can be integrated into a State. But they obviously presuppose that there is first of all … that you're already assuming a State.

The endogenous theses, I would say, are even more striking, because the whole history of a formation of private property starting from the primitive commune … well, everyone knows that it doesn't work, neither in archaeology nor in ethnology. I am just giving impressions: one truly has the feeling that it doesn't work. Why? One really cannot see how it could be done. One would have to indicate a mechanism. It is not enough to say that, all of a sudden, some great savage would say: 'That belongs to me.' No. It would at least be necessary to have some idea of a basic mechanism which, starting from a communal property, or a tribal property, could engender a private property. How can that be done? For its part, everything archaeology teaches us – and you can find much clearer information there – is that property is not or does not at all seem to be constituted, in contemporary archaeological data, it does not at all seem to be born from a so-called primitive tribal system of property. *It is constituted starting from a system of public imperial property*. I would say that it is only later, through a very specific social mechanism, very assignable, variable according to the case but still very assignable, starting from a public property of the State – so not at all a private property, but a public property of State – that private property can be constituted. That makes sense, and it reinforces my basic hunch that the privatisation of property is only a factor in the State if one already assumes a State. For a simple reason, that the privatisation of property implies the public property of the archaic empire as the framework that makes it possible.

And what about money? On the side of money, I appeal to a point that I will take up again next time, but I'll just say this for those amongst you who can already anticipate these points. Couldn't one also say that a simultaneously mercantile and monetary development of the economy could have played a role in the constitution of the State? Here too the answer seems to me: obviously not. No, for two reasons, one of which is self-evident, while the other seems to me much more malign, that is to say, much more interesting for us, if we manage to deepen it this year. The self-evident reason is almost the same as earlier, namely: the merchant economy is assignable to which moment? Even as merchant and monetary economy. It is precisely

assignable. Money [*l'argent*], you understand, is a very complicated problem. But it is assignable precisely starting from the moment where there are very well-determined external circuits of commerce. These exist in primitive societies. Only, there is no monopoly. What appears with States is, as one says, the monopolistic character of external commerce. In other words, let us put it like this to move quickly: it is the emperor who holds the monopoly of commerce. And it is starting from this monopoly that the economy can be really monetarised. So that it is not at all on the side of commerce that one must search for the source of money.

The form 'money' does not come from commerce, rather the latter derives from it … It comes into commerce starting from something else. And where does it come from, the 'money' form? There are many authors (and I don't claim to be the first to say this, on the contrary, I've got this from authors who seem to be saying some interesting things) who suggest the following hypothesis. It is that there are two sources (there is not much choice if you ask 'where does this thing of the form 'money [*argent*]', the form 'currency' [*monnaie*]', come from?'). It could come from two things: either from commerce or from what? Or from taxation. From taxation. Or rather it is a means. … Either one will say that money is a means with which to exchange commodities, or one will say that money is a means of discharging you from tax. Let's leave to one side for the moment why it is that money discharges you from tax. We will see. But with a first glance, we can understand it at the level of summary propositions.

Now I do find very interesting this whole current of specialist writers on financial history who tend more and more towards this solution. They not only insist on the bipolar character of money (in saying that sometimes it is tax that is the origin of money, sometimes it is external commerce), but what interests me even more are those who tend towards the idea of a sole origin, namely that it is always tax. It is always tax which would be at the origin of money and it is starting from this moment, that an external commerce monopolised by the master of taxes becomes possible. I did not develop that at all because we would need to do some (albeit very simple) economic analyses. I personally think that it's true, that money does come from tax and not at all [from the exchange of commodities]. So you can see at any rate why this is so interesting for us. I'm saying this for those who already have some knowledge of these matters, but we will take the whole thing up more gently by looking at the story of the sequence of three kinds of rent …. The three famous rents. For example, when all the textbooks on economics distinguish between rent in products or rent in goods (that is to say, the peasant who gives goods to the landlord), rent in labour or services (the peasant who renders services, who gives services to the landlord), and rent in money (the peasant who makes payments to the landlord), very often these rents are presented as successive in history. But at the juncture at which we find ourselves, you can already see that in fact it is a single system, in which none of the three terms can exist without the other.

And why? Because the apparatus … the State, defined as apparatus of capture, immediately has three poles. It is an apparatus of capture with three heads. And the three heads of the apparatus of capture, are: rent of the landlord, profit of the entrepreneur, tax of the despot. And why? They're necessarily part of the same thing. There is something prodigious in the archaic States, in the archaic empires … and it will also pose problems that will preoccupy the modern State, where things are no longer like that. But one must not say that the archaic State already discovered everything. Because our States went on to discover other things. What is formidable is the

convergence of three forms: of the rent of the landlord, of the profit of the entrepreneur and of the taxes through which it maintains external commerce. How did that happen? It's not difficult, as we can see: necessarily, the State is simultaneously the public proprietor of the land … I'm not bringing private property back into the equation: there is no private property, it is in so far as the emperor, the imperial instance, the instance of power, is the proprietor, therefore the public proprietor. There is no private property. There is a communal possession and an imperial property. It is a system, therefore, in which everything is public. There is no private element. The archaic emperor is the public proprietor and, by virtue of this title, receives ground rent. He is the master of surplus labour, the master of great works, and by virtue of this status receives profit from the entrepreneur. And finally, he collects taxes and monopolises external commerce. And the three heads, I would say, this is almost, if you like … well, in Marx there is a famous trinitary formula, for those who know it. For myself, I am thinking of another formula, but to some extent it comes down to the same thing … but that has no importance, it's no discovery, it is …

The trinitary formula I am thinking of would be this: at the level of archaic empires there is already rent of land, profit of enterprise, taxes and external commerce. And these will be the three heads of the apparatus of capture. Hence you can see why, from where I'm standing, all the factors that have been proposed to me are factors that already presuppose what was to be explained. In relation to the previous arguments, not only is it not monetary economy and the development of the monetary economy which are capable of explaining the State, since the monetary form presupposes tax, which already returns to the State, but it is also not private property, the development of private property that is capable of explaining it, for the simple reason that private property derives, under predetermined conditions, from imperial public property.

And finally, is it the last hypothesis, the public functions which progressively lead to it? No. There are three archaic public functions. There are three. And the archaic imperial bureaucracy has three heads. This is the ground landlord, or the representative of the ground landlord, who is a functionary of the Emperor, because the ground landlord is the Emperor. So it is he who handles the ground rent. Secondly, it is the entrepreneur who receives profit; and the entrepreneur is also the Emperor or his functionary. Both are required: the emperor and his functionaries. Or rather, this is a second type of functionary. And thirdly, perhaps the best of all, the most mysterious, but who appears right from the beginning, is the banker. It is the banker. And there you have the triple imperial bureaucracy. The representative of the ground landlord, the entrepreneur, the banker. Why? Because the bank has never simply been an intermediary institution. The bank is an institution and when one understands … but you already know this, I'm saying this for those … we should try to make this clear, this is what we should do this year: the bank is not an intermediary … or at least, it is only an intermediary institution, in some of its aspects, if it is already an institution that creates. A bank – but not any kind of bank. The others only derive from the more fundamental banks. A bank: meaning an institution for the emission and creation of money. To the question 'where does money come from?', the answer is: obviously, money comes from what emits it, what creates it. There is a creation of money. It is the banks that bring about the creation of money.

Now, in the archaic Empire, the banker is precisely the master of taxes and the one who, in the name of the Emperor, takes care of foreign trade and the monopoly of foreign trade. More: he

carries out the most mysterious operation, the most mysterious for us from the archaeological point of view, that could exist in the most archaic State, namely: he already carries out the operation of being an intermediary between the three poles. Namely: he exchanges money for goods. Because put yourself in the situation of a poor functionary of the Emperor. He owes a tax to the Emperor. He receives lands, but in a delegated title. He is not a private proprietor – we will see that more clearly the next time – there is no private property, there is a communal possession of the commons, there is an eminent property of the Emperor, but it is a public property, and it is a property of the function of functionaries of the emperor. There is no private property in any of that. Well, it is not easy, his situation, the functionary who gains lands with this functional title. He owes to the Emperor a tax. The peasants give him goods for taxes. But the Emperor, for his part, makes a conversion. You know, it's inspired as a system. It is inspired. I mean, if one doesn't understand that … If understands that, one can better understand contemporary monetary operations which, nevertheless, have no relation to this, but must start with a device like that. He finds himself in a diabolical situation, because the Emperor, for his part, does not want goods. Or at least, if he does want them, it's for his stocks. He takes a small share of natural goods, okay. He puts aside some corn, things like that. But he also takes money [*argent*].

Therefore the functionary will have to bring about the conversion of a share of the goods that the peasants owe him into the money [*monnaie*] that he owes to the Emperor. It is necessary therefore that it passes through a bank. And the bank, for its part, how is it to procure that? How will it harvest it? It takes in natural goods and it gives out money [*argent*]. What will this creation of money [*argent*] be in the oldest Empires? It is formidable as a system. It will be one of those very strange systems. Understand that much of what was already known as the agrarian problem, in the most archaic epochs, is completely related to this system. Rent in nature, in natural goods, and then conversion of rent in nature into monetary rent through the intermediary of the bank. In every case, the three great public functions – I say this in order to finish up – are: the ground landlord, the entrepreneur of large works, and the banker, the banker of taxes and commerce. Now, how do these public functions account for the apparition of the State? When, on the one hand, they are strictly complementary – it seems to me – and, on the other hand, that from the moment they emerge, the State is already there.

So, at the point we've got to, I think I have said what this year's problem will be. When it is so clear-cut, we could stop here, and say: "there is no solution, it's perfect." The problem, from where we're standing, is: suppose that the State apparatus is defined as an apparatus of capture that is not explained through the war machine, which will appropriate the machine of war but which will not be explained through it - we can see that it functions like a trap. It is like a trap in the sense in which one talks of a trap in hunting. It is not war that is the model of the State apparatus. It is much more like capture. It would be much more like hunting. One could draw up a table of the apparatus, in the same way one can make a table of the hunting apparatus, or of a trap. It is an apparatus with three heads, constituted by: rents, profits, taxes. How could that have worked? How could that have worked? With a police, to be sure. With a bureaucracy. With a policing bureaucracy. Why does that suffice? How did it come about that there was no need for an apparatus of war at this moment, of a war machine for such an apparatus? How come the problem of war is a completely different problem? So what happens at this level? What is this State that I call 'archaic', and which already presents these three heads? And what about the circulation between the three heads? We could say that this, therefore, is the strange role of the

bank, between rents, profits and taxes; and our trinitary formula of the State apparatus of capture would be: rents, profits, taxes.

So the primary task for you this year is to do some political economy, if you don't mind, at this level of ground rent, taxes, and all that. There is surely a lot on that that can help me. Second task: when we arrive at some of the other problems, it would be good if there could be a group which this time – I will explain why in the next session – could get started as soon as possible on research into what is known as – this might sound surprising, but I'll explain next time – into what mathematicians call 'axiomatics'. And as I think that the relations between the Department of Philosophy and that of Mathematics are particularly close, if need be, I will ask the mathematicians if there is a way for some of you … [*End of the recording*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 02, 13 November 1979**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translated by Christian Kerslake**

**Part 1** [*Here begins the Bibliothèque nationale recording, available on YouTube from Sociophilosophy,*[8] *but not the recording available at WebDeleuze or the Deleuze Seminars*]

I cannot … There are too many of you. How about we divide this into two? I'll do the same thing for both halves in succession. That will be an advantage for you, because you won't have to stay for an hour and a half, and an advantage for me, because I'll have two and a half hours to say the same thing [*Laughter*]. Yes, I'm afraid so, because this situation is unworkable. Come on, be fair. The kind of work we're doing requires smaller numbers. Otherwise, nobody can speak; not even me. Well, what do you think of this idea? [*Student responses*]. Oh, the second session is more convenient? Fine, then I'll just stay here by myself for an hour and a half, that's fine … no, I mean, it's terrible. It seems that last time some people couldn't make it.

Student: Evidently everyone wants to be here.

Deleuze: I can probably handle it because I'll be forced to think about something else, but surely all of you can't manage in this room, it's not possible. What time is it?

Student: A little after 10 o'clock.

Deleuze: Did you say a quarter past 10? [Laughter]. The ideal would be … Last year, it was good because towards the end it began to work rather well, with me asking you questions and you answering with things that I need. Although I want to avoid discussions, it's great when I can say 'I need something, does anyone have any idea about it?' But if it's like this, nobody is going to want to speak.

Students: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Will it cause problems to split the session?

Students: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Don't worry, the choice of group will happen all by itself. You won't be able to sort it out through consent. When did consent ever decide anything? It'll be down to … the rhythms of

intelligence. The most intelligent ones will act quickly and come first. Then there's the opposite: those with a no less profound, but slower intelligence – they'll come to the second one.

Student**:** [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze**:** I'm telling you a secret: I'm not going to go into it, but that's what it comes down to [laughter]. So are these two groups going to be possible?

Student: [*Inaudible*] [Should we move to the amphitheater?]

Deleuze**:** No, that's worse. Then I'm done for. We already talked about that. I said why amphitheaters kill me straightaway. Here, there are too many of us, and the conditions aren't right for us truly to be able to work together, but an amphitheater? What I would do would not work there. Also we would need a microphone. So if someone wanted to say something, they would have to come to the microphone, which puts everyone off. And the Vincennes amphitheaters, I don't know if you've seen them, but it's Dracula in a pure state! [*Laughter*]. It is the grave itself. This place is all right; it's nature itself in comparison … On the other hand, there is a certain severity in what we are about to do this year. In any case, I will stop in an hour and a half, so that those who cannot take any more … Some people are very interested in what we do here, but they won't be able to endure more than an hour and a half. For myself, of course, I could just carry on. Anyway, let's get on with it now. [6:30, *end of the initial discussion; the timestamp starts from zero here for the rest of the recording*]

… It's a bit annoying you weren't all here last time, because I laid out the program, or at least the beginning of the program I have in mind for this year and said something about how it connects up with what we did last year. Then I sketched out, as much as was possible, a sort of recapitulation of our work last year, which above all concerned the mode of existence, the mode of space, the mode of organization, of what we called the 'war machine'. I outlined how we were increasingly led to distinguish, at least abstractly, from the point of view of the concept, between 'war machine' and 'State apparatus'; and how at the end of the year we touched more and more on the following question: well, if the war machine is defined as we tried to do it throughout the year, by a certain mode of space, by a certain mode of organization, etc. that is to be *radically* distinguished, from the conceptual point of view, from what one finds in the State apparatus; if the State apparatus does not derive from a war machine, but if, on the contrary, war machines are 'originally' directed 'against' State apparatuses; if State apparatuses, throughout their whole history, are thrown into a long and very difficult enterprise, that of appropriating the war machine, and appropriating the war machine in the form of the military institution, in the form of the army, even though the war machine in itself is something completely different to the military institution or the army … well, if all that is true, we come up against the question (and this is where we ended last year: happily it came about that we gravitated more and more around this question) okay, but then what? What happens with regard to the State apparatus? Where can such a thing come from?

And this thing, throughout the course of last year, we haven't stopped defining it (relying on very different authors) as an apparatus of a very special type, that is to say: the State apparatus is an apparatus of capture. It is an apparatus of capture. It captures men. Not everything is an

apparatus of capture. Perhaps societies without a State proceed otherwise. And I will say it again just as I did last year, we have not tried to evaluate the degrees of cruelty involved. Is the cruelty of the war machine worse than that of the State apparatus? In no sense. I recall one of our basic ideas from last time, one of the ideas with which we were greatly occupied last year, to wit, the idea that in the State apparatus, as soon as there is the organization of work that the State apparatus implies, something quite strange transpires, because it is as if there is a primary mutilation. It is as if one is already mutilated. Mutilation precedes the accident. While in the war machine, which brings about abominable mutilations, and which is even a specialist regarding them in this sense, mutilation comes later on. Hence the problem is not to know which is the worst. Which is worst? Someone mutilated in war or someone mutilated by work? No reason to say. With regard to the societies that proceed in a different fashion, we will look into the mechanisms that permit them to function later; but, once again, the question is not at all one of cruelty, it is rather of types and of the typology of cruelties … of cruelty.

But to return to the basic question: very well, you will say, this is not where the State apparatus comes from; so where then *does* it come from? Last time, I recalled the point we had got to last year, namely that whatever explanations of the State apparatus we are given, we have the impression that these explanations already presuppose it. I gave the list of theses accepted as classical concerning the origin of the State, and every time it seemed to me, though I could be wrong, these explanations only gave an account of the State by assuming it as already given, already there. So this was what tipped us into our problem: how to explain an apparatus of capture? And how to explain the success of such an apparatus? And how could a success be made of an apparatus of capture, as *opposed* to a war machine? This obviously means that the apparatus of capture mounted by the State does *not* proceed via the violence of the war machine. It proceeds in a different way.

I made a point of that last year, but I did not completely develop the theme. I made a point of saying that there is no question of confusing the police and the army, for example, the policeman and the warrior. Even if there are all kinds of mixtures in fact. The violence of the police is not the same thing as the violence of war, it is not the same thing as the violence of the army. I suggested that the State had policemen and gaolers well before it appropriated the war machine in the form of military institutions. The State first proceeded above all with policemen and gaolers. Where did such a power come from?

This is the question we have arrived at: what is this *civil* capture? What is this civil capture that is not made by means of arms? Of course, to say it again, the State will appropriate the war machine, but this is not our question here. To say that the State appropriates the war machine and needs to appropriate it in order to survive is already sufficient to indicate that its own source is not there. That it faced enormous problems in appropriating the war machine, and did so at considerable cost, we will have the occasion to see through detailed examples.

So, capture by the State does not already suppose a war machine. What appeared exemplary to us were the myths related by Georges Dumézil. In particular the principal myth of the political sovereign who emerges, throwing nets, in the field of battle. He is the binding god, the knotting god, he is the god of the knot – he throws his net, he carries out his capture, and his emergence on the field of battle has the effect of freezing all the weapons. This is therefore not at all a god

of war and Dumézil's analyses infinitely confirm it. It concerns a civil capture, not at all a capture of war. Well, if one defines the State apparatus in this way, then there you are: there is a State apparatus from the moment there is an apparatus of capture.

You will ask me: where's the progress? Well, what seems interesting to me is that this is already a definition, good or bad. To my knowledge it is not that novel, or only relatively so, to conceive the State as an operation of capture. This is what we ended with last year. But what is explanatory about saying that the State emerges ready-made, in one swoop? In fact, when I say 'it emerges in one swoop', it's not worth much. Yes, it's an astonishing swoop, a great success. But a whole set of questions arise: Why does it succeed? How does it succeed? Where does it succeed? Anyway, this history turns out to be quite strange. Of course, it's not enough to say that any explanation proposed to us assumes what is to be explained. This is why we will proceed more gently. And when I talk in a rudimentary way of a surging up of the State apparatus as an apparatus of capture, I think most of you will grasp what I'm alluding to. [Before turning to that], a final parenthesis: for those who followed last year, which was centred around the war machine – if there are points we need to take up again this year, where there are things to add, etc., it goes without saying you are above all welcome to point them out. In particular about the forms of space we distinguished; if we have to take these points up again, we will.

You can see well enough what the idea of a State apparatus emerging in one swoop refers back to. Again, we must be very prudent. But what immediately comes to mind in fact is an aspect of Marxist research. Which is not to say that Marxism has necessarily integrated it, under all conditions, with respect to all the problems it poses. I'm alluding to the whole conception of what is known as the despotic or Asiatic formations. -- And here I'm not going to be saying things for the first time, but it will be organized through a rhythm of exchange. You recall what we try to do in philosophy at Vincennes; we don't adhere to what is called progressivity, but to the idea that one can use exactly the same language for beginners and for those who already have, I don't know, a lot of experience and studies in philosophy behind them. -- Turning to this famous question in Marxism of despotic or Asiatic formations, first of all let's immediately eliminate one thing. Where does it come from? It doesn't come from Marx. Everyone knows that the theme of an Asiatic despotism is originally formed in the 18th century, notably with Montesquieu.

But when Montesquieu defines what he for his part calls 'Asiatic despotism', one can clearly see that there is an active ulterior political motive, that of the critique of absolute monarchy. And above all one can clearly see that what he describes as Asiatic phenomena are phenomena of empire that are already highly developed. But if he's dealing with highly developed imperial phenomena, I can put him on one side because because I've already raised the question of the development of the State. The simple reason Montesquieu is talking about already highly developed empires is because these are already regimes in which private property appears, in which the counsel of the Prince, the private counsel of the despot, etc., appears. When Marx invokes the idea of a despotic or Asiatic formation, it is obviously in a completely different manner, and on no account can we say that he is taking something up from Montesquieu. I believe he proposes something radically new. Particularly in relation to a set of later archaeological discoveries, which in the course of being followed up have singularly confirmed the Marxist schema. That is the first point.

Second point, over which I must pass quickly: the bibliography on this question of the ancient imperial formations. These have been given several names to distinguish them: 'despotic' or 'Asiatic' formations, 'archaic empires' – note that I don't say 'ancient', I deliberately say 'archaic empire'. Which epoch? We are talking about the Neolithic. A great archaeologist [V. Gordon] Childe, about whom I spoke last year, talks of an urban revolution and a revolution of the State in the Neolithic. If I were to give a summary of the Marxist bibliography on these archaic empires, the principal text would be the famous text in Marx's *Grundrisse* that opens up the whole question, that is, in the unedited draft by Marx entitled 'Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy'. It's on page 314 of the Pléiade edition that you will find the great description of the archaic imperial formation …

Student: [*Inaudible comment, no doubt requesting a reference*]

Deleuze: Yes, it's in Volume II, excuse me. After that, a very important book by a Marxist called [Karl August] Wittfogel – w-i-t-t-f-o-g-e-l -- who broke with Marxism, and which has been translated under the title *Oriental Despotism*, with a very important critical preface by [Pierre] Vidal-Naquet. The third great book is difficult to find but is in the library; I cite it, because it's by a Hungarian Marxist I think is one of the best contemporary Marxists, whose name is [Ferenc] Tökei and who published in Hungary (but in French) a text entitled *Sur le mode de production asiatique* [*On the Asiatic Mode of Production*], which is one of the most beautiful texts on this subject. And finally, a collective work by CERM, Centre d'Étude et Recherche Marxiste [Centre for Marxist Study and Research] with the same title, a collection of articles, necessarily unequal in value, entitled *On the Asiatic Mode of Production*.[9]

To get quickly to the point: what does that phrase mean? Why 'Asiatic'? What does it mean when one says 'Asiatic despotic formations'? Or 'Asiatic modes of production'? What are all those words doing there first of all? Why *Asiatic*? Because it is in Asia that one discovers them first of all. In the Middle East, the Near East, Middle East, Far East. However, little by little, the same thing will be confirmed everywhere. And Marx already indicates that. It will be confirmed everywhere, under the strangest forms. One finds these formations, these great archaic Empires, not only in the Near, Middle and Far East – for example, in Egypt, India, China – but also in South America: the great South American Empires. One will find them on the horizon of Greece: the Cretan Empire and also to a lesser extent – but we will have to understand why it is to a lesser extent – the Mycenean Empire. And how can one understand Greek history without referring to these empires? How to understand Greek history without referring to these empires? [Deleuze repeats]: that is said quickly enough. And then in Rome, one also finds … one also has the impression … So, everyone is content, because we have here a kind of unknown horizon.

Why unknown? These great empires that archaeology brings back to life come back to life again everywhere. In South America, even in Europe with Anatolia and Mycenae; in the case of Rome it is the Etruscan Empire. And all these empires, strangely enough, seem to have something in common, points in common. At the same time, one asks oneself: what happened, what might have happened? For these great empires are traversed by a fundamental forgetting. As if they disappeared and their memory is annulled. Why the disappearance of the great South American Empires? These great empires are a very particular case. We will call them 'great archaic Empires'; I will try to justify the word 'great': sometimes the empires were indeed not that great.

There is a famous case, just as mysterious as all the others, the famous empire, the famous imperial formation that appeared to reign on Easter Island, and which inspired the construction of colossal statues. The swift annihilation of that civilization … Mycenae, Crete. In Mycenae, there was the Dorian invasion, then a radical forgetting. Truly the Greek city was only born through a forgetting, a kind of absolute forgetting of its imperial past. This is strange. How does it all happen?

How does it happen that even within Marxism, this history of archaic imperial formations was [so difficult to process]? I will say this very quickly, and you will find echoes of it in the CERM collection, but in a sense, it escapes their grasp, or at least the grasp of an ordinary Marxism, and for two reasons. Two reasons that are moreover connected. It puts in question the famous theory of stages and that of progressivity, to which we alluded last time in relation to progressivist explanations of the formation of the State apparatus. It appeared that in the imperial formations, the imperial apparatus springs up *fully formed*! This is why I am starting with this problem, because it helps to reinforce our question: how to make sense of such a history? This sort of massive apparatus of capture, the nature of which we will soon begin to see, and which springs up fully formed, stands to obstruct the theory of stages and the theory of the progressive formation of the State apparatus in Marxism. If that's right, that has implications. What is suggested, rightly or wrongly – we have to acknowledge this, but actually it's rather complicated – is that this stage of the old archaic imperial formations, of Asiatic despotism, could after all be said to be anti-Marxist, could be said to be anti-communist. It is true that many issues came out of this. Such as: did the Russian Revolution and Stalin do nothing more than bring the old despotic formations back to life?

And, Wittfogel, repentant Marxist, entirely bases his whole lengthy book, entitled *Oriental Despotism*, on a rather labored parallel of the type: Stalin is the Chinese Emperor. Obviously, the Chinese Marxists, the Chinese revolutionaries, and the Soviet Marxists, have all set themselves against this thesis. And it is true that Stalin has strangely enough radically barred, radically censured, all research into this type of formation. Even the texts by Marx have only become known about quite recently. At first, they were secret; anyway, all this has a long history. If one leaves aside this history, one ends up asking oneself: was Stalin the master of an archaic Empire; but this is not so interesting for us at the point where we are. Anyway, these are the reasons why this has for a long time been such a burning question within Marxism; both for the Chinese, at the level of the Chinese Revolution, and at the level of the Soviet state. Why? Here I will finish with all these introductions.

How is it to be defined, [the Asiatic mode of production]? Marx's text, you see, is very beautiful, very beautiful. He says there that there are agricultural communities, agricultural communes. These are first in Marx's schema; I do not say whether we should affirm this schema, or that I myself am proposing it to you, but it is necessary to start with something. From out of these agricultural communes and, on the basis of these agricultural communes, each distinct from the other, a superior unity is erected. The agricultural communes rest on the possession of the soil [*sol*], in the form of a communal possession. But the eminent superior unity alone, namely the unity of the despot, is the proprietor. The communes possess the soil in the communitarian or communal form of possession; the despot is the superior unity, it is like a kind of pyramid, he is the *eminent* proprietor of the ground [*sol*]. What does all this mean? Marx evidently insists on

this a great deal: what makes this type possible, not the uniting of agricultural communities but, to speak scientifically, the subjunction of agricultural communes under a formal transcendent unity, the unity of the despot? What makes this possible, according to Marx, is that agriculture has already attained a certain level of development. It is because agriculture has already attained a certain level of development at the level of productivity, with the means of production supplied by a class of craftsmen, all of this implying a certain mode of production, a development, a relatively developed mode of production. The agricultural commune remains the basis, but it finds itself, in virtue of the productive forces of which it makes use, confronted with problems which transcend *each* commune.

What are these problems? Marx and Engels already insisted on the nature of these problems and Wittfogel's whole book is centred around this very important point (which is not always confronted, but nevertheless comes up all the time): namely, that this development of agricultural productive forces permits, on the one hand, the formation of a surplus stock – so that one leaves subsistence economy behind in order to enter into a new economy of surplus or of stock. There is the formation of a stock. The state of this mode of production makes possible the formation of a stock, and therefore makes necessary, on the other hand … what? It makes hydraulic works necessary. Hydraulic works can be of very different types: take the case of China – for example the rice fields – or of Egypt with the flooding of the Nile – or the case of Greece, for example the Myceneans with the drying of the marshes; it is rather curious that across figurations that are very, very different, you will rediscover the same theme of hydraulic works. To the extent that Wittfogel calls these ancient archaic formations 'hydraulic Empires'. Looking more closely, one becomes aware of … [exceptions?], but that changes nothing, that sometimes empires are not hydraulic does not matter. There are cases where, no, it is not hydraulic works that are fundamental. It doesn't change anything. There is a complementarity between an economy that has become capable of producing stock and the large-scale works that develop the forces of production.

You can see that the schema is quite simple. Thus, the communes are pyramidalized; but (to use a word which will be useful for me, and to try to fix my vocabulary for the sake of convenience, because I need this word) the agricultural communities remain *possessors* of the soil. Note moreover that the communitarian codes subsist and that in fact these communes are independent of each other. The communitarian codes subsist. The simple formula of the archaic empire is that the communitarian codes subsist, but they are overcoded. The old imperial formation is a formation that consists, literally, in an overcoding. Consequently, I take immediate advantage of that to give – because I will need it throughout the coming year – a definition of what, on my own account, I would like to call 'overcoding'. I will say that there is an overcoding when the codes known as primitive, being conserved … [But] what does 'primitive code' signify? It signifies the interlacing of the two constitutive givens of what one calls the 'primitive code', namely *lineage – territory*. When lineages marry, or modulate territories, you have a code broadly, summarily called – and this is very much a summary – a 'primitive code'. These are the nuptials of lineage and territory. It is very supple; it gives a foundation, if you like, for what one can in effect call a 'primitive commune' … I will say that there is *overcoding* when the codes being conserved … I therefore reserve the word 'code' for these interlacings of lineages and territories. Very mobile interlacings, these codes are very subtle, why? Because the territories are in a way *itinerant*; one changes territory and the lineages themselves change, constantly change,

are recast. There is therefore a recasting, a double recasting. Not at all by cause-effect, there is a *simultaneous* double recasting of lineages and territories. When a lineage rises in importance, it takes hold of such or such territory. Anyway, that is what I call 'code', these kinds of dynamics of lineage-territory. … And I say that there is an overcoding when the codes subsist but are, on the other hand and at the same time, related to a formal superior unity which thus literally acts to *overcode* them. I will take this up again … perhaps I give the impression of saying nothing, but, we must pose notions for the next time, and I will keep hold of these very, very rudimentary definitions I have attempted to give of two themes: code and overcoding. When the codes, which are dynamic unities of lineages and territories, are overcoded by a unity – which will be precisely the eminent formal unity of the despot – at this moment, you have an overcoding that defines the archaic Empire.

Okay. But where does it come from? How does this overcoding operate? Here we rediscover a theme (I talked about it last time, I've started to say it here, but here I'm rediscovering it at another level): it will be the eminent *owner* of the soil, in relation to which the common codes are defined by mere *possession*.[10] It will be the eminent owner of the soil. It is a pyramid … Actually, what should one call it? It's not a pyramid, it is a trihedron. One could find a fourth face, but there are three faces, it is absolutely … The base will be the communes, the coded communes, and then the overcoding with its three faces is the superior formal unity. The despotic unity as owner of the soil, as eminent proprietor of the soil: that's the first point. Second point: as master of large-scale works, starting with works of irrigation, hydraulic works or works of a completely different nature (I will specify later what 'of a completely different nature' means). And thirdly: master of rents [*redevances*] and tributes [*tributs*] – that is to say, the great master of taxes. Master of taxes.

Those who were there will recall the trinity at which we arrived, via a different route, last time? One could say that, yes, the apparatus of capture, the State as apparatus of capture, has three faces, it is an apparatus with three heads. There are three faces of the apparatus of capture in its most ancient form, I would say; but this allows for a step forward, because we find a confirmation, and can better situate it in history. Nevertheless, we do not yet understand how these things could be the same, it does not seem possible. So, let's investigate these three heads or three faces.

It is [first of all]: ground rent, and I hope that this year we can find a way (I don't know why this should be so funny … for my part, I find it amusing) to try to explain what ground rent is, without at all taking ourselves to be economists. If there are economists amongst us that will be perfect. I would say that the first face of the apparatus of capture is ground rent. The second face is the organization of work [*travail*]. And I reconnect here with a theme we started to glimpse last year, but to which I would like to attach much more importance this year, in homage once again to the works of the Italian autonomists and of Toni Negri in particular.

There is something obvious which holds true for every civilization and which already holds for the ancient archaic empire: it is that, in economic terms, it is not surplus labor [*surtravail*], what one calls surplus labor, excess labor, that depends on labor; rather it is labor which depends on surplus labor. That is to say: the notion of labor only became discernible from the moment an

apparatus of capture forced the people to bring a surplus labor into being. It is surplus labor that is primary in relation to labor.

Thus, the second aspect of the apparatus of capture is this: the despot is not only the eminent owner of the soil, and, for this reason, the one to whom ground rent returns (ground rent is the revenue of the owner of the soil). The despot's second face, his second aspect, is: I am the master of surplus labor, and through that, the master of all labor. In other words: he is the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur of large-scale works, starting with hydraulic works. So the ground rent of landed property, that's the first characteristic. Second characteristic: the profit of the entrepreneur.

Third characteristic: the master of taxes. Why? For a very simple reason: because he is the one who invents money, and who has every reason to invent money; therefore, we can say that money – again we will have occasion to see this further on – evidently does not come from commerce. Now there will be some among you who will think that this question should be resolved a bit more carefully, but I would suggest as a basic hypothesis (and this is not my idea, there are certain authors who take this view) that far from deriving from commerce, money has tax for an origin and it is commercial only in a secondary sense. Why tax? In fact it is not by chance that the despot is simultaneously the founder of tax and the master of commerce. He has a monopoly on external trade. So it makes sense. Suppose that money comes from tax, leaving aside whether this takes the institutional *form* of tax; by virtue of that the despot becomes the master of external trade; and this is his third aspect.

Now, I ask you: what is the formula of the archaic empire? If you like, if I take up these three things: ground rent of landed property, profit of enterprise, trade and tax, namely, the bank … [*Interruption in the recording*] [39:43]

**Part 2**

… Did an evolution of the State take place? I say: if there is a State which has realised the splendid unity of the three – of the owner, of the entrepreneur and of the banker – it is obviously the archaic imperial State. Why? Because: ground rent, profit of enterprise and taxes are strictly speaking one single and same thing. And, in effect, it is understood very well that they should be the same thing, since the communes owe a ground rent to the eminent proprietor, that is to say, to the despot. How do they hand it over? They will give it both in products of nature, in natural products, which the despot turns into stocks, and in services, that is to say, in labor, in *corvées*, in work. Whence the name – which one can find already in Marx with regard to these despotic formations – "generalised slavery", which in fact has nothing to do with private slavery, since generalised slavery designates the activity of the communes insofar as they are submitted to the surplus labor imposed by the despot and the large-scale works of the despot. This is therefore not at all what one calls ancient slavery, it is an archaic slavery, a generalised slavery, that is to say a communal slavery, a collective slavery. Good: so, under the aspect in which the communal peasant gives products to the great despot, it is ground rent. Under the aspect in which he renders labor, surplus labor in fact, it will become determining, since it is this, it is precisely the existence of surplus labor in the State, that will install the regime of labor. Otherwise, once again, there will be no reason why activity should conform to the labor model. Once again,

among the primitives, or what are called primitives, it is not at all that they don't do anything; on the contrary they pass their time by acting, but, evidently, their activity does not come under the model 'labor'. For there to be a 'labor' model, once again, it is necessary that there be a surplus labor. It is surplus labor that determines that activity falls under the model of labor. Surplus labor is primary in relation to labor; it is from the moment that there is surplus labor that activity becomes labor.

Good, so that works very well. And finally: taxes, why? It is because there is something very important here. It is that the three faces, [1] coinage [*argent*] or money [*monnaie*], [2] enterprise – namely surplus labor and large-scale works, and [3] the eminent proprietor of the soil and ground rent, these three aspects imply what Marx introduces as a determining factor of these old archaic empires, precisely that they do *not* imply a war machine. One can even propose the hypothesis: if the empires disappear so swiftly and in such mysterious conditions, is this not because at the archaic stage, they do not yet have the war machine and find themselves in front of a war machine that is trained against them? And who trains this war machine against them? We already had the answer last year, because our hypothesis last year was that the war machine was precisely the invention of the nomads, that it was the riposte of the nomads against the great archaic Empires. And if these states undergo a radical liquidation (only later to be reborn under evolved forms), if some of them disappear, leaving no trace other than what archaeology later finds in indeterminate form, is that not because they are levelled by [the nomadic war machine]? But let us leave this on one side for the moment.

What I want to say is that in effect they [archaic States] do not operate with a war machine, but to make up for it they operate with a bureaucracy. And this imperial bureaucracy does not comprise something absolutely uniform; on the contrary, from this point on we can spread out a maximum of differences. It will be a very important problem for us to try to distinguish this bureaucracy that is already assumed to be very powerful (because we really are learning all the time from archaeology about what this bureaucracy was, for example, in the Babylonian empire, what bureaucracy was in the Egyptian Empire, what bureaucracy was in the Chinese Empire; it is very instructive on all that, so we now have some serious back up) from modern forms of bureaucracy and the way they are established.

Now, imperial bureaucracy, that implies what? It evidently implies delegated proprietors who receive communal ground rent in the place of the Emperor. It is not the Emperor who counts, it is this whole bureaucracy. The three faces of the pyramid, or rather the three faces of the trihedron – if I call the summit the 'formal eminent unity' – well, the three faces of the trihedron are the three faces of the bureaucracy, and the basis is the agricultural communes. It is very simple as a schema. Now you therefore have a first aspect of the bureaucracy which is tied to ground rent, and that implies an enormous bureaucracy (we will see why), in virtue of the nature of ground rent itself. (As for the large-scale works, it goes without saying that this precisely implies what we analysed last year, namely: the fundamental relation that exists between sign and instrument. And the couple *sign-instrument* is the couple *bureaucracy-large scale works*.) Thus the bureaucratic functionaries, representatives of the despot, receive lands and receive the ground rent attached to these lands.

You follow me? Of another kind (or the same, if you like) are the entrepreneurs delegated to large works. Let's say, then, that the great despot delegates to them *both* the ground rent or a part of the ground rent *and* a part of the profit of enterprise. That's a lot! In exchange, what do they owe? They, you see, are not themselves at the same level as the men of the commune, as the cultivators, but in their turn, they are in a state of debt to the Emperor, of whom they are the bureaucrats. What do they owe? They owe a part of the ground rent that they draw, a part of the profit. How does that happen? It's here that I believe we find the only possible conversion between the *goods* given in the guise of ground rent, I mean the natural products of ground rent, described as 'in kind' ['*en nature*'] – listen closely here because I think this is important – and the profit of enterprise, namely: surplus labor, the labor wrenched from men by the agricultural commune, this time in the form of rent in labor. The only possible equivalence between products and labor precisely implied *tax*; it is tax that fixed the equivalence, and what the great despot demanded from his bureaucratic functionaries was that those who received the ground rent, the bureaucrats who received by delegation, from the communes, the ground rent in natural products and services, that is to say in labor time, in surplus labor – what he demanded from them was to be able to bring about the conversion, because what he wanted was to at least receive a part of it in money, in coin. And the whole system of tax is absolutely necessary to the circulation of goods and activities, of goods and services. You would have no possible equivalence of goods-services, which is obviously one of the bases of every economy – without the measure of tax.

Hence, once again, the role of the bank, which is fundamental. For the entrepreneur of large-scale works and for the proprietor of the soil who benefits from a rent, a bank is required that is not at all a simple intermediary, but which is a creator of money. How does it do that? That's another problem. But from the time of the archaic empires – for example, we have documents on the role of the bank in the Babylonian Empire, it is essential – banks truly are creators of money, for they are the ones who exchange money against the ground rent in kind that the functionary receives; that is to say, they give money to the functionary against the wheat that the functionary receives, and the functionary, at this moment, returns a part of this money to the Emperor. Therefore, there is a whole circulation, money-goods-services, which will be at the basis of the economy of the great archaic empires. So, from that moment you can see the problem that is posed. Given this role of banks, which are not only intermediaries, but which really are creators of money, where do they draw this money from? Well, it is almost always the case that the archaic empires are usually very, very far from metallurgical sources; hence the necessity of external trade, which itself, however, is only permitted through the role of tax. … All that, it's perfect.

But I conclude this very rapid schema by saying: well, you see, it is not complicated, all that. What one must keep in mind about this archaic bureaucracy is that what defines the great empires (and it is because of this that I say that Marx's description in fact had strictly nothing to do with Montesquieu) is that literally nothing is private, and nothing can be private. Everything is public. And in fact, we also saw last year that the State apparatus as apparatus of capture, in all its forms, is fundamentally public. The notion of the State secret is a very late notion, connected above all to the moment when State apparatuses appropriate the war machines. It is the war machine that is secret (moreover without even wanting it), and which finds itself in the situation of being secret. Otherwise, in the apparatus of capture defined as great archaic empire, *all* is public. The sovereign eats in public, the despot eats in public, sleeps in public. It is the man of

war, bizarrely enough, who has a veil, who covers himself in order to eat. It's pretty curious. The secret is born with the war machine. No war machine, no secret. And here again, it is not that there is anything better about this. But for the despot, if he has a mask, it is in order to *show*. It is the public mask, not the mask of the secret.

And why? One can see that, at every level, everything is public in the archaic empire. Everything is public because, on the one hand, the possession of the soil is communal, so that there is no private property at this level. It is the commune that possesses the soil and it is the commune that brings about mobile distributions in lineage. At the other end, absolutely on high, the formal transcendent unity of the despot, which is simultaneously possessor or eminent proprietor, entrepreneur of works, and master of money, absolutely only exists as a public instance. Property, his eminent property, is public property. His emission and creation of money is the creation of public money. The great works he undertakes are great public works. Everything is public there. And the functionaries between, the bureaucrats – bureaucrats of rent, bureaucrats of profit, bureaucrats of tax or of the bank – are pure publicity. Why? Because it is uniquely as functionaries of the Emperor that they enjoy the delegation of property, the delegation of enterprise, the delegation of money; and furthermore, one could find quite complicated regimes where these functions are even hereditary, nothing prevents that. It is not as private persons that they enjoy these delegated powers, it is as functionaries of the Emperor. As Tökei says, in a magnificent text, you can imagine that if they revolt against the Emperor they become little local despots, but you absolutely cannot imagine that they become private owners.

Why? For a very simple reason, because it forms a part of things that are obvious and to which Marxism has long habituated us (when one does not forget it), that is to say: how could they overturn the basis of their own existence? The bureaucratic functionaries receive everything they have precisely from the tribute of the communes, from the tribute in kind or the tribute in labour. If they become private proprietors, they exactly reverse all their sources of revenue, that is to say, it is not only inconceivable – to affirm, as certain authors do, that these representatives, these functionaries, will little by little become private proprietors: it is a nonsense. It is not by augmenting little by little that one adds something, this is pure nonsense. I mean, literally, that means nothing. It is a system where everything by nature is public, from communal possession to property.

When I say the archaic Empire overcodes, I ask you just to keep hold of the difference between code and overcoding, because I will need it throughout the year. I am just saying, because otherwise that would make you almost [*inaudible words*] not enough; why do I need this? What I call 'overcoding' is something that is added on top, and it is because of that that I use the word 'overcoding': it is something added onto the code. Once again, the communal codes, the facts of lineages and territories continue to be exercised within the framework of the communes. What is added to this is a unit that enjoys profit, rent, money of taxation, external commerce.

Looking for an equivalent in order to attempt to be clearer, I would say that the unity of the whole of the comprised communes in the archaic Empire is almost a unity through *formalization*, or, if you prefer, through transcendence. At the basis there are communes, then it rises up to the Emperor, and it is insofar as the Emperor is on a different level from the communes at the base that the overcoding occurs and that the Emperor is the master of large works, the eminent

proprietor of the ground and the creator of money. It is what in logic one would call an operation of *formalization.* I mean that the formal unity is not on the same level as the *formalized*. You follow me? It must be at a higher level. I am expressing myself in terms that are truly very rudimentary, in terms of formal logic, for those who have done it, which necessarily sends you back to something that concerns the famous formalist theories, the theory of types. I would say that the formal unity cannot be of the same type as the set of formalized objects, namely the agricultural communes. It is through this that there is an overcoding. There is an operation of transcendence, an operation of formalization.

In logic, as you know, there is something opposed to, or at least distinguished from formalization, something quite different. This is precisely what one calls the 'axiomatic' or 'axiomatization'; and it is important above all not to confuse axiomatization and formalization. Why is axiomatization something absolutely different to formalization? I think that the reason is quite simple, but I don't want to develop it here, since I had already talked about it last year, and the last time, and I'd like it if later a group could be formed amongst us to put itself to work on axiomatics, for reasons to do with this year's tasks. But, but, but,... but notice the difference here. I'm giving the impression of talking about something absolutely different to my history of the State; but we will see whether or not it is something absolutely different. I'm not so sure. Axiomatization, in what regard is it not formalization? An axiomatic is completely formal. Yes, an axiomatic is formal. Only it is a formalization of immanence, it is a formalization of pure immanence. That is to say: the formalization occurs at the same level as that of the formalized ensembles.

Axiomatics is immanent to its models. This is why it is not a formalization. Or, if you prefer, it is a formalization of immanence, while logical formalization, that formalization called 'logical', is a formalization through transcendence.

Why am I recounting all this? It's because if it ever occurs to us to discover in the social field, notably in the modern social field, various formations which function in a certain mode (I don't say 'as' axiomatic, I say 'in a certain axiomatic mode'), it would be necessary to recall this distinction. One would not be able to assimilate them to old great archaic empires, one would not be able to say: these involve overcoding. Axiomatics does not operate through overcoding, it operates through something else. Then one will already find oneself before a very rich field of concepts because one must sense that codes and imperial overcoding are for us only two first concepts of a series of very varied concepts to come. In fact, let us grant that these archaic empires present themselves everywhere, and that they define themselves as overcoding, or operate by overcoding: that still does not get us very far. Because at the end of the day, how is this overcoding possible? How could it work? With the apparatus of capture, I don't know, but I have the double impression at the same time that we are making progress and yet not making progress, both together. We progress because we increasingly specify the apparatus of capture with its three faces, its trihedron. We do not progress because we don't get any further with the question: how could that work? How could a thing like that be installed? At the same time, we do advance a little because we have begun to give a status to overcoding.

There is an author who uses a different word, but this word must be deeply related to the same thing. This is Lewis Mumford. Lewis Mumford is a contemporary author who wrote a lot; it's

good, but I don't know that much of it. He talks about archaic empires, above all about the Egyptian Empire, and uses the word 'megamachine' to describe them. He says that these are the first megamachines. *Mega*, as you know, is the Greek adjective meaning 'large'. The archaic Empires are great machines. Okay, but that does not seem to go very far, you might think. And us, what are we? What are we? Are there other great machines? Are there machines which would operate differently? Would we be axiomatic machines? Not despotic machines of formalization? We have no idea, we don't know anything about it. Let us suppose that the great archaic empires are megamachines. Is that simply a manner of talking? Maybe a metaphor? Not, not at all, because there is more involved in Mumford, and he puts this question: what is the classical definition of machine? What does one call a machine the most technical sense of the word? The classical definition of the machine, or one of the classical definitions of the machine, which appears for example in the 19th century in a specialist on the topic is this: a machine is a combination of solid elements …. It is a combination of solid elements each having, or having as a group, a specialised function, destined to transmit a movement and to execute a piece of work under human control.

There are several traits, but this one is not bad. So: a combination of solid elements having specialised functions in order to transmit a movement and execute a piece of work under human control. At this Mumford has reason to feel full of gaiety, and he says that this is not at all a metaphor: if you take a great archaic empire, it is quite literally a megamachine. Simply put, it is a megamachine whose elements are men. The men are part of the machine. Hence the idea, in fact, of an enslavement, as Marx says, a generalised enslavement. Generalised slavery, generalised enslavement. Men are the pieces of the machine.[11]

Okay. Well in that case, to talk of overcoding would be to say that there is a machine of which men are the pieces. And this is in fact what one sees at the level of large-scale works, at the level of ground rent, and at the level of tax. One could even specify that the great specialised functions are nothing other than our three dimensions: ground rent, tax, enterprise. Good, everything is going well. I would say that the machines, at this moment … no, the archaic empires, are precisely apparatuses of capture – if you don't mind, it is enough for me if can I manage to accumulate synonyms – that is to say, apparatuses of overcoding or megamachines, that is to say, machines of enslavement. Fine, but why hold onto this word 'enslavement'?

Suddenly, I say to myself: don't we have an occasion here for some research, because with Guattari and others, we have tried to bring to a head a distinction between two concepts. Always with hypotheses in mind: does this work? Is there a place for such a distinction or not? Someone could say to us: no, there is no place. So are enslavement and subjection, to be enslaved and to be subjected, the same thing? Perhaps there are many people who are both at the same time. But, to say that they are both at the same time, perhaps that does not prevent these two things from being different. What difference is there? I would like to proceed more simply: I would like to take two points of view in order to try to state this difference; in that case we stand to make a significant new step in the analysis of the ancient Empires.

I would like to take consecutive perspectives that are *technical* (but involving an absolutely rudimentary technique), and *economic* (also involving an absolutely rudimentary economy). From a technical point of view, when is there enslavement? I would say that there is enslavement

when men themselves are a constitutive part of the machine. That is to say: the machine is thus defined as a set of communicating human and non-human elements. I'll deliberately keep it abstract for the moment, I will not say what kind of machine is involved. Imagine a machine of which you form a part. You are an element of it. It has human elements and non-human elements. You are among the human elements. It can group together other things; it groups together mechanical elements, it groups together informatic elements, it groups together energetic elements, it groups animals, things; but in every respect, you are part of the machine. Think about a machine of which you are an integral part, and you will say that you *serve* [*vous êtes asservis à*] such a machine. But no pejorative nuance is intended at this point.

When do you say you are *subjected*? You are enslaved *by* the machine, okay. So we know immediately that we are never subjected by the machine. It is always good when elementary grammar guides us: one is subjected *to* the machine. It is not the machine that subjects us, when we are subjected. Now, when is there subjection to the machine? I appeal to an answer just as simple as my initial summary response: we are enslaved by the machine when we are human elements making up a constituent part of the machine itself. We are enslaved [*asservis*] to the machine in a thousand ways, to the extent that we ourselves make use of it [*nous nous en servons*]. To make use of it is precisely the point.

But there are two ways to make use of it: on the one hand, to make use of it in order to produce; this involves the producer, the immediate producer, the worker; on the other hand, it involves the user. If I take the metro I am, in a certain way, subjected to the metro. The users are perfectly subjected to the machines they make use of [*aux machines dont ils se servent*]. But as for those who build the metro, well, they are also subject to machines of fabrication, of production. I mean that it seems that machines of consumption, like machines of production, are before everything else machines of subjection in their modern forms. And again, please remember: I don't say that one would be better than the other. I'm saying therefore that there is subjection when the human element no longer makes a constituent part of the machine as such, but is put in relation with it, a relation which is imposed upon it as a relation of usage, of consumption or production. I am subjected to the television to the extent that I listen to it. Okay.

But let us dream a little bit; is there nothing else here? Could there also be other ways in which one could say, beyond being *subjected* to the television, that one is *enslaved*? I avoid all pejorative sense here, because that gives the impression that I'm saying something bad, but no, once again, there is nothing bad in all that. Take a contemporary musician – perhaps this will help us to advance a little further – a classical concert musician: in a way, he is subjected to his instrument. There is even someone who subjects him in turn to his own instrument: the conductor of the orchestra. Think about that. The listener is subjected to the conditions of the concert; you can see that this does not involve anything bad; on the contrary, this is an example of sublime subjection.

In electronic music, I think that you will see immediately that this …. Well, is this still a regime of subjection or is it something else? Is there not something else this time? Namely, the constitution of a machine of which the human and non-human elements both equally form integral parts, constituting a totality of communication and reciprocal information. At this

moment, one would have to talk about service, machinic enslavement, and no longer about social subjection. Or so I'm supposing. Let us continue along the same route.

This reminds me of a science fiction novel by [Ray] Bradbury [*Fahrenheit 451*]. What is science fiction talking about all the time, in a certain way? Qualitative leaps. Qualitative leaps we are forced into. Once again, it is not that they necessarily involve something worse. One must think of it more simply, just in terms of subjection. It is something else. To take one of the great authors from the old days of science fiction: Bradbury. In a story by him about television, the television is no longer at the centre of the house. Imagine. The television at the centre of the house: lovely. 'Here is the news, it's eight o' clock'. The whole family is there. I would say that we are indeed subjected to television; and the very word helps us to identify what is going on. But Bradbury imagines another system: the television is no longer at the centre of the house, it forms the very walls of the house. One buys oneself a wall-television. There's the woman who says to her husband: "We have to economise and only have three walls now", so there's only three-wall TV. The change here is significant, for the programming is now done in such a way that the programme varies with the person who is listening to it.

What does that imply? It means that it is not difficult for the central computer to factor in little local computers with selective views. In addition to the central memory, there are local memories. In every house the TV anchor speaks using the proper name of the person inhabiting the house. The television has become the wall, and at the same time, the listener, the user of the television, has become a constituent part of the programme itself. There are well-known analyses of certain famous shows in Germany involving calls to denunciation, and in certain recent French radio shows, the same thing has emerged, the same appeal for stool pigeons: *you* make the show, and you go to the studio to make the show. *You make the show*. It's not just about entering a competition or doing it for amusement, it's a veritable liberation [*franchissement*]. It seems to me that this is the passage from one regime to another. It is the passage from a regime of social subjection to a regime of machine enslavement.

Once again, I don't know which one is better. I don't even know which is the most economical [*rentable*]. I'm just saying that today we have the privilege of having both. They do not exclude each other. But you will object that it is very difficult to pinpoint the status of the enslaved. With regard to the subjected, I can say that this is the immediate producer, as well as the user. With the enslaved, it's a bit more complicated. This involves systems where the facts are necessarily more difficult to make out. It will involve a kind of operation which has its own terminology; operations of feedback and recurrence, in which there is no enslaved type which does not also serve in the enslavement of another. It will be much more complex. On the other hand, it's not more complex, because enslavement is also simplified. But in any case, it does produce a much more complex formula: we will see why.

So I suggest that we keep hold of this conceptual distinction. After all, what is happening today? You know that amongst all the dangerous disciplines surrounding us, there is a particularly dangerous one known as ergonomics. This is the discipline that occupies itself with the norms of work [*travail*]. Ergonomics is an important discipline today; whole factories are built on its principles. What does ergonomics tell us? I'll say something very basic, even infantile, about ergonomics for those who don't already know. The ergonomists distinguish two things. They

distinguish what they call ‘man-machine [*homme-machine*]’ systems in the singular (‘man’ and ‘machine’ both being in the singular); they also call these ‘employment placements’ [*poste d’emploi*]. And from these they distinguish ‘men-machines’ systems (‘men’ in the plural, ‘machines’ in the plural).

Then, they become very … They are not strong theoreticians, but strong practitioners, you see, and they freely say to themselves: let’s see, is the men-machines system (in the plural) a simple generalization of the man-machine system (in the singular)? You can see where they’re going. Is there only a difference of degree between the man-machine system (in the singular) and the men-machines systems (in the plural). And, well, no there isn’t. But often they say ‘yes’, because they’re very cunning. They say: one only has to generalise the method of analysis of employment placements, and you obtain the great men-machines systems (in the plural). Well, above all, don’t listen to them. Really, don’t. You can tell they’re lying from the beginning. The problem is not at all the same. There is a difference of nature, and it is precisely because there is a difference of nature that our technological distinction between subjection and enslavement might be thought to have some value. What is the difference of nature? It is not at all the same technological problem.

When you have a man-machine system (in the singular), what is the problem? The problem is quite simple: one or the other has to adapt itself. And the practical problem is: how to adapt man to the machine at one moment, and then how to adapt the machine to man in another moment. These are problems of adaptation, in one direction [*sens*] or in the other, or in both directions. And, in fact, the norms of adaptation will take account, according to case, of rules of use and rules of production, rules of work. Often both: there is no work without usage, just as there is no usage without work. But when you have a men-machines system (in the plural), is the problem is still one of adaptation? One gets the impression that modern technology has transcended problems of adaptation. We have arrived at the moment where technology no longer concerns itself with necessary adaptations. And it is not at all because the adaptations have become crueller. It’s not that. On the contrary, it is because they have less and less need [for adapted workers]. And here one will fall back onto the economic problem: why do they have less and less need for adapted workers? Why do they no longer have to care about adaptation? I’m exaggerating a little; it is of course a concern, but not that much.

Why? Because what is the other problem? It has become no longer a problem of the adaptation of one element to another, or of the reciprocal adaptation of two elements, it has become a problem of communication, and therefore of selection [*choix*]. Of selection. That is to say that in a men-machines system (in the plural), the problem is no longer the adaptation of the mechanical element to the human element, of the machinic element to the human element, the problem is completely different: to select, to select well, and not to be deceived. That is to say: *where* must one put a human element? And *where* must one put a machinic element? To what end? So that it possesses, as they say, *reliability* [*fiabilité*]. From which follows all sorts of radically new concepts like *just right* [*comme ça*], which serve them frequently in their analyses. What is *reliability*? Reliability is evidently inversely proportional to failure; the idea is that there must be as little failure as possible.

Now, curiously enough, there are many cases where even the element of a computer is less reliable than a human element. And happily, there are many cases where the human element is much less reliable, much less economical than [using a machine]. So, you see the problem of enslavement is a problem of selection [*choix*]. Where are you positioned? If it turns out you are not adapted, you will sense there is a difference ….

But if you say to me: the two problems are in fact often hard to tell apart, I respond that what interests me is that even affectively, even in affective tonality, it doesn't involve posing problems in the same way. Take a handicapped person, for example, a stutterer or a deaf person. In the men-machines system (in the plural), one will no longer ask how to adapt them to the machine, or how to adapt the machine to them, one will ask how to arrange the system so that communication can get through to a deaf person. That's the regime of machinic enslavement. It's no longer the regime of social subjection.

Again, it's very strange, because consider this. (And I'm still continuing with the first, technological perspective, considering things from a technical perspective. Perhaps all this is wrong; it's up to you to make your minds up. I think it has to be true. It works. The distinction between the concepts stands up and holds true.) Again, recall the history of the machine. Let us return to our great archaic empires. We haven't forgotten them at all, it's all going to come in handy. *It is the great archaic despotic empires that invent machinic enslavement. But they don't have technical machines at all.* Because what do technical machines, under the best conditions, have at their disposal? What one calls … This is the first age of the machine. There were always some [technical] machines, one mustn't exaggerate; in fact, we will see why they have always been there. It is obvious that they have always been there. Well, it's not obvious, but never mind. This is the first age of the machine, of so-called simple machines. Okay, let's pause for a quick break. [*Interruption in the recording*] [86:00]

**Part 3**

… simple machines, machinic enslavement immediately arrived at something quite fantastic. And it is also quite normal. The mechanical elements being extremely simple, men are human elements directly taken into the machine; hence, I think, the justice of Mumford's proposition, when he says: ancient archaic Empires are megamachines of which men are the constituent parts. And this is not a metaphor, this is in the proper sense what the machines are.

So, grant me this: that it is precisely when technical machines are very simple that a fantastic regime of the machinic enslavement of man affirms itself. There is still no subjection. Does that mean it is the beautiful life? On the contrary. So, my question is then: when could subjection have come about? One has only to follow the word. We will find that – and here I'm just sketching out a theme we will look at next time – subjection can obviously only come about with the separation out of private persons. One is subjected *to* the machine, one is enslaved *by* the machine. Precisely because the machine, the megamachine, is not technical, it is the great despotic machine. But one is subjected, not by the machine, one is subjected *to* the machine. It was necessary that something separate itself out, a private instance. We have seen that in the ancient despotic Empires, the owner, whether it is communal, or the functionary or the despot himself, was not a private owner. There could only have been machinic enslavement. Subjection

could only be born much later. Subjection … the formula … There is genius running through all the histories of apparatuses of capture. Perhaps subjection will amount to the new form of capture invented by relatively *modern* (although it will be necessary to examine what sense to give to this word) States. Subjection is a very modern technique; or at least relatively modern.

And what does it culminate in? In the second age of the machine. (This is really just the broadest of historical overviews). Machines of the type exemplified by the steam machine, the machine that marks the beginning of capitalism. And although social subjection is certainly not the invention of capitalism, capitalism will carry it to perfection. It will carry it so far to perfection that it will have the corresponding economic regime at its disposal. I would say that ancient private slavery and feudal servitude – to classify them at the level of vocabulary, were already forms of subjection, and no longer of enslavement. But the summit, the *summit* of subjection appeared with the regime of the salariat. There, truly, man is enslaved to the machine *by* the capitalist, that is to say, by the private proprietor of what? Of what? We will have to see later on.

But what happened then? What happened then, as you know, was what one can call the third age of the machine, the set of so-called cybernetic and informatic machines. Now, what everyone says is not wrong, it is quite true that this is a qualitative leap in machines, but in what sense? Precisely in the sense that the machines are no longer either machines of usage or of production. They are no longer machines of usage, of consumption-production; these are machines of communication and information. And what does that mean? It means precisely that the problem is that in such a system … Well, it is not by chance that men-machines systems (in the plural) designate this third age of the machine, the cybernetic machines and the informatic machines. I do not say that this involves a return – that would be a catastrophe – but it is the invention of a new form of machinic enslavement.

In effect, the problem becomes no longer the problem of choice, no longer the problem of use, no longer that of consumption; it becomes the problem of choice and distribution. Where do I want to place you? Where do I want to place you, so that information can pass through. That is a completely different problem. So I say that at every level it would be almost necessary to live as doubles in the contemporary world, as if we are submitted to a double system. We are at the same time in a situation where a certain amount of subjectivity distances us from machine enslavement, replacing it with subjection, and in a situation where we are led to a new form of machinic enslavement proper to our age. I am moving very quickly, in order … Can you do more, what time is it?

A student: Quarter past noon.

Deleuze: Quarter past noon? We're getting to the end. It's not human to do any more. You see, I know well if... I would relate to you... I'll be ending quickly because I see that you can't hold up much longer. It's for your own good.

I'll now move to the economic aspect. Here again I ask for pardon for talking in front of so many of you who know about these things better than I do, but I need these conceptions for my schema. I need them at a level that remains very, very elementary. What I need is this: in Marx, there is a famous narrative in *Capital* involving what he calls the composition of capital, and

more precisely, the organic composition of capital. What he calls the organic composition of capital is the fact that capital has two component parts. Broadly speaking … it's necessary to know this by heart … I've forgotten it … The first part is constant capital. Then … no, sorry. Those in the know must not laugh because … I'll just go ahead and say it, and I'm sure there are some who can recall the details more or less successfully, because not everyone necessarily has it readily present to mind … anyway, I think I'm obliged to say it now. Constant capital is specifically the part of capital that is transformed into raw material [*matière première*] and means of production. There, you see? The other part of capital is variable capital. This is the part of capital transformed – according to the definition, I'm taking this formulation directly from Marx – into labor power, that is to say, the sum of wages. Variable capital is the part of capital that is transformed into labor power, that is to say, the sum of wages.

What happens? If you understand that, you'll see that Marx is giving a very beautiful explanation. Beautiful and very important, because you understand: if one abandons Marxism, one abandons the last hopes one has. So it's quite simple: we had better return to these definitions of variable capital and constant capital before unpacking what is involved in the State. Now I said that Marx focuses in on a variability in the proportion. Namely, that proportionally (not absolutely – the masses of constant capital or of variable capital might be very high …) … that there is a certain proportion between the two parts of capital, and sometimes variable capital tends to increase relatively to constant capital. This is a first case: variable capital tends to increase relatively to constant capital.

Second case: constant capital increases relatively to variable capital. What are these two cases? Listen closely here. The first case is not so much of a problem. We could say that this is truly what one can call 'the formula' (with a great deal of caution, let us put it this way for convenience sake), 'the formula of the beginning of capitalism' or of 'the first age of capitalism'. Why does everything work well here? Because, as Marx explains very well, surplus value – which is not to be confused with profit, or rather with which profit is not to be confused but upon which profit depends in a certain manner – comes from variable capital. Therefore, it would seem quite normal that the regime of capitalism – which functions on the basis of this strange thing, surplus value, and which draws profit from it, which draws profit of enterprise from it – that it functions on the basis of a tendency to increase variable capital. There would be all the more surplus value.

Good, well that seems simple enough. Note that when the cruellest, hardest, most wicked capitalists have said 'we are humanists', they have a literal reason for saying so. They are just saying something simple: obviously, *we* have never confused constant capital and variable capital. No capitalist has ever confused, whether in the accounts or in calculations, constant capital, which is destined for raw material and machines, and variable capital, which is destined for wages and labor power. They have always clearly demarcated them. And here you see why I have been pointing to the importance of the regime of subjection. Why has capitalism pushed social subjection to its limit? It has pushed social subjection to its limit because of this: the more variable capital increases, the greater the possibility of surplus-value (and indirectly of profit). So it has never confused machines and men.

Now, what does Marx say to us? Second point. I have almost finished my rough economic schema. In some famous pages, Marx tells us that strangely enough – but it turns out it's not so strange, it makes complete sense – the more capitalism progresses, the more importance constant capital takes on relatively to variable capital. (To be precise, for those of you who are specialists, there is grafted on to that another distinction related to constant capital, namely the distinction between fixed capital and circulating capital, but I do not want to introduce this because it would over-complicate the schema and the point I want to make). In effect, the more capitalism progresses, the heavier the investment of capital in the domain of both raw materials and machines. Why? Because … Interesting phenomena come out of this, for example, the narratives of an industrialisation that does not simply content itself – Marx explains the reasons very well – with becoming larger and larger at the scale of the factory, but which passes to the stage known as automation. This is the stage of automation that Marx analyses so splendidly in famous pages of the *Grundrisse*.[12]

We are concerned with a relative proportion, because the surplus-value can of course increase, the mass of surplus value can increase, but this is not the question, what is at stake is the proportional relation between the two. The tendency of capitalism is a tendency of development, as Marx never stops recalling, and this tendency to development tends to increase the proportion of constant capital relative to variable capital. This means what? It changes everything because from this moment, Marx says, the worker, with automation, is nothing more than *adjacent* to the process of work [*travail*]. He is now nothing more than adjacent to the process of labor. From this moment on, strangely enough, work [*travail*] will take on wholly new forms. These are forms less analysed by orthodox communist Marxists than by Autonomist Marxists, notably in Italy, who have opened up and pushed forward the analysis of these forms as they appear in phenomena that are thoroughly complementary: the role of the worker in automation; the role – and this is not at all something different – of subcontracting work, since, in an industry of automation, the old factory work tends more and more to be replaced by subcontracting, which is a very important modern development; the development of a black market – and it is not by chance that the first analyses of all these phenomena should be by the Italians, because the Italians found themselves in an economy where the black market had taken on a determining significance right from the beginning, not for people's survival, but for the very functioning of the economy: immigrant labor, etc. Very new forms of work posing problems and revolutionary possibilities that are absolutely new, but which are perfectly and directly in line with this fundamental phenomenon of capitalism: the tendency for the proportional increase of constant capital to bear on variable capital.

Now here I rediscover exactly the same conclusion as before. What is the formula of social subjection? It is precisely: the greater the predominance of variable capital in relation to constant capital, the more social subjection. This is a law, that is to say, a law is added to Marxism that is purely Marxist, it seems to me. The more constant capital [writing on the board] takes and tends to take relative importance in relation to variable capital, the more machinic enslavement there is. At this moment, man becomes a piece of the machine instead of being subjected to the machine, he becomes a piece of the machine, namely: he is enslaved by the machine. But once again, there is just as much room for desolation as consolation. What new revolutionary chances can emerge here? All those who criticise a certain insufficiency in the contemporary struggles of workers' unions, all those who denounce the positions of communist party officials, base

themselves above all, from the point of view of economic analysis, on these phenomena of capitalism.

So I hope you can see that in these two very elementary matters, the technological development and the economic development I've just sketched, one will be led to distinguish social subjection from machinic enslavement.

In any case, we already have machinic enslavement. We have both at the same time: one is subjected, one is enslaved. But again, that's all the more reason for hope, for seeing new possibilities for struggles, for any number of things, than a reason for despair. No, it is not at all a reason for despair. That's how it is, that's all. But at the same time, it creates something else, it generates factors that are all the same rather peculiar. I have only introduced this whole developmental account as a function of our first model. This model excludes [social subjection], because it cannot be conceived within the framework. The men of archaic despotism, the men of the archaic empire *cannot be subjected* because, once again, social subjection implies the construction of a private sphere, and this construction, we will see (we'll try to determine it in a clearer way, but it probably can't be done) only happens in empires that have evolved. Many things had to happen first. We saw that in an archaic empire, there is nothing that permits a construction of the private, neither at the level of the despot, nor at the level of the commune, nor even at the level of the functionary. In compensation, there is a triumph of machinic enslavement. And when I say, 'today we are rediscovering machinic enslavement', it is not a way of being Hegelian and saying: 'at the end you rediscover the beginning'. It goes without saying that this is a totally new machinic enslavement and one of a very different type.

Let's now draw things to a close. Can you do more? I'll stop if you can't. If you can do more, and it's not a punishment for me to continue … I'll just take a look at your faces and take the pulse, to see if you can do any more. Okay, I will just summarise because I will take it up again, especially as there are some among you who have knowledge in this area, and I hope they will be able to review all this for next time.

Let's assume I've given a summary of the Marxist description of these imperial formations. We have made a bit of progress with the description; we have even progressed with regard to the question of how this three-headed apparatus functions. We still don't know how it could have come about. But I do not claim to have said anything about that yet. It is better to go very, very slowly. However, there is one thing that remains striking in Marx's description. It is that these archaic despotic formations presuppose something. They presuppose, if you have followed me so far, a certain level of development in agriculture, in so far as this is capable of providing, according to the perfect expression of one author, which nevertheless renders it slightly nebulous, a *potential surplus*. A potential surplus that will be actualised by large-scale works, works of irrigation. I would say that this rather bites its own tail. Ignacy Sachs, a Marxist (Hungarian: the only good Marxists are Hungarians) [made this point]. It presupposes certain craftsmen; it presupposes a certain level of development of the communes. You understand? Now, it is for this reason (and I have not said this until now, but it would be dishonest not to say it) that everything I've said presupposes the development of agriculture, a certain artisanal metallurgy, a certain state of simple machines. Marx and the Marxists never stop saying that the

Asiatic despotic formation, the archaic empire, is an expression devoid of meaning unless you put it in relation with a mode of production. You see?

This is why they are particularly furious with Wittfogel. It's true Wittfogel is a slightly ambiguous character to encounter. The communists have a grudge against him because he appears to have done some questionable things: while a refugee in America he participated in Senator McCarthy's campaigns; his name seems to have become linked with some unsavoury stories. So there has been a terrible settling of accounts between Wittfogel, who said that oriental despotism is Stalin, and the communists, who note that Wittfogel has become embroiled in the McCarthy affair. This adds complications to the debate. But they also have a grudge against Wittfogel because he has stayed truer to the theme of the mode of production. In fact, in his concern to bring together Stalin and the Chinese emperor, he is allowing these archaic empires to stand by themselves as something truly independent.

But then we apparently have a catastrophe on our hands, for we are taking exactly the same position, minus the malice and shady business: we are taking exactly the same position as Wittfogel. For everything we have said … If we recall that Marx, for his part, commits himself to fundamentally linking archaic empires to a mode of production, namely to a certain development of agriculture, to a certain development already in process of artisanship and metallurgy, this means that despotic formations only exist under a mode of production that Marxists call the Asiatic mode of production (which is not solely Asiatic; it is called such because one locates it above all and first of all in Asia). But for our part, I don't know why, we are inclined to be follow Wittfogel and say: but no, it does not happen quite in the way Marx says. It doesn't happen like that, why?

Happily archaeology backs us up, that is to say, we do not need to be as shady as Wittfogel because we can rely on an archaeological basis. For if there has been a revolution, or at least something very new in recent archaeology, it is the following discovery, which is far from negligeable. I'll sum it up: there were archaic empires, and they were not only Neolithic, but almost Paleolithic. What is more, since what has been found of these Empires can be considered (the archaeologists have often had the habit of making these hypotheses) as the last link in a chain of vanished previous empires, one could go as far as to speak freely of Paleolithic empires. You will say to me: what's the difference between making the history Neolithic or Paleolithic? Well, there is a difference in making the history Paleolithic, because that changes everything. It changes everything. Why does it change everything? It changes everything because in the Paleolithic, there is no question of a developed agriculture. There can be no question of a developed agriculture. What is more: no metallurgy.[13]

I'm referring to the fact that in Anatolia, one finds, dated archaeologically to around 7000BC – a huge shift back in time – the traces of a great Empire. It was not negligeable, according to the archaeological data: its impact, its sphere of influence, would have been 3000 kilometers wide. It is an enormous, not a little, Empire.

How to explain it? Do you understand why I say that this changes everything? If the archaeological discoveries are confirmed … To add to the short bibliography I've given, these are discoveries in Anatolia by an archaeologist called James Mellaart, and by a very

extraordinary woman called Jane Jacobs, who has written a book called *La Nouvelle obsidian*,[14] and who, starting from Mellaart's discoveries, extracts a type of imperial model, the model of these Paleolithic empires. Mellaart encountered a whole set of difficulties; his excavations were prohibited at one point, issues arose not at all because of his discoveries, but out of pure misunderstanding. You know how it can happen to archaeologists to become embroiled in very serious misunderstandings, where they are reproached for not having left behind with the States involved everything they should have left.

Anyway, the Mellaart case is very complicated, but on the other hand, the nature and importance of his discoveries have not been put in question. Now, why is this something more than simply pushing the date back? You might say: okay, these great empires don't date from 3000 BC, but from 7000 BC, so what? I say that this changes everything. Why? Because, obviously these are imperial formations which are not locked into a base that has already developed agriculture, but which are directly locked into groups, communities, of hunter-gatherers. Of hunter-gatherers. The archaeological importance of such a discovery, if it is confirmed of course (once again, I don't think archaeologists are in any doubt about the importance of Mellaart's work) … if one reflects on it, what is it that is truly important here?

Take a very great archaeologist, who died around …, I don't know when, is he even dead? Perhaps not, I hope not. Anyway, his books are pre-war, from around 1930-40: Childe, Gordon Childe. What is very interesting is that Gordon Childe archaeologically confirms – and he is not a Marxist, he is a pure archaeologist – the Marxist theory of imperial formations down to its details. He says: it's obvious ... Well, he never cites Marx, but if you read the pages of Childe (one should do that at least once, it will allow you to pass three tranquil hours) alongside the pages of Marx or certain Marxists, you will not see any difference. The schema is the same: namely, relatively developed agricultural communities, an archaic imperial formation that stocks the surplus, and makes large-scale works; Childe's schema, which again is a purely archaeological schema, confirms what he himself calls 'the urban and State revolution of the Neolithic'. I would say that a discovery like Mellaart's makes a further step possible: the necessity from this point on –although you understand the difficulties here – of wrecked empires, I mean empires that have vanished. It goes without saying: empires of wood … all that, if it smells, it's not of stone.

So, what happened? What am I saying is important about it? I would say that this type of archaeological discovery … it is not by chance that Jane Jacobs has extracted a schema that in my opinion, renews many things, it is very important. I'm not at all trying to convince you, it's just to make hypotheses. Let's suppose therefore that we are in an environment that no longer implies developed agricultural communities at all. What does it imply? It implies hunter-gatherers; this one point is enough. What might happen then? There can no longer be a formal despotic unity, overcoding: the code is a code of lineage-territory of itinerant hunter-gatherers who exhaust one territory, passing onto another territory. All that works well. But what happens? How will the despotic formal unity install itself? Let us suppose – to continue the hypothesis – that there are exchanges. Now, you will challenge me about what I'm helping myself to: exchanges between groups of hunter-gatherers. To attempt to justify this move will be my object next time; or if not, the time after that. This will be an essential problem. How to conceive a

regime of exchange between groups which one otherwise claims are autarchic groups without communication with each other?

These are not agricultural communities; these are itinerant hunter-gatherers. Suppose that there are exchanges. It's all done in a bag, which I find wonderful. In Jane Jacob's hypothesis, everything happens in a bag. You fling things into a bag, and an empire comes out. How's that? In this aspect, it's very modern: it is a method of chance. The hunter-gatherers exchange wild seeds. There's no agricultural enterprise yet. They exchange wild seeds. They pass the seeds around amongst each other. "Look what I found." The other: "Nice". It's no more stupid than any other regime of exchange, after all. Then there needs to be some small wild animal that's not too much trouble. So, the small docile animal [he writes on the board], which doesn't bite too much and which is not too prickly.

Suppose that these things are put in a bag – no, in two bags – the little animals and the wild seeds that come from different territories. It will produce two phenomena, at first by chance. There will be a production through chance, that's why I said everything is in one bag.[15] There will be two very curious, very important phenomena: phenomena of the hybridization of the seeds, which would otherwise never happen, and phenomena of natural selection between the small animals which would otherwise never happen. These wild seeds in a hybrid form, suppose that … You'll say to me: but then you're assuming large stretches of time, etc., but grant me all that for the moment. I am trying to proceed in order, because if I mix everything together at once it will be terrible. Let me stay with Jane Jacobs' schema.

… Suppose there is a social formation which sets itself the task of putting these wild seeds originating from different territories into a bag. That produces hybrids. These people will then sow these hybrids on their own territory. Now, obviously, that already implies the equivalent of an imperial formation. It is a stock. There is something momentous in this hypothesis. I mean: try to sense the reversal in relation to the Marxist schema (which was already very profound), in relation to the classical Marxist schema: it is no longer the surplus that makes possible the stock, it is precisely the inverse. It is the act of stockage, namely the mixing of the wild seeds that makes possible the existence of a surplus, that is to say the most fertile hybrids, more productive than the wild seeds. That will then produce a series of hybridizations, a series of selections that will operate on the very soil of this formation of stock, on the very soil of the imperial formation.

Hence the very beautiful conclusions of Jane Jacobs, when she suggests formulas of the type: obviously, it is the *Empire* – and the *town*, as concretion of the Empire (we will see later in what sense, I'm engaging in all sorts of directions that have not been justified yet) – that invents agriculture. That completely demolishes … What is very important is that this seems to go much further than all the critiques up until now of evolutionism, of evolutionism applied to human societies. You no longer have stages (for example: hunter-gathers, small agriculturalists, townships [*bourgades*], cities, Empire) at all. You have imperial formations directly locked into the groups of hunter-gatherers. And this is the imperial formation. It is the town that invents agriculture. Agriculture comes from the town. The whole construct comes out of the town.

If we try to establish the reversals in relation to Marx: in the Marxist conception, there would have to be the possibility of a surplus in order for there to be stock, while here on the contrary, it

is the constitution of stock that makes the surplus possible. In the Marxist schema, the despotic imperial formation presupposed already developed agricultural communities; here, the opposite happens. The formation of agriculture is a product of the archaic imperial formation. This is why it is not a matter of shifting dates back, of pushing the Neolithic back into the Paleolithic, or – if you accept this, considering the archaeological data – of pushing archaic imperial formations back into the Paleolithic; it is the very terms of the problem that change. From this moment we can indeed say that it is the archaic imperial formation that creates or makes possible the mode of production, and not at all the inverse. With what consequences? It is at this moment one finds oneself before a broken evolutionism reading. Meaning: to sort this out, we need a field of coexistence. How to explain the coexistence, from the Paleolithic onward, between so-called 'primitive' communities of hunter-gatherers and imperial state formations, towns, war machines and other things still?

Next time we will divide into two, so that we are less numerous, and it can work better. And it would be good if those among you who are concerned with these problems can return to them next time, and themselves have a say about what they think about the issues concerning the State we're discussing; then we can move forward. [*End of the session*] [2:06:25]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on the Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 03, 20 November 1979**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translated by Christian Kerslake**

## Part 1

Before we continue, are there any points arising from last time that we need to go back over? Would you like more detail on anything, or shall we continue? [*Pause*] Then let's continue. [*Pause*]

We were advancing very gently and we arrived at the idea that by pushing the 'State' form far back into time, it becomes no longer merely a question of dating it further back, but of pushing it back to a point where this 'State' form no longer even presupposes a mode of production, and instead can be considered as directly plugged into groups, no longer even into agricultural communities, but into groups of hunter-gatherers.

And this nevertheless posed a problem, because this emergence of the imperial archaic State, which no longer even presupposes an agricultural mode of production, because it itself will create that (and we have seen under what conditions – in a certain sense it is the State and the town that forms the countryside and not the countryside that, little by little, in a sort of evolution, allows townships [*bourgades*] to emerge, then small villages, then towns) … well, this is what will preoccupy us now: a kind of emergence where, every time an explanation of the State is proposed, one says to oneself: no, that already presupposes the State.

And it seems that we come across an obstacle here, because at the level of Marx's schema of the despotic empire, it seemed we arrived at a kind of limit. The minimum presupposed by the emergence of the imperial State was the existence of independent agricultural communities, upon which was established the overcoding proper to the archaic State. But now, we say to ourselves: actually, with the most recent discoveries of archaeology, no, that's not the case.

It seems as if the State apparatus will perpetually never stop positing itself as *presupposing itself*. So we have to try to deal with this. I would say that in any case we should even capitalize on it,

so as to better fix our position with regard to possible evolutionary schemas. You can now envisage the hypothesis toward which we're moving: how to distribute a field of coexistence where everything truly coexists *simultaneously* from the point of view of social formations; where groups or so-called primitive societies, State apparatuses, war machines, the countryside, towns – all that pre-exists, in a field of coexistence.

In that case, what are the relations of tension involved, what form do they take, and how to conceive a field of coexistence? And what are the consequences with regard to our position concerning evolutionism? This is the first point I would like to briefly consider today: a kind of hypothesis about a field of coexistence of all social formations at the same time.

The application of evolutionary schemas to human societies has been put in question in various quite different ways. The principal points in relation to which this question has been posed, or with regard to which they [i.e. the schemas] have been effectively put in question, are: the discovery of an increasing number of schemas, across all cases of social formation, manifesting what could be called a '*zigzag*' form, contrary to processes of *linear* evolution. Zig-zag schemas are interesting on condition that the zigzag is not conceived as successive. Maybe the zig-zag is a schema that will allow us to think coexistence. For example, Russian archaeologists have worked on zig-zag schemas that put in question an over-simplistic conception of evolution, notably when they have observed that, generally or usually, nomadism must not be thought as a state of affairs preceding sedentarization, but as the opposite, as a type of zigzag.[16] There is indeed a passage from itinerance to sedentarity, but there are also sedentary or sedentarized peoples, sedentary cultivators, who give themselves over to nomadizing; the famous nomads of the steppes seem actually to be nomads who have become so through a process of becoming; that is to say, they were sedentary cultivators who moved to nomadizing, in a type of zigzag.

The zigzag is not the only form under which an evolutionary schema can be put in question. There is also – I'm going very quickly – the famous theme of missing stages, stages of evolution which might be present in one place, but which are absent in another place. That is interesting because it allows us to make contractions at such moments, and to move towards a field of coexistence. It could perfectly well be that in one place, there are stages that are successive, but that in another place, on the contrary, it is as if both are born into coexistence alongside each other; or the stages could be completely lacking. Finally, evolutionism has also sometimes been put in question under the form of the discovery or affirmation that there would be certain *ruptures* [*coupures*], radical breaks.

Now, if you recall the theses we encountered in previous years, there is something I would like to go over again a bit more precisely. What are the theses of Pierre Clastres, the ethnologist who died in an accident while in the middle of his work, what are his principal theses, notably in his book *Society against the State*? I think that the novelty of Clastres' theses rests on two points. First point: he tells us that what one calls 'primitive' societies are not societies that *are unaware the State*, they are not societies which are not *evolved* enough or not *developed* enough to furnish

a State apparatus, they are rather, in the strongest and most literal sense, societies *against* the State, that is to say, societies that have set up mechanisms for the warding off [*conjuration*] of the State apparatus. There is obviously a great problem with the nature of these mechanisms of warding off because (you can already see the problem) one must have a presentiment, even if obscure – I'm not saying a clear idea – of what one wards away. What is this dread that is felt?

In a way, I think – and here I'm not attempting to make a scholarly, erudite comparison, I'm just trying to pinpoint something so that the idea becomes clearer – that Clastres took up and renewed an idea for which you will already find an equivalent in another earlier, great ethnologist, namely [Marcel] Mauss. In his famous studies on the mechanisms of the gift in primitive societies, Mauss holds the following thesis: that because the mechanisms of gifts and counter-gifts are accompanied by great expenditures, by great consumptions [*consommations*], and even great *conflagrations* [consumations], it is like they are a means of warding off what? It's like a means of warding off the accumulation of wealth. This is a very interesting thesis: would there be, in certain social formations, mechanisms that would have the function of warding off the formation of something? It is certainly conceivable. But, once again, this already takes us into a great problem … an interesting problem, which for me, it will be necessary to tackle: what presentiment, and what type of collective presentiment, does this assume relatively to what is warded off?

Let us assume that Clastres was right. Primitive societies are not societies that would be in an insufficent stage of development or evolution and which would remain incapable of furnishing a matter sufficient for the emergence of the State apparatus. Not at all! These would be societies which would make a function of mechanisms of warding off. I specify: necessarily, mechanisms of *anticipation – warding off* [*anticipation – conjuration*]. Again, there would have to be some kind of collective anticipation of what is warded off. Now, Clastres, in all his work, once again prematurely interrupted, strives above all to analyse these mechanisms of warding off. And he cites two principal ones: what is known as *chieftainship* [chefferie] in so-called primitive groups (in relation to which he tries to show that chieftainship, far from being a germ of the State apparatus, is on the contrary a means of preventing concentration, condensation, that is to say a means, finally, of preventing the formation, proper to the State apparatus, of the distinction *governing – being governed* – and here his analysis of chieftainship is excellent; anyone who is interested in these matters can see this point). Then, on the other hand, he assigns – and this suits us fine, or it would have done last year, because now it is no longer our problem – another mechanism. He says that what also prevents and wards off the formation of a State apparatus in the primitive societies, is *war*. The role of primitive war, according to Clastres, is precisely to ward off the formation of the State apparatus. Why? By maintaining polemical relations of antagonism between segments of lineages, between segmentary lineages. So here too what is involved is a preventing of a kind of union that would give to the State apparatus a possible matter for it, a kind of concentration. That, I would say, is Clastres' first important thesis.

You can see well enough that the second aspect immediately flows from this. The second aspect, necessarily, is this: if it is true that primitive societies are not societies which are unaware of the

State – that is to say, are not developed enough to furnish a matter for the State apparatus – if it is true that these are societies *against* the State, that then makes the emergence of this thing that literally becomes more and more monstrous more difficult to explain. I say 'literally', because one could say that a monster is precisely what only manifests itself by presupposing itself, it is the apparition that never ceases to refer back to its own presupposition. Thus it becomes absolutely monstrous. How does it emerge, then? If in truth even primitive societies have mechanisms for warding off, or inhibitors, how to explain that the State gels [*prenne*]?[17] I say 'gels' almost in the culinary sense, when one says that 'something gels'.

And in fact we have seen that on some points, Clastres was obviously right. But what already interests me enormously – and this is why I am returning to this point – is that, maybe, at the limit, we would no longer have any reason to talk about 'primitive' societies, or assign this term at all: we would rather talk about *certain* social formations which eminently present the mechanisms of anticipation – warding off.

You can already see where I want to get to. So my hypothesis has to be sharpened: my way of arriving at the definition of a field of coexistence of all social formations would be if I could define social formations no longer at all in an evolutionist manner, but through kinds of process one could call *machinic* which correspond to them, machinic processes corresponding to such types of formation. So I would say with regard to primitive societies: let's suppose that, if one joins up Mauss's data on the mechanisms of the gift as warding off the accumulation of wealth and Clastres' data (chieftainship, primitive war as warding off the formation of the State apparatus), it becomes possible to say that there are social formations that are constructed, not exclusively (that goes without saying), but eminently, on mechanisms of anticipation – warding off.

I recall for memory's sake something from a previous year concerning what are today called 'bands' [*bandes*]. From primitives, one can go to bands. You can see what I want to say: mechanisms of anticipation-warding off appear in particular in primitive societies, but they also show up in other social formations. So maybe this makes possible a typology of social formations of a new type. Perhaps not totally new. But I would say that, as we saw before, these 'bands' are rather curious. There are specialists on bands today, for example the bands of street children in South America. There is something important in the whole problem of bands. There are certain pages of Clastres that absolutely chime with descriptions of bands. In bands there are also formations of chieftainship. There is chieftainship but nothing resembling the State apparatus. Again, I remember a beautiful page on that in a study of bands of street children in Bogota that says[18]: these boys, not only do they die very quickly, obviously, but when they grow up, those who survive do not manage to adapt to the environment. These are bands of criminals, they are dangerous, totally dangerous; but they do not manage to pass into the environment. Why? Because the environment is too hierarchised for them, too structured. Work it out: their environment functions much more under the form of centralized instances of the 'State apparatus' type, whereas with bands of street children, there are all sorts of mechanisms that

function precisely to ward off the formation of a central power, a whole play of alliances that correspond very well with the pages of [Clastres].

Anyway, I won't elaborate on that. We could say that bands present something similar. I recall for the sake of memory that in a previous year we tried to define a certain difference between groups of mundanity [*groupes de mondanité*], or mundane groups [*groupes mondains*], and groups of sociability. And we noted that mundane hierarchies and social hierarchies are not at all the same thing, and that moreover in groups of mundanity, there are chiefs, there are also chieftainships, there are even stars [*étoiles*], but they are not at all of the same type as in societies of sociability. So one could say, which would suit me, that primitive societies, bands of boys, societies of mundanity, all go together, because they fundamentally put mechanisms of anticipation-warding off into play.

But I would say that obviously a second problem follows from this that becomes very urgent from the perspective of Clastres, with regard to Clastres' theses. It is that, once again, if primitive societies, and other societies of the 'band' type, ward off the formation of a centralized State apparatus, how to explain that it gels, that it appears, and where it appears? Alongside what? Why do I say 'Alongside what?' This is something we acquired from last time, it's important. The secret is, of course, that not everything is the State. Why? Because the State is everywhere. I say it is already there. Well, no, it is not *everywhere*, rather (how to put this?): it is already there at the same time as what is *not* the State. It is a field of coexistence. That will make zigzags possible, and will produce a whole typology so that, following such a path, one will find oneself faced with societies defined by mechanisms of anticipation-warding off, where there will be no State – but simultaneously alongside, other groups, which will be founded on another machinic process, on other mechanisms, will form States.

How is all this to be understood? And where will it get us? Well, I say: the problem that becomes more and more urgent from the point of view of a thesis like that of Clastres, is this: okay, there are social formations that ward off, they ward off the formation of the State, but again this is one more reason for asking: how to explain the emergence of the State? Should one invoke economic reasons? Clastres is very interesting for us on this point, because, in a whole chapter of *Society against the State*, he says: well, obviously not. For the same mode of production, you have what? Sometimes you have a State apparatus, sometimes you do not have a State apparatus. In other words, if one calls – I'm thinking of a page in Clastres where he develops the following theme – the apparition of the State the 'Neolithic revolution', then one cannot in fact find an economic basis for it. And this backs up all the more what we've been saying, since we've seen that there are reasons to no longer date the apparition of the State at the Neolithic, but to push it right back to the Paleolithic.

Hence Clastres was indeed forced to invoke a kind of fundamental break. On this point, he became almost structuralist. At the juncture he had arrived at, it was necessary to invoke a break. Of course, he did not content himself with simply affirming a radical break that would have

brought the State, but you can see that in a way (without claiming to speak for him, since I do not know what direction his work would have taken), he was searching more and more for possible causalities of the formation of the State. Although he sought them in a very curious direction: prophetism, Indian prophetism. He became more and more preoccupied with studying certain phenomena of Indian prophetism, in which Indian prophetism would introduce – precisely *against the chiefs*, first of all directed against the chiefs – very strange consequences. Indian prophetism at its base – but one could also say this just as much of Jewish prophetism, this account is quite curious – … In this schema, the very idea of prophetism, as fundamentally directed against the chiefs, would bring with it, or was susceptible to bringing with it, the formation of an infinitely greater power than that possessed by the chiefs. But even so this was a slightly bizarre explanation: invoking prophetism in order to take account of the State apparatus. I cite it for the record. All I can say is ... his work was interrupted.

But I ask: in what respect does Clastres, despite all the progress that he makes in this regard, remain within an evolutionist perspective? It is because, it seems evident to me, when he maintained that 'primitive societies are societies against the State, and so when the State emerges, there is a rupture', it is not by introducing a rupture that one breaks evolution. At most one introduces a mutation into evolution. This is why our own schema last time demanded on the contrary that the State should be there from the beginning. Hence I return to my theme of 'field of coexistence'. I mean to say that from a certain point of view, Clastres's theses are very fruitful for us; and yet from another point of view, well, there is a point where they no longer bring us what we are looking for.

What strikes me (along with everyone else) is the extent to which the mechanism of causality, or the causal process (and this is not what one might have expected), is somehow infinitely richer when one thinks of the sciences known as 'natural' – physical, biological – than in the human sciences. I say it's curious, because it makes me think of a remark by Hegel, a good remark. He said: there is something very bizarre. One always defines man as a rational being. Now, if you compare the natural sciences and history, you will see that the natural sciences have a very strong concept of rationality, and that one finds there an adequation between the real and reason – one is told of a nature submitted to laws that are the laws of reason – whereas when one approaches the domain of man, everything becomes a complete stew. Therefore, man, who is defined as the reasonable being, seems himself at the same time to only offer a matter delivered over to contingency, to caprices, to pure arbitrariness. I would say: one could say the same thing at the level of causality. Strangely enough, if you consider the progress of the sciences – the progress that physics, chemistry, and biology have made, with regard to the refinement, the complication of causal [*causaux*] processes … Wait, is it '*causaux*', or '*causals*'? Which one? Ok, *causals*, fine.

**A student**: 'Causaux' is ridiculous.

**Deleuze**: … Particularly among physicists (really I'm saying things here that everyone has a vague apprehension of), where microphysics has produced extraordinarily complex schemas of causality, very important schemas of molecular causality. Biology has made progress precisely by introducing increasing complication into evolutionary schemas, and has advanced and elaborated forms of causality that are truly very interesting. If you compare that with the human sciences, the latter don't come out well. I mean that when the schemas of causality are applied to man, one gets talk of motivation and all that, but it remains impoverished. Is it that one could not make use of these, without too many metaphors? But why couldn't one say to oneself: but after all, why shouldn't human matter above all be proposed as a problem for the elaboration of highly complex schemas of causality? It's clear enough why the human sciences are so behind, you know. It's because one has such fear of falling into finality and proposing finalist explanations that one becomes wary, and so one ends up preferring to adhere to the flattest kind of materialism.

I will try, not to copy, but to borrow a schema that has presided in particular over a great deal of renewal in *physical* causality. It is the schema of two waves ('wave [*onde*]', as in 'undulatory [*ondulatoire*]') or of the inverted wave. We are told, very roughly, that the coexistence of two waves is not at all contradictory, that it would be even rather be complementary. Again, I'm not applying a physical schema, I'm in the process of making, as a function of … [sentence unfinished], I'm taking the term 'wave', which everyone knows I'm borrowing from physics, but I'm leaving aside the whole background in physics.

To make my hypothesis, I give myself a human social field. Today will be consecrated to hypotheses, schemas of hypotheses. And I suppose that this human social field is traversed by a wave that I will call 'convergent', or 'centripetal'. A convergent or centripetal wave traverses diverse social formations. [He writes on the board] You see? It converges towards what? Towards a point, a point of convergence. At the level of this point, the wave reverses itself. Trust me, eh? [Laughter]. It's as if I'm telling you a story, but one doesn't see where the people are in it, and then one attempts to put the people into it. You see? You have social field traversed by a centripetal or convergent wave, converging towards a point, towards a point *x* that I do not situate yet. Is it in the field or beyond the field? No matter. And at this point, the point of convergence, the wave annuls itself, inverts itself, that is to say, becomes centrifugal, divergent [still writing on the board]. This schema of two waves is to be found in physics and is well known, and what is interesting is that the inversion of the wave is not at all just a possibility. It is, as physicists say, a reality of a different order. You have the convergent wave, the point of convergence where the wave is annulled, and at this point of convergence, it annuls itself since, precisely, it is another wave that replaces it, namely a divergent or centrifugal wave.

Why is this useful for me? Assume several so-called primitive communities. You will recall that we have already encountered the necessity last time to give oneself primitive communities that are not at all independent from each other, but which are already in relation. I had put the problem on one side, but we will need to fix what type of relation there can be between these primitive communities. Here I rediscover the problem, all the more reason not to abandon it; but

I am not quite ready yet. What would it be, this convergent wave? Well, it's obvious that – and I do not think this contradicts the data, even that of Clastres – the societies (again, this is why I insisted on the following point) that possess the mechanisms of warding off State power are also vectors that tend towards the formation of a State power. I mean: they do not ward it off without anticipating it in a certain manner, without having an idea, however confused, a collective idea, however confused, that they ward off. And in fact what does that mean concretely? One can see a very simple rationale here – I am saying very simple things – that becomes absolutely concrete. The more abstract it is, the more concrete … that is my only consolation.

Everyone knows very well that primitive societies are not societies without power. They have, moreover, all kinds of centers of power. They are full of them. This is even why they ward off, it is even through that that they ward off. If they ward off the formation of a centralized State apparatus, it is because they ward off, because they inhibit, because they prevent the resonance of, centers of power. This is the great mechanism, I think, of warding off: to prevent the resonance of centers of power. If I can say very elementary, rudimentary things: to prevent the face of the father, the face of the colonel, the face of the President of the Republic, resonating. To prevent the resonance of centers of power is not to lack centers of power. I would say that these societies are all the same traversed by a wave of convergence, by a centripetal and convergent wave. What is the centripetal and convergent wave? It is the vector that tends to make all these formations of power resonate. And for these societies, this is what must be inhibited, this is what must be warded off. Nevertheless, the vector that tends towards this concentration, it exists, it traverses these societies.

Another ethnologist very close to Clastres, namely [Jacques] Lizot, who worked on a different set of Indians to Clastres, in a book published by Éditions du Seuil entitled *The Circle of … Fires* or is it *Fire*?

**A Student**: *Circle of Fire.*

**Deleuze**: It's *Fires*, I think; I no longer remember.[19] Lizot gives a very effective presentation of a case, a very useful one for my purposes, of shamanic initiation, an initiation of a shaman. There is a convocation of all the animal spirits, the Caiman [alligator] spirit, the woodpecker spirit, other kinds of spirit, all kinds of spirit, each with its own power. And there is the great shaman, the initiator … In normal times, these spirits are like micro-powers, each with its own domain. There is one that reigns over the outside, there is another that reigns over the encampment, there is another that reigns at the frontier, one over the hunt, one over women's work. In the shamanic initiation, the great Initiator will trace lines, even if they are very fictive lines, abstract lines, between each spirit, lines that bind one spirit to another. Between the woodpecker spirit and the Caiman spirit, a magical line will be traced. Then, he will obtain a kind of star which is nicely described in detail by Lizot.[20] There is a kind of star, and then, in the middle of the star, one plants the mast. One plants the mast. So you can see in this operation what I call, under certain conditions, the putting in resonance of centers of power.

But in this Indian society, this is precisely only at play in shamanic initiation, in very particular conditions that must not be exceeded, and again, it holds only for the initiate. If there happen to be youngsters who see the ceremony, they laugh. It is not *taken into* society. Everything happens as if the point of convergence was well marked, but as either properly maintained under artificial conditions that ensure that it will not *take possession of* the social group; or else put on the outside, under the conditions of secret initiation. You understand? So I can say: here you have your convergent, centripetal wave, and I can say that it is this that simultaneously has the two properties. This is why the schema of the wave clarifies things for me. Perhaps for some of you it makes things even more obscure, and in that case, leave it aside, no matter. For my part, it is clarifying, because I can say: let us therefore imagine this social field; here you have the convergent wave, this is what has the double property of warding off and anticipating. It anticipates the point of resonance, the central point, it is by virtue of this that it is convergent and centripetal. But, at the same time, it wards off, because if it arrives at this point, it annuls itself. That is a very nice mechanism of warding off – anticipation.

It annuls itself in order to be replaced by what? Obviously, at the point of convergence, there is the complete inversion of the wave; and we have seen, so I can go quickly, that such an inversion of the wave exists. What you have there, on the contrary, is a State apparatus, what I called an archaic Empire. And, at that moment, a true inversion of signs comes about, or what one could call ‘an inversion of messages’. An inversion of signs or an inversion of messages, under what form?

Let us return to our hunter-gatherers. They circulate wild seeds. The man of the archaic Empire puts them in a bag, and that produces this perfect phenomenon of hybridization which I insisted on last time. It is through this that the archaic Empire invents agriculture. But at this precise point, there is a complete inversion of the meaning [*sens*] of signs, there is an inversion of the wave. The point of the archaic Empire is the point where it ceases to be an importer in order to become an exporter. This is what we will call an inversion of messages. It has received wild seeds from the hunter-gatherers; it stocks them and brings about hybridizations, first by chance, and then in a more and more controlled fashion; and at that moment, the town becomes an exporter. It imposes its own hybrids.

So there I have strictly the coexistence of my two waves and I can say, with regard to primitive groups, that it is not at all … [unfinished sentence] If you like, it is here that I would separate myself from Clastres in the final state of his work, because in Clastres, it seems to me that counter-State societies are still pre-existing societies. Here we’re back with the old settling of accounts (which I think has hardly even begun) between archaeologists and ethnologists. As long as they do not settle their accounts, nothing will work. That is to say, between the archaeologists who teach us that imperial States, imperial forms of Empire, date back to the Paleolithic, and the ethnologists who continue to study groups as if the archaeological map did not exist, there is currently no correspondence. It seems to me that there is no correspondence between the ethnological map and the archaeological map. But in our schema, it becomes relatively clear. Let

us suppose that the primitive groups are traversed by this sort of convergent wave. I can say that they anticipate it, yes, they anticipate it because in effect this convergent wave tends towards a *point* of convergence that would mark the resonance of the formations of power. I can say that they ward it off. Why? Because they literally put this point beyond their territory or, when it is inside their territory, it constitutes a ritual aspect of the territory, which is a way of partitioning it off [*cloisonner*].

And, if I install myself at the point of convergence, at this very moment of the inverse wave, then I have before me a territory of Empire. It is the centrifugal wave, the signs are inverted, and the village becomes an exporter to the countryside. And it seems to me that I no longer have any difficulty – well, for me, it works, I don't know about you – in conceiving the strict coexistence of the two waves, and the inversion of the one into the other. Which allows me to say what? Well, you see where I want to get to: I was trying to give a precise definition of social formations, but (for various reasons) without making reference to modes of production, but instead to machinic processes. Here, I have at least two of them. I would say: well, when does the State apparatus emerge? It is a type of threshold. It is a threshold of (let us use this word) *consistency*. It is the point of convergence. The primitive formations are traversed by a convergent wave, but the convergent wave, precisely, is annulled at this point of convergence. The wave, at this very moment, reverses itself. The coexistence of the two waves, that is to say: I am already defining my two types of formation – we will see that there are others – via two processes that I can call machinic processes.

I will call 'primitive formations' or 'derived' formations those which essentially present mechanisms of wardings off – anticipations. I will call 'State formations' those which present a phenomenon … or rather those which present a different process, a completely different process: the apparatus of capture with the inversion of the wave or the inversion of signs.

We'll see where this leads us. I would say that in effect the State apparatus is a threshold of consistency *beyond* so-called primitive groups, but 'beyond' does not mean 'after'. It is already there. You see what I mean. Finally, I want to say that primitives never existed as they exist now. That is to say, they always only ever existed except by surviving. Always.

Well, I don't know if this long schema makes anything clearer … I can say a little more to make it clearer. Once again – although I have gone too quickly, because 'threshold of consistency' … [needs further definition?] – once again, the State apparatus is a threshold of consistency *beyond* the so-called primitive groups of hunter-gatherers, but this threshold of consistency, do not deceive yourself, is already there the whole time. It must simply be said that the primitive wave annuls itself at the point of this threshold. But throughout the whole time, in the social field, there had been the wave, and then its annulment or inversion. I find this schema enlightening, because ... not you? No? Okay. No, not at all? Fine, okay … Maybe next time, I don't know. Oh well! You will understand, you will be illuminated, because, I tell myself, I have gone too quickly this time. This threshold of consistency, is there only one of them? Is there only one of

them? I will have to be much clearer. Is there just one of them alone? Or must our schema be further complicated? [*End of the cassette*] [46:00]

**Part 2**

… the States, the towns. And in fact one can see why, in the main, one can say that both imply each other. Both imply each other, but perhaps they imply each other in a more or less loose manner, to a greater or lesser extent. One cannot envisage a State Apparatus that would not include the germ of towns, and one cannot envisage towns that would not include an embryo of the State apparatus. But already the study of which one is predominant is very important here.

What reason do we have to identify the 'town' form and the 'State' form? Too many authors, too many sociologists (but happily many) attempt to locate the difference, but in my opinion it is rather the historians who have made the most serious studies of this problem, which will become very important for us. I would say: there is always a predominance at work. It is not the same solution, or it is not the same social formation, the 'town' formation and the 'State' formation. What shows us this right away? Everything! Everything. Whichever way you turn. I can cite a whole series if you have the time. Think about it and maybe you can come up with further examples; feel free to interrupt me if you do.

What I would say is that the States were very suspicious of their towns. It is difficult to understand something in history if one doesn't see the extraordinary suspicion and tension there is between the 'town' form and the 'State' form. There's no reason why they should get on with each other. Why? Well, I'll come out straightaway with what I alluded to last time. It is all the same quite curious. Let's take the history of Europe. Let's very quickly sketch out a history. But I'm also once more taking up the question: how does it come about (it's actually quite strange) that capitalism is born? One can discover its birth, it has a long birth and like everything that is born, it is born already constituted, just like the State. It is not an evolution. How does it happen that nascent capitalism had to pass through the 'State' form? Because that does not go without saying. Something big happened; a great coup took place.

Why would it not pass through the 'town' form? We haven't seen the difference yet. Well, we haven't seen it yet, but I assume that if I pose this question, it should already evoke a little presentiment in us. In fact, that failed to happen. Capitalism obstinately failed to let itself pass through the 'town' form. If I just give slightly more precise landmarks: between the 11$^{th}$ and 13$^{th}$ century, where mechanisms of capitalism were already in very much in place: industrial mechanisms, financial mechanisms (again, this is not the 19$^{th}$ century), very advanced financial mechanisms , mercantile mechanisms, industrial mechanisms, all that is there … well, what does one see, between the 11$^{th}$ and the 13$^{th}$ century? One sees a kind of bipolar world: the towns of the North, the towns of the South and between the two, what? Between the two: the town fairs, the famous town fairs of Champagne and Brie. There is plenty of competition. Is this the 'State'

form? Not at all, not at all! There is a collapse of the 'State' form. It is not there that we find the 'State' form emerging. Think of how the great towns at this point stand up to the nascent States, for example the English State, the Norwegian State. What happened was very curious, this whole struggle between 'State' forms and 'town' forms.

Now, from the 11th to 13th century, the great economic and political power tends – I'm not saying that it happens exclusively – to pass through the 'town' form. The State will win out over it, but why? Again, this is a question. Everything is regulated between the very powerful towns of the North, and the very powerful villages of the South, the Italian towns; and the fairs of Champagne which form a continuous market. That should already tell us something about the 'town' form, as we will see later. There are six big fairs in Champagne which form a continuous market, because each of the six takes two months, so that they form a temporal belt, a continuous temporal market. Under those conditions, they contain everything within the 'town' form. The arrangements or struggles between North and South …

At this point there is a State that is already rather well-formed, which is France. And France had its chance (which is very interesting, perhaps that would have changed everything), namely: capitalism could have had a French center, for the privileged situation of France relates, at this moment, precisely to the proximity of the fairs of Champagne, and there were all sorts of events related to this between the 11th and the 12th century, during which it attempted to take control of North-South relations. But it doesn't happen at all. It doesn't happen at all, because the towns are very malignant. They establish a route of towns that goes through Germany and Italy that above all avoids France; while on the other hand, there is the maritime path from the Mediterranean to the North Sea.

One of the best contemporary historians, Fernand Braudel, puts it very well: there is a kind of opportunity, political and economic, at this moment, for the State, for the State in France, but it does not happen. The towns escape. And if I read a page of Braudel from an excellent book entitled *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme*[21], this is what he says: "Every time there are two runners." And he will even say that they are "the hare and the tortoise", which is interesting, because you will immediately divine who is the hare and who is the tortoise: "every time there are two runners". Both terms are interesting to me, and we will need them later on: "Every time there are two runners: the State and the town. The State usually won." Usually the State wins, okay, but at what price? It turns out that this is indeed what happens: it's the 'State' form that wins out over the 'town' form. "The State usually won and the town then remained subject and under a heavy yoke. On the other hand, with the first great urban centres of Europe, it was the town that won entirely, at least in Italy, Flanders and Germany."

I will multiply the examples. Think for example about the Absolute Monarchy in France. One might say that the French State is particularly centralized: Paris is the center. Yes …, but no, it's not true. I mean, historically, it is not true. Think of the extraordinary suspicion that the 'State' form has for the towns, and inversely, and to the extreme suspicion that the towns have for the

'State' form. There is a whole struggle, and I believe that one cannot even understand what is generally called 'class struggle' without also taking into account the struggle between the 'town' form and the 'State' form. There is an abundance of examples. How can a town be taken into the 'State' form? How is it that it resists? I mentioned the French Monarchy: think of the history of the Fronde. King Louis XIV will not forget what Paris is. Paris is not only a capital. If you like, the true form of the town is never the 'capital', because the 'capital' is already the town subjected to the State. But what is the true form of town? It is – one must not confuse them – the *metropolis*. And the metropolis is the town *as* 'town' form, whilst the capital is the town *as* subordinated to the form 'State'. Nevertheless the true town is: the metropolises. Well, Louis XIV will never have much trust in Paris. The town, first of all, is a strange place of riots, it is a strange place of classes. As a later echo of that, think of the famous history (here I am making quite a leap, but this is for those of you heading in a certain direction) of the Commune. That great reckoning. Yes, I think the last stage in the reckoning between the 'State' form and 'town' form in France was the Commune… perhaps also with the Occupation, with the German Occupation, when they relocated… when French State relocated to Vichy, when, there was something amazing because Paris was also… and not simply, not obviously, because it could occupy, for entirely different reasons… [*Deleuze does not finish*] Anyway, the reckonings …

Something else comes to mind, for those who know that aspect of history: the Renaissance. How do certain Italian towns let themselves be taken by the 'State' form at the moment of the Renaissance? The Renaissance, that would be a fundamental moment. From the 11th to the 13th century, one could say that everything happens through the towns; the 'town form' resists. The 'State' form is not going strong. But then how do the Spanish towns, for example Barcelona, allow themselves to be taken by the 'State' form? Every State, every 'State' form, has its own procedures for disciplining the towns. So there would be the Spanish case, then there would be very particular cases, as with Florence with the Medicis. The Medicis take hold of the town and submit it to a very strange 'State' form. But with regard to Italy, one will have to wait a very long time, and they still they have problems with the 'State' form now, very particular problems which have a whole history.

Now I leave this whole aspect of Europe, even though it appears very important to me. Indeed, I would say that in capitalism it was the 'State' form that ended up winning. But that did not happen straightforwardly. It could have been the 'town' form. Are you following?

I can add all sorts of examples. The confrontation … Take Islam, how can one think of Islam independently of the 'town' form? It's obvious. And what is Islam plugged into? It will simultaneously lead its fight against and conduct agreements with two great 'State' forms, which however it certainly does not take as model, on the contrary. The tension is such that, every time you have a town or towns that prosper, you have to ask yourself which State it was nourished by. Venice, the growth of Venice, is a veritable anthropophagy of the Byzantine Empire. There are oppositions, enormous historical tensions, between the 'town' and 'State' forms. With regard to Islamic towns, I can point you to a book in which many of these themes are developed: *Les équipements de pouvoir* [*The Equipment of Power*], published by 10/18, a book by [François]

Fourquet and [Lion] Murard.[22] They develop many aspects of the relations between town and State, but precisely (they make no secret of it) through an appeal to Braudel. I think that among the historians, it is Braudel who has gone furthest in the analysis of all this. Now, the towns of Islam, of Islamism, are not in the desert, but they do also have relations to the desert. We are talking about Medina and Mecca: Mohammed at Medina and Mohammed at Mecca. This is a system of towns. It is *fundamentally* a system of towndwellers [*citadin*], in which the towns are separated, to speak schematically, by the desert. And the relations of this Islamic ensemble with, on the one hand, the Persian Empire, and on the other hand the Byzantine Empire, are decisive; the whole domination of Islam will be a victory of the 'town' form in relation to the imperial form.

Okay, is that all? No, let's go back again. Let's try to understand and get more of a feel for how the 'town' form is not the same thing as 'State' form. Let's go back to the period between the 11th and 13th century. You can see that so far we've got Islamic towns, towns of Northern Europe where capitalism is elaborated, Southern towns, the Italian towns, where capitalism is also elaborated, the town-fairs of Champagne. Well, to the North, there is a community of particularly powerful towns, known as the Hansea, the Hanseatic community. The Hanseatic community does not strictly have any 'State' form. It has been extensively studied, and the documents are very precise: no 'State' form. It has colossal power, it groups together a number of towns, linking together between sixty and a hundred and sixty towns that meet in so-called general assemblies, but most of the time, they do not attend, only about a third of them [the towns] attend these general assemblies. They fight England, and they impose law on the whole of the North. They have no functionaries. They do not have any juridical personality. They don't have an army. Neither functionaries, nor army, nor juridical personality: this is not a 'State' form.

I won't try again to define the two forms. I would say: it's obvious that it's not the same thing. Let us go back once more; I'm just trying to amass materials. There is an article by Francois Chatêlet which I find very pleasing. In it, Chatêlet puts in question the formula current in antiquity: the City-State [*l'État-Cité*]. One talks of City-States. This would in effect be a way of making out that there are two kinds of State, City-States on the one hand, and then territorial States on the other. Maybe one can say that at some level, but maybe it's more valuable to say something else: why not openly say that cities are *not* States? There is no reason to identify both powers. Once again, a primitive society without a State is full of power and of formations of power, but that doesn't make it a State apparatus from the point of view of the typology we are seeking to map out. Athens is not a State. The Athenian city, that had nothing to do with the State. And Chatêlet did something which seemed particularly interesting to me, he said: there is an idea proper both to the city and the town that is not at all an idea of the State, and that is the idea of a power of magistrature. The magistrate would have been an invention of the town. It's true, you'll see. Yes, the Hansea have *magistrates*. They are of the 'chamber of commerce' type. In Venice, there is also a chamber of commerce. The State, for its part, invented the 'functionary' form. There is bureaucracy in both cases. There is a bureaucracy of the town and a bureaucracy of the State. But I do not believe at all that the functionary and the magistrate are the same thing.

What is more, throughout Athenian history – and this backs up Chatêlet – in the whole of Classical Athens, there is an absolute will to *ward off* … But wait, what d'you know, perhaps our mechanisms of anticipation–warding off are at play here too. Perhaps the 'town' form in its own way wards off–anticipates the 'State' form, but in a totally different way than with so-called primitive groups. You can see that this will greatly complicate our schema already, because primitive groups ward off–anticipate both the 'town' form and the 'State' form. But the 'town' form, in a completely different way, also wards off–anticipates the 'State' form. And the State, for its part, will capture – being apparatus of capture, it will capture – the primitive groups, and in a completely different way, will also capture the towns. One would then have a very rich milieu of coexistence for explaining tensions, struggles. Why point this out? And why go back to ancient Athens? Well, in order to precisely to verify that, in fact, from antiquity onwards (some very good writers make this observation) there are two systems that must not be confused: a *city-town* system and a *palace-temple* system. For example, Crete is truly an empire. There is a Cretan empire. Knossos is truly an imperial system, it is a temple-palace system, palace-temple. With the Myceneans, who in a certain way took their model from Crete, one feels that there is a shift, that it is no longer that. The Greeks themselves did not know. I would say: there are empires, there are indeed archaic imperial formations in Greece. Yes, okay. Mycenae: yes, of course. With Crete at the horizon, etc. And yet one can feel that there is something else going on there. It is much more like a 'city' system already. There is a nice page in Vernant where he compares Knossos and Mycenae, and says: but it is very different, it has a similar air, but it is very different, it is not the same system.

Take another, more basic example: what is known as the Babylonian empire, as compared with the Egyptian empire. The Babylonian empire is not an empire. Ultimately, I would say, trying to make a diagnosis, it is not an Empire, it is a network of cities. It is a network of cities. It is not possible to understand Sumer, for example, unless one already sees it as truly an urban system. Whereas Egypt, that is an imperial system, it is an archaic imperial system. Then you will say to me: yes, but there are towns from the moment there is Empire and there is the embryo of Empire from the moment there is a town. Yes and no. Because everything changes, depending on whether the town is a concretion of empire or whether the appearance of the State apparatus is an extension of the town. Everything changes depending on the dominant factor.

I recall a very beautiful text by Braudel that says: how to explain – it is very curious, he says – that the Orient has always been a *rebel* material within the urban system. He gives two great examples: India and China. There, the towns never develop themselves, they are

completely subjected. Why do they rebel against the urban system? It doesn't catch on, the urban system in the archaic East. And why doesn't it catch on in the archaic Orient? Obviously because the town only develops as a dependency of the Palace. In India, there is a caste system that will be profoundly resistant to the urban organization. In China, there is a system of partitioning that means that the towns are completely subjected. Subjected to what? To the imperial form. In the East – roughly, very schematically – one could say: yes, if the town does not catch on, with regard to the question posed by Braudel, it is because what dominates is the form of the Temple-Palace – think of the old plan of Peking. Peking truly developed as a direct dependency of the Palace. There, you truly have the subjection of the towns to the 'State form'. And that was the

oriental solution. All the solutions are good; but it was essentially because of this Oriental archaic solution that our famous despotic empires are known from Marx onward as ‘Asiatic empires’, even though one finds them elsewhere.

But, it is at the same time – and I insist on the coexistence … Where is the ‘town’ form invented then, leaving aside Europe in the 11th – 13th century, which is already very late? Where is the ‘town’ form invented? We can reply straightaway: it is the Mediterranean, it is the Aegean world, they are the ones who invented the urban world, the world of cities: the Pelasgians, the Carthaginians, the Athenians, along with very different peoples, like the Phoenicians, very different peoples that will organize the urban world, the ‘town’ form, the ‘city’ form. And why? Without doubt, because they can. They can, why? Because – and this then becomes very curious – the imperial apparatus of capture, as we have seen, captures what? Would that not be the wild seeds of the hunter-gatherers? And then it tries to capture the towns, once the towns exist. But the towns, what do they capture? Recall that in its archaic form, the Empire constitutes a stock, and that it is from this same stock that hybridizations will come. The Aegean world in a way precisely profits from the oriental stock, it profits from the imperial stock, whether it be through pillage or through haggling, that is to say in trading. It will develop its own solution, the urban solution with its network of commerce. So everything happens as if, at this point, the ‘town’ form escapes the imperial archaic form, the form of the State; except that the State, after a very long, long history, overtakes the town, gets hold of it and rediscipline it.

I imagine you will have all sorts of examples in mind of another nature, so if need be next time we can return to this. I would just like to move in a slightly more conceptual direction. Let us suppose that the ‘State’ form and the ‘town’ form, at the limit – if you accept the disordered mass of examples I have just cited and my invocation of Fernand Braudel … Well, how might we distinguish these two thresholds, conceptually speaking? The threshold ‘town’ and the threshold … [*Deleuze does not finish*]? The threshold State–town, earlier on I called that the ‘threshold of consistency’. But here the difference is that in fact there are two thresholds. There are two thresholds, not just one of them. The ‘town’ form, we could say – let us invent words, since we need to do that here – we will say that it is a threshold of *transconsistency*. The ‘State’ form, I would say that it is a threshold of *intraconsistency*.

Okay, you will say, isn’t there something … [*He does not finish*]. Secondly, I would also say, which comes to the same (and in their book, Fourquet and Murard have shown it very well): *the* town is an absolutely empty notion. What exists is always a network of towns. The town is fundamentally in communication with other towns. There is no ‘Lübeck’, there is Lübeck in relation to some town, to another town, constituting the Hansea. There is no town in Islam, there is the set of Islamic towns in their relation with the empires; and their relation is composed of violence with the Empires. There are also towns that are not ‘capitals’, but are stock-market metropolises. There is London, there is New York, etc.: this is a phenomenon of transconsistency. And in fact, what is the constitutive act of the town? The town is a process – and now let us take up this word again here, it is useful to us, it is through this that there is a phenomenon of transconsistency – it is a very special process of *deterritorialization*.

I mean that the town deterritorializes itself. What does that mean? Here, in every case, it is necessary that the word has a rather concrete sense. The deterritorialization of the town is the fact that the town, in one way or another, is separated, detached from its backcountry. What is the most famous case of this? The great commercial towns. The way in which the great commercial towns are not only unstuck from their backcountry, but annul the backcountry. They don't know it. They are turned towards something else. Towards what? Towards their own network, towards their own circuit. For any town, there is something that enters and something that leaves. The town is a set of inputs and outputs. This is why I say 'transconsistency' and not at all 'intraconsistency'. Here, Braudel and others have insisted on the town-road relation. It is the network of towns. This is why a town can never be thought alone, separately. A town is fundamentally in communication with another town. How does deterritorialization show itself? It shows itself above all in the towns that throw themselves into the maritime adventure. Whether it be Carthage, whether it be Athens, whether it be Venice later on. Venice is the extreme case, since it does not even have a *terra firma*. It is only later that Venice changes and embarks on its famous conquest known as the 'conquest of *terra firma*'. This is also a fragility of towns: it is absolutely as if they are planted, diverted from their hinterland. It is obvious that, in the case of attack, they cannot count on any help from the backcountry.

I might give the impression of saying that from this point on, every town is a trading town, but that's obviously not the case. I would say: every town implies a network of some nature, whatever this network might be. In Greece, for example, there is a whole network of sanctuary towns. The circulation of the epic, from the Homeric epoch onward, implies a network. The circuit can very well be commercial, but it can equally be religious, it can be military, it can be whatever you like, that's not what's important. Without doubt, in the case of trading towns, it is particularly visible, but, so as to anticipate an objection, I'm not saying at all that every town has to trade: I'm saying that every town exists in a network with other towns, and that this is what makes it a phenomenon of transconsistency. Which comes down to saying what? It involves a town establishing, in relation to other towns (which does not imply wars, but which does not exclude wars between towns), circuits of deterritorialization. Circuits of deterritorialization on which, obviously, something reterritorializes itself: the commodity or else the cult object – it is not necessarily trade – or else the book, it could be anything. To put it in a different way, I defined the town as an instrument of polarization in a necessary relay with other towns. It is an instrument of polarization. It constitutes circuits. It only exists through what enters into it and what comes out of it. It is inputs and outputs, and the coexistence of inputs and outputs. And in order to regulate the inputs and outputs, there are magistrates. It is a bureaucracy of networks.

You can see why I say that the 'State' form is totally different. The 'State' form is a phenomenon of intraconsistency. Everything happens as if in this case you would isolate a certain number of points. You isolate a certain number of points on a territory. A town has no territory, that is not its problem. Again, Venice has no territory, Venice has circuits. On its territory – it doesn't matter whether the territory is natural or artificial, natural frontier or not, that's all quite secondary – [the 'State' form] isolates a certain number of points. These points can be towns, if it has learned how to master them, at least relatively. But entirely different things are involved as

well. These are agricultural enterprises, these are linguistic traits, moral and cultural traits, whatever you like. And the 'State' form is what assures the *resonance* of these points that it holds on its territory.

In other words, but without stating the prevalence of one element or the other, if you give yourself a network of towns for convenience sake (you could start with the opposite, and proceed through the 'State' form), the 'State' form will come to *isolate* a certain number of point-towns, putting them in resonance with points of another kind than 'town', making the whole resonate. It is through this that in the 'State' form there will fundamentally be the resonance of formations of power. And the 'State' form, for its part, will also be a process of deterritorialization, but in a completely different way. I would say that the deterritorialization of the town (which fundamentally belongs to the town: in the town, one deterritorializes oneself, it is a form of deterritorialization) … well, in the town, one deterritorializes oneself, how to put this, *dynamically*. It is a dynamic deterritorialization, which consists precisely in cutting oneself off from the backcountry. The 'State' form is a static deterritorialization, and is no less profound for that, no less powerful; on the contrary. In what sense is it a static deterritorialization? It is because, for the play of territories occupied by so-called primitive groups or by bands, for the play of *territorialities* of bands, the 'State' form substitutes what? Something that is fundamental to it (we're returning here to something talked about it in previous years, in relation to [Paul] Virilio's studies): the fundamental act of the State is the establishment, or the planning [*aménagement*] of the territory. It is the planning of territory. That is to say, it is the superposition onto the territorialities of lineages, onto territorialities-lineages, of a geometrical space. It is the geometrical reason of the State. This is a completely different type of deterritorialization. This time, the territory becomes object; there is deterritorialization because the territory is treated as object. It is upon it that the planning of the State bears. Or, if you prefer … But what time is it?

**A student:** Noon.

**Deleuze**: Noon? To explain everything, here's a very bad metaphor: visualise what in music are called melodic lines, you know, horizontal melodic lines. You can mark points on these melodic lines that will constitute counterpoints. I would say that the horizontal lines are the network of towns. And then you have harmonic cuts, which are vertical and define chords, chords on the horizontal lines. The vertical cuts are the plannings of the State, the 'State' forms. This metaphor, a very bad metaphor, has one merit, which is to make visible the tension of the 'town' form and the 'State' form. How does the kind of melodic line of the towns tend to escape the cuts, the vertical cuts of State, and inversely, how do the vertical cuts of the State tend to break the kind of circuit operating in the network of towns, and under what form do they break them? Well, by making a fundamental differentiation emerge between an external market and an internal market. That is an affair of State. It is an affair of State. The distinction between an internal market and an external market is not an invention of the town. What is the affair of the town is the constitution of a market. Yes, that's right. Whether it be a religious market, or a market of … whatever.

So you see I have four formations. Already. We're making progress. I have the so-called primitive formation. I will call 'primitive formation' whatever rests on the mechanisms of anticipation–warding off. (What I'm looking for is a kind of social typology where everything coexists). I will call 'State formations' formations that rest on the transversal, vertical apparatus of capture, apparatuses of capture which obviously bear on both the primitive territorialities and on the network of towns on the other hand. Thirdly, I will call 'town formation' instruments of polarization that are constitutive of circuits. And all this coexists: the States come to cut and recut the circuits, the circuits traversing the States, etc. So you see, I have therefore: mechanisms of anticipation–warding off, apparatuses of capture, instruments of polarization … All that is necessary to make a world.

Obviously, something else is necessary. What I still need is something that has always existed; again, one did not have to wait for capitalism for such a thing. One did not have to wait for capitalism for formations that can be called 'international'. I don't see anything else that is needed for a social typology; in any case, it's enough for me. They're called 'international', and this is not a particularly apt phrase; what does 'international formations' mean? Without doubt, those formations that span all the preceding formations, which traverse them, which straddle everything, which pass everywhere, which traverse everything. One didn't have to wait for capitalism for that, as we saw last year with metallurgy, with prehistoric metallurgy, or, more precisely, Neolithic metallurgy. So let us look for a more satisfying word, since 'international formations' does not mean the United Nations, it does not mean the League of Nations, it means: those formations whose proper object is to traverse or reunite the preceding heterogeneous social formations. Let us search for a word. There is a word that seems fine to me and which is still employed today: we could call them *oecumenic* [*œcuméniques*] formations. 'Oecumenic', because what is the economy? It is the inhabited world. The formations that traverse the inhabited world are not at all homogenizing formations, and this is why there is something so specific about them. Take a great commercial company, what do we have there? It is completely segmentary, it has segments that lead back to some State apparatus, to some State. Take for example, the great companies at the birth of capitalism, or take, following the example we analysed last year, what happens in the metallurgical process with the blacksmiths who prospect, the blacksmiths of the caravan, the nomadic blacksmiths, and the sedentary blacksmiths. This is why guilds of blacksmiths are so mysterious: what you have there is an oecumenic formation. It necessarily passes through, or has a sector, of bands. Think about the great commercial companies: they have sectors of bands that are truly terrible. Take all of that: there are segments of bands and then segments of States.

Think about the great discoveries [of unknown lands]: what is strange about all these voyages is that the theme of the confrontation of States and towns, the two forms, emerges at the same time. In the great expeditions, you have sectors of bands, with veritable bandits. You have at one end the King of Spain, then you have Christopher Colombus; it's bizarre, he's a very strange man. And then you have the primitives coming from within, under what form? As exterminated? Not always. Under the form of types to exterminate. There are ententes. What role do nomads play in the great commercial process? There is a nomadic segment. And if they are not in agreement? I

would say that an oecumenic formation never proceeds via homogenization. It doesn't happen. It is a social formation of a very particular type in the sense that it is, on the contrary, astride heterogeneous formations. And it is this that gives it the power we're calling 'oecumenic'; meaning that it works everywhere, that it has a universalist pretention. The universalist pretention is never a pretention to homogeneity, not at all. Take the case of Christianity; what constituted the oecumenical pretention of Christianity? What made it present itself as the religion of the oecumenon [*l'œcumène*], regardless of how unlikely this proposition was? It is in part this aspect. And in the case of Islam, one should also see how that came about. But in the case of Christianity, it is at the one and the same time that it becomes the religion of Empire, and that it completely integrates a strong State apparatus… [*End of the cassette*] [92:06]

**Part 3**

… I say that the universal pretention of a social formation comes fundamentally from its capacity to digest heterogeneous social formations. In a certain way, this is obvious. I mean: doesn't it happen in the same way today? Someone might immediately make an objection: doesn't capitalism proceed toward a kind of homogeneity? And there would be the tendency to say: yes, of course, starting from specific examples. I mean: the notorious ethnocides that have not been lacking … The great theme of the ethnocide of so-called primitive societies. At a more obvious level: the way in which capitalism did not serve as support for the developed Empires. The 1914-1918 war marks the end of the two great developed Empires, namely the Ottoman empire and the Austrian empire. Why did it not serve to support it? Finally, that was no longer possible, it could not work.

There is a fascinating history here, because it is at the basis … or rather it is a very important factor in Palestinian history, in the contemporary history of the Palestinians. This is the period of the British mandate, in the course of which Zionism was constituted, alongside the first purchases of land by the Zionists, the first purchases of Arab land by the Zionists. Now, the British mandate, for a while, tried to continue to function on the mode of the Ottoman Empire. That could not last long, it could not. It could not. I mean by that: the most elementary exigencies of capitalism mean that the Ottoman empire was not … [It] was an element, in the sense in which earlier we said that there are elements, there are milieux that rebel against the 'town' form. The developed Empire is not at all a good formula for the development of capitalism.

So, at first sight, one will say to oneself, with regard to all sorts of cases: well, yes, homogeneity does indeed come about. The homogeneity of States does indeed transpire. But in fact it does not at all seem to me that this is the case. Maybe later we will be brought to make further distinctions in these matters, but I do not believe that there is a tendency to the homogenization of States. What is true is that there is a single market. Capitalism brings with it the existence of a single global market. Perhaps one should see if it was like that before, but I don't think so. The existence of single global market, perhaps this is a fundamental characteristic of capitalism,

since, as you know well, there is no specifically socialist market. In turn, once it is said that there is a single global market, one can say that from that moment all States play the role, within certain limits … how to put it? I don't know, I'm posing a question … Perhaps one could say that all States, whatever they are, in relation to the unique global market of capitalism, play the role of … what?

Let's look for a word. Let's say (quickly, without reflecting too much on the meaning): *models of realization*. One could say – and now we use a mathematical metaphor – that they are at most *isomorphic*. Again, one can doubt that the socialist States are isomorphic to capitalist States. But it is possible to say that Third World States or certain Third World States are isomorphic to the States of the center. One can say things like that … maybe. You will see later that I'm posing a question here. But, in any case, even if one assumes a certain isomorphy of States is necessary in capitalism as a function of the global market, this isomorphy does not at all imply homogeneity. Not at all. What is more, we will have to wonder whether, in capitalism, it is not possible to distinguish two things, namely: capitalism as mode of production and capitalism as relation of production. What might indeed be homogeneous – and I am not even sure about this – are the States where capitalism is realised as mode of production. But capitalism can very well be effectuated as a relation of production without being realised as a mode of production. It can be in a full sense the dominant relation of production and still reconcile itself with modes of production that are not specifically capitalist.

For example, I think that one of the modern authors who has gone furthest in precisely these analyses and especially in relation to the Third World, is Samir Amin. Now, Samir Amin says something that interests us a great deal from the point of view we have arrived at. In all his books, he continually maintains the following thesis: *there is no economic theory of international relations, even when these relations are economic*.[23] There is – and nevertheless Samir Amin is a Marxist, and a very scrupulous Marxist (I say 'and nevertheless', I wrongly said 'and nevertheless', because this position is actually very Marxist indeed) – no economic theory of international economic relations, of international relations, even when they are economic. Why? Because international economic relations allow different modes of production to intervene if capital is the relation of reproduction. Now, there is no economic theory of different social different formations. It is therefore the heterogeneity of the social formations that will guarantee – which will not at all contradict, but which will guarantee – the specificity of the final social formation I considered, namely the oecumenic social formations. So that here you have a field of perpetual coexistence.

Think about what we call an artistic movement. An artistic movement, what is that? In what sense is it oecumenical or international? You will find 'State' forms in it, you will find 'town' forms, you will find 'band' forms in it, you will find its 'primitive' forms. Every artistic international formation literally has its Negro art, literally has its State power, literally has its own bandits. It has the lot. Take the period of Cubism or of Surrealism. For the whole of this very agitated period, Dadaism is a whole history of urban networks, with its own urban bands. When Surrealism arrives, it is truly the capture of towns. André Breton takes himself for a man

of the State [laughter]. Fine, it's one of the forms. The Surrealist form is absolutely distinct from the Dadaist form. The discovery or exploitation of so-called primitive arts at the same time, all that is how oecumenism always proceeds.

You will find all the formations there, each at work in each other, overlapping. You have to know what segment you are in, alongside which struggles, abominable struggles, amongst all these formations. That, therefore, is what I call a field of coexistence. If you have understood me, it is now quite simple. One accepts … But next time we'll see what you think of all this, because I'll talk much less next time. What time is it?

**A student**: Quarter past twelve.

**Deleuze**: Quarter past twelve, okay, I will finish soon. So we can accept all that: the coexistence of all these formations. You see that I have a place for five; if you can find any more, perfect. So: the formations centered on anticipation–warding off, on the apparatus of capture, on instruments of polarization, on … [*Response to comments*] What? Slower? Ah no, I don't find five, I only find four. But no! I had five of them! One of them has disappeared.

**A woman student**: Yes, there were four of them.

**Deleuze**: There are only four?

**The same student**: Yes, five minutes ago, there were only four of them.

**Deleuze**: Oh, okay, good, then there are no more than four. Okay, it doesn't matter [*Laughter*]. As a consequence: what we call primitive groups do not exist; there are simply formations of anticipation–warding off. State apparatuses do not exist, there are apparatuses of capture. Towns: they don't exist, there are networks, that is to say instruments of polarization. International formations don't exist, there are oecumenic formations. And you see: it is always a catastrophe when without precaution one projects one form onto another; it is extremely irritating. For example, there are those who have a tendency to say: ah, global financial policy is all elaborated by one group, the Trilateral, or whatever. Not at all! Not at all! It is not that it is any less dangerous, but it is obvious that one cannot project the 'State' form onto the oecumenic form. Not at all. Just as one cannot project the 'town' form onto the 'State' form. Not at all. That's not right, on the contrary, we must make a typology that is very very … [*unfinished sentence*]. If we want to understand the extent of our misfortune, we must realise that the enemy is multiple, there is not just one. You don't have to say that there is someone who decides what the dollar will become, precisely not. The oecumenical forms never dominate their machines. And the sphere of domination of State apparatuses doesn't stretch that far.

So if you accept this schema, you can see exactly where we are now, we can no longer go back. We have said 'all this coexists': fine, but under what form? How is it possible? How is it possible and above all, how can one go onto conceive (one must start from zero, at the point where one is; and ultimately I would like this to become a more concrete history) – how can one conceive those primitive groups that simultaneously anticipate and ward off? The State apparatus is already there, but for their part, they are not it: they anticipate it, but above all they ward it off. They will allow themselves to be captured, or they are already captured by it; they have a sphere of autonomy that is very … But what do they do? In fact, I would say that for the State apparatus itself to be conceivable, it is necessary that the primitives, that the so-called primitives, have all kinds of relations with each other, that is to say, that they already have relations of exchange. In so far as primitive groups do not yet include the State apparatus – or do not include it as far as they are concerned, rather – it is necessary that they exchange things.

On what basis? Although we might seem to have completely changed the problem, this will be our problem next time: on what basis, and how, to conceive the life of two primitive groups in relation to each other? Once it is said that we deny in advance as without basis what the ethnologists call the autarchy of these groups, namely: that each of these groups be self-sufficient? We say: no, that's all impossible, all of them were in coexistence for a simple reason: if State apparatuses already coexist with primitive groups, it goes without saying that primitive groups, in one way or another, are in relation with State apparatuses, of which they are wary like the plague; and they are already in relation with other primitive groups, even if only through the intermediary of State apparatuses. Now, it is with regard to this issue that I would like you to reflect on something for next time.

The point we have arrived at, if we go back to zero, is this: we need a new theory of exchange, applicable to exchanges that could be called, in quotation marks, 'primitive exchanges'. How are primitives able to exchange something?

Well, funnily enough, this makes me think of one famous theory in political economy. In manuals of political economy, we are often told: there are three theories of value (three, preferable to four). There is a well-known theory that goes under the name of the 'labour theory of value', where value is explained in one way or another through labour. That is the classical theory. This is above all not the Marxist theory, because, whatever the way in which Marx takes it up and renews it, his novelty does not lie there. Classical political economy is founded on labour-value. And then there is another theory, utility-value: what determines the value of something is its utility and not the labour that is incorporated in it. This is the 'utilitarian' theory.

And then there is a peculiar theory known as 'neo-classical' or 'marginalist', which says: well, it is neither one nor the other. Value is neither founded on labour, nor on utility, but on *marginal* utility, hence the expression 'marginalism'. So I would really like to ask those who already know

political economy to go back a little over the histories of marginalism. 'Marginal utility', when one reads about it, is very simple: it is the utility of the *last* object. It is the utility of the last object. So one will say, for example, that marginal utility in exchange is the comparative utility of the last object exchanged. Why do they introduce this idea of the last? The marginalists have a fundamental, essential importance in the history of political economy, such that all neo-classicism is marginalism. It's the theme of the last one, the last as determinant of the value of the object of exchange. The last object exchanged: what does that mean? We must try to give an account. I have been too abstract today, but I would just like to conclude on the following point, so that you can think about it for next time. I would say -- or shall I leave it, because I would prefer to wait until next week when you'll have re-read your manuals, or at least I hope there will be a small number of you who will have consented to do that? -- … Because I tell myself, let's try something different. We can say that it's a question of method, fine, marginalism… If you have to take the baccalauréat, and you have as subject 'what is the last?', you can say: that's good, now I have to use marginalism. If you know nothing about it, you can also say, well ok… You'll make limited use of it, but to work your way through this, one should never rely on anything too technical.

I was just talking about 'the last one'. Funnily enough, you just have to go to the café to get ideas [*Laughter*]. Let's forget about marginalism, and think about 'the last one'. Imagine three guys in café: "Go on, this is the last glass!" That might not seem to have any relation to what we're talking about, the marginalists, but I'm not sure about that at all. One of the guys says: "This the last glass! This is the last!". The other says: "No, no, really, I …"; then the others make fun of him: "Ah, you're scared, mate! You think you're going to get grounded!" There is a type of collective evaluation, a kind of collective agreement about the last one, and the *value* of the last one. Another example: one of the most abominable things in the world, a domestic scene. We could have three scenes like that. One in the café … Four scenes: we'll have the marginalist scene, preceded by three more concrete scenes. The scene in the café: the last glass. Domestic scene: "You're not going to have the last word!" Or rather: "I'm going to have the last word!"[24]

Strindberg: "I will have the last word!", "No, you won't have the last word!" What is last word in a scene? And how about the last love? What is the last love? With that domestic scene, just put yourself in that position … I bet you the marginalists are not saying else than what guys say in a café. It is prodigious that there is anything amusing in the domestic scene, because it's such a drag. For both of them, there is a situation of exchange, they exchange words. Both of them have a certain *evaluation*, in my opinion, an evaluation of the point at which one should go no further. What is this point at which one should go no further? Because everything happens as if the domestic scene was like a bath. They make a scene, and come out of it all fresh. Everyone else is bewildered, anyone who witnessed it (because generally, it is done in public); they're bewildered and say: "Good God, what's going on here?", but at the very moment the spectators or listeners crack, the scene suddenly becomes peaceful: it's finished! It's over, but you know it's going to happen again in half an hour [Laughter]. Just when you think 'that's it', it starts up again. Thus we have a series. In each case, there is a type of evaluation: don't go too far, because … There is an evaluation of the last object which, in this case, is a word.

And that is what interests us: it is that from the beginning, the domestic scene comprises *both* the evaluation (at least approximative, by each party) of the last word beyond which things would go too far, *and* the necessary time taken to attain the last word. For one doesn't want to arrive there too quickly, because then the domestic scene would not function. For the last glass, you could say that from the moment of the first glass in the series, there is a double collective evaluation, a collective evaluation of the last glass (after how many?) and of the necessary time (one must neither stay too long, nor not long enough, at the café). My question is: is there not in fact in primitive exchanges an evaluation of the last that would be fundamental in the act of exchange? Do you see? But it would be good to pass through some precise and concrete examples to show this.

And do the marginalists say anything else when they say: it is the last object, it is the value of the last object, the marginal object, that fixes the value of the whole series? The banker [Albin] Chalandon[25], who hides fewer things from us than Prime Minister [Raymond] Barre, said recently: you know, with oil, everyone knows they're being lied to. It is quite normal that value should be fixed by the cost of production of the last object. In the case of oil, what is the cost of production of the last object? It depends on the next, on anticipated future [discoveries] of marine oil. Do you see? The rise in oil prices is deeply connected with discoveries of marine oil. That there is a rise in oil prices as a function of the value of the last object – it goes without saying that sand oil has every reason to align itself. This is a mechanism one learns about in elementary manuals of political economy: that with regard to the cost of production of a given object, costs of production align themselves with the highest cost of production. Of course, there are regulatory mechanisms that intervene, etc. But Chalandon gave this incredible speech, saying: but it is obvious that oil was underpaid. The countries, the States of the center, yes, the States of the center, have always underpaid for oil, and now it's over. But it's over because oil will align its cost of production to the production of marine oil that will enter into the price. So it's another coup by the English, eh?[26] We are told that there is a coup by the Arabs, but it's not, it's a coup by the English. Yes, it's them, it's them. The fault lies with the English. There you go. Okay, more next time. [*End the session*] [1:55:28]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on the Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 04, 27 November 1979**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translated by Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

Concerning our next meeting, I am saying, eh, next time, that at the request of many of those who were working with me last year, who wanted us to do a restricted session, not at all for the purpose of excluding anyone, on the contrary, quite the contrary, uh ... but because we will come back to certain notions that we had developed the next year... uh, last year and, as we will assume they are familiar, this will be like a kind of session that really cannot be of interest, I believe, which can only be followed by those who did the work last year. So, the others, if they want, I'll meet them the week after, a way of returning the favor, on the other hand, for "precursor" sessions which will be only for those ... [*Laughter*] ... There you go. I don't see how, but ... Fine.

Some students: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: About that, the last time, we had made some progress, not much, regarding ..., following the traces of a topic that we needed, namely the possibility of conceiving of a coexistence in a social field, a coexistence and an encroachment of very diverse social formations. And we assumed as a hypothesis the possibility of defining the various social formations by processes which we conveniently called "machinic processes", and we had identified the coexistence and the interpenetration of these processes. So, no attempt had been made at all now to speak of societies, for example, primitive insofar as being social formations, but we had identified a process which, no doubt, appeared in so-called primitive societies, but was also appearing elsewhere and where this process was called "anticipation-conjuration".

We spoke more exactly of the State apparatus, no longer as a social formation or state society; we spoke of the apparatus of capture, another process. We spoke of war machines, we spoke of ... etc. [*Deleuze does not finish*] And we had outlined this social field where, then, when social formations are no longer related to modes of production that they would be supposed…. er… that they would be assumed to suppose, but are related to the processes that they envelop, the very idea of a coexistence of all the formations in the social field seemed to us to be… to be verified, to be established. This is where I am asking if there are any points ... or else if I might continue ..., but I believe there are some points.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What? Yes, yes. Go ahead, talk. Yes.

A woman student: It's about the city and the State.

Deleuze: Ah, on the city and the State. We had indeed seen, I recall, that in these social formations, we had felt the need to distinguish the "city" form and the "State" form because it seemed very important to us historically to understand, for example, why capitalism had gone through the "State" form while the "city" form, in its beginnings, had given it so many chances and so many opportunities. [*Pause*] What's going on? And we had tried to distinguish the "city" form and the "State" form, whatever the competition between the two, whatever the way there was in which the "State" form would later overwhelm the "city" form. We tried to distinguish, here as well, two very different processes by defining the "city" form through the constitution of instruments of polarization within a network, any city referring to other cities, while the "State" form seemed to us to refer to some very, very different systems, systems of resonance that we had tried to… to distinguish precisely from instruments of polarization.[27] So, on this topic, did you want to add something?

The same student: Yes. Anyway, there is someone who has done work on Paris in particular and, from the 10th-11th century onward, and has been interested in seeing how Paris has resisted… er… well, the State, studying this up to 1980. So, I will just read you a page where he talks about Paris currently:

"The French villages did not want a train station, so they had to be built 2-3 kilometers from the church in the open fields. For a long time, there was no continuity in the construction (*tissu*) built between the old town center and its station. Then, little by little, around each station, the central zero began to secrete a rectilinear coagulation of foreign activities. This hiatus is still often noticeable; this is the story of the large number of Sainte-Emilie-Center and Sainte-Emilie-Gare that dot the French countryside. Paris has shown a similar reaction. The battle between the city and the State raged for fifty years and, in other forms, it has persisted until today ending and shutting itself down in the metropolitan rail node which is the process of being completed."

That is, in fact, he explains, afterwards, that the city of Paris had widths for the rails, finally the gauge was at 1 meter 30 and that the rail network gauge was at 1 meter 40, and that it's on this point that all the resistance occurred and up to the present. And he says that it is only now, that is, currently [*late 1979*], that the network of Les Halles has just connected the train system to the metro system, with the resistance ending; that is, what had started several centuries ago, but, by and large, particularly during the time of the French Revolution, that is, the struggle between Paris and the State, has now ended with the junction of the RER in Les Halles with the metro.

Deleuze: Yeah. Indeed, it would be very, very important ...

Student: It was published ...

Deleuze: … and I think they must be from the school of [Fernand] Braudel, right?… I was saying: it is really Braudel who, it seems to me, at least in France, launched this extremely deep study into the at once polemical and competitive relationships between the city and the State which really constitutes something fundamental in the history of Europe, right? Braudel is surely

correct in saying, in Asia, it did not happen like that because, in Asia, there is a subordination ..., in the history of Asia, there is a much more direct and fundamental subordination of the city to the “State” form. But, in Europe, there was a kind of wavering, right, and really, I believe for the birth of capitalism, it's a huge problem to wonder about, in fact, with all kinds of data, who outlined the formation of capitalism according to the “city” form.[28]

And, once again, I recalled this sentence by Braudel, because it seems to me very good, that he states: each time, there are two runners ... each time, there are two runners, and he says: it is the hare and the tortoise. And, of course, it’s this is the city that’s the hare, right? And it is the “State” form… the hare, it’s the “city” form, that is, it was at the highest speed and, for us, we can even add that we gives the word “speed” a very precise meaning. It is not at all a metaphor; it is really the speed of deterritorialization. There is a power of deterritorialization of the form… in the “city” form much greater than in the “State” form… uh… I was trying to say this the last time… because in the city, deterritorialization is truly dynamic, while State deterritorialization may not be less so, but it is static.

And we tell ourselves: but, in fact, what would capitalism have been and how did it take shape when it, and to the extent that it did, passes through the "city" form? What made it need the "State" form? Or what occurred to make it choose the "State" form? This will be very important for us to try to clarify this question. Here, I am saying immediately one of the hypotheses that I see, which seems to me to be one of the most important -- I do not know if I had stated it -- it is closely connected to a related topic, which we will also encounter, which we encountered last year, namely that, in any case, there is a need -- both for the “city” form and for the “State” form -- there is a need to appropriate, to capture a war machine.

And why am I saying that? Because at that point, maybe, everything just becomes a little bit clearer. It seems to me that this is one of the reasons -- I am not saying at all the only one -- but that the “city” form is not a good instrument for appropriating the war machine. That’s the "State" form, because it is the "State" form that can make the investments in so-called warfare "materiel". The “city” form has much less of this possibility. Once again, the “city” form, it’s not that it does not generate and does not have…, that it does not appropriate its war machine, but it essentially needs rapid wars, it needs rapid wars based on mercenaries. It is obvious that war or the appropriation of the war machine will be oriented toward entirely different paths, starting with national conscription, from the point of view of men, by material investment, from the point of view of capital, and that it is… that is perhaps one of the main reasons that capitalism went through the “State” form and did not limit itself to the “city” form, which implied that States… well, as Braudel says, that the hare… that, uh the… the tortoise catches up with the hare. The “State” form had to assert its size, its power apparatus -- which is not the same as that of the power of cities – the State apparatus had to wield this power apparatus over the cities. Hence, in fact, what the text you have just read confirms, the extraordinary mistrust both of cities in relation to the “State” form and of the “State” form in relation to cities.

The same student: Yes, finally, but that is especially related to circulation precisely. Because ... they ...

Deleuze: Yes. Yes. Completely, since cities, insofar as ... as they are instruments of polarization within a network, the city refers to another city or to other cities; it is essentially thought in terms of entrances and exits, essentially, while the State is not that. Of course, there is an entry and exit for the State; I am saying: this is not the main thing.

I want to say that, because, you understand, we will need to remember this point, that when we manage to define social formations by processes (processes of capture, processes of… anticipation-conjuration, etc.), we must see that these processes sometimes play out in a pure state ... I can say a primitive society, okay, or a gang -- it is already not the same thing -- but these are social formations in which really the anticipation process… uh… the anticipation-conjuration mechanism trumps all others. But that is a first point of view.

A second point of view, we must see how each formation not only envelops the preeminent process that corresponds to it, but adapts, adapts in its own way, the other processes. For example, you will also find anticipation-conjuration processes in cities, in the "city" formation, to ward off the state. You will also find anticipation-conjuration processes in capitalism to ward off the limits of capitalism.[29] So, if you will, each process plays a preferential role in a certain type of formation, but it can very well be taken up in a completely different formation. That's why it creates a social field where everything necessarily coexists. You follow? Well. Good. So, we'll continue.

Another student: I have a question about last week.

Deleuze: Yeah!

The student: When we were talking about the last word, the last drink, the last love ...

Deleuze: Yeah!

The student: Maybe we could add: last assemblage in Beckett for ...

Deleuze: The last assemblage in Beckett, yes, why not? We'll see where we can put "the last" in Beckett. Yes, there is a last love in ... which he weirdly calls first love, yes, there is all of that, yes. Good.[30]

The student: And then, for [D.H.] Lawrence, I think you said once that you even have to [*Inaudible*] love. You see?

Deleuze: Ah yes, this is quite simple, yes. What he means… It's not all that simple, right, but what Lawrence means when he says that, fine. Well, we'll talk about all that.

So good, this is a new topic we are tackling today. I'm just asking you to sense that these topics are very much a continuation of each other. Here, we find ourselves in the following situation: we tell ourselves that our task, today, should be to build even a very abstract model, an abstract model that we could call a "model of the primitive exchange". In the background, we are concerned that, nonetheless, among all these mechanisms that we spoke about the last time, the mechanism that we saw fit to call "anticipation-conjuration", both interests me, but it was still not left all that clear: what are these collective anticipations-conjurations? So, would a model of

primitive exchange allow us to move forward in this direction and, above all, would that allow us to strengthen our hypothesis of a coexistence of the most diverse social formations in a given field? And the basic conditions ... So, we're going to do it like that, uh ... if you will: we are proposing, let's say ... uh, I guess we are proposing to build this abstract model of primitive exchange.

At the point we find ourselves, we know what we cannot allow ourselves. What can't we allow ourselves? Uh! And what must we allow ourselves? Well then, by definition, we have to allow ourselves groups that are in a certain communication with each other and, in fact, -- I'm not going back over this -- we do not believe, it does not seem necessary for us to presuppose what is classically called the autarky of small primitive societies or their independence, or their incommunicability. One assumes that primitive groups can be entirely in relation with one another. Moreover, I assume that it's inevitable. It's inevitable because primitive formations already coexist with States, with apparatuses of Empire, that these apparatuses of Empire imply and put the primitive groups into communication with each other, so we have every reason to think that there are expressions of primitive exchange and not independent groups.

Moreover, I tell myself: there is communication between foreign groups as soon as there is, not even writing (writing, that would refer to the State apparatus, to the apparatus of Empire), but as soon as there is speech, as soon as there is language… uh… Something makes us anticipate that, in the end, language, I understand this to include oral language; it does not exist simply for those who speak the same language. I would even say more that language only exists to the extent that there are already contacts between people who do not speak the same language. I mean: language is inseparable from a function of translating languages and not from a function of communication within one and the same language. Anyway, all that…, we offer ourselves this minimum: primitive groups in relation to each other.

But there are things you cannot allow yourself. What is it? If we assume that there are primitive exchanges, we cannot allow ourselves, first, the coexistence of a stockpile. I am stating the conditions of the problem to me, right? I would have no problem with some of you saying: ah well no, the problem for me is otherwise. Me, I am stating how it occurs for me. I cannot allow myself the pre-existence of a stockpile for a very simple reason, which is what we saw the last few times -- I won't go back over this -- that, far from the stockpile presupposing a surplus, it was the stockpile which constituted the surplus, and the stock was an act of the State apparatus.

So, if I'm looking for an expression for primitive exchanges that coexist -- let's understand this well, which coexist with State apparatuses, but which do not constitute State apparatuses, since they will both anticipate and ward off, you remember, State apparatuses -- I cannot assume that primitive exchange implies a stockpile. At the most, I can say that it implies an elasticity of supply and demand. That's enough for me, yes. There is a certain elasticity of supply and demand, that is, sometimes they eat more, sometimes they eat less, good, so they can exchange food, etc., but I'm not demanding any ... any pre-existing stockpile. I'm just asking for some evidence (*données*) of… say -- I'm using a common political economy term -- elasticity of supply and demand. So, about primitive exchange, I am saying: impossible to allow oneself a stockpile for [*inaudible word*] expresses it.

Second thing: impossible to allow yourself a balance or a monetary equivalent (or of another type) for the same reason. Once again, these primitive formations coexist with the State apparatus but involve other processes. Now, we have seen that, no less than the stockpile was an act of the State apparatus, the market, currency, are acts of the State apparatus. And, in this sense, we have already questioned without yet sufficiently justifying it, we have questioned the idea that money can find an origin in trade, that is, in generalized forms of exchange, in order to say: no, in any case, if there is an origin of money, it is on the side of taxation, that is, of a fundamental State act, which we have to research. So, no way to provide yourself: balance, equivalent or market, or the existence of a market.

Finally, third: no question either of allowing oneself the hypothesis of an intervention, in the primitive exchange, of a labor or of a labor-time, of a necessary form of labor or of a socially necessary labor-time for the production of the objects exchanged. Why? Because, there too, last year we had already developed this, but we will have to discover it again under another aspect, this idea, for a very simple reason: it's that these so-called primitive formations do not work under the regime of labor which is a very special regime of activity. Last year, we tried to clarify this. For lack of anything better, we had found the expression of "continuous action" or "activity in continuous variation" which we opposed to the activity of the labor type.

But, in fact, it seemed to us and it will be better ... it will be better to explain it, perhaps today, it seemed to us that, in any case, that labor was not a naturally determined activity, but was a very special determination of activity, a model to which one subjected activity, and this "one" seemed to us once again the State apparatus, namely, it is the State apparatus that subjects activity to the "labor" model. So, there is no question of invoking a labor-time that would serve as a possible comparison criterion between exchange ... between objects exchanged at the level of a so-called primitive exchange.

So, you see, I am continuing my completely abstract hypothesis. And so there arose, to help us, a hypothesis which I must say right away, it is curious that it occurs to us here. I was saying, well yes, there are economists who have said: value cannot be explained either by labor or the labor-time necessary for the production of the object, nor by the utility of the object… -- so you see they are opposed both to use-value and labor-value -- and they state this mysterious expression: value refers to the utility of the last object.

So, I say right away: what is curious is that this thesis -- the last object being the marginal object -- is well known in political economy under the name of "marginalism" or "neoclassicism". and that this theory had and still retains a fundamental importance.[31] I am saying that it was obviously designed to take account of capitalism and capitalist market. But theories have adventures… like… like everything. It would not be improbable that, for example, a theory invented for a particular sector to account for certain phenomena of the capitalist market, notably of the balance of prices under a capitalist regime, shifts direction and is discovered to have a field of application in non-capitalist formations. So, we can always ask this question: does the marginal object, the idea of the last object, not find a ... a very curious application in so-called primitive formations? Won't that help us? That's my question, in our hypothesis.

I'm quoting a ... text from a textbook, not at all by a great economist, from a textbook that explains marginalism. I will read slowly, ok? It's a question ... this time, it's a question of labor and productivity, not about the product; it is a question of the productivity of labor and the worker. And this is what the author says: "Let it be a sheep farmer ..." -- see, it's quite simple, the example must be very clear, right? -- "Let it be a sheep farmer who wonders if his team of shepherds is sufficient. He can see that if he hired one more shepherd (without making any change in his tools or in his constructions)" -- he puts that in parentheses; I'm emphasizing it, right, emphasizing it for the future, for my future. – Take a close look at the conditions: you have the entrepreneur, right, the entrepreneur-breeder who tells himself: do I have enough shepherds? This is the question. And he tells himself: maybe I could hire, that is, pay one more shepherd without making any change in my tools or in my constructions. We should add: neither in my lands -- you are aware that a sheep is so many… I don't know, a cow is an acre, a sheep is…, I don't know ... uh ... but the land area is also supposed to stay the same. – So, without making any changes, can he take on one more shepherd? This is a question that all ... To understand, you have to put yourself ... uh ... all that we will have to say, later, about capitalism, you always have to put yourself in the place of a boss. So ... there you go, the sheep boss, ok? Do I hire one more person, once it's said that this is a matter of not changing anything in your business?

Sense that we already have something. I would really like to go slowly today and have you follow me… very closely and… uh…. A notion of threshold begins to emerge. All bosses know that; all bosses say that. There is even a famous rule which is something like the rule of fifty. There is always a threshold in a business. Bosses know very well that, beyond a certain threshold, the structure of the company must be changed. For example, there is a threshold at which if you hire one more person, you, as the boss, have a labor council on your back. You will tell me: this does not matter, it's okay ... Yes, no, uh ... Fine ... uh ... There are also thresholds in which the accounting can no longer be done the same way. You have to change, I would say… [*He does not complete this*] There are thresholds beyond which the whole assemblage has to change. So, notice that my sheep boss, there, he is asking himself: can I hire one more shepherd without changing my assemblage, that is, without increasing my property, without changing the constructions, etc.? See the problem?

I'll continue. "He can see that if he hired one more shepherd without making any change, the flock would be better looked after, the number of lambs could be increased, and they would be able" - that is, he would -- "he would in this way be able to send twenty more sheep to market every year." Let us suppose he realizes this: without changing the assemblage of my business, if I hire one more guy, I can have twenty more little lambs to send to the market. You see, right? You follow me? If you don't understand, you won't understand the other examples ... it's not ... So up to this point, it's okay.

"The net product", the net product "of this additional shepherd's labor will therefore be in the quantity of twenty sheep". And, right, since with the additional shepherd, the guy, without changing anything, can have twenty more little sheep, the net product of this shepherd's labor will therefore be, in quantity, twenty sheep, and in value, and in value, what the price these twenty sheep will be worth at market. This is all crystal clear. "If the breeder can hire the

additional shepherd for a salary that is somewhat lower" -- that is, a somewhat lower than the price of twenty, the price of twenty sheep minus x -- "If the breeder can hire the additional shepherd for a lower price, a salary even slightly lower than the price of the twenty sheep, he will. Otherwise, he will refrain from hiring him." These are… these are basic rules for a business operation.

"This shepherd we're about to hire ..." -- You see, right? -- "This shepherd we're about to hire ..." It starts ... the text starts to get interesting here, right? There, in the boss's head, he is evaluating. He's evaluating: can I hire a guy? Is he going ... uh ... is he going to earn twenty sheep for me? Can I pay him a little less or a lot less than the price of the twenty sheep at the market rate? -- "This shepherd that we are about to hire is the marginal shepherd, he is the borderline (*limite*) shepherd." Notice why he is marginal or borderline: because, if this last shepherd is hired, and if we hired another shepherd ... another shepherd after the first one, then the assemblage would have to change. This is why the parenthesis is essential. This is the borderline shepherd, given the assemblage being considered. The guy can always hire more shepherds; at that point, he will need new land, new constructions; he will have to change the nature of his operating assemblage, the nature of the business. So, understand, here we are at a last shepherd in the sense of: the last one before the assemblage is forced to change, the last one before the assemblage is forced to change. This will be called "the marginal" or "the borderline object" or "the borderline character". -- Fine, is this OK? You stop me, huh, if this isn't working -- He will receive a salary approximately equal to the net value he adds to the total product, that is, less than the twenty sheep he brings in, less to a determined extent. [*Pause*] Uuuhh, there you go.

But if we assume that all the shepherds in the operation, this one, the marginal shepherd -- this is a beautiful notion, the marginal shepherd, the morning shepherd, it's curious, that ... [*He does not finish this*] Okay then, uh, this must already, you sense that we are going to come, that we are going to come back to our problems that I mentioned the last time, more concrete ones there: the café, the last drink. But I tell myself, the worker of the last hour, we will ... we will have to go and see, will have to return to this parable, there, of the worker of the last hour and see if, not at all if this is marginalism -- that's not how we work -- but if there is a way to make, not at all an assimilation between a text uh ... of the New Testament and a text of political economy, that would be of no interest, but if we cannot jump from one to the other, to create ruptures that will enrich this notion of "last" ... --

But finally, there you have it. If we assume that all the shepherds of the operation, this one and those who had been hired previously -- that is, the whole series, the whole series of successively hired shepherds all the way to the marginal shepherd -- if we assume that all the shepherds of the operation, that one and those who had been hired previously, are interchangeable, that is, if we do not allow ourselves the hypothesis of a magic shepherd (*berger génie*), if they are interchangeable, we must think that all will necessarily receive the same salary. Notice what this means: if you've understood this phrase "everyone will necessarily get the same salary", that's great. He's telling us ... And by what right can he tell us that? He is telling us: The salary of previously hired shepherds depends on the evaluation of the salary of the marginal shepherd.

So, you will tell me: but the marginal shepherd is not yet hired. Obviously, he's not yet hired. Across the entire series, the entire series is determined by the businessman's evaluation of the marginal shepherd's salary. And the salary of the shepherds, of the previous shepherds, across the whole series, will be determined by the salary of the last of the possible shepherds. Once again, how can I say [*Deleuze coughs and chokes*] "the last possible object"? I can say this because I am calling "the last possible object" ..., uh, no, "the last possible shepherd", the last shepherd before the assemblage is forced to change. One more shepherd, besides the last shepherd, the assemblage is no longer possible; another assemblage is required. Therefore, it is the evaluation of the marginal shepherd's salary that determines the salary for all existing shepherds. Do you understand? Fine.

It's no wonder that it was the English who had these ideas; it's very, very ... it's very ... it's very funny. And, therefore, this author who only summarizes the marginalist theses can conclude, this is what interests me: "the productivity of the marginal worker ..." -- namely his power over twenty little sheep -- "the productivity of the marginal worker thus determines not only that worker's wages" -- quite simply - "but that of all the others." Fine. There, we chose the problem of productivity and wages. And he adds in brackets: "In the same way that, when it was a question of commodities ..." -- and undoubtedly, at the level of the commodities, this is even clearer; I therefore chose a more difficult case, so, if you understand it, you understand this all the more for commodities. "In the same way that, when it was a question of commodities, the utility of the last bucket of water ...", "the utility of the last bucket of water or the last sack of wheat governed the value not only of that bucket or that sack but of all the other buckets or all the other sacks making up the stockpile." We'll cross out the last bit: "making up the stockpile" [*inaudible word*], since it doesn't fit, it doesn't change a thing. "The value of all buckets of water and of all sacks of wheat is governed by the marginal object, that is, by the determining value of the last bucket of water and the last sack of wheat."[32]

You will tell me: in that case, we vaguely understood what "the last" was in the case of the shepherd, but we understand more, perhaps, in the case of the bucket of water and ... [*Deleuze does not finish*] Well, if we have already understood about the shepherd and we see that the marginalists began by undertaking their analysis not at the level of productivity and labor, but at the level of the commodity, so it's the utility of the last object that determines the value of the whole series -- that's it, if I sum up, right? It's the utility of the last object that will determine the value of the whole series and of each term in the series. If we say that, we tell ourselves: well, we've got hold, we've got hold of a start.

What can…? And, in fact, we have a break, and so, we tell ourselves, we have to catch our ... breath; let's forget, let's forget about marginalism, or let's pretend to forget it. And we say: the topic, this marginal thing, is really odd. The last one determines the value of the whole series. What can I say about that? That, in fact, it needs to be corrected: it's the *idea* of the last one. The idea of the last one determines the value of the whole real series, of the whole series of real terms. Why? Because we saw it quite well, and there it was clear in the example of the shepherd. It is not when the last shepherd, the marginal shepherd, is actually hired that he will become a determining factor of the salary, it is the salary of all the previous shepherds actually hired which

is determined by the idea of the marginal shepherd's productivity, that is, of the last shepherd that can be hired without causing the assemblage to change.

In other words, there we already have something that matters to me enormously, it is… I will then formulate my hypothesis more precisely: there would be collective evaluations… -- we are in the middle of the social field, in the middle of… in the midst of collective formation -- there would be collective evaluations which would be of an anticipatory nature. What would they anticipate? They would anticipate the limit. -- There we… we… we progress suddenly; we progress in leaps and bounds, even if it's abstract. -- They anticipate the limit. They anticipate the number of terms necessary to reach this limit, and they anticipate the time taken to reach this limit. Fine. [*Pause*]

Why is this collective evaluation anticipatory? After all, it is a philosophical subject that matters to you; well, even from the point of view of the history of philosophy, I am quoting for the record a very beautiful text by Kant that some of you know, on the anticipations of perception. And, in this text, Kant tries to show that perception has a structure such that it comprises at least ... – perception being entirely related to experience, one perceives only something which is given in experience, otherwise we imagine (*on conçoit*), we do not perceive -- well, that there is nevertheless a given that Kant calls a priori, that is, independent of experience, which intervenes in perception, only one. And it is this datum that constitutes the anticipation of perception. And this datum is that whatever it is, perception necessarily has a quantity, an intensive magnitude. Fine.

I am saying: maybe we encounter, on a whole different level, but maybe that… that, there too, the intersection will be created between this problem of anticipation in judgment… and, there, we grasp onto, really under a completely different aspect, we grasp onto a problem of anticipation in collective evaluation. And we say: collective evaluation is… -- and at that point, we will call it, even if it means then saying "oh no, we were wrong, that was only one case; there are other collective evaluations ..." -- but for the moment, I can say: I will call "collective evaluation" an evaluation which bears on the idea of a last object, of the marginal object, and therefore, on the number of terms in the series in order to arrive at this last object and the time necessary to arrive there. You see?

Why does that interest me? That interests me enormously since the other years, uh… I would find something like a confirmation there, but which, in previous years, I could not think through since… [*Deleuze does not finish*] In previous years, for example, we have not ceased to return constantly to the notion of assemblage, very often. And I was trying to say: the assemblage, an assemblage, which seems to me better than the notion of behavior – in the end, we assemble (*on agence*), we do not behave --, and well… it is very different, as a notion, at the same time, and well, I was trying to say: an assemblage always has two sides. It has like, very roughly, it has one side, and these two sides, one does not depend on the other; they are in reciprocal presupposition. Fine, every assemblage has a physical aspect or even, one should say, to harden the word, physicalist aspect, and it has a semiotic or semiological aspect. That is, it is both a machinic assemblage and an assemblage of enunciation. Why am I going through this parenthesis? Because, there, I have a very ... [*He does not finish*] And these two aspects are not at all

symmetrical, they do not correspond at all term to term. In any assemblage, you will find a system of wording and statements, and you will find a system of things and mixing of things.[33]

And there, in the primitive assemblage, where ... that I'm dealing with right now, what do I find? I indeed find the aspect, how to say, a physical, physicalist "thing" (*'chose' physique, physicale*) namely the series of men, shepherds, or objects ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 20]

**Part 2**

In this case, what would I call the "speaking system (*système d'énonciation*) of the assemblage"? Precisely the aggregate of collective evaluations bearing on the ... idea of the last object. And don't wait for the last object to be there. You do not wait…. The boss does not wait to hire the last possible shepherd so that his evaluation of the last shepherd's productivity determines the actual wages of all the actual shepherds. Right? Fine. Well, this is it, this is the collective evaluation. [*Pause*]

And there, I am indeed bringing up a problem. What problem am I bringing up? Because, compared to the outline of the theory of labor-value, here I ... this will become more concrete in a little while, ok? ... You have to put up with me ... You have to ... Compared to the theory of labor-value, notice that there is a common problem with which political economy -- and this is even what makes it interesting in my opinion from the point of view of a theory of statements or a theory of utterance -- political economy inevitably encounters this problem, whatever its conception of value might be, namely: how is the evaluation of the means of exchange or the criterion of exchange established? There has to be a *collective* assessment. I would say that a fundamental and insufficiently outlined chapter of political economy is: whatever school to which one refers, it is that it [the school] necessarily includes a theory of collective evaluations which I would also call "a theory of the anticipation of social perceptions".

Fine. Uh ... So that would work just fine, because in fact, the advocates of labor-value, what are they telling us? They assume that the means of exchange for objects refer to the so-called socially necessary labor-time to produce objects. You see, this is an extremely clear thesis. Once again, there, to credit ... to credit Marx with this thesis is nonsense, not that Marx does not accept it, but Marx does not claim to invent it; on the contrary, it is the most classic old theory of classical political economy. Marx's innovation is quite profound, but, precisely, it is not there, right? Good.

We are told: if there is therefore an exchange of objects, it is because there is indeed a way to compare the objects exchanged, you see, in the theory of labor-value. And this way to compare the objects exchanged is to compare the socially necessary labor-time for the production of object A and object B. I assume that object A takes double the time; it will be worth two objects B. Okay, very simple. You see that the theory of labor-value nonetheless implies …, we do not assume that these societies have, for example, systems or even a state of labor which is mechanized labor. [*Pause*] Now, if we do not assume a so-called scientific, pseudo-scientific mechanization and quantification of labor, the socially necessary working time immediately implies and refers to a collective evaluation of both the worker and the entrepreneur and the

collectivity itself. Ah yes, that takes ... Uh ... you use ... with a steel ax ... uh ... they are not going to take measurements anyway ... With a steel ax, you do twice as much ... or three times more work than with an iron ax ... This is a collective evaluation which relates to labor-time. It assumes the labor regime. Fine.

For reasons that we have seen and others that we will see – once again, I cannot say everything at the same time -- we have deprived ourselves of this possibility in the case of so-called primitive exchanges, that we called by convention primitives, since we are saying: in this, there is no socially necessary labor-time since the activity there is in continuous variation, therefore there is absolutely nothing that corresponds to labor-time. However… However, here I am quoting for the record, so that…, out of a concern…, of course, I know that there are certain ethnologists who have tried to apply criteria, even very quantitative criteria, of labor-time to primitive societies. It's very odd that even those say that it has no correspondence in the group consciousness, that it has no equivalent. We can always apply it, but ... Fine, I am thinking of an Australian who developed much of this kind of research, saying: well yes, but… it does indeed work; it works, it is true, but there it is, it does not matter. For reasons that I have tried to state or suggest, we cannot think that collective evaluation has a bearing on labor-time.

Moreover, one of the most developed texts in this respect is found in Engels, in Engels, the preface that Engels wrote for Book III of *Capital*, Book III of *Capital*, which is not published by Marx himself, is published by Engels, and Engels appends a preface to it. And, in this preface, is, I believe, one of the most precise texts in which Engels says: once it's given, once labor-value is stated, how in a very primitive society can the evaluation of labor-time occur since he is an advocate of a labor-value theory? And his answer states that, well yes, there is a kind of collective evaluation in the mode of anticipation… -- this is a very curious text; well, those who are interested, you will look it up; I will pass it around at the end of the session -- he adds: otherwise, those involved in exchange would not meet their expenses. Grant me… uh… I'm sure you've understood all this, why should that last sentence, "otherwise, those involved in exchange would not meet their expenses" put us into a state of joy that I am not adequately expressing? [*Laughter*] That's because, maybe, you will surely feel this, but it comes close to something, specifically he is in the process of reintroducing a marginalist criterion.

If we try to comment on "otherwise, those involved in exchange would not meet their expenses", how can we define the cost recovery independently from the reference to any other type of evaluation? Won't the respective assessment of costs not allude ...? [*He does not complete this*] In any case, notice in what state we find ourselves: we are saying, in certain cases, namely where there is no State apparatus, in so-called primitive groups, we made a big leap; we were right to talk about an anticipation mechanism, because it works, in fact, in the form of anticipation. There is an anticipatory collective evaluation. And we specify: what does this anticipatory collective evaluation consist of? And we answer: this anticipatory collective evaluation consists in this, that it anticipates the limiting idea of the last object or of the last producer and fixes the value of all the terms of the series and the time necessary to exhaust the series -- implied without the assemblage changing -- and fixes it according to the idea of the last object.

So, we answer, no! Not necessary! The collective assessment does not have to have a bearing on labor-time. Collective evaluation may well have a bearing on the idea of the limit object or marginal object. You see? Confirmation, like the confirmation of rest. -- I am sensing that, in a little while, we are going to take a break because ... You tell me if you can take more because ... I mean, that bothers me ... For me, I find this fun… Fine, this, this puts me in a great state of joy, but for you, it is not necessarily the same thing. Uh ... And sometimes we can talk about things that bore me fully and that are fun for you, you never know. That's how we should distribute UVs [*academic credits*]; I'd ask "who's having fun with this?" Anyone who would say that they're having fun, well ... [*Laughter*]

A student: [*Inaudible*] … accelerate growth without changing the structure.

Deleuze: That's it, that's it, that's it. of course. I'll summarize what he's saying, ok?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Absolutely, absolutely, the bottom lines are completely ... Yes, yes, he's pointing out that, in fact, in any company, precisely what is called accounting operations and. in particular, the exercise of the balance sheet, the preparation of the balance sheet precisely relies on this whole system which implies and which is always created as a function of a threshold beyond which the entire company would have to change its structure, in particular the global payroll, I suppose, what we call the global payroll. Here I think there is someone here who would in any case be much more knowledgeable than me to talk about this, uh…. There we are.

The student: What's important is that [*Inaudible*] in general accountancy [*Inaudible*] to accelerate growth without increasing costs.

Deleuze: Yes, of course! Without changing, it's not so much to increase costs, it's worse than to increasing costs ...

The student: It's time [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That's it.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You are right. You are all the more correct since the importance here, indeed, of this accounting, in fact, causes the factor of duration to intervene. There is the factor of numbers of elements, the numbers of elements in the series; what we are doing is ... this is a theory of ... of what we could call serial groups, but we would call that precisely, borrowing the expression from Sartre, but giving it a completely different meaning. These are serial groups and serial operations that cause a number of terms of the series to intervene, the limit object, idea of the limit object, and time required to [do something]. And, in fact, he is right to insist on the temporal factor in accounting, to the point that one would imagine a thesis: the idea of time in accounting, there yes, that would be a beautiful thesis ... It would, right? I think so, right? Uh ... Certainly ..., but finally ... what would have a lot to say would have nothing to say, but that, it's true. Have you studied any accounting?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You know what you're going to do, right? [*Laughter*] Well, what? This is ... Uh ... Would you be ready [to present], here?

The student: Sure.

Deleuze: Would you be ready right away? That's going to be great; I'm going to continue presenting my concrete examples. If you even like to go next door to think a little bit, how just to explain to us… -- because, there, that would interest me greatly -- to explain to us in about fifteen minutes, I'll have someone find you… [*Laughter*] You could explain to us, precisely, the time factor in accountancy, in business accounting. Could you do that?

The student: Yes, I can ...

Deleuze: Can you? So...

The student: Not right away; it would be better that way; I ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: In my opinion, this is where you are inspired, this is where you [*Inaudible words*] [*Laughter*] So precisely, or you cover your ears, you cover your ears, eh, you just don't listen, you ... re ... Or you go outside and ... uh ... so ... just to give yourself the time [to prepare].

So, we'll forget that, ok, because it's ... it's just a thing ... I am saying, there's a second point. Here, my first point was, you see, this collective evaluation which is, from the beginning, ah yes, I am emphasizing this, because ... there is, for those who would like to extend this then in a philosophical direction… you see the extent to which it is… -- this is good, we have an accounting direction thanks to him -- I was thinking of a philosophical direction; we would have to start again. Those who know Kant, Kant's text, in my opinion, is completely wrong [*inaudible word*] anticipation. In fact, if there is an intensive quantity of perception, that's because social perception is fundamentally serial and works as a function of the limit object… uh… but… So, it is for another reason than the one that he believes ... Uh ... No, one shouldn't say that: Kant is never wrong, he guessed all that [*inaudible words*] ...

So, understand me ... What did I mean ...? Yes, there is… All marginalism has a completely crazy theory because they're all crazy, really, all of them… uh… completely crazy; this is precisely the theory of evaluation and trial and error. And you see that, in a way, if we pursue this, it becomes quite funny since, here, the opposition between the proponents of labor-value and the marginalists takes on a very, very concrete meaning. They both agree, once again, in saying: there is a need ..., nothing would happen in the social field, neither productivity, nor exchange of products, if there were no anticipatory mechanisms of collective evaluation.

Good, that interests me a lot; it's not about planning, it's not about ... It's much more about concrete things, much more general stuff in societies. Simply, the difference is that the advocates of labor-value tell us: collective evaluation has a bearing on socially necessary labor-time. The marginalists tell us: that's not it at all! So, we are right to follow the marginalists on…, in certain cases. I am saying: if it is true that, in certain cases, in certain social formations, you find yourself faced with an activity regime of the "continuous variation" type and not at all of the

“labor” type, there is no collective evaluation of labor-time. And yet there is a collective evaluation which will govern trading. Trading is still possible, because at that point, you have a collective evaluation having a bearing on the idea of the limit object or the last object. But, once again, this idea is there from the start of the series. In other words, it is an anticipatory evaluation of the time required to reach the limit object of the series. But this evaluation occurs from the first term of the series, it occurs from the beginning. In other words, it is much faster than the time required to "get to," to the last term of the series. Moreover, it is necessarily faster than the time required to go from term 1 to term 2 of the series.

Hence a very, very curious notion that some marginalists develop in what they call their theory of evaluation or of trial and error. They developed the notion of infinite speed of adjustment, the infinite speed of adjustment. So there, they conceive it…, they fight among themselves, because there are several ways of conceiving of the infinite speed of adjustment, either in a single operation, er…, it is a really differential operation in the sense of differential calculus. But it can already be conceived in the form of a kind of integration of differentials; that is, there would be several operations which would occur in an extremely rapid time, there would be an op… a summation of these operations; or there would be only one operation, well…, This is very important…, This would be very… And they develop diagrams, then, pseudo-mathematical ones very, very, very…, very creative, very interesting, very funny ...

The previous student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That's it, that's it. That's it. And now, so, no doubt, with uh ... with everything we've done ... what's that called? Uh… the terminal, with the distances of the… factors… of the terminal factor, there would be equivalences of infinite speeds of adjustment. The stock market currently must function... well ... he ... he will be saying that later. See what horizons that opens up for us. [*Laughter*]

So, the time of ... I am saying: a second point. And, there, we have a first point which, already, opens lots of research for us on ... Second point, and well, it seems obvious to me that, in all this, it seems that we are playing ... -- and, if you have something that you did not quite understand, it is only for this reason, it is not your fault -- we are playing on the word “last” and that, in fact, there are two of them, two “lasts”. The “last” has two very, very different meanings. There we are.

So, suddenly, I'm going back to my example, because it's obvious ... let's forget about the marginalists before going back to it. In that way, we will have three points, right? These will be... We created, little a, we start, little b, we forget everything. And I go back to my seemingly simple examples like that, but not easier than anything else. I mean…, I was saying: let's take the word “last” literally. What is the last drink? At the cafe, it's an assemblage. The “men at the cafe” assemblage. What time is it?

A student: Twenty-five to twelve.

Deleuze: Twenty-five to twelve already? Uh ... well, men at the cafe, this is an assemblage. Or else, I said: a domestic drama, at first glance, that seems an event, in that way. No, it is an

assemblage, to see the way in which, in certain households, it is repeated, and it fulfills a very specific social function. We have a fight, right; if we don't have our fight, something is wrong. So, I am saying, at that point, it's even more of a habit, really, it's truly a functional assemblage. I will stick to these two examples; we can multiply them. Either ... Either I am quoting for the record, because I ... I would very much need it later, the last violence. Okay, I've got: the last drink in the cafe assemblage. See, I am looking for examples, but you should find others, but in other areas. The last drink in the café assemblage, the last word in the domestic drama…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The last bonus trick in belote, in a game, yes, there, that's a very complex case, yes ... And then ... uh ... the last violence, which we will leave aside, it's later on that we'll need it.

Well then, well then ... I'll say right away: what's going on? When the men are at the cafe -- I'm trying to recount ... to tell the uh ... common story, a common story -- they're at the cafe. Each of them asks uh… he orders, uh… a drink. There are four of them, let's say. [*Pause*] Okay, I am saying, don't you get a sense that there is something strange? I assume that this very marginalist, that, in fact, the number of terms, that is, the number of drinks and the length of time they stay at the cafe, of course, is subject to all kinds of factors: the need to get home not too late, right?… uh… economic constraints, money… fine, whatever you want… But among all these factors, is there not one series of marginalist type, namely that the value of all drinks is determined by the idea of the marginal drink, the last drink, so much so that it's in order to reach -- like in a finalized series - it's in order to reach the last one that all the others are drunk?

What does it mean? [*Laughter*] So, why don't they start with the last one? [*Laughter*] That's absurd, because not only can they not start with the last one, but they cannot even hurry along the time which is the object of a collective evaluation. And whoever wants to hurry along the time will be laughed at. Likewise -- to say how good people are and are not alcoholics no matter what some say --- the one who wants to lengthen their time excessively will be despised and treated like an alcoholic. There is a kind of collective evaluation, fine; there, we have a number of drinks which is often distributed according to the number of people, that is, each one has his round. And, I am saying: the value of each drink is determined by the idea of the limit object, that is, the marginal glass.

And what does "the last drink" mean? What meaning do we give to: "Come on, the last drink" ... all that? Here too, these are problems of collective evaluation. The last drink is the last one before [*Pause*] the assemblage is forced to change. If you go past that limit, it can no longer be the same assemblage. What does that mean? If we go past that limit, then there is still another last one then, there is a last one after the last one, again, there is a last one after the last one. The last one after the last one is the one that would involve a different assemblage.

What other assemblage in this specific case? I can imagine several. Let's start over. Let's start again to be clear. So, the marginal last one, the one that marks the limit ..., what does that mean, the limit? It means everyone has had enough. It means, we stop drinking, finished, right? This society, this social formation there, the guys in the cafe… well, that's it for today. What does that mean? "See you tomorrow, see you guys tomorrow." What does that mean? Literally, to go

faster, I am saying: you have to recover, right, you have to stop drinking to be able to drink again. You have to stop drinking to be able to drink again, that marks what? It marks the necessary break between two sets of the same assemblage. It marks the necessary break between two exercises of assemblage. -- I hope in accountancy, he has found us [*inaudible words*] to match. -- The necessary break between two exercises of the same assemblage and marked by the marginal object.

Good. So up to there, it's fine. I would add: this is why ... this is why, in a way, you recognize alcoholism in that alcoholics are people who keep continuously stop drinking, right?[34] [*Laughter*] These are not people who drink all the time. Just as you only encounter drug addicts in the process of detoxification, you only meet alcoholics who are stopping their drinking. The "I'm quitting my drinking, quitting my drinking" is strictly a part of alcoholism. You will tell me: what isn't a part of it? We'll see. So, good. So, these are series that are like so many assemblage exercises, the assemblage remaining the same and, each time, the marginal object arrive at the end.

You will tell me: but the marginal object of each series can change. Yes, there are phenomena in the history of the speed of adjustment; there may be an intensification of the marginal object within the same assemblage, but see if, on the sly, already, the assemblage is not in the process of changing. From here, I turn to the other aspect of my problem: what would the change of assemblage be? I can say just anything. There is a threshold; and here as well, alcoholics are… they're not idiots, eh, they're very, very… very sensitive to thresholds. In this way, I am saying: fine, a threshold… where they only have a feeling that… they might not survive (*tenir*). We would have to jump into another assemblage. What then? Or else, to change the nature of the drinks, we also see that in the collective evaluation of drugs. A threshold is reached, and we say to ourselves: ah, we're going to have to change the assemblage, the "drug" assemblage; we're going to have to move on from grass to something else. It happens. It is indeed a problem of evaluating thresholds and limits. And then ... or else, to change the nature of the drinks or change the assemblage, that is, the composition of the assemblage: not the nature of the drinks, but the people with whom you drink. They won't be able to be the same anymore; we'll have to change the assemblage, we'll spend it with real alcoholics, we won't spend it… it won't be with friends after work, it will be something else. Fine. Here as well, there is a kind of evaluation.

Or else, we feel quite well: ah well, if… if I go too far, there, it's… I still am risking something, it's… this will be a particularly terrible assemblage, it will be the hospital assemblage, the "hospital" assemblage. This is an assemblage, the "hospital" assemblage, it is an assemblage. I am saying that, there, we will have reached the threshold because the limit will have been crossed. Having crossed the limit defined by the marginal object, it is necessary to change the assemblage in one way or another, by inventing another… another "alcohol" assemblage or else by entering into a "hospital" assemblage … -- I don't mean that this is necessarily a "hospital" assemblage … -- or else, or else, or else… depending on the inventiveness of the assemblage, there are so many assemblages.[35]

Likewise, with my story of ... I can say ... so, I can go really fast here, because this is exactly the same in my story of a domestic drama. The domestic drama works, right, like an assemblage. It

works through series. Each series or each exercise of assemblage, I would say, is strictly determined by the collective evaluation, that is, the oddly common, vaguely common evaluation that both partners make, if the assemblage is a couple -- therefore, the collective evaluation is the assemblage of the two partners -- that the two partners make concerning what? The idea of the last word, the idea of the last word, the marginal word, the limit word. It may not always be the same, but it would be defined by a certain weight or a certain color. Fine. There is also a collective evaluation of how long it takes to get to that word and what other words through which one has to pass. I would say: the value of the other words and the value of time ... [*Pause*] and the amount of time it takes to reach, ... etc., is determined by the collective evaluation of the marginal word. It is the limit object, in this case.

Suppose they go beyond it [the word]: here, something has gone wrong. All of a sudden, there's one of the two saying something they shouldn't. We can imagine it; this happens all the time in domestic dramas. Once again, when you're the bewildered spectator, you're like, "Well look out, they can't go any farther than that". [*Laughter*]. And then there is one of them who suddenly speaks a word that, to you, seems quite restrained, and that is the one that is not acceptable. It has gone past the limit. It has gone past the ... Yeah. It went past ..., precisely, it left behind the kind of agreement implied by collective evaluation. At that point, the whole assemblage changes, namely, we enter the "divorce" assemblage, the "separation" assemblage, this is another assemblage. It's no longer the couple assemblage; it's another assemblage, right?

Good, so what am I saying? I'm saying that "last" in the sense of marginal, does not mean "ultimate"; it actually means "second to last", since in fact, the last in the sense of "ultimate" is the one starting from which the assemblage is forced to change. "Last" in the sense of "ultimate" or the one starting from which the assemblage is forced to change, this is what I will call "the threshold". So why not reserve the word "last" for that one? We're indeed forced to reserve the word "last" for that one since it is the first. It's the first of the other assemblage. Good.

On the other hand, the last in the sense of limit and no longer threshold, no longer "threshold of new assemblage", but "limit of the previous assemblage", the last in the sense of limit, this is the marginal object. This is the second to last. French has a word that comes from Latin and which clearly distinguishes the second to last or the last in the sense of second to last, from the ultimate, it is the word "penultimate". Penultimate is literally the almost last, or the last before the last. The marginal object is the penultimate or the limit. Beyond the marginal object, there is something else, the threshold once again. Beyond the limit object, there is the threshold starting from which another assemblage begins.

Hence, I can answer the question: in such a formation, what is anticipated, what is warded off? What are these anticipation-conjuration mechanisms that I attached so much importance to the last time? The answer now becomes, it seems to me, crystal clear, uh… water, uh… obvious: in the collective evaluation, what is anticipated is fundamentally the limit; what is warded off is fundamentally the threshold. [*Pause*] And the collective evaluation indissolubly unites anticipation and conjuration, and cannot anticipate the limit without conjuring the threshold, nor conjure the threshold without anticipating the limit.

Hence: how does it work ... -- I have only to apply this, and I have finished my problem anyway. Uh… -- Let's suppose, then, an abstract mode -- I really insist on abstract – abstract mode of primitive exchange. This is what is happening. I take two groups, a group of pickers, who collect wild seeds. Do you remember? I am sticking to my conditions, right, I'm not giving myself a farmer's group. For I don't know if you sense this: farming is incapable of fitting into these series outlines. If you sense that, you've understood everything. Why can't farming fit into these serial outlines, why does it necessarily refer to a State apparatus? We will see that much later, later, but you must already feel it.

So, in any case, I'm not reflecting on that; I'm telling myself: here is my little group of gatherers, they are picking wild seeds, this is not farming. The others are not metalworkers, but they make axes, they make axes. You have group A; I would say no more than A, pickers, and B, ax makers. The best axes were made from obsidian before metallurgy, for example, right? Obsidian, I think it's a kind of volcanic rock with which you get very ... very excellent edges. And then, that's a nice word. Well, I am saying: [in] the primitive exchange, no need to compare the labor-times, no need to ask oneself what the labor-time is in order to gather, what the labor-time is in order to make the obsidian ax, and then compare both. How do you expect that to be possible?

Here, I select an example that fits perfectly. And these two groups don't even speak the same language, well, what do you want them to compare? Moreover, gathering is a typical activity with continuous variation. For example, women go gathering, and then they sing, and then they chat, and then they gather some more. This is called an "activity with continuous variation". There is no ... there is no measurement of labor-time. For the ax maker, he's not going to compare. It's even an idea that would make the ... the primitives laugh, comparing the time taken to gather wild seeds and the time taken to make an ax ... Well, sense this then, how are they going to create the exchange?

On the other hand, they have a collective evaluation. We assume that it cannot be related to labor-time which would even presuppose a common language that they do not have. I assume that they're even two rather distant tribes, not of the same cultural background, not sharing the same language. Fine. They exchange seeds for axes. I am saying: how can the exchange take place? Well, we know that now. We know it. We know it. Uh ... [*Pause*] The question of whether anyone ever used this method to exchange anything is another question. But I think, yeah, I think people acted like that all the time.

Group A, you remember, eh, in your head, group A must be the one that offers seeds and receives axes. I say, in parenthesis, that it is too obvious after all I have said: marginalism is a primacy of the law of demand over the law of exchange. I'm not saying why, but you [*inaudible words, Deleuze lowers his voice*]. Well, group A that gets axes may develop -- I say "may", this is all abstract, eh; you cannot make the slight reflection to me about [*inaudible word*] -- Uh… group A may develop an idea about the last quantity of axes that would force them to change their assemblage. And the group may have [this idea] from the start, the collective evaluation of the last quantity of axes that would force it to modify the structure of its gathering assemblage.

What does that mean? So, I'm continuing, eh, I'm continuing in the abstract. Group B can make a collective assessment of the last quantity of seeds which would force it to modify its own assemblage. If you grant me that, you grant me everything. I would say, at that point, that the value of the traded items is strictly determined by the two limit objects for each group respectively, the marginal ax for the group that gives wild seeds, the marginal seed for the group that gives axes. And if the last ax ... And then the law of exchange will be ... [*Pause*] -- Ah that's very simple; it's the lack of words -- the law of exchange will be : [*Pause*] the last ax, that is, which forces the I-don't-remember-which group to change their assemblage… which would force the group… beyond which, rather, beyond which the group would be forced to change its assemblage, equal to the quantity of seeds that would force…, beyond which the other group would be forced to change its own assemblage.

You see? This is a great market. You can't go wrong with this system. Why? Because: what's valuable here? There is never a direct comparison; this is an indirect exchange. Each group evaluates respectively on its own behalf the value of its marginal object, [*Pause*] and it is this respective evaluation by each group of the value for each of the marginal object relative to each one that will determine the exchange. In other words, the objective relation in the exchange arises from two subjective series; the direct relation arises from the indirect relation or, if you prefer, the equalization in the exchange arises from two unequal, non-symmetrical processes.

But I'm just adding ... you'll tell me: this is a little confusing, how do they evaluate? What does that mean, "they would be forced to change their assemblage"? Well, let's reconsider the group -- and I'll finish up with this -- let's reconsider the group of people receiving axes. Beyond the marginal ax, either they have nothing to do with it, they keep the same assemblage, but they have no concerns about the last ax, they have no need to use it. So, the exchange loses all interest. This doesn't happen anymore. This is the moment time for the break before another series begins again, the axes having worn out. This is exactly the moment for a break at the café. Or are they forced to change their assemblage, so what would that mean? Giving up their itinerance; giving up their gathering itinerance; creating with the threshold-axes – no longer the limit-ax that itself belonged to the "gathering" assemblage – but creating what with the ultimate ax, with the threshold ax? From brush clearing or worse, from stump removal, they become farmers. They could no longer follow the flow of gathering; they would switch into a completely different type of assemblage which, at least, would already involve agricultural elements. So, they ward off the agricultural threshold by anticipating the "gathering" limit. Same reasoning for axes, not difficult, namely that beyond the subsistence seeds necessary for their livelihood, the ax makers would have to change their assemblage.

All is fine; it is still the development for itself of each respective series that will fix the value of the exchange, the value of the object exchanged starting from what functions as the marginal object in a series and from which this functions as marginal object in the other series. Proof of which ... Proof of which ... it's uh ... it's just the last effort that I ask of you, this gives us a confirmation, jumping from savages to things, to the most modern forms; this gives us a singular confirmation concerning the time, the margin, the limit and the threshold, the accounting

exercise. [*Deleuze indicates the student who he has asked to speak*] You pick it up here ... you pick it up here…

The previous student (who has just prepared a brief presentation): [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Ah, ok, you aren't picking it up here… And you should speak loudly… you should speak as loudly as possible.

The student: [*Inaudible presentation; some students say "Louder!"*]

Deleuze: Okay! I would translate that, in my own language, by saying: the assemblage exercises, the successive assemblage exercises, each, uh, primitive assemblage forms a series, and it recurs after a pause, right? Er… Each series is therefore an assemblage exercise. It is obvious that the assemblage exercises are variable. Right? No, what I want you to discuss very quickly, there, to emphasize nonetheless, is your story uh ... the importance of time and of the evaluation of duration in accounting. If necessary, if you can't hear, I'll repeat what he says, if he doesn't want to speak loudly, right? ...

The student: [*Continued inaudible presentation*] [*End of the session*] [92:45]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on the Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 05, 15 January 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**English Translation, Charles J. Stivale[36]**

… [Caligula], he takes his guard to a beach, far from Rome. And there, he divides them in two, he divides his guard in two. He makes them collect seashells, and he orders them to fight each other. We tell ourselves: "Really, things are not going well, Caligula" [*Laughter*]. And then he comes back. Fine. This is the Caligula aspect seen by Albert Camus. This is the delirious interpretation of Caligula. I don't mean that… it's wrong or he's wrong, no, not at all. Maybe why not? Maybe ... Rational legal, political interpretation, politico-legal interpretation; Latin scholars notice that the same word designates "shell" and certain war machines.

Well, it's enough to think about that to think that Sallust's text is perhaps a text of satire, is intentionally satirical, because everything becomes a little coherent.[37] Let's assume -- we risk nothing in assuming since we don't know, [*Laughter*] so… -- let's assume -- but it happened all the time -- that Caligula felt that part of his guard was preparing something suspicious, a revolt. He takes all his guard far from Rome, near the sea and, there, he does not make them collect shells, he is not…, he is not all the same at this level, he has the war machines gathered together that part of the guard possesses, the part under suspicion. And then he has the part under suspicion exterminated by the other part. Everything becomes… a banality, very great rational banality, that is, he stifles a revolt, and then he returns to Rome after having liquidated part of his guard. This becomes crystal clear. Fine.

What does that mean? Is it one or is it the other? I would say neither one nor the other, ultimately. Because ... we have to keep this sphere of ambiguity, the rise of the ambiguous sphere. The rise of the ambiguous sphere, that's exactly it. I can interpret everything either within a determination of private subjectivity, that is, madness, the most private aspect of subjectivity, or within an objective public determination. But, in fact, there are all kinds of regimes, that we will consider, which define themselves as straddling sides, because it's not that they create a kind of synthesis at all, a mixing of the public and private, but that they impose a sphere that is not reducible to one or the other. This is what I call: "the sphere of relations of personal dependency."

At that point, then, perhaps Paul Veyne's title, "Sperm and Blood," would take on an even more general meaning.[38] Take feudalism. It's really with feudalism… -- there are pages, there, immediately, by [Jules] Michelet which are splendid,[39] on the way in which the French monarchy was constituted, where he says: the kings of France are quite odd; they manage, they

manage their kingly seeds really like…, like some kinds of shopkeepers. What do they operate with? It's there…, it's… Michelet credits Louis XI with that, but it started before Louis XI, he says: what is brilliant about Louis XI is that, really, weddings, inheritances, become the objective instruments of a form of politics. You will tell me: it was always like that. I don't know if, at that point, there isn't a kind of mutation through which marriages, inheritances, really become the active and creative factors of a new type of power that is being created at that era -- for example, the power of the monarch which is not at all the same as the power of the archaic despot -- that it all emerges… uh… in that form (in the Roman Empire, it emerged in another form), this sphere, this sphere that must be defined as, each time, the shifting determination of the relations of personal dependency. So, you can… -- we never stop sliding back and forth -- sometimes account for it objectively, and that's not correct, sometimes account for it in a simply subjective way ("the delirium of the Caesars"), that's not correct either. There is quite something else in all that. So, we would try to ... [*Deleuze does not finish*]

But, if you will, I am finally getting to my problem, it's really ... well, what ... what's going on? How do we come to this, with this emergence of a new type of relationship that we are provisionally calling -- we'll see next time if we can clarify it -- but that we are provisionally calling "the sphere of relations of personal dependency"? Once again, whether it is, … so, this is quite varied: personal dependency in relation to the Emperor evolved in the case of the Roman Empire, in relation to… to the lord (*seigneur*) in the case of feudalism – that's an entirely different type; I am not mixing them up – in relation to the monarch in the French monarchy, what they have in common is that they are figures of the relation of personal dependency. Once again, it is not people (*personnes*) who account for the constancy of relations of personal dependency within a society. This is specific. It seems to me that we need a concept of the relation of personal dependency that really makes it ..., that gives it a specific consistency. So, I would say: but who is… who is really at this level? We really need to manage to specify this sphere, this sphere of personal dependency. So, I'm stopping at this point because I want you to think about this for next time; what time is it?

A student: Twelve forty-five.

Deleuze: Who is the man of the sphere of personal dependency? Listen to me carefully. In the end – Twelve forty-five? Oh, we're running out of time -- Who is it? Well, it seems to me that he is ... -- you could say; I'm summarizing this -- he is someone whose historical determination is of colossal importance. He's the person that laments, he's the man of the lament. He is the one who causes this sphere of personal dependency to emerge. What does that mean? And why "the man of the lament"? Is he going to have as great a historical significance as I am saying, the man of the lament? And who is doing the lamenting in the story? We have to know who is lamenting. All unfortunate people complain. But the unfortunate can be quite varied; they can be aristocrats who have lost power, they can be… oppressed peasants, oppressed people, it can be… So, it varies. When it's an oppressed aristocrat, his lament ... [*Pause*] uh, no, [he's] an outcast, someone who has lost power, all that, his lament doesn't have the same name. When people lament, it's not ... it's not ... it's not the same thing. Fine. But, through all these variations, is there

a certain situation of the lament within history? This is what I want you to ... think about for next time. Who is the man of the lament?[40]

I am selecting a hypothesis borrowed from an author whom I find very, very strong, very ... a Hungarian Marxist, a specialist of the Chinese Empire about whom I spoke during another year, called [Ferenc] Tökei, t-o umlaut-k-e-i. A lot of his writing is ... either translated ... well, published in French. I am thinking of a very beautiful text by him of about forty pages: "Birth of the Chinese Elegy", "Birth of the Chinese Elegy".[41] And Tökei's thesis is that the Chinese elegy ... What is the elegy? It's the art of the lament. The elegy is the song of mourning, and the elegy spans history. Moreover, the elegy spans lyrical values. Who are the great lyric poets? There are tragic poets, there are epic poets, but what is lyricism made of? Lyricism has a kind…, two, two fundamental tonalities: the satiric tonality and the elegiac tonality. And these are not the same rhythms; there are satirical rhythms, there are elegiac rhythms. For example, for those who remember the treatises on versification, what is called the couplet, the couplet is a typically elegiac rhythm, invented by poets referred to as "elegiac" poets. Sometimes these same poets have part of their work within satire, part of their work ... But these are the two great poles of lyricism. It will continue until Victor Hugo, these two great poles, two great lyrical poles.

And in what way does satire develop? With the supremely poetic values of insult. [*Pause*] Satire is the lyrical development of insult and the rhythmic development of insult. Insulting has very great rhythmic values. You just have to look at the popular forms of insult; there are very, very great rhythmic values of insults, eh. Someone knows how to insult when he has a good sense of rhythm. If he doesn't have a good sense of rhythm, he might as well not even try. [*Laughter*] Good. There are many languages of insults ... At the time of the Revolution, there were languages ..., or just before the Revolution, there were languages of insults from which the revolutionary newspapers would benefit, for example, *Père* Duchesne's newspaper, which is a derivative of those pre-revolutionary languages which were entirely made up of insults. Awesome. Latin satirists have a ... have a sense of rhythmic insult there, which is fantastic, fantastic, fantastic. So, that's what satire is. And the elegy is the lyrical development of the lament.

And very oddly, there are combinations between lament and insult. It may be the same man who … at the extreme, it is the same man who wields the lament and who wields the insult, and with what humor and what rhythmic value, then, of the lament ... So, if I am saying laments, yes, they span history, I could list the kinds of laments. Great laments are expressed, and then ... But this is annoying, because it's ... it's up to you to think about this, right, for next time; I'd like you to ... [*Pause*]

Okay, I'm making a list, even an absurd one. There, we see immediately, there is an epic lament. The epic lament is usually when the epic has ... lost its relevance. It's an effort, the epic lament is an effort to reactivate the epic. In the late Roman Empire, they try to resuscitate the epic, not necessarily excellent, right, but then, it becomes… a plaintive epic: "Ah, in the old days ... Ah, the decadence nowadays ...", etc. There's a kind of elegiac pole for the epic, right? The epic lament is formed, … for example, even with very great authors like… Well, no matter, especially since I don't have the [*inaudible word*]. [*Laughter*]

So, … well, that would be the whole domain of the epic lament. The tragic lament, with tragedy… you know that tragedy adopts the lament, … Greek tragedy… I am quoting like that, from memory: "Oyeoyeoye oye oyeoyeoye eya popeya eya popeya ..." [*Deleuze wails*] Good, you feel that this is a lament. [*Laughter*] Did you feel it? No, but anyway, I expressed it very ... too cheerfully. [*Laughter*] I expressed it too cheerfully. I'll start again: [*Laughter*] "Ah ahah aaaah aaaah." Good. [*Laughter*] But, here too, we can see that the tragic actor is not the essence of the lament. Why? It's the chorus that expresses laments. In tragedy, it's the chorus. The chorus which, in the end, is in a certain way, excluded from the tragedy, aahh… which is there as witnessing a kind of… I don't know what it witnesses, but… fine, it intervenes when… when we have time to involve it; it intervenes in the form of the great lament. Oedipus does not complain, but the choir, well then: "Ooye, oye oye, oye, what's wrong with him, poor Oedipus? What's going to happen to him?... Oh ooooh oh oh ..." Good. Greek tragedy contains the finest lament texts that exist, but the lament is not pure therein since it is caught in the tragic element just like the lament was caught in the epic element.

There's a whole different kind of lament, so, in a whole different civilization, it's the … relig… … the prophetic lament. The prophetic lament, the prophet never ceases lamenting. And, in that way, the prophet belongs to a great model which is Job, Job's lament. Job's lament [*inaudible words*], Job's lament when he calls out to God: "So, what now? So, what now? What, me? What?" The prophet's long lament is very, very important; it's not the tragic lament, it's not the epic lament.

You have the popular lament which gives rise to the complaint ... You have plenty of laments. But the lament becomes pure in its elegiac role. The great poets of the lament are the elegiacs. These are neither the tragedians, nor the epics. Who is it? First of all, this is the whole tradition of the Greeks. The epics… are spoken about… for the Greeks, of tragedy, but considered as equal to the great tragedies and of ... and of Homer, and from the epic, there is the series of Greek elegiac poets. And there are medallions, there are [*inaudible word*] of medallions here: one side for ... Homer and one side for a great elegiac. Latin poetry which is one of the things… there, well, one of the only men in France today capable of speaking fully of this is precisely Paul Veyne,… because he has, I don't know by what gift, he has a sense of what they contributed to rhythm, about the rhythmic value of these poets. This is the great series: Catullus, Ovid, Tibullus, Propertius, for whom a part of the work is made up of elegies, with rhythms, so with a fundamental rhythmic invention.

And all that, I am saying: who is it… [*Deleuze does not finish*] I'm returning to my question. If the elegy is really the lyrical form of the lament, that is, the form in which the lament appears in its purest form, who in history is lamenting? Well, that's an answer that may interest you, at least Tökei's answer, which shows it -- I am not saying in general -- for the Chinese elegy. Well, he said: who is the one who is basically lamenting in the Chinese Empire? It's neither the outcast nor the imprisoned man; it's the freed slave. Neither the oppressed ... nor the outlaw, nor the oppressed, nor the ... I don't know what; it's the freed slave. The Chinese elegiac genre begins with the importance assumed by this very, very curious historical figure: the freed slave. Fine. So, will this… maybe this will reconnect some things for us.

And the elegiac, the elegiac poet, we can say: he sometimes saw himself as outlawed. Take, for example then, the truly personal form of the lament: the amorous elegy. The elegy will be spoken by ... There is an elegy as soon as there is mourning, as soon as there is a lament, as soon as there is a poetic lament. And take the ... the ... the amorous elegy: the elegiac poet pours forth his lament, right, his grandiose lyrical and rhythmic lament as a function of a whole constellation of situations in which, one by one, he presents himself as being rejected by the beloved, that is, cast out, oppressed by the beloved who abuses her power. But different from the outcast and also different from the oppressed, there is: the excluded one, [and] this is not the same thing, the character of the freed slave who feels excluded. The excluded one is the freed slave; he experiences himself as excluded.

So, it is ... [*Deleuze does not finish*] Hence ... hence the idiotic story, the freed slave who says: "ah, I would have preferred to remain a slave", that's quite idiotic. But let the freed slave, for example, in the examples Tökei analyzes very well, experience himself as excluded. The operation of emancipation is an operation that is very, very important at the same time. Is it not this which, at the same time, will be at the center of the lament, and of a lament that is much more effective than it seems, because it will lead to the rise of this new type of relations, the relations of people and of personal dependency in which, there, the freed slave will discover himself as a true master, not at all as someone who is dependent? If the sphere of the relation of personal dependency is initiated, it's the freed slave or something like that who becomes the master. And he is the one who will bring about the Emperor's *consilium*, he is the one who will bring about the Emperor's *fiscus*. Maybe, right? In the end, there would be a whole domain to finish ..., to give you something to work on between now and next week.

I am jumping to another register: what if we tried then to prepare a course or research study on these problems of the lament? There is in psychiatry ... the ... psychiatry is full of lamenters. And there are three great laments -- there are some students here working on this already, I don't know if they'll want to talk about it ... huh?

A woman student: Next week.

Deleuze: Good, good, good, there are the three great laments which correspond to ... to what we call the great contemporary neuroses, or what were called: the lament of the hypochondriac, the lament of the melancholic, and the lament of the depressive, and these are not at all the same, right? They are not the same. The depressive lament, we would have to invent rhythmic values. These are not the same rhythmic values; these are not the same rhythms. So, that would be too easy, an easy hypothesis, so we can't, but it would have been nice. It's that the real lament would be that of the melancholic, right, because he's the one who sees himself as excluded, whereas the hypochondriac is not… It's not the pure lament because, he, he experiences himself much more as outcast; the depressive, he experiences himself much more as oppressed, imprisoned. It's so easy that it's false, right, so it can't be true.

So, we draw this to an end, that's it. There we are, fine. You think about that, that's where we are. There you have it. [*End of tape*] [20: 21]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on the Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 06, 22 January 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation, Charles J. Stivale[42]**

**Part 1**

… Out of pure, unorganized material… uh… and I really wanted you to organize something on this theme of the lament and its role in both the arts and in history. So, is there no one who could… who might… [present] in my place… Anyone? [*Pause*] You really aren't very cooperative. [*Pause*] Alright, so we'll just drop that, huh. I was hoping ... [*Pause*]

On what we did in the last few sessions, are there any problems, are there any ...? No? My most skillful appeals are still ... [*Laughter*] Fine. Well, that's too bad, because I don't have much to say today, so ... Okay, well, let's go ... Does anyone want to talk? [*Laughter*] Ah la la ... Good. Well. Aaahh.

What we saw in the last few sessions is ... – I'm not managing… I'm not managing to say it concretely enough… -- it's a certain comparison, a certain description of types of assemblages. And how is it within our subject, this comparison, this kind of descriptive study? It's really description at the point we've reached, describing types of assemblages. And what I am taking from our subject -- "what is the State apparatus?" that is, "what kind of assemblage does a State mean? » -- what I am taking from this and what I insist on -- because it seems to me a little bit [*inaudible word*] -- is that we have managed to distinguish these two assemblages -- they are not the only ones; there is an endless list of assemblages -- but, uh, those two assemblages that we're mainly concerned with at the moment, namely an assemblage consisting of a territory-code combination and an assemblage consisting of quite a different combination, land-overcoding (*surcodage-terre*). And we saw that land was always in… within a certain gap with the territory, just as overcoding was a completely different operation from that of codes. And it's on this that I would like to ... uh ... I don't know, I would like to back up a little bit, because it seems to me very, it seems to me ... at the same time, I'm not managing to express this concretely enough, and I feel that there are all kinds of concrete applications.

I am saying: we spend our time in our lives, or long moments of our time, in the regime of the territory-code assemblage, and either collectively or personally, we spend a lot of time coding territories. And what mattered to me was that a certain number of notions were necessary to define that assemblage. And as we saw, what are these notions? It was the idea that a territory assemblage, a territory-code assemblage is defined by its exercise. It is an exercise assemblage, that is, when one arrangement exercise is completed, we start over elsewhere by changing territory. As a result, this is an itinerant assemblage; this is the assemblage of itinerance. In

previous years, we have seen, we have tried to distinguish between nomadism and itinerance. These are not the same at all. But itinerance is indeed the state of one who *follows* a territory flow by passing from one territory to another according to codes. So, an exercise assemblage or an exercise of assemblage … -- but an exercise of assemblage is only valid in this type of assemblage: exercise assemblage -- well, an exercise of assemblage is defined precisely by: as long as I stay within this territory. And then afterwards, I don't change the assemblage, I carry my assemblage into another territory.

As a result, a second point [is], every assemblage of this territory-code type, with corresponding assemblage itinerance, with the corresponding itinerance, will be defined by what was called a *limit*. In a territory, the assemblage is truly serial, and the series is defined by a limit.[43] This limit, as we have seen, is the *final* object, the final object, what was called in marginalist terms, the marginal object or the last receptive object. Receptive as a function of what? Well, as a function of the assemblage. I mean, beyond this final object, there are, of course, other objects, only they could not be captured, they could only be invested if we changed the nature of the assemblage. So, in this territory assemblage, it is always stretched towards its limit, towards the evaluation of the final object and, at the same time, it conjures the beyond, that is, something that would still be *after* the object which could only be grasped in another assemblage.

So, I chose some stupid examples like the last drink, the final word, the last drink in the cafe, that is, the marginal drink, the final word in a discussion, in an argument, in a domestic argument. Uh… I think, to make this even clearer, if you will, I am selecting an example in which this seems very, very obvious to me, the assemblages, for example, Proust's assemblages in *In Search of Lost Time*.

Proust has an idea, like that -- I am not saying that this has a universal value; it is valid for him, really -- he has an idea; in the end, this is within the domain of love. Every love pursues in a certain way its own end (*fin*), its own ... It *repeats* its own limit. Fine, that's an idea, it's beautiful… uh… that's how it is, he lives like this. He explains very well that, for example, his love for Albertine, from the start, does not cease repeating the end of this love. So, it's not a repetition of the past; it's like a kind of pro-repetition. So, every love is oriented towards a series, a series which is defined by a limit. This limit is the rupture, the end of this love. And this love, at its most vibrant moment, well… in its own way repeats the approaching rupture. Fine. He's sad, eh, he's sad, but finally Proust was difficult to live with. Fine. So, there we can see, I would say: this is an assemblage exercise. Moreover, the same love can involve several exercises. For example, in Proust's case, there are two successive loves for Albertine, for the same person, eh? Fine. You see what I would call an assemblage exercise. It implies a certain territory. It occurs in certain places; Albertine is linked to places, all of that. And this series, the Albertine series or the two Albertine series, are oriented towards the limit. [*Pause*]

So, it's each love that is serial and, once a love has reached its limit, well, the narrator of *In Search of Lost Time* switches to another love, for example, from the first love for Albertine to the second love for Albertine. You see? So, each time, the assemblage exercise is defined by a series oriented towards a limit. And then, there is… -- but we must not say that it comes after: all this surprisingly coexists -- there is like another dimension, another dimension where Proust has

more or less the presentiment, and has the presentiment more or less vividly, that there is another assemblage which is being constituted at the same time. And what is this other assemblage? This is the assemblage of his work (*oeuvre*) to be completed. This time, it's more of a romantic assemblage; it's, let's say, an artistic assemblage.[44] Fine. He tells himself all the time: "oh yes, uh ... I'm wasting my time ..." -- Time lost is also time he wastes, right? -- “I am losing/wasting my time with Albertine”. He says, "I should work, I should take up my work ...", all that, as if it were another way of assemblage. Maybe the two aren't mutually exclusive, maybe they can coexist, but that's another mode of assemblage.

And a very bizarre revelation will occur; he tells himself at one point, in his love for Albertine: "Hey, I'm going to marry Albertine. Well yeah, I'm going to marry her,” he tells himself. He tells himself: “No. I have my work to complete." It's not that these oppose each other; he could do his work and marry Albertine, why not? No, it is…, but what interests him is that it is not at all the same type of assemblage, that when he tells himself, and when he has the revelation, it is not enough not to tell himself, he tells himself this all the time: "Ah my work, I am going to do my work". Only, as he does not know how to do it or pretends not to know how, but, at the moment when he has the revelation of what his work will be, and he tells himself: "There, I have it”, at that moment, he switches to another assemblage. This is what we called the *threshold* and no longer the limit. The limit is what separates one assemblage exercise from another assemblage exercise, the assemblage remaining of the same type. The threshold is quite different: it is the passage from one type of assemblage to another assemblage.

And, if I defined my serial or territorial assemblages previously itinerant assemblages, we saw the last time that the other type of assemblage is only a relative dualism, it is only a relative distinction. The other type of assemblage was, in fact, quite another thing. It was an assemblage that was no longer defined by the itinerant relationship of a code and a territory such that a territory is exhausted by a series oriented towards its limit. In that case, I am defining the aggregate of the itinerant assemblage. But this is an entirely different kind of assemblage; this time, it is an assemblage in which the coexistence of exploited territories, the simultaneity of exploited territories, constitutes a land (*terre*), therefore is radically distinguished from the territoriality of itinerance, [*Pause*] and where this aggregate ... -- it is no longer a matter of a series, so it is a matter of an aggregate of territories exploited simultaneously; what I am saying applies to agriculture, but would also apply to any other domain, the territory not being fundamentally an agricultural territory; it can be, but it doesn't have to be -- this time around, there is an aggregate of territories exploited simultaneously, and this is what defines a land.

And, at the same time, this aggregate consideration, this coexistence of territories, will no longer refer to a code of itinerance, but to an overcoding of sedentarity. And it is there that we discovered the assemblage that corresponds to the "State apparatus" as opposed to the assemblage of itinerant groups. In other words, there it was no longer an assemblage of limits, it was an assemblage of thresholds. And this assemblage of thresholds -- and I am saying: it coexists with the other assemblages; it is not the same type -- I cannot say: we go from assemblages of itinerance to State assemblages, no. We have seen, in the social field, there is a kind of play of coexistence of all these assemblages.

So, if I try to define it according to the results of the last time, this "State apparatus" assemblage as we have it for the moment, let me be clear: it is indeed what we called, from the beginning, "archaic Empires". These are archaic Empires and, I remind you, we have seen that the dates of these archaic Empires, according to the results of archeology, must be pushed back more and more. This is not even, as was believed, from the middle of the Neolithic; it is really at the very beginning of the Neolithic and even must result from the Paleolithic, that is, uh…, if you will, they are formed between 10,000 and 7,000 BCE. Finally, "they are formed" ... according to the traces that we have.

How can I define them? Well, from our results the last time around, I think, you have to bring in, to describe ... if I wanted to describe this "archaic Empire" assemblage, I would need two dimensions. In one dimension, this assemblage has two aspects. It implies a comparative space, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it implies a point of appropriation which we called monopolistic appropriation. And these two aspects, in all areas, manifest themselves: a relative space of comparison and point of monopolistic appropriation. And we saw the last time that the second aspect, the point of appropriation, was deeper, that is, in fact was determined. The space of comparison assumes the point of appropriation.

And, as I did not indicate it in this form, I remind you, in fact, of the various aspects in which we found this. We saw that these archaic Empires seemed to involve what, first of all? A comparison of the territories exploited simultaneously, that's the comparative space. Land arises and develops, unfolds as a comparative space of territories. So, it is no longer the successive territories of itinerance where, once one territory gets exhausted, I move on to another territory; here, there is a comparison of territories which will be constitutive of the land. We have seen for the so-called differential rent (*rente*) that the differential rent was precisely this ancient mechanism resulting from the comparison of simultaneous territories.

But we have seen that this comparative space, namely this comparison of the simultaneous territories which constitute land, assumed a point of monopolistic appropriation, this time the absolute ground rent (*rente foncière*), and which is or which defines the right of the despot insofar as being the eminent owner of all the constituent territories of this land, the despot, the eminent owner of the land of which the communes subordinate to the Empire are only possessors. So, there you have both aspects perfectly: a space of comparison, a point of appropriation.

In the second aspect which is no longer the land, which was labor, you have the comparison of activities which implies a comparative space, the comparison of activities between them under the regime of labor, and you have the point of monopolistic appropriation, namely: surplus labor or the fact that the worker owes a duty (*corvée*) in the form of public works, owes the despot a duty. And we have seen in what sense, here too, the point of appropriation was primary in relation to the space of comparison, namely surplus labor was primary in relation to labor to the point that one can only speak of labor in regimes where there is a special category of surplus labor, namely public works.

And then, at the level of a third dimension, at the level of money, we had encountered the same result: a space of comparison in the form of market money, a point of monopolistic appropriation, in the form of tax-money. Now, what mattered a lot to us, and what I really want to insist on because, I don't know…, I don't know, that seems good for us, here too, it is the point of appropriation which is primary, namely: the market use of money obviously implies the issuance, creation of money, and the creation of money is strictly inseparable from the operation of taxation. So, it is the tax which is, there, primary in relation to the commercial use of money; it is taxation that creates money. And it is not by chance that the State apparatus thus defined, from the archaic Empire, implies in its main determinations the issuance of money.

So you see that, if I need so many dimensions, it is because I would say that, vertically (*en hauteur*), if you will, the two tiered determinations of the imperial apparatus is: the tracing or development of a comparative space and a point of monopolistic appropriation. And as horizontally (*en largeur*), this outline will unfold as three -- horizontally, I don't know ... yes -- in three privileged segments, the *land* segment, the *labor* segment, the *money* (*monnaie*) segment, and, in each of the segments, you will discover comparative space, point of appropriation, the point of appropriation being decisive in relation to the comparative space, namely, in the land segment, in the uh… labor segment, and in the… er… money segment.

As a result, for those who uh ... uh ... have been working here for ah ... for a longer time, we can attach ... even if it means making ... [*Deleuze shifts direction*] What matters to me in such an apparatus is that, obviously, you have these points of appropriation, these sectors, these three great sectors, the apparatus of capture … I was saying: the imperial apparatus as apparatus of capture obviously has three heads. It has three heads: land, labor, taxes. So, at the extreme, you have three points of appropriation, appropriation of the land by the despot, by the great Emperor, the appropriation of labor in the form of surplus labor, the appropriation of money in the form of a tax. And it is appropriation that is creative. Okay… oh! But, I would also say: it is not three points of appropriation, because the characteristic of this apparatus of capture is to create resonance together, and the three heads of the apparatus of capture resonate and precisely constitute the public figure of the despot, the despot as being at the same time the great landowner, the eminent owner of the land, the eminent contractor of public works, and the great imposing banker, that is, the creator of money.

So, I can say that in such a system, everything is public. This is what I wanted you to understand. Everything is public by definition. There is absolutely no private sphere. As Marx says when he describes this type of Empire, you basically have communes which are overcoded by Empire; communes can have collective possession of territories. The despot is the eminent owner of the land, but insofar as being a transcendent unit of the communes. The despot's functionaries -- namely the soldiers, the bankers, … the scribes, the contractors, etc. -- can receive tenures, delegations of property, but these would be functional tenures, that is, they are not private owners at all, no one is a private owner. The whole system is a public system.

This is what and this is how, at the beginning of this year, we were trying to define the notion of machinic enslavement. Like [Lewis] Mumford says, like Mumford says, it's a mega-machine, which is a huge machine. It's the first mega-machine.[45] This is the first mega-machine;

everything is public in the system, and see that you can really define it as a mega-machine, an enslavement machine in the sense that it is an apparatus of capture with three heads, the three resonating heads. And, at no moment can I assign a sphere that surpasses the public. This is a public apparatus.

Yes, I am adding, in order to create the link, therefore, with the research that we had undertaken over an entirely different year, you recall that, in this, with two years distance, I don't remember, maybe more, perhaps more, it interests me that we are discovering something which, from a completely different point of view, gives us confirmation if necessary. I recall, for those who were not there at all, that over one year, we dealt with a notion which was that of face.[46] We asked ourselves: what precisely is a face? And we told ourselves: well, there you go, a face is not a personal thing. In fact, there are societies which include faces, and there are societies which do not include faces. A face is a system of, uh… collective functions, of social functions.

But maybe there are very different types of faces. In particular, maybe, for example, the famous stories…, the… the so-called primitives and their reactions when presented with photos, maybe that doesn't mean much, because: what are they reacting to? Are they reacting ... uh ... are they reacting to the magic of the photographic apparatus or indeed are they reacting to something quite different? Namely, there is still something quite insane about this abstraction of the face in our societies. It's very weird ... Maybe so-called primitives, maybe they don't have a face, that is, it's something else, something functions ... these are groups without faces; maybe they have a head, eh? A head is not the same thing as a face… uh… not at all. I don't mean that they only have bodies, but maybe the face is some kind of crazy abstraction. In what case and how did this sort of transformation from head into face come about? And what is the use of our face socially?

Well, it's obvious that… uh… it's obvious that it's very difficult even to talk about the role of language in societies if we do… if we don't take into account the fact that all language is indexed on a face . All the stories about the signifier, we don't see very well… we really don't see what these can mean if they are not indexed on the face. Hey, ... uh ... how ... language is not the abstraction that some linguists maintain. "Hey, he doesn't seem in a good mood today"; "Oh, he doesn't look like he's in good shape," uh ... When I entered this room with the demented wish that you were going to present something, eh, I told myself: "hey, are they going to talk?", I am saying ... well, then ... uh ... You, you react: "he is going to give us a hard time again", all that, fine. All that is very indexed onto faces, but what is this kind of… literally, this kind of erection of the face in some societies and not in all of them?

Fine. Why am I bringing this up again? It's because, at that time, we had tried…, since, assuming that the face is not at all a personal thing, that it is really a function of certain groups, which therefore fulfills certain social functions, we wondered which machine it depended on. And we told ourselves: to create faces, it's not so complicated, right? To create faces, the first way to create faces is what? And we had looked into this, and we had arrived at a kind of very abstract machine of the face, and this abstract machine of the face was exactly ... we told ourselves: well yes, that does not provide a concrete face, but if I try to identify a kind of abstract diagram of the face, it is ... I'm satisfied with two elements: black hole, white wall. A black hole is displaced

onto a white wall. So, that doesn't resemble faces, but rather, this is the abstract diagram of the face.

Since then, I had not yet consulted these documents, I don't know if ... Since then, in any case, this has been very ... I am thinking of a book that recently appeared, a wonderful gift book because it is full of beautiful, beautiful reproductions. This is a book by a guy who has become and has developed into and now has really become a specialist in a tiny little area, namely protective scrolls in Ethiopia. This is a very special thing, the protective scrolls in Ethiopia. The protective scrolls in Ethiopia are things on… parchments; it's a kind of popular magic, very, very popular, right, among poor farmers, but at the same time has… some very literate predecessors. This is a very curious thing. I refer you to the book called, yes, *Protective Scrolls in Ethiopia* or *Magic Scrolls,* I don't know ... *in Ethiopia*, published by Le Seuil, the author being Jacques Mercier,[47] and, therefore, on parchment there are drawings. Obviously, the Byzantine influence is very great; if you remember the Byzantine faces, you see, that is what was called the frontal face. What is the frontal face? Well, before anything, it's: one black eye, two, okay, by repetition, but not just two, it can be four, it can ... On the protective scrolls, they put eyes everywhere, and this is what will determine…. This is the essential act. And Jacques Mercier confirms this, right? What will determine the whole rhythm, it is not at all the decorative patterns that will unite the eyes, it is this swarming of black holes. Two, four, infinite ...

And you have the surface of the parchment, the distribution of black holes and, from there, the constitution of faces with, as they say, "ember eye" (*oeil de braise*). If you remember the last Negus, the last Negus obviously had a court of magicians, and this court of magicians made him extremely formidable. And, if you remember the eyes of the last Negus [*inaudible word*], as they say, ember eyes, except that the embers are not black, but sometimes ... it can be red eyes. And these eyes are precisely the eyes of the Ethiopian tradition of Solomon, namely the eyes of the angel or the devil. And here, we can see this system of the imperial face very clearly. The Byzantine face is still a great stylization of the imperial face; it is the face seen frontally, namely "a black hole which moves on a kind of white surface". Why am I recalling this? Because I am saying: this is in fact the public face; everything is public in the archaic Empire. Everything is public without merit, because there is no such thing as a sphere of “private life” yet. Everything is public. And, the formula or the illustration, the illustration of this apparatus of capture is exactly that: the point of monopolistic appropriation that is displaced within a comparative space.

So there, for my pleasure -- that's why I was going back over all this -- for my pleasure, ... from a completely different horizon, it seems to me that we find a confirmation, there, of what we had studied regarding quite another matter, concerning the face, that the imperial apparatus of capture, with its two components -- point of monopolistic appropriation, space of comparison, such that the point of appropriation is displaced within the space comparison – is graphically expressed ... no, not graphically, is expressed plastically in the form of the despotic face seen frontally, namely the black hole of appropriation as you still find it in the Byzantine face, in the Ethiopian face, in all kinds of faces marked by an imperial tradition. And it is the "black hole-space of comparison" that will constitute the public face of the despot. You understand? [*Pause*]

So, what seems very important to me, once again, is to see the sense in which, at the same time, the apparatus of capture, this imperial apparatus of capture, might have assigned to it particular aspects or others, but in some ways, all of these aspects resonate together. What I am stressing is that our analyses during the last session showed us how, in each aspect, you had these two dimensions, these two fundamental dimensions, the point… the point of appropriation, the comparative space in which the point is displaced -- once we've said that it is the point of appropriation which is displaced within the comparative space -- it is this point of appropriation which is constitutive of the comparative space. It constitutes it by tracing it and displacing itself. And, we have seen it for the land rent, we have seen it for public works, we have seen it for money-tax. As a result, once again, tax is the monopolistic appropriation of currency which will become marketable within the corresponding comparative space, but it is at the level of tax that the money is created.

So… uh… everything is fine, ok. So, what I would like... you understand, if you find it useful ... for one another, all that, but I ... in this ... within this precise outline, well, I will not go any further, because that I do not see ... But, if, in your own work, ... in fact, whether this might be research ... in the last session, I appealed to you to think about the subject of the lament, but, it would be necessary here to link, in fact, these productions, for example: the technical production of the face, the archaic Empire as being the producer of a ... of a type of face, the despotic face which, once again, is the face seen frontally with its two… with its two black holes, at least, and its… its kind of space of comparison. And then… or else that according to which you see as well at the level of land and land rent, or at the level of tax and merchandise, if indeed one can say this for other eras, if we can say this ...

I raised the question, here, can ... can we say this as well for the Empires of the East as for the Greek Cities ... -- for the Greek cities, it seems very true, indeed for everyone Aegean, that money has an origin in tax and not in… and not in the trade -- Is this also true, then, of the Eastern Empires? For me, I believe this is true, once again, for a very simple reason which is that, in all archaic Empires, trade is above all over-coded, that is, it is the Emperor who has the exclusivity over trade, at least for foreign trade. Henceforth, the way in which, for example, I am thinking of the compartmentalization of trade in the Chinese Empire, of the entire effort of the Chinese Empire to overcode trade, to prevent it from having its autonomy, it really is, it's an object…, in relation to the Emperor, it's an object of a monopolistic appropriation. Henceforth, even for the East, it seems to me that the market value of money is subordinated to the issuance of money, which occurs only on the basis of taxes. There is no control of trade without taxes.

So, we would have to look in entirely different directions. So, we have Eric Alliez [with us] who is working on something… very interesting and that I do not at all know, which is mercantilism, which therefore refers to entirely different regimes, but in the case of mercantilism… what relations might we find between… mercantilism… this is at the same time an economic theory and a practice, especially a practice which was very important in Europe and which gives a certain relation, which establishes a certain trade-tax relationship. What type of relationship? And would that confirm our analysis there? Don't you want to talk on this, don't you want to?

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible answer*]

Deleuze: But in its inspiration? No? No, no, as you wish, eh, as you wish. I mean, if ... because it's very complicated, you understand ... For at the same time, trade is divided precisely in its comparative space into internal trade and foreign trade, but also taxation is divided into direct tax and indirect tax. The two dualities obviously do not correspond at all. Indirect tax seems very interesting to me, indirect tax, because it would allow something perhaps to be seized that direct tax is hiding. Direct tax is not constitutive, any more than rent. Direct tax is a bit of the rent type; I mean it doesn't enter into determining the price of a commodity. But indirect tax enters into determining the price. So, I am not saying at all that indirect tax maintains the secret, but indirect tax allows us to understand much better in what sense tax is a condition presupposed by trade. It is at the level of indirect tax that, here, in our modern societies, one could discover a link according to which one could confirm that the commercial relationship presupposes taxation. [*Pause*] Yeah ... [*to Alliez*] Yeah, you'd rather ... uh ... talk about it some other time.

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Okay, you see? You see?

George Comtesse: [*inaudible*] a question?

Deleuze: Yes!

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] these three heads of the Empire, the Emperor as owner of the land, the entrepreneur, the banker [*inaudible words*]… Would [*inaudible words*] push this limit back, the face as limit, the face, which would reject the analysis of the machinic assemblage [*inaudible words*] desire of the Emperor. [*inaudible words*] That is, what is -- the question I'm asking myself is this: what is the despot's assemblage of desire so that he might become owner, entrepreneur, banker?

Deleuze: I understand your question, yes ...

Comtesse: [*inaudible words*] We could ask the same question again after Marx: the analysis he makes of Capital, in the three books of *Capital*, what is ultimately the desire for, not that Capital induces, but what is the desire from which Capital itself is deduced?

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes. There, I say…, I say it really sincerely, because I am not at all sure that I am entirely right, and I am not at all sure that you are, so... But the fact is that we always collide, you and me, upon the same difference, that is, if we translate that into ... as a reproach, not… for more convenience, the constant reproach that you make to me is not going far enough. You say to me: "there is still something else, after what you are saying, which must account for desire". And I -- so I really don't say that I am correct -- it's like a sort of irreducible difference between us, because every time that… you intervene, I have that same feeling. And I myself will reproach you, conversely, for always reintroducing a kind of transcendence, by demanding something other, yet again, which would take account. Because, for me, if you will, once I've described an assemblage -- and if you grant me that an assemblage description is not ... is a particular type of description -- but once I have described an assemblage, describing the assemblage means showing exactly what kind of, literally -- this word has been used on other occasions -- what kind of abstract machine the assemblage realizes. Suppose I say: the face assemblage, well yes, it realizes the following abstract machine: black hole-white wall, point of appropriation-space of

comparison. Once I've said that, I don't feel the need to say anything anymore, because it seems to me that desire is never, in any way whatsoever, behind the assemblage. Desire, for me, is solely and exclusively what puts the different parts of the assemblage into communication; that is, it is what makes it pass into the assemblage, or it's the co-functioning of the ... [*End of tape*] [46: 43]

**Part 2**

... abstract machine, but the assemblage as the realization of a machine is desire, right? To say that one would still need something else which takes account, for example, of the despot's desire once that, or of capital's desire, once one has described the Capital assemblage or the archaic Empire assemblage, for me, literally… , I mean uh…, if you will, me… uh… me no. I am no longer following any of this, because it seems to me to reintroduce a kind of transcendence.

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: I understand that we do not understand each other.

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] We can't just say "desire is what causes to circulate [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: You see. Yes we can; I am not mistaken, Comtesse. You are indeed telling me…

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] that desire is reduced to making the assemblage function, for example, imperial or capitalist, which is not the same thing anyway.

Deleuze: For me, yes, it is. For me, yes, it is. Desire means: it works.

Comtesse: Do you think that the imperial assemblage is the same thing as the capitalist assemblage?

Deleuze: Why are you making me say that, since this is not at all the… well, it's not the same desire. No, our difference is not there.

Comtesse: Okay, so ... only ... only, in the imperial assemblage and in the capitalist assemblage, we can ... we can speak perhaps -- this is a strong hypothesis -- we can perhaps speak of an assemblage of desire which would not at all be transcendent to the imperial assemblage or to the capitalist assemblage, but which would analyze a very functioning of this assemblage and which, however, would allow one to speak of an assemblage of desire as assemblage, as what precisely assembles Empire or Capital. So, it's not at all about the ... about the ... let's say the detour of a transcendence that I am asking this question or making this interrogation, because transcendence, I don't give shit about it.

Deleuze: Hey! Don't get rude! [*Laughter*] No, you understand, I am telling myself: so, you are asking for something more. Once again, I come back to my reaction; you have to manage to develop it because, when you demand, and as long as it remains in the state of this proposition, "something more is needed", I am telling myself: this "something more" -- I am telling myself that, by a nervous reaction -- I am telling myself: this "something more", either it's going to be a

simple abstract transfer of the assemblage, like a simple ... a simple repetition, or else it will be something which goes beyond the assemblage and which, literally, is transcendent. You are telling me: no, that's not it at all. So there, I am saying: it would be necessary… you would have to develop it within a specific case… Am I betraying your very statements by saying that you claim a dimension of desire which, one way or another, differs from the assemblage itself? That's not it, eh? … you see.

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] to analyze it starting from the functioning of the assemblage ...

Deleuze: But how does it differ from it?

Comtesse: The question is very simple: what is the assemblage of the despot's desire so that, precisely, the despot is this owner of the land, this contractor for major works, and this banker, precisely, who… with the tax [*inaudible words*]…

Deleuze: Do you mean that these determinations of desire exist before the assemblage?

Comtesse: No.

Claire Parnet: No, of course not.

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: So, it's that ... it roughly responds to what we call "abstract machine". In fact, the assemblages realize abstract machines. But I don't see how this is an assemblage of desire; I mean, you say constantly: assemblage of desire that you distinguish therefore ...

Comtesse: … of this assemblage of desire, you, you offer an element of the assemblage, that is, you offer the "face" element, it is not certain ... it is not certain that the element or the face component which is effectively a component of the assemblage of desire immanent to the imperial arrangement would be the entire assemblage of desire. That's the question.

Deleuze: Ah yeah, there, no…, the face is an element, in fact. I offered other elements: the earth, etc. ... Your objection, it seems to me, has a completely different meaning; it does not consist in telling me: you are reducing everything to the face element because that would be false, since I introduced the money element, the earth element, the element etc. ... My question is exactly this: here, here is an expression which is sometimes used by economists, so there, we would take a current, classic expression: desire for money. For me, "desire for money" is an expression that only means one thing, namely: define the assemblage in which a particular kind of money is created having a particular function. If I manage to describe this arrangement, I have said what the corresponding desire for money is. It seems to me that you are telling me: no. No, you have to define the desire for money in another way. I've got that right, haven't I?

Comtesse: Not ... not necessarily [*inaudible words*] it is desire that makes ... the assemblage of desire; this what we start from for there to be desire for money, that's what the meaning is. That is, desire for money is effectively the desire to create money [*inaudible words*], it is a desire ... it is a despot's desire, but it supposes the assemblage of despot's desire. [*Inaudible words*] For example, I am taking… I am taking… I am referring, for example, to make myself better

understood, to a book which is, which appeared a year or two ago, I believe, well, I don't quite agree with this book, but it's one of the directions, one of the lines of… [*inaudible words*]. It's Alain Grosrichard's book called *The Fiction of Asian Despotism*.[48] So, this book presents itself as a book of sometimes fictional analysis, but it has the interest and the merit, even if it remains in an interpretation at the end of the book [*inaudible words*], even if it remains within an interpretation in terms of the phallic signifier, therefore a Lacanian interpretation, nonetheless it has the merit of posing the problem of an assemblage of the despot's desire that would not be reduced quite simply, that we could not reduce everything simply to the exercise of the despot's power, that is...

Deleuze: Mmmh, the question is a bit elevated, Comtesse. Are you distinguishing…? [*Deleuze does not finish the question*] Listening you, I have the impression all the time that you want to distinguish between despot's assemblage of desire and despotic assemblage.

Comtesse: Yes, because you are talking about the power of the despot, the despot as owner, as banker, that is power, eh? Power refers to surplus labor… or else to the work of others [*inaudible words*], but that is not enough. We cannot simply analyze the assemblage of Empire as the assemblage of power. There is perhaps a conjugation between an assemblage of desire and an assemblage of power which would not be at all separable, not at all dissociable, but, precisely, the difficulty of which would be to show how that works, it can work together.

Deleuze: Listen, power, there, we'd on about this, uh, I suppose, both of us, but you are making me say, then, in your turn, things that I am not saying. I have never defined the assemblage as an assemblage of power; I define it as an assemblage of desire. In the despot's case, what does that mean? That means: for the despot's power to exist, what must have already been imposed? Land, work, money, face etc., this is not a closed list. Okay, so here, we can ... But what interests me is not that aspect at all; what interests me is that precisely land, money, face do not pre-exist. So, there is a creation of the land in distinction from territories. There is a creation of work in distinction from activity, from activities. There is a creation of money in distinction from trading (*échanges*), marginalist trading. When I linked these determinations to their creation, on my own account, I believe that I have taken the operation of desire into consideration. The phenomena of power only flow from it and flow from it secondarily, in my opinion, it seems to me. So, I don't define the assemblage at all as a structure or a device of power; I define it as an assemblage of desire. And, once again, what matters to me in the history of land is that, as soon as the land is established, it is a source of rent. That defines an interest as well as a power, interest and power of the owner. Good. But, as soon as the land is constituted, it is a source of a rent, but it is not this interest that will make it possible; this interest assumes that there is land and, more simply, the itinerance of territories.

So, my question specific to the assemblage of desire is: how is land constituted in distinction to the territory? And there, that's neither the interest, nor an exercise of power that will account for that. What will account for that is a passage from one type of assemblage to another; it is an entire organization that takes off in relation to the territory, which implies a kind of lift off in relation to the territory and that I have tried to define. So once there is land, yes, there is rent. But if you will, for me, what one could almost call poetic acts of assemblage, namely real creations

are by nature always primary in relation to the practical determinations of assemblage of the interest type and power type. So, that's why I have no need to seek a ... something extra, whatever way that you understand 'extra'. [*End of tape*] [59: 18]

**Part 3**

Deleuze: ... Is that clear, at least? I think it's very clear. You wanted to say something.

Claire Parnet: Yes, that is to say ...

Another student [*perhaps Hidenobu Suzuki*]:[49] I would like to talk about a Japanese writer who precisely explained something about the origin of the State in Japan. But this is a book that rejects all materialistic theories about the origin of the State, so it explains the common illusion or common phantasm. The author used Japanese myths and tales as documents ...

Another student: [*Inaudible*, *but given the answer, he seems to ask the name of the writer*]

The first student [*perhaps Suzuki*]: … The author's name is [Takaaki] Yoshimoto -- so he was using Japanese myths and ethnological tales. [*Inaudible words*] is that the origin of the state is not located in materialistic conditions, but located in, how to say, in types of mental, psychological illusions. And this author, Yoshimoto, is greatly influenced by Freud, but he rejects Freud to the extent that he says there is the difference between the type of psychology which is based on the sexual relation and collective psychology. There is the difference. So, we cannot speak in the same way of the sphere of the collective and psychology based on the sexual relation. So, in this sense he rejects Freud's theory. But in any case, he explains the origin of the Japanese State as being based on the types, on the germinal forms of common illusion which ultimately form the State as a mental object. So, what we talked about earlier, it seems to me to correspond a little to what this author said, that is, explaining the origin of the State like the seeds of mental illusion, and I would like to know whether Deleuze rejects this domain of the origin of the State as something transcendent or not.

Deleuze: Well, I'm a little ... a little ... overwhelmed (*abattu*)…

The same student: Because when you mentioned the magical capture, it immediately reminded me of [*inaudible words*] to the extent that you are talking about the magical aspect of capture anyway.

Deleuze: And yes, and yes, but this is very ambiguous ...

Claire Parnet: I would like to ask a question too.

Another student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What? What are you saying?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: The Japanese author is like Hume? Uh ... I don't know ... [*Laughter*] I don't know ... [*To Parnet*] You wanted to say something, right?

Claire Parnet: I wanted to ask you, finally, when you say: this capture means that, for example, when we are born, we are already caught, that is, we are already within it, is it that thing which causes it to function, are you speaking of it in the same way as desire, well, that makes this assemblage function? That is, because desire makes the assemblage function, is this when desire makes this assemblage function that, precisely, when we are born, we are already caught?

Deleuze: Uh, both. This is indeed because desire is completely immanent in the assemblage, that is, desire is not something which, which precedes…. There is no desire other than assembled or assembling (*agencé ou agençant*), this is the same, saying that it is assembled or saying that it is assembling, but there is never a desire for something which already would not be given. So that's one thing. Uh… When I say, this apparatus of capture necessarily functions, necessarily it functions, since we are already in it, what does that mean? It means exactly, once again: this is a capture operating on certain kinds of aggregates. This is why I needed to define the corresponding assemblage as an assemblage of aggregates and no longer as serial. This is a capture operating on certain kinds of aggregates. And you cannot define these aggregates without the apparatus of capture already intervening there, the apparatus that will operate on them. So, this is obligatory. This simply means that, in the assemblage, it is indeed desire, which is the circulation, that is the operation of circulation itself, without which there would be no assemblage.

Parnet: Yes, but, since ... this particular assemblage, that is, the despotic one that you were talking about, well ... uh ..., when you defined, when you spoke of land, you said that it was a relationship between land and an over-encoding of land…

Deleuze: and a territory, yes, and an over-coding of territory.

Parnet: But, the overcoding, doesn't it… doesn't it also… In the end, for me, when Georges [Comtesse] is talking, well, that's what I understand, but I don't know if he would agree, doesn't this over-coding, doesn't it… also intervene in the way in which desire allows parts of the assemblage to come together. ...?

Deleuze: Of course it does, in this case. In the case of an assemblage of over-encoding, it does intervene, of course. It is strictly everywhere in the assemblage. It is everywhere.

What bothers me more is, of course, where there is a great ambiguity, it concerns what you just said [*the Japanese student*], what bothers me greatly is that in all the outlines that I am proposing, there is never any reference whatsoever to any sort of "illusion", ... or even "mental reality", none at all. So, when I followed Dumézil in using the notion of magical capture, that did not at all refer to a domain that would be one of beliefs or illusions. Not at all. "Magic" was a convenient and temporary word to distinguish this type of capture from other types of capture. We would say, for example: yes, there is a war capture, but it is not at all the same as a State capture. And lo and behold, in mythologies -- but these I do not consider to be illusions either – we hear about a certain type of knot, a link, which is called the magic link, but which also has its

name in archaic Roman law, as we have seen, the *nexum*, n-e-x-u-m, which corresponds exactly to that, this sort of magic knot.[50]

So, for me, "magic" was the provisional word, since I could not yet, at that time, define the nature of this link; it was only a provisional word to point out that, be careful, this was not a knot operated through the violence of war, it was something else, it was another type of link. So, subsequently, we progressed, but I would also say, at that time, if we want to talk about magic, I would say that the currency, land rent, tax money and labor are magical determinations. At that point, I would say, there is indeed an objective determination of "magic". The objective determination of magic is when, in fact, you define an operation on an aggregate, but at the same time, you cannot define the aggregate without having already placed the operation into it. There, we locate a kind of knot which might be called “magic”, but in fact, it is perfectly objective in such an assemblage. You will say to me: but this is contradictory, an aggregate such that one cannot define it independently of the operation which bears on the aggregate. I would say: no, this is not contradictory, since it’s not at all a question of a universal definition; it suffices to define precisely the assemblage that makes this possible. Yeah ... well ... yes?

Another student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Yes ...

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes, here, not only are you not mistaken, but you are even right… uh… [*Laughter*] I mean: it goes without saying that, from the perspective of the archaic Empire, the aggregate of possible functions of the face is not all exhausted. Moreover, the corresponding art, this archaic Empire and the art which corresponds to it only create or assemble -- it comes to the same thing -- only assemble a certain type of face to the point that when you say: but, all the same, there are other functions of the face, obviously yes, apart from this assemblage, there, that is, with this, you are completely correct, and, in fact, it's not hard to ask the question, good. Even if what we are saying is suitable for this frontal face with the black hole and the white wall, well, finally, there are other types of face, and these other types of face, by what do they define themselves? Well, already by a famous figure, a completely different figure of the face; it is from the moment when faces, which then become several, several faces are placed into profile. Several faces in profile, that absolutely does not correspond… [*Deleuze does not finish*]

Uh, I insist on this; it is that a method like the one we are looking for, a method of analysis of assemblages, immediately allows us to exclude ... If someone says to me: but what are you doing with several faces in profile? Notice, all of a sudden, that interests me all the more since I tell myself right away: faces in profile can be in a position of allegiance to one another. For example, a seated king and then a knight coming in and then the king has the face at two thirds, the knight has the face at ... a quarter, I don't know what, and one pledges allegiance to the other. I need only describe such a piece of assemblage to know that it is not a despotic assemblage. This is not a despotic assemblage. Why? Well, like that, because it suits me, okay. [*Laughter*] The despotic face isn't… -- but you can tell the words are quite rich; we have already distinguished, for example, we should not confuse the despot of the archaic Empire with the tyrant of the Greek

city; no relation. We will not confuse ... the tyrant of the Greek city with a current dictator, all that is ..., it's ... or we really mix everything up. -- What I defined as a despotic face, and, there, you are completely right to say it: ok, this is absolutely a question of an example of assemblage, a type of face, it is this frontal face and which has no interlocutor or which doesn't have any…, any…, respondent described, indicated. The Byzantine face sees you frontally; it is you, you are the external spectator who is its respondent. What shows this? It is precisely that all the Byzantine depth is between what you see and you who are seeing.

When, on the other hand, you find yourself facing an assemblage, the assemblage can be very compelling, for example, well ... uh ... there is Christ and the apostles, there is a king and subjects. I can say, it's anything that you want, but it's not a despotic assemblage. It can be a monarchical assemblage, it can be an assemblage ... In any case, it belongs to a whole other world. The proof is that, at that moment, the depth will be integrated into the relationship of one face to the other. It will no longer be between the face seen frontally and you who are looking, as in ... as in a Byzantine work; it will be completely integrated into the work. This won't allow us to say that this is progress; we will say that it is a whole different assemblage.

So, the interesting cases for ... as to the question you are asking is: Aren't there some extraordinarily mixed cases, straddling over them? Obviously, there are. I mean, let's take the long history, since, in this matter of the face, there, which I was summarizing, Christ had a fundamental role from the pictorial point of view, from the plastic point of view. If you take… er… the face of Christ, you have… -- first of all, it all depends on at what moment, but let's even say the crucified Christ -- you have almost Byzantine Christs, that is, where, there Christ still participates in an archaic imperial face. There is God the Father behind Christ. But Christ keeps all kinds of elements of ..., all kinds of Byzantine elements. Then, there, Christ is like a spinning platform; we also see that with Christ appears a completely different type of face, and all the transitions from one to another, notably…, already, the face of Christ is a little turned away or completely in… completely in profile, at the limit, and therefore, is put into relationship with other faces, without this excluding, once again, the relations of allegiance, the relations of command, but these are no longer despotic relationships, they can be relationships of another nature.

Once again, the question is not whether it softens; it does not soften… uh…, but, it's a whole different type of face. The year we were considering the face, I don't know which [students] were there, but, there, I am recalling it to jog our memory, we chose the example of a painting which is very well commented by a critic. ... uh ... critic named Jean Paris, a painting by El Duccio uh ... which shows Christ and two apostles and which is precisely a hinge painting, a spinning platform painting, because one of the apostles still has a face in the Byzantine tradition and it is precisely the one who face frontally, while Christ and the other apostle are already in a relationship with a face in profile, with a face turned away, turned back, turning towards the one, and one towards the other, which precisely marks a completely different painting technique, that is, which emphasizes that depth is no longer between what I see and myself who is seeing, but that the depth is integrated into the pictorial elements of the painting. And there, it is in the same painting that you have an element which gestures toward the Byzantine tradition and another

element which gestures toward the future of painting which is readying itself, namely the integration of depth and new perspective.[51] So, on that, absolutely, I completely agree with you. Good. Well, then, therefore, let's continue. What time is it?

A student: Ten to twelve.

Deleuze: Ten to twelve?... What? Yes?

Another student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yeah ... I regret to say again that, for me, this problem absolutely does not arise, because you would have to know what "for him" means. Either you use "for him" in a sense… in a very, very indeterminate sense, and, at that point, it's still too vague, or you really mean: "for his own person". Now, the despot possesses no person. "Despot" designates only a public office. So, to say: the despot would seek, for example, seek power for him? Uh ... It seems to me, at the limit ... "for him" is an empty expression in such an assemblage. There is no "for him". The question we are now colliding with is, in fact: when will a category of the "for oneself" (*pour soi*) type arise? When does this category of "for oneself" arise, which obviously implies a private sphere? As the despot is a public function, as he reigns over communities that only exist collectively, there is absolutely no "for oneself", there is no private sphere; it is an arrangement that excludes any private sphere.

So, I am saying: at this level, "despot" refers exclusively to… -- it seems to me that Marx and even Engels say it very well in their text on the Asiatic Empire -- it is not at all a person who takes power; it is rather more of the type, if I try to summarize everything: you cannot define, for example, the land function in its difference from the territory function without, as a correlate of the land, there being a despotic function. But this is not a person; it's a function. So, he has no "for himself" at all, any more than the civil servant has any "for himself". Hence, when I say: everything is public, I mean: the municipalities own the land collectively, the land. The despot is the eminent owner, but not "for himself", that is, it is his very function which defines the unity, the transcendent unity of the territories simultaneously considered. Each territory is occupied, let us say, by a municipality which has collective possession of it. The despot is absolutely no different, is absolutely not a distinct person, with the following function: the unity of the territories that constitute the land.

He is not a person at all, he has no "for himself", so he does not seek a "for himself", nor power "for himself". First of all, power, well -- I have never mentioned power in this, it's not at all, the assemblages that I'm trying to describe, these are absolutely not power apparatuses. -- Power flows from it. Power always flows from it, and it follows secondarily, but it is a particular kind of power. Functionaries, for their part, as representatives of the despot either at the level of the land, or at the level of money, or at the level of labor, entrepreneurs, bankers, owners, are not owners for themselves; they are solely functional owners. It's insofar as they are functionaries of the despot that they have the benefit of a particular plot of land, or rather of the income from such land worked by the communities, owned by the communities. So, it is like a kind of public property with three floors: municipal possession of the territories, eminent property of the

despot, delegated property of the functionaries. But, at no time is there the least private landlord about whom you could say: this is a "for himself".

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Are functionaries the eyes of the despot? Yes, it is the multiplication of eyes, yes. As in… as in the Ethiopian parchment, we start with two eyes, and then we… they swarm. So, you've got things with four eyes… four eyes, eight eyes… "eight" eyes… uh… eight eyes [*Laughter*], twelve eyes, etc. then they swarm everywhere.

Another student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: The?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes.

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Face-landscape, it is… it is… it is… yes, it is of the same type as…, it belongs to these correlations, of these changes of assemblage, finally, of these…, no, of these ... Uh, if we admit that, in fact, there may very well be a head and even a human head that is not constituted along the mode of the face, in the same way, there are milieus ... there are milieus and even human milieus which do not necessarily constitute landscapes. So, uh… it is perhaps in the same assemblage that the heads are erected into faces and the milieus erected into landscapes, and, in fact, it is obvious that the transformation of milieus into landscapes involves precisely what we will call planning (*aménagement*), regional planning. In this sense, we could say that the first transformation of milieus into landscapes is done with public works. There is no landscape if there is no public works. It is public work that constitutes the milieus into landscapes.

So there, we can see very clearly that it can be in the same way that the body-head system is transformed or produced from the face by entering into a new assemblage, and it is at the same time that the milieus produce landscapes under the action of public works. If you will, I would say: ultimately, yes, uh… the birth of the landscape is something… it is, in fact, when we build pyramids in the desert, [that's] an entire development of the desert, there, which will transform the desert from milieu into landscape. Currently, the transformation of milieus into landscapes, well, this has been completed for a long time, but it continues, it continues, it is perpetually recreating itself. You see? But I don't think you can define ..., in this sense, there is an obvious correlation between face and landscape.[52] It belongs to the same assemblage. … Yes?

Another student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: I can't hear you.

Student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Ah, certainly not!

Student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, but, uh ... you understand, then, take the example of Kafka. I am saying that in an analysis based on assemblages, things are extremely, uh ... complicated, because it is obvious that in concrete reality, everything is mixed up. You have assemblages which are the concrete assemblages which are always mixed. Simply, they have dominant aspects. In Kafka's themes, for example, in Kafka's themes, we can see very well where the mixtures are. But, precisely, if Kafka is so modern, it is because he refers to other assemblages, he refers to current assemblages, he does not refer to ... assemblages as archaic as those about which we are speaking for the moment.

But still, if ... I am choosing an example, a uh, well-known example, it is *The Great Wall of China*. The Great Wall of China typically describes the construction of the Great Wall of China under the supposed conditions of an archaic Empire. However, his answer to a Kafkaesque pattern that you find very often is the pattern of the pyramid, the pattern of the pyramid or the tower. You remember, in *The Great Wall of China*, there is the construction of a tower in the center, a tower that will never be completed, which is very, very weird. I would say: this pattern of the tower or the pyramid surrounded by a wall, it is very precisely the archaic imperial model. So, it intervenes within Kafka. But what Kafka doesn't stop… -- he doesn't say it, obviously, because he has too much art, it's not his job to say it -- he does not cease showing that this model functions so little that, on the one hand, if I take the… Kafka's texts literally, sometimes he tells us: this model has… never has been completed and will always remain unfinished, because they moved on to something else. To what? He will express it. Or he says: it's true, it exists, but only if one only looks from a distance. It only exists if one only looks from a distance, because, as soon as you get closer, you realize that it's a whole different assemblage.

So, Kafka's first theme: yes, it exists, but it was never completed; it was replaced by something else; it is the Great Wall of China. Indeed, the nomads came, etc., etc. Where did they come from? They are already there before we understood how ... The Emperor ... the Emperor of China is no longer the despot since he is reduced to hiding behind his shutters and curtains, while in the square, while in the town square, there are the nomads who camp out and their carnivorous horses which are eating the meat. It's beautiful. [*Laughter*] Good. There you go, this is a first note on Kafka.

A second note on Kafka: This is only true from a distance, you can see that both, uh ... are ... Why is it only true from a distance? There is the great example of the castle. From a distance, K sees the castle, and the castle corresponds absolutely, from a distance, to the archaic imperial model: a great tower… uh…, a kind of pyramid… uh… a celestial bureaucracy, the despot's functionary, etc. But the closer K gets -- and in fact, he can't get any closer, so it gets even more complicated than that -- the more he realizes that what he took from afar for a castle or for some sort of bell tower or for a tower is in fact an aggregate of small huts connected to each other in length. The text is magnificent, this sort of optical transformation of the castle into a sort of…, an aggregate of shacks that are even more disturbing.

Okay, so let's not get into the "what does that mean?", but finally, for convenience, let's say: what does that mean? It's that, understand, we are already in a whole different assemblage. Kafka simply situated himself at the crossroads of the two. It is no longer the tower-pyramid assemblage; it is the assemblage, this time, [of] corridors, endless corridors horizontally and no longer a transcendent tower vertically. And when Kafka… -- but you know… uh… who, you know, was a specialized bureaucrat, a great bureaucrat, right, that he occupied important bureaucratic functions -- Kafka never stopped wondering, there, very… -- this is not symbolism, he never created symbolism -- he reflected on the modern conditions of bureaucracy.

Uh… I'm not saying that his work holds… boils down to that, but it was one of… one of Kafka's most pointed subjects of political reflection. Well, what is he telling us? He was the first, to my knowledge -- and long before sociologists specializing in bureaucracy -- he was the first to identify the current forms of what one might call neo-bureaucracy. And neo-bureaucracy is not a pyramid-like bureaucracy at all; it's a bureaucracy of corridors, it's a bureaucracy of segments, a string of offices. In *The Castle*, you have the admirable character, Barnabas, whose dream is to become a messenger, at the bottom of the bureaucracy; he asks for a very small post. And he goes from office to office to office to office, in a straight line, horizontally, and he tells the story of his passage, etc.[53]

The same move as for the castle, you have it in *Amerika*, in an extraordinary text where Kafka describes -- but then it takes an art to arrive at that description – in which, if you will, as the description advances, our reader's eye is like in a kaleidoscope; it's the scene that changes, and yet it's the same scene. He describes the castle, uh… not the castle, he describes a house… uh… which is the house of… his uncle, the house of the hero's uncle and, again, at first, we believe that it is a kind of pyramidal house and everything happens as if, as the text unfolds, everything occurs as if the pyramidal house was laying on its side, becoming a kind of corridor which stretches out the rooms. Everything changes. This, I would say, is the transition from the old archaic imperial bureaucracy to the neo-bureaucracy, to modern bureaucracy.

And that's what struck me about Kafka. If you will, why did a movie guy like Orson Welles so fully, so fully grasp Kafka's meaning? Because this only works with encounters, all of that. It's not because Orson Welles read Kafka better than, than others; it's not because he reads better than Marthe Robert, that's not why.[54] Reading better is a matter of talent, it is not a question of… uh… [*Deleuze does not complete this*] But, what explains the encounter… er… the Orson Welles-Kafka encounter? It's not complicated. Suppose, I don't know, that even Kafka only read... that Orson Welles only read Kafka late in life. How did he function before, Orson Welles? It's very weird. Whether they were phantasms or not, what were those things that were his very own? His very own things are not complicated; he had like two ... two dynamic directions that he placed into all his films, but with all the expressive variations you want. He had two main themes, that is, he must live frantically. What are his two main themes? And technically, in the cinema, obviously, that produces something different than in writing. And, to each film, you can assign techniques of camera perspective, techniques ... er ... really optical techniques.

His first major theme was space, vertical space (*en hauteur*) ... so, that can occur ... yes, space that flees vertically. And his other great theme is a longitudinal line of flight. The dominant

space, if you will, by schematizing both, the dominant space of imperialisms is the longitudinal line of flight. If I choose films by Welles arbitrarily..., not arbitrarily in quality, but films like that, at random, it is obvious that, from his first films onward, these two spaces enter, or these two spatial elements enter into incredible combinations. I mean, the beauty of what he gets out of these, of these two great axes of space, it's ... it's fantastic.

If I take a film that is not by Orson Welles, the famous *Third Man*, in which we see that he was not content just to act, but that he obviously inspired the film, that he inspired the images… that it's signed Welles. This is not complicated; it is the extraordinary life and skill, it is not copying, so he had to get involved, through which you find combined the images of great Viennese hotels all vertical with a spiral staircase or the *Third Man*'s Ferris wheel, if you remember, which then defines a space, in fact, which is going to be the space of imperial domination, because that's where Orson Welles at one point thinks about eliminating his buddy by throwing him off the Ferris wheel. So, these spaces, all at great height and dominance and then the space of the sewers which graze the earth, and which will define a longitudinal line of flight of the *Third Man*'s hero.

If I take *The Lady from Shanghai*, think about the contrasting value… I mean, what is lyricism, lyrical values in the cinematographic image? You find the whole theme, for example -- uh, I haven't seen it for a long time so ... -- there is the whole theme of ... uh ... of the space of heights, for example, Rita Hayworth who is diving … who plunges completely from the top of a rock, there… the dive corresponds, it refers completely to the Ferris wheel of the *Third Man*. And then, you have longitudinal space; there is a beautiful image in *The Lady from Shanghai* in which I no longer know who is running; there is a beach where there are kinds of cabins or motels that look out onto a wooded pathway. There are all these people are coming out of ... their holes, their little houses, coming together while something is going on in the longitudinal pathway, and this appears like a kind of movement of flight.

In, uh, in *The Trial*, the way in which he manipulated that space, for example, if you remember the scene of the little girls running and the painter… uh… of Titorelli and the perverted little girls, the way they run into a kind of… space that is really formed by a sort of hedgerow, a kind of very long openwork box, and they run laughing, shouting, and it's a kind of flight, movement… it's very, very fast, very beautiful. And, conversely, there is the whole tribunal space which is very ambiguous, since, also seen from a distance, it looks like a space of heights, but, as soon as one approaches it, it's clear that this is not the case; it's like rooms strung together one after the other.

So, there, you have…, and there, we have introduced what I would like us to start developing today: that introduces this kind of passage from one bureaucracy… When one of the great specialists on China… er… on archaic China, namely [Etienne] Balazs, b-a-l-a-z-s, names his book -- or his [*inaudible word*], I don't remember -- *La bureaucratie celeste* [*The celestial bureaucracy*], that means something.[55] It means: this expresses the bureaucracy of the archaic Empires. And this archaic bureaucracy, in my opinion, is easy to account for with the categories that we have tried to identify. It is this bureaucracy of heights, it is the construction of a pyramid, a pyramid, if you will, whose summit would be the despotic function, the base would be the communities occupying the different territories -- notice that the top overcodes the base, that is,

the aggregate of the territories compared -- and the… the sides… the sides of the pyramid would be the different aspects of the civil service. In our case, it would be more of a trihedron, you can imagine; we could always find a fourth, a fifth, a fifth side, etc.

So, there it would be fine. Today, it goes without saying that our bureaucracy has retained something of this aspect. For example, it thrills me greatly that at the time of ... at the start of the Soviet revolution, when the Futurists embarked on some truly great bureaucratic projects, namely the plans, plans for ... er ... architectural plans for … uh… the central committee, for… this, that, they again adopted, even if it meant… -- that did not prevent what they were doing from being very, very creative -- they again adopted the large model of the tower by introducing into this ... [*Deleuze does not complete this*], and at that time, the tower projects flourished. But one can think that, at the same time, other bureaucratic elements were developing their seeds and introducing a completely different space.

And furthermore, if I come back to Kafka's *The Castle*, to be done with this, perhaps you remember that the castle is only a castle in appearance and seen from afar. As soon as you approach, it looks more like a series of hovels. But, if you remember, moreover, the castle functionaries do not carry on their activity – so it seems, as far as can be discerned -- do not carry out their activity in the castle itself, but go into a hotel, and the functionaries at the hotel… the hotel then, from near or far, is no longer a castle at all, it's a row of pitiful rooms, and it is there that the real business gets done. In other words, the hotel vertically has replaced the castle horizontally, which means, at the most ... at the simplest, if you will, there is indeed a new bureaucracy which passes through the contiguity of the offices, the horizontal contiguity of offices, and which is no longer the celestial bureaucracy, which is a bureaucracy of a completely different type. So, despite everything, it's great, it's ... that doesn't keep it from ... whatever you want ... Any mix can occur.

If you take a huge architectural ensemble today, a modern one, for example, in America… uh… you could very well have the CEO at the top of the tower. Ah, that's aaah ... At that point, he takes on the old office of despotic Emperor. There we are… Uh… One of Kafka's jokes -- I hope he didn't do it every day, because it would have been monotonous -- it's: he worked, you know, in a kind of large social insurance center of the Austrian Empire. When he… in Prague. When he walked into the foyer, right, he would make the sign of the cross, the cross, he who was a Jew, he made the sign of the cross, and he genuflected to show that this was it, the Temple of… [*Deleuze does not complete this*] It must have been frowned upon, it must have lowered its rating, [*Laughter*] but… uh… well, that's the call to the celestial bureaucracy.

But, at the same time, the power centers -- to speak of powers there, as they are swarmed ... when there are powers, for me, they are by nature swarmed within assemblages; they never require ... they really are quite secondary determinations. -- In a modern bureaucratic assemblage, the centers of power are much more in the relationship of an office to the adjoining office than in the hierarchical, vertical relationship. And, where Kafka, really, has been, once again, had understood everything beforehand, is that when modern sociologists deal with bureaucracies -- in particular, there are many Americans who work on bureaucracy -- they show this very well, how the contiguity of offices undermines ... -- of course, all of this gets

rediscovered, the cause is the same -- but, if necessary, undermines, it's like a double grid, the orders, the hierarchical orders which go from the highest to the lowest, there is a whole relationship of offices contiguous with each other that, if necessary, will implicate not a force of resistance or inertia in relation to orders coming from above ... [*End of tape*] [1: 45: 58]

**Part 4**

… a dislocation from one office in relation to the other in which the order is transformed horizontally, where the order that ... not only, there is the transformation of the order according to the hierarchical scale from top to bottom, but there are modulations, modifications when one passes from one office to another, such that a file ... You must consider the double path: the celestial path, the celestial circuit of the archaic imperial bureaucracy, from top to bottom, and the longitudinal path from one office to another. It's not the same bureaucracy. And yet, it can be the same people participating in both. But, you see, we are at the border of two different assemblages. So, it's onto this point that we almost were connecting. If you grant me this, whatever your agreements or disagreements might be ... What time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: Twelve twenty.

Deleuze: Twelve twenty, so we'll finish soon. If you grant me this description of the despotic imperial assemblage, just this once you will grant me this, even though I haven't said much about it yet, it's not at all the same thing as the tyrant of a City, not at all the same as the dictator of a modern State; there's no relation. Once again, the despot has been defined as being exclusively a public function under the conditions of this archaic Empire assemblage, and we attempted to describe this assemblage.

Well, once again, I am summing everything up in negative form by saying: but on this point, there is neither "for oneself," nor a private determination. So we collide… -- we can translate it in… er…, in an almost evolutionary form, but we remove from it what is evolutionist therein – we collide with the question: so then, where can the "for oneself" of private property come from, which will nevertheless be fundamental in the… in… in the entire State apparatus? We began by describing a State apparatus assemblage that does not include any determination of private property. All property is public there. In fact, municipal possession of territories, despotic ownership of land, delegation of ownership to functionaries: there is absolutely no private owner in this. The functionary enjoys ... income or tenure only insofar as being a functionary, that is, through the function he performs, but not insofar as being a person.

So, that becomes a real problem: where can private property come from? Well, if you will, to proceed well, to proceed in order, I would say: we have, in principle, we managed to define very broadly a State apparatus assemblage under the category of the archaic Empire. Everything that we then discover is going to be revealed as varieties of the State apparatus. Will these varieties be or are they evolving? We leave that question for the moment. No doubt, for more convenience, we will act as if they were evolutionary because it is more convenient in expressing

ourselves, but I completely set aside the question of knowing whether there has been a historical evolution or if it is something other than an evolution.

And the question is: where can private property come from? Once we've said: we have as a point of reference ... it's that our States, and as far as our memory goes back, since we do not have the memory of archaic Empires ... uh ... as far as our memory goes back: well, States function within a type of assemblage that operates a mixture of public and private. So, where does the sphere of "for oneself" come from in States? Where does the sphere of private property come from in States? And this is the question I asked last time, and although we've considered all of its aspects, we don't see yet.

If I am summarizing the entirety of this: who can have, here, both an interest in private property -- I am indeed saying "interest" -- or find a power in private property, once it's said that the desire for private property is going to be something else, since the desire for private property is but one with the emergence of private property in a new type of assemblage, the type of assemblage we are looking for? But nobody can; at first glance, nobody. I am saying: the despot's entire interest, once the imperial assemblage exists, his entire interest is to continue within that assemblage. For the functionary, it's even clearer. The functionary receives income from the land granted to him. This land is used by the municipalities. The municipalities give the functionary an annuity (*rente*) in kind and in work. It is obvious that the functionary insofar as being a functionary has no interest in transforming such a regime, since, moreover, this regime is the basis of his existence as functionary. It would be suicide. As the author I was quoting said, a specialist in the Chinese Empire, as [Ferenc] Tökei said: it is conceivable that functionaries might become little despots, that is, create despotic domains, … uh ... separate, autonomous, but absolutely inconceivable that they would become private owners. It is as if they are being invited to overturn the very basis of their social existence. So, neither the despot, nor the functionary, nor the member of the municipality who, as a member of the municipality, has possession of the territory, absolutely no one, in such a system, has an interest in private property.

Where can that come from? So, this is what I was saying: this article or this text by Tökei seems very good to me, because it answers…, I said it the last time, well, it tells us something very curious, it seems to me. He tells us: well you understand, it's not difficult, we have to find… -- it's almost, there, a… a very important methodological point; the text is very, very well done , by Tökei ... -- he said: we would have to find someone, a social character who, at the same time, is part of the archaic Empire and is not encompassed therein, an excluded yet included character. Excluded people in the pure state, that's not difficult: these are outlaws, outcasts. But someone who is both caught up in the archaic Empire and yet not included within it, what can it be? It is neither the despot, nor the functionary, nor the member of a municipality, nor even the slave. For the slave is like everything in the archaic Empire; it is what Marx called, rather than private slavery, in opposition to this, he called it generalized slavery. And generalized slavery is simply the fact that municipalities as municipalities, that peasant municipalities as municipalities, had slaves or else the fact that there were slaves delegated to functionaries, that is, function slaves, attached to one function or another. So, here again, this is public slavery; it's absolutely not the

private slavery of the ancient City. This is why we speak of the archaic Empire in contrast, among other things, with the ancient City.

So, who? Whose interest is it in? That will not be enough to explain the birth of private property, but, if we manage to show that there is indeed a type of collective character who is both caught in the archaic Empire and not included in the Empire, we will have something like a possible hypothesis. And the answer that I find very beautiful from Tökei is: well yes indeed, it is the slave, but the freed slave. It's the freed slave. What does he mean? The freed slave arises as …, which is a product of the archaic Empire, but is produced in the archaic Empire and is not encompassed by it. He no longer has social status. He is produced in the archaic Empire as without-status (*hors-statut*). If I dared to say this, I would say: he is produced with the overcoding, but as uncoded. Indeed, the freed slave, this is awful; he no longer has any status and, as Tökei says -- that's why, the last time, I followed up on the problem of lament and the elegy – he's the one who initiates his lament, and the Chinese elegy begins with this collective movement of freed slaves.

Fine. Let's extend the "Tokei hypothesis"; let's extend the hypothesis. He says: is it by chance that it is the freed slave who will become a private owner? And not only will he become a private owner, but he will become a master in the dual fields of commerce and crafts; if you prefer, of market currency and business, private property, private enterprise? Moreover, it is the freed slave who, in China, will bring the first seeds of private slavery, that is, he will have the right to bond his slaves to himself in a private capacity, especially for metallurgical work, for mining work. Fine. This is a very odd story.

That should make us think of something, and here, it is not by chance, of course, that Tökei is a Marxist. Because, in Marx, there is a remark that he does not invent since Marx is not a specialist in Roman history, and that he draws from historians of Roman history of the 19th century. This is the following story: we are told that the Roman plebs have a long history and that, in particular, the plebs were an essential factor in the demise of the old Etruscan royalty which was quite ... , the old Etruscan kingship, was very much of the pattern and type of the archaic Empire. Well, the plebs supposedly were an essential factor in the destruction of the old royalty for the benefit of the Republic.

And how is the plebeian distinguished from the patrician in archaic Rome? He is distinguished in this way: the patrician is a member through lineage or through community; he forms the Roman people, *populus romanus*. The Roman people, above all, is not the plebeians; it is the patricians. And how is he defined? He has the right to exploit, the right to exploit the public domain which the Latins call: *ager publicus*, a-g-e-r, the field, *publicus*. The patrician is the member through lineage or community who has the right to exploit the *ager publicus*. You see? [*Pause*] There is no private property at all, to the extent that it would be a fundamental misunderstanding to say: the patricians were the rich who had private property. History has taken quite other paths. They have the right to exploit the *ager publicus* which remains the property of either the community or the property of the King, the eminent property of the King, whatever you want. This is a model outline. It's a schematic of… archaic Empire, or itinerant community, at the extreme; it's a mix of them both.

The plebeian, first of all, who is he? All historians agree that all or part, at least in part, plebeians are freed slaves. Not only so; they are also conquered foreigners, whose territory has been conquered, uh… it's also people who are, uh… who have arrived, migrants, etc., but everyone says that plebeians are partly freed slaves. And, as freed slaves, they are excluded from all public rights. Excluded from all public rights, that's essential. We find exactly the freed Chinese slave and the Roman plebeian. There, there is a great identity of status. They are excluded from all public rights in exchange for what? They and they alone have the power, as they say in Roman law, to assign ownership of the *ager publicus*. They assign ownership of the *ager publicu*s to the extent that they are excluded from public property, that is, to the extent that they do not have the right to exploit *ager publicus* like the patricians. What does that mean, they assign ownership of the *ager publicus*? This means: they receive in compensation a parcel of the *ager publicus* by rights. It is not necessarily from the existing *ager publicus*; they are granted a part not yet exploited, for example, a piece of land, of which they are private owners. [*Pause*]

And we only find the same figure for the freed Chinese slave, whatever the difference in the contexts, namely, it is the plebeian who has the legal possibility of becoming the private owner of a plot of land, who has the legal possibility to get involved in trade and to manage enterprises, in particular, metallurgical. If you will, it is at the level of the freed slave or the plebeian that the triple privatization takes place. You will tell me -- I am specifying so, uh ... so that there really is no mistake here -- you will tell me: but freed slaves, that already assumes the existence of slaves, and slaves were private property. I remind you that's not the case. The freed slave assumes public slaves, slaves of municipalities or slaves of functionaries who are freed after a long process and who are without-status, who had status as long as they were slaves, a public status, but who become without-status. And it is, it is these freedmen who will become at once private owners, small private owners of plots of land, small entrepreneurs, small merchants, almost in ... outside the mesh or under the mesh of imperial overcoding. In other words, they are the ones who will cause the flows of private appropriation to flow in contrast with the archaic pole of public appropriation.

While it is the Chinese freedman, whether it is the Roman plebeian, that, at that moment, there is a germ that will work through the States, the archaic States, namely a kind of phenomenon which both grows from within and escapes imperial overcoding. And we can see very well ... You will tell me: but it's still weird, this kind of accident where it is the Empire itself which produces [this]. It is this totally bizarre character, in fact, and who throughout history is obviously aggrieved, namely, he is both in the Empire, but he is produced in the Empire as excluded through the overcoding of Empire. He has no social status. And it is at this level that privatizations begin to take shape, and then the history will ... will precipitate the course, will precipitate the pace.

So, in fact, it should be said that this is not surprising, because if you take the two assemblages that were our starting points – first, the code-territory assemblages, the assemblage of itinerance; second, the overcoding-land assemblage, the assemblage of archaic Empire -- could we not say this, that imperial overcoding necessarily entails – this is a possible hypothesis -- necessarily entails as a repercussion, as a correlate, some decoding of flows? At the same time as it

overcodes flows, a kind of decoding occurs as a countermove. As long as we were dealing with a territory-code type of assemblage, the territorial flows were ... were relatively coded, with relative flexibility. An imperial overcoding apparatus gets introduced that will overcode all of these codes and overcode all of these territories turning them into land. Suddenly, these now overcoded streams, well, a part or several of them, tend to escape. And, when the land is overcoded as public appropriation, at the same time the land flow partially tends to decode. When activity is overcoded as public works, a flow of land tends toward being partially decoded. When money is overcoded and therefore created in the form of taxes, a monetary flow tends to be decoded. And it is these decoded flows that will constitute the flow of private property, the flow of private enterprise, the flow of private commerce.

And that would remain completely unintelligible if we could not assign a type of collective character who is precisely on the hinge of this overcoding and decoding of flows. If you will, when flows get overcoded ... uh, we must always remember that "decoding" does not mean a flow whose code is encompassed; on the contrary, it means: a decoded flow is a flow whose … It is a flow which is no longer encompassed within its own code, which is no longer contained in its own code, which escapes its own code. In fact, one can assign within the archaic Empire the point where the overcoded flows tend through compensation to be decoded, and this point is this point of the plebs or of the freed slave. There you go, well… yes… [*End of the session*] [2: 08: 30]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 07, 29 January 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

Deleuze: ... like that ... we ... First ... First ... Eric, do you ... would you talk a little, or not?

Eric Alliez: Yes.

Deleuze: There you go, first I am looking either for confirmations or else – so that you understand what we are talking about -- confirmations or else complications on the theme that we have considered in the previous meetings, namely: a certain tax-trade relationship, such that, in a certain way, trade could only be developed in a social milieu of taxation. We considered that a lot. And so, among us, we have here, we have here ... Eric Alliez who has been working for some time on both an economic doctrine and on a period in which this doctrine was very important, namely mercantilism.[56] And so I asked him ... how, in his opinion, was organized, among these so-called mercantilist authors -- who are both practitioners ..., who are not only theorists, who are practitioners -- how was the tax-trade relationship organized, since this occurred at an essential moment in the historical formation of European trade? So, what would you say about this topic? What...?

Éric Alliez: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: You have to speak as loud as you can, eh, because ... I don't know if ...

Alliez: I was saying, there is a relationship that emerges between money, taxes and commerce. More than mercantilist theories, I am going to try to consider as closely as possible the politics that the Imperial States developed, to the extent that mercantilism is the triumphant doctrine between, say, the middle of the 17th century and the middle of the 18th century. So, in fact, the thesis that I would like to try to extract is that, in fact, the best formulation, let's say, of the money-tax problem that the mercantilists could paradoxically have given is found in Hobbes. So, in fact, in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes identifies, let's say, two circuits of money, a venous circuit and an arterial circuit. So, I roughly have laid out the problematic. So, in fact, Hobbes says that the venous circuit of money is the taxes and levies which are placed on goods that are transported, bought or sold, a certain metallic mass. This one is channeled into the heart of the man-Leviathan, that is, in the State coffers, and it is there that the metal will receive the vital

principle, because in fact, only its authority, that is, the State authority, will be able to give it its rate (*son cours*).

Deleuze: This is very interesting. Is that in *Leviathan*? How about that.

Alliez: Yes. For those interested, this is pages 268-269 of the, er, edition ...

Deleuze: French or ...?

Alliez: Yes, yes, French. I believe that it's the Sirey edition [1971]. And, next, therefore, to this venous circuit is located an arterial circuit that he defines as the redistribution to individuals, and it is therefore the State which will give the impetus for exchanges of manufacturing and cultures. So we find in a ... in a French mercantilist named Vauban, let's say, a conception which is very, very close to that, insofar as he clearly says that the circuit of money begins at the time of government spending. And he explains it as follows: the horizontal circuit induced by State spending is the same as that which, naturally, links Paris to the heartland (*campagnes*) [*inaudible words*], simply that money circulates there faster, and it is precisely this increase in the speed of circulation, and therefore of money, which will increase national wealth.

So ... it seems to me that the ... the starting point to tackle the problem, let's say historically, is the repeated failure of all the so-called protectionist regulations, therefore all the attempts at overcoding that the territorial States make throughout the 16th century to put an end to the leaks of gold, what we will call cash outflows, and this failure has a demonstrative value on an essential point, namely that, in fact, these are the flows of commercial movements, known as the decoded flows, which regulate and disrupt the movement of cash and fluctuations in process (*en cours*). So, the mercantilists had an example, well, in front of them, one that's very precise; it was obviously the example of Spain which had an absolutely extraordinary wealth both in cash and in precious currency from the 15th to the 16th century, and Spain is absolutely incapable of retaining its wealth [*inaudible words*]. So, from there, something very important plays out, and it is mercantilism that completely takes off from all metalist thinking, that always reasons in terms of the body of gold.

Deleuze: In terms of?

Alliez: The body of gold ...

Deleuze: Ah yes, quite right, yes, yes.

Alliez: That is, that the nation must absolutely preserve as much as possible all precious metals and prevent them from circulating and going to other nations.

So, in fact, what is very curious is that in all classical economic thought, mercantilism has been constantly assimilated with this doctrine whereas, well, we realize that historically [*inaudible words*] this is totally false. So, starting from there, well ... let's say that the war for money (*guerre d'argent*), what Colbert defines as a war for money, takes on a whole new face, and that's the famous theory of trade balance given by an English mercantilist named [Thomas] Mun,

at the beginning of the 17th century, and there, he tells us very clearly that there is a need for circulation of currencies, of metal, to establish a positive balance of exports, and ... therefore, of course, therefore, as I said, this mutation has been determined by taking into account, say, the impossibility of a direct coding of the movement of currencies.

So, from that moment on, essentially English mercantilists will try to stop all the policies of currency devaluation [*inaudible remarks*] which, up to that point, were the most traditional method to manage to pay off public debts, so that the State, in fact, no longer intervenes to regulate the movement of currency, by orienting the movement of the trade via indirect tax (which of course enters into the determination of prices, that Gilles had shown well the last time), public credit and, of course, a whole policy of borrowing, investment and financing, that is, obviously, public expenditure.

So, to summarize a little this ... this very general approach, in this way, to mercantilism, we can in fact say that mercantilism is truly a political geometry of power in that all its work consists of an operation of axiomatization of production starting from the creation of a new space of appropriation and distribution which is the national territory. And the national market is therefore the new comparative space that the mercantilists will cause to emerge from this appropriation [*inaudible words*] of the currency represented by taxes and public credit.

Deleuze: Can I ask a question?

Alliez: Yes

Deleuze: Historically, we can clearly see that the mercantilists, in fact, are very closely linked to the ... er ... 17th century formation of ... large States such as the France and England types, right? Are there mercantilist currents that are linked to the autonomy of cities, or not? Are all the mercantilists ... really linked to the emergence of ... the so-called modern state in the 17th century?

Éric Alliez: The question is difficult, because the mercantilists, strictly speaking, are indeed linked to the emergence of the modern state. [Deleuze: mmh mmh, yes yes yes] It's just that mercantilist policy appropriates a whole series of procedures which were already at the level of protectionism. But the mercantilist current itself is entirely determined by the emergence of the modern State.

Deleuze: Alright, alright, great. Yes, it is very ...

Alliez: So, so we have ...

Deleuze: Although, indeed, it appropriates urban mechanisms ... that's it. Yeah, that's fine for us ... because ... okay, yeah?

Eric Alliez: So, we are used to defining this mercantilism by a nationalization of economic life, so, well, through the best known practices of mercantilist policy, namely: creation of large monopolies to promote and control both foreign trade; the distribution of part of this commercial

capital to manufacturers in the form of subsidies, tax exemptions etc., and then, of course, a whole territorial planning policy with public works which aim in fact essentially at the creation of facilities of circulation. This is the entire policy, well, around creating canals, customs problems [*inaudible words*], etc. So, there is an economic historian called Schuler in the 19th century, who precisely sums up this connection of mercantilism with the emergence of the territorial State. I've jotted down the quote; he said, "Mercantilism in its very essence is nothing other than the formation of the State, not the formation of the state per se, but the simultaneous building of the State and the economic system" ... well …

But what interests us here, beyond a very general approach to mercantilism, is to try to identify somehow zones of immanence [*inaudible words*] of the mechanism of capture constituting what we could call the abstract machinism of the economic-administrative striation of the mercantilists which is, obviously, the basis of the new assemblage, namely: the nation. So, in fact, this whole kind of ... gigantic informational machine that the territorial State is putting into place, let's say, which will simultaneously record, balance, regulate, distribute etc., the financial, commercial, industrial flows, and this obviously allowing the appropriation of the circulation of [*inaudible words*] foreign trade, derives its existence and its efficiency only from a more fundamental plane of appropriation -- this is what Gilles spoke to us about the last time -- namely, the tax that Marx defines, I believe quite rightly, as the economic existence of the State and, correlatively of course, the public credit that Marx defines, always in *Capital*, as the "credo of capital", that's a quote, since public debt operates as "one of the most energetic levers of primitive accumulation", it "endows barren money with power of breeding by converting it to capital".[57]

So what is interesting at the level of mercantilists is that there is a very, very clear awareness of a conjunction developing these two planes, namely tax and public credit, the two being completely inseparable, more precisely, the State accumulation. And of this State accumulation, it can be said that it is really the continuous thread, properly designated. And fine, State accumulation, fine, indirect tax insofar being an advance on capital, while direct tax that occurs on revenue, is really the azimuth point which will allow this mechanism of exchange to be grasped.

So [*inaudible words*] as we said the last time there, [*inaudible words*] he says at one point something that sums up the problem very well, he says: "thus tax and currency appear to be transformers of economic wealth into political power."

Deleuze: yeah, yeah, yeah ...

Eric Alliez: It's ... it's ... So, what I want to do now to complete this ... this kind of overview, like that, would be to try to see what effectively happened in France and England at the level of fiscal policy between, say, the middle of the 17th century and the middle of the 18th century. So obviously [*inaudible words*].

A woman student: [*Inaudible words; she requests to be able to speak to the students, and apparently distributes an announcement for a meeting to be held that morning*]

Deleuze: Of course.

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: I think there are already some. But if you can ... yes. Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes. You will leave some, yes. You pass them around, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: No, there isn't? Wasn't it that that we ...?

Another student: Yes, it was.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes. But you can leave more of them, thank you.

Initial student: Bye.

Deleuze: Goodbye.

Eric Alliez: Yes, so then ...

Deleuze: … those who want to go there at 11 am, eh, you can just go ....

Eric Alliez: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: We can't hear you, Eric.

Eric Alliez: So, I was saying that, in France and in England, mercantilism tends to identify two fundamental fiscal policies, namely: on the one hand, in France with Colbert, and in England with [William] Petty, so from, say, from the middle of the 17th century, it is the aggregate of all the indirect taxes that will be established as the basis of public revenues. So, for example, in England, I have the figures: there, the indirect tax is 70 percent of the total tax. And in France, in the 18th century, the direct tax only increased by half, while the lease of the general tax farm (*la ferme générale*), which collected all of the kingdom's indirect taxes, was going to quintuple. So, that is the first point. And so there, to return to what Gilles said earlier, what is important is that we realize that the nation-State is really reintegrating into its fiscal policy a fundamental element which was at the base of the wealth and expansion of all urban economies between the 13th and 16th centuries, [*inaudible words*] and then, the second element is: financial concentration. So, in France, with the general tax farm, and in England, with what one could call the mercantilism of paper currency, that is, the creation of the Bank of England, which is not only a deposit bank, but also a bank of issue.

So, I start with the general tax farm. So, what is interesting [*inaudible words*] is trying to see the articulation that exists between direct, constitutive tax, therefore, of rent, indirect tax, public debt and public credit. So, from the start, Colbert will link his entire economic enterprise to the financial reorganization of tax revenues. And he will constitute a real financial lobby which will develop a vast network at once economic as well as administrative, ending up covering the whole

country with a gigantic, complex spider web operating on two fundamental levels, in fact via two key figures who, as we will see, represent exactly the same person.

So, on the one hand, it is obviously the finance officer who bought his office (*charge*) and who is responsible for the collection of direct taxes. And he will keep a high percentage of this collection by operating what is called a tax surplus-levy. And the second figure, the figure of the shareholder (*partisan*), [is] really the key figure in the general tax farm, who is responsible for collecting indirect taxes. So, what is this general tax farm system? Well, in fact, it's a private company that establishes a lease with the government. At its end, the company will have to pay a sum into the treasury, in the name of the tax in question, responsible for reimbursing itself and, of course, [extending] beyond. So, this difference will obviously constitute the corporate profit.

So, of course, there is a concentration since, originally, each of the taxes was collected separately. And then Colbert will really constitute the system of the general tax farms with the lease operating on the aggregate of indirect taxes. So fine, and moreover, that will truly operate until the middle of the 18th century, the peak period being, roughly, 1725-1740. And ... So, this is nonetheless an absolutely gigantic operation, because we realize that by around 1730, there were more than 30,000 persons whose interests were completely tied into those of the farm.

So, this is where we have something that interests us particularly; it is that we realize that, in fact, the shareholder (*partisan*) type, paradoxically, therefore the one who, theoretically, deals with ..., is linked to the system of indirect taxation, is the finance officer, that is, the one who theoretically should collect direct taxes. Why? Because, quite simply, by means of his function, his milieu, his alliance networks, etc., he is the most able to fulfill his role as intermediary since he is in permanent contact with potential leaseholders, large landowners who are, through the angle of the seigneurial system, some of the main leaseholders of the land, those who control directly or indirectly, obviously, the main source of wealth, namely the land.

So, what I mean is simply that ... let's say if the ground rent comes down from the heights of a form of hoarding in order to be reinvested, therefore, in the economy of the country, it is of course in large part through the advances of the lenders in [*inaudible words*], through this system of general tax farms. So, there, I believe that we fully verify Gilles's hypothesis, insofar as this is indeed the monopolistic appropriation of currency in the fiscal policy of the indirect tax, with the general tax farm, which truly opens up the market function of money ... er ... well, what Marx calls ... fine ... the becoming-capital of money. So, the indirect tax literally allows the deterritorialization of wealth originating from land and, therefore, this indirect tax will ensure the circulation of money through the creation of a market, of course artificial in nature, and determines in this same way the whole economic dynamic through the investment of this same capital.

So, we notice something that is quite ... that is quite symptomatic: it is that all the receiving managers (*receveurs généraux*), therefore, who belong to the indirect tax system, since it is they who [*inaudible word*] all the finance officers, fine, appointed by Colbert, in addition to their direct interests in the tax farm, are also shareholders of large trading companies, large industrial companies, not to mention the military navy since it is Colbert who is mainly responsible for the navy. And, so, all these large companies, the main origin of funds, are of course the officers and

the [*inaudible words*]. So, there, I believe that at this first level, we verify exactly what Hobbes said, namely that ... well, it is really the State levy, the tax system, which is the venous circuit of money.

So, much more briefly, I wanted to look at another ... another point, let's say, of this system of appropriation, with the English reform, then the problem of public credit with the emergence of the bank of issue. So, what is going on in England?

Deleuze: When was the creation of the Bank of England?

Eric Alliez: It's 1690 ...

Deleuze: That's it, yes.

Eric Alliez: But what is interesting is that we see, well before the official creation, let's say, of this bank ... we realize that the mercantilists will try by all means to create a market for long-term government borrowing and a very, very low interest rate. This constant preoccupation with interest rates can be found in absolutely all mercantilists, essentially Colbert, and that, I think that Keynes sees it very, very well in the chapter which he devotes to the rehabilitation, precisely, of mercantilist policy, since the whole of classical economy will completely reject mercantilism. But then, Marx has a rather ... rather interesting interpretation on this matter. He says that, in fact, classical political economy rejects mercantilism because, in fact, it is the barbaric figure of all ... let's say, the territorial political economy.

So, therefore, this market with long-term government borrowing will be created, and, as if quite naturally, of course, the long-term borrowing will be transformed into perpetual borrowing. And then, the interest is that obviously [that] the payment of interest no longer exhausts public credit, that is, one is no longer required to borrow and then return the borrowed money. One simply limits oneself to paying the interest annually. So, what seems quite important to me is that we realize that the mercantilists had nevertheless anticipated very well a fundamental mutation, namely that ... historically, we realize that it's the public debt, the whole system of public debt that will trigger, let's say, the fundamental mutation of both the stock company and the bank of issue. So here, I would like to read a passage from Marx on the ... precisely on the creation of the Bank of England. It's in *Capital*, it's the whole passage on the genesis of industrial capitalism.

Deleuze: What page? … Bon… [25 :00] c'est dans la Pléiade, tome I, page 1217.

Eric Alliez: Well… It's in the Pléiade edition, vol. 1, page 1217. [*Inaudible words*] [*Laughter*]: "At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments, and, thanks to the privileges they received, were in a position to advance money to the State. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks, whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of England began with lending its money to the Government at 8%; at the same time it was empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital" – and this is obviously the important point – "by lending it again to the public in the form of banknotes. It was allowed to

use these notes for discounting bills, making advances on commodities, and for buying the precious metals. It was not long ere this credit-money, made by the bank itself, became. The coin in which the Bank of England made its loans to the State, and paid, on account of the State, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand and took back more with the other; it remained, even whilst receiving, the eternal creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced. Gradually it became inevitably the receptacle of the metallic hoard of the country, and the center of gravity of all commercial credit."[58] At the same time that the burning of witches was stopped in England, banknote counterfeiters began to be hung there.

Okay, so, I think, there ... I'm identifying two things that I think are quite important. On the one hand, with all modern money, this is a banking indebtedness since, in fact, well, that is the whole meaning of Marx's explanation: it is the debt claim that the bank draws on itself which takes the place of payment currency. So, what is the creation of money? It is, let's say, the projection of a circulatory flow in political economy, and ... therefore this is an extremely sophisticated appropriation formula [*inaudible words*].

And, on the other hand, we notice a second thing, which is that the function of money is absolutely not to exchange, but, let's say, to credit a flow of power [*inaudible words*] of deterritorialization, somewhat finally in the sense that I was saying earlier about the deterritorialization of commercial wealth with this entire general tax farm system, so that it is a matter of crediting with a flow of power [*inaudible words*] the operation of capture which really constitutes the State apparatus. And I think that, in fact, the whole point of reflecting about mercantilism is to see that, in fact, State-creation (*étatisation*) is really, let's say, the very essence of all capitalistic axiomatization. And the creation of money is obviously the most sophisticated point of this axiomatization, obviously with all the development of the international credit system, etc. [28:42]

Deleuze: Perfect. So, listen, there is nothing to add, since everything is confirmation. I mean, there is no difficulty. It would be a mass ... Perfect. So, you see, we could have ... Then, surely, there are other examples. What I would be concerned about is ... then, in a whole different social context, but the example of the ... Eastern Empires. ... To what extent, there too, is the tax system which ... allows the extension of trade, and at the same time, the appropriation of trade by ... by … by the Empire. So, everything is fine. So, there we are ...

Today I would almost like to ... number our topics, and we will discover some problems similar to those of ... [*Deleuze does not finish*]. Here we are, my first question is this. And I would almost like us to manage to ... as if we might sense, to sense a complementarity between ... an inevitable complementarity between two events, two abstract events. The first event that I am considering is, again, the formation of the State as an apparatus of capture. So, we have already completed this aspect; we saw it the last time. I am just bringing it up again in order to summarize that this formation of the State as apparatus of capture, we can ... we can present it, in summary, as the overcoding-land system (*système surcodage-terre*), the overcoding-land system in contrast with what we could call, in passing, the primitive systems which are themselves systems -- is the word "system" appropriate there? It doesn't matter, eh -- code-territory systems. So, we saw that the overcoding-land system was something quite different, and that the overcoding-land system was but one with the erection of an apparatus of capture as such.

So, what interests me today is for this theme to become as concrete as possible. If I try to say what I would like to show .... I would like to show this: that when we find ourselves in a system which overcodes, which overcodes flows, that is, which instead of coding territories or territorialities, overcodes aggregates formed under the conditions we have seen er ... previously, well then, when we find ourselves facing an overcoding system, when we find ourselves facing a system which overcodes the flows of a social field, inevitably, this overcoding will give rise to decoded flows, will itself at certain points cause -- simply, we will have to say which points and why -- but there is something, how to say this, inevitable. Literally, one could say: well obviously, you will not overcode flows, you will not launch an overcoding apparatus without thereby causing decoded flows, that is, decoded flows, I mean, which escape both ... that is, which escape both the primitive code and imperial overcoding, and State overcoding. This is the very act of overcoding of flows which will cause flows, within the social field, that are themselves decoded, flows themselves decoded which therefore tend to escape it, since, once again, "decoded", for us, that does not mean "whose code is encompassed", it means: "flows which escape the code, which escape their code".

So, if you will, so that this becomes concrete, I am taking ... I am coming back to my three ... we saw that the imperial apparatus of capture, the apparatus of overcoding, had something like three heads: public property, the public property of the Emperor who, once again, is absolutely not a private owner, who acts as the public owner of the land; land is an object of public appropriation, so it is owned by the municipalities, but it is an object of imperial property. Fine. So, the first head was public property. The second head was public works. The third head was public tax. These were the three forms of overcoding. And, in fact, in public property, it was the territory that was overcoded and through this became land. In public works, it was activity that was overcoded and through this became surplus labor. And, in taxes, it was the relations or exchanges between goods and services which were themselves overcoded and which became tax money. So, it would be necessary to show that, at these three levels, something very, very precise will act in such a way that the overcoding will not occur without, at the same time, flows appearing and beginning to flow into the social field, flows which escape the code and the overcoding, that is, start the stream of decoded flows.

And the last time I only said this, that this is where every time you must affix, eh, the point that will act like the source of these decoded streams. You understand where I am going with this: it's that if we assign these points well, henceforth ... well yes, necessarily the most archaic State, that is, the oldest Empire, already will contain germs or viruses within it. There will even no longer be any need to assume an evolution. In the oldest archaic Empire, there will already be kinds of viruses which will labor within it and which will ensure that imperial overcoding does not happen without itself creating something that will escape it and which, therefore, will undoubtedly to be included in forms of States which, apparently, appear to us much later or, in reality, do occur much later. But what will interest us ... what interests us is not an evolution; it is already to specify how these germs are distributed within the archaic Empire.

Now, the last time, what did I ... try to say based on the theses of ... the Hungarian sinologist Tökei?[59] I tried to say this, something quite simple: yes, when the despot's public property overcodes municipal possession or, if you will, territorial possession, well then, at the same time, at the same time, we are going to witness a very strange phenomenon, namely flows of private

property will come into being scattered here and there. And the overcoding produced by public property is itself going to give rise to flows of private property that, at the extreme, it is unable to control – this story is very interesting -- ... that, at the extreme, it is going to be unable more or less to control this. More or less, that is, these flows which are decoded are going to be as if caught within a ... kind of tension, their tendency to escape the code and the State overcoding and also the way in which State overcoding must get complicated, must transform itself to catch up with them, to block them ... to, inhibit them, to prevent them, or to master them, to control them.

And, in fact, I was saying: it is at the same time that the public figure of the despot overcodes all the territories as the public owner of the land, and that an entirely different character, who really seems a poor guy within this story, will bring forth the flow, a small stream ... a small stream of private property. And who is this rather ... kind of shabby, kind of weird figure, this character who, once again, complains all the time? For example, on the horizon of the history of China, but in all of universal history, we find this lament, this elegy, it is the freed slave, or the plebeian. The Roman plebeian, the freed slave of the Chinese Empire -- and, once again, the Roman plebs are partly made up of freed slaves, so the resonance between very different systems like Rome and China would be verified -- he is the one who becomes capable of private property, a small private property.

So, there, we can see very well how the overcoding, once again, of the territories, as produced by the Emperor's or the despot's public property, causes to flow under specific conditions -- namely: the freed slave -- a stream which, no doubt, at first appears tiny, a stream of private property. In other words, what ... what I am insisting on is that: it seems to me impossible for us to pass from the forms of the Empire's public ownership to a kind of privatization which would occur by a miracle. Once again, even the Emperor's functionaries who receive land under tenure cannot become private owners, since the whole point of tenure as function is precisely that one does not own it.

So, as Tökei said, the Emperor's functionaries can be made into little despots, [but] they cannot … they can't be made into small private owners. All their interest, and all the income they derive from these lands, come precisely from the public character of the appropriation. The private owner can only come from elsewhere. So, we must show that it both comes from elsewhere and that this elsewhere is necessarily linked to the imperial system. And, we had a first response in terms of ownership. Once again, the overcoding despot's public property causes, at a precise point, that of the freed slave, the formation of a flow of private and no longer public property, that is, there is like a decoded flow that begins to flow into the overcoding system.

I would say the same about our second case: labor. I would say ... I would use the same expression: activity is not overcoded by the imperial labor regime, by the imperial public labor regime, without also a flow private labor being formed. And what will this private labor be? It will already be private slavery, namely the activity of the private slave insofar as being the property of a figure, who is who? Once again: who is the freed slave. It is the freed slave who begins to own private slaves for industrial work and especially mining, craftsmanship and especially mining. [*Pause*] ... Once again, sense that this is some kind of complementarity. As

soon as you have an overcoding system, it is this overcoding system that causes within it the formation and flow of private flows, of decoded flows.

The third example: tax and money. If it is true that the form "money" relates to tax as overcoding produced by the imperial State, by the archaic Empire, it must be said that this money, this "money" form, it is the currency, is metallic currency. It's metallic currency. And, finally, metallic currency is State currency. [*Pause*] Only here's what we have: with this overcoding, we can imagine that a set of equivalences is established – something we have seen; I will not come back to that -- between goods, services and money, especially in terms of tax payment. Some will pay tax in kind, in goods, others will pay tax in services, others will pay tax in money, in money. It is also conceivable that commercial forms, henceforth, are developed since this whole tax system consists of initiating and operating a rotation and putting goods, services and ... and coins into circulation.

So, there is already a kind of circulation. There is already a kind of commercial circulation within this "tax" overcoding. And it is thanks to this system that commerce can be taken by the archaic Empire to the point at which the Emperor has precisely the monopoly of commerce. But I am saying at the same time, understand, this comes down to saying a very simple thing: you can't stop. As is said, ... once something is unleashed, you can't stop it. You just never know what goes with it. You never know the complementarities in advance. These are not logical complementarities. This is another area. There is no logical complementarity between the overcoding by the archaic Emperor and the decoded flows of the freed slave. The freed slave is the figure who is indeed in a situation of decoding. As long as he was a slave, he was still overcoded ... he was encoded. The freed slave is like a ... you see: he is outcast, but outcast from within, he has no status, he has no public right. We are creating a very, very bizarre situation. And the overcoding system secretes that, secretes that.

So, I am saying: fine, you have the tax system, metallic currency, and through these, commerce is indeed appropriated by the State. The great example is, in fact, for example, the way in which the Chinese Empire tried, really, to overcode trade; it is the famous Chinese grid, the grid of Chinese cities which is typically a system of territorial planning that essentially belongs to the State apparatus as an apparatus of capture and which is a way of overcoding all commercial activities. And ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 09]

**Part 2**

... metallic currency other forms of currency. I am taking the classic distinction in all er ... financial textbooks, where three forms of currency are distinguished. Metallic currency, you see, these are coins ... gold, silver, copper, whatever you want. The so-called "fiduciary" money consists of paper in the sense of banknotes. And so-called script currency (*monnaie scripturale*), what is this script money? Well, it's a kind of bill of exchange (*lettre de change*), discount note (*billet à escompte*). There you have it. The first two forms… seem ... very ... to appear around the 13th ... between the 13th-15th centuries, bill of exchange, discount note. There is a rather curious thing, if we think about it: fiduciary money does not seem very, very interesting to me ... because it is ... very interesting, because it allows precisely ... it operates as a kind of creation of financial capital. It allows, in fact, ... on the one hand, to transform everything in the domain of

circulation, but above all, it authorizes the increase of the quantity of currency. This is already a kind of creation of money.

But what interests me are the two extremes. If I take fiduciary money as constituting metallic currency ... no ... not ... If I take metallic currency and fiduciary money as expressing the same thing, being the simple expression and the complex expression of what might be called State money, script currency, and here's my question, is that it has a completely different origin.

You see that I am again locating my theme, in this third case. I am saying: at the same time, it has a completely different origin, and yet it is inseparably linked to State money, to metallic currency, to the point that you will not be able to unleash overcoded flows of metallic currency without also creating currencies. ... flows of decoded script currency. Why? In the same way I was saying earlier: you cannot turn the despot into the public owner of the land that overcodes all territories without unleashing a whole new level of flows of private property that connect back to the freed slave.

You see: the freed slave is not the same as the despot, but it turns out that, very oddly, there is complementarity in the sense that, and this is not surprising then, that in a story that you can already sense, the freed slave will become the Emperor's adviser. There is a very bizarre kind of correlation. Well, we are satisfied with all that. This is an illogical necessity. We would have to find a word for that: an alogical necessity, an alogical complementarity. Then it's not at all the same thing, in the same way, script currency and metallic currency are not at all the same thing. That still does not prevent, as soon as you ... er ... create a system of metallic currency which overcodes, which overcodes trade, you inevitably, necessarily unleash decoded flows of trade which, for their part, pass through the ... script currency. I'm trying to explain better ... Yes ... [*Deleuze speaks to a student who interrupts*] Yes, you will speak later, because maybe I will answer in advance ... because it is... [*Laughter*]

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: So, good. You are saying...?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: You need to speak loudly, eh!

The student: … that therefore traces were discovered of an archaic Empire which would have been discovered on the high plateaus [*Inaudible words*] which is very, very old [*Inaudible words*] And the trace that was found of this Empire is a system of clay balls containing small dice, small triangles with traces of color on them, also clay, and which were found swarming through everything that can correspond [*Inaudible remarks*] of the territory. I wanted to ask you if this is what can correspond to script currency.

Deleuze: No, there, I think this is a form of ... pseudo-metallic, non-metallic currency, but which functions as metallic currency. ... I guess.

Another student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes, but these are functionaries ... in my opinion, they are functionaries .... it depends, it's not in Mesopotamia, right? It's in Anatolia, right?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What? It's in Anatolia, yes. Yes, but that's what we talked about. When we created the hypothesis that there was no reason to stick to Neolithic States, you remember, I'll remind you very quickly about that: we said that, by virtue of relatively recent discoveries in archeology, you could even break with a pattern that had lasted until ... recently, concerning these Empires ... the problem of the archaic Empires. The classic timeline was: these Empires are Neolithic Empires, and these Neolithic Empires already implied an agriculture, an elaborate agriculture, that is, an agriculture capable of forming stockpiles. We have seen that a very great archaeologist, to whom ... a lot of misfortunes occurred, but for other reasons ..., namely an Englishman called [James] Mellaart has been doing since ... -- or was doing ... he's ... he's been banned from excavations ... I think -- ... had been digging since ... 1960, about twenty years ago, had undertaken a series of excavations in Anatolia. And where he had found -- it seems to me that it is ... one of the great ... one of the great innovations, really, in archaeological discoveries for a very long time -- he had discovered traces of veritable Empires, eh, with a radius of about ... with an influence of ... an area of domination of 3000 km -- which is huge -- … in Anatolia.[60]

And ... the example ... the first excavations concern a city with a name that gives you pause, a city, so ... very, very archaic ... which is famous thanks to Mellaart's work and which is pronounced roughly ... I do not quite know how it is pronounced: Çatal-Hüyück. Çatal-Hüyück -- ... c cedilla, a - t - a - l, hyphen, h - u umlaut - y - u umlaut ... - c - k -- But ... because he started there, it seems there are even older ones. He actually traces back ... Archaeological dating goes back to 10,000-7,000, 10,000-7,000, that's huge. And the whole hypothesis ... by which that reverses everything that was said until then about the archaic Empires, as these Empires presupposed an already developed agriculture, etc., what reverses everything is that, obviously, nothing prevents us in addition from believing that these Empires are themselves successors ... Very difficult, these are Empires ... the dwellings are mud, so it is … it's not even…that doesn't subsist at all. We can, at the extreme ... 10,000, that puts us at the very beginning of the Paleolithic ... of the Neolithic. We can, at the extreme, propose the idea of -- which would upset a lot of things about the dating of ... of ... of this kind of problem -- we can propose the theme of a Paleolithic State, cautiously, right. There might be Paleolithic States of which Çatal-Hüyück would only be ... would only be ... a last link.

But I am saying: why is it important, this matter of dates? This is because, at that point, there is no question that Empires presuppose an agriculture. Once again, that was our subject: it is not a certain level of agriculture that makes Empires possible; it is archaic Empires that invent agriculture, specifically archaic Empires are directly in the grips of the world of hunter-gatherers. There is no need ... -- again this breaks the patterns of evolution greatly -- no need to presuppose agriculture, a passage to gathering ... ah ... a rudimentary agriculture, development of agriculture and, agriculture having developed, the archaic Empire becomes possible. No reason. On the contrary, we must in ... Must ... must break, there, all these patterns of evolution, in what form?

Since we see how is possible at least, thanks to Mellaart's work, the erection of an archaic Empire directly engaged in a world of non-farmer hunters. And there, how do we see it?

Well, for a very simple reason, it is that, what we see positively, is rather the way in which agriculture comes from the Empire and comes from the city, namely, there, the framework ... the evolutionary framework is completely transformed; it is even ... turned upside down, namely: it suffices to give you a system of abduction or exchange between hunter-gatherers where wild seeds are, literally, put in a bag. Everything comes out of a bag. This bag, it turns out, is the Empire bag, it's the apparatus of capture. You put in a bag ... wild seeds from different territories, so that does not imply any agriculture ... As a ... an urban planner who is very, very important, I believe, who started from James Mellaart's work, built a whole system ... a kind of imperial model. She's a very good English urbanist ... who has worked a lot on American cities, and her name is Jane Jacobs.[61] Jane Jacobs creates a model that she calls the new obsidian, "obsidian" I am saying ... -- Ah well here I am ... obsidian, for those who do not know, it is ..., but it is very ... normal ..., it's ... lava; it's linked to volcanoes, it's some ... it's ... there are several, this is not a type of lava, it is an aggregate of lavas which before, before any metallurgy, allowed the manufacture of tools, in the Paleolithic and the Neolithic. And, indeed, it yields ... you see, these are ... these are... these are... very beautiful lavas, very ... green black. And, in fact, they can be given a sharp edge, so there were obsidian knives, there was ... well obsidian, it's a very beautiful material. – Fine,

You see, if I insist on "before any metallurgy", I mean it was obsidian, it's just as if I said, "before any agriculture", right? So, there is no need even to assume ... eh, a nascent metallurgy, an emerging agriculture on which the archaic Empire would be formed. No, I am saying: everything comes out of a bag, that is, when you put in wild seeds from different territories -- this is indeed the system of the archaic Empire insofar as it overcoded the territories -- they put it all in a bag with functionaries guarding the bag, the despot's functionaries. What is happening? Everyone knows this. At a greater or lesser length of time, hybridization phenomena occurred, hybridization phenomena. And Jane Jacobs insists strongly on this; she is very, very brilliant regarding these hybridizations within the bag.

And what is going on? Well, the Empire and the capital Çatal-Hüyück, the great capital, it is there that agriculture is created. The capital is in a position to have seedlings, and comparative seedlings; that is, the capital is going to spread those seed hybrids ... she's going to spread them into the territories, where? But the capital is going to put them on its very own land. In other words, agriculture originates in the city and on the city's land. It's not born in the countryside, never, ever! It was born in the city, in the city, on the city's land. So, you see that here, evolutionism, in fact... is totally short-circuited. You have your hunter-gatherer territorialities, that is, your itinerant territorialities, you have the ... the "archaic Empire" apparatus of capture which does not presuppose any agriculture. And then agriculture will emerge from the apparatus of capture.

So, you will have two cases. In fact, when you plant seedlings, when you plant your seedlings on the city's lands, you can do it in two ways: either the same seedling on different properties (*terres*), or different seedlings on the same property successively. These are two interesting cases. This corresponds -- if you remember what we considered the last few times -- this already

corresponds absolutely to the expressions, in fact, of land and ground rent, and of ground rent which goes to the despot. That is, there is a comparativity of lands, or seedlings on the same property. Everything is going very well, right?

So… in fact, this is very, very important… I am saying: the importance of Mellaart's discoveries is not simply to push back -- which would already be very, very important -- to push back the ordinary timeline of great archaic Empires by 3000 years or 5000 years; for once, this is no longer… this is no longer the Neolithic. It is the very beginning of the Neolithic and the end of the Paleolithic, and perhaps farther back. But this quantitative problem is secondary to the qualitative problem. It is that, if you push back the date, from that moment on, there is no ... no reason still to suppose – as it still is in Marx's theory or in the theory of ancient archaeologists -- no reason to assume that the Empire supposes an elaborate stage of agriculture, no need. In other words, the Empire's emergence, we can say: this apparatus of capture is assembled, but it is assembled in one fell swoop. And it is contemporary, it is ... it is immediately contemporary with any social field. That doesn't mean that everyone is subordinate to it; there are people who escape it, but it's always there on the horizon, always on the horizon.

So, I come back to that, fine ... This kind of comes back to the same thing, we didn't really ... get off track from what we were saying. See, my complementarities ... Only I am adding: as soon as this Empire is there, as soon as this overcoding apparatus is there, it also contains the viruses that eat away at it. And if I go back over the list of the three viruses, which at the same time are something else, but something else inseparably linked to the system of overcoding, I would say ... I would start again by saying: public property which overcodes ... the public property of the despot who overcodes the land, engenders a shallow stream on the side of the freed slave -- at the beginning shallow -- a shallow stream, the decoded flow of private property, since the freed slave is the decoded figure. He has the right to private property only because he is excluded from public rights. At the same time, he becomes capable of having private slaves, unlike the despot who only has public slaves. The private slave is the one who, precisely, goes to work in metallurgy, in the craft industry, over which the freed slave has a sort of de facto monopoly.

And I come back to my last example: so, I have my State money, metallic or even fiduciary currency. I am saying, well yeah, fine, this is a currency of overcoding, with the "tax" system. It already operates a circulation, a rotation during which the equivalences of goods-services-money are constituted. So, it [currency] overcodes trade and commerce; it overcodes all systems of equivalence. Only here we have this: you cannot unleash this currency of overcoding without another, script currency constituting itself alongside, but necessarily always alongside, but in necessary complementarity. So, you will say to me: but what is this script currency? How do we distinguish it? If I take the two poles "State currency"/"script currency", "metallic State currency"/"script currency", the distinction is very well drawn by Marx, in the texts ... in his texts on currency.

Marx -- I am summarizing a lot -- Marx says roughly this: you understand, he says …, metallic currency, … -- and he sometimes says State currency -- metallic State currency is by itself an element of socialization. That's fine with us ... if you follow me, this expression is fine with us; that is, [currency] is itself a social determination. In what sense? It socializes. What? Well, it socializes whatever it comes into contact with. What does metallic tax money come into contact

with? We have seen it: with goods and services since, in fact, it is at the level of tax that, once again, is created -- this, I will not stop trying to repeat it -- that it seems to me that the first systems of goods-services-money equivalence are established. So, this metallic currency socializes goods and services, that is, it is a question of a public social relationship. [*Pause*]

Script currency, what is it? There, Marx says it very ... -- I believe all the ... all the financiers ... would also say it; the analysis is very, very ... it is not especially Marxist what I am saying; any ... financier would say it, I think -- that, logically -- I'm not talking about de facto mixtures that are ... -- logically, what is called script currency is the expression of a relationship between two private persons. I'm not necessarily saying physical persons: it can be legal persons, but it is a relationship ... it is a monetary relationship between two private persons. In other words, script currency -- and this is what strikes me as essential, essential, if one tries to go beyond the purely ... apparent definitions -- script currency is always asocialized; it is not itself an element of socialization. It must be socialized; it is a private relationship, private relationship between who and who? Between a private person that we will call a bank and a private person that we will call a merchant, for example. In other words, what Eric [Alliez] was saying clearly earlier, it is even the definition of the creation of money at this level; there are several creations of money. There is a creation of money, metallic currency. There is a whole different type of creation of money, namely: a bank issues a claim on itself; that is script currency. The act by which a bank issues a claim on itself is going to be the fundamental private bank-merchant relationship that will constitute so-called script currency.

So, we understand better the forms of script currency. It's going to be ... the first form, it's going to be the bill of exchange (*billet de change*). The second form, much more complex, will be the discountable note (*billet escomptable*). So, you will say to me: but the State intervenes ... but be careful, of course, the State will intervene. But we are dealing with logical determinations. Of course, it has to. But, if you will, we have to talk about a duality of money. There is money as a public social determination that belongs to the archaic Empire already; this is metallic currency. It refers to the tax system. The tax system makes goods-services-money equivalents possible and overcodes trade. But, at the same time, you cannot unleash this same overcoded circuit without, within this circuit, creating points of decoding. These points of decoding are the formation of a completely different monetary flow, a now fundamentally decoded monetary flow; it, "fundamentally decoded," that is, which expresses the private relationships between people.

You will say to me: why [can't] it be prevented? Well, because… it's at the level of this circuit… it's a bit like… -- if you will, there, I'm selecting a… geometric metaphor… easy -- it's as if there were tangential points. You undertake your overcoding circuit: there are tangents that are emerging. There are tangents that take flight. So how will these be retained (*rattraper*)? -- I am correcting simultaneously what I have just said -- At the same time, this currency, therefore script, which is a private relationship, as opposed to metallic currency as a public agency, [about] this script currency, I am saying: it expresses a private relationship and not a social relationship in itself. But, at the same time, it is inseparable from a process of socialization. It is socialized to the extent that ... or through the intermediary of operations, of the commercial and banking operations it makes possible.

Which means what? This obviously means that there will have to be -- and there is a need for -- an adjustment from script currency to metallic currency. There will have to be a form of control over this script currency by the most archaic State. The State will have to make this up. And why does unifying the two currencies have a role? For one simple reason, both currencies need to be convertible. Script currency, if it is not convertible into metallic or fiduciary currency, it ... it makes no sense. If you will, it arises as a private relationship between two people, but can only work as long as it is socialized. And it is only socialized to the extent that, in one way or another, it aligns itself with metallic and script currency, with State currency.

There must be convertibility of the two currencies. And who is it that ensures the convertibility of the two currencies? It's the bank ... not just any; it is no longer the same as the one that issued the script currency. It's the bank that is rightly called "central" or "State", or at the extreme, the World Bank. The central bank is precisely the one that will ensure the convertibility of the two currencies, the passage from one currency to another, but the control of the other by one. Particularly striking example, for those who… [*a few inaudible words*] for example, it is obviously the central bank which will fix the discount rate, the discount rate which concerns above all script currency. When you discount a draft, precisely there is a discount rate that is set by the central bank. You understand?

So, this is perfect. I mean: we possess our outline. I mean: you see that, in our three examples -- which are nothing more than examples since they are the three fundamental aspects of the State apparatus, of the imperial apparatus -- I say: yes, it is very odd but every time you form a circuit of overcoding which one can call "State apparatus", circuit of overcoding, either at the level of the public ownership of the land, with the comparison of properties, you remember, this is a veritable circuit -- from the worst to the best land, from the best to the worst, there is a circuit of the land, there is a land circuit (*circuit foncier*) -- you form an overcoding circuit. Well, at the same time, in certain points of this circuit, which can be assigned, you create the flow of flows that are decoded. This is private property, at which points of the circuit? The answer is: the freed slave, or the plebs. It [the pleb] is the mistress of private property… at first, eh? It's not going to stay that way for long in such a system. It's the freed slave as well.

In the second case, when you create a circuit of labor, of public work, and you have there the second aspect of overcoding; you cannot do it without, at certain points, some flows of private labor, flows of work that will be called oddly free labor -- but it is a very, very curious sense of the word "free"; "free" means exactly "decoded" -- ... flows of free or privatized labor only flow at certain points of the circuit. What are these points? My answer: it is the private slavery of which the freed slave is something like the inventor.

And, thirdly, when you create your "tax" circuit, when you make your metallic tax circuit, you cannot do it without at the same time causing, at certain points of this circuit, flows that are decoded. Which points of the circuit? Our answer, our third and final answer, is not difficult: at the very points where script currency is formed as a relationship between two people.

So, this is going to be… this going to be a very amazing thing, the archaic Empire. It already has all the germs or viruses that force it either… either to disappear, or to evolve. This system of public appropriation, which did not include anything private, itself creates the conditions for the

formation of the flows of privatization. [*Pause*] I'm not managing to express this… I want to say it even more clearly, and then I… I don't know… is that clear? Ah…

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Really? There, I was going fast, in fact, because ... there you have it, it also seems that ... "slavery" ... well, it has already been said .... It is… it is a word that… that it has been linked so much to "private slavery", notably when someone, when men are the private property of other men, has been so linked to "private slavery" that we almost hesitate to speak of public slavery. When ... certain authors, influenced by Marx, launch this category of what they call generalized slavery, what does that mean, "generalized slavery"? It is precisely slavery which is not private slavery. So, what is "general slavery"? Generalized slavery is the state of labor in the archaic Empire when either a certain number of workers are owned, we would say today, by the crown, property of the Empire -- you see, this is not at all… it is not property of the despot as a private person -- they have a function, namely a public work function. They are public slaves.

I would like to point out, for example, an excellent book by… I suddenly think of Métraux, of… a great ethnologist, Alfred Métraux, on the Aztecs, where… he insists enormously on the existence of public slavery, namely… among the Aztecs, it is called yana (y-ana).[62] There are… children taken away from their communities early on and who are public slaves to the Emperor, and who are assigned to public works duties. But public slavery goes beyond that, or slavery… what is called generalized slavery goes beyond that, because… generalized slavery is also… the situation of surplus labor, namely municipal workers owe the Emperor a service in public works. For example… the text we were talking about last time, I believe, the… the admirable text by Kafka on the Chinese wall and the construction of the Chinese wall, well, municipal workers owe a surplus labor, which goes toward constructing the wall, or else, in the so-called hydraulic archaic Empire, that is, which rests on an important hydraulic construction, well, the labor of the canals and of maintaining the canals, it is a public work.

There is therefore a generalized or public slavery. But therefore, the public slave is a slave either to the despot as the public owner of the land or to the despot's functionary insofar as this official receives land via tenure. But this is land of this function; it is not privately owned land since, when he ceases to fulfill his function, the land reverts to the crown; it reverts to the imperial authority. Or else, even, he is a slave of the municipalities… of the village communities which had slaves. For example, in China, the municipalities… the farming communities themselves had slaves. In each case, you see that this public slavery is the opposite of private slavery; there is no private property of a slave at all. And yet there is public slavery.

When does private slavery seem to appear? Well, here too, we repeat exactly, this is entirely the ... something symmetrical to what we saw for land ownership. When does land ownership appear as private property? It appears when we can assign persons, in the social field… -- it will precisely become persons, so this requires… this requires something like prejudging, anticipating… -- people who are excluded from public rights appear. So, the question: who is it that is excluded from public rights? Okay, I'm starting over… just to make it really clear, well, the despot is the master of public rights; the functionary is defined by public rights; village municipalities have public rights; public slaves have public rights and public duties. So, in such a

system, we say to ourselves: but there is no room for the slightest evolution, or for the slightest change. Everything is planned, everything is perfect. You never foresee ... it's that at the same time, there is this very bizarre mechanism -- you will say to me: why did it come up, this mechanism? No doubt… I don't know… that… that is beyond me -- but there is, in all Empires, this mechanism of emancipation.

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Where does that [emancipation] come from? I do not know. It…. if you tell me, indeed ... well ...

The student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Yes ... Oh ... that ... if I am being reproached for giving it to myself, the freedman ... In that, I cannot go further, there, for the moment; maybe during another year, I'll have an idea… You mustn't blame me… I am saying, fine, … There if you ask me, in fact, "what necessitated a mechanism of emancipation?", I am not sure that we can find an answer, but that, there, then, that presupposes, in fact, things that I do not have on… on the Chinese Empire, for example, where… where the movement of freedmen has been so important. So, the movement of freedmen presupposes that emancipation is like a kind of institution necessarily, necessarily constituted in such a system ... I will allow [discussion] later, because, as I will lose everything if ... and because I'm almost done.

So... well, given this criticism that can be made of me and which is very, very fair -- that I am not explaining why there is, there is this institution of emancipation -- I am saying: the freedman has no public rights. He no longer has public law. He is no longer a slave; he is not a functionary; he is nothing. He is excluded from public rights. The plebs, there, maybe it would be on the side of the plebs, because nonetheless, the Romans are more familiar to us; maybe, there, the answer would be easier to find, but… in fact, we can see very well in… I am considering Rome at a time when, while forcing things a bit, one can present Rome as a case of an archaic Empire. And in fact, everyone agrees on this, that the Etruscan Empire, that this is an Empire, this is an Empire of the archaic type ... with all its public determinations, this public property, etc. This is the heyday of Kings, of what is called ... in mytholo ... in ... legend, the Kings of Rome.

What happens? What will cause this Empire to collapse? Once again, you remember, we saw this during another year; these archaic Empires were odd in both seeming so perfect and then suddenly collapsing, suddenly collapsing, the Greek proto-Empires… of Crete, of Mycenae etc., which collapse like that with, we think, the Dorian invasion, which produce texts. The texts disappear, and the Greek City will rediscover texts from a whole different horizon and in connection with quite different things. There are all kinds ... the disappearance of a small Empire, the Empire of Easter Island ... These disappearances are very bizarre that seem to have really corresponded to a "catastrophe" type, in fact. Fine.

So, I am saying: in the case of the Roman Empire… -- of… of this old Roman Empire, I… I am not talking about what is classically called the Roman Empire… -- of… of the old Etruscan system, which is an archaic system, what takes place? Well, the patricians…. There are the patricians, and they belong entirely to the imperial system … public, in what sense? In the sense that they exploit public land. This public land is the eminent property of the Etruscan King; the patricians exploit and have the right to exploit the public land, *ager publicus*. Fine, there we are. There are public slaves, there are villagers, there is everything you want, there is everything that has been said to define the Empire, [that] the plebs are formed.

So, fine, what does that mean, "the plebs are formed"? So, well, we fall back on the same thing a bit. The plebs are made up, it seems, of inhabitants of the conquered territories, in part, in part freed slaves, we fall back on… so no freed private slaves; that's not where we are, freed public slaves, freed imperial slaves, freed royal slaves. Once again, I am saying: if ... if ... yes, you are entirely too correct in telling me ..., but then why is there this emancipation, why is there this institution since ...? I do not know. I do not know!

Well ... well, the plebeian, you remember, he is excluded from all public rights, that is, he is not allowed to exploit the *ager publicus*. But, precisely insofar as being excluded from all public rights, he has the right to designate property from the *ager publicus*, that is, to claim possession of a small piece of land in a private capacity. A piece of what? Is it the *ager publicus* itself or land outside the *ager publicus*, some uncleared land? In my opinion, that changed; it's a very, very important problem, that, in which the only point that I know a little about is then… royalty, but it is a very… relatively late case, the royalty of the Lagides, under Greek influence in Egypt. Well, this is very curious; sometimes… it was an assignment of cleared land, already cleared, therefore already belonging to the crown, sometimes it was un-cleared land, right? In any case, whatever this point may be, whatever its importance, that does not prevent the plebe from having the right to assign the property of the *ager publicus*, that is, to receive as private property a… a small lot. So, it is confirmed that it is the freed slave who -- literally, if I may say -- invents, by suppressing, … or benefits, creates; it is as a function of the freed slave that the flow of private property is created.

And this same freed slave, insofar as being excluded from public rights, will also have the right to engage in trade and crafts, even if it means, of course, still paying taxes to the Emperor -- there will be a whole system of special taxation -- and insofar as he is not only the owner of a piece of land, but he has a sort of de facto monopoly on industrial and commercial activity, which does not come within the rights of the patricians -- the patrician is not at all interested in this, at that time -- well, the freed slave will become the private owner of slaves that he puts to work, who will no longer be public slaves. And, ultimately, as a master of trade, he is the one we can imagine as initiating the first equivalents or the first seeds of a so-called script currency.

So, in fact, the more I speak, the more I am telling myself that your comment is quite correct, that, henceforth, if emancipation is so important, we must understand where such a thing comes from, this emancipation. Why does the Emperor need… why does the Empire have an institution, that he doesn't know, at the same time… the extent to which it is not going to deport him… that I don't know. I do not know. That will be for another time, eh, or one of you can discover this. There we are… Is that clear? It should be very clear. What time is it?

Claire Parnet: Noon.

Deleuze: Yes?

Parnet: Ten past twelve.

Deleuze: Ten past twelve? ... Well, I'll add very quickly: there, all I just said is a complementarity that I'm going to call an intrinsic complementarity, between what and what? Intrinsic complementarity, that is, internal to the imperial system, between overcoding and the appearance of decoded flows. If I summarize this ... this intrinsic complementarity, I'll say: the more you overcode, the more you will also cause to flow, at other points, decoded flows which will be like the correlates of the points of overcoding. You see? Script currency, a correlate of metallic currency; private property, a correlate of public appropriation. But these are not at the same points, right? I am saying: we should add that ... there is also an extrinsic complementarity. So, there, maybe… aah, maybe, in this way… you have to take everything into account…

Extrinsic complementarity is what one might call the resumption of the great dossier ... that historians talk about, the East-West dossier. And here I am summarizing because I spoke about it during another year, I think; I am summarizing a kind of great archaeological hypothesis which, precisely, was the reigning hypothesis before Mellaart's work, but which, from what I retain, is perfectly valid even in light of Mellaart's work. This is the hypothesis that an English archaeologist, again, [Gordon] Childe, c-h-i-l-d-e, laid out very, very well in ... in two books, *Prehistoric Orient* and *Prehistoric Europe*. And Childe's archaeological outline, himself an archaeologist, is exactly this: he says, well yes, the great Empires were formed in the Middle East, Middle East, Egypt… and, we can add… -- he does not deal with China… he is a specialist in Egypt… -- we can add: in the Far East. It is the invention of the East, the archaic Empire.[63] [*Interruption of the recording*] [92: 39]

**Part 3**

… China. It was under these agricultural conditions that the first large stockpiles were formed, the first large imperial stockpiles. So I won't come back to that, because we have changed the order of things: it's not the Empire that presumes the stockpile, it's ... the stockpile that presumes the Empire, etc., but that doesn't change anything.

Let us suppose the model of these great archaic Empires was precisely the East. Why? It would be necessary, there, to bring in all kinds of things about geography, about ... contemporary historians have done a lot, for example ... the West-East dossier, it's a ... it's a commonplace ... in contemporary history… studying the ancient record. With [Fernand] Braudel, you find… you find that aspect deeply detailed, the evaluation of both the potentialities of the West and the East… why a particular thing happened here and why not there.[64] For example: what was the system… what was the relationship of the East with wood, the relationship of the West with wood, the relationship with water… in both cases, well, all kinds of things.

In this very general dossier, it seems to me that Childe was already raising a great cry. He said: you understand, oh well yes, the large agricultural stockpiles were created in the Near East, in

the Middle East and, we add, in the Far East. Good. At that point, what else is there in the world? Well, there is already the world we call the Aegean world which will become the prototype of the West. But what is the Aegean world, this Aegean Mediterranean world? Well, he says: oh, they're unable, if only through the geographical conditions, they're unable to achieve a level of agriculture and to make stockpiles of the imperial stockpile type. The big bags of seeds, right, even wild seeds, if I go back, then, to the Jane Jacobs framework, … where the great hybridizations occur, … the lands on which the seedlings are planted, all that… No, the Aegean world with all its small plots of land, its islands, all that, no! These are not… not the [right] conditions.

And Childe writes some very beautiful, very brilliant pages on archaeological excavations, when he, there, he really speaks as a specialist; he said: well, you just have to ... be a little familiar with ... tombs, the studies of tombs; we can see very well that, in the Aegean world, tombs give us absolutely nothing of the "stockpile" type, as we find in the oriental tombs. Finally, stockpiles are very, very ... much weaker; this is quite evident, right? He says, he manages to say: well yes, so we find Empires, the Cretan Empire, the Empire er… of Mycenae, Crete, Mycenae… But he almost goes so far as to say: but these are Empires as jokes. These are Empires for laughs; they're not… Agamemnon is not the Emperor of China. Agamemnon of Mycenae… or think of Plato's very beautiful text, those who know this text, in which the Egyptian told the Greeks: you are only children. "You are just children," said the Egyptian, because ... no ... you don't know ... at the level of an imperial machine, you don't know, you do not know what you're doing.

Why don't they know what they're doing? The Aegean world… We will see what that implies in Childe's framework, which seems very, very interesting to me. In Childe's framework, it means this: the Aegeans are too far from the great centers of the Middle East to be directly within the sphere of influence of these great Empires. These great Empires are already there, but the Aegeans, the Greeks are too far from the sphere of influence. By themselves, they cannot create the same thing. They can't afford to create stockpiles like that, to build an Empire. On the other hand, they are sufficiently close to know that they exist, to be in constant relations; what is going to happen? As long as they can, they plunder; the Greeks are great looters. As long as they can, indeed, the plundering, there ... er ... all Greek literature is crisscrossed with these big operations, these raids which are raids for looting the agricultural stocks of the Middle East.

Okay, but ... it's not always easy to plunder a great Empire, so what else can they do? Well here it is: they will have another regime, because thanks to agricultural stockpiles, what was the Eastern Empire doing? In Childe's framework, it's quite simple. So they were developing -- or, we would say: they were creating agriculture, but that ... difference matters little since it's no longer about that -- so they were developing or creating agriculture, on the other hand, thanks to the stockpiles, they could maintain castes of specialized craftsmen. Namely: there were people who lived on the Empire stockpile, and who took care of what? Either of metallurgy or trade, both at the same time, since these Eastern Empires, in fact, are great, great metallurgists and yet lack raw material. So, they already needed some very, very extensive commercial circuits.

Fine. But you see that these trades, these specialized craftsmen, either metallurgists or traders, as they depended directly on the archaic Emperor, in fact, they lived on the stockpiles, they lived on the functionaries' stockpiles, on the stockpiles managed by the functionaries, on imperial

stockpiles. Along with their families, they were like… functionaries of a different kind; they depended directly on the imperial stockpiles. As a result, the Emperor, the Eastern Emperor, the archaic Emperor had all the means to overcode trade and crafts. Trade, metallurgy, industry, he possessed them! But, here too, we will find exactly -- but, if you will, at another level, at the level of exteriority, what we found earlier at the level of interiority -- but, at the same time, their very function in the archaic Empire did not cease to put them in touch with the outside world, that is, with the Aegean world. In fact, metals ... metals, for example copper, which the Middle East was tragically lacking, they came through Egypt. So, these metallurgists and these traders came from very far off, they did not come from the Aegean, eh… According to Childe, starting from the Neolithic, one finds, right, of… for example, tin from Cornwall passing through the Aegean and arriving… but not in the Empires… from the Middle East, so that supposes immense commercial circuits, eh, enormous, enormous.

And so, these traders who were overcoded in the archaic Empire, they find themselves at the same time in another situation, under the other aspect where they are dealing with the Aegean world from which raw materials will come, that is, the Aegeans exchange raw materials for agricultural stockpile. As a result, the trader in the Aegean world has a completely different status than in the Eastern world or tends to have a completely different status than in the Eastern world. Likewise, the metallurgist tends to have a completely different status than in the Eastern world. And yet, in a way, he's the same. He is the same guy who travels around, there is an itinerance -- so a new form of roaming -- of the trader and the metallurgist. Sometimes it's the same kind, sometimes it's not the same. We understand, at that moment, what it could mean for a kind of corporation being formed, a corporation of metallurgists who would have like two heads, even three heads: a head in the Eastern Empire where it is overcoded, a head in the Aegean Empire… in the Aegean world where it is much less established, and then an obscure head among the little known peoples who occupied Cornwall at that time and who deliver tin… Good.

It gets complicated. What does complementarity mean this time? It is that, at the extreme, the same figure who is overcoded in the East under the conditions of the archaic Empire, simultaneously exists as much less coded, as at the extreme decoded, in the Aegean world. And that's what Childe says, already: well yes, the vocation of trade and ... of liberal trade, so-called "liberal" ... from the West, but it begins from that point onward. And this is not at all a virtue; this is a kind of complementarity. They don't have to create great archaic Empires because they exist from them. They exist from them, but this is a give and take.

Look at my two complementarities; I would say: one is consistent with Childe's archaeological framework, that is -- if I am looking for expression that summarize them -- it would be extrinsic complementarity consistent with Childe's scheme in archeology. It would be flows; the overcoded flows in the archaic Empires of the Near East and the Middle East necessarily generate, or necessarily have as a correlate, flows which tend to be decoded in the Aegean world. There we have a geographic complementarity. … We're crushed by global visions like that…

The intrinsic complementarity, this time around, conforms to the framework, if you will, of the sinologist Tökei, of the historian Tökei: the more the system of overcoding establishes (*assoit*) its power, the archaic imperial overcoding establishes its public power on the ownership of land, public ownership of land… etc. etc., labor ... public labor and ... and ... tax, the more are formed,

in correlation, points of decoding, decoded flows, first, of private property, second, of private labor and slavery, third … of script currency. Phew, there you go.

So, if you understand this situation, imagine: we are in there, we are in this situation of double tension, intrinsic tension, extrinsic tension… Yes, it's a… I think that this is one of the big points for understanding what could only be the archaic corporations. You see, these are multi-headed apparatuses, there as well. It goes without saying that, if need be, they were quite close branches, … guys who were familiar with each other, eh, the guys who … the Aegean metallurgist, the Egyptian metallurgist, and then the Cornwall metallurgist. They had to maintain relations, they had to… there were… there were caravans, they went through nomadic populations, they went through… At one end, who owned the mines? Who were the people who ran the mines, eh? At the other end, what were those Empires that already had a very strong metallurgical industry, whereas they did not have the metals necessary? What did that imply?

It implied precisely this complementarity between the overcodings. The more the Emperor overcoded trade and crafts, the more they had to… the more they had to unleash… more in some ways; on the other hand, there were all… all, so… in favor of … decoded flows, there were all the lines of flight, namely the metallurgists who were fed up, who had to go through entire collectivities to be settled in the Aegean world where they had good, much ... much better conditions. There must have been… peasant revolts; they had always been in favor… always… very, very often, in the ancient world, they were related to the revolts of metallurgists, revolts in the mines, all that. The overcoding of mines ... The Emperor ... The Emperor attaches great importance to it. ... Still just not long ago, eh, and that's why historians ... that's one of the reasons historians explain very well that ... it is not China which invented capitalism, whereas it could have done so for a long time; starting from the 12th century, one of the reasons is precisely the overcoding in which the Emperor controlled… where the Emperor as a public person, of course, controlled the trade and labor in the mines.

For example, when he decided he'd had enough of this, the mines were closed, right, they weren't being worked anymore. There, it is typically, the Emperor of China decides the closure of the mines -- see the book by [Etienne] Balazs on… *The Celestial Bureaucracy*, where he explains very well this system of the mines which were closed periodically… which required maintenance officials for the state of the mines, that goes without saying.[65] But... this was really pure overcoding; a Western state can never ... can pull off something like that. I mean: they just imitated… and… took what they could from… archaic Empires, but there, there is a system of overcoding which, at the same time, will be simultaneous, then, with enormous flows. The grid of cities in the Chinese Empire consists essentially in preventing precisely, in principle, in preventing the trade flows from being decoded. So, there we code them completely. A particular city, right, will have ... a particular trade monopoly, and not another, right; it will not have to undertake another kind of trade. And, in the city itself, the neighborhoods will be completely gridded and partitioned. This is the partitioning method. In fact, this is a kind of overcoding method of.

And it turns out that the more you overcode, at the same time, the more there are these kinds of flows which are decoded, which ... either which are decoded in relations with the outside, or even inside. So, this is the double complementarity. Hence: you put yourself in the position of…

of… being in an Empire like this, so what's happens? What might possibly happen? Fine, shall we have a little break? What time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Half past twelve!? You've had enough, maybe, right? Yeah, eh? Yes. Are there any questions? Are there any questions? Did you understand all that? Okay, so, next time ... No, then ... I ... anyway, no! Excuse me… I… I… Can you hang in there for another 5 minutes? Yeah, 5 minutes, eh. In that way, that ...

So, I am quickly summarizing something that I ... a little ... that I had started, that I intended ... to develop much more, but we have to move forward. What might happen? Well, what's going to happen, I would almost say, here it is: we are going to witness the second figure of the State. Only, a second figure of the State, this is very complicated, this is very poorly expressed. This second figure of the State seems to be an evolution, not necessarily an evolution. On the other hand, it seems to be a somewhat homogeneous figure; it's not homogeneous at all; it's whatever you want. In this second figure, there are actually the most different, the most varied forms... They have nothing to do with each other.

What is an evolved Empire? I would say: an evolved Empire is an Empire in which the relations of function, in which the public relations of function, as we defined them previously -- I will not go back to this -- are constantly doubled and, at the extreme, replaced by relations of personal dependence. You will say to me: "relations of personal dependence", but then what is this, is this turning into a matter of psychology? Not at all, obviously. What interests me is not "personal"; it is the "relation", that is, it is the consistency and constancy of these relations, regardless of the person. The Roman Emperor can be Julius or Octavian, but that does not prevent that, between the Roman citizen and the Emperor, there being a relation of personal dependence. Fine, each time you have a sphere of personal relations of dependency that is arising, doubling, covering, replacing the public relations of the old archaic Empire, you can say, this is an evolved Empire.

We have seen that, precisely, the Roman Empire, how should it be defined? By the rise of this sphere, then, called "the private sphere". Not that it is not ... that it is not social; it is perfectly social, but the public has ceased to designate the imperial mode of appropriation, the public is no more than the means of appropriation which has become a private appropriation. So I was saying: that's it, this is the story of the Roman Empire; I am not starting over again, you understand, and it is not by chance that, here, we again find the fundamental figure of the freed slave. In the evolved Roman Empire… the Roman Empire occurs as an evolved Empire, it's that… it arises; there are Empires that are born evolved, the Roman Empire is an Empire that is born as an Empire evolved.

And in what form was it born? It was born with a double system already, the system of functionaries, which refers to the old topic of the *populus romanus*, the old Roman people, the Senate, etc. and which, very quickly, is only there as a kind of cover. And this whole system of imperial functionaries that remains, it's very curious -- imperial functionaries... public tax -- is doubled by another system, which is what? The freed slave as a member of the Emperor's private *consilium*. And it is the private *consilium* that governs, it is not the Sta... it is not the Senate, it is

not even the imperial functionaries. The *fiscus*, which is a special tax or which covers a set of special taxes, and which differs from the public tax, and there you have this whole sphere, so, it is very complicated, because that, you see, there are… even in… this "evolved Empire" category, you have all kinds of extraordinarily varied figures.

But I am saying: its dominant feature is that relations of personal dependence duplicate public service relations. Well, on this, I am saying, let's forget about evolved Empires; they continue ... they continue, but that's not the only case. It seems to me -- and it's with this that I'd like to ... but I don't have the time anymore, so I am just quoting -- I believe that the organizations of town and city, which precisely stand apart, are decoded from Archaic Empires -- as we have seen, the "city" organization which is very different from the "Empire" organization -- well, the whole regime of corporations is another thing; they are relations of personal dependence of an urban type, very different from those of evolved Empires, completely different, but they must be analyzed starting from there. Private slavery ...

A student: [*Inaudible words*]

Deleuze: Very different both from archaic Empires, but also from evolved Empires. They are relations of personal dependence of an urban type, very different from an "evolved Empire" type. … feudalism, I'm not even developing that because feudalism is derived from that. It is a system of relations of personal dependency. Once again, what matters is not "personal" in this; it is that they are constant or consistent relations between persons determined as private persons. And the big difference between feudalism and false feudalism, between real fiefdoms -- that is, feudal fiefdoms -- and what is called, what historians call false fiefs, false fiefs, it is quite simple: it is the function lands which refer… which refer more or less directly to an archaic Empire. For example, it is the tenures granted to the functionary; it is what is designated by the Greek word not of fief precisely, but the Greek word *kleros*, it is the *cleruchies* I had spoken of, I believe, once previously very quickly. And there you are granting ... the Emperor grants the benefit of land to a functionary as a civil servant, the land reverting to the crown when the functionary retires or dies. The stronghold (*fief*) is completely different. It is private property with a relation of dependence ..., of personal dependence of the vassal vis-à-vis the lord. Private property there goes through all these types of relations of personal dependence. So I'll quote, like… to satisfy myself about that, relations of personal dependence in the evolved Empires, relations of personal dependence in cities and towns -- and again: these would be… of… very, very different cases -- relations of personal dependency in the feudal systems… in rural feudal systems. So, it would be at ... at the level of land ownership, which then becomes private property.

And I am saying, and this is where I would like to end, what... what allows me to say that this is a second figure of the State? And I don't even need to say it anymore, because, if need be, someone will tell me: but there is no State, there is no longer State ... the State is in feudalism, does the State exist? In any case, that doesn't interest me because there is always a State on the horizon. There is always a State on the horizon. Even in feudalism, there is always an Empire. There is still an Empire, either as an old archaic Empire that has broken up, or an evolved Empire that is alongside it. And the relations of personal dependence, they arise… they arise within… to double, to replace those imperial relations. Fine.

But then what do they express? What is it, since what interests me is that they are relations of dependence between private persons, but that they have a social consistency as ... as great as ... as the rest, as in sy ... as in imperial systems. I would say: well, it's not difficult, if you have followed me, there we ... we got hold of this. I would say… and we will understand why there are so many varied figures at this level. Not so difficult, because, if you accept the idea that this second figure of the “State” -- in quotation marks, "State" -- this second figure of the "State" arises as a function of this phenomenon that we saw previously, namely archaic overcoding itself causes decoded flows and results in flows being decoded. I would say that relations of personal dependency are the expression of conjunctions, local, topical, qualified conjunctions between decoded flows. As a result, I will indeed have my two great figures of State, already, they are not the only ones; I will have: the archaic state overcoding, the archaic Empire, overcoding of flows in the archaic Empire, and then, there, topical conjunctions between decoded flows.

It is in fact necessary that all these flows which are decoded, they will have to enter ... What the relationship of personal dependence expresses is ultimately something completely impersonal, namely: these ... these local conjunctions, very ... which form topoi, places (*lieux*), these topical conjunctions, which form places that are at the same time places of legal discourse, places of society, places of the social field, geographical places, whatever you want, that are places in all senses of the word “place” (*lieu*)… Thus: topical conjunctions between flows decoded as such. And it's a ... in a way, that keeps them from being decoded even more; it keeps them from taking flight. That creates kinds of knots; that creates kinds of… Fine.

How do you define courtly love? Courtly love is very odd. What has the tremendous... importance of ... chivalrous love first and then of courtly love? I would almost say, you understand, what is marriage? Well, on marriage, this is not a bad thing to say about it: it’s a particular system of overcoding system. In the end, the origins of marriage, we would have to look for them in the despot’s marriage, namely… : marriage, in my opinion, is very well formed in the archaic Empires. ... It's ... yes, this is an overcoding. It's an overcoding of a certain kind of relationship, and public relations, right? Fine. [*Pause*]

At the same time, it is not difficult to show that in a society, at the same time that there is a whole overcoding of marriage, well ..., there are flows, flows of sexuality, but also flows of feeling (*sentimentalité*), which tend to be decoded. And they did not exist before, these flows; it is indeed overcoding which provokes on other points, which establishes a circuit, the marital circuit, the public marital circuit, with the despot’s marriage as a model, the pharaoh’s marriage... well ... and then which will result in a whole system of flows that are decoded. Flows which are decoded, it is not with my wife that I could ... she, she is contained, it is not ... it is not that she is incapable of it, it is that … she is caught in the overcoding.

Hence the systems that have existed in all societies, very, very odd. Chivalrous love and courtly love, this is love, both in one case and in the other; in both cases, it is not the same thing, but in both cases, it is the love a man feels for a woman who not only is not his but has no right to be his. In a way, you will tell me: this is codified. Yes and no, it all depends on what is called a code. I believe it is codified as that which escapes the code. ... This is the state of the decoded flow. You cannot have chivalrous love or courtly love with your own wife. And, at the same time ..., at the same time as I develop chivalrous love and then, above all, courtly love, what is being

developed? A new system. It didn't exist before, I believe, or it did, but then in other forms. Love is defined as a relation of the personal dependence of a man in relation to a woman.

You understand, by definition, why you can't establish this with your wife. It would go completely against the system of marriage as an overcoding, which itself is based only on the primacy of the man. And the decoded flow is going to find its expression when it is going to promote a type of relation that is going to have its right, I would say that this is typically a topical right. Marriage is an overcoding, courtly love is a ... is something topical. Ah yes, this illuminates everything, this. ... It's illuminating. It's something topical and which will be defined by… which will not be, in that way, a compensation, which will be the invention, the establishment of a relation of personal dependence of the knight in relation to the lady (*dame*). Well, it's going to be a conjunction between decoded flows.

Fine. And ... and in the entire institution of chivalry, courtly love, that won't be to say ... you understand, it would be really silly to say: this is ideology. It's not ideology at all. It is a… fundamental phenomenon which is like the correlate of the status of marriage at that moment, when a relation is established… It is not that there is a relation of personal dependence in the case of the marriage, it is not at all the reverse; it does not operate at all on the same level. This is something else.

So I would say, to sum it up, I can define an aggregate of apparatuses of power, let's say, a second type of apparatuses of power, however varied they may be, by trying to create a category, a proper social category that I will call: relations of personal dependence between private persons. And I am saying, these relations of personal dependence between private persons are defined by this, it's that they express conjunctions between flows decoded as such. In this way, they form a new right. As a result, I have at least two very vague figures: the system of overcoding of "imperial apparatus" flows, and then this thing, this much more blurry, much more varied zone that goes once again from evolved Empires to feudalism via urban regimes, topical conjunctions between decoded flows. What can occur after? After ... I withdraw "after", since it's a ... this is not an evolution, everything is already there, everything is still ... Finally... but it's for convenience. What even more horrible thing can happen after? Or even more beautiful?

Well, you can tell, this is where we will start next time. [*Laughter*] Everything is ready for… Everything is ready for capitalism to emerge. Oh… That's good. Very good. So, there we are. [*End of the session*] [2: 08: 30]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 08, 05 February 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translated by Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

Good. We're in the more and more… severe series …, more and more… abstract for our research. And, for the moment, therefore, we will soon be finished. We will soon be finished since I had planned a semester, that will make a little more than the semester, and then, afterwards, we'll see what we'll do ... something less severe.

So… you see: for the moment, we are considering something like two forms, two "State" forms, and these two "State" forms are… on the one hand, they do not evolve all that much, they can be place into evolution evolved… the second after the first. Good. But not necessarily either. And above all, they are not at all equal, they are not at all… There is one of them which is relatively well detailed (*découpée*), it is the State apparatus as overcoding, overcoding of already coded flows. This is what struck us as the archaic Empire. I won't go back over that. And then we saw a second form. It was no longer at all overcoding of already coded flows, or the archaic imperial machine, but it was something much more vague, namely: it was everywhere ... everywhere, and in the most diverse forms, what we are trying to define as conjunctions, conjunctions that we called topical, topical or qualified conjunctions, between decoded flows. They were basically our two…, our two concepts that we had.

Topical or qualified conjunctions between decoded flows, this is very different from an imperial machine for overcoding already coded flows. At the last meeting, we tried to show how this second figure was as inscribed, or, at least, already outlined lightly (*tracée en pointillés*) within the first. But, above all, the second figure is a really clouded figure (*nébuleuse*), since the topical conjunctions between decoded flows come in the most diverse forms, namely: they correspond to all systems of relations of personal dependence. In fact, what we will call "topical conjunctions between decoded flows", it is also the relations of dependency instituted between qualified objects and determined subjects, for example, land and the private owner, or else the slave and the master, or else as well, relations instituted between subjects, in the plural, for example: the knight, in feudalism, the knight and the lord. Fine.

And there, it was so diverse… perhaps one can understand, for example, the extent to which certain historians, at a certain moment in history, gave to "feudalism" an extension in all senses. But historians very quickly revised… er… this point and denounced this use… er…, this extensive use of the category of feudalism. In fact, we find ourselves here facing a whole

variable, very, very variable set according to all kinds of historical figures, types of relations of personal dependence, and the relation of personal dependence, it seems to me that this is exactly the legal expression of a topical conjunction between flows which are decoded. Fine, but this is extraordinarily… this is very, very nebulous… ah… even in some cases, we tell ourselves: well no, there is no State in this, there is such a crumbling of relations. Nonetheless, even in cases of feudalism where the concept of the State no longer applies, this feudalism still relates to a State on the horizon, to a State apparatus on the horizon.

In any case, I'll leave it there; so we have these two concepts, these two huge concepts. Once again: the apparatus for overcoding coded flows, namely the imperial machine; on the other hand, the relations of personal dependence insofar as they express topical conjunctions between flows which are decoded or between decoded flows. I am insisting: these topical conjunctions are therefore expressed in relations of dependence either between a qualified object and a determined subject, or between subjects determined in relation to each other. You see? And… that's the point we reached, okay? And what is going on? You can correct me… while I am saying… whatever it might be. What happens after? No: put "after" in quotes. What happens "next", "next" in quotes, since it isn't necessarily evolution, it isn't necessarily something that comes after. ... I would also say: what is going on elsewhere? Or else: are there still other figures besides these two huge figures that we have? And you see the extent to which everything is varied since, the second figure, I can't even say that it has any real unity. So, what is going on? What is going on elsewhere?

I want to ask the question, there… like that, it's to give us a bit of exercise (*nous entraîner*), because everyone knows…, everyone basically knows what… er… what capitalism is, but it's a task of, of knowing, and then…, and then an entirely different exercise than the practical exercise which would consist in saying to oneself: well, let's look for a definition. What makes us say: well yes, at such and such a moment or at such and such a place, there is either a surge of capitalism, or there is something which, already, presents itself as capital that is emerging? My question is, then, you see right away: does capitalism represent yet another concept, besides our two previous concepts? So I would like, here, to be as clear as possible, and for you to intervene…, since… everything…, my whole conclusion is going to turn to issues of current policy, but not today.

I am saying: I, it seems to me, reading ... er ..., in reading Marx and, in particular, *Capital*, it seems to me that there are always two definitions, two definitions… er… of capital. And, these definitions are very strict, that is… [*Pause*] And why two definitions? Well, I'm thinking of a common distinction in logic, in classical logic. In classical logic, we distinguish nominal definitions and real definitions. It's not Marx saying all this; this is meant to try to make the question very concrete… what is the point in trying to define [capital]… [*Brief interruption of the recording*]

… triangle, the figure formed by three lines closing a space. I can still call it a "triangle"; it's quite independent of the question "are there triangles?", namely: this definition does not show the possibility of what's being defined. Can three lines enclose a space? I don't know in advance. So, you see, we will call "nominal definition" a definition which tells us nothing about the very

possibility of what's being defined. I can always define a square circle. Whether it is possible/ impossible ... I can define an animal named "unicorn"; whether there are unicorns is a whole other question. So: a nominal definition is very simple. What logicians call a "real definition," you understand, is a definition that not only defines its object, but, at the same time, shows the possibility of what's being defined. [*Pause*] That is, it implies a rule of construction, for example, in mathematics. It involves either a rule of construction, a rule of production, or a rule of acquisition (*obtention*). How do I obtain this? For example: how does one obtain a closed figure, defined by three lines? If I state it, I am giving a real definition of the triangle and no longer a nominal one, you see. What I'm proposing to say -- that's why I was making this parenthesis -- is that it seems to me that ... we can proceed in this way for capital. What would be the nominal definition of capital? What would be the real definition of capital? [*Pause*]

Well, I'm starting from a text by Marx. I'm starting with this search for a nominal definition. And I'm slowly reading a text by Marx, eh, which seems quite interesting to me. "It was an immense advancement", "It was an immense advancement when Adam Smith rejected any determination of wealth-creating activity", "It was an immense advancement when Adam Smith rejected any determination of wealth-creating activity and only considered labor solely. In other words, he says neither manufacturing labor, nor commercial labor, nor agriculture, but all activities without distinction. With abstract universality… " -- here is the text which seems essential to me -- "with abstract universality of wealth-creating activity", "with abstract universality of wealth-creating activity, we have at the same time universality of the object insofar as being wealth, namely the product itself or labor itself, but insofar as being past, materialized labor." It matters little how complicated this is. What I glean from this: "with abstract universality of wealth-creating activity, we have at the same time universality of the object insofar as being wealth".

What does that mean? In what way… it sounds very, very abstract, this… this sentence. In what way, can, can that that mean anything for us? Well, I am saying: when people tell us about capital, what does that immediately conjure up for us? Capital, of course, is wealth. But what kind of wealth? Well there it is, it's very odd. It is a wealth that is neither this nor that nor that. To speak like… like Marx, it's wealth itself. What does that mean? That means it's a wealth that is no longer qualified as land, nor monetarily, nor even commercially, nor even industrially.

The question of whether capital will be realized in industry rather than in commerce is quite different from what is the nature of this wealth which is called "capital". Our first answer, and you see that this is really a nominal definition, is precisely: there is capital when wealth is no longer determined as such or such, when it is no longer determined as land, as industrial, as a commercial, as an artisanal, as… like this or that as being determined… what? It is determined as a wealth-creating activity. Capital is the subjectivity of wealth. It is wealth insofar as universal subjectivity, that is, it is wealth which is no longer qualified or determined as such objectively, land wealth, monetary wealth, this wealth, that wealth, but which is wealth itself related to the wealth-creating activity, namely: capital. Capital is the subject of wealth-creating activity.

You will say to me: but then, this is very… well, if you consent to it, you would say to me: but this is very odd, because this has existed all along! No! Not at all. Our question becomes that

surely it took a strange social formation for wealth no longer to be determined in one particular way or another, but to appear as wealth in itself, that is, to appear as pure and simple subjectivity. You see what I understand by wealth as subjectivity; by "wealth as subjectivity," I mean solely wealth related to an activity, that is, to capital. It is related to capital when it is no longer determined under the objective aspect of such or such a quality, land wealth, artisanal wealth, commercial wealth, monetary wealth. Maybe that will clear things up.

So, we can say at the same time: but it always existed abstractly. Yes, but how is it that no social formation has even had the idea to identify such a notion, this concept of abstract and subjective wealth? Obviously because everything was against it. The abstract concept can arise only under the conditions of a concrete social formation, which is going to pose for us all kinds of problems.

Well, then, I would say: well, the nominal definition of capital is thus precisely this: ultimately what I am proposing is, wealth which is no longer qualified as one thing or another, thus wealth that has become subjective and, therefore, wealth in itself. It poses… capital poses universal subjectivity as the subject of any wealth whatsoever.

Well, you will tell me: this is all philosophy. Yes and no, it's not philosophy at all, because let's try to say it concretely. I am not exceeding my requirements of an entirely nominal definition, but ... how do we really recognize capitalism? Well, obviously with capitalism, there is a mutation of property (*propriété*) and the conception of property. Property is capitalist… when is property capitalist? These are ways of recognizing things. Well, I believe that property is capitalist precisely -- I am starting over again -- when it is no longer qualified as one thing or another, that is, when property has become the property of abstract rights. But abstract rights, what do they mean? Of course, these rights are not an abstraction, capital.

So, to say "the ownership of capital is the ownership of abstract rights", that obviously means: of abstract rights which, as such, are convertible. Convertible into what? Into whatever you want, convertible into land, convertible into money, into currency, convertible into means of production. But this is a big mistake, and the… and economists always recall this, to identify… finally… in any case, Marxist economists constantly recall this, that it is a big mistake to identify capital with the means of production.

Furthermore even, one would not understand anything about capi… about the mechanisms of profit, I believe -- of profit which is essential to capitalism -- if we identified capital with the means of production. Why? Because we would not understand the essential mechanism by which an equalization of the rate of profit takes place, which supposes that capital traverses both the sectors of production and the most varied means of production. Capital is not the means of production or goods of equipment; it is -- how to put this? -- the substance, in both a philosophical and commercial sense, is the quantitative and homogeneous substance which is invested in the means of production.

In other words, capitalist property is the property of abstract rights convertible through all concrete determinations, and in particular and eminently, the means of production. Why do I say, "and in particular, and eminently"? Because, undoubtedly, in order to bring about the emergence

of the autonomous sphere of the means of production, the property had to bear on convertible abstract rights.

So, that's an immediate confirmation; I mean: property in the capitalist form is no longer that of the land, of this, that, or something else; it is the property of abstract rights. It comes down to exactly the same thing as saying: wealth has ceased to be objectively determined in a particular form or another and instead is related to wealth-producing activity, namely: capital, wealth, any wealth whatsoever. And this is very curious ... I am saying: what would prove this? Two things would prove it… I'm trying to… make this concrete. Two things would prove it, I am quoting here… my authors for all those who find these points of interest.

When we reflect on so-called primitive accumulation of capital, that is, the way in which the first capitalists, even before the formation of a capitalist system, organized an accumulation of capital, the authors who study this historical question -- since, there, this is… this is a problem of history -- who closely study this historical question, show very well that what the capitalists gained… what the first capitalists gained mastery over and which allowed primitive accumulation was the property of abstract rights. This is not the ownership of land, for example; this is the ownership of abstract rights over land, to the extent that they bought the land at a moment when it was cheap -- it took all kinds of circumstances obviously -- at the end of feudalism; they buy the land at a time when, for reasons x, it come cheaply, they resell it [*Deleuze coughs*] at a time when it is expensive and convert their land rights into means of production. [*Deleuze coughs*] So the primitive accumulation, so-called "primitive", what is called the so-called "primitive" accumulation of capital would show very well that capitalist property was constituted by taking abstract rights for the object. Another point… Can't you hear well?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah, well, I'll try to speak louder. Second point. Oh! Second point. Second confirmation. ... This is the attitude of capitalism in relation, precisely, to a phenomenon which we have seen playing a very large role at the level of the archaic Empires and also at the level of the second form, the topical States, namely the attitude of the capitalist [*Deleuze coughs, almost choking*] with regard to land rent. [*Deleuze coughs*] That is, capitalism has always tended, other than in exceptional cases that ... which should be taken into account, but overall, we can say that a fundamental tendency of ... of capitalism is the inhibition or even the liquidation of land rent. You see how this is a confirmation, that is, it is the mark that wealth is no longer defined by a property of land or a property of this or that, but, precisely, property is itself the property of abstract rights [*Deleuze coughs and finds it difficult to finish his sentence*] and wealth arises as capital when wealth is no longer related to a particular quality or another. [*Deleuze coughs*] Land rent has always been a kind of weight for capitalism. - [*Deleuze coughs several times*] [*Pause*] When one has a coughing fit, if you're ... if you turn all red, that's fine; if you turn blue, that's very, very bad. What am I?

Several students: Red!

Deleuze: That's good. That's okay. [*Laughter*]

A student: Even scarlet, eh! [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: Ah! so, how… how do they… they get… this has a lot to do with the history of early capitalism, the way they are going to ward off land rent. There were two ways, and there, Marx explains it very well, very, very well, and then it was taken up by specialists in agricultural problems…, basically, it was… relations between capitalism [and] agriculture. … These have never been the story of the landowner who, either in the public form of the despot or in the form of the private owner, received a share of the business profit and took that share in the form of rent from land, rent from… a land rent. They obviously don't like it. And how did they actually do it? There have been two approaches historically, at once the English approach, and there was the French approach. I mean: all of this is kind of getting us into more concrete political issues that… we'll look at… in a while. [*Deleuze coughs*]

The English approach was very odd. There was ... this is what is called, here, typically a class alliance, in fact, in both cases. There was a very curious class alliance between the English entrepreneurs, the English bourgeoisie, if you will, between the English bourgeoisie and American agricultural producers to bypass the English peasantry. And why? This is where… if I am developing this example, it's because… we really need it. Because the American wheat land did not include land rent. And why didn't that the American wheat fields not include ground rent? You will understand immediately, if you have grasped the path I tried to follow in the previous sessions regarding land rent: land rent precisely involves the comparison between simultaneously exploited territories, namely: the least bad territory garners a rent in relation to the worst territory, eh, which itself doesn't garner any.

But, on the topic of the constitution of American agriculture, with the displacement of borders, the occupation of wheat lands, the constitution of large wheat lands, etc., there is no land rent. But this is ... this is the ... famous American history that ... The US border is not like the European borders at all. European borders determine a whole. The American border each time marks the place to be moved beyond, to be displaced. So American wheat did not pay land rent. The English bourgeoisie made massive imports. It created a sort of alliance, American agricultural entrepreneurs [and] English bourgeoisie. The English peasant, there, he is… he is like squeezed. And the English owner -- that is, what the English called the landlord -- he is possessed; it is his responsibility for forming the English bourgeoisie capitalist alliance ... er ... [with] American agricultural entrepreneurs. You see that is one way of getting around the land rent.

In France, at the same time, it is the same problem for French capitalism. The solution is completely different. This is ... this is a case where, precisely, we see the variety of possible solutions. This is all about politics, it's also… it's not… not a matter of pure choice. France, on the contrary, chooses the peasant's small property lot. This is another way of liquidating the land rent. It favors the small property lot of the peasant operator. This implies that the small peasant operator is guaranteed, that, in particular, he has a standard of living higher than that of the worker. It was true for a long time in France. So, in this case, I mean, in France, it was the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the small peasantry that was fundamental, which, throughout the French 19th century, was fundamental.

And then that… and then that's been over for a long time, that… I mean: some things still remain… some things still remain… in our provinces, it is… [*Deleuze coughs*] But finally, it's basically over. But what caused that to end? It seems to me that this is very interesting, the real reasons why that ended. It implied in particular this, this alliance ... bourgeoisie ... What do we include in the group? ... This bourgeoisie-peasantry alliance implied a protectionist politics. We have held onto a lot of protectionism; here, there is a kind of weight of history… the French agricultural problems and still currently, with… the problems with Europe… French protectionism is very, very… is in a situation… which, in fact, poses all kinds of political problems. [*Deleuze coughs*]

But I'm saying... : that does not prevent this old peasantry-bourgeoisie alliance in France, well, it has had its day for a long time, right? But it has had its day, under what kind of pressure? I think one of the main reasons was Algeria. It was Algeria because, then, we would find something that brought France closer to an English-type solution, [*Deleuze coughs*], but in a completely different form, namely: the Algerian vineyards did not pay rent, and the land was taken from its owner, so there was no land rent. [*Deleuze coughs*] This is dispossession, this is expropriation ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: I can't avoid it; there's a draft, right?

Claire Parnet: Yes.

Deleuze: Ah. And since I am in the center of this draft, that's why I… [*Deleuze coughs*] -- You understand, there, that was… it was Algeria which made it possible, for France, thanks to a whole system of expropriation, to no longer go through the alliance with the small peasantry. There obviously had to be land expropriated.

Okay ... this is ... this example, so why did I just develop it? Solely to confirm an aspect of this nominal definition. I repeat: it's when there is capital; capital is not just any wealth whatsoever, even nominally; capital is not just any wealth. On the other hand, capital is not the same as the means of production or possession ... or ownership of the means of production. [*Deleuze coughs*] Capital is: abstract wealth, that is, wealth that has become subjective -- understand well, I am saying: "become subjective" to distinguish this wealth from a wealth that would be determined objectively as one thing or another, such as land wealth, monetary wealth, commercial wealth.

Ah no, as Marx said, it was ... "an immense progress when Adam Smith rejected any determination of wealth-creating activity. It was raised to abstract universality of wealth-creating activity." And, by that very fact, he had at the same time -- this is what becomes essential -- and by that very fact, he had at the same time the universality of the object insofar as being wealth, namely: labor which, for its part, was no longer determined as this or that, [*Deleuze coughs*] but as unspecified labor. In other words, abstract subjectivity of wealth was immediately reflected in abstract labor. You see? You understand? That's why I insisted that capitalism brings a new mode of ownership, the ownership of abstract rights. [*Deleuze coughs*] Ah, my god, my god… What?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah! It's not in *Capital*, that [quote]. This text is in *General Introduction* [*Deleuze coughs*] ... *General Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, 1857, in La Pléiade [Gallimard], volume I, page 258. [*Deleuze coughs*]

So, I am almost reaching a first result. I know this is boring, all of that, but hey, it doesn't matter. It does not matter. I am reaching a first result, I would say: the nominal definition of capital, is it -- you just need to understand better -- I would say, it is… capital, [*Deleuze coughs*] is the relation between a universal subject -- I like it because it seems not to ... not to mean anything strictly, and, at the same time, it seems to me extremely ... operational -- it is the relation between a subject posed as universal and an object posed as any object whatsoever. Fine. [*Pause*]

I mean, I think… so… to make it easy, I'm thinking of the expression *cogito*… I think, you see, of Kant's *cogito*… for those who… know that. The *cogito* in Kant is expressed like this: I think and, insofar as I think, I think of any object whatsoever, namely, what Kant names with a very beautiful word: the object = X. Good. I am saying, all things considered, well, in capitalism, there is something similar. There is: the relation between the wealth-creating activity without any other determination and any object whatsoever, abstract labor. It is therefore the relation between a subject posited as universal and an object posed as anything at all. If you grant me that...

But, again, it's completely, it's ... it's ... it's very curious, this story, because how can it work? We will see how it can work. But see that I'm fine in a nominal definition since, thank God, praise God, we are not going fast, ... nothing I just said shows the possibility of this thing that I am defining. I say: capital is this, no ... We say to ourselves ... we should say to ourselves: my God, how can such a thing exist? Nothing in my definition shows it. Fortunately! Since I wanted ... I wanted it to be that way. [*Deleuze coughs*]

Now ... I'm just coming to a first ... conclusion, and then afterwards, I would like us to take a break so that you might react to that first point. But we are going very gradually. Good. You must not raise any objections to me which would start into the second point. I am saying: if you follow that, the nominal definition of capital, this is a definition that almost seems like a definition taken, I don't know, from German romanticism, from German philosophy ... from the 19th century, ... the relation between a subject posed as universal and an object posed as anything whatsoever. And it is inevitable that, henceforth, capital is the operation through which the subject posited as universal, namely wealth itself, appropriates the object whatsoever, namely labor, since property as ownership as abstract rights will precisely enable this operation. So, you see, it's all right, it's really all right. But I come back, ah ... I repeat, it is ... it is the incantation: the relation between a universal subject and any object whatsoever. Fine.

Oh… well there you go. Here we are, I can already say: this is no longer a topical conjunction. There, we have a criterion. This is no longer the domain of topical conjunctions. You remember ... um ... what we called a topical conjunction: it was a relation between either a specific object and a qualified subject, or between specific subjects in relation to each other. That was the topical conjunction between the decoded flows. What do I find now? Now I find a completely different figure, in a startling sense. This is no longer a topical conjunction since, in fact, wealth has ended ... it is no longer ... it is no longer ... determined as one thing or another. The object of

wealth, namely labor, is no longer determined, no longer qualified, unspecified labor and abstract wealth. So, what is this? This is no longer ... We have moved from the field of topical conjunctions; what have we entered? I'm looking for a word to for better… to… contrast fully. I would say: well, since this is another area, it is as if this is now a kind of big, there, an immense conjugation, a generalized conjugation of decoded flows. We have gone beyond topical and qualified conjunctions to enter a kind of conjugation… of flows… decoded flows as such. And so, let's choose the word… Let me introduce it right away so that… that you sense what is coming, let's risk it -- but… I'm not trying to justify it for the moment -- isn't that something like what is called an axiomatic? We have entered a whole new machine: an axiomatic defined as a generalized conjugation of decoded flows. So, you see that I am opposing the topical conjunction and the generalized conjugation.

I would say: well yes, it is an axiomatic of flows that is absolutely distinct from qualified conjunctions. Why? Why can I already say "axiomatic"? You sense it, no matter how little you know about it, because, precisely, one speaks about the axiomatic when one is situated before some bizarre systems that speak to us about the object whatsoever and which consider [that] the axiomatic is precisely the system of elements considered as unqualified elements. When you find yourself facing a treatment of elements presented as unqualified, that is, as being neither this nor that, as not being determined in a particular form or another, such a treatment, whatever it might be -- we will have to… to ask the question "what might such a treatment be?" -- but such a treatment has a precise name and constitutes an axiomatic. Whenever an element is determined or qualified, you know in advance that it is not axiomatic. It’s whatever you want, but it’s not axiomatic.

So, my term "axiomatic" is vaguely, I would say, with capitalism, indeed begins a new machinery, the axiomatic of decoded flows, which overflows on all sides the topical conjunctions that we had seen previously. And, in fact, there are no longer relations of… personal dependence; there is only a sole and universal subject -- what Marx sometimes calls in early texts "cosmopolitan energy” -- cosmopolitan energy, which attributes to itself any object whatsoever, namely abstract labor.[66]

There you go, that’s my first point on the… nominal definition. Immediately emerges the, the following question: well, how is that possible? Does that exist? If you accept this definition of capital which consists above all in refusing to allow capital to be defined by the ownership of the means of production, investment in the means of production place follows from the definition of capital and not the other way around. Well then… in second [comes] the question of the real definition, showing the possibility of such a thing. Good. A short pause, in case there were… This has to be very, very clear, insofar as that… those who are interested in this, in any case, this first point has to be very, very clear. Yes?

Richard Pinhas: [*Inaudible words*] it seemed to me that intervened, so it goes completely in the direction of… what you are saying, but rather at the level of a conceptual or abstract [*Inaudible words*] of the event of the land rent and of the new determination of exchanges, it would be a modification at the level of the speed factor which materializes in an acceleration of the circulation…

Deleuze: mh!

Pinhas: so, this process, we can see it at the historical level… [*Inaudible words*] And that makes me think of the fact that in the definition that you give of the axiomatic, in music there occurs more or less the same process, that is,… there is an acceleration of the speed factor and [*Inaudible words*] rotation… at the level of circulation itself which in the music [*Inaudible words*] It's that we deal with unqualified material and that it is on the speed of circulation of this material that… that we will see a new type of music which will be of the axiomatic type. [*Inaudible words*] and what is absolutely unthinkable with the standard materials of instruments.

Deleuze: Completely, because, in fact, there is… but that… we agreed when we spoke about it… at other times… [*Deleuze coughs*] If there is a connection between music and capitalism -- not in the sense that all music is capitalism, but in the sense that… no, in a way… more… -- What is there that's…? It's that, at least, there is a large common area which is the processing of flows ... er ... the way in which music finds itself faced with a problem of sound flows and the way in which capitalism finds itself faced with flows, that can't be unrelated, right? So, what Pinhas says is quite correct; it's that, it seems to me, the history of Western music means that… there too, we could situate kinds of music… -- … how to put this… -- operating through overcoding, kinds of music operating through conjunction, and then… from the end of the 19th century onward, it's obvious that there is a kind of generalized decoding of flows, of sound flows… in the form of… precisely, for both technological reasons, for… all kinds of reasons, and that, at that moment, kinds of music of an "axiomatic" type becomes possible.

Pinhas: So the second part, it has a lot more to do with the real definition than with what you said about the nominal definition, is that what I saw as the acceleration of circulation, therefore the speed factor, which seems to me, to be fundamental there, but which does not manage to be situated, do you consider it… let's say, at the level… -- … as an example, although the example is badly chosen -- as being a result of… of the change in the status of land rent, for example, or as, on the contrary, being something that caused, in a general movement, the shift in the status of land rent?

Deleuze: No, I would say that for the phenomena of acceleration, this axiomatic is a dependence, yes, it follows from that; it must follow from that absolutely necessarily, but it involves quite other dimensions than we haven't yet seen, in my view.

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] the nominal definition… and that, precisely, the idea of capital is the idea of a relation, first of all, a differential relation between these two flows and secondly [*Inaudible words*] the idea of a conjugation. But we cannot really say that capital is conjugation. If you stay at the level of a nominal definition, one must say that it is the idea of a relation, or the idea of a conjugation.

Deleuze: Well, without… restriction, yes! Yes! Absolutely. But, in my opinion, you just stated – that will let me go even faster -- you just stated what the real definition is. So, what you saw very well is that I was not already authorized to say "conjugation", since there was no conjugation at the level of the nominal definition. The conjugation would imply something that I had not yet stated and that you have stated.

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] is a flow of wealth, is it a problem, is a flow of wealth like that, is it capital? [*Inaudible words*] Isn't it precisely in the idea of a differential relation, or in the idea of a conjugation before [*Inaudible words*], it is rather through this idea and in the realization of this idea that the flows of wealth and the monetary flows become capital.

Deleuze: Agreed, agreed, agreed. In any case, you are right to say: the nominal definition does not allow one to say -- ... I got ..., I went a bit farther with this ... but that didn't matter, it was to prepare the passage ... -- The nominal definition can only be expressed in the following form: capital is the relation between the universal subject, that is, the activity, the wealth related to a pure activity and no longer qualified in this way or that, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, labor posed as abstract and no longer determined as this or that, a pure relation. There, Comtesse is completely right, I can only offer a pure relation of appropriation and without at all showing, again, how it is possible.

But how is it possible if I switch to the real definition? Comtesse just said it. And we can immediately see that… capitalism, well it's true… I am, once again… I come back to this all the time, I find that historians are right, those who say, anyway, but, capitalism could have happened elsewhere, it could have happened before, it might not have happened at all. It took something very bizarre, on the order of an encounter, an encounter. There is a contingency, a fantastic contingency in the emergence of capitalism, a contingency in the double sense. Again, it might not have happened, it could have happened elsewhere. Why an encounter? Well, we will find the same data as in our nominal definition, but quite differently organized.

And, there too, Marx -- this time, on the one hand, in the *Grundrisse*, on the other hand, in *Capital* -- insists greatly on the following point, and… it seems to me, this is one of the strongest points in Marx's analysis. It's that precisely something like two series are required. You see my nominal definition: the relation between the pure subjective activity of wealth and labor as any labor whatsoever. Thus: the pure relationship between the universal subject and any object whatsoever. I was saying: it's already in this way that topical conjunctions become outdated. And how is that ... How is that possible? Marx shows us very well that historically, the conjunction of two heterogeneous series was required, as Comtesse has just said.

On the one hand, it took a real movement -- but here again, the word is required -- a movement of deterritorialization of labor. "Deterritorialization of labor" means the entire manner in which, in the current of feudalism and at the end of feudalism, the worker is torn from the land. According to what factors? All kinds of factors, internal factors, external factors. External factors: the last major invasions. Internal factors: the changes in the economy… er… and the crisis in serfdom, whatever you want. In other words, [there's] a first series which, through many manifestations -- a series itself [being] very, very varied, not at all… er… monotonous -- a wildly varied series which ends up producing what Marx and others call "the naked worker", the naked worker or the free worker, that is, the worker who is no longer determined either as a slave or as a serf, neither like this, nor like that, but as the pure owner of a pure force of abstract labor. He is deterritorialized; he is no longer referred to a land. It is the production of the naked worker which will constitute the basis of the proletariat. For that, an historical series is required, to produce the naked worker, that is, the worker who is nothing more than the owner of his labor

power. And once again, this series brings into play extremely varied causes and circumstances that run through all of feudalism and the end of feudalism.

But, on the other hand, that's not enough. As Marx says in a very beautiful text: it was not enough for the conditions to be met in order that a naked worker might be produced… [*Interruption of the recording*] [54: 26]

**Part 2**

… artisanal and commercial wealth and become the ownership of abstract rights that can be invested in means of production. So, the two series are the production of independent wealth and the production of a naked worker. And, as Marx said, fine, one can conceive that one might occur and not the other; at that point, you never have capitalism. It's as if it were the encounter of two very, very different series.

You will tell me, if needs be, the same factors overlap, for example, the deterritorialization of the worker is accompanied by a transformation of wealth on the owner's side. This is obvious. So, there are resonances from one series to the other all the time, but it's not in the same way. There are indeed two kinds of wealth… There are indeed… sorry, two series, and it took this encounter between independent wealth and abstract labor or naked labor. And this is what made capitalism possible, and suddenly realized. [*Pause*]

So, at this level, I can in fact reintroduce, in accordance with Comtesse's remarks earlier, the idea that, in fact, it is the conjugation of two decoded flows at most, and I can add, there, like a kind of amendment, ah yes, the topical conjunctions that we saw previously, they were already related to decoded flows, but, in a certain way, they prevented them from being decoded further. They stopped… they stopped locally, they temporarily stopped the decoding. It's like another knot has been tied; it's as if another capture had occurred.

But at the level of generalized conjugation, it is necessary that… and the flow of work goes beyond all the topical conjunctions to lead into the formation of this kind of monster, really, the naked worker; wealth, the flow of wealth, must overflow all topical conjunctions to result in the formation of this kind of monster: capital, and, at that moment, yes, there is the encounter . There is the encounter between this pro… this er… naked worker who only has his labor power, in the Marxist project, and this abstract owner who is the capitalist.

So, the real definition of capital will be: the encounter between the two heterogeneous series, one of which results in the production of the naked worker and the other results in ... eh ... has as result the formation of the independent capitalist. [*Pause*] So you see that this is literally a level of decoded flow that goes much further, that has spilled over even ... even topical conjunctions. And, ultimately, once again, there is only one subject: capital; one single object: labor. This, then, is called "the generalized conjugation of decoded flows". The universal subject is reflected in the object whatsoever, namely abstract labor is capitalism insofar as being axiomatic.

So, there, I went much faster because ... It doesn't matter, it is not ... I am pointing out that [*Deleuze coughs*] ... to my knowledge, one of the texts in which this aspect of Marx on independence of the two series is best commented on, and in Althusser's book, *Reading Capital*, is [Etienne] Balibar's text. Balibar places enormous emphasis on the contingent aspect of the encounter between the two series.[67] He shows, for example, how er… in Rome… -- and Marx… there are letters from Marx, in which Marx himself emphasized this point -- why capitalism did not happen, asked Marx, in the Empire, in… in… Rome, even before the Empire, where a kind of mass of naked labor meets, a kind of mass of guys who are completely… who are expropriated… small expropriated peasants, who are reconnected in the city and who have only their labor power. So, there is a series, almost from capitalism, which is available. The other series is not available. Confronted with this mass, …of almost sub-proletarians, the plebs -- the plebs, former small expropriated landowners – are not reconnected, do not constitute themselves as the other necessary term, namely: capital, independent capital. Wealth remains land-based, it remains monetary, in the form of usury; it remains commercial, etc. It does not become capital.

So, at that time, for other reasons, Marx refers to Byzantium as, there again, elements, all kinds of elements were available. For other reasons, historians refer to the Chinese Empire around the 12th century, all kinds of items were available for… all kinds of items, why? Always for this kind of decoding of flows which would result in this constitutive conjugation of capital. And, there too, there is a highly forceful imperial power which prevents… which remakes conjunctions, which will prevent this capitalist formation.

So… hence the double impression: it had to happen… ah…. Necessarily, something like that had to happen, but it almost didn't happen, or else it might have happened way before. That reintroduces many contingencies into history, that. All kinds of variables have to come into play. Okay, if you grant me all that, our question explodes. I mean: the question that concerns us in our work, namely, ... but, if you grant me this system, this, this new type of formation which no longer operates by overcoding of flows, which no longer operates by topical conjunction, but which operates by generalized conjugation of decoded flows, that is, through the axiomatic, well our immediate impression is that: what further need is there for State apparatuses?

At first glance, there is no longer any need. In the other cases, the answers were qualified. In the first case of our archaic Empire, there, the answer went without saying. There must be a State apparatus because that's all there is with an imperial apparatus capable of undertaking the overcoding. In the second case, we have seen [that] the State apparatus becomes extraordinarily vague, nebulous, for example, in feudalism. But however vague, however nebulous, the power system still refers to the horizon, a virtual State apparatus or somewhere else, whatever you like. In any case, very precise apparatuses of power are required to operate the topical conjunctions. But there, at the point where we have reached, if this vagueness which would seem bit like in an axiomatic, everything occurs automatically. As Marx said wonderfully, why does Marx hate Proudhon's idea, "property is theft"? He thinks that this idea ... is stupid, he hates it, expressions like "property is theft", this ... he thinks it's ... how to say, that ... this is not a good order-word, ok? Property is absolutely not theft; how does it occur? It is not possible. For a simple reason, as he says… the worker, Marx says in texts which appear to me to be quite brilliant, he says:, of

course the worker is exploited, he is extorted, but we should not take that for an extraction from his skin, because, okay, he is exploited, but within the framework of a system which produces him, which produces him at the same time as being that which is extorted and which produces the extortion. He does not precede.

In other words, and there Marx goes very far, I'm quoting… these are notes… it's Marx's notes very late in life which are notes on Alfred Wagner, who was an economist… er…, an economist of the contemporary right of… er… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] In the notes on Wagner, Marx says very well: but capital is a right, and the capitalist extorts only what the right allows him to extort. We could not say it better; it seems to me that this is perfect. In fact, the ownership of capital is the ownership of abstract rights, and it is in the name of these abstract rights that the extortion of surplus value occurs, namely the relationship with labor. It's not a theft at all, obviously. So that goes without saying.

And I am saying, in such a system, it seems literally not even to be automatic; it's better, it's automation, namely… well, what a need is there of a State apparatus? Just for the record, I am pointing out that this problem concerns us immediately because ... er ... this is the subject of our research, these figures of the State apparatus. Well, I am just pointing out, just for the record, that there is a whole current of capitalism that says: yes, no need for a State, or the smaller the State and the less it reveals itself, the better that will be; let things happen spontaneously (*laissez faire les choses*). Capitalism has always unfolded alongside a great critique of the State. In a way, he invents a machine that no longer passes through the State apparatus. So, here… we would collide here… so, suddenly, you would be entitled to tell me: fine, well then, why did you say all that if it has no connection with the State?

And yet ... And yet, several things immediately cause us to reflect, that is, are going to toss a problem our direction. Understand: if we find out… -- so that… you might see which direction… I would like to go -- if we find out that, by right, the capitalist formation has no need of a State apparatus in the sense that we have seen previously, if we see, however, that it can only function with State apparatuses, we cannot -- here, the conclusion is imposed by itself -- therefore with capitalism, there is… I would not say a mutation, but there is a change. There is a very profound change in the role and functions of the State apparatus. What is it going to be, this new figure of the State? Where do I see this?

Well, I am accumulating there, in this way, remarks, from left and right. I am saying: it's obvious that when capitalism tells us -- at certain eras, still, not at all, right? -- when capitalism, at certain moments, tells us: but we have no need for a State, the less there will be, the better, it is not lying. It does not lie. Only, this is an extremely ambiguous proposition; why? Because it means ... it doesn't mean at all -- and here you have to weigh the words -- it doesn't mean at all "there should be no State at all"; on the contrary, it invokes human nature to say that there is always a need for a State. It says: we need a minimum State. Fine, I am returning to a topic that we started the last time and that we will only come back to when we talk about politics today to conclude all this ...

But the minimum state, I remind you, this is how I find this expression from [Paul] Virilio very good; what is it? Historically, this is what has been called the totalitarian State. The totalitarian State is not at all the State at its maximum; it is the minimum State. Namely, it is in fact the minimum State that allows decoded flow of capital and abstract labor to operate their conjugation as automatic. I mean ... I was taking this example, in order to establish the liberation of prices; that is, to let prices vary freely, you need a State apparatus, that is the minimum State. And that has always been one of the poles of the totalitarian state, ensuring the liberation of prices. So, while people often seem to slide from the expression "minimum State" to, ultimately, "no State at all", we on the contrary, it seems to me, we must establish the biggest difference between the expression "no State at all" – an expression which would be supported only by certain anarchists -- and the expression from capitalism: "in many cases, the minimum State", namely, implying -- they do not say so -- namely, a totalitarian state.

So, capitalism's claim for a minimum State obviously does not mean that capitalism does not need, in its own way, a State apparatus. It just needs a very special kind of State, because, once again, at the point we've reached, it's out of the question for us to say that modern totalitarian States are like archaic States, like despotic States. No, that's quite another thing, unrelated! Moreover, there's no ... no reason to say that so-called socialist States, whether they are totalitarian states, no, it is .... it's ... it's not that this would be better, it's that it's something different. The totalitarian State means something very, very specific. Okay, let's assume this, that's my first point.

Second remark: therefore, in any case, there is indeed a State apparatus, and it is obvious ... it is obvious that the conjugation of the two flows which really defines capitalism, namely the flow of independent capital and the flow of unspecified labor, needs a State apparatus to function. In a way, it works well on its own, but it also occurs through force. It works through the force of the State apparatus. And, in fact, the expropriations which determine, which produce and which reproduce the naked worker, the accumulation which produces and which reproduces abstract wealth, necessarily occur through an apparatus of force, through an apparatus of violence. That's sort of a quick second point.

Third remark: let's look at concrete cases or then…. You understand, in fact, there is a very, very odd thing about capitalism; it's ultimately why it has always been for people… for all people, even… even revolutionaries, it's always been something quite fascinating. Everything is always fascinating, really, but we tell ourselves: but finally, what is it ... it's still amazing, that,… I mean… it's… it's… it's really a virus-like thing, really. It's something… what Pinhas was saying earlier about… er… the acceleration of circulation, all that… We have the impression of… [*Deleuze does not complete this*] And then, the swarming of virus, the capitalist virus which seizes, which … which recedes, which advances, all that… It is not surprising… It is enough to read *Capital* to see how Marx is fascinated by this thing … He wouldn't have been who he was if he hadn't been… fascinated by that thing. So…

But one gets the impression that, in capitalism, there is really a movement to push always further a kind of axiomatic of decoded flows. The more it is decoded, the more, in a sense, capitalism becomes gleeful. And, in that sense, there is indeed a capitalist inventiveness, there is an insane

capitalist creativity; that is why they grasp hold so well. And so… that impression, what is it? We have… we have the impression at the extreme… I am selecting a contemporary example, because at the extreme, but that… they are capable, you understand, in… in the development of production or exploration, or information, they are capable of doing some completely insane things, really.

Okay, I'll take one case, transspatial exploration, an historical case. America -- but what does "America" mean? Does that mean capitalism? Does that mean the American State? -- in any case, enormous flows of capital are mobilized in the service of a very curious institution, and famous in America, which is called NASA, n-a-s-a. NASA is a distinctively American institution with both… mixed, what, both with State government interests, and… and private interests, and military interests, and the… eh… well. [*He doesn't finish*] And it's of the research unit kind (*bureau d'étude*), right? They created… they were essential.

In the early ... transspatial exploration projects, NASA played a fundamental role. And they undertook projects, so obviously, assuming huge, huge capital investments, in that exploration. And there you go… -- so that's it, you'll understand right away,… -- I'm outlining this by saying: well it's really as if the flows of capital, but… -- there, I'm using the words literally -- were going to the moon… they were going to the moon, fine. It is a mode of deterritorialization. Fine. This is what, for example, there is a banker… I… once again, bankers, I find they are the ones who speak best, eh, about what is happening today, a lot better than the industrialists who are either really morons, or else… liars, hypocrites. Bankers are much more… [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

One of the guys who talks best about economics and money today… is a guy called, he's not… he…. He's not a revolutionary, he's a… he was a high-ranking functionary, but as he was thrown out, he retains a great bitterness about it, so that… that gives him a very great critical sense… his name is [Jean] Saint-Geours, and not long ago, last year, he published a very interesting book called *Pouvoir et finance* [Power and Finance], in which he then evokes ... he calls it "la stateless currency", "stateless currency".[68] It's a little upsetting, but… and he evokes the mass, then, this flow of stateless money of which, he says -- and he explains very well by what mechanisms -- which passes through borders and over which the States have no control. So, this is somewhat the case, but Eurodollars, petrodollars, etc., are just one case of this currency, right? It's very, very… [*He doesn't finish*] So that's why, when you say America, it's not the United States, it's… capitalism as well, fine.

But… this time, it was a case in which it was no longer stateless currency; it was really the flows of investment that… they were deterritorializing. Really it was going to the moon. It was… it was nonetheless… that was NASA's greatest moment. What happened? Why am I citing this example? Old Eisenhower, who was President of the United States at the time -- I'm outlining, right, because the story is so long -- cuts off some of the NASA funding. It was tough, it was a struggle, a struggle for influence was required… Fine. So here I have, I have my exemplary proposition, my typical example: the President of the United States is cutting off part of the funding of a cutting edge capitalist institute for transspatial exploration. Fine.

Let's try to translate this here, like that, to… if I may say so, not a lot, for fun, into our language. We would say: flows of capital, huge flows of capital tended to be decoded and de-territorialized more and more. Fine. At the same time, why is the President of the United States reacting? Because, of course, there were factors alongside. It was because the Russians, the USSR, from that point on, did not think of transspatial exploration in exactly the same way, and in the end, it won. For once, this was a victory for the Russian conception over the American conception, I believe.

With Russians, this was no more reassuring; it was even, in a sense, less reassuring; from the start, the Russians conceived of transspatial exploration as having… er… -- you'll forgive me for outlining a lot, but I think what I'm saying is not wrong, not completely wrong -- as having to make a sort of belt around the earth, that is, deterritorialization, yes, but the deterritorialization had to remain relative, that is, had to take the earth as an object. It was a question of making a kind of belt, I'm not just saying for surveillance, but it also implied surveillance, it implied communications, etc., but it was still a deterritorialization stretched out towards the earth as an object to be flown over and to cinched up. So it was, in a sense, a much more reasonable conception. I say, the so-called socialist countries are much more…, we will see why… they are in a sense much more…. They don't have the virus aspect of… they proceed differently; it's not the virus, that, it's not… it's not viral invention, it's not creativity of a virus like in capitalism; it's something else.

So… well, finally, what the President of the United States does is say: okay, in fact, we are going to end up looking like morons, we… the Russians are going to make their barrier and go make their… transspatial belt around the earth, and we are going to send ourselves to the moon, but… and after? [*Laughter*]. And after? So, what does the President of the United States do? He reterritorializes capital flows to a minimum. He tells NASA: no, you are changing your program. You're changing your program. And NASA has to follow this order because the State is big enough that ... You see? It's really enormous.

There, I see in this a typical example of the role of the apparatus ... of a State apparatus in a formation, in a capitalist regime. We must prevent ... since, if you accept this definition of capitalism as a generalized conjunction of decoded flows, the flows have to be prevented from being decoded ad infinitum. It's not possible that ... no, we can't go too fast, we must not, ... etc. There must be regulatory mechanisms.

And the State will be one of those fundamental regulatory mechanisms. The state will make the necessary reterritorializations to prevent capital flows from being decoded too quickly or too radically. All kinds of apparatuses of regulation in this system of automation will be required. So here, we can clearly see the need for a "State" form as well, to the point that I would say, yes, why is it that -- last remark, we have seen this so I will not go back over this -- why is it that capitalism did not pass… did not triumph through the intermediary of the form "city"? We saw that it had triumphed through the intermediary of the "State" form. So ... this is ... there is indeed a reason. And we saw why. Obviously, it needs, much more capitalism and the capitalist formation has become one with the great formation of what is called this very particular figure of the State, namely the nation states.

And what are nation States? As we saw, there is all the music that would come back, the nation States, it takes place with music. And it is the superiority of music over painting… People march with music… and not at all because music is… it is… might be an ideology, but because music is much more from flows… and that works, that functions. I mean, in what way is the nation State music? Ah that's… that's always the question. The nation State is how to create a land and a people. How does one create a land and a people? Well, so it's done with blood, with… lashes from whips, right, with… with music, with whatever you want. [*Pause*] In Italy, that occurred with Verdi. Strangely, in Germany, that didn't happen with Wagner… And that matters… There are flows… Fine.

And what does "one people, one land" mean? It's that a people is always the product of a deterritorialization of a population. It's a decoded population. If a people still remains to be created, it is because that implies a population… decoded populations. By what means have nation States made peoples? With populations, that is, the nation State has been… it can only be defined by crushing what must be called… it would be necessary to find the word, there… of what Guattari calls, for example, nationalitarian phenomena. The nation has been defined by crushing nationalitarian phenomena. A people was created with populations. A land was created with territories. It implies both music and violence. But then, this land-people which defines a nation, what is its function? Well, that will tell us a little about the role of the State in a capitalist formation. It is precisely in the framework of a people-land, that is, a nation, that what? That the circulation of labor and capital is realized, or the homogeneity of capital without external obstacles in principle.

If you follow that definition, what ... what results from it? It's very simple. If you follow this last remark and all the very quick remarks I made, I would say: well yes, in capitalism, the State apparatus is absolutely, absolutely… necessary and … accompanies capitalism at every moment, only the State has completely changed. What happened to it? This is where we come then to our real problem, I believe, namely: before, in a way, yeah ... no ... I am thinking of a term that we use constantly when we talk about axiomatics, only that's going to push us into some difficulties. An axiomatic is inseparable from what are called models of realization. Fine, an axiomatic has models; it necessarily has models of realization.

What is an axiomatic's model of realization? This is an area in which axiomatics are concretely realized. A domain where an axiomatic is concretely realized is a domain of ... is a domain of realization (*effectuation*) or a model of realization. It goes without saying that an axiomatic always has simultaneously, at least by right, several models of realization. See, there, in what sense is taken "model". "Model of realization" is the field of realization of an axiomatic. We'll see, I'll try to give examples later, ok? I almost want to say, here, what is the State apparatus now? It is ... the State apparatus ... the State apparatuses are the models of realization of this axiomatic which was defined as the generalized conjugation of decoded flows.

States will define… nation States will be exactly the models -- including their lyrical values, their musical values, their sentimental values -- will be the fields of realization (*effectuation*) or the models of realization of the axiomatic of capital, which does not mean not to say that this is appearances. The models of realization are absolutely not appearances. I am insisting on the real

character of the nation State. A people, a land, they are really created, but what are they created like? As models of the realization of the axiomatic itself, so quite varied ... Models of realization are quite varied from one another. It is understandable that there are completely different types of State, since the same axiomatic refers by nature to completely heterogeneous models of realization, heterogeneous. There is even necessarily heterogeneity of models of realization where a given axiomatic is realized (*s'effectue*).

And how is this a completely different function of the State? This is a completely different function of the State because ... because ... I am returning to the imperial State. … I'm going back to the imperial State… -- [*Brief inaudible discussion between a student and Deleuze*] -- Because I'm going back to the archaic State, I could say: it is a model. But in what sense a "model"? It was model to be realizes… It was… like the apparatus of overcoding. Overcoding had to take place. It was a model in the sense of a transcendent model. It was what had to be reproduced, what had to be put together and put back together. But now the same word "model" has completely changed its meaning. It is no longer the model in the sense of "transcendent model"; it is, on the contrary, a model in the immanent sense of model of realization in relation to an axiomatic, which axiomatic is alone and took over the role of… from the old-fashioned model.

You understand? Normally you should not really… understand because… because we haven't said what an axiomatic is. As a result, our task now would be twofold. It would be double, understand. Here is the task which remains for us, I believe, it would be threefold ... no ... yes, I do not know. First task: what does this comparison between the economic political situation of the world and a very precise mathematical notion like that of the axiomatic mean?

There we have my first question against myself. I mean, what does that mean?... Is that a metaphor ... What's its purpose? This is… what am I trying to do? What does it mean? This is ... this is ... Seemingly, it's silly. It's silly. Well, it's not smart, really. It's easy, first of all, it's… hence the need to… [*He does not finish his sentence*] There we are, even if it means taking a detour, we have time; what is this, what is it exactly in mathematics that's an axiomatic? And, henceforth, can this notion be used to qualify the modern international situation other than metaphorically? There we are. You can sense my ... my tendency to hope for an answer: this is something quite different from a metaphor. Capitalism is truly an axiomatic, given what mathematicians call an axiomatic, and it is more than a metaphor. But still, it would be necessary to justify it. Second question: henceforth, if the term "axiomatic" can be transported, transferred to the world economic and political situation, how does this situation appear? And what is the role of the State in this situation? There you have it, those are my two problems.

If I answer those two questions, we'd basically be done… with this State apparatus series. So, there we are. So you have to agree that we will go through a rather long ... not very long, but a little bit, where we will forget everything, that is, we will ask ourselves: what is precisely an axiomatic in mathematics? Especially since it's very funny, it's very ... very recreational ... And that's within this that we will find our political problems. What time is it?

A student: Quarter past twelve.

A student: quarter past twelve twenty.

Deleuze: Ahhh. Twelve twenty? So, we can start, if you are… or take a break, or you have had enough, you tell me… Or else, we talk about something different, or I can start to outline a little what an axiomatic is. Because I can do it, yes, fairly quickly, in order for you to be able to think about it. Because ... And after the holidays ... that you might bring me some things ... Are you tired or are we going to continue?

A student: [*Inaudible*] very funny!

Deleuze: Everything is fine. You?

The student: Very funny, exciting!

Claire Parnet: Let's continue!

Deleuze: So, listen, not for long, because… I'm feeling tired, anyway. Here I am asking questions… I am making an appeal, as I have done several times, and sometimes it worked, sometimes it doesn't very much. I am making an appeal for some of you, for example, those who have done a little mathematics, to take over with some things that you know, eh, about… about the axiomatic and that… when we come back from vacation, we'll expand all that.

Well, I am starting with two basic, very, very simple things, since I am also thinking of those people who have not done math at all. There is a very good classic book by a ... by a French logician called Robert Blanché published in the Presses Universitaires de France, you know in higher education collections, but Blanché was a very good logician, b-l-a-n-c-h-é, a book called *The Axiomatic*.[69] For those who don't know anything at all, if there are any… you'd already have an idea, ok?

And, on the other hand, for those who know a little more, I remind you that there is in France… -- I'm not saying that this is no outdated, I don't know, besides, but things change so much in the field of axiomatics as in all fields of mathematics -- there was a series of authoritative volumes in France, under the name ... published under the name of Bourbaki. I am saying "published under the name of Bourbaki" since "Bourbaki" designated a circle of mathematicians that also included, it must be said, the best mathematicians, among the best French mathematicians, and who have made a very, very vast axiomatic which was published by Hermann.[70] Now this axiomatic from Bourbaki, which is outdated, which is classic under the name of… of Bourbaki, this axiomatic from Bourbaki… -- it is rather several axiomatics, it is an axiomatization of all mathematics --… this axiomatic includes… introductory considerations, or else in appendices in which Bourbaki… tries to explain a bit. And I would greatly like to simplify an example he gives, ah, like that, citing my sources, and there we are. I am asking: what would ... what would that be? This is my first comment.

Bourbaki tells us, well, roughly, roughly, he says: there you are, there is an axiomatic every time you find yourself faced with ..., or every time you build relations ... every time you determine relations between unspecified elements. Between unspecified elements: that is, these relations, they will be established ... These relations, let us symbolize them by: capital (R) in parentheses. You see, if I write on the board, I will make a capital (R) in parentheses. Whenever you have a system of relations between unspecified elements, you are in the domain of an axiomatic.

We understand, but we tell ourselves, but what is this? What is he talking about now? I am proposing, because it's going… it's going to be very useful to me for… er… afterwards, relations between unspecified elements, and I tell myself: we need a special name. I propose like that, for me, for convenience, the term "functional relation". And I will distinguish, at that moment, functional relations and formal relations, formal relations being relations between specific, specifiable elements and functional relations being relations between non-specifiable elements. So, I would say: fine, there is an axiomatic when we are faced with a set of functional relations between unspecified elements.

Symbol of this relation: x, small x, capital R, y [xRy]. I would say, … there's… I'm reading this… -- … you see, this symbolism, it's not Bourbaki's, eh, I'm simplifying it myself, a lot… for my use and for yours -- I read this formula, arbitrarily I have the right: there is a functional relation between xy as any elements whatsoever. [*Pause*] There you go. And suppose I define three R's, three capital R.'s. For anyone having an interest in this, I'm almost asking you to think about it a little bit… you have to note it down or you won't remember it. Those who don't care, you won't take notes ... it doesn't matter. But that's the advantage of bringing together, it seems to me… an audience… whose concerns are very different. You choose yourselves.

I say: first relation… I am going to define, here -- understand what I am doing -- I will define an axiomatic with three relations, three capital Rs. I say: first relation, with two any elements whatsoever x, y, a third, z, necessarily correspond, to any two any elements whatsoever x, y, a third necessarily corresponds, a third, z, necessarily corresponds. This is my first capital R, my first relation.

Second relation: there is a small element e… there is a small element e such that, for any element x, we have xRe = eRx = x. I recognize a second axiom here. I'll read it again: there is a small element e such that, for any element x, we have xRe = eRx = x.

Third, eh, third and last -- there are many more, but I am selecting three, I am selecting an axiomatic with three axioms -- for any element x, for any element x, there is an element x prime, such that xRx '= x'Rx = e. You will understand everything, I assure you; you will understand everything. [*Laughter*]

I'll end with… just a first remark. First remark. If you find yourself… something… you have to play around a lot… since we don't know anything, we, eh, you have to trust a little… I don't know what anticipation… if I find myself facing something like that, I say to myself: hey, this is not the same as formalization. In other words, I… I don't know why yet, but I can feel it. So ... it happens that things we feel are wrong, of course, but I tell myself: this is not formalization; we should be able, starting from there, to be able, even better than logicians have managed, to distinguish logical formalization and axiomatization. I'm not saying this is new; there are a lot of people who have tried to distinguish formalization and axiomatization, but… you ought to feel that this is a process which is not formalization, that it's of a different nature. These functional relations between any objects whatsoever, there is no hint of object specification in there. [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 40: 43]

**Part 3**

… two models of realization. The two models of realization that this axiomatic with three axioms comprises is already ... – don't make me say stupid things, eh? I am not saying "these are the only ones"; I'm picking two of the simplest ones -- the addition of the real numbers -- we will verify this, right away here; it's going to be easy – the addition of real numbers -- real numbers, you know, positive, negative, or zero numbers – the addition of real numbers: the first model of realization. The second model of realization: the composition of displacements in three-dimensional Euclidean space, the composition of displacements, a very simple operation, the composition of displacements in the Euclidean space. [*Pause*] Good. These two models of realization are absolutely independent of each other. That's a remark, too, that I will very much need. They are absolutely heterogeneous. They are independent.

Let's try: what does it look like? You retain: the addition of real numbers and the composition of displacements. My first axiom: to two elements, x, y, a third z necessarily corresponds under the clause of the capital R, that is, of the relation. In the case of real numbers, the relation is addition. This is the model of realization, this is the addition. Well, in fact, to any two real numbers whatsoever, x, y, a third… you see that I am specifying my elements… with respect to and in the domain of realization. In the axiomatic, I didn't need to specify them. So, there is no contradiction. If now I am specifying them, that's because I am looking precisely for the models of realization.

So, to two elements, to any two real numbers, x and y, a third necessarily corresponds under the rule of addition. Notice that this axiom is verified by addition. But this would also be true of multiplication. So, an axiom is obviously not enough to define my… my axiomatic. I'm just saying: if you give me two real numbers, fine, then, under the rule of addition, they are addable, and that yields a third. It yields z. Likewise, two displacements in Euclidean space are composable, R designating at that time composability just as R earlier defined addability.

Second axiom. So, there… -- we're having a competition, eh? for those who are interested, of course; you will find it right away, in both cases, and that will be very, very, very, very, very, very enjoyable -- you remember: there is an element e such that for any element x, we have -- you put yourself in the situation of real numbers, of the addition of real numbers -- so, if I translate my axiom, that yields: there is an element e such that for any element x, that is, for any real number, we have: $e + x = x + e = x$ ...

A woman student: It's zero.

Deleuze: [*He applauds*] [*Laughter*] Awesome, awesome, that's zero, eh. It's zero. Or, in the composition of displacements, there is a very special concept which is what is called identical displacement, identical displacement, which leaves every point in space fixed. So, see, according to the… according… -- and that has no relation, zero and the identical displacement, they are two completely heterogeneous notions -- according to the model of realization, my axiom is realized with zero ... my second axiom is realized with zero or with identical displacement.

Third: for any element x… -- you think in terms of adding real numbers -- for any element x, there exists x' such that x + x' = x '+ x = e, that is, zero. Well, relative to x, it's -x, it's the negative number. This is the negative number. For the displacements, this is called, in this model of realization, inverse displacement. [*Pause*]

I am saying, therefore… Ah… I can now complete my definition and say: we call "axiomatic" a set of functional relations between unspecified elements which are embodied or which are realized in formal relations and qualified or specified elements, specific to each of these fields of realization, of these models of realization. I confirm my impression that this is completely different from a process of logical formalization. Why? Because, in an axiomatic, you have a set of functional relations between unspecified elements that immanently wash over (*baignent*) [*Pause*] the models of realization at the same time that the models of realization directly realize, each on their own, directly realize, each in its heterogeneity, each in its… for its own account, the relations of the axiomatic. [*Pause*] So, how is that different from ...? [*Deleuze does not finish this phrase*]

On this point, if you ... you will think about it. It is quite obvious that a process of axiomatization encounters enormous problems.[71] What are these problems? I'll quickly try to categorize them so that you might think about them and, if necessary, so that you find others. I would say: the first problem is one concerning models of realization. The models of realization of a same axiom are heterogeneous with respect to each other; however, they realize the same axiomatic, hence the properly axiomatic notion of "isomorphy". We will say that they can be heterogeneous, yet they are no less isomorphic with respect to ... they are not homogeneous, but isomorphic with respect to the axiomatic.

So, a fundamental question: to what extent are and can the models of a same axiomatic be both heterogeneous and yet isomorphic? Are there not cases even where one must conceive of a heteromorphy of models which, however, refer to a same axiomatic? What am I thinking about? You can only understand this if the idea is confirmed that this is not a simple metaphor, the comparison of the global situation to an axiomatic; we will be faced with the problem ... the types of State today ... if we accept our hypothesis that State apparatuses are models of realization of the axiomatic. Fine, to what extent is there a homogeneity of all types of State apparatuses? But even if they are not at all homogeneous, they can nonetheless be isomorphic in relation to the axiomatic. At that point, we should speak of an isomorphy of the most diverse States, of the type ... perhaps even that the axiomatic supports and implies a true polymorphy or heteromorphy; in any case, we cannot confuse heterogeneity, isomorphy, heteromorphy, etc.

A second problem: each axiom -- you can easily see it in my previous example -- is independent of the others. This is even why it is not a theorem. A theorem is the proposition that depends on other propositions. An axiom is a proposition that does not depend on a previous proposition. If I can generate one of my axioms from other axioms, it's not an axiom; it's a theorem.

So then, so then ... axioms are independent, and yet they form a set, and this set has, by right, a limit. What is this limit? What is the limit of an axiomatic? The limit of an axiomatic is easy to define: it is the point at which one cannot add an additional axiom -- the axioms being

independent, one can add some; I could have been satisfied with two axioms in the example which I gave you, but I added a third; Bourbaki, he inserts a lot of others -- well ... er ... the limit of an axiomatic is the point at which you cannot add a new axiom without the system becoming contradictory. We say, at that point, that the axiomatic, ... consider that this axiomatic is saturated. This is the problem of saturation or limit, of the limits of an axiomatic, a saturated system, when one can no longer add an axiom without making the set contradictory. Fine.

Here too, I am saying, we will find ourselves facing the problem, there is a famous problem: the problem of the relation of capitalism with the limits of capitalism, and what does "the limits" mean? And what is meant by the way capitalism, as Marx says, ceaselessly pushes, shifts its own limits? Might we speak of a saturation of capitalism? We indeed see that there is a similar problem currently. When there are people who say: the end of resources, the end of resources, well, okay, so does that mean the system is saturated? And what does it mean that the system is saturated? Here I mean, I get the impression that it's not entirely a metaphor anymore; this topic of saturation is found throughout the entire global political situation. … fine, there are thresholds of saturation. There is an urban crisis, we are told; there is a crisis in the flow of raw materials. There is a crisis of this, of that. Well, that means saturation. We are told that in cities, electricity, fine ... it's at the point of saturation. Is it by chance that we come across this notion? There we have the second problem that we will have to consider: what do limits or saturation of an axiomatic mean?

Third problem: [*Pause*] one of the great moments of axiomatics was the discovery by ... by ... by a famous axiomatician, of the following phenomenon. It is that -- here, I am summarizing it enormously, eh, because we have only just to grasp its spirit, ok? ... -- one could state it thus: it is that in any slightly complex axiomatic, comprising a large number of axioms, this axiomatic necessarily includes a model of realization in so-called natural numbers -- you will look this up in the *Petit Larousse*, eh, what natural numbers are, eh, so that you establish for yourself ... in numbers natural. … fine, let's just assume this, just hold onto that -- And natural numbers define or belong to so-called denumerable sets, denumerable sets. Hence a great dismay, and that was one of the first great crises of axiomatics, the idea that what we call in mathematics, and regardless that non-denumerable sets had a power that made them escape the axiomatic, that the axiomatic could not exceed the power of the denumerable. An example of a power that exceeds the power of the denumerable: well then, there is a famous power, the power of the continuous, that is, the power of the points on a ... composing a line. This power of the continuous is a power of the non-denumerable ... of ... of a non-denumerable set.

Good. So the axiomatic… there, it is no longer the question of limits; it is the question of a higher power, a power irreducible to the axiomatic and yet in relation with it and which would be like a power of the non-denumerable, whereas the axiomatic operates within infinite, but denumerable sets, if need be. Is there a way, for axiomaticians, to overcome this difficulty? Is this difficulty fundamental? It doesn't matter. I am saying: our third problem would be the problem of the power in its relation to axioms. If I continue what, for the moment, is only a metaphor for us, what do we mean when we say if… Does the following proposition mean something: that the global axiomatic releases, in a way, a power that it is not sure itself to

control? You will tell me: oh well, yes, that, we see what that means, it is all these apocalyptic visions, eh… it is… that's the current millennarian visions; that used to be the atomic bomb, so now it's… good… all of that… Fine, is there anything for us to learn from that? And under what conditions? The relations of an axiomatic of capital with a power of the non-denumerable. We'll indeed see. Is this a metaphor or is it better than a metaphor?

Final point: another ... another great crisis of the axiomatic occurred when an axiomatician was able to demonstrate theorems, a series of famous theorems according to which, in the attempt to axiomatize arithmetic, which seemed precisely one of the easiest, richest domains for axiomatics… er… In this attempt, well, there necessarily occurred an encounter with some propositions that this axiomatician named "undecidable", "undecidable propositions", which does not mean propositions whose consequences we do not understand, but propositions which we cannot demonstrate, by relating them to the system of axioms, whether they are true or not true, that is, which place into question the principle of the excluded third party. We cannot demonstrate whether they are true or false, in this sense they are undecidable.[72]

So my third problem… my fourth… this is my fourth problem, I no longer know… my fourth problem is: does every axiomatic, including the supposed global axiomatic, include a certain type and a certain number of propositions that we would be entitled to call undecidable propositions, and which would obviously be our last hope, because… otherwise there isn't much, there isn't much… hope, if there are not undecidable propositions?

Uh… So, understand, that doesn't at all mean … For example… I distinguish… propositions… even unpredictable ones; it is known that no economist and no banker can predict the increase in a money supply. We cannot foresee the increase of a money supply. This does not mean that increasing a money supply is an undecidable proposition in the system, because its unpredictability is particularly ... absolutely is part of the system of axioms and refers to the system of axioms. It's not that. But are there any propositions so that, so this time it won't be their truth and their falsity, what will it be? Well, it will be their ability to stay in the system or else to get out of the axiomatic and… to react against the axiomatic, but reacting how? Does every axiomatic generate and secrete its undecidable propositions? There you go, you see, I am considering these problems, but hey, that's how it is… You… you can think about this, and then we will resume after… [vacation] You wanted to say something?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes? What's this?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Could we use it there? It would be amazing if you did.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, you are not fully … ? No, I'm asking you because if you have any way of [*He doesn't finish his sentence*] … Think about it, if you see a way to… next time, talk about that, yeah. Yes, completely. Well then, there we have it. [*End of the session*] [1: 59: 45]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 09, 26 February 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcript, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation by Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

On the other hand, … we'll soon… we'll soon have finished the first part of our work, right? So, I appeal to you very strongly, to a certain number of you, because, myself, I would conceive of the year-end, the second part… in the form of me making myself somewhat available to you, that is, doing separate things based on the state of some of your own work ... Whether this would consist of details ... for example, you can very well ask me ... according to your own work, to prepare a session on an author or on… a subject… All that, we would do very… disconnected things, eh? So, it's up to you to consider this.

So, there are already some people who have asked me to prepare… but, there, that seems bigger to me, that is, it is if… to prepare something that would be like a kind of… as a presentation on a very great philosopher, but a very difficult philosopher, named Leibniz. So, in fact, I could, unless there are… but… if you have some subjects that… about which you would like… -- it is up to me to say "I can" or "I cannot", obviously -- if you have topics or problems related to your own work, we can, eh, we can see. So, think about it for the next time and the time after that, unless there are already some ...

Or else… like… I think, but, here, that depends greatly on you as well, there are a certain number among you here who… who have been working with me for… a long time, for many years, and all that we've been doing for four or five years, I think that these are still some very diverse things, but these are things revolving around the same notions. So, it may be useful to go back to certain notions on which we have been working for several years. In the end, anything is possible; it's up to you to… You will tell me, either right now, or next time, or still at another time. Otherwise, I'll do something about Leibniz if there's no… special request.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Lichtenberg? That's not enormous, right?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but… what he's known for…

The student: [*Inaudible*] that enlightened me!

Deleuze: yeah, yeah, yeah… I can't. I don't know enough. Yeah, that's ...

Another student: [*Inaudible*] Jakob Böhme?

Deleuze: Yeah… I'm being careless because I can't see myself doing something about Böhme, I wouldn't be able to … yeah. I mean, you never know, yeah ... Yeah, yeah.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: [Alois] Riegl, yes.[73] Yes, yes, yes, yes. But that, we will perhaps come back to this a little bit later ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes! Oh well, yes. Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes… yes. That we can, yes, [Henri] Maldiney, yes.[74] Yes…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Good! There we are. I would like you to continue to accept this convention on which we were working two weeks ago [*actually, three weeks*]: I'm trying ... We really forget where we have reached in our analysis of the State. And I'm making a very long parenthesis to ask: what exactly is an axiomatic? I am saying: this is a long parenthesis since an axiomatic has nothing to do with the problem of the State. An axiomatic is a certain type of system or discourse specific to ... mathematics. Fine. Just… just this point, don't forget that the hypothesis that causes us to pass through this detour is the hypothesis that it wouldn't be inaccurate -- I'm not going any further, that is, I'm weighing my words relatively, I'm using conditionals -- it would not be inaccurate to treat the so-called modern political situation as an axiomatic.

So… but… temporarily, let's forget this concern which links this topic to our subject. And we are considering for itself, for itself, the question: but what is an axiomatic? First of all because it can always be useful, but above all, because… it seems to me to pose a lot of problems even to be able to understand, not only what science is, but what we can call "a politics of science". And, the last time, I just chose an extremely simple example to try to make you feel what an axiomatic is. And I am recalling this example because, if you don't grasp it a bit… but… I am recalling it by outlining even more this example that I had already simplified myself; I am simplifying it even more by saying: here is an example of axiomatics. [*Pause*]

You define a purely functional relation between any elements whatsoever (*éléments quelconques*). Any elements whatsoever, what does that mean? It means: you do not specify the nature of the elements that you are considering; you determine a functional relation between any elements whatsoever. You're going to tell me: this is very weird, really. What does that mean?

Let's consider the symbolic form xRy. xRy, capital R is the functional relation between any two elements whatsoever, x and y. You will tell me: that really doesn't get us very far. You determine… -- we are leaving aside why you determine… how you determine… we will see that, later -- and I assume that we determine axioms, axioms which will correspond to the functional relation xRy, x Relation y. First axiom that you determine – I'm choosing only two, really, to keep this simple, right? --, eRx = xRe = x. eRx = xRe = x. There you are, you treat this proposition, this equation as an axiom, that is, as a first proposition which is not derived from any other.

Second axiom: xRx'= x'Rx = e. Good. Why is this a second axiom? Because this second proposition is not supposed to be able to be proved based on the first. It introduces something irreducibly new. If I find myself faced with a proposition that can be proved based on the axioms previously determined, I would say that this is not an axiom but a theorem. So, a set of axioms is a set of independent propositions which assume nothing else and from which the theorems will result.

I return to my two axioms. What is that? Well, an axiomatic refers… and this is the second essential notion -- the first essential notion is the idea of uniquely functional relation between any elements whatsoever -- the second fundamental notion of an axiomatic is that, as we had seen, of a model of realization. We will say that an axiomatic, as a set of functional relations between any elements whatsoever, refers to domains, to models of realization in which these are realized. What does it mean that these are realized there? This means that, in these domains, in these models of realization, the elements take on a qualified nature. The any elements whatsoever take on a qualified nature. An axiomatic, therefore, if we created an axiomatic of the axiomatic, I believe that it would not be difficult to demonstrate -- this would be a theorem -- that an axiomatic necessarily includes several models of realization, if only possible or virtual models of realization, to the point that the notion of an axiomatic having only a single model of realization, model of realization, would be contradictory.

But, well… I am saying: an axiomatic has models of realization; let's again choose in the example, there, the minimum example that I have just used: the axiomatic that I have just defined with two axioms, with two axioms; by staying with, by staying with two axioms, this axiomatic has a first model of realization, which is what? Which is the domain ... -- or rather no, not the domain -- which is the addition, the addition of real numbers. In what? I reread my first axiom: there is an element e such that, for any element x, we have: eRx = xRe = x. In the case of addition of real numbers, this element e is zero. [*Pause*] You can indeed write 0 + addition of real numbers; that will give you, in the "addition of real numbers" model of realization, that will give you: 0 + x = x + 0 = x. Try it for division, multiplication; it doesn't work like that. So, that allowed you to circumscribe the addition of real numbers. Second axiom: for every element x, there is an element x' such that xRx' = x'Rx = e. For the addition of real numbers, x' is the negative number, -x. [*Pause*] Fine.

But then why did we look for… an axiomatic? We looked for an axiomatic precisely because the addition of real numbers does not exhaust the functional relation. There will be, virtually or actually, there will be other models of realization. I had given another model of realization of this axiomatic with two axioms, namely the composition of displacements in space, in three-

dimensional Euclidean space, which, in itself, is a set entirely different from the addition of real numbers. And, this time, my first axiom will no longer be realized by e = 0, but in the case of the composition of displacements in space, my first axiom will be realized by: e equals what one calls, precisely, in this model of realization, “the identical displacement”, that is, the displacement which leaves each point of space fixed. And, for the second axiom, x’ will no longer be realized by the negative number, but by what is called, in this model of realization, in this second model of realization, by what is called "the inverse displacement".

Suddenly, if I redeveloped this example, it is for a very simple reason: it is that it seems to me that, starting from such a simplified example, one sees what there is that’s extraordinarily original in an axiomatic. I would say that it ... [*Deleuze does not finish*] You see that, in fact, the axiomatic in itself only encompasses functional relations between any elements whatsoever. You understand, our purpose is not to do math here; it's really to have this minimum that allows us to… to understand what they wanted to do, the… the people who created axiomatics. The axiomatic itself only encompasses that: functional relations between any elements whatsoever insofar as being random (*quelconques*). One doesn’t even have to ask what ... what an axiomatic is talking about: the question has no meaning since it [the axiomatic] is talking about any elements whatsoever, and it defines functional relations between these elements as such.

But then it's ... what makes this so important? Why is this interesting? Because the axiomatic really seems to me to be the only thing ... the only discourse that allows a direct comparison, a direct confrontation, a direct comparison between heterogeneous sets or domains insofar as being heterogeneous. These will be the same functional relations between any elements whatsoever that you will discover in the "addition of real numbers" set and in the "composition of ... er, composition of displacements in Euclidean space" set. I am asking: is there another method which we… There I am speaking quite positively about axiomatics, so for…, but we will see that… that… we will also see that there it has problems, right? But, for the moment, it's ... it's a pretty amazing method that by no means can be taken for granted. It gives us the means… and I don't see any other way, at first glance… at first sight… , at first glance, we do not see any other way to compare heterogeneous domains insofar as they are heterogeneous and to compare them directly, that is, without going through homogenization. There we have it. So, you would have to understand that, because otherwise… So, I am even quite willing to start all over again, if you do not understand, but… You’d have to [understand], because otherwise… Either you have to understand, or else you have to leave during this class time, because otherwise everything ... everything depends on that, right? There we are. So, think carefully… Do you understand?

Some students: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Very good, great!

A student: [*She refers to the element e which is defined in Axiom 1, but also in Axiom 2, which seems to call into question the independence of the axioms of the axiomatic*]

Deleuze: It's not that they don’t have [independence]… Yes, in that sense, yes! Yes, yes. But one cannot be deduced from the other; this is what I call independence ... or what we call the independence of axioms. In other words, one is not a theorem that depends on the other. Fine.

So, if you have understood that, I immediately ask, because this is a subject that lingers in… a bit in everything… both in the history of all these things and also… which arises directly, and which, at the same time, never comes up, well at least among the authors that I have read, that does not seem to me ... it's not convincing, so all the more reason to say to yourself, to seize the opportunity, to tell yourself: Do we have the means to bring just an ... attempt at some precision in all this? We are always told: be careful, though, do not confuse logical formalization and axiomatization. So, even at the historical level, that occurred; it was at the same period that the great axiomatics are created with, among others, a very great mathematician named [David] Hilbert and that a logical formalization is created which will receive the name of logistics, and therefore also a great logician and great mathematician directs and develops the thing all the way to… to an unequaled point, namely [Bertrand] Russell. And, you have only to read, even without ... even understanding very badly, you understand, one doesn't have to ... it's not necessary to understand everything, right? You just have to read a page from Russell and a page from Hilbert, [and] you can see that literally they're not the same world. Logical formalization is not at all the same as an axiomatic, as axiomatization.

And all I want to say is, so, well, what's the difference? What's the difference? How does an axiomatic, as I have just tried to define it and as you have understood it so well, differ from a formalization? I would say, a formalization, here's what it is: it is the emission (*dégagement*) and the determination of formal relations between elements specified according to such or such a type. I am weighing every word, eh. At least you see, even before I explain myself, that it's not the same thing. "Functional relation" is opposed to "formal relation"; "any element whatsoever" of the axiomatic is opposed to "specified elements" of formalization. But then, if the elements are specified, that is, are defined as one thing or another, how is there formalization? And what are formal relations in their difference with functional relations?

This is where the notion of type comes into play in a fundamental way and has always been present in formalizations, although ... it is well known that the particular author of a theory called, in the field of logistics, "the theory of types", namely Russell himself, that is, that this theory was constituted late. That means that, in a way, it was being used before it was theorized. And the theory of types consists in determining as a condition under which one can state about propositions the distinction of: a plurality of types according to which propositions are likely to fit into each other. What, in fact, is the principle of the theory of types? Quite simply, it's this: a set does not contain itself as an element. [*Pause*]

What does this mean, "a set does not contain itself as an element"? It means something very, very simple. I am selecting an example given from Russell himself. Here is the proposition: "Napoleon has all the qualities which make a great general"; "Napoleon has all the qualities which make a great general", good. Russell finds that "having all the qualities that make a great general" can never be treated as one of the qualities necessary to make a great general. If you define… Or else, another example given by Russell, if you define "typical French", if you say "ah, that is a typical French person", "typical" is not one of the characteristics used to define a typical French person. In other words, "typical" and the characteristics that define a typical French person are not of the same type. [*Pause*]

Good. Let's give an example; so, I am preparing, there, … I am preparing my return to our problem. I tried to say that a certain State apparatus, what I called the archaic apparatus, in a certain way relied on the overcoding of farming communities. We saw in what sense this could be stated, in what sense it was debatable, etc. But consider this proposition: the archaic State apparatus overcodes farming communities. I would say, it's very simple there; if I make a very arbitrary application of the theory of types; I would say: this State apparatus cannot be an agricultural community. You follow me?

Why was the theory of types… why was it created and developed by Russell – here, I'm really stating the elementary principles, but it's a stupendous, stupendous… and very funny… theory. – Why did, why did Russell feel the need to formalize it? To find a solution to what were called the famous logical paradoxes. You know, paradoxes of the type "I'm lying", you see, eh? The proposition "I am lying", is it true or is it false? It's not hard to show that it's impossible for it to be true, it's impossible for it to be false. Russell's answer is quite simple: the proposition "I'm lying" is neither true nor false. In fact, if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true, right? Good, anyway, you know that; it's in every ... every newspaper for amusement, right. But it really disturbed the logisticians, these things. Well then, Russell, Russell's answer is very simple: the proposition "I lie" is neither true nor false, because it is nonsense.

And I would like you to understand, there -- I am starting a parenthesis again within my parenthesis… -- it is not by chance that it is the English who found and who also so fully developed this… this concept of nonsense there, and who worked so much on it. And this is very important because… if you will, in concrete experience, for me, it seems to me that… one cannot do philosophy, besides, if one does not live this experience, but there is very few things true or false… it's not true and false that matter. That's never what has mattered. It's a moment for celebration when we happen upon a false proposition. A false proposition is very, very rare.

What is it that makes us all unhappy? Our common misfortune is never living within error, not at all ... not at all. It is that ... our common misfortune is that we do not stop either encountering or -- horror! -- ourselves broadcasting things that are pure and simple nonsense. But this is wonderful, I assure you; it's a day for celebration the day you say something false. That's not it, otherwise we say bullshit (*conneries*), and it's not the same, right, these are not errors, right? Stuff that doesn't make sense, really… Yeah, why not… We don't stop… ah, fine… This in the domain of "neither true nor false", it doesn't make sense. True and false is still what makes sense. But it's rare, rare, you know, that you even get to the possibility of true and false. Take an ordinary speech; we can't say, we can't even say, this is false. Take books. But there's an enormous number of books… We read that, but we really tell ourselves…, it's obvious that the question is not "is it true or false… What is the gentleman saying?" It's "does that make the least bit of sense?"

I have always been struck by the following problem, to connect with the problem of mathematicians. Mathematicians are not kids at school, eh… I mean: when mathematicians don't agree with each other, there isn't a single one who says to the other: you were wrong, what you are saying is false. I mean… and that's what bothered me a lot, me… I have the impression that the whole theory of truth… in classical philosophy has always been so problematic in categories of true and false, that they were always… childish, implausible, fictitious situations. In the

classic theory of true and false, well, we are treated like children in school. There is always a teacher who can say to Toto: no, Toto, 2 and 2 is not 5.[75] And you will not tell me that this is what we die from. It is not because we say too often: 2 and 2 is 5. We die, there, from a much more…, a much more aggressive virus, namely the weight of our stupidity, and this is not the weight of our errors, not at all ... not at all ... It is the weight of all the things that we say and that we think and which have strictly, really, no meaning. Hence the question "what is nonsense?" This is an infinitely more important and urgent question than the question "what is false? ". And, once again, the false just does not exist.

And when mathematicians… Once again, except under extraordinarily abstract conditions, those of the child at school, that of the gentleman to whom I ask the time in the street, then, indeed, he can tell me something false, he can tell me "it's three o'clock" when it's half past two ... fine, that makes me miss the train, at the outside, but ... Ah ... A politician in his speeches doesn't tell us false things; he undertakes a much more pernicious operation which is to spin nonsense to an unparalleled degree.

Fine… I am saying: when two mathematicians argue, it happens… science is constituted by polemics. It is in this sense, too, that science is politics. When two mathematicians argue, it is not the situation of a teacher compared to a child; it's not one saying to the other: ah, you thought 2 and 2 was 5. Oh, no. One says to the other or suggests: your thing is fine, but it's without any interest, that is, it has no sense. None ... At that moment, he is using very vague words; that indicates the state of the matter and that this is what we should think about. What do we mean when we say, "but this proposition has absolutely no interest", "this proposition has no importance"? This is stuff revolving around meaning and nonsense. No sense, no importance, no interest.

What is the mathematical interest of a proposition? In thesis juries, for example, we see quite well guys that demonstrate… they demonstrate theorems, right? We can always invent theorems if we have a sufficient mathematical background. There we are, why not? No interest! We can always maintain propositions of a philosophical type, but they still must have an interest. What is the strictly philosophical interest of a proposition? What is the strictly mathematical interest of an equation? There are proposals that lack any interest, that is, lack any meaning. Fine.

So, you see where the theory of types was going; it consisted in saying: one of the forms -- in any case, here, I don't want to go too far -- one of the forms of nonsense, one of the forms that has no sense, so it's worse than false, it's what can be neither true nor false. It is when, in a proposition, one contaminates proposition elements of different types, that is, one constructs a set that contains itself as an element. When I say, "I lie", the proposition bears on itself, under conditions in which it could not bear on itself, so it is devoid of sense. So, at that point, it forcibly is neither true nor false since it doesn't make sense.

You see, I am coming back, then, to my simpler topic: what is a logical formalization? To take up my example again, I am saying the archaic State apparatus looms over or overcodes agricultural communities. So, it is of a different type from farming communities; it is not itself an agricultural community. I would say: the proposition "archaic State apparatus" is of a different type from the proposition "agricultural communities", exactly as Russell told us: the proposition

“Napoleon has all the qualities of a great general” is not of the same type as the proposition “so and so has the particular qualities of a great general”. I mean: formalization -- I am using my expression or the definition I proposed -- logical or logistical formalization is the determination of formal relations between specified elements according to the type of proposition that corresponds to them. [*Pause*] In this sense, formalization sets up a model to be realized. [*Pause*]

I am coming back -- but here, I am almost done with this… this… this… with this first point -- I am coming back to my definition of axiomatics: axiomatics determines uniquely functional relations between any elements whatsoever. [*Pause*] In other words, it proceeds more by the path of formalizations which fit into one another according to the types of propositions, but it ensures a kind of point of contact (*mise en contact*) of universal relations as such, between any elements whatsoever, universal relations with domains… with… of… fields, of the most heterogeneous domains of realization, whereas in the formalization, you always had to go through a homogenization at the level of the higher type. Type 1 sets could not be compared, from a formalization point of view, could only be compared to the extent that they were homogenized by a type 2 set. Type 2 sets could only be compared to the extent where they were homogenized by a type 3 set.

So, there it seems to me that this is very curious. We can clearly see the innovation in the axiomatic process. I would say that the axiomatic is precisely the functional relations that refer to models of realization. Formalization is the formal relations which constitute models to be realized. And, all that I tried to show the last time is that, in the case which concerns us -- here I am starting a parenthesis again -- is that, in the case which concerns us, one could say by hypothesis, but it has not yet been well justified, that unlike the archaic State, the modern State has ceased to be a model to be realized; it has become a model of realization in relation to an axiomatic. [*Pause*] Good. This is extremely difficult, all of that, but finally ... What?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What is it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh yeah, well yeah ... as we'll come back to this, that doesn't matter. No, it's just… so, I would like… What?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: It's the formalization, oh well, yes… the formulation? Uh, yes, I was saying… Yes, I just tried to show, very quickly, that, if you will, the archaic State, what we called during all our previous research the archaic Empire, insofar as being an overcoding of community, in a way, it was a formalization. In this sense, it is indeed a model to be realized. [*Pause*] It’s a transcendent model, isn't it? As we have seen, modern states seem quite different. And how are they entirely different? It’s because, this time around, these are no longer models to be realized; these are models of realization. You see that the word "model" has completely changed its meaning, that is: these are the fields of realization in relation to a general axiomatic which is what? That we

have tried to determine as being the axiomatic of capital. [*Pause*] But anyway, there, I'm getting ahead of what remains for us to do.

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible*]… in the realization model e =, for example, 0, we must suppose that there is only one axiomatic, for example, that of Hilbert, which precisely states the possibility of both zero and the successor of zero. So, there is another problem here; it is the model of realization of the formal definition of the axiomatic supposes an axiomatic which makes possible precisely the assignment of a series of integers (*nombres entiers*) to the model of realization as fulfilling the… the formal definition. There is a problem with the axiomatic ...

Deleuze: In my opinion, sorry, it seems to me that there are two points in what you are saying. On the one hand, there is the requirement of, precisely, what axiomaticians call not, in fact, a formalization, but a meta-mathematics; that would be fulfilled by a meta-mathematics, the requirement that you are stating. And, on the other hand, in the very correct example that you yourself give, it seems to me that the need to define the successor belongs rather and constitutes ... itself an axiom, an axiom which intervenes from the axiomatic of integers.

Comtesse: That's it. That is, before saying that … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, you need an axiom of succession. [*Comtesse continues to speak as does Deleuze, with barely audible remarks*] I agree completely with that. Completely agree with that. An axiom is required, yes.

Comtesse: We need several axioms… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Okay.

Comtesse: At least four axioms.

Deleuze: Okay, yeah, okay. Oh okay!

Comtesse: [*Inaudible*] the important thing about Hilbert is that, unlike all classical philosophy, all the classical philosophers, Descartes, Leibniz and all the others and even before, who believed that the series of integers was natural, well then, it must be founded axiomatically. We cannot be sure that if 0 is a number like, for example, [*Inaudible*] Hilbert's axiomatic, that we have a successor of 0, the possibility of a successor must be axiomatically founded.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

Comtesse: This is one of the biggest problems in axiomatics, and also one of the biggest problems [is that] it makes another level of conjugation in the most heterogeneous [*Inaudible*].

Deleuze: Oh yes! Yes, yes! Ah, I see what you ... mean, yeah. You, you would give ... that's possible, yes. I'm just saying that everyone understood, I think, that in the very example I cited, remaining with two axioms didn't mean at all that the axiomatic that I was… defining there… that it was enough, was itself consistent, right? Comtesse's remark, namely that this presupposes

other axioms, that's ... that's certain. And you ... oh yes, you ... you replaced the story there with an axiom of successibility because you think that there will be a particular use of it at the level of ... at the level of a theory… of capital? It is possible, yes. It's possible.

Comtesse: We are completely obsessed by the idea that a successor to zero is required and that zero is a number. The whole controversy is to say ... for example [*Inaudible*] if we think that zero is a number, we cannot [*Inaudible*] a successor of zero, except to say that ...

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah

Comtesse: [*Inaudible*]… unbelievable nonsense in mathematics, that for there to be a successor to zero, you have to state that zero equals one.

Deleuze: Yeah ... yes, yes, yes, okay. Yes, yes. I totally agree. [*Pause*] Well, then, we'll find that again, at the level of the succession, right, you will say, yes, good. There we are. Have you understood? [*To the students*] Shall I continue or ... shall we stop? Do you want … have you had enough?

Claire Parnet: No, no, let's continue.

A student: Why is it the Anglo-Saxons who ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Well, why is it the English who have ...? Ah well, they didn't ... No, the axiomatic, they never liked it very much, the English. You know, we find here ... for me, my dream that ... because -- it is not my personal dream -- I tell myself: there is this path in Nietzsche which has never been taken up again, because it is a very dangerous path; one would have to be Nietzsche to… to succeed in things like that, this kind of typology of nations. Why is a particular problem linked to such ... to a particular country? Eh? It's very clear in philosophy, but it is also very clear in mathematics, all that, it is very clear ... Why does a particular country provide ...? It's very odd when Nietzsche starts raving about the English mind, the German mind, the French mind, all that. So, why is it the English who ... for whom the matter ... a problem, it's never ... it is never abstract? I believe theorems are abstract, right, but concrete things in thought, real events in thought, are never abstract. That doesn't mean that this is historical either; it would be necessary to invent quite different categories. But why are the problems signed? … [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 08]

**Part 2**

Deleuze: It's curious, nonetheless… Well… is…? I am indeed saying that it is insanely dangerous, that is, we risk falling into the worst platitudes ... of ... by saying: but ... we would have to have the method to speak well about this. So, the English, why is it the formalization, the logistics that fascinated them, and why did they have geniuses on this topic, incredible geniuses? That seems obvious to me; in all fields, then, we should think about the vocation of England for thinking nonsense, for thinking about the problem of sense and nonsense. The English have always been guys who have said… finally, I will sum up. One of their philosophical contributions is… they're quite… they're quite funny, eh, the English. We always say: oh pfff…

they don't go far, it's… They have a good laugh instead; they laugh at French philosophy, German philosophy, all that. They say, that's good, but what does all that mean? What does it mean? What does the question "what does that mean?" mean? For the English, we can see very well, they say: oh, these are people who talk to us about the true and the false; only, here it is… they only forget one little thing; once again, it's that the true and the false assume that what one is saying already makes sense; what interests us is: under what conditions does something ... does a proposition make sense?

So, it is in all fields that the English have been perpetually drawn to the question of sense and nonsense. Take their literature: Why is nonsense a driving aspect, that runs through English literature from beginning to end? When you find a page of nonsense, why is it that you know it's English or American? Or Jewish? -- Although Jewish nonsense is not the same thing, but anyway… generally it will not be difficult at that moment to show that it is rather… Except precisely Lichtenberg, him… there are always… little exceptions like that -- But why is English thought, American thought penetrated by this problem of sense and nonsense? Whereas the French, they have always been very heavy, very clumsy, in the question of sense and nonsense. No matter how hard they try ... No matter how hard they try to be light, it hardly works, eh. It hardly works, next to English nonsense, if you think… even in the cinema, if you think of… so, both Americans and Jews… the Marx [brothers], fine, the Marx [brothers] as an art of nonsense….

Fine. Whether it's in literature, from Lewis Carroll to [Edward] Lear to… the whole tradition of nonsense, fine: is it by chance, I am saying, that their philosophers do the same in philosophy? That is, Russell is indeed a sort of great Lewis Carroll of philosophy. Good. So, there are mysteries that escape us… Good… why? Oh, there would be… there would be things to discover, ah yes. At that point one would have to, indeed, well ... come to a clear definition of what nonsense is. Suddenly we might understand why this particularly interests the English and why the French have always missed out, that the Germans are still something else, something else, it's not… [*Deleuze does not complete this*] Yeah, well, fine.

So, there you have it; I would like to make a second remark. There we have my first remark on the axiomatic. I would like to make a second remark on the axiomatic because it will, I believe, be very useful to us later. From everything we have just said, one might think an axiomatic is like a kind of automasticity process (*procédé d'automasticité*) in mathematical discourse. It is like a sort of construction of a spiritual automaton -- "spiritual automaton" being a famous expression in philosophy -- or, ultimately, even more, real automation.[76] Literally, these are the rules of a speech in which you don't know what you are talking about, since you are stating relations between any elements whatsoever about which you do not specify the nature. Not only do you not need to know what you are talking about, but it is recommended that you do not know what you are talking about.

So, fine, one can have this impression that 0 -- and it has been said quite often -- the axiomatic tends and even proposes to expel not only all images in favor of a pure symbolism, but all the resources of the in… of intuition, of construction to replace it with the enunciation of the set of axioms. [*Pause*] And, in fact, one only has to look to see quite well. I mean, at the point we have reached, we can see quite clearly that the axiomatic is inseparable from a type of

experimentation, undoubtedly from a very particular type of experimentation, but impossible to define in fact the axiomatic as the expulsion of experimentation; it is rather the constitution of an entirely new mode of experimentation. For I am insisting on this, nothing tells me in advance, if I undertake the axiomatic, nothing tells me in advance which axioms I must choose, and to what extent my axiomatic will be consistent or not, non-contradictory, to what extent it will be saturated or not. I remind you that an axiom is said to be saturated when I cannot add an axiom to the previous ones without the set becoming contradictory. So there can be contradictions in an axiomatic and contradictions which, if necessary, are not visible immediately, can only be seen at the level of the theorems that I deduce from it, but, even more, at what point my axiomatic is saturated?

All that is really ... there is an inventiveness in axiomatics. Before speaking badly of the axiomatic, I believe that we must… we must indicate what is rather extraordinary in… in this adventure of the axiomatic. Very difficult to… there is a kind of… yes, of invention, of creation of axioms. There, then, I completely take up again what Comtesse just said. If you propose an axiomatization of arithmetic, well… yes, you will need some [inventiveness] and then to what extent will it be contradictory or not, when will it be saturated? Now, what does this kind of thing consist of ...? So, it's not at all a thing where… a mechanism would replace, right? I believe that it is, in fact, a mode of experimentation which is itself ... subject to failures, to successes. Ultimately, I would say the same as for formalization; there are axiomatics which have no sense, which have no interest. So, fine… [*Pause*]

As a result, one cannot form from the axiomatic the idea of ... of a kind of constitution of infallible automatic knowledge. I insist on this because, in our comparison that we will make later, in a while, between the axiomatic and politics, we can no longer maintain as an objection the idea that, in politics, we make mistakes all the time, if in axiomatics as well ... So, that is not the question. If I try to define the word, the level of the axiomatic, what will I say? So, I return to the four categories that we have ... that we sketched out. The categories that we have outlined, I would say that, in the end, we should only identify three of them and indicate for convenience that we are not confusing these three concepts.

The first concept is: topical conjunctions between flows. You remember: what we were calling "topical conjunctions between flows" is in the case where flows are decoded. These are the forms in which the movement of flows is as if stopped, tied off, in a particular form or another, and it is the whole domain, as we have seen, that we called the "domain of personal dependencies". So, there were topical conjunctions.

With capitalism, in our previous analysis, we thought we were getting into a very different element. It was no longer…. It was no longer a question of topical conjunctions between flows; it was a question of a generalized conjugation of decoded flows. [*Pause*] And, at that point, there were no longer relations of personal dependence between subjects; there was in the end only one subjectivity, as we have seen: the subjectivity of capital. But we had defined capitalism precisely as the formation of this generalized conjugation which was distinguished from topical conjunctions.

Our question now could be: Isn't there something else yet? Pure hypothesis, right, because there, I ... I ... this is just to have my terminological references. I would say: yes, there might still be something else, and that's the connections of flows, the connections of flows which would not refer… which would be reduced neither to topical conjunctions, nor to a generalized conjugation. Why? Why would there be a need for this notion?

That's what I meant with the experimental nature of axiomatics; it's that axiomatics is still a way of stopping flows, in this case the flows of science. This is one more way to stop. Why? It seems to me that this is striking in the history of mathematics, or in the history of physics, since physics has been very axiomatized. The axiomatic always worked like a kind of stopping point (*arrêt*) ... like a kind of stop, there. It's in this way that I said, "politics of science", where it is a question of saying to people, "ah no, one must ... Do not go any further, because ...", "Do not go any further", literally…, these flows of scientificity, these flows of mathematics, these flows of physics, etc. ... we need to get this all organized. It… it flees everywhere, it leaks everywhere, all that, wherever you go, wherever you go. I'm saying that axiomatics, at the start of the 20th century, in the first half of the 20th century, in mathematics, but also in physics, worked as a means of blocking, of stopping.

Well, here is the proposition ... here is the hypothesis that I would offer in the second place, in this second ... in this second remark: it is that, when flows are decoded, for example, flows of science, well ... they escape their topical conjunctions. But aren't they yet moving beyond? Generalized conjugation, generalized conjugation of flows, this is still a way of blocking them, of saying: no, ... For example, imagine, when did the axiomatics of physics have its major, major role? It was when, really, I believe, scientists themselves began to get worried by and about the ways and paths that so-called indeterminist physics was taking. And, at that point, there was a real need for some reorganizing. Everything unfolds as if not only scientists had told each other -- there were also scholars, but not only scholars -- it was as if ... scholars and powers, the powers that were in charge of the politics of science, had told themselves: but anyway, what are these… what are these flows of knowledge which are more and more decoded, which… where are we going? What is this stuff? And [there was] a sort of reorganization which consisted in reconciling what is roughly called indeterminism with determinism. A great French physicist had a fundamental role there, namely [Louis de] Broglie, in this sort of reorganization, and the axiomatics of physics, for example in France, took place starting with Broglie's students. It was really like saying: but indeterminist physics is dragging us into some stuff… [*He doesn't finish*]

That's exactly what I was saying, if you remember, concerning the famous story ... of NASA, flows of capital, flows of capital, flows of capitalism that are all ready to go to the moon, but , there, there is nevertheless a State to say: ah no, no, no! One mustn't … One mustn't go too far. A little reterritorialization has to occur. Ah… And so, we tie it off, we seal it. The axiomatic is a bit like that; it operates a general conjugation of flows which prevents them, I would say, which prevents them from going too far, that is, from connecting with vectors of flight. It operates… how to put it, yes, I can't find the best word, it operates as a kind of symbolic reterritorialization.

And, in math, it's the same; axiomatics in math really has to do with ... I'm thinking, for example, of the kind of flight of geometries in all directions. And now that didn't work out, right, through the axiomatic; it continues to flow, to slip away… everywhere. The situation of current

mathematics, it is ... it is all the same ... very, very curious, when you hear mathematicians speak ... these ... these situations where, really, mathematical knowledge has completely fragmented, where there is a mathematician in Japan who understands what the… what a mathematician is doing in Germany… And then there you go, and then the others… good… This kind of situation where really the flows of knowledge, there, are… are extraordinarily continuous. Fine. The axiomatic is ... I repeat, the axiomatic is a kind of restructuring, structuring, symbolic re-territorialization.

You see in what sense I would distinguish, therefore, between three concepts: topical or qualified conjunctions between flows; generalized flow conjugations; and something more: connections, that is, what pushes flows even further, what makes them escape the axiomatic itself and what puts them into relation with vectors of flight. So, it is in this sense: isn't there something other than the axiomatic that we could call the connectors type? And I think -- and this is the last remark I would like to make concerning this math story -- I think there has always been something very, very curious in mathematics, and it is about this that I would like to speak to complete his math story because that will continue being useful for us in our parallel with… politics.

At the same period as the formation of the first great axiomatics, to which Comtesse alluded earlier, along with Hilbert and others, coincided a mathematical movement which seems to me of very, very great interest. And there, oddly, to return -- we always find the same problems -- to return to our story: why was the center of this mathematical movement located in the Netherlands? It's curious; there would be… reasons… we would need to find reasons… for that. And a very bizarre, very important school of great mathematicians who called themselves intuitionists, intuitionism or constructivism, constructionism, arose in reaction against the axiomatic. Note well: this is all the more interesting as there were also aesthetic movements that claimed to be constructivist. Fine.

I don't know if there were any possible relationships… I don't know. These mathematicians, I am naming them for… if, by chance, you heard about them in a book… I am naming the principal ones, it was: [L.E.J.] Brouwer, B-r-o-u-w-e-r; [Arend] Heyting, H-e-y-t-i-n-g; [George FC] Griss, G-r-i-s-s, and in France, a very, very curious mathematician, who wrote a lot, who was called [Georges] Bouligand, B-o-u-l-i-g-a-n-d and one of his best books -- but that can only be found, I believe, in a library - is called The Decline… *The Decline of Mathematico-Logical Absolutes* [*Le déclin des absolus mathématico-logiques*].[77] And they were opposed to the axiomatic, I believe, in two simultaneous ways.

On the one hand, they were going in reverse (*en retrait*), because they demanded conditions of construction in space. But, on the other hand and at the same time -- in that sense they were really going in reverse (*en retrait*) -- but in other aspects of their work and their thinking, they were far ahead which, of course, is important to us. They could be both at the same time. As if they had demanded that, literally, mathematical flows go even further, exceed the limits of axiomatics, in particular they had a way of calling into question principles that axiomatics retained, in particular the so-called principle of excluded third, according to which a proposition is true or false, and what they opposed to the axiomatic was -- and there it is very useful for us; I am not saying why yet -- it was what they themselves called, well some of them called, what

some of them called a calculus of problems, a calculus of problems and, indeed, when we see what they call a calculus of problems -- notably the mathematician Griss did a lot of calculating of problems in the sense…, there was also a Russian in there… There was a French couple… hey! I recollect something: there was a French couple of mathematicians-physicists, students of Broglie, which represented a kind of epistemological domestic scene [*Laughter*] because the husband was one of the best axiomaticians and the wife was an intuitionist, [*Laughter*] and they had a lot, a lot of talent,… they got divorced, eh, [*Laughter*] but hey…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: [Jean-Louis] Destouches, Destouches, and Paulette [Destouches-] Février yes, yes, yes. She, she was making presentations on calculating problems ... and he was doing axiomatics ... absolutely ...

But, what interests me, therefore… -- this couple is nonetheless… is still very important, because they surely lived a kind of duality of inspiration… -- what interests me is how we can already, in our hypothesis, without specifying anything yet, ask the question: is there not, even beyond the generalized conjugation such that an axiomatic operates, isn't there something else which is of the "connection with particular vectors" type that goes beyond the axiomatic, that is, a calculus of problems as opposed to a determination of axioms? And what would a calculus of problems be as opposed to a determination of axioms? You feel that this is our only chance in politics, if our comparison is founded with the axiomatic. How to get out of an axiomatic?

And if I look into the history of science, into the history of mathematics, I just want to note for the record three cases that seem essential to me in which we would find something of this duality, the opposition of scientific currents, opposition… First case. First case: the opposition of two essential scientific currents in Greek geometry -- I am selecting a distant example -- the opposition of two very important scientific currents in Greek geometry -- if… I am summarizing, it's just… there, really for the record that… and to be able to use it later -- you have a conception of Greek geometry which is very simple, which proceeds by: definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems, proofs, corollaries. This conception of geometry finds its truly royal form with the geometer Euclid. [*Pause*] Do not mix everything up; I am not saying at all that this is already axiomatic. I'm saying it's a deductive system. It is certainly not axiomatic yet, but it is a system that one could call an "axiom-theorem system". [*Pause*]

How to define it, this very general deductive system? I would say that this deductive system consists in defining essences in order to deduce the necessary properties from them. It goes entirely from "essences" to "necessary properties". For example, the Platonic conception not only of mathematics, but more particularly of geometry, is a conception of this type: we go from essences to necessary properties, and this is the definition of deduction, of an ideal deductive science.

And then there is another much more ... bizarre current, from the time of the Greeks. This is a current that is no longer theorematic -- you see I can call the first conception a theorematic conception of mathematics, and it culminates, again, with Euclid -- the other conception is a

problematic conception. The essential element of this conception is no longer the category of theorem, theorem to be demonstrated; this is the category of problem to be solved.

You will tell me, and you would be right: but, in the first conception, there are already problems. Answer: yes, there are problems, but problems which are closely subordinate to the theorems. Of course, the two are intermixed, but that's not an argument, that. There is a primacy of theorems over problems. Moreover, to solve a problem, in the first conception, is always to relate it to theorems which allow them to be solved. And, in Euclid, there are many problems, but the solution to the problems is but one and proceeds through the determination of the theorems which will make this solution possible. This is the "theorem" category that wins out over the "problem" category.

But there are some very bizarre geometricians. So, you already sense, those who know a little Greek history… or the history of Platonism, you must think that, perhaps, they are linked, for example, to currents that are known as the Sophists, that they are linked to… to people all the more bizarre since we have lost the texts, but we can… well… [*Inaudible*] well… It's a *problematist* current. And how does the problem differ from the theorem? I am saying, the theorem is not difficult; you go from ... -- well, it is not difficult ... -- you go from an essence to the properties which necessarily follow from it. To create theorems (*Théorématiser*) is to determine the properties that follow from an essence. You define the essence of the circle, and you deduce its necessary properties. I seem to be saying it's easy; it's not easy, of course. On this point, you subordinate all the problems to your theorems. The others do not proceed in that way.

What is the difference between a problem and a theorem? It's that a problem is not of the *essence* type; it is of the *event* type, something happening, or of the *operation* type. You cause something to be subjected to a figure and something extrinsic; you cause it to be subjected to a painful operation, an ablation, an addition, a squaring, a cubing (*cubature*), a whole surgery of the figure. It is no longer a question at all of looking for the properties which result from essences; it is a question of looking for the metamorphoses which are linked to events. Yes, that seems to me to be a perfect expression, perfect, very clear. That's the "problem" category.

Well, ok, I'm going to cut, here, I'm going to cut an angle into my triangle; what's going to happen? So there, I'm going act so that ... a plane cuts a cone at an angle there. What's going to happen? Good, that's a very, very curious way of thinking. It is an event thinking (*pensée événement*) and no longer an essence thinking (*pensée essence*) at all. Events of a special type will be properly mathematical events. We will oppose geometric essences, ev… properly geometric events. Fine. And there too, you understand, one must harden, one must not harden too much in any case. Of course, in that sense, you will also find theorems, but this time around, theorems will be entirely subordinate to problems.

And I believe that, in Greek geometry, there was a kind of very intense struggle and, finally, there was a victory. The "problem" tendency would have been ... completely, so it ... it has the equivalent of Euclid, that's what we know, for example, of Archimedes' geometry. Good, this is the great Euclid-Archimedes opposition. [*Pause*] These are truly events of geometry as opposed to geometric essences. There you have my first case. You see that here, I can say: a problematist conception was already opposed to the theorematic conception among the Greeks.

Second example: from the 17th [century] to the 19th, from the 17th to the 19th, we agree with ... many authors, historians; they agree in considering that some -- not just one – some conceptions of geometry arise from which we can date so-called “modern” geometry. And along what path does that occur? That occurs along a double pathway. I am trying to define the first path, the reinforcement of a symbolic power, the reinforcement of a symbolic power, that is, to go beyond intuition or representation in space towards a symbolic power. Of what is that the pathway? This is the pathway of algebra. This is the pathway of analytical geometry, and that will open itself onto the whole future of mathematics. But in the 17th century, it was above all the development of algebra and analytical geometry. So there, you see, spatial representation, that is, intuition, is taken over onto the side of the affirmation or the development of symbolic power, yeah, algebra and analysis.

But, at the same time, another current ... if I'm trying to locate names, this is, for example, Descartes. This is very much the pathway of Cartesian geometry, hence the role of Descartes in analytical geometry. And then, among the successors of Descartes: the tendency to make analytical geometry into a completed model for the whole of geometry. But there are also forms of resistance, and paradoxically a whole other coexisting pathway emerges. And this completely different pathway has some strange names and above all ... some strange names because these are rather strange men who introduce it. I am naming one we talked about… back in… I don't know, many years ago… a very, very weird geometrician named [Girard] Desargues, D-e-s-a-r-g-u-e-s, who wrote very little, but whom everyone considers to have been fundamental for the development of modern geometry. So, there is… there is… an old book from the 19th century: *Les Oeuvres de Desargues* [The works of Desargues] and all the adventures of his life. He had all kinds of misfortunes; he was condemned everywhere, in Parliament, he had a trial in parliament… all that. Good.[78]

If I create, if I try to create the lineage… he was greatly interested in… very oddly, he was in contact with stonemasons. You see why, in this second conception, [contact] with stonemasons and stone cutting is quite important? Why? Because stone cutting really belongs to the "what's going on?” type. Obviously, stone cutting is problematic. This is obvious. Rounding, cutting, this is the domain of ... not properties that arise from an essence, but, as was often said in the language of the era, [the domain] of affects or events that transform a figure. [*Pause*] One of Desargues's texts is called, has a marvelous title, a very, very "Lewis Carroll" title even, “Draft of an essay on the events that are determined by the encounter of a cone with a plane” [*Brouillon d’une atteinte aux événements que déterminent la rencontre d’un cône avec un plan*].[79] You see there is the thing: encounter, attacking events. You can sense that this is not Cartesian language here; this ... that langue is part of another tradition. This is the language of the problematist current. Fine, the importance of Desargues is fundamentally recognized not only by Descartes in this, who is quite correct, who in several letters says that Desargues is ... he is a formidable geometrician. But here, this is no longer merely a recognition, this is almost a disciple, but a disciple who ... who ... will surpass the master; this is on Pascal's path. And it is on the path of Pascalian mathematics and no longer in Descartes’s approach that we find the Desarguian generation, the generation following Desargues.

Long after ... -- ah ... Pascal as well, this is a situation ... this is a very bizarre situation in science ... -- long after, you have a famous name as the creator of so-called "descriptive" geometry, it's

[Gaspard] Monge. And Monge does not cease formulating a theory that he himself calls, in his language, "a theory of particular affects", and he distinguishes the particular affects of bodies from general properties. And it's in this way, when he deals with physics, it is very important, since he treats phenomena, for example, electrical phenomena as particular affects of bodies in distinction from general determinations of figures of the "space and movement" type. In any case: Monge's descriptive geometry. And Monge, what is this? This is a very, very weird current, because Monge is ... well ... he's fully a scholar, but he's a scholar who is not of the same tradition as the other current. He refers to a character… to a type of character that we talked about, here, in the year … I don't know which one, when we were considering that, namely the engineer, the military engineer, the military engineer's science. This is a very, very strange thing.

And then, so in the line, ... there is really a ... a continuity here, if we try to establish continuities ... there is a continuity, it seems to me, Desargues - Pascal - Monge, and then in fourth case, perhaps one of the greatest -- he has his little street in Paris -- [Jean-Victor] Poncelet, Poncelet who is a great military engineer, but above all, above all, the inventor of so-called projective geometry -- projective, this is problematist; pro-blem equals pro-jection. Literally, it's… it's… it's the same word, one in Latin, the other in Greek – Poncelet's projective geometry, which has a great axiom, which is based on a so-called axiom "of continuity".

And there too, to stick to examples as stupid as the one I chose for the axiomatic, what is the axiom of continuity from Poncelet, in projective geometry? You see ... a circle or an arc, eh, you draw a ... line that intersects the arc at two points, right? These are two real points. You make it move up. The moment comes when there is only one real point. You will continue to tell yourself, you will continue to say: there are two points, but, simply, one is fictitious, or one is imaginary. You move it up again. The line comes out of the circle and no longer intersects ... and no longer intersects anything: you will continue to say that there are two fictitious points; you will have established a series of continuity between heterogeneous cases, namely: three heterogeneous cases, the case where your line actually intersects the circle at two points, the case where your line is a tangent, and, a third case, the case where your line is outside the circle. You will tell me: what is the point of introducing these imaginary points? Ah, yes indeed, I won't tell you, because you must sense that this has a colossal interest, from the point of view of geometry, that it results in a new conception of geometry.

If I try to summarize here, at this level, the example becomes very simple… Yes, it becomes… I would say: in both cases, as well in the conception, in the first conception as in the second conception, that is, in the path of analytical geometry, Descartes, in the path of constructive projective geometry, Monge, Poncelet, Desargues, etc. .., in both cases you go beyond ... -- otherwise there would be no science -- in both cases, you go beyond the conditions of spatial representation, that is, you go beyond simple intuition. This is common to both. This is the way in which both are scientific.

But, in one case, you move beyond spatial representation or intuition toward an increasingly consistent power of abstraction, or toward symbolic power. In the other case, I would say, it's a entirely different -- you'll understand -- you move beyond this toward a trans-intuition, that is, you develop a kind of ... space between cases. In one case, I would say, you create a conjugation; in the other case, you create a connection. [*Pause*] You're raising yourself into some kind of…

what? A trans-spatial intuition or trans-intuition. You do not go beyond space toward a symbolic power; you are creating connectors of space. You unfold a space common to the three cases: the line that intersects, the tangent line, the line outside the circle.

I would say that my second example overlaps my first one: I will call, if you will, "deductive" or "theorematic" conception the conception which goes beyond the spatial representation towards the power of abstr ... towards the symbolic power, and I will call "problematic" the Desargues, Pascal, Monge… Poncelet's conception which goes beyond the spatial representation towards a trans-intuition or a trans-spatial intuition. And, that the two intermix ... It's possible that at some level, the two intermix, but every time, there are tensions.

I am choosing only one example because I remember it: there is that… Poncelet has a whole polemic precisely with a descendant… and a creator, but a descendant of analytical geometry, a guy who… developed the analysis to a much more advanced level… and… and who… and who is his contemporary, a mathematician named [Augustin-Louis] Cauchy. And the kind of Cauchy-Poncelet tension renews, if you will, under completely different conditions historically, renews the same opposition as the one we have just seen among the Greeks, between a Euclidean current and an Archimedean current. Fine.

I am saying: [here's] a third example in modern mathematics. First path: the formation of an axiomatic power, [*Pause*] an axiomatic power which consists in going beyond spatial representation towards a more and more, how to say, abstract symbolism ... in the sense of a symbolism of any elements whatsoever; and, on the other hand, the problematist or intuitionist current of which people have wrongly -- you see what I mean -- people have wrongly created a conception of it, when that occurs, because I believe that there are math historians who present things in that way, as if my second current here was just regression. But, in fact, it is not at all a current which simply claims the rights of spatial representation and which says "ah well no…" The anti-axiomaticians are often presented as people who simply say: ah, but we cannot do without spatial representation and the axiomatic is wrong. And I don't think this is at all the case. They are much more… the second current is… it is as interesting as the first one; it's not at all… attempting to say: ah, spatial representation must be maintained. It goes beyond spatial representation no less than the other [current]. Archimedes goes beyond spatial representation, but he does so through a method of limits or of exhaustion, that is, metamorphoses of figures and passages to the limit. Poncelet does so with his axiom of continuity. It's weird, by the way, that we call it an "axiom of continuity", "axiom". We should remove the word "axiom"; it's obviously not an axiom of continuity, it's a condition of ... it's a condition of problems, right? It's not an axiom at all ... You can treat it like an axiom, at that point, it's an intersection (*un mixte*), it's a mixture. You see, therefore, I would say: it does not exceed the conditions of spatial representation any less than the others, but, instead of going beyond it towards a symbolism, ultimately a symbolism of the object… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1: 32: 23]

**Part 3**

… They will establish a continuity between the three discontinuous cases; for example, in the case of Poncelet, you see, the line which intersects the circle, the tangent line, the line outside the circle. So, between these three cases, they cause to flow, or they cause a kind of common line to

pass through, a fictitious line… good. But, in this current, it is not the power of the symbol; it is the fiction of an in-between (*entre-deux*). [*Pause*]

So if I summarize, I would say: we are entitled from here on to consider, not yet of course, but to consider better our hypothesis that three concepts must be distinguished: once again, that of topical conjunctions, that of generalized conjugations, and that of connections, connections, at the extreme, I would call it almost creative connections, or anticipatory connections. This will be a different world, anticipatory connections, and they would not proceed via the axiomatic: they would proceed by a calculus of prob ... problems.

Hence the importance that, in the so-called intuitionist or constructionist school, the importance in this school, of ... [*Pause*] what they call precisely a calculus of problems. The book by Bouligand that I was quoting, *The Decline of Mathematical-logical Absolutes*, the thesis, the whole thesis is this, with some very rich, very varied examples: that there would be in mathematics two irreducible elements, one that Bouligand calls "element of the global synthesis", and the other that he calls "the problem element". And undoubtedly, he shows that a problem can be solved only by the categories of the global synthesis, but conversely, he shows, that the cat ... the categories of the global synthesis can only proceed, can only function thanks to germs of problematic elements acting like kinds of crystals therein, acting like viruses therein.[80]

And I believe that, when he analyzes -- this is the strength of this book -- when he analyzes some very concrete cases, even if we do not understand, there are some that we understand, so… he shows very well, he gathers this tradition very well, he doesn't talk at all about the problems that… I have considered historically, but… he's like… the state… of the first half of the 20th century, he is a very, very good representative of this mathematics of events, that is, of this problematist mathematics. There was once a whole ... a whole current of math teachers, anti-axiomati ... anti-axiomaticians, who were trying to create a teaching program of ... [*He does not finish this*]. Basically, we can say the axiomatic won in the contemporary mathematics teaching program, even in the small classes… It is sometimes formal logic, it is sometimes… formalization, sometimes the axiomatic which has won, if you open a math book at even the sixth, fifth, fourth levels.[81]

And there was a whole current that said: no, no, we must not go in that direction. You have to go, you have to go into a really problematic conception, namely, on the contrary, cause everything ... to collapse, to create mathematics program above all based not on axioms. It's very funny, I don't know if… if… you would have to have little brothers or…, but well, many of you have seen these books… and then, after all, I'm stupid… you are not my age… so yourselves you are… you may have been… taught with this extremely axiomatized method, in geometry and in… and in arithmetic. In fact, they start off with set theory… I'm not saying this is wrong at all: it's… it's… it feels weird… Myself, I'm from a generation in which it was neither one nor the other. So, that wasn't any better, right? It was something else, it was really the old pedagogy.

But, these teachers that I am thinking of, these mathematics teachers, entirely from high school, they were very good mathematicians, but they demanded a completely different conception: that's what interests me, which was really the construction of problems, because they would say: it is only at the level of the problems that we can invite the students into a kind of activity

without it becoming a pure and simple mess, namely, we have them build a problem, and at that point, hey, wouldn't everything come together? Because not every problem has ... what? I mean -- to tie everything together…, all these scattered remarks -- a problem, a problem what? You will never say about a problem that it is true or false. What is true or false is a solution, it is a proof. It's the proof of a theorem. A problem is not true or false. Well, yes there is: we can see what we call a false problem, it is ... it is a problem where there is a mistake. It happens in academic exams (*concours*) all the time; someone creates false problems. Yes, false problems. Ah, there is a mistake, there is a missing piece of data, so this is a false problem. But, otherwise, a problem is neither true nor false as a problem.

Only there you have it, a problem either makes sense or it doesn't. There are problems that just don't make sense. And, then again, that is entirely the same as bullshit (*connerie*). Stupidity perpetually consists in posing problems that make no sense. And there, this is not the domain of the true and the false, it is the domain of sense and nonsense. As a result, we would find our [previous] stories. Okay, so, making mathematical events emerge, that's a different conception than axiomatization, where on the contrary, in axiomatization, we make necessary properties flow from a system of axioms. There you go, so I'll again consider, to conclude, briefly… What time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What? Twelve twenty, my god! You can't take it anymore! [*Laughter*]. It was… Okay, so I'll finish really quickly. I am saying… well, what is the…? At the point where we are, we have at least… made this long, long parenthesis, which brings us to what? So, I am really coming back to my question about the State and politics since that's where I would like to finish this first series of studies this year.

Well, there we are. My question has become a little more precise; it's: what is our interest, if we try to treat the current situation as an axiomatic, under the conditions that I have just stated: the axiomatic is not at all a mechanical knowledge, it is not at all a gimmick without experimentation, it is not at all an infallible method, it is not… But the givens of the current situation like entering into an axiomatic, what happens?

In this case, how are the political problems considered? What does that mean, to treat the current situation as an axiomatic? This means two things: both that we would have reasons to assimilate capitalism to an axiomatic, and also that we would have reasons… I mean, to assimilate -- first point -- to assimilate to… capitalism to an axiomatic, I don't have to do it anymore, because I believe that's what we have done previously. All our definitions of capitalism consisted in saying: yes, capitalism arises when the topical conjunctions are overwhelmed, in favor of a generalized conjugation, in favor of a generalized conjugation of two flows: the flow of wealth, become independent, the flow of labor become "free", free in quotes since… [*He does not finish*] And it is this conjugation or encounters of decoded flows that constitutes capital as subjectivity.

So, fine, we have reasons to consider capitalism as a social axiom. The immediate consequence is that political problems are only considered very partially within the framework of countries and States, that political problems immediately are considered, fundamentally, always -- without

there being any kind of fundamental reflection; on the contrary, it happens by itself -- are immediately considered in a global framework, right, in the framework of a global system, to the point that it is very, very difficult to talk about what is happening in a country without taking into account -- and once again, this does not imply any special knowledge – without taking into account the entirety of a global situation that distributes data. Third point: this comes down to saying, States and countries are ultimately analogous, let's say, to models of realization in relation to the axiomatic of capital. [*Pause*]

And finally, [*Pause*] as a last point, we obviously find that this situation is quite… hopeless for us. At least it would be only if we made the axiomatic, precisely, into the idea of a kind of infallible power. Fortunately, we took our precautions. There are plenty of things that escape through the mesh of an axiomatic; there are plenty of things that get the hell out, there are plenty of things that ... that don't allow themselves to be axiomatized, and that continue to flow through the mesh of the axiomatic, and that's what we are calling the world of connections or the calculus of problems-events, events as irreducible to the axiomatic order at the same time that they never cease being produced within this order.

The question would therefore be: do we have anything to console ourselves with in this? And what would be the problems, or events, what would be the connections that are working the global axiomatics currently, in such a way that, here and there, there might be sources of hope? An urgent problem for us, right? Good. [*Pause*] And I recall – at random, I will fall back exactly onto the point where I would like us to start the next time -- I recall that, in fact, if I return to the mathematical topic of axiomatics ... Here we are: we find ourselves facing a certain number of problems linked to an axiomatic.[82]

So here, the axiomatic-world situation comparison is only valid if we discover something similar to the aggregate of these problems, at the level of the world situation. I would say: the first problem is that, in an axiomatic, of one being able to add up to a certain point and, up to a certain point, to withdraw axioms. This is the problem of addition and withdrawal. A comparison of the axiomatic with the world situation is only valid if we are able to discover at work, in action, this process of adding and withdrawing axioms at the level of capitalism. Is there really an addition and a withdrawal of axioms? Axioms of capital? A first problem.

A second problem, I would say: it is no longer that of addition and subtraction, of withdrawal and addition; it is one of saturation. An axiomatic is said to be saturated when, precisely, nothing more can be added to it. And, in my opinion, although it is not necessarily evident, if there is an author who has treated, who has been able to show us how capitalism works as an axiomatic, it is Marx. And it's Marx not just anywhere; it's Marx in a very beautiful, very important chapter of *Capital*, which is the chapter on the downward trend in the rate of profit.[83] And Marx's thesis, which we'll have occasion to look at -- but I would like some of you to consider and reconsider it between now and next week -- Marx's thesis, basically, is that capitalism never stops confronting limits -- there is the idea of limits of capital, at every moment – never stops confronting limits, but that these limits are immanent to it.

This is a very complex thesis, very beautiful but very complex one. You see, it is made of several propositions that are interlinked: capitalism never stops confronting limits; second: these limits

are fundamentally, essentially immanent to it; third point: as a result, it does not stop colliding into them, and, at the same time, shifting them, that is, pushing them further… and, further on, it will collide with them again, it will push them more, shift them further. It is this thesis of limits as immanent and not external obstacles, which would make them absolute limits; in other words, it is [capitalism] that creates its own limits, and that therefore collides with them, and that shifts them. This fundamental thesis, I believe, poses the problem of the saturation of what one might call: the saturation of the system at a particular moment or another.

Third, third problem: States and countries ... States and countries, nation-States, can in a way be seen as models for realizing this axiomatic of capital. [*Pause*] In that sense, what is the status of models of realization? What is the measure of their independence from the world situation, in relation to the axiomatic itself? What is the measure of their dependence, etc.? This is another problem, besides the one of saturation of the system.

Fourth… I don't know… yes? Four, is that four? Little four ... Four, yeah. Oh well, we'll see later, right? There are too many, right? There are too many, but fine…. We'll start there the next time. So, try to re-read ... this chapter of Marx, ok? [*End of the session*] [1: 48: 57]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 10, 04 March 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq and Mariana Carrasco Berge; augmented translation, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

... disappeared without any problem. So, it's always disturbing when the day before there is a problem and, the next day, it's gone.[84]

And if I summarize, I suppose you are all aware, the University Council has made a decision -- among others, but I will start with this one -- a completely unusual decision by invoking for the reason, under the pretext of the existence of drug trafficking -- while it seems to everyone that, if there have never been any drug problems, especially in Vincennes, it seems that, in recent years, these problems are more and more… secondary and have… even lost all their acute character -- well, by thus employing as a pretext the existence of such traffic, the Council decided to call in security guards, that is, a police force, a para-police force, a strictly university police force, the security guards of which would be assigned the surveillance of student ID cards; worse still: professors' ID cards who must provide photos. [*Laughter*] Worse still: the cars themselves. Anyway, a stupid surveillance (*contrôle de con*), really. The security guards were put in place. It seems that…, three hours later, four hours later, the Council reversed its decision. Suddenly, our anxiety increases. We tell ourselves: either they really did a… made some crazy blunder, or else it's going to be repeated in another form.

And what I want to say is that everyone can understands the stupendous drawbacks and ... the dreadful regime established by the surveillance of student cards at the university entrance. Everyone also understands that if there are drugs, that [surveillance] does not [*Inaudible*] resolve anything regarding the [drug] problem and regarding possible drug trafficking. But I would like to insist -- insofar as there is always a risk that such measures will be repeated -- on a very specific aspect, which does not even concern foreign students, because for foreign students, it's too obvious that controlling their cards is a measure that affects them in an even worse, even harsher way. Okay, that's obvious.

One thing that seems less obvious to me is that… and which I really care about, is that if student card surveillance is introduced in a university unit (*faculté*), it means that the door is closed to what are called auditors, whether foreign or French.[85] And it seems obvious to me that a university which closes its door to auditors is a university which is closing in on itself, which is drying up its own recruitment, and which is becoming a kind of ... school (*école*) in the sense of

... upper school, in the sense of a high school, really. So, I believe that it is essential, really very, very important that the university's access to auditors be maintained at all costs, because they are the one who are simultaneously serving as a guarantee that the registered students and foreign students will not be subject to surveillance. If we no longer have the right to welcome auditors into the course (UV)[86] framework, I maintain there is an absolute danger for everyone.

A student: [*Inaudible; in light of the answer, he asks Deleuze to read a document*]

Deleuze: I'm reading. I am reading because it seems to me a wonder (*merveille*), perhaps, to use for the future. I am reading the President's letter to the teaching staff. I'm not betraying any secrets since it ends with: you are invited to share these decisions with the students. [*Laughter*] So, these decisions disappeared. Hence, I am reading: "A control of student cards, at campus entrances, teachers, staff, continuing education trainees, etc., will receive an individual card or certificate". Fine, fine, fine [*Deleuze skips some lines*] ... "These controls will be carried out by professionals". [*Laughter*] … "These controls will be carried out by professionals. One or more teachers will be present every day at the entry lodge…", you see, the poor service guy will still be forced to accept having someone from the Council there since… "one or more teachers will be present every day at the entry lodge,to examine specific cases, in parentheses, auditors, visitors". So, I tell myself here, eh… I am asking, for myself, I get the impression that… here [*in the seminar group*], and I am not the only one, about half of you are auditors. Right? Fine. Yeah.

A woman student: Who does that leave?

Deleuze: What?

The student: I wonder if there is even one student that ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That's it! Ah yes! I'm not saying this is a special case at all here. But I'm sure more than half of us are auditors here.

The student: [*Inaudible comments*] if they come ...

Deleuze: So, obviously, I imagine, if only here, I assume there are ... forty auditors or fifty auditors. Can you… can you imagine, you see, eh, what a traffic jam would occur, right?! Right, that's the type… that's the only kind of retaliation possible, if… that control were… that would be… okay… [*He doesn't finish the thought*]

And so, at the same time, I am adding, before ... I would like your opinion, that there remain two extremely urgent problems, even if one supposes that this matter of surveillance has disappeared, I do not believe it because … There is something obvious: why is all this happening? I mean ... we can never tell ourselves that those others [*the Council*] are dumber than we are. Why did they put themselves in this situation? To announce the surveillance measure, to put up posters everywhere, and then, in one day, retract all that, I am saying, it is obvious that certain currents, internal to Vincennes even, have a very keen interest in the following policy: as it is certain that the transfer won't be avoided, therefore the next year, at the start of the next school year, a certain number of teachers or administrators must admit to themselves that, if necessary, a

showdown is needed beforehand, that a showdown is needed beforehand allowing a normalization of the university, of this university, a normalizing of Paris VIII before the transfer.[87] And, in fact, from their point of view, from their point of view, this is not stupid. It is almost a matter of fixing the problems that may arise at the time of the transfer, of fixing them beforehand, even at the cost of creating forms of provocation.

And in this regard, I am saying that the "student cards" story was a particularly visible provocation, but that it's being continued… -- and the Council has not yet reconsidered – by two other decisions, namely: opening up the university to the narcotics police, and under conditions that I do not know. If there are any of you who know, for example, whether the term "police" means "the right to carry weapons", right? Does that mean that there are armed police walking around? What are their powers on behalf of ... their drug investigation? Can they come into a class, to sniff if there's a little joint, [*Laughter*] and… and take someone into custody? What is the limit of their power? What is… I don't know; that has never been specified, to my knowledge, by the Council. I would very much like the Council to clarify this precisely. So, in short, there are, … there are policemen walking around with guns, who have the power to enter, I don't know, fine. However, on this point, the Council did not completely retract this admission of narcotics police into the university.

A second extremely important point, which seems to me an abominable story, is that there was, as there are in all the universities, but particularly in this one, there was a small number of false dossiers. These false dossiers are linked and originate from a very simple matter which is the situation of foreign students today. And these false dossiers, to my knowledge, have produced what is nevertheless ... extremely rare in the history of the university, have produced from the [University] President, I do believe, I do believe that he is the one who specifically lodged a formal complaint. While administrative sanctions have always existed, in all faculty groups, in all trade groups, and generally, there is no occasion ..., but there is an old university tradition, I do not even say that it is solely the tradition at Vincennes, it is the tradition, including in high schools, etc., for the Rector to have certain disciplinary powers, etc. that… one only lodges a formal complaint in the event of a murder… And, in the name of these few false dossiers, a formal complaint was lodged which is very serious, especially since one of these false dossiers, so it's particularly serious, included a false residence permit, I believe. As a result, the guy against whom the formal complaint was lodged is obviously extremely threatened. And it is obviously unacceptable, on the part of a university president, to lodge a formal complaint for… how… how to put it, errors (*défaillances*) or… or… finally, find the word… which would be administrative in nature.

So, I am saying that, of our three problems, one suddenly, wonderfully, but incomprehensibly disappeared as the Council revisited this whole matter of security cards and student ID card surveillance. The other two problems remain. I'm not sure that the first problem won't come back to us in… ten days, two weeks… and, or even [if it's] something to be undertaken during the Easter holidays, yes, yes, yes, yes. So my question is: I believe that ... it would be very good to plan ahead with forms of response, and also very good not to forget the two points: the presence of police in the university, first point; second point: this case of formal complaints for dossier tampering, for false dossiers, right, and for use of forgery. These are two points which are

essential and for which the Council must provide explanations, or that even the President must provide them.

There we are. As for the possibility, in fact, that something might occur during Easter, well, I would very much like for us to manage to come up with ... some possible forms of response. It stands to reason that, for example, someone was in fact proposing the possibility that ... What made it work so well here, ... yesterday? This is because the administrative staff had already grouped themselves together, instead of entering, an old technique, instead of entering one by one or two by two, and perhaps, henceforth, of getting confronted by a security guard; they entered as a massive group, so the security guards were immediately overwhelmed. On the other hand, I think the students were very… themselves… used a very effective technique, that is, [*Inaudible*] suddenly with each security guard … [*Inaudible*] [*Laughter*] And the point is that every collision has been avoided, so this is very, very good. What still worries me is how the problem suddenly ... vanished. It's like we're being told: what's your problem? There was never anything different! There was never anything different! So: there was something different; we weren't dreaming. And there are things that are continuing to occur.

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: The situation in what respect?

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: So, it's very important… I can see clearly… on the teachers' side, I can see what we can do. It's not much, already, but what we can do immediately is: bury the Council with ... protests and declarations, and requests for explanations, requests for an explanation about the powers granted to the police, for example, etc., protests against the project for security guards, fine, and emphasize our disagreement to the maximum, that's it. On the student side, I was not at the General Assembly yesterday. Who was there? What was decided? What was proposed? What ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: So ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, back to basics. So… well, well, let's talk about this.

Another student: It seems of great interest to take a look … [*Inaudible*] *L'Humanité* has quite simply recast the responsibility onto the [*Inaudible*] of the PS [*Socialist Party*] ...[88]

Deleuze: Is that true?

The student: Quite simply, they are at the origin of the Vincennes disorders at the present time… [*Laughter*] However, we know that the decision taken by Merlin,[89] and endorsed by the Council with its predominantly Communist majority… [*Inaudible*] This is odd anyway.

Deleuze: Someone pointed out to me that, in fact, the PC [*French Communist Party*] has a current policy which is extremely simple, which is summarized by Marchais[90] when he says… "between drugs and the Olympic games, I chose the Olympic games" [*Laughter*], but that, very strangely, this campaign against drugs, at one point again ... we all have the impression that drugs, we all have the impression either to rejoice or to regret it, that drugs have ceased to be an urgent problem. So, it's ... it's ... it's rather odd ... that ... there is this campaign, and which unites *France-Soir* following a ... well-tested formula, which brings together *France-Soir* and the PC.[91] And what is very odd is that this anti-drug campaign is exploding and corresponding roughly ... well, to Vincennes. I mean ... there's a history of a high school ... it's in ... it's in the Marne, right, a high school where the ... where the Communist Party launched its anti-drug campaign ... it's in Vitry?

A woman student: No, not in Vitry, that's not it ...

Deleuze: No.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: And in Vincennes, this is surely linked to matters also concerning ... the municipality. I don't know, I don't know. So, in fact, there… it's… this is very odd all the same. To come back to what you are saying, the great campaign that the Communist Party undertook about this high school, there, by attacking the teachers who had raised the question of so-called soft drugs, good, and then, it's like a revival here in Vincennes which is taking place, there ... a connection operating through Vincennes which is very, very, very bizarre.

A student: What is odd [*Inaudible*] about the islands of security, that is, to strengthen the police presence in order to make [*Inaudible*] livable. [*Inaudible*] in order to be safe, we must strengthen the police presence by [*Inaudible*] the establishment of a [*Inaudible*] ... fascist [*Inaudible*] fiscal ...

A woman student: [*Inaudible*] the Council [*Inaudible*] at two o'clock.

Deleuze: Yes, yes

The student: [*Inaudible*] at two o'clock, so everyone [*Inaudible*] the GA [General Assembly], very calmly; [*Inaudible*] over an hour! And so, the students had to go find the Council en masse: they were locked in there, they did not want to leave; they wanted to go through the window ...

Deleuze: The Council, they wanted to go out through the window?! [*Laughter*]

The student: Yes!

Deleuze: There is no dignity anymore. At the time of… the time of the previous president, who was [Claude] Frioux, Frioux had a much better technique, eh… [If] Frioux was surrounded by students, he would take the head of the procession and would go to sequester himself.[92] [*Laughter*] I find that… I find that… it's… that it had more… flexibility, diplomacy and dignity,

than escaping out the windows… [*Laughter*]… [That's] really unfortunate. I see two aspects in that ... that would almost ... we have not finished talking about this, but this would almost be a transition with what I have left to say about our work.

I see two aspects here that are confirmed everywhere, even three, if necessary, three aspects. There is still a tendency to give civilian functions a new military structure. I am thinking about one point, for example, we are being treated like an atomic factory, right? See, in an atomic factory, the… from the cleaners to the engineers, they have a little thing with their photo… there, well, this is the passage under surveillance … not even from the police; it is not a police regime, it is a military regime, there. This is the militarization of civilian functions that belongs very, very deeply to our society.

I'll choose another example that affects all of you … good. In a lot of… -- yes, here, this connects … it's good that…, these are two separate things; I mean, what we have to say to each other practically, there, and then our work… it's very good if it coincides -- I am choosing a specific example that strikes me as the militarization of a civilian function. I would say the police, at the extreme, are a civilian function; it's obvious, it's obvious. For once, the police are not at all the same as the military. And you are aware that, in a certain number of European countries, namely Germany, Italy and in… in… how would I say it… in… I cannot find my word, you see, an… [there's] an effort to catch up with them more recently in France … Here's what happened: the police demand, in more or less direct forms, for… the right to shoot on sight. The right to shoot on sight, we tell ourselves, it's… it's, it's… terrible, right? Under what forms did this occur? It occurred, to my knowledge, in three forms: uh… it occurred in some very… I would say strong forms, some strong forms and some devious forms. The strong forms occurred in Italy [*Inaudible*] and in Germany. This right to shoot on sight was invoked by reason of the existence of terrorism. So, if it's a terrorist, they shoot on sight. Fine.

France -- in the constitution of a European judicial area – France found itself ... looking quite stupid once again, because there was an obvious desire from the start for an alignment with this new police structure, and we lacked… we lacked … the justification, namely the existence of terrorism. Fortunately [Jacques] Mesrine arrived, and we caught up a little thanks to Mesrine; he was public enemy number one.[93] What I mean is that there was a campaign which was readied for the next day and which was subsequently confirmed, namely that as soon as there is a public enemy, the right to shoot on sight is a given. So, in its own way and in a more devious form, France found a way to align itself with the police regime in Italy and Germany.

And I mean something quite simple. This is… this is… my first point. When the police have the right to shoot on sight, it's obvious then that to shoot on sight means what? Well, this is a regime that is no longer the police regime at all; it is the military regime, it is the war regime! Shooting on sight is war itself. So, here, the demand, even when it is conditional, under certain conditions, the police demand to shoot on sight has as immediate meaning, it seems to me, a kind of militarization of the police, namely the assimilation of the policing function within a war function.

A second point, what does this imply? This implies a whole new category, and, as we all know, a whole new category of enemy. Since the enemy is the notion specific to both the army and the

state of war, the militarization of civilian functions in the State can only occur if we form a strong and new concept of the enemy. So, what is the enemy? At that point, it is the famous concept, and this concept has already been highly elaborated, as much by jurists as by specialists of national defense, the enemy becomes any enemy whatsoever (*l'ennemi quelconque*). And the notion of any enemy whatsoever is a notion, currently, I believe, which has not yet received its full status, but ... and which will receive it. Jurists are working on it, the military, generals are working on it, the ... national defense magazines are cluttered with articles on the any enemy whatsoever. So any enemy whatsoever, we can see very well, could be the drug trafficker as well, yes, ah, well, it is any enemy whatsoever; it could be Mesrine; it could be the terrorist, but it can be the political autonomist, it could be… whatever you want, it can be… [*Deleuze does not finish*] And see why I am insisting on this point: it is just that this interests me a lot, because any enemy whatsoever is typically an axiomatic notion, that's obvious; it's part of the theory of any object whatsoever. That's ... so, to me, that ... interests me theoretically as well as it's a practical concern.

And finally, my last remark would be this; it's that, in this regime, therefore, of militarization of civilian functions, with any enemy whatsoever as a basis that, at the extreme, is extraordinarily fluid since each of us can be the any enemy whatsoever under a particular aspect; this is really the axiomatic which is set into motion. Well, here we find an expression or a factual situation which has been very well analyzed, it seems to me, by… by [Paul] Virilio,[94] namely the idea, the kind of… organization of security -- I was thinking about this precisely because someone has just spoken of islands of security, etc. -- the organization of security based on the management of small insecurities. And that's very curious, because this is a modern notion, we could say, the management of molecular insecurities, which is one with the organization of a security. So, this is very curious.

I mean: if you take the spectacle of a city now, all the same, there is… there is something that is very, very odd: it is… it is in the realm of everyday life…, but these cities which are perpetually, for example, crisscrossed with… EMT vehicles. And emergency medicine, you see these little cars or ambulances all the time, all the time; it's very odd, because there are emergency doctors who have asked, but… leftists [doctors], who asked a very interesting question, it seems to me, about the nature of the profession that we make them do. Because, when one isn't fully aware of this, for example, we tend to tell ourselves: ah well yes, emergency medicine is still not so bad, because hey, why the ... if an old lady breaks her leg, at home, a poor old woman, emergencies occur, it's true. But, emergency doctors themselves say that these are extraordinarily rare cases, that emergencies; they have, for example, if they deal with ... twenty ... twenty cases or thirty cases, I don't know, for example, they have two emergencies, right, the old lady with the [*Inaudible*] of the femur, this is rare, really. What happens is… someone who has a cold, yes, it's someone who has a cold or who tells himself: hey, I have a headache, something must be wrong… I have high blood pressure, he calls to have his blood pressure taken… With that, emergencies…. Why is he calling? Because ... there are no longer ... there are no longer many generalists, there are no longer many general practitioners ... of general medicine, and those who remain, they do not make house calls to patients.

So, you see that, here, I want to say a very simple thing: we understand that the atmosphere of a kind of huge security, thanks to the medicine of… emergency medicine, you can be treated

whenever you want it, in ten minutes ... etc., occurs at the same time through a management of small insecurities, namely: the city crisscrossed by these cars, ambulances, etc., the character, as we ... as the specialists say, the organized character of the city as permanent stress, like a kind of stress of permanent aggression. And it is against this background of a thousand small programmed insecurities that the administration of hardened security, a militarized security, of a military security is based.

So, that coincides very well with the determination at the same time of any enemy whatsoever ... Whatsoever, this is… this is your neighbor, the management of small insecurities, radio games, well, all that, etc. ... Gather information about your neighbor… well, fine… the famous games of German TV [*Inaudible*] Yes… this is the determina… this is rather the position of… it is this new function, the function of the any enemy whatsoever that accompanies…, which serves as a correlate to the militarization of civilian functions, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to the kind of military security that emerges from the management of small insecurities. So fine. Ah! drugs, drugs in Vincennes! Huh… Some kind of molecular drug there, well… even if it's not drugs, it's the equivalent of drugs. Vincennes is the drug… [*Laughter*], and then, there's a kind of process of security (*sécurisation*). The [University] President says: ah well yes, you see, security is going to be the narcotics squad. Fine, there we are.

Yeah so, getting back to practical matters, ah ... what ... what ... is there a date for the next Council [meeting]? March 15? This Saturday?

A woman student: No, next Saturday ...

Deleuze: Saturday… no, the following Saturday, yes. Anyway, you're telling me that Merlin said that ... there was no way the formal complaints would be withdrawn, is that right? Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: About the brigade, about the presence of the brigade in the university?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh, ok.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

A woman student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: And what are ... once again, has the question been asked about what are the rights of this brigade? I mean: does it have the right to intervene in classes in session (UVs)?

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Normally, if it's the ... flagrante delicto, they can come in here and ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, that is something else! My question is, do they have the right to do that?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That…?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze:[95] Yes, but it was ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, because I would agree with you to say that, them, their best interests, they should not give a damn about that, but if they are told to do something, they will do it.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but that sidesteps my sole argument, which I am thinking about very strongly, which is that both the Ministry and certain internal movements in Vincennes have an interest in a showdown before the transfer.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Of course not, but uh… the Communist Party, I agree; the Ministry [of Universities], I'm less sure, that it wouldn't be able to…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You have a lot of confidence. [*Laughter*]

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: For me, I only see one thing as a response, in fact. For example, I am coming back to this matter of security guards. If the security guards matter returns, there is… the immediate idea, of course, is that all students… [if] no student would present his/her card, so what happens? It's not that… it means: they don't have their cards, okay. My question, already, if we tried ... -- there is a very justified call for things to be worked out in the class sessions (UVs) -- if that occurred, I am asking: would foreign students be in particular danger? They are obviously more vulnerable.

A woman student: Well no, it's not sure ...

Deleuze: What?

The student: Those who have their cards ...?

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Obviously

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

A student: And it seems to me that in a case like that, it is the [*Inaudible*]… A series of facts… [*Inaudible*] provokes, and then there is a retreat… [*Inaudible*] I am armed and… [35 : 00] I don't believe what you're saying, we're going to be armed… [*Inaudible*]

A woman student: I think there is still one thing ...

Deleuze: Wait, he hasn't finished; I think he's not finished.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The withdrawal of the guards, right? That's it: the ... the majority that has decided to reverse the ... this is a tiny majority. I was told thirteen against twelve, you say fourteen against thirteen, it's the same.

Another student: In the assembly, it was nine ... eight ... people ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah, but that ... do you get the impression that nobody believes it, that nobody believes it? They are saying it, but nobody believes it.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but if I return to… What?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, precisely, to clean things up before the transfer [to St. Denis], right, I'll come back to that, because there are a number of departments which, if you will, basically are creating problems (*emmerdent*) for the… the normalizers, right? The departments that are creating problems for the normalizers, that's ... for example, I'm not saying it's the only one, but that's ... the philosophy [department]. Why? Because we're de… we're denationalized, deprived of everything, in a catastrophic situation… [*Laughter*] and it's obvious that, for example, the philosophy department has a need… a need, like oxygen, for auditors.

A woman student: But they [*these departments*] were the ones who created the situation anyway, since they took away the diplomas… [*Inaudible*] who can there be in the philosophy department? Either auditors or people from other universities.

Deleuze: Yes, yes ...

The student: Yes! It's a problem, but it's a problem of… jealousy.

Another woman student: No, but there are very few; we should ask the class here.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The first woman student: Here? Yes, but without a diploma ...

The second woman student: Yes, yes! They want a diploma from Vincennes.

The first student: Yes, they want a diploma from Vincennes. So, they want to nationalize a new degree before the transfer, liquidate the philosophy department as it is now… They've been trying for seven years… [*Inaudible*]

A student: [*Inaudible*] to the outside, ourselves, ourselves [*Inaudible*] from the police… [*Inaudible*] [38: 00]

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

A student: [*Inaudible*]… because they themselves know that they are not currently able to initiate negotiations… [*Inaudible*] The Council is the PS [*Socialist Party*], [*Inaudible*] these are people who are barely accredited [*Inaudible*] but they control the university, they control [*Inaudible*] they have ideas to hold onto it [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah! There's nothing to laugh at here….

The student: … it isn't the case. [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: And you are saying ... normalization has occurred in a majority of departments.

A student: Of course, of course, but those who stay, for those who stay, everyone knows [*Inaudible*] in the current situation [*Inaudible*]

A woman student: Yes, but that sucks ...

The student: But I don't believe in their interests, I don't believe they are people who believe … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Okay, and one is still surprised. And we tell ourselves: ah, well, that, I had not thought of that. So, what are they up to now?

The student: It's not them ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: So yes, but do you agree with the following principle ...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Do you think they're tired of paying our lecturers? Sure, sure, sure.

Another student: [*Inaudible*] they tell themselves that… going to Saint-Denis when they can't go to Saint-Denis… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but once again, our problem is this: isn't it true that, before going to Saint-Denis, they need to have a confrontation?

A woman student: Yes, but me… [*Inaudible*]

Previous student: Actually, they said they were going to shut down university ...

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah… that's occurred. There are ... there are some who say: that has occurred.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: There is something ... very interesting since yesterday, it is that for the first time, the long-held illusion ... namely, that there is like that a kind of alliance among the people of Vincennes and which means that [*Inaudible*] against the Minister [*Inaudible*] has concretely fallen, right, now the contradiction is apparent between the Council and the interests quite simply of the students. The showdown is ... [*Inaudible*] After, if you will, the Council yesterday is ... [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: But there is something that makes me think that, finally…, auditors are much more threatened than, even, foreign students, because, in fact, in the logic… in the Communist logic ...

Deleuze: Oh yes, that ...

The woman student near Deleuze: Yes, no, but the non-graduates as well, but what I mean is that, in the Communist logic of labor, let's finally take "labor" without thinking about the university, I mean someone who comes to a place, well, to an office or a factory, as a free worker, that is, who doesn't want to be paid, I mean that for a Communist, that's really the thing he couldn't stand, because he knows exactly what labor is. I mean, he just talks about the world of labor. And so, if we go back to the same situation with regard to students, it is certain that ... as Gilles was saying earlier, from the moment that free students are present, both free students and … and foreign students and non-graduate students can remain, that's obvious. But as long as there are no more auditors, I mean ... then there really is nothing left ... I mean, the rest of them disappear at the same time.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Yes, that's it.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Of course

The student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Well, they are jealous because, here, there is only that, obviously! Well they are, they are ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes! Yes. Yes, Yes, Yes.

The student: And, like next year, all that's left is … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: I believe that… well I'm not sure, that a possible concern, one of their possible concerns would be that the conditions of the transfer [*to Saint-Denis*] are obviously catastrophic, that… they may fear that the conditions of the transfer ... there are pros and cons. It is not certain that the very fact of the transfer does not eliminate all the problems, that is, that people accustomed to Vincennes do not return, the changing location ... they … [*Inaudible*] ... they will not go there, that everything takes place calmly.

But, there will also be, given the small size of the available space, there will probably be a dismantling, that is, that there will be departments which will be regrouped, for example, the non-normalized departments ... will be obvious ... will probably be put in some sort of sub-ghetto. One would think that the conditions of the transfer would rekindle forces of protest -- even on the part of currently normalized students -- would reignite some sort of ... thing. Hence -- but I'm presenting this as a pure hypothesis, eh, I'm not at all sure that… every time I predict something, I'm wrong, so it's… -- I am saying, I have the feeling that they are looking for something first. I'm not sure; if you tell me no, why? I am not sure. Yes, yes, yes ... I have the feeling that there is ... they are looking for a confrontation beforehand. What? … [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 29]

**Part 2**

A student: Next year it's going to be tight, right? [*Inaudible*]

Another student: ... already going to the prefecture to see what is going on, eh! Even with proper papers ...

Deleuze: Yes, it has been for a long time, yes ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, you're right, but you're not right, in fact, because… it's true what you're saying: there is no question of… stopping student immigration in France. But…

The student: Absolutely not ...

Deleuze: ... it's all about changing its nature completely, in dual agreement between the French government and, for example, the African governments, ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes

Another student: … the guys should have their dossiers from their respective countries…

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes ...

The student: The administration of ... the country [*Inaudible*] ... gives you the dossier, they give ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes

The student: And not from just any university

Deleuze: Yes

The student: ... [*Inaudible*] students come to study in France rather than going to Germany, than going to ...

Deleuze: In my opinion, you are neglecting a very important point here, it is that ... what you say is only true very, very generally because, what is happening now is that the recruitment of foreign students in France, for example, African students, is tending to change, namely: the same number will be allowed to study in France as needed, but a guaranteed number and where each specimen will be guaranteed by the government of origin.

A woman student: There's another thing: when you ask Pakistanis ...

Deleuze: Of course!

The same student: ... if they speak French; from the start they are eliminated, in the Asian countries where one French isn’t spoken, when one goes to the embassy to apply for a visa, and one asks if you speak French, if you don't speak French, well ... you can't ...

A student: It's that, it has been two years ...

The woman student: Yes, that's it!

The student: ... stories about embassies of these countries ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes. Well, you know, two years is very recent, eh! It's… it's not that old… [*Laughter*].

Another student: It's old, though ...

Deleuze: I see... if the matter ... I am coming back to the matter of the security guards, right? If the matter of the security guards were to happen again, uh… I see, then… it is up to you to say what you think; for me, I would see as an immediate response, I do not say a long range response, as an immediate response, three things simultaneously: maintain this old technique of grouping, for example, by classes (UV), right, those who are taking this class, and well, we all meet -- so that would be, for example, say between fifty and a hundred people -- and we arrive as a group. At that point, it would be split into two, practically. There would be those registered at Vincennes who say -- but as a group, it is not a question of saying it one by one --: we do not have our card. You will tell me: good, and then after that? We will see. On the other hand, auditors would do the opposite: they would go to the control lodge, where the poor service guy is sitting, and they will say: here is our case, we are auditors, and me as a teacher, I guarantee that I absolutely need them for the… the forty, the fifty, the hundred, fine! Even at that point, we will invent some, some auditors ... that I absolutely need for the normal functioning of my course. That creates a traffic jam, right, but as an immediate measure, ok? Third and simultaneously, what I would almost suggest, but you would have to agree, but… here we are talking casually; this is a pure project…: to see if there is any way make an agreement, for a week or two weeks, with the Cartoucherie[96] -- which is not far away -- and continue holding class sessions on other premises, which avoids… they are having problems?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Well, that's good, so they would leave us ... some hangars (*granges*), and we would go and work there. Well, that would create a kind of situation of force where we would be in a kind of illegality since it is absolutely forbidden to teach anywhere other than on the premises of the university, but our argument would be that the conditions for exercising normal courses in the university were taken away from us. So, I see ... once again, it's not that at all, as a long-range plan, it's at immediate range: we can do that, we can last a few weeks in this mode.

A student: I think it is very important precisely because it would allow an opening in opposition to of the logic into which they want to lock us.

Deleuze: Yes, yes

Another student: For me, it's… action-reaction, actually… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Previous student: Because I find that ...

Deleuze: They would rather close it down.

The student: It's weird, I think it's too easy … [*Inaudible*] Normally they don't care ...

Deleuze: I think so too. Well, I have the same feeling as you, I find that very fishy.

Another student: [*Inaudible*] … security guards. Yesterday, to bring them back in a fortnight, let there be a showdown. Based on this showdown, close the university.

A woman student: But they wanted to have it, this showdown ...

A student: No, they didn't want to have it yesterday ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

A student: They really want a pretext ...

Deleuze: Hence your insistence on the next meeting in two weeks.

The student: In two weeks ... Yes, because, the text had to be read [*Inaudible*] ... they questioned everything they had voted on yesterday … [*Inaudible*] everything that was voted on yesterday, that is, the withdrawal of the guards ...

A woman student: The narcotics squad ...

A student: Yes, the narcotics squad ...

Deleuze: No, how were they questioning the squad?

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah good, oh yes, yes, yes ...

A student: That is, they can go back on what was voted on.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, they made a provisional suspension! And they put it off for two weeks.

A student: [*Inaudible*] We'll see how it goes during these two weeks. And then we'll see.

Another student: I think, it is… the problem also arises with regard to the narcotics squad, I have… I communicated the information in… at the level of each [*Inaudible*], I am referring to the article published in Saturday's *Le Monde*: the ... the dealers in question are known to the police, and I personally, I read the Public Prosecutor's report ... well the journalist…, the dealer with whom he spoke, the journalist from *Le Monde*, who did not tell the whole truth, of course… Well, he [the dealer] was released; the police returned the drugs to him on the spot, on the campus itself; he was arrested on the spot, of course, transferred ... finally present in court, the prosecution presented its report, then they released him. To me, personally, the Prosecutor's report is scandalous, and then the journalist didn't say anything about it, of course. So the question of the narcotics squad on campus is completely absurd, because they [the dealers] are judged, they are released: this is quite simply a propaganda campaign that the government is setting up, and which finds its justification, of course, in the [*Inaudible*] which is one of the university's authorities, of course, the Council. So, talking about the presence of the narcotics squad on campus, I find that unspeakable, and then without any significance because the complicity then comes from above anyway ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The woman student near Deleuze: That's why we have to be very careful, because… well, you were saying earlier that there was finally… no… not a new militarization of the civilian life, but that somehow… legally, we were creating any enemy whatsoever. I mean, in fact, maybe also the way of creating any enemy whatsoever ... before creating it legally, maybe it's also this thing that looks so easy ..., that ... everyone is ready to be an enemy. I mean, it always seems to me every time so… so dangerous, well, this… I mean, we are also always so ready to be enemies… uh… I don't know, one always has to be very careful because… good, it's all the same, well, good, yesterday there was, there was this thing which is decided, here it is: Monday March 3, from Monday March 3. Tuesday March 4, nothing more. I mean… indeed, this withdrawal, to me, seems to me almost more curious than the thing itself.

Deleuze: Yeah, so we are in agreement. I also find it very, very ... Yes?

A woman student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: When did he say that?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

A student: I think there is something, but I don't understand anything anymore. I don't know if it was the [*Inaudible*] Council that reported to the police, that there were attacks [*Inaudible*] in the university, and that from there, it led to the interview [*Inaudible*] by *France-Soir*, then [*Inaudible*] by *Le Figaro*… or if it's the police who are up to something… But I don't get the

impression that it was the police because it took Merlin [*Inaudible*], so what I'm guessing, if there's the newspaper article first ...

Another student: Yes, that's it.

The previous student: It's… it's first, finally, the reaction…that was first… a reaction to the *France-Soir* article, then a certain number of… people who…, well, who worked… well… people… staff who complained to the Council and then it seems that Merlin, well…

Student: After the article ...

The previous student: Yes. After the article, Merlin well… he went to the Council with a knife in hand, fine: it's a fight, it's a mess in the university and… [*Inaudible*]

Another student: No, all this is fiction because the journalists started asking people questions again… asking people questions, and people are answering… So, what did they do in Nanterre? That's a story, they took all the events… [*Inaudible*] Vincennes, then they identified them for [*Inaudible*] an article, saying that Vincennes … [*Inaudible*] This was the article from *France-Soir* …

The previous student: Either way, it was the *France-Soir* article that started it all. There was a rather rotten reaction from the university authorities, who put in place these… these… these draconian measures that… that that… everyone knows ...

A woman student: Well, on Thursday the 21st or so, there was a staff member who was assaulted by someone who was supposedly ...

Another student: Drugged?

The woman student: ... dealing ... and who threatened him with a knife, or something ... and it was from there that ...

Deleuze: Yes.

Another student: I heard this story all the same because, if we are going to start thinking that each … [*Inaudible*] from *France-Soir*… there is someone powerful up top that moves into action to wipe out … [ *Inaudible*] this becomes delirious because *France-Soir*…

Deleuze: Are you kidding, you say "it's delirium", but for me, I see no madness in believing, as has been said and repeated a thousand times, that a phone call from a ministerial cabinet member might result in an article in *France-Soir*, that… it's part… you must not, you must not invoke power like that. That's how it has always been done at *France-Soir*.

The previous student: Okay, we agree. In this, it is possible, but then at that point, [*Inaudible*] surprising, this flawless synchrony, in that way ... and, and the reaction ... [*Inaudible*] you know? To this…

Deleuze: Good.

The student: … still! To imagine Merlin plotting: ok. To imagine that the Council is plotting: ok too. But to imagine they are plotting together!

Deleuze: And no, because there is something else… One can imagine… One can imagine a fourth thing that… that you aren't taking into account; it's that… they find themselves united for extremely different purposes. For example, it was already striking in 1977 that there was obviously, at the time of the campaign,[97] which spoke about an enormous drug trafficking in Vincennes, there were two possible political stances: there was the Council's and the President's stance saying, and even adding, saying: yes, yes, that's frightening, and you don't even know everything -- which was still a very curious reaction from the university authority, eh… really they were adding to this --; or there was the ... the other stance consisting in saying: just shut up (*faites chier*), there are no more drugs here than there are in Censier,[98] there are no more drugs here than elsewhere, so you must not … never denounce your neighbors, but hey… [*Laughter*]… I don't know, it may not be visible anymore, because… well… Good. And already, at that time, we saw a kind of… of bizarre conjunction of university authorities, often on the Left, with the concerns of the Minister, in order to propel this campaign. There is no doubt that they have different goals, for example, when [Georges] Marchais says: the enemy is drugs, … Fine, he doesn't exactly have the… the same ... the same goals as the narcotics squad. … I'm like you, I prefer the goals of the narcotics squad, which seem less… good to me. In the end, if they overlap, that doesn't mean they have the same goals. [*Pause*]

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: I don't think that's it. But it's curious because, at the same time as drugs, for us, I mean, it's… well, there are hardly any more, it does not exist anymore, let's say, but at the same time, it 'is precisely, well ... an event, no, no, but, as we said, well ... a ... in the sense ...

A student: It exists.

Claude: No ... well, ok, if you will, an event, an event, that creates a certain effect, a noise, a very loud noise, and then after there's fallout. The kinds of fallout are silence all the time, and then after the silence, I mean, sometimes we start to talk about it again. And here, it's a bit like what is currently happening, that is, that drugs really are now the moment when, in all the suburbs, whether rich or poor suburbs, all the kids are taking drugs, and this is really the moment when every mother, every person in all of ... in all of France, is really experiencing the problem drugs, whereas before, it was us who took drugs, and it was…, it was something like that, but the others didn't think about it. Whereas, I mean now, it's something that is part of their life now, I mean, exactly the same way mothers now decide to give their daughters their pill or whatever!

Deleuze: It's true that it has become a municipal problem.

The woman student near Deleuze: Of course!

Deleuze: It has become a kind of municipal problem.

The woman student near Deleuze: It's entirely a municipal problem. It's no longer the problem of ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Were there… I don't know, do you know, you? Were these security guards from the University Ministry (*le recorat*)?

A student: No. They were security guards hired at the level of ...

Deleuze: That's it. It's very different, eh! Very different.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Hired at the level of…?

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The student: It's linked, it's linked to the University Ministry, right?

Deleuze: Of course, that's the new threshold. That was the request to the University Ministry, yes, yes, yes.

The student: They are professionals, so ...

Deleuze: As they say, as they say so well, yes, they are professionals, yes! Besides, they say, uh ... the security guards have been requested by the Ministry, right?

Claude: Saint-Denis, … Saint-Denis is also affected at a municipal level; there, there's a major campaign at Saint-Denis for the repression of the inhalation of fabric glue among high school students ... [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: Ah yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes… No, no, it is true that what Claude just said is very correct, I believe. That ... it's not at all that the drug problem has indeed disappeared; it's that it has become completely municipal. That is, this is at the moment when it no longer proposed within the university as head…, as head of… I don't know what, it is at this moment that it once again gets launched and that… the new launch occurs that consists in saying: but all that is the university's fault, and among others, at Paris-VIII.

The woman student near Deleuze: But because, in the minds of people, it comes from here.

Deleuze: Yes, yes.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes

The woman student near Deleuze: That is, the municipalities ...

A student: It's not really our problem, if we start discussing drugs, with Merlin ...

Deleuze: It's not our problem, but it helps us understand, in our muddle ...

The woman student near Deleuze: Because the municipalities ... [*Inaudible*]

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes ...

The woman student near Deleuze: No, but all the municipalities, I believe, in Ville-d'Avray, in Versailles, the rich suburbs, it's crazy, but… they only talk… the… the… the good women only talk about that.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes ...

The woman student near Deleuze: I mean that the municipalities are currently ... thinking, as they are geographically located, that is, they only manage to think of it in relation to the capital, that is, if, if all the children of the municipalities are taking drugs, that's because it comes from the capital! I mean, they themselves [the children] didn't feel like doing drugs! If they take it, it's because we provide it to them. So, I mean ... as final outcome, it's certain that there must be Vincennes or a place like that to ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes ...

The woman student near Deleuze: In the end, I know that in all the municipalities, ... people are totally in favor of the cops being in Vincennes.

Deleuze: Mm… yes, yes, yes. So, what… Do you see other things …? Once again, in the very short term: if the matter of security guards comes back, which is the most visible matter, which is perhaps not the most important one, but which is the most visible, if this matter of security guards were relaunched by the Council, would you basically agree, do you see other things than the three… the three very small, immediate responses… that…, that I am proposing to you?

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: How do we practically recognize each other? At the front door?

Deleuze: Obviously, we meet again…, we'll meet in front of… in front of the entrance.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

A student: I believe that if there is a mobilization, there will be no security guards. A mobilization should take place now. Now and not the day that Merlin decides to bring back guards.

Deleuze: So, in what form? What do we do before? Yes? What do we do before? Unless there is a protest to the Council, etc. Yes?

Another student: I believe that the move worked very well precisely… [*Inaudible*]… narcotics, unofficially, one can always denounce it. But when they are there, when the police are there, and it is authorized, there we are facing a problem. But we don't even see it anymore because we feel like we have ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes ...

The student: ... security guards, if they're going to come back ...

Another student: If they come back, it doesn't matter! If they come back, it doesn't matter! The problem is, there is the … [*Inaudible*] police!

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The student: Yes, but it was there unofficially, that is, if you catch … [*Inaudible*] there unofficially, it can always be denounced, and we can ask: what is [*Inaudible*] …? From that moment onward … [*Inaudible*]

Another student: Everyone knew the police were there before, and we didn't care in the slightest; everyone knows the police are here now, and we now have to care.

Deleuze: Ah listen, no, no, no. Now I think you're wrong, I don't know… I… I can't think of it like that.

The student: When you say that the main … [*Inaudible*] was the security guards, you are still thinking ...

Deleuze: I said the most visible.

The student: The most visible, of course!

Deleuze: No … me ... where I don't agree with what you just said is that, for me, there is a big, big difference, a big difference even in nature, between a state -- we cannot simply say: ah well yes, there are cops, there have always been some since '68. That's true, but what matters is ... is -- not at all the ... the same, the same as the state of informers sneaking around the university who

inform the police, or even police officers who ... who ... who are there in an unofficial capacity; or else this kind of formalization of the presence of a specialized squad, acting in a capacity, right, and ... to which the university is open. This is nonetheless a fact ... this is nonetheless a new fact.

The student: [*Inaudible*] what it demands from us [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: So, as much as I vaguely see… small things, but… to be done immediately, if the matter of security guards is placed on the front burner… What is there to be done about this question of the [narcotics] squad, which is a whole other question?

A woman student: What if it was a provocation? To manage to…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah, you think there is a link between the two! That there is some kind of ... oh yeah. Yes, yes, yes, yes…

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes ...

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What? I cannot hear. We can't hear ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: It's good; let them come to Vincennes! And everyone's imagining, I'm not sure what, that this is going on… well, let them come!

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Yes, no, but it's crazy, this kind of argument, haa! We are only talking about this!

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, there, in fact, as we continue talking, nonetheless, some… some very small things become a little bit clearer, because it seems to me that from a little of all that has just been said there emerges, in fact, an operation ... an operation easy to understand which would consist, just at the moment when ... the drug problem is no longer a problem -- assuming it is never has been one -- is no longer primarily a university problem, that it has taken on a completely different aspect, that we can roughly call a municipal aspect, that it's at this time that a movement is reconstituted denouncing the university and… and our university in particular as a supplier of drugs. So, in fact… What?

A student: [*Inaudible*] … the black sheep, we are kidnapping them [*Inaudible*] And so then, we see the reaction! [*Inaudible*]

Another student: But all that doesn't tell us what is to be done, after all. What can we do? [*Laughter*] And not just at the Institute of Philosophy, here, but in Vincennes and elsewhere ...

Deleuze: No, yes, yes, but ...

The student: If we do something [*Inaudible*] this ... it won't have any impact!

Deleuze: We are starting from… what has been entrusted to us, namely that it is still not a bad thing to talk about it in each class (UV) to see what comes out of that. So, we provide ourselves with the framework, for example, of a class, of any class (UV): ours, right? And we tell ourselves: well what…, what can we do? So, it also depends on what is happening in the other classes at the same time ... So, once again, this is where I am. I see in… very, well, I… this is not big, I see a small set of immediate responses to the matter of security guards; I don't currently see… if… if they come back out … if… if … Yes, I do not see immediate responses to the presence of the [narcotics] squad.

Another student: I think that we see one, which remains to be applied, which is that of refusing to do … [*Inaudible*] Yesterday ...

The woman student near Deleuze: … to refuse to do what?

The student: There were already some departments that had resumed their courses. [*Inaudible*] for example, and in English, that's all I know, maybe there are others. It's still extraordinary, that is, there could be cops there in the room, we would continue to teach ... that's it really ...

A woman student: Well, good for them! [*Laughter*]

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, the threshold…, I can answer for myself, for example, in my own name, but in my own name, I depend on you, that is, it would be necessary that, her, we all agree. For me, ... I tell myself this: for example ... to refuse to teach because the squad is in the university and does not manifest itself in a visible way; that seems to me a bit like going on strike in a personal capacity, it is something meaningless. For me, the threshold would be… There would be two thresholds. There is one that is so big that for me it goes without saying. The biggest is that, either here or in any class at Vincennes, a squad member becomes identified as such, that is, makes an intervention, an interpellation, a search, etc., as you say. It is very unlikely to happen unless there is a set-up. If this is in the hallways and if it's about a student from here, for me it's the same threshold. If it concerns a student from another class, this depends more on you, there, this depends more on the aggregate, but I believe that it would also be the same unacceptable threshold.

So, in this regard, I am almost waiting ... for me, the definition of when I would consider not having the conditions possible to do my course is that there would be an intervention into a class or at the exit of a class. So, obviously, what is .., the whole problem that you are posing remains: what happens if, for example, one evening, even when the university is closed, etc., there is an interpellation of a type that does not belong to the faculty, for example, what happens in this case? What do I do? There, I admit, I have much less of position prepared in advance because, at that point, I would also depend greatly on the reactions both from the students and from the other professors.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, sure, yes, that didn't matter.

The student: [*Inaudible*] ... from the narcotics squad: it comes, it says: so, you, what do you think?

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah ... yeah ... It's not just the level of principles; once again, it's also the question: what is to be done? Because, once again, to say, under these conditions, I'm not teaching, it's ... it's like I was just saying, I'm going to strike. It seems to me ... it's still very different from if there is any student being taken into custody during a particular class being in session, or classes in general, where it seems there to me to be ... another threshold really. So, in the second case, I have no problem; in the first case, it seems more complicated to me because it seems to me that ... that we necessarily depend more on a general movement.

A student: [*Inaudible*]… ready to say in a concrete way that, if there are security guards, we are going elsewhere to do the course, outdoors, to try to show people that, above all, we are here…

Deleuze: Yes, that has an advantage, holding a course elsewhere, in my opinion, that has an advantage, since, at that point, it is not in a position in which I am going on strike.

The woman student near Deleuze: Yes.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, no, no.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: The security guards is a matter that comes from our location, that is, that it is university-related, it is indeed located on the university campus. So, we tell ourselves nonetheless, in Vincennes, this is a precedent, we have never had any security guards, [*Inaudible*] very well ... [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: It may not even be ... we don't even know ... who to answer ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: What's going on? It's because their impact is not the same!

Deleuze: Ah well, I agree ... that's why I'm asking ... yes.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, it has disappeared, it's very curious, this thing… which… and then everything disappears.

The student: ... Because we know this matter is bogus (*bidon*)!

The woman student near Deleuze: They don't even know it themselves ...

Deleuze: Once again, the matter might not have been bogus.

The student: Three months ago, … [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: But silence is not less than ...

Another student: [*Inaudible*]… has been developed, asking all of their departments to report all of their research for ten years. That is, there is a campaign, not only national at the level of France, but at the level of the whole European community, to solve what is currently called the drug problem, which has opposed several departments, the department of demography, of medicine, of sociology… and many other departments… [*Inaudible*] things like that. [*Inaudible*] This action, which is at Vincennes, must be the responsibility of, it must continue to be the responsibility of the University Council. Well, the drug problem can never really be solved. This is really a problem, they have stopped much more important projects this year ...

Deleuze: Yes, but… our problem from the start, I think everyone has understood, is absolutely not the drug problem. Our problem from the start, including the presence of the [narcotics] squad, including the guards, etc., is a problem which concerns the normalization of Vincennes and… what is happening at Vincennes. Were it a traffic that wasn't drugs, and some other traffic, the problem would be presented in the same way: it's that this is the current pretext for this reorganization of Vincennes.

The student: ... it's knowing how much you can emphasize an action of this kind, if you really think about trying to see everything at once, it's both going to paralyze the work at the university and put us in situations ...

Deleuze: I don't understand what… what he's talking about?

The student: Merlin's problem ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ah yes, ah yes, ah yes, ah yes.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: … it's not about drugs.

Deleuze: No, completely, completely. But once again, the pseudo-drug problem does not apply at all as such, in everything that has been said from the start.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, but anyway, I want to emphasize it again, yes.

Another student: The students' problem … [*Inaudible*] It's an attack on [*Inaudible*], it starts with foreign students, it will go through auditors, then it will go through non-graduates, then etc., up to the … [*Inaudible*] desired number of students in…

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The student: … the elimination, of course, of departments that are not of interest at all ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The student: It's not provocation anymore. That's over: the provocation, they moved it. Now they are taking action.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The student: It's over, even if he withdraws his formal complaint, it's over; the prosecutor is not coming back … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, but that's something else. Okay. It would nonetheless be something very, very important if the president withdrew his formal complaint ... it would probably not save ethics, that goes without saying, but, if only for the future: it would be a very, very… very significant gain.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: So what I'm afraid of and what I don't know, but I believe that… for the past eight days, what [François] Châtelet[99] has been greatly involved with, is: to know exactly what our, roughly, if I can call it that, our approach (*courant*) represents in relation to the whole of Vincennes? I believe and I would have liked to know ... Is there no one in the history program here? I believe the history department produced protest texts. Does anyone know about the history department texts?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes? You read it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. Only, indeed, apart from this obvious means, which is: protest to the Council, protest of teachers to the council ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, the philosophy department wrote a letter, yes. Only on security guards, yes.

Another student: Yesterday in class we started to write two letters relating to the narcotics squad and the formal complaints, and… asking them if… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh good! Oh good. Oh good. Yesterday then? Did he plan on sending it…?

A woman student: He took it immediately ...

Deleuze: Ah, he took it to Merlin! Alright, yes.

The student: The first letter. For the second … [*Inaudible*] it was taken to Merlin. But then we decided … [*Inaudible*] we started to write two letters, relating to the narcotics squad, to the police, and relating to the formal complaints that were made against foreigners.

Deleuze: Good. What about letters to the Council, then? Or to Merlin.

The student: Addressed to Council.

The woman student: And I think the newspaper, too. Because…

Deleuze: Yes, yes.

The woman student: … because … [*Inaudible*] met a reporter, and he said… [*Inaudible*] gave the letter …

Deleuze: That's it. A guy from AFP [*Agence Presse-France*], yes, yes.

A student: … It's very funny because the people… [*Inaudible*] who absolutely wanted the squad's withdrawal, there are people who [*Inaudible*]… it's always the same, who want to make revolution, who want hands to be raised, to go out and demonstrate….

The woman student near Deleuze: Well, let them go ahead and demonstrate ...

The student: ... this was yet another Assembly that was completely screwed up, because once Merlin came, he said: in any case, I've decided this and that, everyone left ...

Deleuze: That, …, in fact, they go around… it is not very much… I mean, the protest to the Council, on the one hand, it is not much: it has seen others, the Council, and, on the other hand, the downside is that it is quite likely that it will show that the protesters are a minority after all. So, is there not something else? Is there nothing else to be done?

The student: Yes, if the protest is really supported by the students ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

A student: What was weird, at this General Assembly ...

Deleuze: Wait, just a second, eh ...

The student: What's very weird is that they put a tremendous amount of energy into going to get the Council, and then once the Council was there, and Merlin said he was only accepting the first point and that he did not accept the other two, there was, there was no protest, well, I did not hear anything… people came out and it was finished.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student: In the end, you didn't protest!

The student: But the "you" is "they"! [*Laughter*]

The previous woman student: No, but listen, on the whole, no one protested, there you go.

Deleuze: Yes, you were saying… what?

The previous student: [*Inaudible*] ... There is a principle at [*Inaudible*], this is Vincennes, a university for everyone. [*Pause*]

Deleuze: Yes, for everyone, that means non-graduates, foreigners, auditors. We agree on that. But ..., well, visitors, they are auditors, or well ... free strollers, really ... strollers.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, in particular, in this text by Merlin, one sentence, gives me ... almost shivers down my spine, because, following all the decisions announced, the text ends with: "finally, a large amount of information will be directed outside", by whom since… well, then…"once these

measures are implemented, to make it known that the university is fulfilling its responsibilities". So, in fact, "the university fulfills its responsibilities", that means, it seems to me, that means to the government, more or less: we are not pursuing the same goals as you, but we are completely in agreement. In any case, we are completely in agreement on the means. So… hopf… good.

But then, I quite agree on all the point on principles, in particular the one that you recall, but, once again, we fall back into the question: what, as for ..., what immediately regarding the squad and…. regarding the formal complaints? I'm saying something about the remark one of you made concerning the usefulness of teachers intervening in newspapers. In my opinion, that's been screwed up for years, right? It was still possible ... I think, five, six years ago. Today, I swear to you that, in my opinion anyway, that has become impossible because the newspapers have radically changed their structure. If you take a newspaper like *Le Monde*, there isn't even the equivalent of what in the old *Le Monde* was the "free opinion" section, where a poor guy gave his opinion. And it was framed, there was the title "free opinion", there were no commentaries. Newspapers have invented new techniques that I think are very… self-evident… not great, but very, very effective. *Le Monde* has invented, for example, its particularly grotesque second page which delights everyone ... every time we read it, or which is really ... the idea as a dumping ground ..., like a dumping ground for a newspaper. Fine. Suppose somebody gets something published, gets something published ... They stick it on that second page. Of course, any example ... Châtelet, Lyotard or me, [if] we managed to get something [*Inaudible*] on the current Vincennes question. It was obvious that, we will be stuck [*on nous foutra*] ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [92: 42]

**Part 3**

Deleuze: … That's it, in my opinion, there is only one way to intervene in newspapers now, it is in the paid form… in the paid advertisement form. But it is very, very expensive. On the one hand, it's very expensive, on the other hand, I'm not sure it's very, very effective. Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes… They are not forced to since it only merits the right of reply if Lyotard was taken to task…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: They won't publish it.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: ... They will not publish it. It's only Merlin who can, and as you might expect, he won't. [*Laughter*]

A student: *L'Aurore*'s comment this morning is still ...

Deleuze: What's it saying, *L'Aurore*?

The student: It's unimaginable, it's unbelievable ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What [*Inaudible*]

The student: Vincennes, basically ... [*Inaudible*] Vincennes [*Inaudible*] rat hole, or something like that ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah. Well, good, good ... No, I think it is possible, that ... to hold a course ... in ... in a showdown, to hold a course elsewhere. But again, that can't last long, and ...

A student: Here I have a great plan.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, and it's not without danger, you're right, it's not without danger.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. Do you have a plan?

The previous student: We do, we create a scoop, we create a scoop ...

The woman student near Deleuze: Merlin smoking!

The student: In front of the reporters, obviously and ... and trying to find the people from the narcotics squad, we take Merlin, we tie him up, we put a gram of something [onto him], and we hand him over to narcotics squad. He is the originator ...

A student: … The drugs in his pockets.

The previous student: And we do something [*Inaudible*] like the Italians.

A student: [*Inaudible*]

A woman student: What are you going to do?

The previous student: That will be what it is. We'll see for the rest ...

The woman student: This is how we took it ...

The previous student: We'll see for the rest.

Another student: Ah, that's crazy. I don't believe it. [*She says it with a laugh*]

Deleuze: So in fact, the… the thing, in fact, that… someone just reminded me, on the other hand, there are these texts which are in preparation, here, by Châtelet… but, there, once again, this is simply the small channel, so it consists in giving texts to the Council, texts of protest… Yes, yes, yes, yes…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Make leaflets, ah, that! Yeah ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, but already the distribution of leaflets at Vincennes would be very, very good. Has it been done or not, here, before? Were there a lot of leaflets or not?

A student: I think the question is for us ... I think the question ...

Another student: There is a demonstration on the 14th.

The previous student: I think the question is not to answer the problem raised by the Council where Merlin talks about leaflets. The proof given to us yesterday is that even with… very strong pressure from the students, [*Inaudible*]… and even [*Inaudible*] Council ... this same Council could not decide [*Inaudible*] a single point. [*Inaudible*]… I don't know but… you don't know? The door was broken, people were coming in through the window, exiting through the windows ... the Council was stormed ... so much so that the discussion was cut off, so I think the leaflet issue was is completely absurd, it will have no effect….

The previous student: What's a little annoying is that there isn't a real backlash against the narcotics squad and [*Inaudible*] third is suing, you see? Whereas the security guards really caused an action, you see?

Deleuze: Yes, that's very important, yes, yes ... What time is it?

The woman student near Deleuze: One fifteen? One twenty… Yes. One thirty ... half past one.

The student: It means that people, even inside the university, are not really concerned by this matter, and even if they are concerned, they prefer to do nothing about it because ... in all ... in addition, they are not… they are not [*Inaudible*] like here, you see, for them, when they come back to the university, it is to go to the department of literature, or American English [*Inaudible*] In the long run, that's not encouraging really. They are not very encouraged. I even believe there is even a problem. Now if there's a problem, you've got to talk to people, you know. With people at the university, [*Inaudible*] if you don't talk to them, there's no point …

A student: This is exactly what you are saying: they succeeded through normalization, exams, the … all that to demobilize people about…

Georges Comtesse: That, for example, is a very important problem, because in the ra ... on the radio, in the newspapers that appeared almost a year ago, there are articles that are written, where they almost tend to say: now in universities and in high schools, high school and college students are disciplined, normalized, passive; they consume knowledge; they want work, they want their future. So, [*Inaudible*] for example… Giscard,[100] the Secours, with [Lionel] Stoléru[101] and all his clique were speaking in the Sorbonne amphitheater, for…

Deleuze: [*to someone near him*] That was great.

Comtesse: … to bestow awards on the *Meilleurs Ouvriers de France*.[102] Giscard, he himself delivered after, after, after, after precisely, a short speech in response to Lévi-Strauss; he said: to intellectuals, I am assigning you a critical function, it is your job to criticize, but provided that you are realistic, [*Laughter*] provided that realism is the line of your criticism. After what he said in front of everyone assembled, the intellectuals and the *Meilleurs Ouvriers de France*, here is the family photo of France in 1980. [*Laughter*] In other words, in other words, at the Sorbonne, even in the large amphitheater of the Sorbonne, where there had been so much agitation and so much tumult in May 68, there is really normalization, even in the large amphitheater of the Sorbonne. So why not think, based on this, that a University Council here, in Vincennes, can test the students' capacity for resistance?

Deleuze: Yes, certainly, yes ...

Comtesse: Why, if precisely they are as well normalized, trained, domesticated as elsewhere! In other words, their attempt failed, since there were forty of them arguing at most with security guards, so they are going backwards.

Deleuze: Yes, oh okay, yes ...

Comtesse: Maybe it's to test our resilience.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: [*to someone next to him*] Poor Merlin. [*Laughter*]

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Anyway… all of this… there is still something: the extreme importance… the extreme importance that everyone who can be there on the day of the Council meeting. It's the 15th, isn't it? You tell me.

The woman student near Deleuze: Saturday the 15th.

Deleuze: It's the 15th: you have to be ... you have to be ... you all have to be there.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: A Saturday!

A woman student: It's a Saturday on purpose so that we ...

A student: There you go. Also, a point perhaps, that we have to put pressure so that the Council meeting might be held on a weekday, because Saturday is a disaster ... [*Inaudible*]

The woman student: This is absurd!

The student: ... So, this is something they can think about too! I think, it's prepared carefully for the purpose, right there ...

A student: Oh yes!

Deleuze: Yes, even, yes!

Another student: They are not idiots, those guys!

The previous student: If we're mobilized, we'll be on Monday too. If we are mobilized before, we will be on a Monday. That is, people will have… will… have time to think Sunday to act on Monday.

A student: [*Inaudible*] no question ... I think ...

The previous student: I think there was a comrade who had proposed a rather interesting thing: it is to put on a radio, in the end, to put loudspeakers here at the university, to inform people daily and to really present the problem. I think that is ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Anyway, again, even if the meeting is kept on Saturday the 15th, eh, even if it remains on ... a Saturday, I think it's essential, essential to be there! Yes! [*Pause*]

Another student: Good, but that is, the danger is that taking into account, if you will, the population of Vincennes who are workers all the same, who work [*Inaudible*] rest, Sunday being nonetheless this… it's going to end up in a real catastrophe which, in that way, will free the hands of the Council, [*Inaudible*] Merlin [*Inaudible*] what he wants, to take back quite simply the decisions which were voted. Then there will be no more changes because I experienced it yesterday with all the pressure that ... that we exerted, well ... it didn't work anyway ...

Another student: Because people were confused, they didn't know what they were really talking about…

The previous student: Yes, they did, they did, they did. It was agreed not to dissociate the three points!

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: [*Inaudible*] during these two weeks, we can… we can put pressure… [*Inaudible*]

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, but the pressures, the pressures ... By dint of talking about pressures quite simply, we no longer know which one we are talking about, because there are pressures of all kinds. There is, for example ..., we are told that there is a very specific pressure to be exerted, and in what form to demand that the Council does not meet on a Saturday ... Fine, that is already a type of pressure. This is very different from the additional pressure on the content of Council decisions. But there is this problem indeed of Saturday.

The student who had spoken of mobilizing: [*Inaudible*] of the meeting on Saturday is not to be allowed to go on like that [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Obviously

Another student: All the bourgeois who go away for the weekend, they won't be there, well, so much the better!

The previous student: Exactly.

The other woman student: Not all the bourgeois who go away on weekends are here, so much the better! So much the better! Ah yes!

The woman student near Deleuze: Exactly.

Deleuze: Yes, it would be… it would be… it would be good, if it were absolutely true what you're saying, but among the people who go away on weekends, there are some guys who are not bourgeois, you know what I mean… [*Laughter*] Yes, but we always come back into the same little circle: what is to be done, for example, to demand, a specific point, that the meeting not take place on Saturday, what to do except address this to the Council? Which will say that… It [the Council] is free from its agenda, it will invent all the reasons to say that… that… that… it cannot meet on any other day than Saturday, etc., etc.

A student: They are prevented from meeting.

Deleuze: So, we prevent them from meeting.

The woman student near Deleuze: So, everyone is coming on Saturday. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: So, again, everyone has to come on Saturday.

The woman student near Deleuze: It's completely silly

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh, yes, the occupation ... the occupation is enough.

Another student: [*Inaudible*]

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

The student: Committing oneself at that level by wanting ... by wanting to send the message to the Council [*Inaudible*] you have to see, this is a dilemma ... it's up to ...

Deleuze: Well yes, but listen, we all agree on that because, when we talk about a message sent to the Council, it is precisely to say: if that's all we have, it is laughable. Yes, that, everyone agrees on this point ...

The previous student: [*Inaudible*]

A student: Merlin, he's looking for a fight.

A woman student: Merlin is waiting for this.

The student: And he's waiting for this.

Deleuze: I think that ...

The woman student near Deleuze: So, we have to go to the meeting.

Deleuze: I think that… that, in any case, that the Council, as we said, there is not much reason… There are some [*Inaudible*], but that's all.

The student: The Council currently, in relation to that, these two problems, that's not the problem! It's not to the Council that the message should be sent ... I don't know. If someone is to receive the message, if it's about sending a message to someone … [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Well… Merlin, isn't he on the Council?

Deleuze: Yes…

The student: … because, talking to Merlin, like that: mm, Merlin… For all classes (UVs), I think for all classes that meet [*Inaudible*] to see what can be done, we have the right to… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: One has to go through…?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but concretely, what does that mean?

The previous student: Concretely, it's very simple! It means going door to door ... [*Inaudible*] or even making leaflets ... You have to see ... to have imagination [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Aah, imagination, okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.

The student: The previous times, remember, in the [*Inaudible*] case, it was a case that started because there was ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, but why are you saying that? We've all been here for two hours ...

The woman student near Deleuze: … Not having imagination … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: … it seems like we're very interested in it so …, at least those who are there… Yeah?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, I'm struck, especially what proves you right, is that ... usually there are a lot more people. It's already a little worrying, but there are a lot of guys who must have said "well yes", a lot of auditors who must have told themselves "it's not going well today ..." yes, yes, yes .

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The woman student near Deleuze: Noise is a parasite.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: [Jean-François] Lyotard, what day does he have his class? Thursday, right?[103]

The woman student near Deleuze: Thursday evening.

Deleuze: Thursday night, eh? I'm looking for points of… connection, where we could therefore… So, there are Châtelet's text which were… outlined yesterday. There will be Lyotard class on Thursday. I'm saying, what do we have as possible meeting points between now and the 15th, eh? … Thus, it's urgent, indeed urgent to find… to find means to exert this first pressure, … that the Council meeting occur on a Saturday. If it does happen on a Saturday, it's even more urgent to be extremely, extremely numerous.

A woman student: We talked about ... sending the messages to the Council ... to the University Council, to the Council of [*Inaudible*], wouldn't it be more efficient to contact each member?

Deleuze: Personally?

The student: Personally. And ask each of these members to explain themselves to the department to which they belong. I think it would be useful.

Deleuze: Except, I guess that certain departments will exculpate them up front, that is, they'll say they don't accept this procedure.

The student: No, I don't think all students from ... from ... even normalized departments would agree! I don't think so: we will trust the students if we don't trust the heads of the departments. I think that kind of ... anonymous collectivity, "The Council," that we're speaking to is nothing at all. But each of the members, that has another [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That's right. It's true, it's true, it's true.

A student: I think that to speak of the members of the personnel, one by one: well, there too it is… it is… it is to fall into error, because the members of the personnel, they also form… I do not know, microstructures within the Council itself, they are well structured ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes.

The student: … they belong to parties and unions, they have known political positions!

The woman student: But they are very embarrassed ...

The student: ... so it's a well-woven spider's web that ... it's really hard to ... undo, really, to ...

The woman student: It's not so difficult. Because there is a personality of each person who is not so proud to be ... to be singled out and to have ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The student: That is, they are even sensitive about being uncomfortable … [*Inaudible*]

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Another student: But there's no contradiction between the [*Inaudible*] politics, for example, because these are organisms ... [*Inaudible*] Especially since Merlin doesn't want to give in. If there is not a lot of pressure on the Council, it will not give in. [*Inaudible*] The aggregate of the organizations that are represented on the board, [*Inaudible*] totally agree with ... [*Inaudible*] You shouldn't focus too much on Merlin … [*Inaudible*]

The student: There you go, I think again that saying that party members are just people like you and me; this is ... this is completely wrong! This is a fierce struggle of tendencies within; the proof is that it's is no ... it is no coincidence that a particular tendency, a particular requirement, are made higher up, are always decided according to the balance of power. It is not… we must

not delude ourselves, these are not people like that… caught, like that, for example, in the department, if there is a political game, a real political interest which means that ...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The student: ... as usual, in a well-structured way.

Another student: But there are also things, the real facts speak for themselves, for example, look at Merlin [*Inaudible*] it seems, on the idea of staying in Vincennes. [*Inaudible*] even though there is a pull from the Council called … [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes.

The student: So that's good.

Deleuze: This is the minority of the Council.

The student: These people ...

Deleuze: But strangely enough, it was a guy from that minority that came ...

The student: Okay ... Wait a minute, wait a minute. So, it's ... so there are people who are in favor of staying in Vincennes.

Deleuze: No, since our question is: do those who say they want to stay in Vincennes believe it?

The student: Well that's it!

Deleuze: I am inclined to think they do not believe it ...

The student: Because they don't take it upon themselves to say: we don't believe it. It's up to the students whether they believe it or not. Not in the Administrative Council.

A woman student: Or stay ...

The student: In Vincennes, it was never done differently.

The woman student: Or stay in Vincennes and normalize ourselves completely.

The student: That's why you can't ... You can't accuse the Council of [*Inaudible*] publicity if you don't see how it works. The Council, it has [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes.

The student: Because at the time when ...

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. [Pause]

A student: There, what is called a minority, that is, [*Inaudible*] they think they are a majority. That is, [*Inaudible*] they're the ones who vote anyway [*Inaudible*]

A student: [*Inaudible*]

The student: What you have to see is that Merlin has a very radical tactic of [*Inaudible*], well, he [*Inaudible*] on the right or on the left depending on the circumstances, [*Inaudible* ] he recently relied on [*Inaudible*] Vincennes, [*Inaudible*] to stay here [*Inaudible*]… supported Merlin against the inter-union who were ready to go to Saint-Denis, in particular, whether it was the Communists who had released a leaflet from November, for [*Inaudible*], for the transfer to Saint-Denis, but… and whether it's the right… [*Inaudible*] the English department, which also was in favor of going to Saint-Denis [*Inaudible*]. And that there was ... an alliance was formed between an inter-union minority, the [*Inaudible*] and then Merlin, well ... [*Inaudible*]

Another student: I suggest that we draw some conclusions, because ...

Deleuze: Okay. Okay. Well… well… ah ah…. For me, the conclusions… only the conclusions that… that I would propose, are: so, even if we think that it is not very effective, to keep abreast, that…, that, I would do this with respect to Châtelet, the state of the texts and the use of the texts… which were projected in his… yesterday with him; to see if ... there are leaflets to be created from these. Second point: the possibility of ... meeting at Lyotard's class, which gives us ... two, three days, I imagine. In two, three days, we can have… an element can emerge, all that. It seems to me that there must be a lot of possible meeting points. So, the possibility, at the time of Lyotard's class, and there, what ... what will his class propose? It's important by Thursday, or by… to find, or look for or… try to conceive means of action to demand… that the Council not meet on the 15th, that the meeting not take place on a Saturday. Finally, at whatever moment it occurs, really, to go there, everyone to go. I mean, immediately, these are ... these are the things that I see.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Even so, it would be better for everyone, for ... well, for us, if this Council did not take place on a Saturday, if it was possible ...

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. Okay well… yes.

[*Sound of chairs*] [*End of the session*] [1: 58: 58][104]

Deleuze: Well, we didn't get any work done!

The woman student near Deleuze: No.

Deleuze: So, tell me ... [*End of the session*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar of 11 March 1980**

**Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines**

**St. Denis, Course 11**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale**

**Translated by Charles J. Stivale**

… Which final question? The next question: supposing that it is correct to regard the capitalist system as an axiomatic and to equate its functioning with the functioning of an axiomatic, what results from this for a supposed or desired understanding of the global political situation? So, at the same time, this looks very ambitious; we must not have too many illusions because ... these are just small remarks, that is, can we find in… some events, in… in what appears practically, some reasons to confirm this hypothesis of capitalism functioning as an axiomatic? And for us, and ultimately for us, what… what a source of despair and also what a source for a bit of hope this is! Or else, therefore, what a source of some very, if needs be, very insignificant remarks.

So, I am having these remarks follow one another, asking you to remember…, I suppose you remember a little bit, the way in which we tried to define an axiomatic for itself, already at the level of mathematics. But now, you see that our problem is different, our problem is exactly: what axiomatic criteria can allow us, allow us to orient ourselves in current political situations? That's exactly it: what are the major properly axiomatic criteria that would allow us, yes, to find our bearings in possible current political situations? And so, I am offering my list of these criteria.[105]

I am saying -- first criterion – addition-subtraction (*adjonction-soustraction*). In fact, it is true that an axiom implies a respective independence of axioms from each other since no axiom can be deduced from another. A proposition that is deduced from an axiom is called a theorem. So, in a social field, there are surely propositions of the theorematic type: they depend on axioms, but the axioms themselves, you cannot conclude an axiom from another axiom. The independence of axioms within an axiomatic obviously grounds the possibility sometimes of adding axioms -- at that moment, you say in mathematical terms that you are enriching the system, an enriched system, when we add axioms -- or else you remove axioms: this is called an impoverished system. I am saying: immediately, do these very abstract notions, borrowed from the axiomatic, have a corresponding notion that makes us say, why yes, that's how things occur, at a certain level? This is my first remark.

But I respond yes! Yes, it seems to me that in what is happening currently, in global political and economic phenomena, we are constantly witnessing something that's almost like two poles, and I would say that it is the first great bipolarity, the first great bipolarity of the capitalist system, the

two poles being a tendency to add axioms, to always add axioms to the axiomatic of capital, and a contrary tendency to withdraw axioms, to operate with a minimum of axioms. [It's] a double tendency: to enrich the system-to impoverish the system.

And this bipolarity, what is it? It seems to me that we can define it -- and in passing, we saw it previously, I'm going to … I'm going to try to go all the more quickly; on this, I'm just going back to this first point -- we are saw this, it seems to me that it is represented precisely by two models of State. You remember our general thesis, namely that in capitalism, the State undergoes a kind of mutation, yes, a kind of mutation; that is, it no longer functions as an imperial model, that is, as a model to be realized, but functions as a model of realization in relation to the axiomatic. The State has become a model of realization for the axiomatic of capital. Well, I am saying, the first great bipolarity of modern States doesn't even seem to me to be democracy and something other like democracy. In terms of tendencies, I would say… there is a kind of totalitarian pole, and there is a social-democratic pole.

You will tell me: but the passages, they are ... obviously passages, they are ... they are very ... that is why if we had to create a typology of modern States, I would not speak of a democratic State, a totalitarian State, this State, that State; I would just limit myself ... -- if would you please stop laughing because it's disturbing to me in trying to speak; I don't mind your laughing, but it blocks me in what I'm trying to… to say, it's tiring. Uh ... that's a grade school comment, really ... It's bothersome, really, what… -- What was I saying?

A student: The totalitarian pole ...

Deleuze: Ah yes, you will tell me: there are passages perpetually, yes. I am selecting a typical case, which currently seems to me to be one of the most… the most important cases in what is happening in the world, namely the case of Brazil.[106] You know that, in Brazil, there is precisely a kind of situation which is an, how to say, an alternative, almost in the "either… or" mode. Either, or: I am not saying at all that this alternative comes from heaven; it is founded by a kind of economic development in Brazil ... by all kinds of givens -- we will perhaps see this as we go through our sections -- but there is a deadline which is currently set, namely the upcoming elections. There is a possibility, namely that, by virtue of a rather prodigious economic development, which has its reasons, which should be analyzed ... Brazil is faced with the possibility of truly developing an internal market. Fine. Very important.

Related to this, there was -- while it was a typically totalitarian regime -- there was the recall and acceptance by the exiles, the acceptance to return to Brazil. They came back en masse, right, the exiled Brazilians. Currently, this is really a tightrope, namely power is still held in a totalitarian way, and there are elements that are being put in place, why? For ... the other end of the alternative, namely the possibility of a regime, roughly speaking, of social democracy. There is a common enemy, namely… In any case, there will be a settling of scores, whether social-democratic or totalitarian, there will inevitably be… tendencies and people who will be liquidated in history. But this is not certain, here; again, it is not sure that there won't be a return to totalitarianism.

And if you just accept this example, Brazil truly as currently being a country that offers this kind of alternative in suspense, a kind of suspense, there, who can say if, in fact, the elections will be held and will be sufficiently free for a kind of Brazilian social democracy to be established, or for the totalitarian system to be reconstituted? I believe in history, right; this is a rare case in which such suspense occurs. There has often been a transition from social democracy to totalitarianism and vice versa, but I am saying, this situation ... we tell ourselves: well, what exactly is going to happen, and how? And the very understanding between the totalitarian elements and the social, social-democratic elements ... all that, how far will it go? Fine, this is very, very odd, very fascinating, it seems to me, the current situation in Brazil.

So, if you agree that there are indeed these two poles, and that these two poles are more relevant than the constitutional democracy distinction, etc., etc., well, if we give ourselves some perspective, what do they correspond to? I am saying, fine, it's very simple. Again, if we try to define what this is, that the totalitarian pole and the totalitarian State that expresses that pole, I am saying -- it is not difficult; well, it's not difficult! -- ... I would say, you have a totalitarian State when the axiomatic -- this looks very abstract, but it's not so much, I don't know ... well, it will be up to you to say… -- when the axiomatic of capital is realized in a model of realization which retains only a minimum of axioms.

In other words, as [Paul] Virilio says,[107] and here I find once again that this is a very, very profound expression, the totalitarian State is not the State at maximum, it is the State at minimum (*un minimum d'État*). When you remove the maximum number of axioms, when you retain only the minimum number of axioms, you can only do so through a totalitarian State. What does that mean? It means a very simple thing: what is the economic-political structure of a totalitarian State? Well, I believe that it is above all a State which organizes the collapse of its internal market.

So, if you will, my first bipolarity, totalitarian State-social democratic State, becomes more precise since this bipolarity is based on two cases of the internal market-external market relationship. A totalitarian State is a State which retains, at the level of axioms, only the axioms necessary for participation in the foreign market. So, it organizes the liquidation or collapse of the internal market in a radical form or in a mitigated form. What does that mean, to organize the liquidation of the internal market? This means, to retain as the fundamental variable only the level of reserves and the rate of inflation. A typical example if you will ... There, well, an axiom, I would say at the extreme: an axiom for the reserves, an axiom for the rate of inflation. Which implies what? This implies openness to foreign capital, by virtue of the very nature of the external market. This implies industrialization of the country, but industry of food products and materials intended for export -- always the primacy of the external market -- and the collapse of the internal market, as well in the sectors of labor as of consumption, as of salaries, etc. So, here you see that all the capitalist axioms -- I indeed mean capitalist -- on which the internal market depends are going to be done away with or tend to be removed. In such a case, in fact, there are no more axioms for that region.

What does this mean? That the whole region of the internal market is not going to disappear just like that, but it no longer has its own axioms. They are no longer anything but theorems, that is,

they are no more than propositions-consequences which depend on the axioms retained, or even worse still, they are wild propositions, that is, that are allowed to vary freely. An example of such a totalitarian State today, a most vivid example, is obviously Chile.[108] And the Chilean government itself says this, in its inspiration which is precisely an inspiration from the theorists of American capitalism, from the famous [Milton] Friedman school, from the famous Chicago school, they say this: the main axioms that are retained are the rate of inflation, the level of reserves. And, in one text, a Chilean official says: the rest is only a consequence. I am saying: this is the very language of the axiomatic, "the rest is only a consequence", that is, it is in the nature of theorems, which depend on axioms, but you will not have axioms there. Your only axioms are openness to external capital, participation in the external market, and the rest results from this, namely the collapse of the internal market. I am saying, if in the case of Chile, it becomes clear that it is indeed a totalitarian State, well ... in other cases, it may be less clear. You will nonetheless be able to speak, to speak no less, of a totalitarian pole which is gains the upper hand.

I was saying: for France currently, it goes without saying that we… we cannot… we cannot exactly say that the liquidation of the internal market in France is occurring in the same way as it occurred in Chile, but it goes without saying that, once again, measures like the liberalization of prices, the axiom posited as predominant over any other, of making French production competitive on the foreign market, will imply that the the axioms be reduced, that a reduced number of axioms be made operative, the axioms expressing precisely this prevalence of the external sector over the internal market. And this is what defines the totalitarian pole of the State, namely the State is totalitarian when there is only a State at minimum, that is, when there is a tendency to restrict axioms.

So, what is the outcome from that? Concretely, what does that mean? Well, you can see how, in fact, this is the opposite of the social democratic tendency, namely all kinds of axioms will be withdrawn more or less visibly: social security; oh well, no, you only have to wonder what the other pole is: at that moment, it seems to me, we understand much better! If there is a social democratic pole, what does that mean? It means that the social-democratic pole, fine… it proceeds by the tendency of the perpetual addition of axioms. You will ask me: but how is it possible? Obviously, we would have to state the concrete circumstances in which such a pole becomes urgent or becomes possible. Once again, why in Brazil at present is there a social democratic pole that has emerged virtually, when the State regime, the State form, the State model were totalitarian? What ... what made it happen to allow this?

But, whenever you have a period in which circumstances are such that capitalism tends to multiply axioms, you can say: social democracy is taking shape. In what form? Well yes, we will add: you want an axiom for this, etc. As… as… as they say: popular pressure. Do you want an axiom for women? Okay, we'll make axioms for women. Axioms for employment? Well, a social democratic regime identifies itself ... well, especially with its axioms for employment ... for example: the axiom “full employment”. There, fine, when you have a brandished axiom of the “full employment” type, you can say that we are in social democracy. You see, every time

you locate the ongoing emergence of some kind of economic or political proposition to become, to be constructed as an axiom, you can say that there is a tendency to multiply axioms.

And what fascinates me is that, in a capitalist organization, to what extent it is really flexible, sometimes for withdrawing axioms, sometimes for making them proliferate, multiplying them and, if necessary, moving from a pole to the other. You see how this occurred: for a long time, our economy really existed -- and here I have the impression of speaking at the same time very abstractly, but very concretely also --, for a very long time, our economy existed with kinds of axioms that were considered as, precisely, corresponding to a so-called "Socialist" influence… which were regarded as fundamental, full employment, fine. Yet everyone has known for a long time that, in particular, the plan provided -- including already the Debré plan, really[109] -- provided a buffer of fundamental unemployment. The planned organization of a mass of unemployment has always existed ... in the sense of the totalitarian State, namely: regulation, and, ultimately, collapse of the internal market.

And all that, all that ... in a country's politics, you can very well assign this or that event according to this or that pole. And I am just saying that, currently, if in a sense, the so-called Giscardian regime,[110] the Giscardian regime seems to me to have signified, politically and economically, the preponderance of the "restriction of axioms" pole, while the two poles crossed, shared the social field before. Here, we are in a time when French capitalism seems to me to have radically opted over a time period for the tendency to restriction, the subtraction of axioms. Fine.

A last remark on this first point: I was saying, and I remind you of this, that an ... a possible interest of this distinction of the two poles seems to me to be this, to lead us to multiply certain distinctions, namely, at that point, there is no question of ... confusing totalitarianism and fascism. It is not true that totalitarianism and fascism are ... are the same thing. Fascism, once again, is a very particular type of State which is not at all, and which does not correspond at all to the same problems as the totalitarian State. And I think the distinctions between the two are relatively ruinous, because they prevent us from understanding some things. There have been fascist States. As far as I know, there were only ... anyway, in Europe, there were only two, namely the Italian State and the German State, right, ... at the time of Nazism.

Okay, but how is this [a fascist State] not at all the same as a totalitarian State? I would say that the Spanish State, Franco's Spain, always was a totalitarian State; it seems to me very classic, and not at all a fascist State. Why? That's because the fascist State, if we question it and if we reflect on this notion -- according to the criterion that I have just proposed, addition of axioms or subtraction of axioms -- well, we sees that, very strangely, it accomplished both at the same time. That the Nazi State called itself "national socialist" indicates well enough that, in a certain way, it was inspired either by social democracy or by what is still quite another thing, so-called socialist States. In what sense, and why? I am saying that what defines the fascist State is much more this: it is the conversion of industry into an arms industry. I would say, at that point, this is not at all an opening to foreign capital. Moreover, the fascist State is a state which explicitly poses the economic question: how to manufacture internal capital, and which can only be understood on the basis of this question. If the famous Nazi economist [Hjalmar] Schacht was of

importance, it was precisely because he carried out this internal production of capital necessary for the Nazi State.[111]

And this internal production of capital entirely calls upon processes of the "multiplication of axioms" type. It is not at all the same as a totalitarian State; it is simply obvious that Nazism is not a social democracy. This is National Socialism, which means what? This means that the domestic production of capital, therefore, which excludes the appeal to foreign capital… -- not which excludes it… which does not exclude it, there has always been foreign capital, but finally which does not… which does not make the appeal for capital ... for foreign capital a fundamental axiom, since it is, even when they receive it, it is a question of supplementing it [capital] with domestic capital as well – so then, this production of domestic capital occurs in the perspective of an industry which becomes exclusively or, in a prevalent way, a war industry, while for the totalitarian State, there is absolutely no ... there is absolutely no expansionism. If there is an expansionism that basically belongs to the fascist State, whether it was in Italy, whether it was in Germany, if this is a State that can only live under the form of an expansionism, that's precisely because its production of domestic capital is correlated with a conversion of the whole industry into a war industry, into an armaments industry. And we see that, in parallel fashion, to the totalitarian figure "appeal and openness to foreign capital", there corresponds a completely different figure which is that of Nazism or fascism, namely "the production of domestic capital as a function of an arms industry".

And, the other pole, the totalitarian aspect of "the collapse of the internal market" is found in a certain way; it is the famous restrictions, but it takes a completely different form, no longer simply the reduction, the restriction, the subtraction of axioms, but this time, some propositions, a proliferation of properly interior axioms, namely… -- which seems to me very important for all regimes -- of fascist type, namely the very, very bizarre constitution of a whole industry and a whole market defined by a very particular type of product, namely the production of ersatz (substitute) products, which you do not find at all in totalitarian regimes. There too, this… this is a big difference.

So, I would say that a fascist State is a State which is not ... which is relatively original compared to the two poles, to the first great bipolarity, totalitarian State-social democratic State. From one of these perspectives, it has its own way of suppressing axioms, and from the other perspective, it has a way of multiplying axioms. It's a very monster kind of composition. Fine. That's my first remark; it's precisely like that.

A second remark. The criterion that I am studying, at the level of this second remark, is no longer addition-restriction of axioms, from the point of view of the axiomatic, but the question of the saturation of the axiomatic. In fact, this is obvious: if it is correct to consider the functioning of capitalism as equating to an axiomatic, what about a saturation of capitalism? And in fact, what comforts me, what comforts me in ... in this ... in this problem, I am not encountering it by chance since this is a problem that everyone has always posed: it is an extremely classic problem when it comes to the question of capitalism, namely is there saturation and in what sense? And here, this notion of saturation, which belongs to all economic reflections on capitalism, of

eventual saturation, almost suggests that our axiomatic-capitalism assimilation is, in a sense, better founded even than we had perceived it to be.

What does this question of saturation mean in an axiomatic? This is quite simple, namely it is possible that an axiomatic, and more so, it is undoubtedly inevitable that an axiomatic reaches a moment when it is saturated. What does this mean, saturated? That means we can no longer add an axiom -- the axioms being independent, and we have seen: there is the possibility of adding or removing axioms --, well, one speaks of saturation when one is in a state where adding an axion is no longer possible without the whole axiomatic becoming contradictory. An axiomatic such that you can no longer add a single axiom is said to be saturated.

What about for capitalism? Is there a limit at which capitalism can no longer add axioms? And what, then, would this limit of capitalism be? And that is why I referred to this famous chapter of *Capital*: "The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall",[112] because it is in this chapter, it seems to me, it is in this chapter of *Capital*, very important, very beautiful, that Marx goes the furthest in the presentation implied, at least, in the implicit presentation of capitalism as axiomatic. And if I am trying to state the highlights of the chapter, by… by urging you to read it or reread it, I would say: it seems to me that there are like three, three moments, three very… -- this is an extraordinarily complicated chapter, very, very composed, in a very complex way --.

I would say there are like three levels: first there is a kind of analysis that Marx does, and which seems so modern to me, then, an analysis which addresses the following question, namely: yes, there is an inevitable limit of capitalism, and what is this inevitable limit of capitalism, namely that capitalism cannot be developed without changing the proportion of so-called "constant" capital and of "variable" capital, that is, constant capital becoming relatively more and more important? What does all this mean, that capitalism cannot be developed without giving a prevalence, without causing the prevalence of constant capital over variable capital? And how is this a limit of capitalism?

This is very clear in ... in Marx's presentation, this is even crystal clear (*limpide*). We call "constant capital", I remind you, at least it is a notion… -- I insist here because this is very important for all those who are interested in Marx, and he seems that among Marxists, it is really presented in a very, very confused way, this point, that I am insisting on parenthetically -- there are two great distinctions concerning capital: there is fixed capital and circulating capital, and then there is constant capital and variable capital. If one already mixes them up, it is not worth trying to read *Capital*. But I am saying that the situation is very confused because, in fact, fixed and circulating capital, this is a distinction which Marx renews, which he uses and renews, but which does not come from him, which is classic before him. Constant capital and variable capital, this is Marx's own contribution, and this specific contribution by Marx appears only in *Capital*. The *Grundrisse*, a fundamental work which precedes *Capital*, still only speak of fixed capital and circulating capital. There is a text of Marx's notes which seems to me to have enormous, enormous importance, in which Marx, between the *Grundrisse* and his writing of *Capital*, explains that he considers that he has made a fundamental discovery by distinguishing between constant and variable capital.

So, I am saying… I am indignant; for once, I am saying: this is scandalous because, for example, in the Pléiade edition,[113] you find a reference to this text which was coldly deleted… really why, then? [There's] a reference, and the text is not even cited. And in a note -- I wrote it down, it seems so scandalous to me -- I can read it, the… an incredible note for someone who is preparing an edition,… it's on page 1705, there, note six hundred… note ... never mind: "In an earlier passage which we omit, [*Deleuze emphasizes these three words*] Marx states that the distinction between constant capital and variable capital, which Adam Smith and his epigones confused with the categories of fixed and circulating capital, contains the whole secret of the genesis of surplus value and capitalist production." Period, okay, perfect. That tells you what an edition edited like that is worth, fine.

So, if we accept the idea that ... the, ... one of the great innovations of *Capital*, compared to Marx's previous works, will be this identification of the fundamental distinction between constant capital and variable capital, it is very easy to understand what these new Marxist categories mean, which, once again, did not exist prior to Marx. Constant capital is exactly the capital invested in the aggregate of raw materials and means of production. [*Pause*] Variable capital is the aggregate of the capital, the part of the capital invested in human labor. Marx's thesis, Marx's famous thesis, is that surplus value, capitalist surplus value, comes from variable capital, that is, from the share of capital invested in human labor. -- I have a paper to sign, don't I? Will you be open ... in a quarter of an hour? … Thank you so much. [*Apparently someone from the secretariat entered momentarily*] -- You see, and a corollary of Marx's thesis, a corollary of Marx's thesis: the rates of profit, the capitalist rate of profit itself depends on surplus value. Are you following that? Because you have to follow, because it's ... it's not complicated, it seems crystal clear to me, it seems very simple, very ...

And what is the evolution of the capital? When it develops, what is its evolution? Marx says some things, continues to say some very, very simple things. Well, the evolution of capital, for reasons that will be seen later, is inseparable from a kind of fundamental technological progression. There is a technological inventiveness of capitalism. Capitalism is a virus-like thing: there is a very great kind of technological creativity. And what does this technological creativity entail? That the share of capital invested in the means of production tends to increase relatively, tends to increase more and more relatively, namely constant capital tends to gain the upper hand. Not absolutely: it goes without saying that the surplus value drawn from human labor increases, increases absolutely, but what changes is the "constant capital"-"variable capital" proportion the relation of two, namely the share of constant capital tends more and more to outweigh the share of variable capital. Hence what Marx will present as the inevitable crisis of labor in capitalism.

So, when people talk about the predictions that Marx makes, it always strikes me as bizarre that he is criticized precisely on the points ... [that] he did not foresee. If there is a point that he had not foreseen, it is what would become, for example, from the… the seizure of power by the proletariat… His predictions are very slim. On the other hand, when he speaks of a becoming of capital, namely the share of constant capital tends to increase more and more. Of course, he already had the data in his era, but we can say that he is saying something fundamental for us today and that, after all, I can't see who… who else said it except him, namely what is confirmed

by the simplest technological evolution, and as well technological development in the field of so-called computer or cybernetic machines, implies a reversal of the constant capital-variable capital ratio. The share of constant capital becomes more and more essential in modern capitalism, the process of labor being no more than a process as Marx said, adjacent to the machine.

So, you see what Marx is thinking here, that he is describing a limit of capitalism. I would say, this is fully within the problem of saturation: if it is true that constant capital tends to take on greater and greater relative importance, then what happens? Capitalism encounters a limit in what sense? In the sense that the surplus value drawn from human labor, and therefore the rate of profit which depends on the surplus value, tend to have less and less importance respectively. It is the downward tendency in the rate of profit, downward tendency. Here too, this is a matter of poles: there is a downward tendency in the rate of profit. That would be the limit of capitalism, but Marx does not say at all that this limit is reached: it really is a limit, there, again in the mathematical sense, namely something that we approach, and from which we are always separated by an infinitely small quantity, hence the expression “downward tendency”. This is Marx's first great idea.

A second idea: if there is a downward tendency like that, or I would say as well, a tendency to saturate the system, you see, I would define the tendency to saturation by using the words again, there, that we are dealing with, by saying: yes, the tendency to saturation is the tendency of constant capital [*A student near Deleuze whispers*: Did you hear that?, *probably a noise outside*] to take a larger and larger proportion. Hence a second level of Marx’s text: how ... how to account, then, for this tendency? What does it depend on? What does this tendency depend on in the sense of a tendency that is never reached: there is a limit, and a limit which, in a certain way, is pushed back as you approach it? This is the idea of… this is… it is an idea, there, caught… no longer in the axiomatic, but in differential calculus, in old-fashioned differential calculus, namely the more this limit is approached, the more, itself, it is pushed back.

How to explain that? In some very beautiful pages, Marx tells us something like this: yes, there are some limits of capitalism, only there you are, that's what we have to understand: these are immanent limits. -- There, I have a feeling that we will… stop. [*Apparently there are noises outside*] -- These are immanent tendencies, right? What do “tendencies” mean? Forgive me: these are immanent limits. What exactly are immanent limits? You can see: what is an outer limit? This is a limit that is encountered as an extrinsic obstacle [*there is a mechanical noise near the microphone*], we collide against such a limit. For example, capitalism very much likes to make us believe that it collides against an extrinsic limit. For example, this is the whole topic currently on the limit of energies, or the limit of food resources: capitalism presents itself as confronting limits which would be the limits of the universe.

Marx said something different: he says “yes” to limits, only these limits to capitalism are immanent limits of capitalism itself. Why? Because there is what Marx calls a kind of contradiction of capitalism. [*Pause*] He tries to define the contradiction in the following way, when he proposes, in this chapter on the downward tendency, when he proposes the idea of immanent limits. This contradiction, he says, is that capitalism both does not cease -- and cannot

do otherwise -- it even invents that, it produces in order to produce, it has invented production for the sake of production, so it has ... we would say, in our language, when we speak of decoded flow, in fact, it has decoded production, it invented a product in order to produce and, at the same time, at the same time, in an inseparable way, uh … [*Pause*]

Suddenly I am telling myself: something serious is going on, maybe, I don't know… You don't want to listen if…? Can you hear? No, yes, just listen with your ears, not… Ah, no!

Student: Stop!

Deleuze: Because… you can't hear, those who are near the door, what…? Ah, it's outside the window, a fine.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh good, oh good! Tell us! Tell us!

Various voices: [*Inaudible*][114]

Deleuze: Well, I think we have to go outside, because it's still very ... it's ... it's still serious. Okay, well, listen too bad, right? [*Pause*] When did it make the… decision, the Council? [*End of the session*] [43: 53]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 12, 18 March 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq and Mariana Carrasco Berge**

**Translation by Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

Deleuze: … [As for] my categories … He wants a chair? … Pass him a chair.

A student: I am trying to find a chair ...

Deleuze: Isn't there an extra chair somewhere? Well no…

A student: Well, no? [*Pause*] But that's not normal.

Deleuze: Good. Yes, yes.[115] We saw the last time, here, a first large heading -- you would almost have to conceive them as insertable headings (*rubriques à tiroirs*), that is, you can add things, you can, you could create others, perhaps, but at that point, you are intervening -- the first heading which we looked at from the point of view of this parallel or this assimilation "politics-axiomatic situation", this is like a global political problem really ... namely the situations of "addition" or "withdrawal of axioms". And these two poles "addition-withdrawal of axioms" allowed me to define a first bipolarity, a first bipolarity of the "State" form, of the "State" form in the modern sense. And these two poles of the modern State were "totalitarian State-social democratic State" depending on whether the tendency to restrict axioms manifested itself or, on the contrary, the tendency always to add them did so, and this varied from place to place.[116] So, in that, I suppose that, unless there are some things… I almost dreamed earlier that you would complete this with some concrete examples, so I was saying: the current case of Brazil seems to me exemplary, in fact, because it exists as if in a suspended state. Are they going to choose a kind of social democratic line with the addition of axioms? Are they going to maintain the "reduction of axioms" totalitarian line? etc. Fine, sometimes it's: one tendency asserts itself here, but there, the other tendency asserts itself.

And this first State bipolarity, "totalitarian State-social-democratic State", seemed to me to respond to the "internal market-external market" relation, the tendency to restrict the axioms in which the totalitarian State fundamentally appears when it comes to organizing the collapse of the internal market or asserting the exclusive primacy of the external sector. And the social-democratic tendency tends to assert itself to prevail when it comes to constituting an internal market and placing it into relation with the external market. Fine, so, it is around the pole of… no, of the "internal market-external market" relation, I believe, that we could account for the

“totalitarian State-social-democratic State” alternations or, if you prefer, "addition of axioms-subtraction of axioms". There we are, so that’s what we’ve considered.

My second heading -- and that’s where I was the last time -- as in any axiomatic, it was the problem of saturation because, however strongly, however precisely the two poles we’ve considered previously present themselves to be – the tendency to add-the tendency to remove axioms, in an axiomatic -- the problem that still remains is this: does a limit exist? Is there a saturation of the axiomatic? Once again, saturation is when you cannot add axioms to an axiomatic. A single axiom can no longer be added without the whole becoming contradictory. At that point, we say the system is saturated.

Can we say that in the global system, more precisely in the capitalist global system, can we say that there is saturation? If capitalism is an axiomatic, can we speak of saturation of this axiomatic? Is the notion of saturation a concept which is not only mathematically valid when it comes to studying axiomatics, but is it a comprehensive concept, that is, that makes us understand something about the global political situation? And I was saying: our point of departure, here, is this great text by Marx on the tendency of the rate of surplus value to fall, because it is in this text that, to the maximum, it seems to me – although he does not use that word -- Marx describes capitalism as an axiomatic, and on what basis? Namely, Marx’s entire thesis is: capitalism indeed has limits, but these limits are extremely particular, extremely singular. So, what are these limits?

And I was saying: Marx's text, well, it is organized, he organizes his analysis according to several levels, and at the simplest level, it is the description of this tendential limit, namely Marx tells us: capitalism is not developed without the two elements of capital changing their relation, their proportion. Namely: the more capitalism develops as a system -- we tell ourselves: good, as axiomatic -- the more the part of capital represented by constant capital, the more the "constant capital" part of capital tends to prevail relatively over the other part of capital, “variable capital”. Once again: in what way – and here, you must grasp this very well -- in what way is this a limit of capitalism? It is because variable capital is the part of the capital invested in human labor. Surplus value -- whether this is true or false doesn't matter, I am summarizing Marx's thesis -- surplus value extorted by capital depends on variable capital.

It is under its "variable capital" aspect that the extortion of surplus value by capital takes place. Constant capital is the part of capital represented by raw materials and means of production. If it is true that constant capital proportionally tends to outweigh variable capital, what does that mean? Notice already -- which is an essential remark, otherwise… one cannot understand Marx's thesis at all -- that does not prevent the "variable capital" part and the surplus value which depends on it from absolutely increasing as capital grows, ... grows as capitalism develops. [For] variable capital and surplus value, the more capital develops, the more it [the variable capital part] absolutely increases. But what tends to decrease is the relative importance of variable capital in relation to constant capital, that is: the more capital develops ... the more capitalism develops, the more the share of constant capital tends to prevail over variable capital. So, “the tendency of the rate of profit to fall”, what does this Marxist notion mean? It means, as the "constant capital" part of capital prevails relatively, well, although the mass of surplus value increases absolutely, it decreases relatively.

So, there is a limit, in that sense; there is a very special limit of capitalism. In what sense, a very special limit? We can see very well what Marx means then: a very special limit since surplus value and variable capital increase in the absolute, with the development of capitalism, but at the same time, represent in the total sum of capital a smaller and smaller part. This means that capitalism is perpetually approaching a limit, and that limit recedes, does not stop receding, as it comes closer. What is that? How to put this, it is ... it is a very curious status of the limit: hence the expression "downward tendency". What would such a limit be? Such a limit is what we must call: a transc ... er, limit, an "immanent" limit. It's an immanent limit. And this is the entire paradox of an immanent limit: an immanent limit is such that, in fact, as it is produced and is not encountered from the outside by the system, it is internal: the more the system approaches this limit, the more it pushes back this limit. This is like a very, very special, very singular status of the limit. It seems abstract; we're going to try to make this very ... as concrete as possible.

A student: [*Inaudible*] ... internal structure, there is a moment of explosion or a moment of fusion or ...

Deleuze: Yeah. But ultimately, it can be even more ... even more simply explained by a series, ... by an arithmetic series. I mean: one, plus a half, plus a quarter, plus an eighth, etc., etc., which has a limit and, at the same time, that limit is immanent, precisely in the sense that, the closer you come to the limit, the further the limit recedes.

So what interests me is this: what is this notion of an immanent limit, that is, a limit that is not encountered from the outside? Notice what problem this answers. In fact, all capitalism has the strongest interest in persuading us that the limits it encounters are the limits of the world, that these are the limits of resources, for example, natural resources, that they are extrinsic limits: this is always the great theme of politics. What government never ceases saying and telling us: but there is no other possible policy, really; in other words, the limits, they are external? Now we begin getting suspicious: no, that is not right; the true nature of the limit in the political system [is] that the limit is really generated by the system, as an immanent limit, that is, a limit which moves away, which recedes, as one approaches it.

Henceforth, what is this immanent limit? Where does this kind of… immanent characteristic of the limit come from? This is where Marx's second answer comes in, and this is the point I reached when we stopped the last time. This is because Marx says: well yes, the immanent limit translates a kind of contradiction at the very heart of capital; you see, analysis shifts a level here, I would say, because [in] this contradiction, it is no longer a question of… simply a relation, of a proportion, between the two constituent elements of capital: constant capital-variable capital. This is quite another thing: it is a contradiction within capital in general.

What is this contradiction? In a very beautiful page, Marx states it very, very simply; he says: well, at the same time ... at once, at the same time ... at the same time, it is capitalism which invents the idea of producing in order to produce. Capitalist production is a production in order to produce; it is a production that takes itself as an end, and why does this belong to capitalism? There, our previous analyses almost prevent us from needing to repeat the letter of the ... Marx's pages because, if it is true that capitalism works with – in relation to previous or other formations --, if it is true that capitalism works with literally decoded flows, it goes without saying that, at

that point, capitalism releases flows of production for the sake of production. Decoded production is "to produce in order to produce".

But let's accept that capitalism inaugurates economically, and with what that implies politically, this reality of producing in order to produce. It remains nonetheless, and you see that here, this is… I mean, this is almost things that… you can… that one must feel as much as understand: this means that insofar as being capitalism, that it invents and that it unleashes a force of producing in order to produce. In other words, is this so contradictory? But it is indeed at that point a contradiction internal to capital itself; it is at the same time that it invents a product in order to produce and that it is a product for capital. In other words, producing to produce is the correlate of producing for capital, and yet producing for capital and producing in order to produce are a living contradiction within the State. For if I produce for capital, that subjects production to very restrictive conditions that ... which seem to be opposed to producing in order to produce. In fact, maybe this is not in opposition, but there is at least an apparent contradiction in the double movement, in the double movement of capital: producing in order to produce-producing for capital. It remains abstract, all that. We'll… we'll see, right, but… what does that mean? In fact, it means that to produce in order to produce is something that only works at the same time as I produce for capital, since it is capital that unleashes the flow of producing in order to produce.

As a result, this is a very curious situation. So, since I will need it later, let's return to the terminology to try to situate it, that ... that we needed about quite another thing, namely, about the problem of war. But is it ... is it by chance that we need to return to that terminology right now? I was saying: there is very interesting terminology in General Clausewitz's theory of war: it is when he distinguishes between aim and objective (*but et objectif*), the aim of war and the objective of war. And the distinction comes down to telling us exactly this: the aim of war and the objective of war are not the same thing. The objective of war is what he calls, on his own, absolute war; and the objective of war is defined in a very simple way, namely, the overthrow or annihilation of the adversary: this is the objective of war as absolute war.[117] The aim of war is quite different: the aim of war is the political aim, it is the political end that a State proposes to itself – some very diverse political ends: it can be for very different ends -- this is the political end that a State proposes to itself when it makes war, that is, when it simultaneously proposes the annihilation of an adversary.

And Clausewitz says: the political aim is fundamentally limited, namely it is such an aim that a State proposes, whereas the objective is absolute. The objective is absolute, but it is still very variable; why is that? Because the annihilation of the opponent varies depending on the opponent's determination itself. To annihilate the adversary, that means ... that changes completely depending on whether the adversary is identified with the enemy army or with the entire enemy population, or something else. You can have a type of war, for example, in which the overthrow of the opponent is identified with destroying the enemy army. You can have a type of war where the overthrow of the opponent is equated to "destroying the enemy population": these will be two very different types of war. In other words, when I say, "war has a variable aim and objective", well, the aim is always limited; the objective is more or less limited.

When can I speak of total war, which we found to be very different from absolute war, since absolute war is simply the objective, specifically that in whatever way you want to understand

the adversary, one proposes to overthrow the adversary, or to annihilate him, but total war is different: it occurs when the objective becomes unlimited, namely when the adversary is identified with the whole of the enemy population. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited; in fact, it is a question of annihilation in the sense of radical destruction. So, the question at the level of war is exactly this: when the objective of the war becomes unlimited, that is, when the war becomes total, don't the aim and the objective enter into a very peculiar contradiction -- the limited political aim of war and the limitless character of total war, the possibility of a contradiction?

I am saying what we find here -- and the reason for making this this overlong parenthesis – [is] because we are going to find a problem which resonates with this one; I would say: what is the objective of capital, and what is the aim of capital? The aim of capital is to produce for capital; that's its aim. What is the objective of the capital? The objective is unlimited. Capital's objective is to produce in order to produce. It is inevitable that, in some way, the limited aim of "producing for capital" and the unlimited objective of "producing in order to produce" enter into at least an apparent contradiction. Why do I add "at least an apparent"? This is because the contradiction will obviously be resolved if there is, and if capitalism includes a means of resolving it, and a concrete means, a kind of mechanism through which it [capitalism] does not cease to resolve it at the same time as it introduces it [the contradiction]. If we discover this concrete mechanism by which it does not stop solving it [the contradiction] at the same time that it [capitalism] introduces it, we are simultaneously answering our question, "what is an immanent limit?", namely that this limit is produced by the system, but produced in such a way that it does not cease being pushed back as one approaches it.

Well, yes, yes, and that is part of the beauty, it seems to me, of Marx's text, to show us in the last point, on the third level, that there is indeed in capitalism a mechanism that is working in such a way that the contradiction between the unlimited objective and the limited aim, between "producing for the sake of producing" and "producing for capital", that this contradiction finds its solution, finds its resolution thanks to a typically capitalist process. And this typically capitalist process is what Marx sums up in the following expression: periodic depreciation ... "periodic depreciation of existing capital and creation of new capital."[118] Do you perhaps sense that we are getting closer, -- but we are trying to get closer to something concrete in a very, very gradual, very careful way -- we are already getting closer to something concrete? If we want to understand even a little bit, for example, about the current oil-nuclear narrative, you can see that this is the typical case of this periodic process of capitalism, namely: depreciation of existing capital-creation of new capital; this corresponds exactly! This is why, here as well, the oil crisis is not imposed on capitalism from the outside, but that it is really a limit, in the sense of an immanent limit, depreciation of a type of qualified capital-recreation of a new capital. This is absolutely necessary so that, precisely, the limit is produced as both what we keep getting closer to, and what recedes as we get closer to it. It is the process of creating a new capital on the periodic depreciation of existing capital that is going to be, it seems to me, one of the most fundamental capitalist processes.

And so, let's just try to draw a conclusion. If you understand this point, that capitalism works on precisely these two phases -- this kind of double phase: depreciation of capital-creation of a new capital – that gives us something. That provides a status to something which is, in fact, very

maddening in capitalism, namely its powerlessness -- here, we will try to see this concretely -- its powerlessness to go into reverse. What does “to go into reverse” mean? Obviously, that cannot mean going back to… to… the ax, the flint, the primitive state, etc. ; it is not about that, but the powerlessness in political and economic choices to return even to something that would have been possible a few years before, as if, in fact, the nature of the immanent limit literally defined what we must call an irreversible arrow, an irreversible course of capitalism, which obviously causes our misfortune.

What do I mean here? So here, we must try to speak concrete; we have to start all over. If I summarize the set of notions that I am grasping in this second heading of saturation, I am saying: saturation is the immanent limit. I am saying: the immanent limit is a limit that is both produced by the system, to which the system keeps getting closer, and which recedes as one gets closer to it. I am saying: the relation with this limit, the relation of the system with this limit, defines an irreversible arrow, an irreversible course, good, etc.

And a book has just been published that I find very beautiful, so… it is… it is… and… and which seems to me to be… which concerns a completely different subject, but which seems to me to be an illustration of this subject, if I try to say concretely, well yeah, you see how it works, the immanent limit. It's a book by Robert Linhart, ... which is kind of an investigation into what's going on in Brazil right now. The book is called *Sugar and Hunger*. *Sugar and Hunger*, f-a-i-m, and has as… as a subtitle, “An investigation into the sugar regions of northeastern Brazil”.[119] There we are; I would just like to relate some points from this book, and read some passages. And my only comment would be to mark what way I need this, that is, how this is the very illustration of one of the overly abstract topics that I have just tried to develop.

Linhart tells us one thing that… he says it so perfectly that, I mean, even if we thought this, he recreates it for us… fine. It's very beautiful, the way he says it. He says this: you know, hunger, well yeah ... the problem of hunger in the world, right, hungry people, ... obviously, this is not a ... this not an exterior limit. This is what he calls "produced" hunger. In a way, we all know that hunger is produced. What am I trying to say, more confusedly, when I speak of an immanent limit? Well, this is precisely in opposition to an exterior limit; in other words, hunger is not encountered as the result of scarcity; it is produced as the result of an organization. In other words, although the word is not pretty, we must speak of a hunger, f-a-i-m, as "sophisticated" in opposition to ... or else a hunger that is not at all a hunger from scarcity; it is not hunger from scarcity at all. What is produced is hunger, there you are ..., there you are; the system produces hunger. This is ... there we have it, the ... the immanent limit. How does it produce hunger?

One must show that it [the system] produces it in the very process of its development, that capital produces hunger in the very process of its development. So, as a general idea, this is ... nil: everyone… everyone will be ready to say, "okay, fine". Every time we find a concrete, an extremely concrete analysis to make sense of these abstract expressions, this will obviously take on a ... greater importance. Well, let's take the example of sugar cane in the northeastern region of Brazil.

Here it is -- and I just need to add: this is indeed part of the process of "producing in order to produce" and at the same time "producing for capital" -- the development of sugar cane, what

does that mean? That means it's really a blind development, ok! More and more plots of land will be taken by the sugar cane: to produce in order to produce sugar. You will ask me: why? Because, at the same time ... it's at the same time producing for capital, for sugar capital. Fine. So, we produce in order to produce sugar because, by that very fact, it is the only way to produce to produce for sugar capital. What does this mean? This means that each plot of land will be planted with sugar cane. So, what does that mean? That means: development of a huge property, a large landholding. You see, to produce in order to produce sugar and to produce sugar capital, this apparent contradiction is already being completely dissipated! There is only sugar capital that can produce sugar in order to produce sugar. Everywhere you go, [it's] to make cane sugar: this is not nothing, that, because [there's] an immediate consequence – sense in what way [there's] the limit; once again I'm relating all of this to show, in a specific case, how the limit is produced from within and not encountered from outside -- because… what is going to happen, if you are in this situation?

You ... you can conceive it: this is indeed a question of developing capital, not of its creation. In other words, you can imagine that this situation, compared to the previous situation, has at least two catastrophic characteristics, two catastrophic characteristics from the point of view of the populations. First characteristic: collapse of private land plots. Ah well, yes, in ... in the early stages of sugar capital, this is a kind of stage of the big farm, but the big farm, however strict the regime -- and this was not ... and this was no party! -- the big farm still preserves for agricultural workers the possibility of small private land plots where they can grow diversified crops, a minimum, a minimum of diversified crops. The development of sugar capital -- sugar cane everywhere -- has for its first consequence, what? Monoculture.

And I am not telling anyone something that ... I am not saying, no ... I am not teaching anyone anything if I recall that one of the fundamental problems of Third World economy is precisely the capitalist misdeeds of monoculture, or of monoproduction. Why? Because it is within this monoculture already that we understand how, already, the limit is produced from within. In what sense? In the sense that all the land is occupied in the form of the large property which wipes out all that was left of the private land plots that could be cultivated by the agricultural workers. Practically they go to the city. Once again, it's not that the old days on the farm were good: on the contrary: it was… there are even positive reasons why they emigrated to the city. But, really, there is a movement that must indeed be called deterritorialization. This will be the basis for the formation of large city slums. And furthermore, any possibility of a diversified, somewhat diversified food is eliminated. Specifically, the small private land plots allowed the maintenance of a certain heterogeneity in the diet. Monoculture has a catastrophic result which is there is no longer any local possibility of a diverse food supply. The homogeneous food of the Brazilian northeast becomes, not even the absence of food; in a sense, it's almost worse -- well worse… we don't know what is the worst -- it's a kind of black bean: a starchy black bean type, the regional food there.

Here we have Linhart's text which strikes me as very ... if you follow me, it seems to me that here we grasp on the spot the constitution of ... of what I called the immanent limit. This is precisely what he calls "a modern hunger". I mean, a modern hunger is, if you will, hunger, f-a-i-m, immanent hunger; this is not a primitive hunger, or so-called "primitive". This is not a hunger that would be the encounter with shortage; this is a hunger produced by the mechanism of

modern capital. This is what he says; I'll read slowly: the text seems to me very ... very clear, right: "As I collected testimonies and data, hunger appeared to me with terrible clarity, like the material and the product of a device complicated to the point of refinement. Hunger was not a merely dramatic, almost accidental absence of available food." -- That would be external hunger; it would be "shortage" hunger, -- "... as they present it to us when they want us to believe that it would be enough to quench it by charity or emergency relief movements. The hunger of the Brazilian northeast was an essential part of what the military power called the development of Brazil". In the end, just as the limit is a constituent element of development, hunger is a de… constituent element of development.

"This was not a simple hunger, a primitive hunger; it was an elaborate hunger, a perfected hunger, a hunger in full flight, in short, a modern hunger. I saw it progressing in waves, called economic plans, development projects, industrial poles, incentives for agriculture, investment, mechanization and modernization of agriculture". -- Indeed, this sugar monoculture implies a highly industrialized agriculture. -- "It took a lot of work to produce that hunger. In fact, a lot of people were working at it quite hard. This took place in buildings, in offices, in palaces, and in all kinds of command and control posts. This hunger buzzed with purchase orders sent by Telex, with lines of credit in dollars, marks, francs, yen, with feverish transactions. They were never done going into the details of producing this hunger. Store owners, bankers, shipowners, executives, experts, businessmen had their share of this, as did an army of intermediaries, broker-dealers and consulting firms, planning institutes, and generals, politicians, police officers. Through its very characteristics, this hunger was confused with the development of the mode of production, a sugar-based monoculture, a monotony of food, a slow, patient hunger, a snacking hunger progressing at the rate of the market economy."

And in fact, he quotes the testimony -- here I… -- he quotes the testimony of a doctor who analyzes very well this type of hunger linked to a monoculture, and there you are… The doctor says: yes, with the disappearance of a … small land plots, where an agriculture could still be maintained, … a somewhat diversified culture, with the development of a sugar-based, very, very industrialized monoculture, "now we encounter sugar cane even in the cities, and the peasants no longer see any other food than black beans, cassava, exceptionally dried meat: no fish, no milk, no vitamins. Malnutrition during embryonic life and the first eighteen months of childhood leads to permanent mental impairment. Children are missing up to sixty percent of the brain's neurons, and this destruction is irreparable. Another consequence: the average size of peasants decreases", etc., etc.

There you have it, if you will; as the first point, I am saying that, if one understands this well... this notion of produced hunger, what Linhart proposes we call "modern hunger", the hunger which is produced by a process of development as such, we have exactly what I was trying to have you sense, to have you understand, namely this status of the immanent limit. And I would like to discover if we also have the means of giving a concrete status to the idea of the irreversible arrow, something irreversible in this movement through which a limit is produced, a limit constantly pushed back, at the same time as it is reached. For this process is terrible; I mean hunger has never been a way in which ... through which people are killed. In a way, this would be almost too good if ... if people, as they say, they ... they would die from this. There are many people who are dying of hunger, but what is terrible about hunger is that hunger also multiplies

the hungry, that is, it reproduces in this way as many as it destroys in this way. And this is indeed the process of the limit which is perpetually pushed back at the same time as we approach it and never stop approaching it.

And in fact, what is this irreversible arrow in the capitalist system? I am trying to return here to this same situation in Brazil. Here is what Linhart tells us: it is that the development of the highly industrialized sugar-based monoculture which ravages and wipes out all the small remaining plots, well, this is not yet the final word because here is the tale that he relates to us and which is very fascinating, it seems to me. It is that this sugar-based monoculture has a first major stage of development, namely, to produce sugar for the sake of producing sugar, but it does not stop there. A second big stage of development [is] sugar alcohol being used as a mixture for gasoline to make the cars run. Fine, this corresponds well to producing in order to produce: something must be done with this overproduction. The sugar market is not doing well, the global market ... So, fine, they're going to use some of the al ... the alcohol in sugar to make cheaper gasoline. Okay, so this is ... I am saying this is a second stage of development since it is no longer about large land ownership: the whole automobile industry is entering the race for sugar development.

Only what will happen? Starting from a certain proportion, sugar alcohol in relation to gasoline (here as well, this is very proportional), special motors are needed. As long as the proportion is minimal, you can still do it by ... by adapting the classic engines, the engines in classic cars. When the proportion increases, sugar alcohol in relation to gasoline, special engines are needed. So, there is a need to initiate, to build factories that will manufacture these engines, obviously, with foreign capital. This is what occurs in this region of northeastern Brazil. That involves huge investments. Here I do not need to force or develop this; I assume you understand immediately: this is the same, this is even an example of this process or this irreversible arrow that I was talking about earlier, namely "depreciation of existing capital-recreation of new capital". I am saying: sugar-based capital is undergoing a depreciation as evidenced by the global price of sugar, which, in fact, is very low. The depreciation of existing sugar-based capital corresponds to a recreation of new capital, this time in the automotive industry, which will use sugar alcohol provided that a new type of engine is built.

Result: if I take these two stages of sugar cultivation -- sugar cultivation, in a first stage of development, which destroys all the plots of land, all the plots that would have allowed the maintenance of a still diversified diet; second stage: transition to the automotive industry which will manufacture types of engine -- sense that even if I could say: at the first stage, one revolution was still enough, let's say… forgive me a random word: a "limited" (*restreinte*) revolution was still enough to bring down the sugar monoculture, for example, to reform cooperatives, to reestablish the possibility of a relatively diversified diet, etc., at the second stage, this is no longer possible. Why? Because it is the aggregate of industrial investments that themselves depend on this sugar monoculture. To reverse this will imply, at that moment, much more difficult, much more complex operations, will imply an all the more radical revolution, which, at that moment, collides, at that time, with interests that are so multiplied that it [the monoculture] risks being liquidated.

So, that means that things weren't going well before; afterwards, things are even worse. At the same time, it is…. it's the progression of this limit, if you will, this kind of very, very curious

limit, this kind of really gnawing limit, right, which makes you keep approaching it, [while] it recedes, and at the same time, it outlines an absolutely irreversible arrow. Irreversible… irreversible in what sense? Well, it will take ... measures will be needed. For example, it is obvious, it is obvious that… in order for Brazil… right, to emerge from a situation, for example, an insane situation which is the situation of the northeast, well… it will be… it will be much more difficult now, where industrial investment is caught up in this kind of movement, and has taken over from the sugar-based cultivation movement, than ten years ago. Fine. This is what I wanted to call this kind of saturation, which is a very weird saturation, since you can see that it never stops receding as one continues approaching it.

Well, then I would almost like there to be the… the counterweight, that all this analysis consisting in saying very quickly in what sense all this is hopeless, might at the same time be an analysis in the sense of… what is possible? what… what can happen? What…? And if you will, we can see very well how the stages of capitalism there unfold in this ... in the form of this step, really, a kind of limping step. I call a “limping step" this kind of limp that corresponds to "depreciation of capital-recreation of new capital". And that this is obviously at the hinge point of these two phases, of this limp, that revolutionary movements intervene ... Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No, it occurs at the level of the global market. For example, the depreciation of sugar-based capital occurs at the level of global sugar prices; it occurs at the level of "producing in order to produce".

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh no, yes, you're right, no, no. You see, I wouldn't want to, I can't be clearer. Are there any ... So, in this "saturation" heading, I would put all these problems of limit of... as I just outlined them, yes, if you can see. Yes?

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes -- [*Deleuze talks to someone near him*: You are going to be there.] -- Yes.

Georges Comtesse: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah. [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 09]

**Part 2**

… As for this problem: how to go back onto a given state of monoculture? So I would like to read, here, precisely, in my per… in… what Comtesse has just added, … a short passage from Linhart on the history of motors: “The day the first separate pumps for the fuel… for fuel derived from cane alcohol were installed, the populations of the northeast were condemned to a further worsening of their lot" -- that's it, the immanent limit which is perpetually reconstituted -- "As long as the limitation was to add a proportion of cane alcohol, 14% , to gasoline, there was no need to modify the motors; one could remain in a provisional state, changing policy. Henceforth, special engines are needed: Volkswagen is already producing them. Other manufacturers will follow. The third pump means a major conversion of the automotive industry and investments. No question of going back. Do you understand what that means? The condition for the cost of this new fuel not to become prohibitive is that the wages of the sugar can workers must be maintained at a level of misery. Until now, these farm workers were confronted only with a class of landowners dealing with declining economic and political movement. Henceforth, they will also clash with the powerful multinational auto companies, and sugar will devour more tracts of land, wiping out what remains of food crops. This is the hunger" -- f-a-i-m -- "of the northeast that will allow cars to roll throughout the entire country.” Good, very clear, there is nothing to add, there you go. Nothing to add to all this; … yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*] ... This isn't the first time that [*Inaudible*] ... in the 19th century, ... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes. Yes, yes, yes. Well, the coffee monoculture would be exactly… yes, I am not saying at all that this is linked either to sugar, or to recent events; it has always been a… fundamental question, and, once again, if there is among the specific problems of the Third World, there is basically this problem of monoculture, and of mono-industry! Take the case, we could almost have placed this whole analytical test, well, this insufficient analytical test that I am proposing to you, we could have placed it under the sign of… of the small country where it happened… of the small Third World country, where recently such strange things happened and which was like an exemplary case: the… the old Dutch Guiana… Suriname, that's Suriname, it's called that, Suriname, you see, this little country… it's the old Dutch Guiana, which is wedged between the old English Guiana, and the old French Guiana.

Ok, what happened there? Well, I have, I ... I want more detailed information. I'm sticking to ... an article in *Le Monde*. *Le Monde* says: there, in my memory, there is what? It's ... it's a country with about, say, five hundred thousand inhabitants. I may be wrong, but roughly: five hundred thousand inhabitants. Monoproduction: this is ... this ... you find that all the time. Monoproduction: bauxite. Fine. [*Pause*] What other characteristics? Population ... population, as in so many Third World countries -- that will interest us, we will see why later -- an extremely mixed population, since [they are] descendants of black slaves, but also descendants of a second wave, who are Indians especially, right, and who were brought in when… when… with the abolition of slavery, the… the Dutch, there, the Netherlands,… brought… a lot… of… Indian laborers. Fine. So, [it’s] a population with a strong racial mix [*métissage*]. Large influx of emigration, out of the ... about half of them leave the Netherlands. Huge bureaucracy, but oddly, the bureaucracy is provided by the formerly English Guiana, by the neighboring country. A bureaucracy, because we'll see that there are specific bureaucratic problems in a third ... in Third World countries, obviously.

So, there is everything there, so that we can get our bearings: capitalist monoproduction: bauxite -- that is, really at the same time, producing in order to produce and producing for capital --; influx, influx of emigration: half of the population that leaves from the Netherlands; constitution of a typical Third World bureaucracy, provided by the neighboring country ... Curious to think of all these movements at once! Well then, there too, this is perpetually the production of the limit ... How the system never encounters an external limit, does not stop producing its limit. Okay, we'll come back to all these points. Under this second "saturation" heading, do you see anything to add or is it clear enough? Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. Yes… Yes, yes, yes. Yes, in that, you are completely right to say that, there, we retain it, that almost -- but it anticipates other topics that I wanted to tackle --, so I already remember that if you follow this kind of law identified by Marx, right, of capitalism, namely: as capital develops, the share of constant capital, that is, invested in machines, outweighs the part of variable capital invested in labor, that basically explains the status of current labor. What is the current labor problem? We note -- and here we have to ask ourselves why -- I mean: both in the Third World countries and in the central countries (*pays du centre*), what do we notice? The development… the growing development of so-called "precarious" forms of labor. What are the precarious forms of labor? Precarious forms of labor are either underground (*noir*) labor, or temporary work, [*Pause*] or, at the extreme, the increase in unemployment which means the preponderant share of precarious labor: this is the multiplication of forms of the worker's status -- temporary worker, precarious worker, all that.

Still in the same book, Linhart analyzes the forms of precarious labor. For example, as agricultural workers gradually no longer live on the land of large estates, but migrate to the slums, they increasingly assume the status of precarious workers. But at the same time, what is happening in the rich countries, in the so-called developed countries, in the central countries, for example, in countries like ours? Well, everyone sees it: it's, it's the multiplication, the increasing importance of the same forms of temporary and precarious labor, as if, here, the situation of the central countries and the situation of Third World countries were bizarrely not that much different. What is happening currently? So, one would really have to be a very, very… classic economist to say that this is an accident. It is obviously not an accident, it is not an accident linked to a moment of crisis; it is really the expression of the deepest tendency in the development of capitalism. This tendency can be stated in the following way, exactly using Marx's terms: as constant capital becomes more and more important in relation to variable capital -- you remember, "variable capital" is capital which has to do with labor --, as constant capital -- which has to do with the means of production -- takes on an increasingly greater importance, if only by automation in relation to constant capital, in relation to variable capital, the forms of labor become forms of precarious labor, forms of underground labor, forms of temporary labor. Fine. And there ...

Comtesse: Would the limit of that be, for example, the disappearance of work?

Deleuze: Yeah!

A student: And the dispossession ...

Deleuze: Oh yes, yeah.

Comtesse: … for example, a day later, a day after [Lionel] Stoléru paraded at the Sorbonne,[120] the next day, on Monday on Antenne 2, he declares with incredible cynicism, he declares this: if the… the workers, when the workers will be… we will cost too much, we will replace them with industrial robots ...

Deleuze: Yes? Yes, yes, yes, yes. And I am saying: what concerns you, for example, in particular in this situation? You know it well, that is, this has already been said a thousand times, but precisely what I'm trying to do is to bring together as many notions as possible that are ... that would be a little bit functional. It's that ... what about the students as students in all this? It is that the students, as the forms of underground labor, temporary labor, or so-called precarious labor develop, in all senses of the word "precarious", students are fundamentally caught, and are almost at the forefront, of this category of "precarious labor".

So… for the Third World, it has been often analyzed, especially by Samir Amin, eh?[121] But in the central countries, to my knowledge -- and here, it is now or never to pay them one more homage -- it is not by chance that in the central countries, the first to have grasped this essential, not accidental characteristic, the first to have told us: but you know, the development of temporary labor, precarious labor, etc. is… it is not an accident in modern capitalism, it is really its fundamental tendency, this is not the crisis, it's not… it's not oil, it's not… it's… it belongs to [capitalism], fundamentally, for the simplest reasons, the easiest to explain… this is Italy. It's Italy, because, very strangely, Italy is… it's a kind of prodigious country, where the forms of precarious labor… so there we see… -- I'm preparing a topic to come, for us later --, that things are not ... they never are ... although there are irreversible arrows, this is not at all a reason to despair, because the form of erratic work has a force… it has very, very great revolutionary potential. The kind of double Italian sector, where really there ... the existence of a double sector was asserted very quickly: a kind of underground sector, of temporary sector, of precarious sector, which finally became kind of like the very condition without which the Italian economy would not work; all of this has been analyzed, it seems to me, very, very deeply by all the autonomous current in Italy, right? I mean, this is one of the main contributions in theory or in… the practical theory of contemporary labor, the contribution of Toni Negri's analyses, or in Germany, you will find that, you find that especially in… Negri in Italy… you will find that in Germany with a good author called [Karl Heinz] Roth, r-o-t-h, who wrote a recent book,… [published] with Bourgois: *L'autre mouvement ouvrier* [The other workers movement]. In France, you have several guys who have been working a lot on these precarious forms of labor which have developed in France for several years very, very ... very powerfully ...[122]

And I am preparing some more consoling conclusions for later: it is that, once again, the revolutionary potentialities of these immanent limits, one can hardly say in advance -- and that is very, very consoling -- to what extent it is the system that produces them, but to what extent they turn against the system. The Italian situation… the Italian economic situation such as "precarious work" would seem to mean that the Italian economy is reaching the extreme of such labor, but, in fact, it is this precarious labor that has become an indispensable element for the whole

economy. Consequently, the new forms of struggle that become possible ... the way in which, necessarily, the struggles henceforth go beyond the narrow framework of the company, the factory, necessarily situate their locus much more in a neighborhood (*quartier*), a region, etc. Why then does the PC, the PCI [Italian Communist Party] … what is the difference in this respect between the labor policy of the PCI, and the labor policy… of Autonomy? This is where I think the differences become very, very concrete. Why does the PC insist on maintaining the corporate framework? Well, it's obvious, really, it's obvious. Fine. Let's move on to a third heading -- unless we take a break ...?!

Claire Parnet: Oh no, we're not tired. Are you tired?

Deleuze: No? I would say a "third heading," but you cut me off if you see any other ... you see, I want every heading to be inflatable, really, so we can add things to it. Third heading: I am still trying to apply to this axiomatic of… to create this axiomatic of politics.

I am saying: you remember that, in an axiomatic, well, the axiomatic does not itself refer to a model to be realized, but it refers to models of realization and that the whole topic that I proposed to you – a very abstract topic at that point, but which should now become more concrete --, the whole topic that I proposed was that modern States were not like archaic empires, not models to be realized, the archaic imperial model, but functioned as models of realization in relation to the axiomatic. What we will call a "model of realization in relation to an axiomatic" is a domain in which the purely functional relations of the axiomatic are realized, realized in very different ways, in varying ways. In the axiomatic example that I had given here, at a purely mathematical level, I said: well, take an axiomatic with two axioms or with three axioms that I had defined, and you see that it is realized both in the addition of whole numbers and in the composition of displacements in Euclidean space. We will say: the addition of whole numbers and the composition of the displacements in space are like two models of realization of the axiomatic, that is, two of the domains in which this axiomatic is realized.[123]

I am now saying, regarding the political situation, States -- I do not claim to exhaust their nature --, I am saying, one of the aspects of modern States is that they function as models of realization of the axioms of capital, that is, these are the domains in which the axiomatics of capital are realized. And it's through this that I answered the question: why does capitalism need the "State" form when, at first glance, it could do without, or could even reverse this form? The answer was: if capitalism has maintained the "State" form and recreated a particular structure of modern States, it is for a very simple reason: it is because [capitalism] completely changed their nature; it needed States because States provided it with the best… the best models of realization for its axiomatic. So, there you have it, so that's a relatively ... relatively simple answer. I am saying: let's accept that as a hypothesis and see where it takes us.

You immediately see that we are already led to distinguish two notions. We are led to distinguish the two notions of "homogeneity" and "isomorphy". What is the distinction between "homogeneous" and "isomorphic"? Well, I think it's obvious that "State" forms can be very different from each other. It's not about saying "all States are equal": this is not true, not all States are equal to one another. It is not a question of saying either that ... perhaps one must not say either that ... there are some ... good ones and others not good: that's not it, that's not it.

Rather, we should say: well yes, there are very heterogeneous forms of States; in other words, States are heterogeneous. Modern States are heterogeneous. We have already seen a first bipolarity "totalitarian State-social democratic State" -- it is not true that these are equal, no --. There is a heterogeneity of totalitarian States and social-democratic States, even when there is interpenetration of ... when, there are elements of one within the other ... it is not the same thing. But I am saying: States can be heterogeneous and yet be isomorphic.

What are "isomorphs"? "Isomorphs" will mean: they are both models of realization for one and the same axiomatic. So heterogeneous States can be isomorphic. A totalitarian State and a social-democratic State can be two domains of realization for one and the same axiomatic; in this way, they are isomorphic, and yet they are not homogeneous. Likewise, I would roughly say, to resume the comparison I was making, the addition of whole numbers and the composition of displacements in space are not two homogeneous domains; these are absolutely heterogeneous! These are no less isomorphic insofar as they are two models of realization for one and the same axiomatic: the same axiomatic is realized in one and in the other of the two domains.

So, I would say: there you have it, can we say that all States, even heterogeneous, are isomorphic? This abstract question can have a certain concrete interest, … it could lead us to… to qualify things, that is, to seek the whole, to seek to determine the set of bipolarities of States modern. I was saying: a first bipolarity ... what is it that shows, roughly speaking, that one could assume a kind of isomorphy of all States, whatever they are, an isomorphy, again, without homogeneity? Well, this fundamental economic data point, namely: there is only one and the same global market, there is only one and the same global market, namely the capitalist market. For it is difficult to understand anything at all if we do not take this into account: that the socialist countries themselves are awash within a global market which is the capitalist global market. So, it is the existence of one and the same global market ... And ... -- [*Deleuze whispers to someone apparently delivering mail*] Hello ... thank you very much; ohh! ohh, this mail. Cagnard, there some more mail for you! Thank you, eh, thank you very much --. So, yes…

A student: One and the same global market ...

Deleuze: Oh yes! One and the same global market implies this kind of isomorphism of the most ... and most heterogeneous States ... and formations, of the most, State-like States. And I am saying: we saw a first bipolarity, this bipolarity which varied with the respective position of the internal market in relation to the external market, it applies above all -- I am not saying at all exclusively --, it applies above all for the States that I would call "central States" (*Ėtats du centre*). What would the central States imply from an axiomatic point of view? It would already imply a lot of questions, which I have ... I have not yet addressed at all, here, and which I am citing ... which I am citing ... which I am listing, without wanting to analyze them.

I mean: why must an axiomatic be centered? Does it belong to an axiomatic to have a center, and what? Well, for example, a center and a periphery? Are there axioms of the center and axioms of the periphery? And what would this distinction mean in an axiomatic of the center and of the periphery? And the fact is: if, for example, you refer to [Fernand] Braudel's famous analyses on the formation of capitalism, I believe that, in Braudel's texts, he insists enormously on this point: how the development of capitalism implied the formation of a center in what Braudel calls,

precisely, by creating this concept somewhat, "the world-economy" (*l'économie-monde*)? Why is the "world-economy" fundamentally a centered economy? With the essential problem that Braudel analyzes in detail: how was the center formed in the capitalist world-economy?[124]

Answer: why was it formed in Europe at a particular time, and why was there a kind of rivalry between southern and northern Europe, and why did the north win? The question is all the more important for us as it was in the North that, at the same time, the true forms, or the most solid, the most consistent of the "State" forms, were taking hold. This is also where the center of this world-economy was established from the point of view ... or the center of this axiomatic. And it is at the center that this first bipolarity that we saw very quickly developed: "addition of axioms-subtraction of axioms", or if you prefer, "totalitarian pole-social-democratic pole". But I am saying: aren't there other ... aren't there other bipolarities?

My first remark: starting from 1918, the center saw the imposition -- here, I am weighing my words because we cannot say that [the center] favored this, right -- saw the imposition of a second bipolarity, namely, that of capitalist States, and so-called socialist States or those called "socialist-bureaucratic". [*Pause*] I resume my series of questions, or my presentation of questions: can we say that socialist States, or so-called "socialist-bureaucratic", and capitalist States are homogeneous? As I am trying to bring together a certain ... a certain number of political data, if you will, since the last war, it is worth remembering that: it has been said often ... it has been said often, and many authors have developed the topic of a homogeneity, of an increasingly advanced homogenization of the so-called socialist States and of the capitalist States. One of the first to develop this topic after the war was an American named [James] Burnham, but the topic has been reexamined ... thousands of times. Fine.[125]

What does that mean, that there would be homogeneity? Is there even a need to invoke homogeneity? A good number of authors have indeed analyzed the structures of bureaucratic socialism and thought that it was really of crude appearance, which allowed a kind of homogeneity to be discussed -- for example, it is the development of planning, it is the role of planning, it is the development of the bureaucracy, but all that, it is… it is very vague because, each time, the question reverberates: is the so-called "socialist" bureaucracy the same as capitalist bureaucracy ... or even Third-World bureaucracy, every time there is a need for very, very careful differential analyses ...?

But, at the point we have reached, we would tend to tell ourselves rather: this question is not of much interest, because there is no need for States to be homogeneous in order to be isomorphic. At the extreme, we could -- it's not even sure that we could -- but I'm just saying: at the point we have reached in our analysis, we could speak at the extreme of an isomorphy of capitalist States and of so-called "socialist" States without this isomorphy leading to the slightest homogeneity! That would only mean that these are heterogeneous models of realization, in relation to an axiomatic which remains the axiomatic of capital. In any case, I am saying that the center has seen the imposition of a second bipolarity between the capitalist State and the socialist-bureaucratic State.

And then, everyone knows that ... it was not imposed -- that is why the words must be qualified --: that the center organized a third bipolarity. The second bipolarity, I would call it -- you might

as well do geography, like everyone else -- I would call it: a "West-East" bipolarity. The third bipolarity which belongs to the axiomatic of capital, this time, has not been imposed; it organized this third bipolarity: it is the famous "North-South" bipolarity. "North-South", there was only a fictitious geography, right! There is only ... yes, fictitious geography. I mean ...: the South could very well be the North, what can that do? It is a vector: the "North-South" vector. It's a bit like the limit that is always pushed back: you can very well find South in the North! Well fine… why not? It does not matter since it designates a vector, an economic-political vector. And this time around, that third bipolarity is the ... bipolarity between States in the center-States of the periphery, or what is more simply called "Third World." Fine. The South vector is the Third World.

And we still have a South, right? Besides, France has its South; it has its South which is in the process of… which is in the process of being prepared, or which is starting to express itself strongly… Corsica, Brittany -- Brittany, it's the south of France, it's not going well… right, as a vector, it is the South --, good. As Giscard said, you remember, in… in… in his… in his big… in his big speech…: it's annoying, the more balance there is between the West and the East, the more things become unbalanced from North to South. And this is very important to us, because that is the production of the limit; that is our only reason for hope. Otherwise, we'd be screwed, right! Okay, so I am saying: this is a third bipolarity.

Well, my question is this: so, without even having to say it, all States… This third “North-South” bipolarity, I can say that it had two major stages: the organization of colonization, this is how it is organized, and then with the end of the colony, with the end of colonies, of colonization, the organization of a Third World by capitalism, well, States of the Third World. My question is therefore: it is not at all a question of saying all that is homogeneous! It is a question of asking the question: to what extent are all these formations and all these bipolarities ... to what extent are all these State formations isomorphic, even if they are very heterogeneous? You see, that can't ... it's a question that can only be thought about in relation to their functioning in relation to the global market.

I am returning here, and I am taking a minimum of risks without ... but without seeming to, without telling you why, that's perfect. I am taking a minimum of risks because I am trying to give, then, some very simple definitions, at my ... at my own risk and peril, of two very common notions: "mode of production" and "relation of production". I would say: well, here it is, you understand, a mode of production, for me, I mean, it's not complicated, I'm not at all trying to say things… learned, or even technical things… I would say: a mode of production is closely determined by the role of the force of labor [*Pause*] in the production system. What defines a mode of production is the style -- I am using a very vague word, on purpose --, the style, the allure of the force of… the status of the force of labor in a production system. That, I would call it ... by convention, I would call it the "mode of production". I would call the "relation of production" this time around, the status and nature of wealth securities (*titres de richesse*) in the production system. [*Pause*]

You can already see where I am going with this; I would say, at the limit -- once again, I don't think it's ... it's not that what I’m saying is deep, not at all deep, right, but it's not orthodox, I am specifying : here, I do not claim to be anyone, I am just attempting to provide a reference point

for myself, right, it's convenient for me --, I would say, at the limit, to bring together some things that we have just seen, I would say: the mode of production is always on the side of the status (*l'état*) of variable capital in the system. What allows you to define a mode of production is ultimately the status of variable capital. What allows you to define the corresponding production ratio is the status of constant capital. Not that the… not that all these notions merge, but they are linked.

Fine, on that point, with as much lightness as possible, I tell myself: well, so-called capitalist countries, what are the so-called capitalist States? These are States in which the mode of production is capitalist, and the relation of production is capitalist. What does this mean? This means that the major form of the wealth security is capital. We have seen it, we have seen it -- there, I will not go back over this; it is even the only thing on which I have truly insisted --: capital does not designate means of production; it designates property rights or wealth securities that can be invested in the means of production, which are not at all the same thing. Fine. So, I can say that there is a relation of production that can be determined as capitalist: it is when capital determines the relation of production, that is, when the wealth securities are identical to capital itself. What is the capitalist mode of production? It is when the labor force has the status of wage earners ... well, which implies capitalist surplus value -- which is not the same as feudal surplus value, or surplus value in other systems --.

So, I can say: central States are basically capitalist states, that is, the relation of production and the mode of production is capital there ... are capitalist there. What is going on, and how could one define very, very lightly, there, very ... like that, to be able to identify so-called "bureaucratic" socialism ... no, [to identify] so-called "socialists" or "socialist-bureaucratic" countries? What is that, I mean, if we ask the question: where does the capital come from? In a capitalist country, capital comes from capital, hence the famous concept of the so-called primitive accumulation of capital. And how does capital come from capital? Because, precisely, capital defines convertible wealth securities. In a so-called socialist country, where does capital come from? You see, what defines capitalism, once again, is not capital; it is the fact that capital there is the relation of production or the wealth security. In a socialist country, the wealth security or the ratio of production is not capital. However, there is capital, there is a production of capital in so-called socialist countries. So, what is the wealth security, that is, the element that will allow the creation of capital? I think it can be said: a country is socialist-bureaucratic when the wealth security, or the element which enables the manufacture of capital, is not capital, but is the [economic] plan; this is the plan.

You will ask me: how do you create capital with planning? It's no more difficult to do ... than when you create capital with capital, no more difficult! I mean… or else, [it's] *as* difficult, as difficult. But it is obviously planning which, since the Leninist period, has been the constituent element of the manufacture of domestic capital for the USSR. I mean: if the so-called "socialist State" and "capitalist State" are not homogeneous, it seems to me that it is for a simple reason: it's because one can always homogenize, if one takes things in midstream; to say, ah, but capitalism has developed lots of planning and has attached more and more importance to planning, you see, for example, the "New Deal"; and we can say… -- or look at… Hitler's Germany --… and then we can also say: and look at the socialist countries, the importance of planning. But what matters is ... it's very silly to take things as ... in a ... by isolating it from

movement. Its movement is in fact the opposite: in socialist-bureaucratic countries, it is capital that depends on the plan; I mean it is the plan that is the building block of capital. In capitalist countries, there may well be a plan, and even a relatively powerful plan on certain occasions, for example, in France, at the Liberation, yes. It is just the other way around: it is capital that is the building block for the pieces of planned production. The "capital-plan" relation changes completely in one case and the other.

As a result, in the case of so-called socialist States, it seems to me that we would be entitled to say: but, of course, no relation of production relation exists there; the relation of production is not capital, it's the plan. It's the plan which determines the relation of production, and this is not a capitalist relation of production -- once again, that does not mean that it is better: it is something different -- whereas in capitalism, whether there is a plan or not, there, the relation of production is indeed capital itself. And that does not prevent socialist-bureaucratic States from being isomorphic in relation to the axiomatic of capital, that is, they are domains of realization.

So what could I say to finish up with these… you understand, it's a kind of… -- just ignore this if that doesn't interest you -- for me, this is a kind of purely terminological outline. What can I say about the Third World States? There is hardly a problem there. I mean, there are a small number of Third World States that we can identify as having an affinity with socialist-bureaucratic States, and sometimes even like ... I don't know, ... with hopes, with certain hopes that… the USSR no longer allows us to have; I think, for example, of Mozambique, fine. But the majority of Third World States are more on the side of the capitalist states. In what sense? In the sense that the relation of production is capital there; the relation of production is all the more capital there since these Third World States favor, according to the totalitarian expression, the external sector, that is, give absolute priority to the external sector, the exemplary case, the exemplary case [being] sugar-based monoculture.

But I would say, what makes the specificity, what makes the heterogeneity of the Third World States, is that even in this case in which the relation of production is capital, the mode of production is not necessarily capitalist, not at all. What can it be? It can still be -- but I put "still" in quotation marks -- it can "still" be even more or less, more or less, slave-based; [*Pause*] or it may "still" be more or less feudal. Why do I put "still" in quotes? Because there would be a misunderstanding -- which, it seems to me, certain Marxist authors have made in this regard -- a misunderstanding "still" to be avoided. The misunderstanding is to say, yes, these are remnants (*restes*), they are vestiges (*survivances*). Yes, for example, the slave-based side, of the large plantation, or the feudal side of certain forms of Third World agriculture, or of certain modes of Third World production, are vestiges. These are what Marxists call transitional forms. The most perfect case of the so-called transitional form was the cultivation of cotton under slavery, in the slave states of America, before the Civil War.

What interests me is that at the point we've reached, I would say, this is not transitional at all. Why? I take up a remark which seems to me the basis of all of Samir Amin's research, Samir Amin being a Marxist economist who seems to me, or who seems to many people, to be one of the most important in the study, in the current state of studying Third World economies -- Samir, then, Amin, a-m-i- . One of his particularly good books, I believe, is ... is called *Unequal Development*.[126] The basis of Amin's thesis is that, far from being transitional forms, it's a

question here of peripheral forms. What does that mean, perfectly contemporary peripheral forms? These are not vestiges. In fact, “contemporary peripheral forms”, what is this idea based on? It is based on this observation, on this basic observation, namely: the economy of the Third World is a perfectly modern economy. What is typical, what is exemplary about the Third World economy? It is not an economy that has remained half-primitive; on the contrary, it is an ultra-modern economy, namely: oil installations, industrialized agriculture, of the "sugar" type or "fruit company" type. This is all an absolutely modern economy.

These are therefore not at all forms of vestiges, but they are the conditions of the axioms proper to the periphery that results in the relation of production there being completely capitalist, and so I would say -- this is why I was developing this whole terminological research that floats a little ... a little ... a little bit ... in a vacuum --, I would say: the relation of production is capitalist there, but not necessarily the mode of production. The mode of production can very well be quasi-slave-based, quasi-feudal, and not at all as a vestige, but by a nature specific to the axioms of the periphery. Why? And what would the axioms of the periphery be, which would make possible these kind of somewhat monstrous States, monstrous States in which the relation of production is capitalist, without the mode of production being so, and yet without there being that much of a contradiction?

This is why it seems obvious to me that before the Civil War, in the context of ... American slavery, that the cotton companies, that the cotton cultivation worked with a slave regime, and does not at all seem a transitional form, not at all. Not at all. This is… this is… this is a figure from the periphery. What happened with the Civil War is not at all the elimination of a vestige: it is that the entire USA has been constituted as states of the center, as states of the West, whereas some of these states were still under the “periphery” formula, before. They were centralized, they were de-per-iph-er-ized? [*Deleuze pronounces the syllables this word one by one:* dé-pé-ri-phé-ri-sés] But, you will see that the other movement also exists. I'm just saying: well obviously, what are the axioms proper to the periphery? Samir Amin offers some -- and this is what I find the best, myself, in his analyses --, in *Unequal Development*, he searches a bit: he does not use the word "axiom", but it really comes down to that. He is looking for, he indeed says that the Third World States are extremely ... themselves heterogeneous among themselves, very, very different ... He distinguishes several kinds: he distinguishes the Oriental kind, the Arab kind, the American kind: South America… well, he distinguishes four of them -- I don't remember which one is the fourth… Arab, Oriental -- and Africa, of course! The African kind, which is really very, very different.

But, very broadly speaking, the properly peripheral axioms would be: to the very high development of large landed property, why is it an axiom -- there you have it, the first great axiom of the periphery -- why is it specific to the periphery? An immediate response: if you remember our previous analyses -- there, I ... I am only reminding you ... a very quick reminder --: you remember that I tried to show how at the center -- it was only valid for the center, this, what I was saying at the time -- land rent and land ownership had been liquidated by capitalism from its inception, and that this was inevitable, that this was inevitable to the extent that the flows of forms of capital (*flux des capitaux*), the flows of capital (*flux du capital*), implied a kind of decoding of flows. It is inevitable that land rent was as an element rejected by capitalism; it was rejected by the central States in two forms, in the English form or in the French form, at the

beginning of capitalism. It was rejected in the English form of land rent, and from then on, interest in large landholdings was rejected by European capitalism in the English form through alliance with American wheat, which did not pay land rent, precisely because America, at that time, still was playing the peripheral role, or in the French form, through small peasant property. In both cases, capitalism was breaking with the land structure. And in fact, the capitalist relation of production could only emerge at the center…[127] [*Interruption of the recording*] [92: 52]

**Part 3**

… large landholdings, either in the form of an outside company's properties -- the fruit company, for example -- or even locally-sourced landholdings, huge landholdings. Peripheral capitalism needs, at least capitalism applied to the periphery, needs a development of land ownership as such, whereas at the center, it has gone through a trend of eliminating land rent.

That is the first point that seems to me to be very important, and one cannot say, and once again, in my opinion, it would be a misunderstanding to say: large land ownership in Third World countries is linked to a simple vestige. It is so little linked to a simple vestige that the current data of the economy, or one point of the current data of Third World economy, namely the existence of highly industrialized monocultures, necessarily passes through this… immense land ownership, through the existence of an immensity of land ownership since, we have seen it for sugar there, since it goes all the way to eliminating all the small peasant land plots.

A second characteristic -- so here I would say is the first axiom specific to ... peripheral States, to Third World states --, a second axiom: a form of commerce, and there, I indeed believe that ... this is ... it goes to, credit for this goes to the Chinese Marxists, not current ones, the old ones, you know, who created a category or who proposed the existence of a particular economic category that they called -- borrowing the word, I believe, I suppose from Spanish --: "comprador trade". "Comprador trade", what is it? It's… it's… it's a category -- and here too I'm being very quick… there has been a lot of Maoist literature on comprador trade like… and this is in order to understand something unique to the Third World, and this is a category that seems very, very interesting to me. -- Comprador trade is a particularly ... cruel, particularly formidable type of trade that creates, how shall I put it ... very vaguely ... creates the connection between external capitalism and the rural hinterland. This is a kind of unleashed commerce, where the commercial relation then implies a very, very ... very important regime of violence and usury, where again one would want to say at first glance: oh, this is a vestige! Not at all. This is a current mode of functioning in Third World economies.

In Linhart's book, I'm returning there to a very short allusion to this comprador trade, but as it is very concrete, I will relate it: you see, the peasants ... the peasants who no longer even have any plots of land within this sugar-based monoculture -- they no longer have land plots, they can no longer cultivate, there, a small plot that would allow the diversification of food -- and they have to purchase, and they are absolutely defenseless, for example, at the shop established on the large property, and which will create the link between external capitalism, which animates the sugar-based monoculture, and the rural hinterland of the small poor peasants. And here is Linhart's text which makes it easier to understand than anything I might say: "However, food" -- a peasant explains that what he sells or doesn't is all the same, right -- "… everyone went into debt to buy

the seeds, and upon selling ... what remains of the small land plots, and at sale, at harvest which was good, no one earned anything from it. Many sold their entire harvest without managing to pay the banks, so even a good harvest pushes us even deeper into misery" -- that's what Comtesse… that's what you described earlier, right -- "It's the same everywhere: what we harvest has no value. The larger the harvest, the more hunger there is. Question: yet food is sold very expensively! Where does the difference go? Answer: to trade" – So, this is not just any trade, this is the comprador trade. -- "This is the devil's trade here." -- This is exactly what ... what the ... Maoists call trade ... comprador trade --. "This is the devil's trade here, there is no control. The harvest lasts three months, it's a crazy time; the trader wants to buy everything at a very low price. Then he will sell it for a high price" -- this is a trade that implies this storage, eh -- "the government lets this happen (*laisse faire*). In reality, the government is only interested in export culture." That is, the government is only interested in the external sector, in relation to foreign capital, to foreign capitalism. And it is the ... the comprador trade that reaps the very profitable function, bringing immense profits, of ensuring the junction between production oriented towards the external sector and consumption in the hinterland. You see, comprador trade would therefore be a category, or an axiom, of the Third World States, and we can see right away, in fact, that here too this is not at all a vestige, right?

Let us add: a third axiom specific to the Third World, that proletarianization, or if you prefer,… the misery, there, of… of… or the becoming of these peasants who no longer have any land plots, etc., the proletariat… proletarianization does not take place there at all in the same way as in Europe, as it occurred in Europe with the development of capitalism. As Samir Amin says, proletarianization is marginalization as well. It's inseparable from the constitution of slums. Conversely, the force, the role of peasants in this process of proletarianization is very different from that of Europe ... good. Yet another axiom that… Amin tries to… analyze: bureaucracy in the Third World, which also has a very different role, both from the role it had in Europe, or that it has in Europe in capitalist countries, and from the role it has in the so-called socialist countries. It doesn't matter, right? Anyway, I am saying that it is in the book, *Unequal Development,* that all this is analyzed most precisely.

I'm just trying to draw conclusions from this quick review. I would say: well yes, once again, Third World States, could we not define them as, in many cases, the relation of production is capitalist, but the mode of production there is not capitalist, and that this is so not as a vestige, but by virtue ... but by virtue of axioms, organized axioms specific to the periphery, organized axioms specific to this Third World? As a result, of course, political resistance movements or revolutionary political movements also have a structure or potential that is very different from those here.

What do I mean? Because, at the same time, we should add almost the opposite. It seems to me that we should at the same time *relativize* Samir Amin's theses, if I… and… but almost to relativize them to make them even more, even stronger or even more convincing, because there it is… there you are, Samir Amin tells us: the Third World economy is not at all a lagging economy; it is an extremely modern economy, once again, of the metallurgy type, huge metallurgy, petroleum, industrialized agriculture. So, the Third World economy is… it's… it's really not… I mean, it's… it's entirely distorted to present it as a "developing" economy. That's what…, that's already where there is the abominable lie. It is not at all a developing economy; it

is an economy… one cannot say that, for example, the monoculture of sugar,… in the Brazilian northeast is… the sign of an economy in the process of developing; it's a wildly modern economy! It's a ... high-industry economy, that's even why ... that's even why the situation is so tragic!

Well… I am saying this: what does that mean? We will say: what was it that allowed this displacement of a highly developed economic sector in the Third World? This is even what would distinguish, in what is called the Third World from the former colonies: in the former colonies, there was an undeveloped economy. What do we call the Third World today? There are cases, for example, Africa, it would pose ... all kinds of problems. It depends on which region of Africa. There are undeveloped areas, etc., but that is not what constitutes the Third World's acute problem. The Third World's acute problem is that it is the object of a highly developed economy, a completely twisted economy, really, a completely harmful economy, a catastrophic economy, but highly developed, highly industrialized. What allowed this transfer of a developed economy into the Third World? What made it possible is precisely our law of capital, namely that the center has reserved for itself more and more, temporarily -- it is not even certain that it will be ... that it will be for a long time --, the center reserved more and more for itself the sectors not of advanced industry or advanced agriculture, but of advanced automation. I am saying: that is one with the law of capital that we have seen. The…

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: That's it. Constant capital becomes more and more important and starts by gaining importance in the center itself. So capital, the axioms of the center, have more and more reserved an automated sector for themselves. Good. Hence the job crisis at the center, right? On the other hand, there emigrated -- and ... it matters a lot, for example, in what is called "the crisis in metallurgy", "the crisis in the steel industry in Europe", it matters enormously that a highly industrialized, highly specialized steel industry established itself in Third World countries. So wherever one is… it's… it's a situation… it's definitely part of these dead-end things of capitalism, because… it creates the kinds of holes of… crisis in Europe, and that is also the crisis economy… in the Third World! It's amazing, this stuff! -- So ... but, I am saying: we must go further. Why must we go further? You have to relativize everything, Samir Amin, because, on the one hand, I don't see any contradiction. I imagine, there would not be much a contradiction if, in a few years, highly automated sectors were established in Third World countries -- Brazil, all that… - Yes?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: [It's] possible; me… I don't know. Let me finish; you will say if you agree or not, because this is what I am telling myself, like that ...: it is very true that, in an axiomatic like the one we are studying, in an axiomatic of capital, it is very true that there are axioms of the center and axioms of the periphery. And I believe that the distinction of a center and a periphery belongs to the axiomatic, yes. But, as capitalism develops, I would say the center becomes more and more -- so taking up a concept that we've used often here -- the center is more and more deterritorialized, and moreover, the *centers* are more and more deterritorialized. In its own way, this is what's expressed in the idea of the importance of multinationals. This does not mean that

there is no center any longer! It means that there is a center, but that this center is less and less localizable in a territory, which might even be the USA, which might be ... London, which might be ... this place, that place. There is a kind of detachment from the center, or a detachment of the centers from territorialities, in relation to territories. As a result, centers can be realized directly on the periphery.

You will ask me: what will that change? Well, it is this alone which explains, it seems to me, the reversal of movement that we have just seen, namely that at the center, at the same time as the investment of constant capital increases, a force of labor is produced … sorry, a crisis of labor occurs, that is, labor that passes more and more into underground forms, precarious forms, temporary forms. What does this mean? This means that we must think of, it seems to me now -- and we will be led to think of it more and more -- the Third World's existence not only as peripheral in relation to the center, but the existence of all interior Third Worlds at the center. The tendency and distribution of capitalism, which implies this "center-periphery" distinction, means that, at the same time, everything is exchanged -- the center detaching more and more in relation to the territory, being able to incarnate and be realized more and more directly at the periphery; conversely, zones of true periphery are hollowed out in the center, as if it was no longer enough to speak of Third Worlds, but that one had to assign Third Worlds in the process of being formed at the very center of the system. So there, obviously, that seems to me very ... very important for the future -- we'll see in what sense -- this formation of new Third Worlds or what we have sometimes called: "Fourth Worlds". The Fourth Worlds are the Third Worlds which are constituted in the very center because, that is, in the old territories of the center, because the center has been deterritorialized and can be realized at the very periphery.

To conclude this point, I would just like to say -- then, let's go back to my question, my third heading which was indeed "models of realization and isomorphy" -- : I can give several answers. I can say: yes, ultimately all State formations, all modern States are isomorphic with respect to the axiomatic of capital. This just doesn't mean "they are homogeneous". This simply means that it is the same axiomatic that is realized in different models. Another possible answer: no, ultimately, they are not even isomorphic. For example, the central States can be said to be isomorphic. Are the central States and the States… of the periphery, of the Third World, isomorphic? There are many things that would make us want to say "yes". I mean, there, each central State is no longer the same regime of the colony, it's true! But this was almost replaced by the isomorphism. I mean, to me, it seems obvious that if you take the large central States, each has its isomorphs in the Third World. For example, the Central African Republic regime, there, the… [Jean-Bedel] Bokassa,[128] right, … very isomorphic for France, fine. There are African States that are very isomorphic to England; there are States, as someone was saying just now, there are States that are isomorphic to the Federal Republic of Germany. Each has its own; there are some very curious isomorphic relationships, yet there is very great heterogeneity between these States.

Fine, what would that mean? Ultimately, we can speak of an isomorphy between these quite heterogeneous States, but I am saying: ultimately as well, we can very well say the axiomatic sustains a certain polymorphy. And in fact, the axiomatic of capital implies or sustains some States which are capitalist both in relation to production and through the mode of production; some States which are neither capitalist through the relation of production nor through the mode

of production, and which will nevertheless be models of realization in relation to the axiomatic of capital; and finally some States, as is typical of a number of Third World States, which are [*Pause*] capitalist in relation to production, and not through the mode of production. And all this defines axiom coronas (*couronnes*), distinct axiom layers, and at the same time, with the transfer of types of axioms from one point to another. Why? Because, once again, I am trying to emphasize what there is in the global economy: it is the more and more… more and more deterritorialized character of decision-making centers, namely that, … it's stupid when one… when one thinks in fact of a kind of global government as hidden, which makes the decisions. Even the Trilateral [Commission] isn't that, it's not that.[129] The decision-making centers are really more and more in a state of disconnection from the territories.

As a result, a decision that would have global significance ... we ... we will always find multinationals there, but it could very well be made in Brazil, and as a function of the State of Brazil currently. [The decision] is not required to go through the central agencies, all that, because, in a way, there has been a detachment from the center through ... [*Deleuze does not complete the sentence*] As a result, once again, at the same time, the center can be directly established on the periphery and, on the other hand, the old center, the territorial center, can be hollowed out by real small peripheries which arise. Fine, then, I would say: yes, the ... axiomatic, in this case -- but we discover an idea dear to mathematicians – the axiomatic sustains, under certain conditions, not only a heterogeneity of models of realization, but sometimes a real polymorphy. Once again, the whole question for us is, what is ... what in all of this provides reasons ... to believe that ... this is not screwed (*foutu*), right? Good. What time is it?

A student: Half past twelve.

Deleuze: Half past twelve? Good. Shall we keep going, or have you had enough? Eh? Have you had enough?

A student: Almost ...

Deleuze: Okay, so let's stop, ok! Fine, I… well, I'll certainly finish next time. That's good, because what's going on with ...? Ah yes! Next time, also I ask you then, after Easter, we will do something different, ok! This will all be over. Think about what you want us to do, right! Ok, we'll talk about that a bit next time. [*End of the session*] [1: 53: 45]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 13, 25 March 1980**

**Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq et Mariana Carrasco Berge**

**Translation by Charles J. Stivale**

## Part 1

[*In the first thirty minutes of this session, Deleuze develops a long answer to a question posed by a student before the start of the recording*]

… the generic name to designate what? To designate peoples, if necessary, very, very varied peoples and who have like ... who have as a unity -- it is not a fundamental unity --, but who have in common to be in very diverse ways, if necessary, metallurgical peoples. And in fact, throughout history, there, throughout history, the question of metallurgical peoples, of their autonomy, of their relationship with other types of people, seems to me something fundamental, fundamental. What does their relationship with other types of people mean? This means, of course: the imperial peoples, on the one hand, that is, sedentary peoples, farmers, themselves working the metal, but then should we perhaps distinguish between all kinds of styles of metallurgy? It is obvious that the imperial sedentary peoples have very, very strong metallurgy, surely even acquired a kind of monopoly, but… but… they grafted themselves onto more directly metallurgical peoples. I mean a very simple thing: it's that many archaic empires lack mineral ores. They have no ore -- and yet they have a very, very elaborate metallurgy -- but, for example, the Near East is drastically lacking in ... tin, it is drastically lacking in copper. So there have to be other forms of metallurgical peoples who are at the same time prospecting peoples, extracting peoples and, much more, who bring ore to the imperial regions.

So, when we talk about the blacksmith problem, you know, it seems extremely complicated to me because there are all kinds of blacksmith: there is a blacksmith integrated into empires, there are quite different blacksmiths from that. So how do you tell them apart? I tell myself -- and that's what we were trying to do one year, I think, last year, by the way --: we tried to distinguish kinds of social spaces, social spaces.[130] And we tried to define first of all a kind of imperial space that we called a striated space, a striated space which was both the space of agriculture, and the space of sedentary lifestyle. Then we saw that nomadic peoples existed only on the condition of developing, unfolding, a very, very different type of space, and that these spaces were already in conflict; that the nomadic peoples developed and lived, they inhabited -- in the fundamental sense of "inhabiting", so in the almost Heideggerian sense of "inhabiting" -- they basically inhabited a smooth space; and that the question was not so much: the desert, the steppe, etc., but if the desert, the steppe and, if necessary, the sea were of great importance, well, it is because

these were models of the realization of smooth space, but at the same time, that things were very complicated because a smooth space such as the sea is at the same time a space that States and empires will striate, will striate very, very quickly. And then, just as smooth space becomes striated -- this will be the great defeat of the nomads -- so too striated space can restore smooth space. Fine.[131]

So… good, I… I seem to be getting off topic but, in fact, not so much because my question is: if we grant that… it is not even the question of Gypsies (*Tziganes*) -- the Gypsies pose, in a particularly acute way, only this problem which… is found throughout history at all kinds of levels -- -- if I am granted that there are peoples who are undoubtedly the most mysterious in history, even more mysterious than the nomads, ... that there are peoples that may roughly be called, these "metallurgical" peoples. For example, in European prehistory, there are very curious metallurgical peoples who seem to have been decisive in the constitution of Europe. It is these peoples that archaeologists call "chalice vessels", people-with-chalice vessels (or beakers) because in their tombs were found, right, … this is their only point in common. There are reasons to think that they are racially very, very different from each other, but strangely enough, they have a sort of common marker (*sigle*), which we find in all their tombs, in the most diverse places: it ranges from Spain, ok, to Eastern Europe. They swarmed from everywhere, these so-called "beaker" or "chalice vessel" peoples who ... and these are beakers in the form of chalices.[132] Ok.

Well, I mean, so what is this? If we… if we grant the category -- all that would be open to discussion -- if we grant the category of which the Gypsies can be an example, a privileged example, the category of… metallurgical peoples, if we say, however extensively that they mix, sometimes with the imperials, sometimes with the nomads, then this becomes a political problem once again. Among these peoples, there are some who form a sort of alliance with the imperial sedentary peoples. "Alliances", but in what form? This is very, very complicated. There are others who form an alliance with nomads; for example, the Tuareg nomads have their own metallurgists, their own metallurgists who seem very, very odd since research, ... ethnographic research and archaeological research offer very interesting hypotheses, that ... these metallurgists allied with the Tuaregs, allied with the ancient Tuareg nomads, could be either from Jewish colonies in Africa, descendants of Jewish colonies in Africa, or descendants of the Crusaders, or else again, [from] certain peoples of Africa, there, well, a people… a special African people.[133]

But in the end, if we try to find a clean space (*espace propre*) ... then it's understood: in fact, all this gets mixed up. You have alliances between nomads and sedentary peoples, between metallurgists and nomads, between metallurgists and imperial sedentary peoples, ... but the important thing is that these alliances are not of the same type at all. Understand that this means there is already a global market; from the earliest times, there is already a global market, and above all, a global market in metallurgy -- obviously much more metallurgical than agricultural -- -. What metallurgy brings is the "ingot" form (*forme lingot*). The ingot form has been known since antiquity, and it is something fundamental. In my opinion, one would have to show that the ingot form is not the same thing, nor the money form (*forme argent*), nor the… the currency form (*forme monnaie*), nor… the… nor the commodity form (*forme marchandise*). No doubt, it is a commodity, but the ingot is… it is… the very form of stockpiling, with the possibility of taking back, melting, refashioning, with the idea of an infinite process; recasting (*refondre*) will

always occur ... [It's] very important, this ingot form in history. And there are caravans which bring ingots into empires because they don't have, they don't have the ores. They have strong metallurgy; they don't have the ore. So that already assumes ... And the ore, they wouldn't have delivered it raw; there are all kinds of [metal] works, especially in the metallurgical process, which does not stop being worked, being undone and being reworked.

So, my question is: whatever the actual mixtures might be in the most ancient history, if one tried to define a properly metallurgical space, what would it be? Last year, I came up with a very simple idea, really: if we roughly grant this distribution "striated space of archaic empires" -- including the sea; they striate the sea: the shipping lanes striate the sea, -- [and] the smooth space of the nomads -- either desert nomads, or steppes, or even sea nomads… sea nomads – how, on the other hand, would we define the strictly metallurgical space? Our hypothesis was: yes, there is a very, very particular space that we called "holey space" (*l'espace troué*),[134] and holey space is something very, very odd -- this is perhaps how I will answer your question more precisely --: how is holey space, you understand, precisely that, metallurgical space? I mean, there, it's at the level of ... how to put it, of the most summary phenomenology: making holes. The metallurgist, not the imperial worker who receives the ore, but the prospector, the extractor, the blacksmith who works the ore to reduce it to the transportable "ingot" form, or already to draw from it some objects, on behalf of nomads or on behalf of sedentary people, well, he spends his time making holes in space. This is a holey space, which creates ... which obviously creates a lot of difficulty.

Suppose, here, that one must inhabit (*vivre*) things quite childishly: a ... a nomad in his desert, here, in whose space holes will get made, he doesn't necessarily like that; an imperial sedentary, a farmer, in whose space holes will get made, well you know, this not just a lark! This is a conflict between barely compatible social spaces. These peoples are not happy. If necessary, it will take all the emperor's might to enable the metalworking prospectors to make holes here and there. Sometimes, as it happens most often, it's that the great mineral resources are outside the limits of the empire. So there, well, they make their holes in the mountains… but with what? I believe that in the history of mankind, a holey space is one of the most fundamental, the most important points. If I look for – myself, I admit that this is not… three is not enough… we tell ourselves: this is always annoying… we must never limit ourselves to three --, but the three basic social spaces, whatever their mixtures, their de facto mixing, the mixtures into which they enter…, these seem to me smooth space, striated space, and… and holey space. And there is no reason to ask, which one is primary.

Once again, smooth space is no less artificial than striated space. Striated space already implies, it seems to me, [that] it's the product (*le produit*). This is the product, so what is it? No, it mixes up a lot of things. Space, for example, forest space, seems to me a striated space, a basic striated space. However, the straited space of the empire occurs through land clearing or deforestation. Why? Because the forest space is a vertical striated space where it is very difficult to ensure, ... how to say, the equivalence of dimensions in space. What agriculture brings in relation to the forest space is a space striated in all directions, that is, homogeneous space -- this is what I was trying to say last year, right, but maybe I didn't manage; one has to wait a year to say it better -- homogeneous space is not at all on the side of a space smooth, it is not a smooth space at all. Homogeneous space is the abstract product or abstract representation of striated space. Homogeneous space is space striated in all directions, in all directions, so that a vertical striation

can be folded back onto the horizontal, and you get a complete grid of the space. Henceforth, this is an equivalent space in all directions; henceforth, it is a striated space. It is the abstract representation of striated space, whereas smooth space ... is absolutely not homogeneous, not at all homogeneous. On the contrary, what defines it is the variability of directions, the fundamental change of directions, such that no direction is equivalent to another, and no determination of a direction can be folded back onto or translated into another. Okay, no matter.

So, I come back: a holey space is something else again. Making holes in space is a very, very odd activity. I believe that as regards space, we have three… we have three possibilities, three basic possibilities -- and… if you yourself look, on the level of… [*Deleuze does not finish this thought*] you can tell yourself, if you are a nomad, a sedentary, or a metallurgist, then ... nothing but to own your tastes, right, this is all so ... I mean, there is, there is no need to even ask yourself: is this natural, is this artifice? Because ... it's both, obviously, like everything, it's both. There is no division here. And I tell myself: there are three ways of being in space, of being in space: there is a way in which really… well… we occupy the space without counting it. I mean: we consider ourselves as being multiple, and we occupy a space in a whirlwind fashion; I mean, the body, a body, considered as multiplicity, occupies a space in a whirlwind fashion without counting it. This is the formula for smooth space. So, who does this? Well, it can be a gust of wind, it can be a tribe, for me, it's completely ... it can be animals: the question "who?" does not even arise, you understand, and [nor] how it occupies [space] in this whirlwind manner, by artifice or by nature. These questions have no interest. There we are.

A space is striated, so what is it a striated space? You can, from there, it seems to me… -- or else you change, you invent; if you find me a fourth, a fifth, a tenth kind of space, nothing could give me greater pleasure! Right? It saddens me to have these things in threes ... but you have to find more of them at all costs; there is no reason that there should be three. -- Fine, how do you recognize a striated space? This time, it's in the fact that it relates to a body considered as one, which occupies the space by counting it, following linear directions, that is, by going from one point to another. It's in this way that last year, I was saying a migrant is not a nomad. A migrant in its pure concept is someone who goes from one point to another, even if he does not know where he is going to stop. A nomad isn't that, really. A nomad is someone who seizes hold of a non-punctual space. It's not someone who goes from one point to another. [*Pause*] So, it's really… I am not at all saying, and here, you get that I really mean this from the heart: I don't think that there is… that there is one type of space that is better than the other, but you will be a creature of striated spaces if you inhabit space… if you inhabit space this way! And if you ... if you yourselves, you inhabit space in this way, if you inhabit as a one body, which goes from one point to another, even if you do not stop moving, you will not say: I am a nomad. You will say: I am a sedentary person. That's just as good, right, that's just as good, but you won't have the right to say ... even if you move all the time!

On the contrary, a guy who does not move can say: I am a nomad. There are situated nomads (*nomades sur place*). It is enough dwell as situated -- involuntarily, not just to enjoy oneself -- but to inhabit things rather like this: one is not a single body, but the body is a multiplicity and which, even situated, occupies its space therefore like a multiplicity of elements animated by a whirlwind movement. This is no better than the sedentary conception; it's something else. I am saying: at that moment, you are… [*Deleuze does not finish this sentence*]

Well then, furthermore, I recall, while I'm at it, I recall the ... the ... the text that seemed so wonderful to me, last year, the text by Toynbee concerning nomads who says -- it's the only very, very intelligent page that I have ever read on nomads -- and he says: but you know, nomads are not at all people who move, they are people who do not move.[135] These are people who do not move, that is, whereas all the other peoples get out of the desert, well, the desert grows – just bring to mind: oh, Nietzsche, the desert grows! --,[136] well, when the desert grows, that is, grows at once into the forest ... into the forest and onto the cultivated lands, like a kind of corner which develops there, when the desert grows, the peoples flee, except those known as nomads; they're the ones who don't want to leave. And so, the only way not to leave is to become a nomad, to hold onto the steppe, to hold onto the desert, with the variability of directions, well, all that.

So, I come back once again -- because I seem to dragging this out, avoiding the question that you asked -- I am saying, if ... if you live a little, in that way, your relations with space, then you can really be … born in the city, I don't know… not to have any nomadic ancestry whatsoever, all that, and you can be a nomad. Obviously, there are city nomads! Obviously, it's ... and then there are sedentary people ... fine, there's whatever you want. So, I ask: even without touching a piece of metal, how will you recognize that you are a metallurgist? Well, it's not difficult, right: it's the space of holes. Create holes, create holes in space. So, if it is even to find something other than metallurgy, you can tell yourself, even if you do it to find something other than metallurgy, it is that you are in a relation with something metallurgical. Okay, well, so… I mean: where my heart is greatly saddened is when, for example, we think of… of certain psychoanalytic interpretations of the activity of creating holes, in which the link is not particularly clear with really what is the most important aspect, namely the constitution of a space.

And what is this? Creating holes isn't just about creating a vacuum, ok! It's finding something that exists in the holes. The holes are not a lack, they are not an absence. A "hole" is what we call a certain kind of receptacle. [This is] why there is such a fascinating term in the metallurgical vocabulary of all languages. In French, it is "gîte" [*mineral deposit, ore*]. *Gîte*. *Gîte*: that's what's in the hole.[137] So, a holey space is not a space where something is missing; it is a space such that discovering what is in the holes is made possible. And what is in the holes, what is it? It's metal first and foremost, or maybe it's other things, but this something else, if it is experienced as what is in the holes, it will have some relation or another to metal. So ... fine, ... I'm leaping onto whatever ... metallic music, what is it? What is the metallic in its relationship with music? It's more important than looking for what relationship there is between the blacksmith and the musician on the level of myths! Because the relationship between the blacksmith and the musician, Gypsy music ... in my opinion, we can only understand something in this if we proceed through certain hypotheses about metallurgical space.

And, and, and I am saying: how do metallurgical peoples live? Here, it's very ... With the same basic things, I would like to say: the dwelling, the sedentary dwelling, what is it? The sedentary dwelling, well, it's well known, in whatever form -- there is the forest dwelling, maybe even sedentary, semi-sedentary, there is the forest dwelling ... fine. There is also the dwelling, well… oh well, I… I tell myself, to complicate things -- but, furthermore, metallurgists will have all kinds of common groups (*franges*), not only with the imperial sedentary peoples, not only with the nomads, but also with forest peoples. And why? For some very simple reasons which are the relations between metal and wood; to make things melt, you need charcoal. The site of the

metallurgical enterprise is at the border of forests, the border of woods because they have to have some, some wood, and as a result, at the level of the dwelling itself, we will find ... neither forest forms nor metallurgical forms.

So, what do I call ... -- well, here I'm just talking ... the sedentary dwelling, it's up to you ... it goes from the palace to the house, okay ... --: what is the perfect metallurgical dwelling? The quintessential metallurgical dwelling is the hole. The metallurgist and metallurgical people -- in my opinion, I believe, and I believe this needs to be confirmed -- are the great cave people (*troglodytes*), and I believe that cave dwelling has been fundamental in the history of mankind. What is this? And currently, for example, [they are] peoples as metallurgical as those from which present-day Turkey descends. Turkey is still riddled with these ... these kinds of cave towns. You have to be particularly sensitive and even moved, but politically moved, by the kind of reactivation that occurs, where for example -- but I do not have enough information at all on that --: you know that Turkey currently is not only one of the most… one of the countries most in crisis and… who will… who will take in… in… in our current history, who will take over from… it will be the next country in which something fundamental is going to happen, I assume. Well, today's Turkey has -- like many other countries, by the way -- huge slums, right? Now in Turkey in particular, -- but I do not believe that this is the only case, I believe that there are cases also in South America, I believe -- in Turkey, there are huge cave dwelling slums, the cave dwelling of the Gypsies.

So, I am pointing out in order to return to… the precise question that… One of the greatest specialists on Gypsies,… and who was a professor at the Collège de France, is called [Jules] Bloch, b-l-o-c-h, and he wrote -- I am specifying all of this because… you all know the small collection *Que sais-je*? … which obviously is very, very uneven, but every now and then, there is a masterpiece, a masterpiece in this collection -- and this isn't complicated: it's Bloch… who, I believe, is one of… really one of the most profound men on Gypsies and metallurgical peoples and who… wrote the little *Que sais-je?* edition on the Gypsies.[138] And he insists a lot on… he says from the start -- in my memory: I did not reread the text, but I believe that this is true, that my memory must not be false -- it seems to me that he says a lot from the start: there are sedentary Gypsies, there are nomadic Gypsies, and in the end, this distinction is not absolutely relevant, applied to Gypsies.

That interests me a lot, you know, because it's as if… -- but he's the one who knows -- I could say: oh yeah, he proves me right. The distinction is irrelevant, it means: okay, there are… sedentary Gypsies; there are nomadic Gypsies. Why is it irrelevant, according to him? Because what matters are the meetings of the sedentary and the nomadic; it is the system of communication between each other: the great annual meetings, etc. And why? Because ultimately there is something deeper for them: they are sedentary or nomadic only secondarily, only secondarily; what they are first and foremost are cave dwellers (*troglodytes*). So, you will tell me: yes, but, ultimately, I can very well live in a sedentary house as if it were a hole, that is, as if it were a shelter (*gîte*). I can ... what does that mean: living in a house as if it were a hole?

So, I come back to my tale about forest-dwelling metallurgists: the huts of forest-dwelling metallurgists are very fascinating; me, that's where I would like to live; I ... I would like to be a forest-dwelling metallurgist. First, it's better because ... it's less ... less specialized, [*Laughter*] ...

you understand? He has a hut, so there he is really a woodsman: the hut is the woodsman's thing, and it's a hut buried within the earth. So, with all the… all the… intermediaries, sometimes buried… into the earth one-third, two-thirds, or even up to the roof, you will ask me: and the ventilation? Is the ventilation guaranteed? Yes, yes, yes, there are chimneys, there are hole chimneys. So, these huts are very odd ... me, that's what I would like, right, that's ... that's where I would like to live.

So, ask yourself ... If you want to know your way of ... being with space, you have to ask yourself things like that, see, what is it? We could do a test ... then you can create a ... a palace: at that point, you're on the despot's side, but that's not bad, everything is there. [*Laughter*] If you create yourself a kind of hole there, then think… I don't know if I referred to it last year… well, there's a great movie [by] Eisenstein, *Strike*. In *Strike*, you have the splendid images of a holey space. Basically, that is, for those who remember, this image is a very beautiful, very beautiful space, made entirely of holes, and in each hole, there is a disturbing creature there, who is planted, which emerges halfway ... the variety, there, of the positions of guys emerging from their holes, there, who are there like a kind of people who emerge, there ... so, a rather disturbing people, ... everything, all the themes are there… who emerges from the hole? The metallurgist, the beggar, ... that which is disturbing.[139]

So, I just want to end on ... Given all that, we ask: you understand, mythology is always a disaster, and even ethnography in some respects is a disaster, because everyone notices that ... the blacksmith always posed enormous problems, and myths show a kind of ambivalence regarding the blacksmith. We are told all the time: the blacksmith is both hated and respected, revered or sometimes hated, sometimes revered, or a little of both constantly, etc. We feel that this is not the way to pose problems. First, what blacksmith? The blacksmith, by nature, is double, he is a twin. When [Marcel] Griaule studies the status of the blacksmith among the Dogons, he shows that very well.[140] If the blacksmith, for example, is ... feared, it is not at all because he is impure, as some ethnologists try to explain. It's because -- it's for a completely different reason -- it's because he's double, so because he can marry himself, because he's incestuous, because he's twin-like.

And why is he a twin? He necessarily has two heads: he has a head on the side of the nomads, and a head on the side of the sedentary peoples, and it goes without saying that there is complicity between the two heads, that there are arrangements between the nomads' blacksmiths and the sedentary peoples' blacksmiths, otherwise we no longer understand anything about the arms trade in the ancient world. How do the nomads come to have the Chinese sword… the Chinese sword? So, the legendary story tells us: ah, it's because there was a Chinese deserter who went over to the Mongol side ... No, that's not possible. It is not possible. It's like the atomic bomb, you understand: to use the steel saber, and to remake, reproduce steel sabers, it is not enough to… to… leak the secret; you need an entire ... an entire infrastructure, you need blacksmiths, you need a metallurgy. So, good. So, the blacksmith is fundamentally twofold since he has a shelter (*un gîte*) with nomads, a shelter with sedentary peoples. But what makes it possible to say "the blacksmith" then, if he is double? The answer is quite simple: it is because he is secondarily double; his specificity as a blacksmith -- wherever he is, among nomads or among sedentary people -- is to create holes and inhabit a holey space, and unroll, invent, a holey space. There you go, yes, so did I answer the question?

A student: Yes, yes.

Various voices: [*Inaudible; a question about the reference to Toynbee*]

Deleuze: Toynbee… it's… it's his great book on history, right, so… there are two kinds: there is a book in ten… there is a ten-volume version, it is even better, but not translated, right! Not translated, and there is his big summary that he did himself, which is translated with the title *L'histoire*, by Gallimard.[141] What were you saying?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The architecture of?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes? Yes, yes, yes… Yes, yes, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. Yes, Yes, Yes. Yes. Yes.

A student: I can only make approximations, but ...

Deleuze: We're all there, right? … [*Laughter*]

Another student: It seems to me that someone who deals with space [*Inaudible*], very dissimilar spaces, and [*Inaudible*] together is Kafka, anyway! [*Inaudible*] The burrow… [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The holey space is Kafka, yes. Yes, Yes, Yes. And here I am asking myself: are there any Gypsies in Kafka?

The student: The singer [*Inaudible*] is a splendid text! [*Inaudible*] the singer is a mouse. I assure you that is fantastic.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah. Are there any forms of holey space with Kafka? I do not know…

The student: I think there are!

Deleuze: And also, we should think about painters, how painters proceed: are there spaces with holes in painting? I think there's all of that, fine. Anyway, think about it, there you go, good.

So, tell me, we still have to ... anyway, today we are finishing politics and the State; wherever we end up, we'll take it as finished. So, I am just adding ... good. I would like to know, in the third quarter, there's going to be the Easter holidays; there, in the third quarter ... do you have any requests?

A woman student (*sitting very close to Deleuze*): Yes.

Deleuze: Otherwise, I'll decide… Yes? What?

The student near Deleuze: I would like ... if you wanted to talk about abstraction in [Henri] Maldiney?

A student: Ah that guy!

The student near Deleuze: And then also… well, I don't know if it's really interesting, but also on… fuzzy set theory… in mathematics.

Deleuze: Oh yes! Ah that, that yes, then, that yes. … In fact, there, you are going in a direction that it is very possible for us to do, that you are proposing to me, insofar as I can, to the extent of my skills, that you are proposing to me a certain number of topics which interest some of you and which I deal with, either a topic in two sessions or in one session. We can do that. So… you, you said: yes, uh… a theory of so-called fuzzy sets… Yes, well, it's possible, … the theme of abstraction in painting and according to a contemporary author, Henri Maldiney[142] ...

The student near Deleuze: I would especially like that.

Deleuze: Yes, we can. Are there other things? Because I have to think about it during Easter. And Leibniz ...

The student near Deleuze: No! Not Leibniz, please!

Deleuze: Yes, I would rather like to do that… that would almost allow us to develop two, three sessions which would be… a pure introduction to a possible reading of Leibniz. It doesn't matter, for those who don't care, they wouldn't come!

A student: Well, everything is interesting.

Deleuze: For those who are interested, then I say: yes, there you go. We're going to do that, then. I am confiding in you for the third trimester, and at the beginning, I will do … I will do two or three sessions on Leibniz.[143]

The student: I like that.

Deleuze: So, those who might be attending these sessions, when we return from break, I ask them -- if they can, right, it's not absolutely essential, but all the same, it would be better – by Leibniz, you know, he's both an author who writes brilliant texts, but also a multitude of small

texts, small texts. He multiplies the small texts. Much of Leibniz's work is even letters, or even little pamphlets (*opuscules*), as they say. Now, among these little pamphlets, among the easiest to find, I refer to three, it would suffice for you to try to get through one of the three: *On the Radical Origin of Things* -- these little pamphlets, the smaller they are, the more he gives them admirable titles -- one is called *On the Radical Origin of Things*; another is called, it must be… I don't know, twenty pages! …

Student: Isn't it in [*Inaudible*] that was published in [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh sure, yes. Yes, yes, yes. ... The other is called *Monadology*, treatise on *Monadology* ...

The student near Deleuze: But this one is long.

Deleuze: No, it's ... forty pages ...

The student near Deleuze: Oh good! I must be confusing [something] ...

Deleuze: And another is the *Principles of Philosophy*, uh… *Princ*…, sorry: *Principles of Metaphysics, Principles of Metaphysics*.[144] So, it's not about ... I'm not telling you at all that you have to read all three, right! I'm not telling you anything; I appeal to your professional conscience: it is better to read one. On the other hand, these are so beautiful ... So, it doesn't matter that you don't understand, right! [*Laughter*] I really care about… No, no, no… it's…. The question, I assure you, regarding philosophy texts, the question is not at all: do you understand? Because the question is above all: what appeals to you in the texts? You may very well feel that something appeals to you without yet understanding it. And you'll only understand if you have first grasped something that appeals to you. In that way, he has ... he's like a painter: he has his style, Leibniz ... if the style appeals to you, it's ... it's because this is something for you to get involved in. Fine. So, the little yellow [administrative] sheets for UV [course credit], you will take them at the end, and then you will give them back to me ... after ... when we come back from break, for those who want to take the seminar.

So, I'll finish very quickly, because we've had enough of this, all of this, we've had plenty, I apologize, this whole politics and the State thing. … Ah yes! I was asked to do something on *The Idiot*!

A student: Oh yes!

Deleuze: On the subject of the idiot, which indeed is a very, very important theme in ...

The student: The idiot, generally!

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The student near Deleuze: No, not at all.

Deleuze: What is an idiot? Yes.

The student: That's wonderful.

Deleuze: And why did the Russians take that, gave… to the character of the idiot this dimension, whereas it comes from Christianity, this character?

A student: [*Inaudible*; *he suggests that another professor had considered this topic recently*]

Deleuze: Did he do that? Ah no, then, ah no, ah no. Ah well, I did not know that. Ah well, too bad, a subject… Well, if there is already some students who spent a whole semester on *The Idiot*, … I mean, the subjects are so numerous in the world: there's no point in taking them up… No, it's not that I would say the same thing, but it's that, it's that… well… no? So, ok.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: And you, did you take the seminar? [*The student indicates that he attended the seminar*; *laughter*] Well, well, you'll discuss it! You'll discuss it! We would create a mix (*mélange*)? Right? The idiot…. So then, we'll see.

There we are. So, I am pointing out, to follow up on this "politics and State" topic, at the point we have reached, that… there is material for… in yesterday's issue of *Libération*, there is a very interesting text, at least for us, on the point that we've reached, which is precisely, when I was talking about the development of forms of temporary work, subcontracting, precarious work, in the central countries, there is a long text that I find very good ... on the organization of subcontracting and temporary work in the Dassault companies, right, so I think that ... this corresponds, this goes so well with what we were trying to analyze, that … Those who have… who have read it, read it again or… and indeed, it's quite curious, because… no, I don't have time to go back over that.

A student: But in Hegel, he created a philosophy of law, a philosophy of history, but he did not create political philosophy; there is no politics in Hegel! On politics ... politics ... would you like, have you seen the term "politics" in Hegel once?

Deleuze: Have I seen the term "politics" in Hegel once?

The student: Do you see the legal [*Inaudible*]? You see the history, you don't see the problem? The political position?

Deleuze: No, indeed, that's not a Hegelian notion, no ...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: … maybe not, I don't know. Isn't there a Hegelian here?

A student near Deleuze: Who's is it that ...?

Deleuze: Well then? So, you remember that in this “politics-State” topic, … we were just trying to indicate some headings, right, to come to an end of this. And we saw a first heading "addition-subtraction of axioms", a second heading, "the saturation of an axiomatic", or, more precisely, the very particular nature, the paradoxical nature of the limit, when the limit is an immanent limit, that is, a limit not encountered from the outside but produced by the system. [*Pause*]

Third heading, we have seen: "the question of models of realization in an axiomatics", namely the models of realization, in a global axiomatic of capital, being the States themselves, hence the question in this third heading: in what sense can we say that these States, that the various forms of State, are isomorphic or not with respect to the axiomatic, with henceforth all kinds of bipolarity: bipolarity between the central States, second bipolarity between capitalist States and socialist-bureaucratic States, third bipolarity between States in the center [and] States of the periphery? Okay, that’s where we were.

I say very quickly: fourth heading. This time, in relation to an axiomatic, this would be the question of power (*puissance*). And where does this question of power come from? Well… it's very different from the others -- that's why these are headings, but once again, you have to add, you can add, you can mix… -- I am saying: it's a different heading because what I would like to group under the title "the power heading" is ultimately the relationship of this axiomatic of capital to an actual war machine. And why is this the question of power? This is because, at the level of any axiomatics, we are told that the axiomatic is in relation to a certain power which goes beyond it, as if [the axiomatic] itself exuded, as if an axiomatic was fundamentally engaged with a power which nevertheless exceeds it.

Why would an axiomatic have to be fundamentally engaged with a power that emerges from it and yet exceeds it? The theoretical answer, the abstract answer, is relatively simple: it is that every axiomatic necessarily has models of realization in what are called denumerable sets, whether these sets are finite or infinite, that is, sets whose elements are denumerable.[145] [*Pause*]

And there are powers that refer to … non-denumerable sets, for example -- the simplest example -- for example, in mathematics, it is the power of the continuous. I would say, for example, that the series of integers is an infinite set, or the series of even integers is an infinite set as well, but it is infinite denumerable sets, so denumerable that you can even say that the series of integers is double the series of even integers. The power of the continuous, namely the power that refers to all the points on a line, it [the line] is not denumerable. Okay, let's suppose like ... -- that's the subject of theorems in axiomatic in mathematics -- let's suppose that a certain power of the continuous escapes axiomatic treatment, and yet, in a certain way, the confrontation of the axiomatic with this power, however inevitable, founded in the axiomatic itself: this is what I am calling the topic of power.

And I am saying a very simple thing: this is somewhat, if you will, the relationship of capitalism with its own war machine. It seems to me, under current conditions, not at all times. Everything happens as if the modern war machine -- well, all these are hypotheses, well, it is not so much … [*He does not finish the sentence*] It seems to me… the more we proceed, the more it's really time to stop --, … everything is happening as if the modern war machine, that is, let’s say, since World War II, since the Second World War -- but there were principles before, there were

premises before -- everything happens as if it had somehow become autonomized, but in a very special way, that is, as if [the war machine] was witnessing a power of the axiomatic which nevertheless went beyond the axiomatic itself. What does that mean?

You still remember those Clausewitz concepts that I tried to propose because they seem very, to me very enlightening for understanding anything at all about the problem of war.[146] This is because, just like capital -- since we saw this the last time -- just like capital, and this is undoubtedly the deepest link between war and capital, just like capital, war has an aim and an objective, and that the two are not the same thing. [*Pause*] And that the aim of war is the political aim pursued by the warring State or States, while the objective is the immanent objective of war, which Clausewitz defines as overthrowing or annihilating the adversary. I'm saying that, for a long time, we could almost define pre-capitalist wars like this: by saying that in pre-capitalist wars, the aim and the objective receive a kind of ... agreement, a variable and fairly well-determined agreement, namely: war continues its… -- war as war -- pursues its objective: to overthrow the adversary, under the condition of an aim, namely: to overthrow the adversary in order to obtain such and such a thing, for example, to conquer a province, to gain an economic market -- there are already trade wars (*guerres commerciales*) --, etc., etc. And to overthrow the adversary, that can mean all kinds of things, it depends on what way one identifies the adversary according to the aim: sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be to destroy the enemy army, sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be… [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 24]

**Part 2**

… it works like this. The first sign of ... At that moment, the war machine is indeed caught up in the State apparatus: in fact, the objective which refers to the war machine is subordinated to the political aim which refers to the political aim of the State that makes war.

What occurred when the war tended to become total? I believe that one can, in fact, assign a tendency to total war from the moment when capitalism seizes the war machine and gives it development, material development, fundamental material development since it is even in this way that nomads -- who until then were the autonomous war machine --, it is through this that nomads will be dispossessed and will perish.

Well, what happens is that when the war tends to become total, at the same time the objective and the aim, it seems to me, tend to enter into a kind of contradictory relation. There is a tension between objective and aim. Why? This can already be seen with Napoleon: the main elements of ... the first great establishment of a total war is obviously the Napoleonic wars; everyone says it; it's ... it's a triviality. It won't get resolved: the second big step in total war is the 1914-18 war. The third great stage of total war is fascism. And what is there ... what is there ... in common with these three stages? It is ultimately, I believe, the declaration of a kind of tension, of contradiction between the political aim and the objective ... and the warlike objective. Why? Because as the war becomes total, the objective -- to use Clausewitz's term: overthrowing of the adversary -- knows no bounds. The adversary can no longer be identified with the fortress to be taken, with the enemy army to be defeated; it is the whole people and the whole habitat. It is the entire enemy people, at the same time as, from the perspective of the country which ... of the

other country that is pursuing the war, that is waging war, it is the entire [enemy] people who are invited. So, the objective -- to overthrow the adversary -- becomes such that the adversary can no longer be identified, assimilated to something definite, but becomes the totality of the enemy people, the totality of the enemy habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited, and that's total war.

You see, that's why the misinterpretations that are sometimes made about Clausewitz are based on a very specific point: when Clausewitz defined the objective of the war as annihilating the adversary, some, too hastily, say: ah well, Clausewitz is the creator of the concept of total war. Not at all: annihilating the… the adversary is what Clausewitz calls not "total war", but "absolute war", and [the] Clausewitzian absolute war has nothing to do with to do with total war, since Clausewitzian absolute war – namely, the objective: to overthrow or annihilate the adversary -- receives a variable figure according to what the adversary is identified with. To overthrow the adversary can once again be taking a fortress, and then that's it. But war becomes total when the overthrow or annihilation bears on the entire enemy people and the entire habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited; why? It's never ending.

And I recall the texts which seem to me the best,… analysis of… this… of fascism -- but in a way, it was already obvious for Napoleon – when, for example,… Hannah Arendt does not stop saying that in her book on totalitarianism… -- so it doesn't matter that, for her, she identifies totalitarianism and fascism -- but what she says, in my opinion, only applies to fascism, and not to everything for totalitarianism.[147] It is obvious that fascism can only be defined like this: not by a State apparatus -- the State apparatus, she shows this very well, in the analysis of fascist institutions, is a kind of facade, it's a kind of facade, it's an office (*bureau*) behind which there is always another office --. What fundamentally defines fascism is the initiation of a movement that has no other end (*fin*) than the movement, that is, the unlimited objective. A movement which has no other end than movement, therefore, which has no other end than its own acceleration, is precisely the movement of absolute destruction. So that is very, very important in Hannah Arendt's book.

The student near Deleuze: [*Inaudible*; *question on the reference to Arendt*]

Deleuze: It was translated into French under the title, I believe *Totalitarisme*, at the Seuil. And that fits very well with [Paul] Virilio's analyzes of the fascist State.[148] It also overlaps with texts from ... Hitler's lieutenants, or Hitler himself, when they invoke a movement with no destination or purpose. The movement without destination or purpose is the movement of pure destruction, that is, it is the movement of total war.

So, I'm just saying: at that moment, you understand, there is a sort of autonomization of the war machine in relation to the State apparatus, and it's true that fascism is not a State apparatus. Moreover, I would say, to complicate matters, all that goes too much without saying: it is not enough for the military to take power somewhere for a war machine to become autonomous. In totalitarian regimes, strictly speaking, it is often the military who have the power: it is not at all a "war machine" regime! Not at all, on the contrary: it is a totalitarian regime in the sense that there is one of them that says: the minimum State.[149]

But the fascist State is quite another thing! The fascist State is -- and precisely, it is not by chance that the fascists were not soldiers --. A General Staff, when it takes power, it can create a totalitarian regime; a fascist regime, [that's] much less certain. A fascist regime is ... it's ... it's such a ... twisted idea ... it's not even the military, that. The German General Staff was ... in the end, it was ... it would have liked to have been in power, but Hitler got there ahead of them. So, there could have been all the arrangements that one wanted, one cannot say that fascism is an emanation of the German General Staff. It is the emanation of ... something quite, quite different.

And this is where we see a war machine that becomes autonomous in relation to the State, hence once again Virilio's very good idea: the fascist state is a suicidal state. Of course, it is about killing others, but one will consider one's own death -- and this is the truly fascist theme of living death -- one will regard one's own death as the crowning death of others. You find that … in fact, it's, that is ... you find it in all fascisms. Totalitarianism is not that at all, right? It's a lot more… how would I say, it's a lot more "petit bourgeois", totalitarianism; it's a lot more conservative! Well, little matter, we've already seen all that.

I am saying: that, all that, is rather a way to answer a question which, in a certain way, with hindsight of the years, seems less and less obvious to us: why the hell did the United States prefer to ally itself with Stalin's Russia, with the Stalinist USSR, rather than coming to an understanding with Hitler? We tell ourselves: after all, well, once it's done, we tell ourselves: fine ... this is not so obvious; at the beginning, it was not so obvious, even at the level of the allies, at the level of England and France, right! Everyone knows how there was an interesting political pattern, namely: they attacked… they attacked… fascist Germany [unleashed] itself… on Russia! That was interesting, … well, it might have happened!

To the question "in the end, why did the tendency toward an alliance with the Stalinist regime rather than with the Hitler regime win out?" I think the answer is relatively simple: it is that the allies must have had, I suppose, the impression rather quickly that in the fascist regime, there was the autonomization of a war machine which finally, at the extreme, was uncontrollable by capital -- I am assuming, right? This is a hypothesis, like that, ... a very abstract hypothesis, perhaps an idiotic hypothesis, fine --, and that finally, the Stalinist regime or the bureaucratic socialist regime was able to give capital much greater security and guarantees. If you will, it's awful to… to say, it seems to me, but… what is awful to say is that in the fascist movements, there is a mass characteristic of which the countries capitalists must have been very wary, a sort of mass movement, a movement appealing to a kind of ... of ... "we'll get you, we'll destroy the world, and then we'll kill ourselves afterwards." There is something, there is a kind of machine there, of movement ... of movement for movement.

And one of the strongest points in Hannah Arendt's book is when she shows that the more the Nazis saw that they were going to lose the war -- they sense this very quickly, right? --, far from this ever being for them a motive to stop, or to moderate the movement, it is a motive to precipitate it. They can only endure, they can only postpone the outcome, namely the loss of the war, by accelerating the war; they cannot do otherwise. If this hypothesis is correct, I believe that this is the most profound reason why the allies made the alliance with the Stalinist regime and not with the regime… because, in other respects, they would have preferred much more to make the alliance with the regime… with the Nazi regime.

So there we have this very, very odd situation, right, where the objective of war, when the war becomes total, the objective of war becomes unlimited and, at that moment, comes into conflict with the political aims that a State apparatus pursued through war up to that point. How to bridge this abyss? Well, in fact, that's what's been said, and that is, that's what Virilio, it seems to me again, analyzes so well about the contemporary war machine. Where the fascists also,… were only… precursors, where the Nazis were only precursors, it's because they had constituted a kind of autonomy of the war machine, with a whole economic regime subordinated to this war machine, subordinated to armaments, etc.; they had done all that. But they still needed this war machine to be realized in wars. In other words, they kept something of the old approach, namely war will be the materialization of the war machine.

So, what I'm saying is very much a summary due to trying to shape (*tailler*) some notions, some concepts; I don't mean to say that today it's not like that. The war machine today, well, it's obvious, it pursues wars as well. It also needs ... it's obvious, we see that all the time. And I'm saying that nonetheless, there is something that has changed: it doesn't need this in the same way. I would say: we tend towards the following situation – in order to be careful, right? -- we tend towards the following situation in which the modern war machine no longer even needs to materialize itself or, at the extreme, no longer even needs to be materialized in real wars, for it would be the war machine itself which would be war materialized. In other words, the war machine does not even need to have wars as its object, since it discovers its object in a peace of terror. It has conquered its most extreme object, adequate to its total character, namely: peace.

Which implies what? Obviously, which implies all the catastrophic, apocalyptic visions of today. So, don't make me say that there is no more war: of course, there are still wars, but these wars have become parts of the peace itself! And what did the concept of "Cold War" mean if not that? The concept of "Cold War" meant, it seems to me, explicitly the state of a war machine which, for whatever reasons, no longer tended to be materialized -- except through ever possible accidents, we are told -- no longer tended to be materialized in a war, in a real war, but was in itself and by itself a materialized war, which already led many American authors to say for a long time, well, the Third World War, we are there; it has already started. Hence all of Virilio's remarks in this regard appear to me to be correct, when Virilio assigns and offers the following characteristics: this new war machine, which I call power (*puissance*), therefore, you see its relation with capitalism: at once how capitalism does not control it and how, at the same time, capitalism is in a fundamental relation with it, in a relation of fundamental confrontation with it; so, the characteristics indicated by Virilio, again, it is this war machine taking peace for its object and no longer war.

Henceforth, it's the whole topic of the enemy -- second trait -- it's the whole topic of the enemy that changes. The enemy becomes any enemy whatsoever (*l'ennemi quelconque*), and this is really an axiomatic notion, that of any enemy whatsoever. [*Pause*] This war machine acquires a power to capitalize, how to say this, a knowledge, and not just a knowledge: an almost unlimited scientific and technological power, [*Pause*] following which the tendency for the very distinctions between war and peace diminish, tend to disappear. Hence, finally, comes the general phenomenon of the militarization of civilian functions, particularly by assigning any object whatsoever which is anyone, anything. It could just as well be locusts on a radar screen, as ... as three Indians in a row, as ... as ... a rocket, as ... all of that. There, there is an odd cave

dwellers thing; so, I tell myself: in modern profession, yes, right! Atomic submarines ... what it is about these guys living there ... living in ... sheltering in the submarine, right? And what ... how do their eyes appear, right? Or they look at the radars where they see it as some kind of cloud to be interpreted, okay. Are they… are they… crabs? Or are these some enemies approaching? Well, ultimately, it's the any enemy whatsoever. Fine, there you go.

See, there you have it, all that ... I will try to group under this fifth heading, and in fact, how is this war machine the equivalent of some kind of power of the continuous? It is that at the level of this war machine -- and here I am thinking of ... once again, of texts by Paul Virilio which explain this, which develop this very, very well -- it is that all the points of space, however distant they may be, are put into contact, "are put into contact", that is, all the points of space exist in a topological neighborhood: however distant they may be physically and geometrically, they are in a topological neighborhood. This is called the age of nuclear war.

And it is obvious that, if nuclear war is presented to us as a kind of limit of… of… of… apocalypse, etc., it is almost in the sense… It would be necessary to compare, if you will, my heading 4, here, "Power", and heading 2, "saturation" since, there, the apocalypse of nuclear war is exactly the limit. This corresponds entirely with the limit of our other register, register 2, regarding saturation. This is an immanent limit: if it takes on the apocalyptic aspect, it is because, in another way, not quite at the limit, it is exercised as such already! It is exercised entirely as such: it does not stop pushing its limit, but at the same time, it is this [limit] which draws the new map of the world which, in fact, is a map that is no longer a geographical map, but a topological map, with the most distant points in contact. Good, there we are. So, that works, that works very well… Phew, what time is it? Right, I might have to stop before ...

A student: A quarter to...

Deleuze: What?

Various voices: A quarter to twelve.

Deleuze: What, before noon, what?

Various voices: A quarter to twelve.

Deleuze: Oh, no! So… good, good. So, at this point, it looks like everything is going for the worst. We tell ourselves: no matter how much we look at our registers, if you are ... our articles. Article 1: well, this is not great; if one has the choice between totalitarianism and social democracy, this offers no joy. Article 2, saturation, that kind of sneaky limit which recedes as one approaches it, and which is secreted by the system, it is ... it is not a delight, it is not … Isomorphy as models of realization of the same axiomatic, this is hopeless, all that! Power, the power of a war machine of this type, which no longer even needs war because it is, it is itself material war, materialized war! This is... this is even sadder, right! So, that's why I had planned for the possibility that we all head to bed there… [*Laughter*] because if… if the time were…!

But now, what's left, of course, is much harder: the articles that might bring us hope! ... Well, you see, this is ... I almost have the impression, here, I dare not tell you, because it is up to you to fabricate your hopes! So, I'm just trying to… to say… well, here it is, I'll say it: you understand, once again, all that we tried to do here had a very, very modest rule: it's not because we… we are trying… I don't believe, in any case, myself, I'm not good at… it's not because we are trying to think globally that we aren't more pretentious than… than [thinking] locally. It's obvious that the political problems today, well, they're global, right? It is not harder to think globally than at the level of one's village, because, once again,… this is… this is one of the points -- here we must pay tribute to Régis Debray on this point, because that I believe that he is one of the few to point this out with obstinacy --:[150] that really means nothing to… to speak about Europe today if one does not take into account, well, … economies subject to everything that European regimes assume as third world enslavement, enslavement, etc., and… and all the problems that… whatever they are, education problems in France, well, refer to global determinations. This is too obvious. So, thinking globally isn't even a special effort, right?

So, I am saying: I am proposing a fifth article, like that, a fifth article -- always in my concern to insist on this parallelism axiomatic, or this "axiomatic-capitalism" co-presence -- I would say, well, everyone knows -- you remember, we saw it when we were interested in what an axiomatic is in science, precisely in order to be able to arrive at this graph -- I had insisted on this, it's that: an axiomatic is not only confronted with a higher power, of the type "power of the continuous" type -- that we have just seen --, but it is also confronted with very particular types of propositions that axiomaticians have called -- constrained and forced -- "undecidable propositions".[151] So that's it: it's the first ... the first little bit of hope, for me, is that the capitalist axiomatic, or capitalism as axiomatic, does not cease generating undecidable propositions. And we will see what undecidable propositions are: these are not at all propositions faced with which we are left, like that, telling ourselves: oh well, what are we going to do? These are propositions which are the direct object of all companies -- I am not saying the certain triumph -- but which are the direct object of all companies and all revolutionary positions.

In fact, what is it, then, in this miserable parallel, what is an undecidable proposition in an axiomatic? Suppose that, in any axiom whatsoever, you collide -- for reasons ... it doesn't matter, I tried to state them very briefly, I will not come back to this -- you collide with propositions which you cannot demonstrate whether they are true or false, propositions which concern this domain, and you cannot prove that they are true or false. They belong to the domain of indemonstrability, very annoying, because these propositions are not axioms, and they are not theorems either, since a theorem is basically a proposition which you prove to be true or false by dint of the axioms of the corresponding axiomatic, and as a function of those axioms. There, as a function of the axioms of the corresponding axiomatic, you cannot do so: the proposition is undecidable.

And to be true or false, this seems a requirement of all knowledge or any understanding well known under the name of: the … excluded third, namely a proposition is true or not-true, or between the true and the non-true, there is no third. I would say that an undecidable proposition is the subject of an included third; as a result, I can call my fifth heading, or my fifth article, I can call it, here, in relation to the axiomatic of capital: "the included third, or undecidable propositions." Well, what would that be? And I am saying that, once again, undecidable

propositions are only very relatively undecidable since they are the object, or they constitute the material of any enterprise, therefore, of any revolutionary decision. It is precisely the fact that they are undecidable in relation to the axiomatic that makes them belong to an entirely different system than the axiomatic, and that they are subject to an entirely different process than those of the axiomatic of capital.

So, the axiomatic of capital can always be able to attempt to deal with it; I mean, it can always try to constitute the axioms that refer to these propositions, yes. Or else, another way in which it could deal with them -- and that would perhaps explain this somewhat obscure story of power that we just saw earlier -- is extermination, [*Pause*] applying to them the power of destruction which makes their object no longer exist. But here we see, for one reason or another, the two methods by which axioms could recover these undecidable propositions or included thirds do not work. Why doesn't this work? Because axioms may be added, there is a certain type of proposition into which axioms do not take hold (*ne mordent pas dessus*). That's how it is. We will see; I have not yet tried to say what these propositions were.

Or else, the other case ... the other case ... the other case: we could apply to them the destructive power in a pure state, that is, the war machine, wham! All that ... like that, we no longer discuss it. Well then, no, no, no. No, why? Because even the fundamental phenomenon of modern axiomatics, namely the existence of camps, never provided a definitive solution from the axiomatic point of view. I mean, the camps multiply the people locked up there rather than suppress them. Just as organized hunger, organized famine, multiplies the hungry more than it kills people, it does both: it kills people and, at the same time, it multiplies them surprisingly. To me, the camps seem to be… something evident: far from bringing what we called a "radical solution" to one problem or another, namely: no more Jews, no more homosexuals, etc., oddly enough, that causes the victims to swarm forth.

A student: What if the whole world becomes one camp?

Deleuze: If the whole world becomes a single camp? This is ... this is the answer of power, yes; what is happening? Yes. Is it possible? Yes, it is possible, yes. I tell myself: what makes us think that this would be a false conception that would be required, if you will, to be able to say: well, it's very simple, after all… they would only have to make the whole world into a single camp; that would only be possible if we did not take into account this very particular nature of the limit. The whole world as a one and single camp, that would indeed be the limit. In fact, at that point, there wouldn't be so many problems, right. But it turns out that the whole mechanism of the limit, from the point of view of this axiomatic of capital that we have just seen, is a limit that does not cease to be produced in order to be, at the same time, perpetually pushed back. It is by virtue, it seems to me -- here, I would answer this question that ... whose meaning I understand well: it is an almost entirely logical question -- ... I would answer yes, that would only be possible if the limit did not have the nature that we tried to discern earlier, and that Marx already announced as the limit of capital. But finally, we cannot exclude anything, right! At that point, there would be no more hope; at that point, we would stop ... there you go.

A student: Is there the camp center of the and the camp of the periphery? Would it be different?

Deleuze: There would still be two! [It's] not certain because they could say: there is a good chance that ... in a certain period of time, the situation of the center and the situation of the periphery become more and more relativized. It is not a question of… This is my only difference – myself, I learned everything of… regarding… regarding these problems from Samir Amin --[152] but my only difference, what I'm not convinced of in Samir Amin's thesis is that the current, the current differences of the "Third World" situation, and of the "center" situation, in the great "center-periphery" opposition as he paints a political and economic picture of it, to me, this is … it seems to me to fade away more and more, or to be called upon to fade away. There, we will end up in a "periphery-center" system of a completely different nature; for Samir Amin, I mean, the "center-periphery" distinction still operates under strictly geographic conditions. I believe that it is called upon -- it may still be true -- but that it is called upon to lose this localized geographic determination.

So, what I mean is, if… so let's suppose… this… good… I mean: let's get to the important question anyway, then: what are these undecidable propositions, or rather, what is their impact? Well, you remember -- here, I can go fast because these are just hopes, so we don't talk about hopes --,… you remember… regarding archaic empires, we tried to identify a kind of law. We were saying: the archaic empire is an ap ... it is an over-coding apparatus, it overcodes flows. Good. And… oddly -- and there, I was criticized, in fact justifiably, but that doesn't matter… -- we had tried to identify a movement, a vector, and we were saying -- what we can understand, vaguely, in that way, I am not going to reanalyze these points -- we managed to say: yes, but be careful, when an over-encoding device -- that is, which is established above codes, above territorial codes -- when an over-coding apparatus is established, in the form of an imperial State device… [*Deleuze sniffs something in the air*] Oh, that smells like dope, right? [*Laughter*]

Claire Parnet: It smells like something's burning.

Deleuze: There, I had a sniff, eh! [*Laughter*] I had a sniff! Yes, uh… uh… yes, yes, yes.

Well ... but what was...? Yes: when an overcoding apparatus is established, yes, well, as much…, it undoubtedly overcodes the flows, that is, over the territorial codes, it adds another code which is the code… the imperial overcoding. And we were saying: but in doing so, it will trigger something absolutely new, namely as a kind of fluxion of decoded flows. It does not overcode coded flows without also causing the flowing of decoded flows that it initiates itself. And we tried to analyze it at the precise level of how private property is formed within the archaic empire.

If you remember that, I mean: it's not the same vector, and yet it looks a lot like it, the one I would like to propose now. In fact, it is no longer about archaic empires, it is about the axiomatic of capital. And I am saying all that, precisely, quite simply, I am saying: well, there would almost be an equivalent vector, namely, you remember that, we had defined the axiomatic of capital as a generalized conjugation of decoded flows -- this is very important -- especially of two great basic decoded flows, at the basis of capitalism, namely the flow of labor and the flow of wealth, two distinct flows. It was the conjugation. They were decoded in the form of abstract wealth, and labor… and independent labor. Capital was the conjugation of these decoded flows as decoded. Fine. Well, I would say now: if the axiomatic is a general conjugation of decoded

flows, the axiomatic does not operate this conjugation without causing to flow at the same time, and without inciting, and at the extreme, without itself creating, arousing, opposing to oneself, some flows which escape conjugation, that is, which cannot be axiomatized, which are not axiomatizable. [*Pause*]

What are the four great rebel flows? We have only to consider the declarations of the grand capitalists; they say it all the time, for example, [Robert] McNamara's speech to the World Bank,[153] all that, they come back to it all the time: the four great flows, right, which… which are really of an undecidable nature from the point of view of capitalist axioms. These are: flows of raw materials, flows of food materials, flows of population, flows of urbanization-slums. We must agree: in what sense are they not controllable? That means: by virtue of the nature of the limit, the immanent limit that capitalism creates, even if it means constantly shifting it, these flows, these flows are always at the tangent to the axiomatic of the system and of something irreducible. We cannot axiomatize them. These are basically propositions that will have to be called "undecidable propositions". [*Pause*] Why? Because it's the system of capital that produces them, it's the capital system that produces them just like hunger in Brazil, as have seen from Linhart last week, right![154] It is the system that produces them but produces them as its own limit. It produces them as its own limit such that they resist axiomatization.

So, there is ... there is something really undecidable: what will that become? There is something undecidable, in what sense? It's that, at that point, capitalism can only recover them perpetually by some sort of leap. As we have seen, this is the kind of formula, this is the law "depreciation of existing capital" in relation to which these flows were not capable of being tamed, "creation of new capital" which will attempt to appropriate them, or control them. But, as soon as the new creation of capital has taken place, things are flowing again. So, these undecidable propositions, I would say, are the lines of flight of the system, and -- I'm just recalling what we've seen in other years --… which is, if you will, the… the point at which… one of the points where I would feel really uncomfortable in… in a "classic"… Marxist thought, if you will -- is that for me, once again, a system or a social field is not defined by its contradictions. You will tell me: it is almost the same, but not quite; for me, it is defined fundamentally by what flows in there, along its lines of flight. And in my opinion, lines of flight are not quite the same thing, they are not at all the same as contradictions.

And the axiomatic of capital does not operate this conjugation of flows, without at the same time giving rise to flows that never cease to escape it. So, once again, there are four levels, and it's not the recreation of capital, it's not the recreation of a new capital, which will manage the control of flows, because the recreation of capital will impress its axiomatic on a particular type of proposition which will be axiomatized, for example: the nuclear industry, fine, but through that something else will escape.

So, these lines of flight, obviously, are ... I would say, ultimately, the revolutionary expression, what would it be if we dreamed? The revolutionary expression, if you agree, there -- it's… it's just in order to establish some notions, right, some terms, ok, it's… in order to reach a kind of minimum of rigor, solely in words --, I would say: if ... if you grant me that the axiomatic is really to conjugate flows, it is the conjugation of flows, or the generalized conjunction of flows, I would say, we must distinguish the connection and conjugation, and even oppose them.

Connections must be opposed to axiomatic conjunctions. The connections are the relations – so these types of relations should be defined -- the eventual relations between undecidable flows. What would that mean, to establish relations between this flow ... which have as common ... which have in common to draw lines of flight in the system, and which can be ... flows but entirely different? It can be -- I take, then -- it can be flows of materials, it can be flows… of urbanization, it can be flows of women, it can be flows… of artistic creation, etc. What would these connections be?

This is where I come back to this topic -- to plunge myself again into mathematics, but not to mathematize anything at all -- when some mathematicians opposed to the claims of axioms something they themselves called "constructivism" or "constructionism", namely a calculation of problems, that they specified. Because finally, we should perhaps delete the word "calculation" which is too ... planned, but finally: these undecidable flows, these undecidable propositions, these lines of flight, which are undecidable in the sense that we do not know at all how they can turn, we do not know what their revolutionary charge is. Yes, we do! Someone knows, since they are not so undecidable: those who make the decision to create a revolutionary material from it, because it is possible. These people know; they don't know if they'll win, they don't know, right. But anyway, it's not at all so undecided then, the undecidable. What is undecidable is the objective character of a certain type of event or flow in the social field. And in fact, after all, capitalist axiomatic is an axiomatic, but what it can predict is extraordinarily tiny.

And I am saying: if we grant these kinds of constant undecidable propositions in a social field, can we say that it is ... -- well yes, there would be an answer here, we ... we saw it the last time -- what would this be through which the Third World would oppose a sort of force of resistance to this global axiomatic? Yes, we saw for what reason; in fact, Samir Amin evaluates the possibilities of resistance of the Third World, precisely by virtue of the fact that, at all these levels, the flows of raw materials, the alimentary flows, the flows… including the flows of famine, the flows of urbanization-slums, constitute undecidable propositions.

But what I am insisting on once again, well, that's what I was saying earlier: it's all the more important for us, all that, that I believe in a vector in this axiomatic whereby the situation in the so-called countries of the center and the situation in the Third World countries, of course not becoming homogeneous -- that ... it is not a question of homogeneity -- but can become isomorphic, in their own way. The current tendency, if you will, we had identified a tendency specific to the situation of the Third World, and that for a long time, namely the fundamental existence of a neo-slavery type labor, by calling this labor "neo-slavery" which is perfectly ... and which belongs perfectly to capitalism, which is incited by capitalism, but which is no longer even defined, and which can no longer even be defined by the category of salaried workers. Even when there is a salary, the salary is so tiny, or the price of food is so high, that the guy can't buy anything. So, it is not even wage labor when there is an appearance of wage labor. Nor are they archaic remnants, since it is adapted to the most modern capitalism, since it occurs in the midst of the large, highly industrialized capitalist plantations; it occurs in ... oil factories -- it's like temporary work at Dassault, well, ... we can't say that these are remnants or archaisms -- they are forms absolutely adapted to the situation, to actual capitalism, to modern capitalism, this surge of underground labor, contract labor, contingency labor, which once again, was, for the first time analyzed in Europe and reported by the Italians. And why by the Italians? Because the Italians

were the first economy in a country of the center to operate on this basis, we realize, ten or twenty years later, that it is happening to us.

And… it does reach us, in fact … and we are told that this is a crisis: we know very well that this is not a crisis. We know very well that, even if it means predicting, ... -- and I realize that but ... that ... all of this is full of hope -- even if it means predicting, we feel that we are heading towards an abolition of wage labor. And what will that mean, an abolition of wage labor? It will obviously not be the destruction of capitalism, not at all, not at all, not at all. Capital will remain as a relation of production, even if [*Pause*] it disappears or even if it takes another form as a mode of production: the relation of production will still be capital and determined by capital. The mode of production will no longer be capitalist, that is, will no longer consist of wage labor. It will consist of what must be called "neo-feudalism" or, more exactly -- because they are not the same thing: feudalism and slavery, obviously --, "neo-slavery". And it will be: underground work, temporary work, subcontracting work, which will not be especially… there will be, there could be a maintained form of "salary", but in fact, it will no longer work like that, it won't work like that anymore.

You will ask me: how will it work? Well, you may well have the coexistence of two regimes, at the level of production methods, and we could have "the appearance of a wage earner"; you give a guy a pittance, and then at the same time, on this poverty salary, you force him, for example, to spend it in ... what we call that ... in stores ... in the company stores,… fine. And, on the other hand, part of the salary too, instead of being given in money, will be given, for example, as free meals, right. On the other hand, it will not be people from the company, in the form of employees, since it is a mobile workforce -- you see, again, the article ... we talked about this last time, but … You see the detail of the analysis, there, in what Dassault is doing now, recently, but once again, in Italy, it has already been done that way for twenty years. -- In Third World countries, you see, or see… the little, if you remember, of what… the passages I read from Linhart's book, in Italy, and in… -- shit… [*Deleuze momentarily forgets the reference*] -- in South America, for a long time, in large agricultural or fruit companies, there has been a kind of form where there is a pittance, and then ... the store, the fruit company store, for example, that… who gives things to the guys and then… when the harvest is over, well, they go back to their slums, etc. We can no longer call it the wage system; you have to call it what it is: it's a ... either a new name would need to be found, or to call it perfectly contemporary neo-slavery. In the phrase "slavery," there is something disturbing, of course; it feels like it is, once again, a remnant. It is absolutely not a remnant, it is a completely new form, but it is no longer wage labor.

And so… good: I am choosing an example of connection. If I say: ok, "students and Third World, it's the same thing", what does that mean? "Students and Third World, it's the same thing", that does not mean that it is the same thing, but even if it means finding a revolutionary isomorphy, since it seemed to us that there was an isomorphy of "State" forms in relation to the axiomatic, what defines revolutionary connections? This is because students as a category were also among the first categories to pass, to be entirely marginalized in the sense of -- and this is not over -- in the sense of: subcontracting labor, temporary labor, labor ... starting with positions in education, right, where the forms of temporary labor very, very quickly took on enormous, enormous importance. And I am just saying: when work… -- it is not at all that salaried labor

seems to me a magnificent… regime: once again, this is not what interests me --, I am saying: the current crisis is not at all a crisis; it is… it corresponds exactly to the contemporary… conditions, of the formation of new capital. And this is not a moment to pass, it is rather ... it is salaried labor that has had its day. We're obviously going into a completely different world which, in my opinion, means that -- and that's what I mean, regarding this story from Samir Amin that I'm dragging along: it's not spot on for me, but which is my only reticence about Amin's analyses -- so in some ways, given the fundamental differences, somehow I believe the situation in the center and the situation on the periphery, in the Third World, will tend more and more, not to get homogenized… [*Interruption of the recording*] [92: 44]

**Part 3**

... But decision-making centers constitute the center, okay. But precisely, the center is becoming less and less geographical. And it is because the center is deterritorialized that the territorial acceptation they had, center and periphery, tends to lose its relevance, and that the situation at the geographical center and on the geographical periphery-Third World, tend to become or will tend to become more and more isomorphic.

And I am saying, in the case of undecidable propositions, I am saying: it is obvious that there is the chance there of a ... of what I call, if you retain this terminological difference, of what I call the chance of a connection, a revolutionary connection, or a connection that would technically be called a "problematic connection", as opposed to conjugations. Because, finally, we should not cry too much about the wage earners since what was the great accomplishment realized by recent capitalism? The great accomplishment realized by recent capitalism, since the Russian Revolution, was, of course, the integration of the European proletariat into the enterprise of global exploitation, namely the European proletariat of the center was caught precisely within an axiomatic system, which meant that, whether you prefer it or not, and more and more preferably, it actively participated in the exploitation of the center, either because, ... the armaments industry, ... or yet still under more direct forms.

But the compromise of the European proletariat in the exploitation of the Third World is a fact which explains precisely everything that all this time has caused us a problem concerning the attitude of the unions forever, since unions managed the interests of a European proletariat that had completely resigned himself. Look at a very interesting book, for example, in this regard: how the American proletariat was caught up in a very active participation in the Vietnam War, … It's a book by [Paul] Baran, Baran : b-a-r-a-n, and [Paul] Sweezy, s-w-2 e-z-y, and it's called something like *Monopoly Capitalism*.[155] And I would say: the way in which the Western European and American proletariat has been determined to participate actively in the exploitation, this is precisely the case of an axiomatic conjunction. This has been, by dint of making axioms for the working class, etc., this has been the whole social-democratic tendency, it has been, well, it has a long history, in Europe and in America. A revolutionary connection, as opposed to an axiomatic conjugation or conjunction, would be like movement… not the reverse, it is not logical movements; simply it is when the chance would occur or arise for an alliance between the exploited Third World and a class of workers [*Pause*] in the center, which would no longer be exactly caught within the wage system.

So, I asked: why ... is it just a joke, when the Italians there asked: are we the Indians? Or was it, in a way ... in an infinitely more tragic way, when German terrorism was like ... existed in some kind of connection with the Vietnam War, and so many, so many, so many ambiguities arose from there? Isn't it… was it not the… the first outlines, or, if necessary, the first failures for the development of a connection of this type? But what I call the set of undecidable propositions is: in the provocation, in the operation which ... by which capitalism does not cease to create flows that are strictly speaking undecidable, the possibility that connections between a situation which tends to unite ... not to homogenize, once again, but ... let us choose this word for simplicity: which tends to be homogenized at the center and at the periphery, and to constitute there a kind of possible revolutionary material.

Here we have my first re… my fifth, anyway, my last [*remark*] and that I will leave blank, because I had treated it three years ago, so -- and that the hopes have been so fully confirmed since --, so I say for the record, because we are going to put this to bed, we are going ... we have enough, here it is: it is, ... the fact, the fundamental fact of the advance, and the development, and the activity of minorities. And what does that mean? Well, that means something fundamental, it seems to me, right, both in all our hopes and ... [in] almost all ... all the others ... all the other dimensions are hanging on this last article, namely: the development of minorities or so-called "minoritarian" movements. And why is ... why? It's because… the nation-State, it goes without saying… what time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: -- Oh là là, I'll finish at eighteen after, ok! So… I'll have not more than… so… you understand, it's going to go very, very quickly --… the nation-State is obviously, … all nation-States are constituted by a kind of crushing of what we ... we have sometimes called "nationalitarian or minoritarian movements". There is no nation-State ... if nation-States are called and claim to be part of a nation, it is precisely because they were constituted by this kind of over-coding of all nationalitarian movements. Fine. For a long time, it was perhaps considered in early capitalist, that nationalitarian movements were crushed and that, instead, irreversible nation-States were established.

And I insist on distinguishing or recalling that we distinguished here, some time ago, three very different notions: majorities, minorities, and also minoritarian movements. And what matters to me is that "minorities" and "minoritarian movements" are not the same thing at all. "Majority" is not difficult, it is not difficult to define; I would say of a majority that it is a set which is adequate for its own criterion. That's a majority. It sounds… it sounds silly, but it's very… it's… it's very good, it's very true. You see, it is… it is at the level of contests: when we are told in contests -- moreover, it is completely illegal, it is… but… it is… necessarily, it is illegal --, we are told in contests: state your opinion on this,… say, for example, which lady seems the prettiest to you, or the most beautiful work of art, then you will win, but you will win provided that your choice coincides with that of others; otherwise you will not win. You see the scam, since you are asked two questions at once: say what you prefer, but you are told: be careful, eh, you have to prefer what others prefer, because otherwise you will lose. [*Laughter*] So we tell ourselves, oh well, so ... and ... am I being asked ... what I prefer, or what my neighbor prefers? It's a tense situation. The majority, that's it, exactly: it is a set which refers to its own criterion, in the sense

that belonging to the majority is that which represents the criterion according to which the majority has been predetermined. What is the majority, ... in our countries of the center? The majority is: European, adult, white, male, male ... what?

A student: Woman?

Deleuze: Ah no! Ah well no, ah, well! Let's see! … There we are. At the level of the worker himself, what is this? There is a phrase that I like in a text by Yann Moulier.[156] He said: yes, the criterion ... the criterion used by the unions was: skilled worker, white, over thirty-five, etc. In short, this is: the ordinary man. This is exactly what Joyce called Ulysses. Ulysses, that is: nobody. He's the ordinary man. As Ezra Pound says wittily, it's the average European, sensual, city dweller, honestly sensual, city dweller, etc. You have a majority criterion: well, it's obvious that all white men, male, adult, count twice: once in the criterion, once in ... the whole. So that's what a majority is, right, I think.

What is a minority?[157] Well, it's a subset. A minority is a subset: not difficult. How is the subset defined? As opposed to the majority criteria. We will say "a minority" then, as opposed to "male" which is a criterion of majority, it will be "woman" or "child". No, oh well no: not the opposite of "male"! [*Laughter*] As opposed to "adult", it will be "child". As opposed to male, it will be… "female" -- yes, there, I am not mistaken --, as opposed to… yes… there you are, as opposed to "white", it will be "black", "yellow", all that you want; as opposed to ... to "skilled worker", it will be "OS",[158] well, all that. There you have it, you have a minority.

Notice that we fully recover our axiomatic at that point. A social democracy is defined by the fact that it will give you as many axioms as you want -- well, within limits -- for minorities, namely subsets. Ah, do you want axioms for the kids? Well, we're going to create kindergartens, okay? Want axioms for women? Okay, okay, abortion, okay, all of that, within limits, because you can't exaggerate, but there will be axioms, right! On the contrary, we will call "totalitarians" those who reject axioms for the subsets; they can just get lost. That's what a minority is.

What do you call a minoritarian movement? It is: neither one nor the other. Everyone knows that minorities die, either as subsets into which they are inserted, or as subsets that they make for themselves ... that they construct for themselves. They are screwed, really; they are screwed either because they carry out an operation literally of reterritorialization, or because they are, as they say, "integrated" within a system, in a kind of axiomatic, right, good.

What defines a minoritarian movement? Well, that's what I tried to say once before, so here I'm going to sum it up really, really quickly, before we leave. This is ... it is the determination really, there again, of a line of flight, namely: the minoritarian movement, as opposed to the minority; it is not an aggregate, it is a becoming.[159] It's a becoming, fine. Well then, what is it,… "woman" as a minoritarian movement? Well, this is the becoming-woman. It is not a subset, it is the becoming-woman. But who is it that becomes a woman? Well, the simple answer is that who becomes a woman first is women. Well yes, and… it's women who have to become women, because it's… it's only women who are in a good position to become women. But ... if, on the contrary, one considers "being a woman" to be the property of a subset, it is obvious that this is screwed. They have a sort of secrecy or exclusivity, or relative exclusivity of a becoming, but not

the property of a status at all. Fine. So, a minoritarian movement is the trail of a becoming, and it's exactly the same thing as saying: the trail of a line of flight. And this is not the constitution of a subset.

And at the same time as I say, “women have to become women”, then that's not all: the Black Panthers said it very well: blacks have to become black, it is not done at all ... not completed. On the contrary, because if being black, that ... is ... like their daddy, well no, on the contrary; if the Black Panthers had a role and had a fundamental importance, it is precisely because, there, they initiated this topic, this kind of ... of revolutionary connection, namely that blacks had to become black, and that that was it, that that was already the fundamental activity, otherwise, they would be a subset, a minority, fine.

So, it's not about seizing the majority, but it's about answering the question: what ... how do you explain that it has always gone so badly? Obviously as soon as one wants to seize the majority, it is a disaster: it is neither a question of claiming minoritarian status, nor of taking the majority. It is about drawing these lines of flight where someone, someone, collectively or personally, embarks on a becoming. Becoming black for blacks, becoming woman for women, becoming a Jew for Jews, etc., etc.: fine, then, that's perfect. Not sure whether it is by… by… by being pious, for example, that the Jews become Jews, I am not sure, right! [*Pause*] So you get it?

So, I’ll add right away: why yes, that's it. If even the black has to become black, if even the Jew has to become a Jew, what does that mean? But the result for us is fundamental! It’s us as well. If the black has to become black, it is because this operation, this becoming is inseparable from a coexistent becoming through which the white also has to become black. Not in the same way: this will not be to copy him. He has to produce his own becoming black. Something which ..., if you will, culminates if you agree to the idea that, in this case, it was not quite poetry or words, in the kind of loud cry from Rimbaud: yes , I'm a negro![160] “Yes, I am a negro!", that is, this: only a white man, who is embarking on a kind of becoming. So, the black’s becoming-black has as a correlate a possible, eventual black-becoming of the white; the becoming-woman of the woman has as a necessary, indispensable correlate, a becoming-woman of the man. And that, the English and Americans have understood it so greatly. And ... it is not by playing at being transvestites that ... you become a woman when you are a man;[161] it is by ... it is undoubtedly by their ... ways of writing that the English and American novelists already have ... by ways of living, by an affectivity, by an entire affectivity.

What I am saying immediately -- I say it before you say it to me -- has an obviously disgusting aspect, because that seems to mean: you understand, ah, well yes, we see it coming, you could tell me, you necessarily are bringing back with your double becoming, in the end, you are bringing back a kind of mothering by the white, by the man. If the becoming-black of the black is accompanied by a becoming-black of the white himself, we say: this is suspicious; then there has to be a white man who embarks on this attempt, otherwise the black man could not do so by himself! I don't mean that; I mean, connections have to be established. This is not about mothering at all; it can turn into mothering, these kinds of alliance. Alliance between what and what? That would be a connection: it means that simultaneously and in two different ways, a white European or American, for example -- or some -- sort of his majoritarian aggregate

following a line of flight, and that simultaneously a non-white, a non-male, etc., departs from his minority aggregate, following another line of flight.

One of Faulkner's most beautiful sentences is in *Intruder in the Dust*; it is, he makes a character say: well yes, after the Civil War,… no, before… before the Civil War, we whites, -- Faulkner has him say -- we had only ... one choice comparable to what occurred at the time of ... the Second World War, namely: we white people had to be, either we had to become black – finally, this expression in Faulkner is… it is good for us, at the point of our analysis --, either we become black, or we end up as fascists. Yes, that seems to me the expression, always, that. That does not mean that it will take a white person to oversee, to sponsor the becoming-black of blacks, or the becoming-woman of women; that does not mean that at all. This means that it is at the same time that a minoritarian movement is composed as having two dissymmetrical heads: a head through which something flees from the majoritarian aggregate, and something at the same time flees from the minoritarian aggregate. In other words, the minoritarian movement is a becoming that passes between the two aggregates: the minority aggregate, and the majority aggregate. This is why the minoritarian movement does not identify with a minoritarian aggregate. They'd like it to identify with that, but it can't happen. In fact, it creates ripples, it ripples onto the white himself, it stains the man himself, etc. That said, fine, that's it, a connection. In other words, becoming is always a double becoming.

We can't get any further into the reasons for hoping, unless ... there you go ... after we return from break. It's the real [*incomprehensible word*]… unless, after returning from break, according to what suits you -- here, we can't take anymore, I imagine -- but we can do a session on all that, if you have some things to add.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The little yellow forms? [*These are the administrative files that Deleuze must return to the secretariat; Deleuze makes an exasperated sound*] Ohhh, they mustn't avoid me ... [*End of the session*] [1: 51: 16]

**Notes**

[1] On the Book of Numbers and Moses, and also for much of this development, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 387-388.
[2] *Travail* will be translated as 'work' or 'labour', depending on the context.
[3] On the questions of borrowed writing as well as weapons and tools, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 400-403.
[4] On the role of feelings (sentiment and affect) as well types of justice, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 399-400.
[5] On types of violence, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 425 and pp. 446-448.
[6] For this analysis from Georges Dumézil (in this paragraph and the following one), see the reference in *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 425-427 and p. 564, notes 3, 4, and 5, to *Mitra-Varuna* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948). However, Deleuze and Guattari also cite in this regard Ernst Jünger, *The Glass Bees* (New York: Noonday Press, 1960), p. 564, note 6.
[7] To clarify this gap slightly, and with reference to matter-movement in relation to the phylum, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 406-409 and 415.

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-JR9_GOoA (verified September 2, 2023).
[9] Deleuze and Guattari reference these works in *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 564-565, note 9: the French text, *Le despotisme oriental* (Paris: Minuit, 1963, or 1964) was first published in 1957 (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press). According to the footnote, the French edition removed Pierre-Vidal Naquet's preface in the second edition. The other references are to Ferenc Tökei, *Essays on the Asiatic Mode of Production* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1979) with Deleuze and Guattari's reference to Studia Historica 1966; and the CERM publication, *Sur le mode de production asiatique* (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1969).

[10] On the distinction between possession (*Besitz*) and ownership (*Eigentum*) in Karl von Savigny, Hegel and Marx, see Lawrence Krader, *The Asiatic Mode of Production* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975), 13-16.

[11] On Mumford and this term, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 428, 457, cited by Deleuze and Guattari as mentioned in an article "The First Megamachines", *Diogenes* 55 (July-September 1956) (*A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 570 note 55). However, they also cite Mumford in *The Pentagon of Power,* volume 2 of *The Myth of the Machine* (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1970) (p. 570, note 58).

[12] Marx, *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 692-695.

[13] For discussion of these references, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* plateau 13 "7000 BC: Apparatus of Capture", section titled "Proposition XI. Which Comes First?", pp. 427-437.

[14] On Mellaart and Jacobs, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 565 note 11: Mellaart, *Earliest Civilizations in the Near East* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) and *Catal Hüyük* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Jane Jacobs, *The New Obsidian*; French translation of *The Economy of Cities* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 [1969]). In the original English text, Jacobs uses the term 'city', but Deleuze uses *ville*, usually translated as 'town'. As for V. Gordon Childe, Deleuze and Guattari refer to him in plateau 12, on nomadology and the war machine, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 563, note 101, specifically, *The Prehistory of European Society* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1958) and *The Dawn of European Civilization* (New York: Knopf, 1958).

[15] Jacobs suggests that the "excellently manufactured hide bags" (*The Economy of Cities*, 29) initially used in New Obsidian for the transportation of obsidian from volcanoes are themselves bought by external traders, who then use them to carry quantities of seeds in their subsequent exchanges with the traders in obsidian. She does not mention any small animals, which it seems obvious would not in any case be transported in such excellent bags; she clearly distinguishes the activities of the "barter-seed stewards" from the "animal stewards" (36), who handle *large* animals of varying degrees of docility. *A Thousand Plateaus* makes it clear that there are two distinct flows, of seeds and animals: "It is a stock of uncultivated seeds and relatively tame animals from different territories that performs, and makes it possible to perform, at first by chance, hybridizations and selections *from which agriculture and small-scale animal raising arise*" (ATP 428).

[16] In *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP 430), this view is attributed to Mikhail Griaznov, in his *The Ancient Civilizations of Southern Siberia*, trans. James Hogarth (New York: Cowels, 1969).

[17] In French, *prenne*, the present subjunctive of *prendre* [to take], can be used in a culinary sense; for a dish to 'prenne', a certain ingredient or combination of ingredients is necessary. There appears to be no direct English equivalent.

[18] In *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP 358), the text is identified as Jacques Meunier, *Les gamins de Bogota* (Paris: Lattes, 1977); cf. p. 178.

[19] Jacques Lizot, *Le cercle des feux. Faits et dits des Indiens Yanomami* (1976); translated by Ernest Simon as *Tales of the Yanomami: Daily Life in the Venezuelan Forest* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[20] There is no reference to a 'star' [*étoile*] in the passage in Lizot's book on the planting of the mast (*Le Cercle des feux*, pp. 127-133; cf. *Tales from the Yanomami*, pp. 95-98), although the shaman is said to "draw on the ground imaginary lines that radiate all around [the mast]" (133/98).

[21] Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XV^e^ et XVIII^e^ siècles)* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967); translated by Miriam Kochan as *Capitalism and Material Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1974), p. 398, translation modified.

[22] François Fourquet and Lion Murard, *Les équipements de pouvoir: Ville, territoires et équipements collectifs* (Paris: 10/18, 1976); first published in *Recherches*, 13, 1973.

[23] "Since the theory of relations between different social formations cannot be an economistic one, international relations, which belong precisely to this context, cannot give rise to an economic theory" (Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 146; cited in ATP 566, n. 23.

[24] Deleuze refers to the "last glass" in the Spinoza seminar 3 (9 December 1980), in Cinema 2 seminar 21 (24 May 1983), and most extensively in *L'Abécédaire,* "B as in 'Boire' [Drinking]".

[25] Albin Chalandon (1920-2020) co-created the Banque nationale de Paris in 1952 and went on to occupy various ministerial positions in the 1960s and 70s, before becoming director of the oil company Elf-Aquitaine in 1977.
[26] Presumably a reference to British discoveries of North Sea Oil in the 1970s.
[27] Besides the previous session, Deleuze discusses the relation city versus State throughout Plateau 13, "Apparatus of Capture," in *A Thousand Plateaus.*
[28] On Braudel and these points, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 431-435.
[29] Deleuze considers the anticipation-conjuration process in plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 435-437 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 543-545).
[30] Beckett's short story, "Premier amour" (1946) is translated "First Love".
[31] Deleuze develops these same terms (e.g. utility, the "last", marginalism, threshold) in section XII, "Capture", in plateau 13, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 437-442 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 545-550).
[32] In footnote 24 of Plateau 13, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 566, Deleuze attributes this quote (and provides its text) not to an Englishman, but to Gaëton Picon, from *Economie libérale et économie dirigée*, vol. 1 (Paris: Sedes, 1946-47), p. 117. After the text of this citation, Deleuze adds parenthetically: "Marginalism seeks to quantify the assemblage, when in fact all kinds of qualitative factors are at work in the evaluation of the 'last'."
[33] Deleuze develops these two aspects of the assemblage in *A Thousand Plateaus,* plateau 5, "On Several Regimes of Signs," notably, pp. 140-145.
[34] Deleuze discusses his own alcoholism in this perspective in "B as in *Boire* [Drinking]", in the video interview with Claire Parnet from 1988-89, *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z* [MIT/Semiotext(e), 2012).
[35] See also "D as in Desire" in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z*, for Deleuze's moving account of being forced to deal with student at Vincennes who has experienced the extreme threshold experience and requiring hospitalization.

[36] This is only a 20-minute segment of the complete session of 15 January 1980, and given that there are no sessions available from December nor from 8 January, it is possible that there are several sessions missing from the recordings (e.g. 4 Dec, 11 Dec, 18 Dec, and 8 Jan). However, by comparing the material included in this fragment for the session's end to the material in session 4, one notes that the respective references in each session corresponding to A Thousand Plateaus do not constitute a significant gap in the development from plateau 13, "Proposition XII. Capture" (pp. 437-448) in session 4 to the same plateau, the start of "Proposition XIII. The State and its forms" (pp. 448-452) in session 5. Still, in session 6, Deleuze seems to backtrack to the second half of Proposition XII, possibly suggesting Deleuze's awareness of gaps in his presentation.
[37] Sallust, or Gaius Sallustius Crispus, was a Roman historian from the first century BCE. However, he lived during the century preceding the era of Caligula. This is perhaps a reference to a text given by Deleuze in the session segment that remains missing.
[38] Paul Veyne was a French historian, a specialist in ancient Rome. However, no title that I could find by Veyne corresponds to the title cited by Deleuze. Veyne's major publication prior to this session is *Bread and Circuses* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1976; 1993 translation), on the practice of gifts in the Roman Empire. However, given that further on in the session, Deleuze speaks of forms of poetic elegy, there is perhaps a link between Veyne's mysterious title and another book by Veyne, on Roman erotic elegy (*L'Elégie érotique romaine* [Paris : Le Seuil, 1983]) that was published admittedly after this seminar, but sections of which may have already been published prior to the book's publication.
[39] This is no doubt a reference to the major historical work by Jules Michelet, the multi-volume *L'Histoire de France*.
[40] The lament is a frequent topic for Deleuze, not only in the following sessions of this seminar, but also here and there throughout the other seminars, notably in several seminars on Leibniz, notably 24 February and 19 May 1987, and also in the eight-hour interview, *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (*Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z*).
[41] As Deleuze says, Ferenc Tökei is a Hungarian sinologist; his book, untranslated into English, was published in French translation by Gallimard in 1967.
[42] Let us note that this session's transcription differs entirely from the presumably corresponding text at WebDeleuze where the transcription is, in fact, from the 29 January 1980 session, that is, the week after this current session. As such, our transcription is currently the only extant copy of the 22 January 1980 session while the translation, of course, is original to the Deleuze Seminars site.
[43] On this point, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* plateau 13, pp. 439-440 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 548-549).
[44] On the "final love" in Proust and "the work to be completed", see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 438-439 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 546-547).

[45] On Mumford and the megamachine, see session 2, 13 November 1979.
[46] This certainly refers to the seminar that took place during 1975-76 (ATP I) from which a great number of sessions were filmed by Italian television RAI-3 through the efforts of Deleuze's student Marielle Burkhalter, including segments of approximately a dozen meetings, with the transcripts and translations presented under the heading A Thousand Plateaus I – Deleuze at Paris 8 (Video Links). This seminar and subsequent ones no doubt were developed by Deleuze and Guattari into Plateau 7, "Year Zero: Faciality", in *A Thousand Plateaus*.
[47] Jacques Mercier, *Rouleaux magiques éthiopien*s, Ed. du Seuil, 1979; *Ethiopian Magic Scrolls*, trans. Richard Pevear (New York: Braziller, 1979); see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 533-534 note 14; (*Mille plateaux,* p. 224, note 12).
[48] Alain Grosrichard, *Structure du sérail : La fiction du despotisme asiatique dans l'occident classique*, Ed. du Seuil, 1979.
[49] The majority of transcriptions into French and corresponding translations into English were made possible through access to the recordings available from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), then through the Paris-8 *Voix de Deleuze* site, faithfully produced over nearly a decade by one participant in Deleuze's seminars, Hidenobu Suzuki. According to François Dosse in *Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives* (Columbia University Press, 2011), Suzuki "becomes an institution all to himself", to whom Deleuze would refer colleagues if they weren't able to attend one of the sessions. I should note that 1979-80 is the first year of Suzuki's recordings, and also that if this is indeed Suzuki speaking (which seems likely given his proximity to the microphone), this is one of his rare interventions in Deleuze's seminar.
[50] Deleuze refers to *nexum* several times in *A Thousand Plateaus,* in relation to Dumézil, p. 552 note 1 (*Mille plateaux,* p. 435 note 1), and in the context of the link or knot, p. 460 (*Mille plateaux,* p. 575).
[51] Deleuze provides this reference – Jean Paris, *L'Espace et le regard* (Paris : Le Seuil, 1965), I.ii – in *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 184-185 (*Mille plateaux,* p. 227).
[52] Deleuze develops the landscape concept and the face-landscape contrast in three plateaus in *A Thousand Plateaus*, plateau 7 "Year Zero: Faciality", notably pp. 170-190 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 211-214, 218-230); plateau 10, on becomings, and plateau 11 "1837: Of the refrain".
[53] On *The Castle* and bureaucracy, *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 213-214 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 260-261).
[54] The French critic Marthe Robert wrote *Alone like Franz Kafka (Seul comme Franz Kafka,* Calmann-Lévy, 1969).
[55] Balazs's *La bureaucratie céleste* (Paris : Gallimard, 1968) is apparently a revised and updated edition of an earlier translation in English entitled *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy; Variations on a Theme.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Translated by H. M. Wright. Edited by Arthur F. Wright.
[56] Deleuze quotes the unpublished research by Eric Alliez in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 568, note 36 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 553-554 note 32) which will be published several years later: *Les Temps capitaux,* t. 1, *Récits de la conquête du temps,* préface de Deleuze (Paris : Édition du Cerf, 1991) ; t. 2, vol. 1, *L'État des choses,* vol. 2, *La Capitale du temps* (Paris : Édition du Cerf, 1999), translated by George Van den Abeele as *Capital Times : Tales from the Conquest of Time* (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
[57] Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. 31, p. 535 ; https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf
[58] *Ibid,* p.536.
[59] Deleuze quotes Tökei concerning freed slaves in *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 448, and the discussion of the three forms of decoding unfolds in the following pages, pp. 448-452.
[60] Deleuze refers to James Mellaart's work in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 565, note 11 (*Mille plateaux,* p. 534, note 11).
[61] Jane Jacobs is, in fact, an American-Canadian author in urban studies and sociology whose major work is *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961; Vintage, 1992).
[62] Alfred Métraux contributed notably to a publication in seven volumes produced by the Smithsonian Institute entitled, *The Handbook of South American Indians* (1940-47), with Julian H. Steward as the general editor.
[63] Deleuze quotes Gordon Childe's work at several points in plateaus 12 and 13 in *A Thousand Plateaus*, notably pp. 412, 415, 428-429, 450-451, and 562 note 96, 563 note 101, 569 note 42 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 513, 516, 534, 561, 563).
[64] Among the numerous references in *A Thousand Plateaus* to Fernand Braudel, see pp. 558 note 60, 558-559 note 64 (*Mille plateaux*, voir p. 478 n. 53 et 480 n. 57).
[65] Etienne Balazs, *La bureaucratie céleste* (Paris : Gallimard, 1968).

[66] Deleuze refers to "cosmopolitan energy" in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 453 and p. 460, with references given to Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 129.
[67] Deleuze provides the citation in *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 569, note 48: "On the historical independence of the two series and their 'encounter'," see Balibar in Althusser and Balibar, *Lire le Capital* (Maspero, t. II, pp. 286-280).
[68] Jean Saint-Geours, *Pouvoir et finance* (Fayard, 1979). See *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 569-70, note 52.
[69] Robert Blanché, *L'axiomatique* (PUF, 1955). Deleuze refers to Blanché's text in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 570, notes 54 and 60. The discussion in this part of the session – including the American and Russian space programs -- corresponds almost directly to *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 454-460.
[70] This is no doubt the edition in several volumes published, starting in 1939, under the name of Nicolas Bourbaki, *Théorie des ensembles* (Hermann).
[71] On the axiomatic and the four problems that Deleuze lays out, see plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), "Proposition XIII. Axiomatics and the presentday situation", *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 460-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 575-590).
[72] The final section of plateau 13 on the apparatus of capture is, in fact, titled "Undecidable propositions", *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 471-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 588-590).

[73] Deleuze considers Alois Riegl during the Painting seminar, 12 May 1981.
[74] Deleuze refers to texts by Henri Maldiney on Cézanne during two sessions on Spinoza, 13 January and 31 March 1981 (the latter also being the first session of the Painting seminar).
[75] "Toto" is a name for a stock character in French discourse, a generic child as well as the butt of "Toto jokes" (*blagues de Toto*).
[76] Deleuze attributes this term, "spiritual automaton", to Spinoza during the session on continuous variation, January 24, 1978. He returns to the term in several other sessions: in the first session in the short Leibniz seminar that follows this seminar on the State apparatus, April 15, 1980; and in five sessions during the fourth seminar on cinema and philosophy: October 30, 1984; November 6, 1984; January 8, 1985; April 23, 1985; and June 4, 1985.
[77] Georges Bouligand et Jean Desgranges, *Le déclin des absolus mathématico-logiques* (Paris : SEDES, 1949). See *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 570, note 61.
[78] On Girard Desargues and his works as well as on conical sections, see the second Leibniz seminar, specifically the session of November 18, 1986, and March 3, 1987, as well as *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, pp. 20-22 (*Le Pli,* pp. 28-30). Regarding the text *Les Oeuvres de Desargues,* several modern reeditions exist of this text; it was originally edited by Noël Germinal Poudra, published in 1864. See also *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 365.
[79] The title seems to be slightly different from the one that Deleuze cites: *Brouillon Project d'une atteinte aux evenemens du rencontre d'une cone avec un plan* [Rough draft for an essay on the results of taking plan sections of a cone]. See the study by Jan P. Hogendijk, "Desargues' *Brouillon Project* and the Conics of Apollonius", *Centaurus* vol. 34 (1991), pp. 1-43, http://www.jphogendijk.nl/publ/Desargues2.pdf.
[80] Besides the reference cited above (note 5), Deleuze and Guattari refer to Bouligand in connection with the intuitionist school (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 554, note 21) and in connection with Bergson and the dualism of two mathematical elements, the "problem" and "global synthesis" (*A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 556, note 40).
[81] Roughly seventh, eighth and nine grades in American high schools; year 7, year 8 and year 9 in UK comprehensive schools.
[82] As is evident in the preceding session, on the axiomatic and its four problems outlined by Deleuze, see plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), Proposition XIII. "Axiomatics and the present-day situation", *A Thousand Plateaus.* pp. 460-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 575-590).
[83] In all likelihood, this is text in from *Capital,* book III, part III, chapters 13-15. See *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 567, note 32.

[84] Certain aspects of what Deleuze and the students say regarding the Vincennes situation finds an enlarged contextual explanation in chapter 19, "Deleuze at Vincennes" in François Dosse's *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari. Intersecting Lives*, translation by Deborah Glassman (New York : Columbia University Press, 2010) [original French published in 2007]. The move of the entire Paris-VIII at Vincennes operation from Vincennes (east of Paris) to Saint-Denis (north of Paris) – referred to in the discussion as "the transfer" – was announced by the Minister of Universities, Alice Saunier-Seïté, in June 1978, and the transfer would take place in 1980, thus starting in the Fall semester following this very seminar. On the atmosphere on the campus during Deleuze's years there, see Dosse, pp. 347-357 (French text: pp. 412-418).

[85] From the start of Deleuze's seminar, he attracted a large group of non-registered students, *auditeurs libres* or course auditors.
[86] UV is the abbreviation for "unité de valeur", or academic credit strictly speaking, with at least two senses: on one hand, the UV is the collected set of course requirements constituting part of a university exam, mostly the course work for which one received the UV (or UVs); on the other hand, and this is the usage employed throughout this discussion, the UV refers to the course itself from which one will receive the "unité de valeur" (or credit).
[87] The use of "normalisation" and "normaliser" (normalize) in this context seems to suggest the steps taken either by the entire institution or by the individual units (that is, the departments) that constitute the institution (and that Deleuze seems to designate at one point as the "normalizers" [les normalisants]), to come into conformity with the global university requirements imposed by the State. Given that the professors and students had no choice regarding the "transfer," "se normaliser" (normalizing oneself) seems to be necessary but nonetheless disdained because of its inherent coercion.
[88] At the time of this discussion, *L'Humanité* was the newpaper of the French Communist Party.
[89] Pierre Merlin was president of the University of Paris VIII-Vincennes from 1976 to 1980. Although he is presented in this discussion as being responsible for the policing actions contested by Deleuze and the students, he opposed the Minister of Universities, Alice Saunier-Seïté, and her (and the government's) project to destroy the Vincennes campus and move the site and activities to Saint-Denis in northern Paris. He resigned from his position the very year of this seminar in protest over the finality given to the Minister's political decision.
[90] Georges Marchais, general secretary of the PCF, the French Communist Party, from 1972 to 1994.
[91] *France-Soir* was a very conservative French daily newspaper that went bankrupt in 2012, then was started again as an online tabloid. Further on in the discussion, references will be made to *Le Figaro* and *L'Aurore*, also conservative newspapers in the same era. As for *Le Monde*, this is France's fairly centrist journal of record.
[92] Claude Frioux was the president of the University before Pierre Merlin's election.
[93] Jacques Mesrine, a French criminal who operated in several European nations as well as in Canada, had in fact been declared "enemy number one" (most wanted criminal) in France at the start of the 1970s. Above all, see the biographical films in two parts, "L'Instinct de mort" and "L'Ennemi numéro 1", or the English title for both, "Mesrine", by Jean-François Richet, released in 2008.
[94] Paul Virilio's texts cited by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* corresponding to the points raised in the discussion are *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986; Paris : Galilée, 1977) and *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris: Stock, 1976; no translation).
[95] Normally, one would expect Claire Parent to be seated near Deleuze, but her voice in not heard at all in this session.
[96] The Cartoucherie at Vincennes is a former factory for armament and gunpowder fabrication situated in the Vincennes woods, near the campus, reconverted in 1970 by Ariane Mnouchkine as a theater location.
[97] This probably refers to the municipal elections that took place in France in March 1977.
[98] Censier is another French university campus in the heart of Paris, University of Paris-III.
[99] Besides his role as a French philosopher, François Châtelet was Deleuze's friend as well as the department head of philosophy at Paris VIII-Vincennes from 1970 (with Foucault's departure) to his death in 1985.
[100] As a reference point, this seminar takes place under the conservative political government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, French president from 1974 to 1981.
[101] Lionel Stoléru was an economic advisor in Giscard d'Estaing's government.
[102] The *Meilleurs Ouvriers de France* is a designation for a competitive award granted across all trades – from baking to metalworking, to name but two among at least a hundred – within the individual trade elites and granted formally by the President of the Republic. On the *Meilleurs Ouvriers de France*, see the documentary, "Kings of Pastry", by Chris Hegedus and D.A. Pennebaker (2010).
[103] Jean-François Lyotard was teaching his philosophy courses in the same department as Deleuze.
[104] The few lines that follow the end of the cassette belong to the co-transcription by Annabelle Dufourcq and Mariana Carrasco Berge, not to the recording available on YouTube or on Web Deleuze.

[105] As was seen in sessions 8 & 9, on the axiomatic and the four criteria detailed by Deleuze, see plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), Proposition XIII, "Axiomatics and the present day situation", *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 460-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 575-590).
[106] On Brazil within this context, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 463 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 579).

[107] The texts by Paul Virilio that Deleuze and Guattari cite in *A Thousand Plateaus* that correspond to these comments are *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986; Paris: Galilée, 1977) and *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976; no translation).
[108] On Chile in this context, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 462 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 578).
[109] Michel Debré was the initial Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic (1959) but was forced to resign when he lost his position as député in 1963. He was quickly re-elected député from Reunion Island. He returned to the government in 1988 as Minister for Economy and Finance, hence the Debré plan.
[110] The adjective *Giscardian* refers to the conservative French government under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 1974-1981.
[111] Schacht was a banker and Hitler's minister of the economy.
[112] This is from *Capital*, book III, part III (chapters 13-15).
[113] The Pléaide edition of any author's work, published by the respected editor Gallimard, is considered to the definitive edition of that work for the author, hence explaining Deleuze's indignation.
[114] Given the lengthy discussion at the previous session about decisions proposed to be taken by the Vincennes President and the University Council, the student no doubt explains something that has occurred on campus that morning, resulting in some kind of action by students (and professors), resulting in Deleuze suddenly ending the session.
[115] The few lines of exchange up to here are located on the recording at the Bibliothèque Nationale, but not on the recordings available at YouTube (hence, neither at Web Deleuze, nor on the Deleuze Seminars site).
[116] As was evident in this seminar's sessions 8 and 9, and the short session 11, on the axiomatic and the four problems specified by Deleuze, see plateau 13 (on the apparatus of capture), Proposition XIII. "Axiomatics and the present day situation", *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 460-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 575-590).
[117] On Clausewitz and these distinctions, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 419-421 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 523-524).
[118] Marx addresses this topic in *Capital*, vol. 3, ch. 15.
[119] Robert Linhart, *Le sucre et la faim* (Paris : Minuit, 1980). Let us note that Deleuze needs to spell out the French word for hunger, faim, to avoid confusion with its homophone, fin (the end, the goal).
[120] Lionel Stoléru was an economic advisor in the conservative government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.
[121] Samir Amin was a Franco-Egyptian Marxist economist, who died in 2018.
**[122]** In *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 571, note 66, Deleuze and Guattari say: « A movement in Marxist research formed on the basis of the works of Mario Tonti (*Operai e capitale* [Turin: G. Einaudi, 1971]; French translation, *Ouvriers et capital* [Paris: Bourgois, 1977]), then that of Italian autonomy and Antonio Negri, whose name was to analyze the new forms of work and the struggle against work. It was a question of showing simultaneously: 1) that the struggle against work is not an accidental or "marginal" phenomenon in capitalism, but one essential to the composition of capital (the growth in the proportion of constant capital), and 2) that this phenomenon engenders a new type of worldwide struggle – workers' struggles, popular struggles, ethnic struggles – in every domain. See Antonio Negri, especially *Marx and Beyond: Lesson on the Grundrisse*, ed. Jim Fleming, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan and Mauriuzion Viano (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1984); Karl Heinz Roth, *Die "andere" Arbeiterbewegung* (Munich: Trikont, 1974); and the current work in France of Yann Moulier, Alain and Danièle Guillerm, Benjamin Coriat, etc." At the same time as this seminar occurred, the US journal *Semiotext(e)* published an issue in a new "Intervention Series" entitled "Italy: Autonomia, Post-Political Politics," *Semiotext(e)* III.3 (1980), later re-published in a new edition, *Autonomia, new edition: Post-Political Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007).
[123] On these distinctions, see the current seminar, sessions 8 and 9 (February 5 and February 26, 1980).
[124] On this topic, Deleuze and Guattari say in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 584, note 59: "Braudel shows how this center of gravity formed in northern Europe, but as the outcome of movements that, starting in the ninth and tenth centuries, put the European space of the North and the South in competition or rivalry with one another (this problem is not to be confused with that of the town-form and State-form, but does intersect with it). See « Naissance d'une économie-monde », in *Urbi*, l (September 1979), pp. 3-20" (*Mille plateaux,* p. 584, note 59).
[125] By James Burnham, see his *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: John Day, 1941) [*L'Ère des organisateurs* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947)].
[126] Samir Amin, *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973).
[127] On the English alliance regarding American wheat, see session 8 (February 8, 1980).
[128] Bokassa was President of the Central African Republic from 1966-1976 and then emperor under the name of Bokassa I, from 1976-1979.

[129] The Trilateral Commission, founded by David Rockefeller in 1973, is a private non-government, non-partisan discussion group to foster discussion, cooperation and economic development between Japan, Western Europe and North America.
[130] Only one session from 1978-79 is available, with the title (given by the anonymous transcriber at Web Deleuze) "Metal, metallurgy, music, Husserl, Simondon". See the ATP IV seminar on The Deleuze Seminars site.
[131] It is useful to recall that Deleuze and Guattari devote the penultimate chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* to this topic, "14. 1440 – The Smooth and the Striated". Deleuze also provided a summary of these concepts in the first session of this seminar, 6 November 1979.
[132] On the subject of nomads, the blacksmith problem, the "beaker people" (*peuple-aux-vases-calices*), metallurgy in general and, farther on, the "ingot form" in particular, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 409-415 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 510-517). Regarding the "beaker people," say Deleuze and Guattari, these are "people known for their bell shaped pottery… originating in Andalusia", whom they contrast to the prehistoric "battle-ax people" (*peuples-aux-haches de combat*), "who came in off the steppes like a detached metallic branch of the nomads" (p. 414).
[133] On the complexities of these lineages, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 392-393, and p. 560, note 72 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 488-489).
[134] On "holey space", see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 413-416 and 480-499 (*Mille plateaux*, pp, 515-17 and 600-624).
[135] This reference to Arnold Toynbee is located in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 381 and p. 557, note 52, "*A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press 1947), … vol. 1, pp. 164-186: 'They flung themselves upon the Steppe, not to escape beyond its bounds but to make themselves at home on it' (p. 168)."
[136] This is a reference to Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "Among Daughters of the Desert" "The deserts grow: woe him who doth them hide!"
[137] We find this term in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 413 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 515).
[138] The precise reference is in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 562, note 99: Jules Bloch, *Les Tziganes* (Paris: PUF, 1953). Numerous sources indicate the publication date as 1953, with 1968 (or 1969) as a later edition.
[139] A reference to this film and the image of these holey spaces is also provided in *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 413-414 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 515-516).
[140] Among several references to Marcel Griaule and to this subject in *A Thousand Plateaus,* the most pertinent is to the book by Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, *The Pale Fox* (Baltimore MD: Afrikan World Books, 1986); *Le renard pâle* (Paris: Institut d'ethnologie, 1965).
[141] Arnold J. Toynbee, *L'Histoire, un essai d'interprétation*, coll. « Bibliothèque des idées » (Paris: Gallimard, 1951) ; *A Study of History: Abridgement of Vols I-VI* by D. C. Somervell, preface by A. J. Toynbee (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1946).
[142] Deleuze and Guattari refer several times in *A Thousand Plateaus* to the text by Henri Maldiney, *Regard, Parole, Espace* (Lausanne : L'Age d'homme, 1973), notably pp. 493, 495, 547 note 2, and 574 note 31. Deleuze refers to Maldiney as well several times, for example in this seminar session 9, in a Spinoza session on January 13, 1981, and in the introductory session to the Painting seminar, 31 March 1981.
[143] In fact, five sessions, beginning 15 April 1980 and ending 20 May.
[144] In fact, the title is *Discourse on Metaphysics*.
[145] On the nondenumerable set, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 469-471 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 586-588).
[146] We saw these distinctions in the preceding session; see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 419-421 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 523-524).
[147] The Hannah Arendt reference in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33) is to her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York : Harcourt Brace & Co., 1951 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 283, note 31).
[148] In the same note in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33), one finds a reference to Paul Virilio's book *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976 ; Galilée, 1993).
[149] It's to Paul Virilio that Deleuze and Guattari attribute this term in the texts they cite in *A Thousand Plateaus* the corresponds to it, *Vitesse et politique* (Paris : Galilée, 1977) and *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976) [*Speed and Politics,* Semiotext(e), 1986 ; no translation for the second].
[150] Régis Debray is a political figure in France as well as a philosopher, activist, and creator of the research field known as "mediology".
[151] As we saw in session 8, 2 February 1980, where this term is considered, the final section of plateau 13 on the apparatus of capture is, in fact, titled "Undecidable propositions", *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 471-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 588-590).

[152] As we saw in the preceding session, Samir Amin was a Franco-Egyptian economist who wrote *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973).
[153] Robert McNamara, after having served as Secretary of Defense under the presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, became President of the World Bank.
[154] This is a reference to Robert Linhart's *Le sucre et la faim* (Paris: Minuit, 1980).
[155] The English title of Baran and Sweezy's book is *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).
[156] Deleuze and Guattari cite Yann Moulier as belonging to a group of French writers who analyze new forms of labor and struggles against labor, as do Mario Tronti, Antonio Negri, and Karl Heinz Roth. See *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 571, note 66 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 586, note 60).
[157] See the subsection, "Minorities," in plateau 13, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 469-471 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 586-588).
[158] OS is the abbreviation for "specialized worker" (*ouvrier spécialisé*), that is, a worker without affiliated qualification within a single, repetitive task.
[159] On becomings in relation to minorities and minoritarians, see *A Thousand Plateaus,* pp. 291-298 (*Mille plateaux,* pp. 356-367).
[160] This is an implicit reference to Rimbaud's *Une Saison en Enfer* (*A Season in Hell*, trans Louise Varèse (Norfolk, Conn: New Directions, 1952), p. 9. Deleuze, without and with Guattari, presents this quote very often, notably in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 379 (*Mille plateaux,* p. 470).
[161] This comment greatly resembles a famous article by Guattari, "J'ai même rencontré des travelos heureux", first published in *Libération*, 3 April 1975, and then collected in *La Révolution moléculaire* (Fontenay-sous-Bois: Editions Recherches, 1977), pp. 189-191. This text was translated by Rachel McComas and Stamos Metzidakis, published first in the "Polysexuality" issue of *Semiotext(e)* IV.1 (1981), pp. 80-81, and then in the collection Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-1977* (Los Angeles and Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e)/The MIT Press, 2009), pp. 225-227.