Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

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Obviously, I'm asking that you be extraordinarily patient, as at the moment we're just building our program. At the same time, it won't have escaped your notice that even as we build this program, we're already getting started on it. So, perhaps it's not so much a question of patience after all. Our starting point, well, our starting point last time, was a very simple one: it consisted in taking a set of splendid statements made by the first great filmmakers, which we still reread – if we reread them… – which we still reread with great enthusiasm, but all the time saying to ourselves, well, those were the good old days, meaning that nobody believes in these things anymore. But our question is, first of all, in what sense does nobody believe in them anymore? Why doesn't anyone believe in them anymore? And then, does this mean that we've given up, by dint of cinema's weariness and mediocrity, that we've given up on establishing any kind of new relation between the field of cinema and thought?

And last time, I was saying how early cinema would launch these declarations in three ways – declarations that today, once again, seem to us a bit like statements from a museum. Firstly, cinema as a new mode of thought; secondly, cinema as an art of the masses; and thirdly, cinema as universal language, or, as they sometimes called it, proto-language.

As we've seen, many things can be said to undermine the confidence of the first great filmmakers, particularly when it comes to the question of universal language. And among the commonplaces that immediately spring to mind, is the fact that the arrival of the talkies would clearly call into question its claim to be a universal language. What's more, when linguistics began to inform film criticism, when it inspired a certain critical conception of cinema in the form of semiology, it took as its target, as the object of its criticism, this supposedly naïve notion of universal language, and claimed to apply, or be forced to apply to cinema, categories of language that were infinitely more precise and that stripped it of its claim to be a universal language.

But in the end, it's not an intellectual event like linguistic analysis, however well applied, that can explain why we've lost our belief in cinema as a new mode of thought, as the art of the masses, as a universal language. And in line with the remarks of both Serge Daney and Paul Virilio, I spoke of an event that concerned us infinitely more directly, that is to say that the idea of cinema as an art of the masses presupposed that the masses become real subjects.[1]

And this is true not only from the point of view of a revolutionary cinema such as that of [Sergei] Eisenstein, it was also true of [Abel] Gance's cinema. Now, it doesn't take long to explain why the masses never managed to become subjects; that, on the contrary, cinema played a major role in conditioning them, and that, in the end, a political *mise-en-scène* was

able to rival the cinematographic *mise-en-scène*, and even made use of it. And that, in short, what sounded the death knell for cinema's original ambitions was plain, ordinary fascism, and as Daney says, the great manipulations of the state, the state's great *mise-en-scène*.

However true this may be, we're now faced with two problems: where did these hopes of early cinema derive from, and in what did they consist? In particular, as I was saying, we'll need to make a fairly precise examination of the relationship between the language system, language itself and cinema, before we can settle this question of universal language. But why and where did these hopes for a cinema that, for convenience, we can call "classical" come from and how did they develop?

Our second problem, on the other hand… whatever this bizarre alliance, the great Hollywood-fascism alliance that Virilio analyzes so well, consisted in – which doesn't mean that Hollywood was fundamentally fascist, but what it does mean is that fascism rivalled Hollywood, and experienced itself, at least in Goebbels' mind, as fundamentally competing with Hollywood, meaning in creating a *mise-en-scène* of the state the likes of which had never been seen before, and one that the Hollywood studios could never attain… On the other side of the coin, given that our modern cinema, after the war, would renounce the great Hollywood mise-en-scène and even constitute itself on the basis of this very renunciation, founding all of its new discoveries – think of Italian Neorealism, for example – on this very rupture, in this new direction that cinema was beginning to explore… Wasn't a new relationship between cinema and thought already being woven, a new cinema-thought relationship of a very particular kind that would be radically different from the first one?

Now, last time, I started to say a very simple thing: why is it that from its very beginning cinema would think, and sense, that it had a special relationship with thought? My answer will seem disappointingly simple, but perhaps, as we go along, we'll realize that it's not so simple after all. As I was saying, the very nature of the cinematographic image is to be *automatic*. It's the only, or at least it's the first automatic image, that is, endowed with self-movement. On the other hand, the image of thought – remember I tried to explain last time how thought presupposed an image of itself irreducible to its methods, meaning pre-existent to any method, and pre-existent to any functioning of thought according to a method… Well, on the other hand, the image of thought was inseparable from two automatisms. So, far from the automatic character of the image – the idea of which is quite simple – far from the automatic character of the image being deprived of thought, or of its power, as some people believed at the time of cinema's beginnings, *the automatic character of the cinematographic image would encounter not once but twice the automatic nature of thought.*

As I said before, we're all familiar with the first automatic aspect of thought. We're all familiar with it, yet we don't really know whether we can base a consistent category on it. Why? Well, the zones of automatism, the figures of automatism, are so varied in themselves, we can always group them under the general category of unconscious or subconscious mechanisms of thought. We've seen how these unconscious or subconscious mechanisms of thought range from dream states to other states of different kinds: suggestion, somnambulism, delirium. And no doubt, between all of these, there are very subtle transitions. But as far as I'm concerned, we still don't know whether there is a need to form a consistent concept of automatism in terms of all this. If there is, we could call it "psychological automatism" or "mental automatism," without yet knowing how many phenomena, and which ones, this category would cover. As I said before, the first attempts to constitute a consistent concept of

psychological automatism were made by [Pierre] Janet, around the same time as the advent of cinema, though without any influence from cinema – I only want to mark the encounter between the two – and by [Gaëtan de] Clérambault, under the name of "mental automatism". The major difference being that, for Clérambault, mental automatism is above all mental-neurological and not simply a psychological automatism, as it is for Janet.

To give you a clearer idea of how we're already beginning to group scattered elements together, I want to say how at the same time, or from the same time onwards, there were more and more attempts to express – with all the vagueness this notion of expression implies – a truly psychological automatism, or if you prefer, the unconscious mechanisms of thought. And several literary attempts to express such mechanisms were being made in a variety of directions, on the one hand, in Surrealism, with so-called automatic writing, and here I'm only really referring to the crudest aspects of automatic writing, it's only gradually that we'll see what automatic writing consists in. On the other hand, with... with [James] Joyce and the interior monologue, and these two are already very different, but then we could also add more recent experiments, for example, the cut-up method used by [William] Burroughs, which should also be compared with these attempts.

And yet, from its very beginnings, cinema has rightly or wrongly considered itself to be more capable than literature of expressing psychological automatism and the unconscious mechanisms of thought. And I insist, because – and I'd like you to reflect on this because it seems obvious to me – it's not by chance that the cinematographic image is an automatic image and that, from its outset, cinema has filled its images with characters that are either zombies, sleepwalkers, people under suggestion, or automatons. It's no coincidence that, from its beginnings, cinema thought itself capable of confronting the phenomena of dreams, mental confusion, delirium, and even the supposed visions experienced by the hanged and the drowned.

You immediately recognize the great themes of German Expressionism. As I said last time, you'll also recognize those of the pre-war French school, where [Jean] Renoir no doubt went very far in pushing the idea of populating the cinematographic image with automatons. But you'll find elements of this taste French cinema has for the mechanical automaton in all the great auteurs, starting with [Jean] Vigo, for example. And I would say that when a filmmaker as modern as [Robert] Bresson develops his theory of the cinematographic model as opposed to the theatrical actor, it’s no accident that he founds the basic character of what he calls the cinematographic model on everyday automatism.[2]

For me, this is already a fundamental difference between cinema and theater. There is no zombie theater, no automaton theater. But of course, yes, there is. There's no sleepwalking theater. Well, yes, there is, there clearly is, but since when? I would say that these things have existed since the invention of cinema. We might very well say that the famous *Cabinet of Doctor Caligari* [1920] is still theater, that it's still theatrical stage design. Well, on the one hand, that doesn't seem so obvious to me, yet on the other, the intrusion of delirium, of the automaton, of the sleepwalker, as the main character, is a sign of neo-expressionism itself, and not specifically cinematographic expressionism. And I think Bresson is fundamentally right when he says… he's not theorizing the model as opposed to the actor in general, he's theorizing the model as something intrinsic to cinema as opposed to the actor’s quintessentially theatrical character.

So, there's a link between the specificity of the cinematographic image as automatic and the contents that cinema will bring into play. This seems to me to be quite obvious, and to confirm our first point of departure, which is this well-founded encounter between the cinematographic image and the unconscious mechanisms of thought, or psychological automatism. And it's already in these terms that early cinema forms a kind of alliance, a marriage with thought.

You see, if you're following me, what I'm doing when I talk about building a program… you can see that in this part, small as it is, we've already gathered together a considerable number of paths for research, and when I tell you what I expect from you, things will be even simpler, since in terms of this topic alone, which seems to me to have its own coherence, we have a psychiatric direction, a literary direction, and a specifically cinematographic direction.

But I would say that, on the side of thought, "automatism" has always meant something else too. So, the first automatism, what did I say it was? It's… it defines a psychological automatism, that runs from dream to suggestion and so on, meaning that it defines a kind of *noetic matter*, a kind of noetic chaos – "noetic" here meaning only that which solicits thought, that which addresses thought, an object that addresses thought. But automatism also had a completely different meaning, and this time it was a grandiose automatism, an automatism that was logical and no longer psychological. And thought was dreaming of being able to establish a logical automatism that would ward off error.

So, when did thought enter this dream of a logical automatism that would ward off error? It's an old story, but not that old – because, I think, you can always find... It begins with the 17th century, when [Baruch] Spinoza, in his treatise, *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,* [1677], comes up with his great formula... he says, what the Ancients didn't conceive – which means that here he is clearly breaking with Aristotle – what the Ancients didn't conceive… – although the Ancients, in the development of syllogisms, in a logic that was already formal, did conceive a great many things. So, Spinoza is telling us what the Ancients didn't conceive, namely *to grasp thought as a spiritual automaton*, and to propose the great formula of thought as a spiritual automaton. Needless to say, here we're no longer on the side of psychological automatism. We've moved into logical automatism.[3]

I mean, ultimately, to simplify everything – but these are the kind of simplifications that should make you shudder – what lies on this horizon is the computer, or the artificial brain and so forth. They're on the horizon, and perhaps this horizon is not so far off. But one must be prudent. Here, we're no longer talking about the noetic matter that constitutes psychological automatism. This time, we're talking about a form of *noesis*. Noesis being the act of thinking, and automatism will be the form that noesis takes. It's like a higher automatism. And Leibniz is so, so seduced by Spinoza's term that he takes it up again, and in one of his texts, *New System of Nature* [1695], you'll find the affirmation of thought as a spiritual or mental automaton. Above all, you should not mix up Clérambault's mental automatism, which refers to the other aspect of automatism, with the mental or spiritual automatism of classical thought, which claims, on the contrary, to found the order of reasons and the order of logic within the sphere of thought.[4]

So, let's take a quick look at what Spinoza meant by spiritual automaton. Thought lies within us like a spiritual automaton. What he meant was that thought has the ability to concatenate its own ideas in a purely formal order, that is, independent of the nature of the objects they

represent. This is what formalism is. We would consider neither the existence nor the nature of the objects, the idea of which is formed by thought, and we would link ideas with one another according to relations of necessity, according to relations of internal necessity, independently of the representative content of those ideas. We would consider only the form of the idea, and this formal concatenation of ideas independent of the nature of the objects they represent would constitute spiritual automatism.

What does that mean? I would say that, in a way, this is what we call the "demonstrative order". So, we have to imagine that Spinoza was right in thinking that the demonstrative order had not yet reached its full formal development, even in a Greek thinker like Euclid, and that it was necessary to give it new traits on which to base its formalization. What were these traits? They're very simple. Spinoza asks us in what way an idea refers to another idea independently of content. In other words, in what way does one idea formally refer to another idea? His answer is quite simple, and it formed the basis of a whole system of geometry at the time, the need for a genetic geometry, in other words, one whose definitions would be genetic definitions.

In other words, an idea was not to be related to the object it represented, *it was to be related to its own cause*, and spiritual automatism is the concatenation of ideas according to cause and effect. Not according to causes and effects of things, but to *the notion that every idea has a cause which is another idea*. And the concatenation of ideas from definitions and according to genetic definitions is what constitutes formalism. What does this imply? I have the idea of a circle. It doesn't matter whether or not circles exist in nature. It doesn't really matter. What's more, it doesn't matter what the circle is in nature, that is, the causes of the circle. I have the idea of a circle as a figure, or a place of points that are situated at equal distance from a single point called the center. I adhere to the genetic definition of the circle because "place of points situated at equal distance" is indeed a definition, but it's the idea of a circle, that's all. It's the idea of a circle. What is the genetic definition? It is the movement of a straight line around one of its extremities.

But look how Spinoza insists on this, a circle has never been made like this in nature – supposing there are circles in nature, which again is something that doesn't concern us. In any case, we can be sure that they aren't made in this way. Physics or nature never proceed by a straight line – because a straight line is an idea, purely an idea – that is mobile around one of its extremities. So I'm going to link this idea to its own cause *as an idea*. And I will have a chain of ideas… [*Recording interrupted;* 32:04]

... the movement of a semicircle around its axis and so on. I will connect ideas in due order, as Spinoza says, in due order, independently of the existence of their object, and independently of the nature of their object. Why should I do this? Because *the idea will have a formal nature of its own*. And what is this idea in terms of its formal nature? It's the idea in relation to its own cause, this cause being perfectly fictitious from the point of view of nature but it doesn't matter. Yet, on the other hand, it is not fictitious from the point of view of my power of thought. The formal concatenation of ideas will therefore be dependent on a power of thought, the power of the spiritual automaton. And that's it in a nutshell.

Notice that we will need to go much further in this sense. Spinoza is not concerned about the nature of the object represented by the idea. Yet this doesn't prevent ideas from retaining an internal nature: the circle, the sphere, the straight line. We can conceivably go further: what

happens if we don't even consider the nature of the thing whose idea we are positing, or rather, if we don't even consider the nature of the idea itself? That's another case, but isn't it actually another figure of the spiritual automaton? I mean, in a way, we've left formalism behind to enter something else, but which perhaps realizes the spiritual automaton even more completely than does formalism: we've entered the realm of what, much later, will be called "axiomatics". Here, we consider elements the actual nature of which is not specified.

What does it mean to consider elements the nature of which is not specified? What I mean is very simple. What I mean is that, for you to get sense of the difference between formalism and axiomatics… this is an opportunity that, well, some of you already know it… but for others, it's an opportunity to learn something. Anyway, it's not difficult. Let me tell you, it's not difficult to understand.

I think that… whatever the elements under consideration, I claim "e R x". You'll tell me, but this is algebra. No, it's not algebra... maybe it required some algebra, but it doesn't matter - "e R x = x R e = x". Not difficult, eh? Capital "R" indicates relation. So "e Relation x"… "x Relation e = x". You see? Are these circles? Are they spheres? Are they straight lines? I'm not even considering the formal nature of the idea.

So what am I considering? Well, I define a formal structure, which is to say a set – and here, I'm only using one example so as not to complicate things, so in this case, I only have one relation – but, let's suppose I'm considering a set of relations between unspecified elements. Once I've defined my structure, I can always ask myself, just for fun: what effectuates this structure? I can always try to specify the elements, but I don't need to. So, let me ask you: there's something self-evident here, there's an element that's easy to specify, that responds perfectly to the relationship "e R x = x R e = x", and this is that "e = 0", "x" therefore being any number, and "capital R" being an addition… so we have a whole number, let's say, for the sake of simplicity, any whole number, with "capital R" being an addition. So, what you have is "0 + x = x + 0 = x".

You might well say, so what? Okay, okay. But it doesn't have to be whole numbers. It can also be displacements in space, in Euclidean space. It can be displacements in Euclidean space. Displacements in Euclidean space also verify "e R x = x R e = x". What is "e" in this case? At this point, "e" is what we call "identical displacement", identical displacement being that which leaves every point in space fixed. Now you can see the function of an axiomatic – and these aren't the only possible cases, are they? I'll take the two simplest cases – a structure that suits two completely unrelated fields: the addition of integers, and the composition of displacements in Euclidean space. You will say that you have constituted an axiomatic.

In this axiomatic, I have retained only one relation. It goes without saying that an axiomatic implies several relations that are subject only to the condition of their being independent of one another. Each axiom must be independent. And from several axioms, you can draw consequences, consequences that will apply equally well to the addition of integers, the composition of displacements in space, and many other things besides. Here we have a new figure of the "spiritual automaton." To put it simply, I would say this is *combinatorial*. It's no longer simply the demonstrative order that Spinoza invoked, it's a combinatorial order that is already what we find in Leibniz. That's why I say that artificial brains aren't far off, and this is something we will have to come back to.

But what do we find in a book that caused a considerable stir at the beginning of the 20th century, [Paul] Valéry's celebrated *Monsieur Teste*? Once again, it's an admirable text. But far from being a pioneering text, it's like a great presentation, the great completion of classical thought. And M. Teste is the bearer of a thought that develops in the manner of the spiritual automaton. And M. Teste explains that he is the bearer of a thought that lives on its own substance, its own thought, and he invokes the autonomy of the thinking function. He explains this autonomy, and here I'll read from the text: "He knows only two values" – M. Teste – "He knows only two values, two categories, those of consciousness reduced to its own acts"… "He knows only two values, two categories, those of consciousness reduced to its own acts: the possible and the impossible". Indeed, it doesn't matter if and in what way something exists in nature. Thought deduces its thoughts from one another or combines its thoughts with one another, as you prefer, independently of any question of their reality. "It knows only two categories, those of consciousness reduced to its acts: the possible and the impossible."

"In this strange head" – well, Valéry says something very odd – "in this strange head" – well, it's a strange brain, let's say – "where philosophy has little credit" – yes, yes, and yet it's philosophy that invented all of this, no matter – "where language is always on trial, there is scarcely a thought…" – no, I'm wrong of course, it didn't invent axiomatics... but then, the idea of the spiritual automaton, which M. Teste claims to be, clearly originates in philosophy, which makes M. Teste seem ungrateful, but he is in fact fundamentally ungrateful – "where language is always on trial, there is scarcely a thought that is not accompanied by the feeling that it is tentative; there exists hardly more than the anticipation and execution of definite operations. The short, intense life of this brain…" – that is, its thought – "The short, intense life of this brain is spent in supervising the mechanism by which the relations of the known and the unknown are established and organized". The spiritual automaton monitors "the mechanism by which the relations of the known and the unknown are established and organized".

And in *Monsieur Teste*, there is one page that seems very unusual to me, and that should be useful to us. Because I suppose… I suppose, that M. Teste is ill. I say "I suppose" because this doesn't appear to be formally stated in the text. What's more, I assume he's suffering from some incurable illness. And this incurable illness, even if he is a bearer of the spiritual automaton, reminds him from time to time… reminds him from time to time of what? Of another order, which is to say that M. Teste *suffers*. And he makes a rather odd speech once he's in bed, and he says: "I've..." – and there are the three little dots all the time, so we know he's stammering – "Nothing… much… Nothing but... a tenth of a second appearing… Wait... At certain moments my body is illuminated..." – while he is pure thought, the bearer of pure thought, the bearer of the spiritual automaton – "At certain moments my body is illuminated... it is very curious... Suddenly I see into myself…" – that is, into my body – "I can make out the depths of the layers of my flesh" – the body – "and I feel zones of pain, rings, poles, plumes of pain... Do you see these living figures, this geometry of my suffering?"

It's not the same as before. I'm very interested that M. Teste, that Valéry needs this... to the higher geometry of the spiritual automaton there corresponds another geometry, the geometry of suffering, the zones of pain, the rings, the poles, the plumes. "Some of these flashes are exactly like ideas." – yet they are the reverse of ideas – "They make me understand… from here, to there… And yet they leave me uncertain. Uncertain is not the word… When it is

about to appear…" – that is, the suffering M. Teste expects – "When it is about to appear, I find in myself something confused or diffused. Areas that are… hazy, occur in my being" – whereas the spiritual automaton, on the contrary, is all rigor and clarity – "I find in myself something confused or diffuse. Areas that are… hazy, occur in my being, wide spaces suddenly make their appearance. Then I choose a question from my memory, any problem at all . . . and I plunge into it" – I take from my memory, that is, from the spiritual automaton, I take from the spiritual automaton – "a question… a problem of some kind. I plunge into it... I count grains of sand... and so long as I can see them… my increasing pain forces me to observe it" – that's the pain – "my increasing pain forces me to observe it. I think about it!" – and here's what we needed – "I only await my cry, and as soon as I have heard it – the *object*, the terrible *object*…" – again the pain – "the *object*, the terrible *object*, getting smaller, and still smaller, escapes from my inner sight..." The cry is what has brought the two automatisms face to face. The confrontation of the two automatisms: for a brief moment, the neuro-psychic automatism and the logical automatism, the spiritual automaton, were locked in an embrace. And in this brief moment, the cry sprang forth. Okay.[5]

And wasn't there a need for that, the cry or something similar? Why? Because the spiritual automaton is the most beautiful thing that can inhabit us. The spiritual automaton is the god within us. But there's only one drawback to the spiritual automaton, and that is that it remains eternally suspended in pure possibility. It knows only two categories: the possible and the impossible. Spinoza will find a way out of this – here, I'll make a very brief aside for those who know Spinoza – Spinoza will find a way out of it because… but this will lead him not to shrink from a fantastic conclusion, namely that *all of the possible is real*. Just like that, it holds everything. But Leibniz won't be able to say as much, he won't be able to say that the possible is real. In any case, even if all of the possible is real, the spiritual automaton remains eternally suspended in its own possibility, which is the possibility of thinking.

And then there arises – and I don't want to mix things up, it's for you to see if all this is well-founded and necessary – then there arises, perhaps, a kind of cry, what last time I called a philosophical cry, for the moment it doesn't matter who said it, who uttered it. That we have the possibility of thinking "is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking". Indeed, that thinking is our logical possibility is something we all know. But does this mean that we think? That thinking is our logical possibility means that we have the spiritual automaton within us. Do we think? That we have the possibility does not guarantee that we are capable of it.

This beautiful text, which will have significant consequences, is, as many of you have recognized, the opening of Heidegger's *What is Called Thinking?* And here I'm not claiming to link it to Heidegger's own philosophy – we'll see, we'll see if we get there – but I'm extracting this text because it has some value for us in any case. That we have the possibility of thinking does not yet guarantee that and does not yet say that we are capable of it. In other words, what is it that sets the spiritual automaton in motion? We need something, in Heidegger's terms, we need something that *gives us to think*, otherwise we remain eternally in the possibility of thinking, nevertheless we still won't be thinking. In Heidegger's terms, we need something that gives us to think, otherwise we will remain in the category of the possible. Okay.

But isn't this where, quite independently of Heidegger, I will find something that interests me in terms of our question this year? I'd say that what gives us to think, what will give us the

ability to go beyond possibility… well, what would it be? You need a *shock*. You need a shock to set the spiritual automaton in motion. Not just any shock. It's not enough to hit it, because if you hit it, then you'll simply fall back into psychological automatism, meaning dizziness, or sometimes fainting, amnesia, aphasia. If you hit the spiritual automaton too hard, you fall back into mental automatism. You need something very specific, something that would be a *nooshock*. So we can always form this notion of *nooshock*. *Noos* is the Greek word for thought. A *nooshock*, well, a *nooshock*, would be that which gives rise to thought. Which takes us out of the simple category of the possible. Fine.[6]

Let me continue with my musings. Didn't cinema, which, as we've seen, somehow confronted psychological automatism, also have to confront logical automatism, the spiritual automaton? This seems much less obvious. And yet... Wouldn't cinematographic images, in certain cases, claim to rise to an order in which they would deduce one another according to formal sequences? Either that doesn't mean anything, or we'd have to say what these formal sequences are. I'll put forward a hypothesis: these formal sequences could be camera movements. The formal sequences, the passage from one image to another, would be camera movements, though not just any camera movements. In other words, is a theorematic cinema possible?

So, you could look for complicated things in abstract cinema. But that's not what interests me. It's not... no, it's not that. What interests me is precisely a phrase of Alexandre Astruc. Alexandre Astruc, who was both a filmmaker and a great thinker about cinema, said shortly after the war, in a text from 1949: “The expression of thought is cinema’s fundamental problem”. Well, I like the fact that he said that in 1949, because Gance and Eisenstein were saying the same thing earlier. But then came the war. So, after the war, Astruc maintained that cinema had only one problem: the expression of thought. And he says that with the war, something changed, and that before, cinema – he's being very cautious – silent cinema proceeded, rather, by the association of images, hence the importance of montage in this cinema. He says something very simple: silent cinema proceeded by the association of images, hence the importance of montage. We'll see what these associations were when we have occasion to return to this topic. And he says, now – you can immediately see how the text is precisely dated – this is the moment when we are completely hooked, following [Orson] Welles, on the discovery of depth of field. And to a certain extent, we believe – whether rightly or wrongly – that depth of field puts montage into the image, thus internalizing montage and, in the end, making it secondary.

And here's what Astruc adds: “More and more, we realize that the unfolding of a film no longer proceeds according to an association of images, but in the mode of a theorem”. A theorem… odd that he should use that word, isn’t it? Theorematic thinking. Cinema through depth of field, and through other... other procedures, would become a theorematic cinema whose formal sequences would be the camera movements. This will be of no surprise to the cinema experts – and this is what Astruc meant by his famous "camera-pen" theory – the camera-pen means something very precise, but which is not, it seems to me, the way we usually think about it: it's a cinema that would generate images no longer according to the association of ideas, but according to the formal sequences constituted by the camera movements.[7] [*Recording interrupted;* 1:01:45]

Part 2

... it would be a cinema of the spiritual automaton.

And, as I said last time… let's investigate a little, even here, you see, perhaps depth of field could be said to have two effects: a physical effect and a mental effect, a logical effect. Astruc spoke very well about the physical effect, when he said: "it's the snow-plough procedure", it's the snow-plough procedure. It's as if the camera plunged forward like a snow-plough and pushed to the sides… you see the way a snow-plough clears the road by digging in, dumping the snow on both sides. He says that this is how depth of field works, because the characters will no longer have lateral entrances or exits, they will enter and exit either from the background, at the end of the snow-plough's path, compressed by the snow-plough, or, what would be even more interesting, because it makes for a strange optical effect, from beneath the camera.

I'm thinking of I don't know which [Rainer Werner] Fassbinder film, where you can see this very clearly. It has a very curious shock effect. It's a scene – if any of you can remember the name of this film, it would help me…[8] – it's in a café, a German cabaret. In the background, there's a very pronounced depth of field, and in the background there's a scene taking place, a quarrel, a brawl, a fight. And the people in the café are afraid. And just as the camera tracks forward towards the characters in the background who are fighting, the frightened customers exit, from the front, you see? They exit precisely from underneath the camera. So you, as a spectator, experience the very interesting effect of being like a poor guy who enters the café and finds himself completely ignored by the people leaving and at the same time attracted by what's going on in the background. It's a very odd physical effect. Now, if I look for the mental, logical correspondent of the snow-plough effect, it will be the unfolding of images, no longer according to associations, but according to formal sequences constituted by the movement of the camera.

So, to sum up Astruc's proposal – and we should take this for what it is, just an idea, a minor idea – *cinema ceases to be associative and becomes theorematic*. Clearly, this is not the case, it's obviously not the case. Yet it's a good idea, and we will see why. As I was saying last time, this theorem structure… it seems obvious to me why [Pier Paolo] Pasolini, regardless of the question of depth of field, given that he's not a great fan of it… why Pasolini would entitle one of his greatest films *Theorem* [1968]. What does he mean by this? I would say there are two great theorematic films by Pasolini. Actually, in my view, all of Pasolini's work is theorematic. He's one of those filmmakers who have broken as far as possible with image associations, substituting them with something of a different nature, which in my view are the formal developments that bring together… or necessarily lead from one image to another.[9]

The two real shining examples of this, although they're quite different, are *Theorem* and *Salo* [1975]. And I add *Salo* for a very simple reason: whatever they may say, he is faithful to Sade. Because you know that Sade conceived these figures, these obscene figures, these figures, yes, these completely obscene figures, these perpetual pornographic figures, that he combined with the figures of a geometry, a type of geometry where a figure comes to embody the formal relations of a demonstration. And that's why you always have the narrator, who doesn't simply claim to be narrating, but to be making a genuine geometric demonstration, while the bodies, the poor bodies of the victims, form the appropriate figure for the demonstration. Sade's literature is fundamentally demonstrative in nature. There's always a demonstrative purpose, to the point where the Sadean heroes summon the victim to demonstrate – and they would not be happy if they couldn't inform her about the

demonstration, so that she can participate with full knowledge of the facts. Okay, so *Salo* is all about this kind of demonstrative procedure which will have terrible consequences.

And in another way, *Theorem*… in what sense is it a demonstration? If I tell you that in mathematics, as we've seen in other years – I mention this very quickly here – we take a problem, and then we consider the different cases of this problem… So, if I take – we spoke about this in previous years – if I take the problem, a famous problem such as the one we refer to as "conics", you have planes of conic sections, in different ways. These planes of conic sections, well, as sections, they can give you many things depending on their orientation. If it's parallel to the base of the cone, it'll give you a circle. If it's transverse, it'll give you an ellipse. If it coincides with a side, it will give you two straight lines. If it passes through the vertex, if the plane of the section passes through the vertex, the projection will be a point. Okay, so you've got several cases of the problem.[10]

So, I would say this is how he conceived *Theorem*. He gives himself the conditions of a problem: into a family comes a visitor from outside, and every member of the family will pass through this encounter. But in what form? Every member of the family will become the plane of a section. The first case, I don't remember the exact order… the first case will be the hysterical paralysis of the young girl. Then, erotomania, in the case of the mother; animalization in that of the father; the maid will experience levitation. And they will all pass through this. It may not seem important, but they will pass through real categories: faith in the case of the maid's levitation, art in that of the blindfolded son who urinates on his canvas, sexuality with the mother's erotomania, neurosis with... All these categories – neurosis, sexuality, animalization, faith… they will pass through all these categories as through so many demonstrative cases.

And try to understand what I'm saying here, otherwise it will lose all meaning: this is the opposite of a thesis-type film. Theorematic cinema has nothing in common with the thesis-type film. There is no thesis here, no more than a mathematician has a thesis. What we have is simply the possibility of substituting the necessary sequences in modern cinema for the old associations of images we found in early cinema. I don't need to say that… invoking some very, very different filmmakers… for example, what does the famous austerity and severity of [Robert] Bresson's cinema consist in? Apart from the obvious... And why does he require automatons instead of actors? His famous models. It's quite clear, it seems to me, that if we subject Bresson's images to the criteria of an association of images, they can only be understood to a very limited extent. Whether we're dealing with the development of a thought, with all the fragmentation of the world that implies, the violence done to the world and its associations and so on, I'd say that this is the opposite of a thesis-type cinema. It's a demonstrative or theorematic cinema.

George Comtesse: I have a comment about the film *Theorem*. In *Theorem*… I don't know if it's possible to simply inscribe Pasolini's film in terms of linkages, a more or less demonstrative sequence within a relative narrative, a relative theme that would be the erasure of the bourgeois family by the arrival of God, by the arrival of a simulacrum of God... Because it seems to me that in the film, there's something that can no longer be traced back to a narrative sequence, or even to a figure such as, for example, an ellipsis. There's a figure without cause... and yet there is an ellipsis in the film, or rather, there is a series of ellipses that break precisely, that constantly break the demonstrative linkages and even the narrative linkages. For example, it's not so much the effect of what's happening that's important. That's

not what's important to Pasolini, which is to say, it's not really a demonstrative sequence. The title itself is...

What's important is that in what's happening, whether with the maid, the girl, the mother, the father or the son… in what's happening, meaning in the event, there's an ellipsis in what's happening, and the ellipsis of what is produced in what occurs, and what we see afterwards presupposes precisely that ellipsis. In other words, cinema's thinking lies in the ellipsis itself, in the narrative ellipsis, an ellipsis of the sequence too, which we could say is geometric or demonstrative. We don't know what's going on, what has happened, and we only see the consequences of what has happened. We don't think about it, and it's almost unthinkable.

And yet Pasolini demonstrates the consequences of this – consequences which, because of the ellipsis itself, can no longer be reduced to the demonstrative sequence. For example, we don't know what happened to the maid, to the desire aroused in her by the visitor. We don't know. We only see the consequences of this, the consequences of the ellipsis, that is, she levitates above the house, she miraculously heals the child's face, she buries herself in the earth weeping, her tears sinking into the earth, that is, she mortifies herself, she rises even more in this incessant self-mortification. So, this mortification – and I'm only taking this example – this process of mortification, of course, is an effect, a consequence, but not a consequence that would be homogeneous to an event, to what happened in a linkage. It's the consequence of an ellipsis. And thought, if there is a cinematographic thought, it is precisely the thought of the ellipsis.

Deleuze: Yes. Okay. Is there anything else you want to say? Do you have anything else to add? That's good. I would add that when we talk about linkages, obviously that doesn't mean we know what happened. Obviously, I don't know what happened. That seems to me to be the very nature of the spiritual automaton. Maybe he knows, the spiritual automaton, but I don't, I myself don't know. It may be within me, but I don't know what happened. What I do know is that whatever has happened, it's of the order of necessity and not of association. That's where I think you're developing very different topics from mine – I don't claim, in fact, I've never claimed to be able to explain the essence of *Theorem* – I'm just taking one small aspect, a very small aspect that is useful to me. Now you're telling me, no, not only is there something else, but it's this something else which is essential. Well, I can give you full credit for that, since it's not my problem. As to what you've just said, literally speaking, you're absolutely right when you say that we don't know what has happened. But what we do know is that what has happened, has happened by virtue of a higher necessity. I don't mean a divine necessity, but a higher necessity.

To the point where, if I wanted at all costs to apply the schema I've now arrived at, but regarding which I can say that I absolutely agree with you in advance, this clearly doesn't exhaust the film, I'd say that the visitor from outside is really the equivalent, or he plays the role of a kind of spiritual automaton and that each case of the problem, each case, whether it's the girl and her hysterical paralysis, or levitation and so on, refers us back to an automaton of a different kind. Sometimes it's formal. The levitation is really presented… it's clearly an automaton, if you like, it's the spiritual automaton echoing itself, perpetually echoing itself, the spiritual automaton as sent from outside, and the different cases... [*Recording interrupted;* 1:18:12]

... I don't at all mean that these are things that can be understood, even at the level of classical thought. Because, of course, formal linkages can be understood. But what is absolutely not understood, and what is not to be understood in formalism, is what has happened in nature. What you call the ellipsis… in my view, I would make and give this the status of what actually happens in nature, and this will completely… it will completely fall into an ellipsis in the sense you intend, and yet it will somehow constitute the essential. What happened? How did it all happen? But none of this prevents it from being a cinema that no longer proceeds by… that I'd say no longer proceeds by association of images but perpetually moves from a spiritual automatism to a mental-physical automatism. It is entirely in this sense that I spoke of a theorematic cinema. So, first of all… it's hot in here, isn't it? It's nice. How can it be so well-heated? So we're just about to stop for a minute, we're about to have a break… but I'm just finishing because...

You see, I would say we have our two automata, automata that pertain to the image of thought. The mental automaton and the spiritual automaton. They belong… they're two fundamental dimensions of the image of thought. So now I come back to my question, since this is the last response I will have regarding this first part of our program: how does the cinematographic image relate to these two dimensions of the image of thought, the mental automaton and the spiritual automaton? And my sole answer for the moment is that, once again, it was inevitable… it was inevitable, since the specific character of the cinematographic image is its automatism. And insofar as it is automatic, it will, first of all, express the mechanism of the unconscious, which is to say mental automatism, in a way that is perhaps more complete than in any other art form – remember what Eisenstein said, once again, about how only cinema can adequately realize the interior monologue.

And secondly, because this image is automatic, and therefore capable of producing what Eisenstein would incessantly refer to as a "shock". And it is only because of its automatism that it is able to deliver the shock. It is capable of setting in motion the spiritual automaton that would otherwise remain a pure and simple logical possibility. Hence, from the outset, cinema has been capable not only of expressing the unconscious mechanisms of thought, but also of giving us the kind of shock that no longer constitutes the simple possibility of thinking, but that makes us *capable* of thinking. And you'll find these two themes – as we'll see later – you'll find them specifically in Eisenstein's cinema.

And so now I've arrived at an initial response regarding the way in which the idea of a new mode of thought was, through these two forms, through these two automatic forms, welded together with the cinema-image. And so I come back to the same question. Okay, but there was the war and so on, so what made us stop believing in it? You might say to me that some of the examples I've referred to come from the post-war period: Pasolini, Bresson... okay, okay, it's true they came after the war. But what happened is perhaps a complete reassessment of the relation between thought and cinema, given that the early confidence was broken. But as I say this, is it only at the level of cinema that this happened, or is it also at the level of thought? Because fascism, war and so on didn't just have a direct influence on the *mise-en-scène* of cinema, they also had a direct influence on thought. And what I called the image of thought has undergone constant mutation.

So there we'd have a second area of inquiry, namely: is it possible to identify a certain number of major mutations in the image of thought, mutations that would likely underpin cinema's new relation with thought? You see my question? Well, yes, it is. So the second part

of our program will be to study these mutations in the image of thought, and their consequences for the relation between cinema and thought. And what I'd like to propose to you – and this is where we'll have the opportunity this year to do as much philosophy as thinking about cinema – is that… I believe there are four fundamental points in relation to which this mutation has taken place, but at very, very different times, and it's these we will need to study. And we must immediately try to see if there isn't something in cinema that will tells us: ah yes, ah but of course, this has happened… this has happened in cinema too.

I would say that the first great mutation of thought – well, it wasn't the first time, it underwent many mutations – the first great mutation of thought is *the substitution of belief for knowledge*. What does a philosopher like Kant mean when he introduces a formula that will remain the Kantian formula par excellence: "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." How should we translate… is it faith or belief? Was he a particularly pious philosopher? No. Then he must have meant something very specific. He was pious, but not excessively so. I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith and to make room for belief.

The second great mutation is no longer the substitution of belief for knowledge, but the substitution of what we might call an *outside* – outside as in a real outside – of an incomprehensible outside for the intimate sense, or what we call inside. And so, in the work of certain authors that many of you are familiar with, and who are closer to us than Kant is, but who are perhaps in some ways dependent on him, there emerges a thought that presents itself as *the thought of the Outside* with a capital O. Whereas, until now, thought has always been linked to the intimate sense, now thought has broken off from that intimate sense, thought has broken off from the intimate sense and now claims and presents itself as a thought of the Outside, one that is eternally of the Outside and of an Outside impossible to internalize. What's more, as you've already guessed, this Outside has nothing to do with the outside world, it's infinitely more "outside" than the outside world. So, the second mutation concerns the thought of the Outside.

The third mutation concerns the reversal of the relation between thought and body. "Give me a body, then!" [Sören] Kierkegaard's *Diary of the Seducer*. "Give me a body, then!" with exclamation mark. It's odd that a thinker should cry out – for here we have a philosophical cry – "Give me a body, then!" After all, for a long time, thinkers tended not to have too much of a body. Either they pretended they didn't have one, or they warded off the body's solicitations, but you can't really imagine Socrates saying, "Give me a body, then!", can you? What happens when a philosopher, as a philosopher... No doubt it has something to do with the fact that he was one of those who substituted belief for knowledge. He says, "Give me a body, then!" So if he needs to believe in something, he needs to believe in the body.

But why would we need to believe in the body? We shouldn't think that this concerns only the philosophers and no-one else. Maybe it's the situation we're in: we have a great need to believe in the body, even though it sometimes does very unfortunate things. It sometimes leads to body cults – believing with the means we have! – body cults, body ceremonies, body Olympics. But perhaps this need to believe in the body also passes through other channels. Does this mean you don't have one, the fact that you need a body? Yes, I need a body. Maybe cinema will manage to mount the camera on a body. It's not easy to mount a camera on a body. What kind of cinema would that be? Is there a cinema of the body? Is there a cinema of bodies? I'm not sure yet.

I remain with this mutation of thought, within thought. Substitute the body for the categories of thought, meaning that the real categories are the attitudes of the body. You'll tell me that they are materialists? Well, no! That's the beauty of it, it's men of faith, like Kierkegaard. “Give me a body, then!” They might be idealists, they can be whatever you want, they can be materialists, this would apply to all of them: we need a body. Nietzsche, Nietzsche needs a body. In other words, I'm mixing up authors who aren't alike. At least they find each other. That means that it is no longer up to thought to judge life. Thought has done away with its old task of judging life. On the contrary, *it's now thought that must introduce itself into the categories of life*. But why? Undoubtedly to be able to believe! To believe in what? To believe in life! And why do we have to believe in life? All this becomes a series of problems.

And then there's a fourth mutation, which I hardly dare to mention, because it's a very complicated business and perhaps it hasn’t yet taken place. It takes the form of “Give me a brain, then!” Give me a brain, then. Why? Again, for better or for worse. Video clips… right. Give me a brain, then. What does this mean? Is there a mutation? Not in the brain itself, because it’s of no importance to me if there are mutations in the brain itself. But is there a mutation in our *relation* with the brain? That would be the fourth mutation. All right, then. In all four cases, I ask in the same way, is there a cinema of the brain?

I'd just like to... because here we’re constructing a program… I don't think modern cinema will prevent me from also focusing on philosophy. But in modern cinema, the poles are very... there is a very great cinema of the body. How does the cinema of the body work? It's not at all a cinema that is lacking in thought. No, no, no, no, it's a mutation of thought. The cinema of the body… but it’s something we’re already used to, and it's already a lot, it’s the cinema that substitutes narration with attitudes of body and with the linkage of bodily attitudes... Here! There would be a linkage of body attitudes. Ah, look! A linkage of body attitudes. That confirms it. There would no longer be an association of images, there would be a linkage of bodily attitudes. There's no longer a story being told; a linkage of body postures replaces the narrative.

What is this, what is this cinema? Cinema of the body, mounting a camera on the body… I don't mean... it undoubtedly implies a certain direct cinema, you can always mount cinema… I mean a camera, on the body, like in the early films of [Andy] Warhol, fine. But then things get complicated. It's not enough. What is this cinema where there are no longer stories, but a linkage of postures, where the formal linkage of bodily attitudes has become the theorematic, demonstrative force of thought? So much so, in fact, that there is no longer any narrative at all, or if any remains... here I see a great tradition, one of the greatest in my opinion… one of the greatest American filmmakers today is [John] Cassavetes. I think he has had a fundamental role in the invention of a cinema of the body and of bodily attitudes. Do you understand what that means? He'll break up space, he'll only keep what's important to the body, what's important to the body in relation to such and such a posture, in relation to such and such an attitude. It's a completely different conception of space.

In France, [Jean-Luc] Godard and [Jacques] Rivette have been at the root of a cinema of bodily attitudes. Think of the splendor of *L'amour fou* [1968]: the couple who cloister themselves, in the middle of *L'amour fou*, the couple who cloister themselves and go through all the attitudes. He will link attitudes together: attitudes of madness, amorous attitudes, aggressive attitudes, and so on. Magnificent! The splendor of these linkages of attitudes. Is this theater? No. It's a cinematic theatricality that's the complete opposite of theatrical

theatricality. Although you can do it in the theater… if they do it in the theater, it usually doesn't work, or at least it would be cinematic theater. This kind of theatre belongs to cinema.

And Cassavetes takes this very far, as does Godard, except that this will create its own danger. Everything, everything, every time there's a new solution there will be danger... because we're all tired, profoundly tired, of witnessing certain stereotyped postures in the cinema of the body. The stereotypical posture we now see in nearly every film is a more or less tired body, because fatigue will be a major category of the mind. Fatigue becomes a category of the mind. The attitudes of the body are the categories of the mind. And the problem of thought cannot be conceived independently of fatigue. And the problem of thought cannot be conceived independently of waiting. Fatigue, waiting, these are categories of the mind. Okay, but we too are sometimes tired, fed up with seeing these bodies propped against a wall and then letting themselves slide, or crouching down – once in a while, we say to ourselves, it's okay. It can even be splendid once, twice, but then when it becomes the slogan, the trademark of every film in this trend, you start to get fed up, especially if it happens several times during the course of a film. We'd like to say, we've got it, it's the archetypal posture. You see, you can practice at home, you lean against a wall, and then you slide down, and then something happens, you go from despair to hysteria – a hysterical scene on the floor, while just before you were like that against the wall, okay.

But among the great filmmakers of the body who succeeded Godard and Rivette, in the younger generation, what we call the post-Nouvelle Vague, you'll find extremely different ways – I'm grouping them here, but we'll have to... later, we'll see, we'll have to analyze their differences – I see above all Chantal Akerman. Hers is a cinema of postures and attitudes and the linkage of attitudes. Here, formal linkages of attitudes replace all associations of images. [Jean] Eustache… Eustache. [Jacques] Doillon. And the greatest of them all, it seems to me [Philippe] Garrel… Garrel, who doesn't simply make a cinema of attitudes, but has done something prodigious, I think, the effects of which we haven't finished exploring. In other words, he has used the cinematographic image to really produce a cinematographic *constitution* of bodies. That's why he needs Mary, Joseph and the child. It's the problem of the three bodies. It's the problem of three bodies in cinema. But he will show us something prodigious in this sense, which in my opinion has never had an equivalent in cinema: how beginning from the black image and the white image, and their combination, bodies constitute themselves cinematographically.

Now, I would say this is essential for cinema, because one of the objections that theater… that lovers of theater make against cinema, has always been: Ah yes, but you lack the presence of bodies, the presence of the actor, you lack the presence of bodies in cinema. And in some very fine texts, [André] Bazin took up… Bazin took up this point, and he wondered to what extent it was true that cinema lacked, missed the presence of bodies, and to what extent there actually was a presence of bodies in cinema. Of course, there isn't. I mean, that's not the problem. Not only is there no presence of the body in cinema, but cinema must turn it into a virtue, must turn it into a power. The power that cinema must make of it is to cause us to witness, beginning from the black image and the white image, or the snowy image, the process of bodies *taking on consistency*. And to have produced this consistency of bodies means that, for me, Garrel has since the beginning been one of cinema's greatest filmmakers, and that his work will have long-term repercussions that have no equivalent. And I would say that this forms a group of… Let's say, in America, well, the greatest in America is

Cassavetes. If you look at a Cassavetes film, there may or may not be a story, but you'll see that what he presents us with is a theorematic linkage, a theorematic linkage of a very particular kind: the linkage of bodily attitudes.

But again, as I want to build up my bibliography for you, so that you can take what is useful to you, we'll see how... There is one author who has said some very profound things on this question, namely Brecht, who tells us that there are linkages of body attitudes that are perhaps already essential to theater, and more essential, more important than – well, we'll come back to that next time, I've already said too much – much more essential than the subject, than the theme. And he had a particularly apt word to describe such linkages of attitudes, linkages of bodily attitudes, linkages of postures: he calls them *gestus*. And I believe that the Brechtian conception of *gestus* is infinitely more important than the more famous conception of distanciation, and that Brecht's theater is a theater of *gestus*. Now, perhaps at the time, he was approaching something that was predestined for cinema, and *gestus* is indeed...

Take the latest Godard film, *Prénom Carmen* [1983], it's the very epitome of a cinema of the body. There's the burlesque, comic side, the bodies bumping into each other, the scene of the two lovers each trying to grab, literally grab the other, to wedge them in a window or a door, bang and there's a slamming. The body is not just a visual power, it's a sonic power. All these blows, this mixture of embraces and blows, is the burlesque of this cinema. At a deeper level, there's the *gestus*, in other words, the formal linkages from one attitude to another. Well, we'll look at this in more detail at a later stage.

And I would also say, isn't there also a cinema of the brain? Well, I find that categories are always well founded, but one might say that each case is very different. Clearly, Garrel and Akerman don't have much in common. But so what? Neither do Victor Hugo and Gérard de Nerval. But in my view, this doesn't mean that the category of Romanticism isn't well-founded. Okay, then. The Nouvelle Vague seems to me a perfectly valid category, if you're able to define its criteria. I think one only has to discover the relevant criteria. In this case, the criteria given by a cinema of the body and of bodily attitudes and linkages of attitudes, authorizes me to group together, whatever their differences, authors as different as Akerman and the other three I mentioned, under the label of post-Nouvelle Vague.

And in my view, there would also be a cinema of the brain, which is something else entirely, a new relation with the brain, and that's good, because in homage to America, just as I mentioned a great American filmmaker in terms of cinema of the body, here for a cinema of the brain I can think of another great American filmmaker – if we want to immediately understand this innovation – and that would be [Stanley] Kubrick… it's definitely Kubrick. But here in France, here in France the cinema of the brain would be the other pole of the Nouvelle Vague. One of the greatest filmmakers of a new cinema of the brain is [Alain] Resnais… clearly, it's Resnais. So, what do I mean by a new relation with the brain? I mean that all this brings into play the difference with pre-war cinema, another field that concerns me here. Because, after all, pre-war cinema already had a relation with the brain, just as it had a relation with the body.

So please understand what I'm saying: what I'd like to do in the second part of my program is to study the four mutations of thought. We might have found six, eight, it doesn't matter…

four will already be exhausting enough, four mutations of thought: the mutation of belief, the mutation of the Outside, the mutation of the body, the mutation of the brain.

And it's through these four mutations that we'll be able to pose the question: isn't there a new relation, as profound as the former one, between thought and cinema, and which may have replaced the old one that nobody believed in anymore? According to which… I don't know about you, but I'm exhausted, I think we need a pause, this time six minutes… six minutes, and then, and then I... [*Recording interrupted;* 1:45:59]

... to complete the program, we have to examine these four mutations and then see what can be found in cinema in relation to these mutations. So, what I'd like to avoid, obviously, is – but I won't succeed in doing so – to make arbitrary comparisons. So, what counts in what I'm about to tell you isn't simply that Kant said such and such a thing… what counts is almost the mental contexts this entails.

Because… I'll try to comment on the first mutation: the substitution of knowledge by belief. Because it was very important for philosophy, when little by little, and in several ways, belief came to replace knowledge. And once again, does this mean we've all suddenly become pious? Obviously not, no. But it's a strange adventure. And it is an adventure. I've suggested it before, but we've never really studied it closely. These things never happen only once. In my view, it's something that has been done on four major occasions, and each time always in a couple.[11]

It was Pascal and Hume, first of all, two authors who seem to be very, very different, who made this rather prodigious substitution, which consisted in saying to philosophy: you've always taken knowledge as your model… well, the time has come for a real change. One has to realize that knowledge depends on belief. Now, the first of these authors is known to be a Christian, but the other we know to be an atheist, or almost an atheist. Well, actually, it's not so clear in his case. But anyway. So it's not as simple as saying, Ah well, this is religion taking over philosophy. No. It's as an atheist, or a quasi-atheist, that Hume will tell us that knowledge depends on belief.

The second time it happens, it's with Kant and Fichte. And Kant is a man who attaches great importance to religion. The case of Fichte is more complicated. In some respects – and we have to be very careful here – there is, perhaps, something resembling a Fichtean atheism. And then, a third time, again in the form of a couple, with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In this case there is no equivocation. One wished to be the Knight of Faith, and of faith in the Christian sense of the term, while the other would have liked to be the Antichrist.

And then in France, there are two authors who, if I have time, I'd like to tell you about, because they've fallen into obscurity, but they repeat the same story... This is [Charles] Renouvier and [Jules] Lequier, both authors from the late 19th century. Obviously, it's difficult to compare them. They're not as brilliant as the others, but it's still very interesting… it's always interesting to try and dig up authors who have disappeared, for who knows what reason, Renouvier having had a huge influence on French philosophy at the end of the 19th century, and Lequier being a very unusual thinker in his own right. And Lequier was deeply inspired by spiritualism, whereas Renouvier practiced a kind of modern atheism. You see how each time we encounter these couples. So, my question is... I'm trying to help you

understand what is at stake in this relation belief-knowledge.[12] [*Recording interrupted;* 1:50:56]

Part 3

Take the example of Hume. Hume says something very odd. He says, Listen, there isn't much of a problem in the case of knowledge. It's not a question of knowing what we know or what the limits of knowledge are. It's about knowing what occurs in everyday life. He claims to be a philosopher of the everyday. This philosophy of the everyday will lead to the formation of a concept, dear to English philosophy, one of the most beautiful concepts in philosophy, the concept of *habit*. And Hume tells us, if you look, if you contemplate your days… an ordinary day – imagine this is Hume talking to you – but you know nothing, you know… you know nothing. On the other hand, you are constantly believing. Why are you constantly believing? You never stop believing, you never stop believing. You bow to belief all day long. Why do you do this? It all depends on what one means by "belief." And perhaps Hume will be the first philosopher to give a profound and original definition of what we call "belief".

He says that to believe is to affirm, on the basis of what is given, something that is not given. In other words, *to believe is to go beyond the given*. Good. The operation by which I go beyond the given is called an *inference*. To believe is to infer. Our condition, meaning the human condition, says Hume – and this should shed some light on what we would call "empiricism", because empiricism is not what we think it is – Hume tells us this: I never cease, whatever I do and whatever I say, I never cease to go beyond the given. It's enough for me to say "tomorrow", or for me to say "a thousand years ago", each time I go beyond what is given to me, that is, I believe. I believe water will boil if I turn it up to a hundred degrees. Okay.

But when I use words like "always" or "tomorrow", what am I doing? By definition, these are not given. "Always" is neither given nor can be given. "Tomorrow" can be given only on the condition that it becomes "today", which is no longer tomorrow. If you analyze language, as English philosophy did long after Hume, you'll see that language is made up of signs that refer to determinations that are not given and that cannot be given. I believe the water will boil if I put it to a hundred degrees. All that I can say, all that is given to me, is "I've done it ten times", or "I've done it a hundred times". I can say that every time I've done this, it has boiled. That's a given. But that's not sufficient, it's never sufficient to say that every time I've done it, it's worked. I say that it will continue to work. Hume will ask no more. We might say that this is a matter of "experience". Hume sneers at us. How can we expect experience to account for operations that go beyond experience? It's not complicated. How do you expect the given to account for the operation by which I infer something that is not given? In other words, I know nothing, but "I believe".

So the whole problem of knowledge has shifted. The real question is: *on what condition is a belief legitimate?* Hume doesn't say that perhaps tomorrow, at a hundred degrees, the water will no longer boil. Instead, he asks: By what right, by what right am I sure that it will boil at a hundred degrees tomorrow? If you tell me: because it's always boiled at a hundred degrees, my response will be, And after? What right have you to believe that the future will conform to the past? To believe is to assert something that is not given. But we spend all our time asserting things that are not given. *Our actions never cease to exceed the given.*

So that empiricism, far from being a philosophy which tells us to content ourselves with the given and no more, is a philosophy that will list all the operations by which we go beyond the given, in order to question their legitimacy. By what right do I assert more than what is given to me, how is such a thing possible? And Hume… his case is very rare, because usually philosophers are old, they are late starters, whereas Hume is the only philosopher to have done his important work at a very young age… by the time he was twenty, he had all his ideas in place. He's the only such case. Kant, on the other hand, was already sixty when he had most of his ideas. But if I'm speaking about this now, it's merely to tell you that here we have a case where the problem will indeed shift from knowledge to belief. What this is going to tell us is that our situation is impossible, thus it will develop like a novel, a magnificent novel.

Hume will say, that would be too perfect, if the question became: under what conditions is a belief legitimate? You see, the problem is no longer that of what is true and what is false. The problem is the legitimate conditions for belief. So, okay. From one discovery to the next, he came to realize that there are conditions for the legitimacy of belief. For example, believing that water boils at one hundred degrees and will continue to do so tomorrow is legitimate. And he will try to demonstrate this. On the other hand, in his view, the idea that God created the earth is an illegitimate belief. He doesn't say that it's irrational. He says simply that it doesn't meet the conditions of legitimacy of belief. But then he adds, You can't… and this is what is so marvelous, the choice is in fact theoretical, because we cannot exercise our beliefs, our belief, according to conditions that make it legitimate without, whether we like it or not, *opening the door to beliefs that are illegitimate*. This will be very, very important for philosophy, meaning for the problem of thought. And for a very simple reason: the problem, once again, is no longer that of being true or false, it's no longer a question of error or truth. It is a question of legitimate beliefs against illegitimate beliefs, and the possibility or impossibility of separating them, of sorting them out.

So much so that Hume, as is well known, would have a very great importance… a very great influence on Kant. And yet it's incredible how different their ways of thinking are. But then, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* [1788], no, sorry, in the second introduction – there are two introductions – in the second introduction to *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant proposes this formula that will have a great echo, an echo that will be fundamental: "I had to…" – we have to read this "I had to" literally, since it implies that he didn't do it for pleasure. Hume is diabolical, so in his case it must be for pleasure... but not Kant, not at all. If he could have kept knowledge, that's what he would have preferred. But he can't: "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith".

This seems an odd thing to say, but what's he talking about? Well, Kant never wrote books about faith. What's more, when he did write about religion, it was in a weighty tome entitled *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* [1793]. So… what does he mean? Well, what he means, I think… he means this – if you follow, I'll take an example almost in the negative to try to… because it's so complicated, I'd like you to understand – basically, in 17th century classical philosophy we can say there was error and truth. Truth was the vocation of thought. What prevented it from attaining this were other faculties: sensibility, imagination. But if it could succeed in overcoming the prestige of sensibility and imagination, it would evolve into truth. And this indeed would be the spiritual automaton.

Kant then discovers something that makes us shudder, namely, no longer the domain of error, but *the domain of illusion*. And *illusions do not come from outside the mind*. It's as if Kant were saying: Ah, if thought only had to guard against errors that come from elsewhere, from the pressure of sensibility or the pressure of imagination, life would be beautiful. But that's not it. *It is thinking as the exercise of reason that itself engenders illusions*. In other words, *there are illusions of reason*. Not illusions that reason undergoes, but illusions of a peculiar nature that reason engenders and that are far more dangerous than errors. Here too, you would think that the image of thought would be completely overturned by a conception like this. There will be ideas, illusions, generated from within reason, that are internal to thought. From that point on, these illusions will be so tenacious... [*Recording interrupted;* 2:04:24]

... perhaps now we might be able to understand the relation of knowledge and belief. Undoubtedly, it's with Kant that we have a great act of rupture, a great act of rupture. I put it this way merely for the sake of convenience… all this becomes very dangerous if it's said too quickly. It seems to me that, with Kant, *man breaks with nature or the world*. And in this respect, Kant is very fundamentally modern, even if this rupture was hidden away, disguised and so on, but from then it will never cease to worsen, this rupture between man and the world, as if, as if, as if it was schizophrenia that was beginning. A huge rupture. Okay, then.

Why Kant? Because what he attempts to show is that our knowledge is condemned to grasping only sensible nature. We cannot know anything other than sensible nature. Why can't we? Because it is sensible nature that is informed, organized, in accordance with our categories of thought, in accordance with our ways of thinking. Knowledge is an act of thought, but this act is not legitimate – and here we find the question inherited from Hume: under what conditions is something legitimate? Knowledge is an act of thought that is legitimate only insofar as it addresses sensible nature.

Well, you will tell me, this isn't a great state of affairs. Yes. It depends. Kant shows this in his own way, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But there' is another nature, suprasensible nature. Suprasensible nature is *nature as it is in itself*, as opposed to *nature as it appears* in sensible form. Well, suprasensible nature, or what he calls "the thing in itself" as opposed to the thing as it appears… suprasensible nature is something we cannot know. Yet it can be thought. This is the first time that the model of knowing [*connaissance*], that is, of knowledge [*savoir*]… this will be the first time that the model of knowing or of knowledge does not exhaust thought. It's the first time that "knowing" will be simply a dimension of thought, which includes other dimensions. Knowing is a specific organization of thought when it takes sensible nature as its object, end of story. Knowing does not exhaust thought. Knowing is a *case* of thought. So there are thoughts that are not a question of knowledge, and indeed, we think suprasensible nature without knowing it.

But there has to be a relation between the two natures, suprasensible nature and sensible nature. Yes. There has to be a relation. But this relation is unknowable. It's this relation that refers to faith. In other words, there is a faith of reason. There is a faith of reason *as* reason. Just as there are illusions of reason as reason – when reason thinks it can know suprasensible nature – there is also a faith of reason as reason, when reason *thinks* suprasensible nature and thinks its relation with sensible nature.

I would say that what occurred is that this constituted the essence, the essential aspect of knowledge. The essence of knowledge was a kind of man-world or nature-spirit balance, a

kind of complicity between thing and concept, nature and spirit, world and man, such that truth was embodied in knowledge in the form of a correspondence between thing and concept, man and world, as a complicity of the two. I believe that the condition of knowledge throughout philosophy, including Greek philosophy up to the 17th century, was this complicity between man and nature, man and world, which made – or if you prefer, image and concept, it's the same thing – the exercise of knowledge possible.

So, of course, it was possible to believe, but what did believing consist in? Believing meant one of two things: either believing in another world or believing in the possibility of transforming this world. So, in a way, the primacy of knowledge delegated this privileged domain to belief: either believing in the possibility of transforming the world or believing in another world. Okay.

Well, what is our situation today? I'd like to finish on that note, just so you think about it. There's something here that makes me think that from a certain point of view it no longer matters whether one is atheist or. Why is that? We're in a very strange situation with the world. What we're asking for and demanding are *reasons to believe in this world*.[13] Do you realize: we've stopped believing either in another world, or in the possibilities of transforming this one. What we ask for is something far simpler, exactly as though we were afflicted with a universal schizophrenia or a universal hypochondria. You know, in hypochondriacal delirium, there's no more world, no more body, no more organs. Or in schizophrenia, where it's much more in the form of – not exactly negativism – but world-flight, loss of world. That's the state we find ourselves in. Of course, not to the point… not to the point of it being pathological, but we need, we need reasons – something that has never been asked of philosophy before – we need reasons to believe in this world. How odd. That's what we demand.

So it's no longer a question either of believing in another world or of believing in the possibilities of transforming this one. It's no longer Christian faith, or revolutionary faith. I'd say that the Christian faith and revolutionary faith that we once found in cinema – because there's a deep Christianity in Western cinema, just as there was a revolutionary faith in Soviet cinema – well, I'm not saying that cinema has ceased to be Catholic or revolutionary, but it has completely changed the figures of its Catholicity and its... and its manner of being revolutionary. It's not the same as in early cinema. Why not? Because, once again, what we need is for something to give us reasons to believe in *this* world. But why? Why should we?

Well, here what I'd like to say will seem the most obvious things in the world, namely, commonplaces, the commonplaces we find everywhere these days. We live in a world that we're told… a world that is made up of what? That is made up of advertising, slogans, artifice. We are told… you can take all the commonplaces of this epoch, and for me they can be interesting as a diagnostic tool. There's no more nature, there's no longer anything… there's no... everything is shoddy and fake. It's all just billboards. What does this mean? Both inside and outside, we're worth nothing more. The misery of the outside world is also the misery of our inner world. Slogans are as much in our heads as they are in the billboards, aren't they? All these packaged things, oh dear, what a disaster they are. Okay.

After [James] Joyce, one of the greatest novelists of all time, [John] Dos Passos, was the first to make a real revolution in the interior monologue. But what did Dos Passos' revolution in the interior monologue consist in? In creating an interior monologue that was full of ready-

made formulas, stereotypes, everything. And it's not by chance that he called upon cinematographic techniques. It was with his famous "camera eye" and his renowned "newsreels" that Dos Passos filled his interior monologues, the same misery inside and outside. Here, one cannot even distinguish between what comes from the outside world and what is an interior stream of consciousness. It's not just TV that imposes slogans on us, it's also the slogans that are imposed on TV, we find the same bullshit outside as there is inside. Okay. All right. So, we demand reasons for believing in the outside world as much as in the inside world.[14] We can no longer go on with this lack of belief.

The situation is highly paradoxical. Because the more this world is made by man – through technology, science and what have you – the more we find ourselves at odds with it, and the less reason we have to believe in it. *The more human this world becomes, the more we are at odds with it, and the less reason we have to believe in it.* This is our painful condition as creatures of modernity.

Our ancestors – think of the difference between us and our ancestors – our ancestors, it's not that they were particularly happy, but they believed in another world, they wanted reasons to believe in another world, or they asked for reasons to believe in the possibility of changing this one. We, on the face of it – I hope this isn't our last word, that would be too much, it would be very sad – we, on the face of it, are long past all that. As [Samuel] Beckett says, that's the old style. The modern style is: at least give me reasons to believe in this world. And if I need God, and if I need to say "O my God", and if I need to say a prayer – that's why the atheist and the believer are exactly in the same bag, oddly enough, it's not so as to address myself to the other world, it's to be given… it's so that whatever God will give me reasons to believe in this world and not the other world. That's the schizophrenic situation, which is ours. It's ours. It's the rupture between man and the world.

Well, you might say, all this stems from Kant. But in what way? Try to feel the substitution of belief for knowledge. The ultimate effect of this substitution of belief for knowledge – well, at the moment, I'm not saying... The ultimate effect is that we're now in the position of having to ask for reasons to believe in *this world*. That's all we're asking for, reasons to believe in this world. And, once again, understand the paradox: the more the world is made by man, the more we lack reasons to believe in this world.

You might say, well you may be right. But what has this got to do with cinema? Well, I think that's what it has lived on, that's what modern cinema lives on. Here's a text by Godard that I find very striking, about one of his first films, one of his finest in fact, which was *Bande à part* [*Band of Outsiders*, 1964]. He says: people criticize my characters for playacting, making bad cinema [*faire du cinema*] in *Bande à part*, but that's not true. My characters are free and spontaneous, it's the world that is like a bad movie. I think that's exactly it. It's the world that's like a bad movie. The characters I show don't make bad movies. On the other hand, I show the world making bad movies. We no longer have any reason to believe in the world, because it's the world that makes bad cinema. That's all it does, the cinema of politicians, the cinema of TV, the cinema of cinema, the cinema of everyday life, the cinema of the domestic scene, the cinema of anything you like, cinema by car, cinema on foot, cinema on horseback. In short, the world is bad cinema. It's clearly bad cinema.[15]

I ask you, what is it that can give us back some reason to believe in the world, in this world? The answer is simple: perhaps only cinema… – if it's the world that makes bad cinema and

takes away all reason for believing in it – perhaps cinema itself can give us some reason to believe in the world. So, the question of cinematic illusion would no longer be: Does cinema give us an illusion of the world? Or: Are we imaginary participants in the hero's adventures? The whole problem that has encumbered thinking about cinema and cinema criticism regarding imaginary participation seems an idiotic problem, completely stupid! The real question would be: Is cinema capable of restoring our belief, not in the world – since it's the world that makes bad cinema – but of restoring our belief in the *link*, the lost link between man and the world. For me, that would be the highest purpose of cinema, to give back to us… to give back to us reasons for believing in this world, that is, reasons for believing in the link between man and the world.

I'll take one example, because I think this is one of the figures who most had to confront this problem, and that's [Roberto] Rossellini. Rossellini made a film about Joan of Arc, which was *Joan at the Stake* [1954], after [Paul] Claudel, and which was, it seems to me, sadly misunderstood, and was considered a wrong turn for Rossellini. And we see that the film is divided… – so obviously, it's funny, because it's well known that Rossellini was a Catholic, and that his cinema has a strongly Catholic dimension – but here he shows us Joan of Arc in Heaven. So it was roundly mocked by the critics, this celestial Joan of Arc, talking about herself the way she was on earth, but no, it's not that Rossellini lost his mind. When you see the film… for me it's a beautiful, grandiose film, and it can be explained... no, not explained, it's actually quite simple, quite simple. Joan of Arc needs to be in Heaven *in order to believe in this world*. There's nothing complicated about it. You see that this… this is what he saw, which is a marvelous, quite marvelous thing. And indeed, she needs to be in Heaven in order to believe in the tattered shreds of what happened to her on earth.

Is this just my interpretation? No. Because it seems to me so much of a piece with Rossellini's thinking. Rossellini never stops saying that, for him, art is finished. But why does he say that art is finished? He says that art – and he's not the first to say this, there was already [Leo] Tolstoy, and there have been other great artists responsible for this revolution in thinking – he says that what is needed is an ethic, an ethic. In any case, he thinks that art is incapable of providing this ethic. What does he expect from an ethic? Hence all his final work, all his pedagogical work, whose goal would be to reconstitute, as it were, an ethic. Why does he think art isn't...? Here, he has some very cruel things to say about art, and each time we say to ourselves, of course... It's wonderful. You find it in all of Rossellini's interviews.[16]

He says that most of the time art is either aggressive or self-pitying. And that seems to me to be true, it's... Of course, he's talking about bad art, but bad art counts, because it constitutes most of what is produced. They're either aggressive and mean, or plaintive and self-pitying, whiny. Who is he referring to? Well, even musicians, even painters. There can be a way of whining in painting. And what does it mean to be aggressive? To be aggressive is to destroy the world, to destroy the world. To be plaintive, to whine, is to register the rupture with the world and to feel sorry for oneself. A mixture of vanity and whining… but why do you need to write… Oh dear, you find so much vanity and whining in literature, it goes without saying. But you find it equally in painting. All those canvases that oscillate between extraordinary vanity in the destruction of the world and incredible whining and self-pity. The two usually go together. It's an art that lives on the rupture between man and the world. It lives on that.

What Rossellini is saying is: I want an ethic that restores our belief. In what? Again, he's not saying that he wants to restore our belief in God. The fact that he believes in God is his business. But whatever it is we believe in… whatever entity we believe in, *we expect it to give us reasons to believe in this world*. For we have lost touch with this world. We've fallen into aggressivity or self-pity, we no longer have a link with the world. We're asking for a belief, which is to say we're asking that reasons for maintaining a link with this world be given back to us. Well, I think everything Rossellini did in his cinema was to reinvent by returning to the past. All of his pedagogical cinema is concerned with reinventing man's link with the world, and in this Rossellini's influence on modern cinema has been fundamental, and we have to take this almost literally... Godard has never tried to hide his filiation with Rossellini, which consists in this: If the world is, or makes, bad cinema, only cinema can restore our belief in the world.

So, you see, what I call a schizophrenic situation regards this new problem of belief: How can we and how will we be able to believe in this world? It's not enough to say that this world will kill us, that it is capable by its very nature of doing us harm. That's no reason to believe in it. What we've really lost is belief in a link between ourselves and the world, and what we ask of philosophy, art, even science, is to restore this missing link, which would be a link between man and the world. And once again, we have this paradox which Rossellini expresses so well. The more this world is made by man, he says, the more the link between man and the world is broken.

So much so in fact that cinema would be an attempt to give us… to give us reasons to believe in the world. In this way, it would become a cinema of belief, and no longer of knowledge. The fundamental cinematographic act would be to record the rupture between man and the world: the image cut off… the modern image of cinema – and this is why I insist that it's no longer a cinema that proceeds by association – the key image of modern cinema is the image of man cut off from the world. If there were a single inventor of this image, I'd say it would be [Carl] Dreyer. But all cinema has followed, all modern cinema has followed. Whether it's Bresson or Rossellini or whoever, the fundamental image is the image of man cut off from the world.

The old cinema… the old cinema, constantly tried to develop the link between man and the world. The link between man and the world was a given of the old cinema, it was the *action-image*, it was the action-image. We've seen – and here I don't want to go back over this, but I'm repeating a conclusion that I think holds – we've seen that modern cinema was founded on the collapse of the sensory-motor schema, meaning the link between man and the world. Man finds himself in the world as if faced with a purely optical and sound situation. Man finds himself in the world as if in front of a store window, or like Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* who sees everything that happens in the street through the rear-view mirror of his car. That's our situation. We are in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation to which we can no longer react.

I would say that cinema records this state. It acknowledges this rupture between man and the world, and makes it the basis of its images. In other words, it presents us with characters in a state of sensory-motor rupture, meaning, who are caught up in pure optical and sound situations. This was the founding act of Italian neo-realism. We've seen all that, you know it, so I won't go back over it again. But what I can add now is that, if man is deprived of the power to react and no longer believes in the possibility of his reactions to these pure optical

and sound situations, he still has – and this could perhaps be immensely powerful, and be able to revitalize things – he still has the power to claim a belief, a belief that would not be a reaction, no, but that would heal the rupture, a belief that would be a belief in a new link between man and the world. What would come out of this? What new type of rebellion, what new type of resistance, what new type of revolt? This would be, and already is, a political cinema.

Give back to me reasons to believe in this world, and I mean this world *as it is*, if only to discover what life forces remain, in the sense, for example, of a blade of grass that, strangely enough, has the strength to shatter paving-stones. If the world we've broken away from, with which we are at odds, this sort of window-world, is a world of paving-stones, then to rediscover reasons to believe in the world is to rediscover life, to rediscover what remains of life between the paving-stones, or in the mummies of a bandage... no, sorry, in mean the bandages of a mummy, and in many other things besides.

And I insist that this is not an abstract act. The day we believe in this world… I don't mean the bad cinema that the world makes… but the day we believe again this world, I'm convinced that new forms of rebellion will already be widespread. The new forms of resistance will already be widespread. The fact that we're now in a situation of a rupture with the world, and that in this very rupture, we no longer have a single reason to believe in this world, far from threatening the powers of darkness, is of great help to them.

I don't mean to say that cinema can do this on its own. What I mean is that cinema as a whole has turned to the side of belief, if we understand what we mean by belief: the operation of believing in this world, and no longer the operation of transforming it, or believing in another world. And this is something that fundamentally concerns cinema as an art form. This would be our first topic, that of belief and knowledge. But next time, I'll have to go over this again because I think it's too complicated… I didn't say it's too complicated for you, I mean it's too complicated for me. I haven't explained it well. I didn't explain well. I screwed up. Okay. Anyway, try to… I don't know, try to see if you can feel, I don't know... well... [*End of the session;* 2:37:24]

Notes

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[1] These are the texts by Daney, *La rampe* (Paris: Cahiers du cinema / Gallimard, 1983) and Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema. The Logistics of Perception,* trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: Verso, 2009). On Daney, see *The Time-Image*, p. 176, p. 312, and on Virilio, p. 309, note 16.

[2] This is Bresson's *Notes on the Cinematographer,* trans. Jonathan Griffin (1975; Copenhagen: Green Integer, 1997). On Bresson and the automaton, see *The Time-Image*, p. 178 and pp. 312-313, note 42.

[3] Baruch Spinoza, *Complete Works,* ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002), p. 24.

[4] On the spiritual automaton in Spinoza and Leibniz, see the brief reference in *The Time-Image*, p. 310, note 19.

[5] See Paul Valery, *Monsieur Teste*, trans. Jackson Matthews (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989).

[6] Deleuze introduces the importance of shock and "nooshock" at the start of Chapter 7 of *The Time-Image*, "Thought and Cinema", pp. 156-157.

[7] Deleuze refers to Astruc's text "L'expression de la pensée est le problème fondamental du cinema", which appeared in Pierre Lherminier's collection, *L'art du cinéma* (Paris: Seghers, 1960). See *The Time-Image*, p. 311, note 35.

[8] Here Deleuze refers to the film *Lily Marlene* [1981]. Regarding the "snowplough effect", see session 20 of Cinema 1 seminar, May 25, 1982.
[9] On Pasolini see *The Time-Image*, pp. 174-176.
[10] On the theory of conics, see sessions 19 and 21 of the Cinema 2 seminar, May 3 and May 24, 1983.See also sessions 3 and 5 of Cinema 3 seminar, November 29 and December 13, 1983; and session 3 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, November 18, 1986.
[11] On cinema and belief, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 170-173.
[12] On couples, see *The Time-Image*, p. 311, note 3.
[13] Deleuze expresses the same thought in *The Time-Image*, p. 172.
[14] On the contribution of Dos Passos, see also session 17 of Cinema 1 seminar, May 4 1982.
[15] Here is Godard's citation on the subject, quoted in *The Time-Image*, p. 171: "These are people who are real and it's the world that is a breakaway group. It is the world that is making cinema for itself. It is the world that is out of synch; they are right, they are true, they represent life. They live a simple story; it is the world around them which is living a bad script." See Jean Collet, *Jean-Luc Godard* (Paris: Seghers, 1970), pp. 26-27.
[16] On Rossellini's pedagogy, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 247-248.