Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

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Part 1

… well, we pulled off an amazing feat, which was to end up at the same point as the time before last. So that's that. Today, we're going to make a little bit of progress. But last time, and the time before last, we'd just been trying – again, as a way of building this program – we'd just been trying to isolate two points of mutation in an image of thought. One was the substitution of belief for knowledge, and the other was the position of the body: "Give me a body, then", and I don't have time to go back over that, it's quite simple. But I'd like to point out how the two things are connected, how they both pertain to the same overturning of the image we have of thought.

The connection between the two is… you'll recall that the substitution of belief for knowledge is, in a way, unstoppable. At any given moment, it can arrive at a certain equilibrium, for example, by redistributing the relation between knowledge and belief, the way Kant does. Kant performs a redistribution that is based on his basic formula: I had to substitute belief for knowledge. He redistributes knowledge and belief. So we can mark the points of equilibrium. But this inevitably means that we will be continually drawn away from this or that point of equilibrium, and that the substitution of belief for knowledge – and here I'm no longer talking about Kant – will lead us to demand something completely new: we demand, as I was saying, reasons to believe in *this* world.

And this is undoubtedly where the substitution of belief for knowledge reaches its most extreme point: *when belief becomes a claim for reasons to believe in this world*. For there's a problem that I haven't addressed and that I don't intend to address, and this obviously relates to the *reasons* to believe in this world, but what do we mean by *reasons*? They may well be reasons, but in what sense? In what sense, since it's clear we're not talking about *pure* reason? So, what would constitute a reason, or reasons, to believe in this world?

Well, what we have here is almost the passage from the first to the second formula: what does it mean to believe in this world? It means believing in the possibility of *life* in this

world. It's a matter of believing in life, in other words, of *believing in the body*. In other words, *the reason to believe in this world is the body*. To give me reasons to believe in this world to "Give me a body, then". At the point we've now reached, it would be totally inappropriate to object that believing in this world is something that occurs by itself, or else that a body is something one already has. No doubt, I do already have one, in *fact*, and doubtless too I believe in this world, in fact. But in a way, I'm asking a question of *right*: I *demand* reasons to believe in this world, and I demand a body, to be given a body.

And I said last time, don't expect – which you obviously didn't – that this body will be a glorious body or even a Greek body. Oh no, it won't be a Greek body. Why do I say "a Greek body"? Because, as we've seen, the Greek body, even taken simply as a body, is matter informed by a beautiful form. It is the model of knowledge, and in this sense, gymnastics is a form of knowledge, and the Greek body is informed matter, the body that is part of the world of knowledge. So, when I say "Give me a body, then", it's not a beautiful Greek body that I ask for. No, it can be a fragile body. Or even worse, a weary body. A weary body… well, what would that imply? A tired body, or a body that's waiting for something. Tiredness and waiting, tiredness and waiting... It's the opposite of the informed body, the opposite of matter informed by a beautiful form. Tiredness and waiting mark the body's inadequacy in relation to itself.[1]

Why do I repeat this: tiredness and waiting, tiredness and waiting? I'm always repeating them to establish a kind of short-circuit between philosophy and cinema. Tiredness and waiting. I spoke of a cinema of bodies. If there's a filmmaker of the body, and one of the first beyond those I've already mentioned, it's well known that this is [Michelangelo] Antonioni. Who better than Antonioni knew how to put tiredness and waiting into bodies? What does it mean to put tiredness and waiting into bodies? I would say – well, those of you who were here last year will immediately understand this, for the others, it doesn't matter – I would say, it's clearly a body that *reveals time* or on which time has been inscribed. It's a body that gives us a direct image of time. *It's a body that is the body of time*. That's it, this fragile body, always tired, always waiting. So, you see, it's not at all the Greek body. The Greek body is the body of adequacy. The Greek body is the *movement-body*.

But it's a long time since we've had a movement-body. We have prostheses. Movement is prostheses. What I mean is that cars or other things of the sort are all prostheses. On the other hand, we hardly have a movement-body anymore, meaning that things move on our behalf, *we have a time-body*. This is what our radical ill health consists in. Tiredness, waiting, it's the thorn in the flesh. So, we evoke this thorn. What's more, we need this thorn to believe in the world. *One needs a weary body to believe in the world*, one needs a waiting body to believe in the world. The body is the reason for believing in the world. But at what price? At the price of the body having to inscribe or record time directly upon itself. No more graceful chorus of Greek bodies, no more dances in the round. It's over.

So, you see, I'm just putting together... "As long as he has this thorn in his flesh, he can live" ... As long as he has this thorn in his flesh, he can live: it's a very beautiful phrase, but then again, the whole context is beautiful, it's a very beautiful phrase of [Søren] Kierkegaard.[2] The idea of the thorn in the flesh is a Kierkegaardian idea. The

Kierkegaardian hero fundamentally has a thorn in his flesh. As long as he has this thorn in his flesh, he can live. “Give me a body” means: give me a thorn in the flesh, put it inside me. Does this imply a taste for suffering? No, you understand, a taste for suffering, all that is a very secondary matter. What it means is: Let my body become the inscription of time, let my body reveal time. Tiredness and waiting. You see it's no longer a question of movement.

I just wanted to say that it's in this sense – and this has to be clear to you, otherwise I can't go on, I'll have to start all over again – the link between the two formulas has to be clear to you: on one hand “Give me reasons to believe in the world”, that is, substitute belief for knowledge, and on the other, “Give me a body, then”, the link between the two being that the reason to believe *is the body*, given that this body is the body that directly bears time, tiredness and waiting, as opposed to the Greek body, which was the body of knowledge. The body of belief is a poor body, a poor body, but at the same time an extremely powerful one. Do you follow me? I mean, I'm not asking if you're convinced about this. Well, yes, actually you do have to believe in all this, you absolutely must believe in it, and if you don't... if you don't believe in it, you understand, it’s self-selecting, you can't come back here. If you want an explanation, I can... well, no, I can't, because you have to believe. That's it.

So, let’s continue. I would say that there's a third aspect to this mutation, a third aspect that I'll try to summarize by saying: *thought comes from Outside*. Here too, we have a mutation: thought comes from Outside. I'm saying that here too we have a mutation, whose importance we must immediately assess, even before knowing what we're going to say. Before or up until Kant, I’m not sure, thought fundamentally existed in alliance with an intimate or inner sense, and in a certain way thought was essentially considered to be *thought from within*. Now the idea that thought comes from Outside, this would be the third cry.

Just as I'm trying to point out specific things in the work of certain authors that don't depend on one another, today I'd like to develop this third aspect of mutation. And in my view, the two greatest authors to have developed the idea of a thought that comes from Outside are [Maurice] Blanchot and [Michel] Foucault. And they are not unrelated, since Foucault wrote an article in 1966 in the journal *Critique*[3] under the title “La pensée du dehors” [“The Thought from Outside”], which was a tribute to Maurice Blanchot. In the same year, Foucault published his own book, *Les mots et les choses* [*The Order of Things*].[4] Now, I would like to say… we'll have the chance to come back to this, once again, we’re making the program, and I need to get to the end of my program in order to explain to you both what I expect of you and what you have a right to expect of me this year.

We'll see about all this later, but what I want to say right now is that it seems certain to me that Foucault's work has fallen prey to, and has never ceased falling prey to, a certain misunderstanding in relation to history and the way he deployed history, which can lead certain readers, even those in good faith who admire his work, to believe that Foucault was becoming almost more of a historian than a philosopher. On the contrary, it seems to me that his work never abandoned the purest element of philosophy, he simply

maintained a wholly original relationship with history, but we'll have to look into this. And if he remained and remains within the purest element of philosophy, it's because, in my view, there's only one thing that really interested Foucault, and that is *what it means to think*.

And so why then, did he need to pass by way of historical objects in order to pursue his research? That's a good question. But if you like, when, at the end of his life, he claimed – which he hadn't done before – not a dependence upon, but a certain affinity with Heidegger, it goes without saying that this point of affinity consisted… – both in Blanchot and in Heidegger – in the fact that their work is capable of asking: what does it mean to think? And for both Blanchot and Foucault, the answer is: *thought is the exercise of the Outside*.[5]

And here, we come back to a task that concerns us all this year, namely, if I take Blanchot, for one simple reason, it's that for most of you – you know Blanchot as well as I do – for many of you… and now we have a situation where many of Blanchot's ideas, or ideas close to Blanchot, have become commonplaces of a certain modern way of thinking, which is to say, we're immediately familiar with them. I'm not saying this out of snobbery, not at all. I mean that these are ideas that, even without having read a word of Blanchot, we've sort of breathed in, so that we find ourselves in a strange situation with regard to them: we're familiar with them, and yet I'm not even sure we understand them properly. So, one of our tasks this year might be to try and clarify Blanchot's way of thinking, and to do the same with Foucault's thought, which, for other reasons, risks eluding our grasp, since the historical aspect of his analysis might conceal from us the way he took hold of the problem of what it means to think.

So we have to put all this in some order, and I would say, it's very odd. Foucault entitles his essay on Blanchot "The Thought from Outside", and indeed the Outside is a theme that Blanchot never ceases to refer to. And once again, I would never present Foucault as a disciple of Blanchot, but I do think that he borrowed – and he said this, he always admitted it – that he borrowed certain ideas from Blanchot that he would take up again in his own way, recreate them in his own way, following the completely different method that characterizes Foucault's own work. Which permits me to discuss them both at once in terms of the question: What do we mean by the thought from Outside?

Well, to understand this, I'll start by going back to the model, let's call it the classical model, the model of knowledge or learning. Because the model of knowledge or learning, this classical model, the image that we could now call the classical image of thought, was something I tried to define last time, but I only defined it in part. In a way, I only defined its framework. As I said, the model of knowledge posits a conformity of nature and spirit, of man and the world, and this conformity must be taken literally, since this conformity is a form of knowledge. Or conversely, knowledge is conformity, since to know, in the Aristotelian schema, is the operation of an intellect capable of taking form, capable of taking the form of the thing, "con-formity". And we saw the way all these ideas come together in Claudel's notion of "co-birth".[6]

But I'd almost say that this is what defines the framework of knowledge. What happens within this framework? What movement? I'd say that the movement of knowledge, in the classical model, occurs along two axes, and this shouldn't surprise us considering how we began, if you remember the way we began. It occurs along an axis that would define "the logical possibility of thought", and also along an axis that would define "the organic-psychological possibility of thought". The first axis of the logical possibility of thought presents itself as the concept, and the concept, I would say, is both object and subject, that is, it merges with a double movement: integration and differentiation. Integration will define, for example, the concept as *genus*, or even as supreme genus – here I'm just trying to group things together – whereas with differentiation we see the specification of the concept, the way in which the concept as *genus* divides into sub-concepts or species, the differentiation of the generic concept, of the concept as genus, into specific concepts. And by this, I mean that "logical thought" goes from integration to differentiation and from differentiation to integration.

Following the other axis, what do we have on the side of the "organic-psychological possibility of thought"? We no longer have the concept as a Whole that integrates and divides, that is, as a supreme genus. We no longer have the concept as a Whole that integrates and divides, that integrates and divides, that integrates species into a genus and divides the genus into species, integration-differentiation. On the side of "organic-psychological" possibility, we have *images*. So that's my second axis, we have images… and what else? And their *linkage*, meaning the way in which one image emerges from another image, or is linked with another image. The "organic-psychological" axis gives us associable and associated images. Okay.

So much so that this axis, in turn, like the other axis I mentioned just now – you see how things harmonize and are harmonious by nature – for the previous axis, I already had a double movement. For the concept as Whole, I already had a double movement of integration and differentiation. Now, here too I need a double movement. It would be nicer if it were... and if it's nicer, it's also truer, isn't it? Well, yes. Then, obviously, we have a double movement, because it's well known that images are sometimes associated by resemblance, and sometimes by contiguity. Resemblance and contiguity are the two laws of the association of images.

Don't tell me – and of course you won't tell me – that associationism is an old, outdated theory. Because the claim that associationism is an old, outdated theory is not only an outdated claim, it's a stupid one. I mean, what happened is that, once associationism, namely, the laws of association of images, emerged in the work of certain 18th-century authors, the theory of association gave rise to all sorts of reworkings, corrections and enrichments. But the basis or core of the theory remained strictly intact, for the good reason that – and here again, this would be a very good example of philosophical rigor – there was absolutely nothing to transform in terms of this raw fact. And what was so fantastic about associationism, and its introduction in the 18th century? It introduced the first major theory of relations into philosophy. And regarding the celebrated notions of association by resemblance and association by contiguity, it's only if you understand what they mean that you'll be able to grasp their novelty or importance from the

perspective of the theory of thought: *resemblance and contiguity are the two fundamental relations from which perhaps all others derive*. Okay.

And the starting point of associationism is quite simple: just because two ideas resemble one another, just because two images look alike, doesn't mean that one image will lead me to another that resembles it. The miracle is not that things are contiguous or resemble one another. *The miracle is that resemblance and contiguity are relations*, meaning that the image of something given to me makes me think of something not given just because it resembles it. I see Pierre's portrait, I think of Pierre. You'll tell me: that's self-evident, since the portrait resembles the model. Not at all, it's not self-evident. It's self-evident *only if resemblance is a relation*. How must things be made for resemblance to be a relation? How must things be made for contiguity to be a relation? That's the key question of associationism. No one has ever been able to improve on this question, this very question, and no one has been able to give it an answer other than the one that, beginning from the 18th century, [David] Hume was to give it. Good.

In any case, from the point of view of the organic-psychological possibility of thought, I therefore have the association of associable and associated images according to the double relation of resemblance and contiguity. Right. So I've got two axes, with four movements, two for each axis. You follow me? What I'm saying is very simple. You can intuit it yourself. I have the concept as Whole, to which corresponds integration-differentiation. And I have images, to which correspond association by resemblance and association by contiguity.

Let me digress for a moment. Linguistics, modern linguistics, falls completely into this schema. It's even a bit worrying. If we were to look for a modern image of thought, it would be – I don't know if this is worrying but... – all I'm saying is that linguistics, the kind of linguistics people speak so much of, absolutely fits into this schema, into my schema with its four… with two axes and four movements. Let’s take [Roman] Jakobson as an example. Maybe we'll go back to him, we'll most definitely go back to him. But here I just want to situate… I’m just arranging all my pieces. At a first level, I can say that Jakobson's famous problem of metonymy and metaphor explicitly takes up the notion of contiguity and resemblance. What's more, in his linguistic theory of aphasia – note that aphasia was always a major problem of associationism – and in this cerebral disorder that gives rise to aphasia, we can identify several distinct types of aphasia, but in the very masterly study of aphasia that Jakobson makes from a linguistic perspective, he distinguishes between two types: aphasia as a disorder of metonymy or contiguity, and aphasia as a disorder of metaphor or similitude.

I would say that linguists also speak extensively about a notion that is absolutely fundamental to them, rather a pair of fundamental notions, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. I'm not going to try and define this right now… we'll come back to all this, perhaps in more detail than you would wish. But I would say, very generally, let's suppose that the syntagm marks the consistency of contiguous linguistic units that form a series and which follow one another according to certain laws, laws of linkage. Whereas the paradigmatic is no longer contiguity, it has much more to do with similarity. But in what sense? It's the linguistic model according to which, in an utterance, we are led to

choose one word rather than another that is, in enunciable respects, similar to it. For example, when I say “You have a beautiful house”, and not “You have a beautiful castle”. Is there a dichotomy there, between house and castle? I would say it's... what I see is as if at the border. Is it a castle? Some locals call it a castle, but I say to myself, it's not a castle, it's a house, it's just a big house. In my sentence, I choose one word rather than another. I say, for example, “Alfred's niece” when I could have said “Octave's daughter”, assuming it’s the same person. Okay. So, you see that what I have here is a system.

What is it that interests me here? It's that, syntagmatic-paradigmatic, you see… if I call a syntagm – for the moment, I'm only defining it in the most rudimentary fashion – if I call a syntagm a linkage of successive units, a linkage of successive language units, and if I call a paradigm the choice between units that are similar in certain respects, then this seems interesting to me. Because at the level of syntagmatics and paradigmatics, I find my two axes. On one hand, I find the image axis of similarity-contiguity, while on the other, I find the axis of integration-differentiation, meaning the integrating unit of the syntagm, which integrates its own parts, and the differentiating paradigm, that is, the choice of one unit rather than another that could have taken its place.[7]

This is just to say, if we limit ourselves to this… I don't know what linguistics has in store for us, but it's odd how it makes use of a very respectable but extremely old model of thought. Perhaps it’s right to do so, perhaps not. That’s just how it is. Just a spot of perfidy in passing, but we have to ask ourselves why. And finally, in Jakobson, you'll find the interplay of the two axes: similarity-contiguity on one hand, and integration-differentiation on the other. Okay, then.

So, what do I mean by all this? Well, I mean that *knowledge is communication*, the perpetual rotation of the two axes. How can I present this movement, this movement of knowledge? Because it’s in this sense that knowledge is movement… I'd say that the concept as Whole never ceases… or if you prefer, at the same time as it differentiates itself, it is externalized in associable images. The concept as Whole differentiates itself, but at the same time, is externalized in associable images. Conversely, images associate with one another, but in associating, they are internalized in the concept as the Whole that integrates them. And the movement of knowledge never ceases to be the movement by which, in differentiating itself, the concept externalizes itself in images, and by which images, in associating themselves, are internalized in the concept.

So that’s all clear, isn’t it? This double movement of internalization and externalization defines the movement of knowledge or, if you prefer, the “inside as self-consciousness”, the inside as self-consciousness, which is to say the pure concept never ceases to be externalized in the image, while the image never ceases to be internalized in the concept. And we will call this the Whole. And the author who pursued such a vision of knowledge to the very limits of its consequences – and from then on could only call it “the movement of absolute knowledge” – is Hegel.

And in Hegel we find a distinction that I think is very interesting. Hegel's two great works are the *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807] and the *Science of Logic* [1812-1816]. And in Hegelian terms, Phenomenology develops *figures*, while Logic proceeds by *moments*. It

would be very unfortunate to confuse these two aspects of Hegel, figures and moments, the figures of consciousness and the moments of the concept, although there is a curious correspondence between them, and the whole of Hegelianism is the relation and the study of all the different movements by which figure becomes moment and moment becomes figure. I would say – and here I'm becoming very unfaithful to… – I'll try to say in what way Hegel clearly seems to me to form part of this classical image of knowledge. It's that figures are the real – no, not the real – but they are the analogue of associable images which, by associating, rise to the level of the concept as Whole and become internalized in the concept. So, the end of Phenomenology is absolute knowledge as interiority, which has integrated all figures. And conversely, Logic will be the opposite movement, meaning the concept as Whole that is divided according to its moments, but being divided according to its moments, it becomes externalized in figures. What should we retain from all this? I would say that this is the thought from inside. The thought from... [*Recording interrupted*] [44:19]

Part 2

... splendid term, when he becomes a poet – the Whole is not only the transmissible and simple repose of the concept. It is also the Bacchic drunkenness that penetrates all its parts. It's the delirium, the Bacchic drunkenness, the double, the double figure, the simple translucent repose and the Bacchic drunkenness. Ah yes, it's...

So, for those of you who… – and here I'm linking this with what we did last year – I'd say that this classical image of thought is fundamentally based on an idea of the Whole, and of the Whole as open. What does the openness of the Whole consist in? The openness of the Whole is *the permanence of the movement by which the concept internalizes images only by its being externalized in images*. It's a closed circle, but infinite, it's an infinite circle, and the inside is this dialectical unity of inside and outside. It's the dialectical unity of internalization and externalization. This is what defines self-consciousness, the inner sense of the concept. Self-consciousness isn't the awareness I have of myself, it's the inner sense of the concept, that is, the concept as Whole, which internalize images, images of the world, only on condition of being itself externalized in images of the world: signed Hegel.

It's this thought, you see... there's so much more to be said on this, but I've chosen this particular milestone to try and help us understand this reversal. It is thinkers like Blanchot, like Foucault, who tell us that *thought comes from Outside*. In other words, thought will be defined as a power or potency from Outside, a force from Outside. And Foucault comes up with this formula as a response, presenting it as a response to both his own thinking and that of Blanchot: when the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself, when the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself. He says that this is thought, or at least it's our thought. Our thought is when the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself.

What's going on here? We're in danger of not fully understanding this Outside, it's terrible. You understand? Is it clear? Good. How... I would say… I'll try to number things. This is the first aspect in the third mutation that I'm trying to define, it's the first

aspect: the thought from Outside, thought defined as a force from Outside, something that makes thought as though it were something that *erupts*. I don't know if you're familiar with all these themes... but by dint of being familiar with them, by dint of already being pre-familiar with them… once again, we run the risk of no longer giving them a rigorous status, and at that point they become… they become mere catchphrases, they become modern catchphrases and so on.

The first thing we need to understand is that this Outside is obviously not the same thing as exteriority. For if it were exteriority, well, we'd be brought back. In other words, this Outside has nothing to do with the exteriority of the world. This is fortunate for us, indeed more than fortunate. Why? Because almost by definition, at this point, we can be sure of what we're saying. We can be sure of what we're saying, since we've already seen that this whole mutation of thought is based on, and continually includes at all of its stages, the rupture of the sensory-motor schema, meaning the loss of a relation with the world. I won't come back to this, but it's precisely because we lost our link with the world that the mutation took place the first time in the form of "Give me reasons to believe in this world" and the second time in the form of "Give me a body". And the third time would be: "Let the Outside hollow out and lure the inside out of itself."

So, this Outside is not the same as the external world, it's not at all the exteriority of the world. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that this outside will perhaps be able to give us back a link with the external world. But this Outside can only arise against the backdrop of a rupture with the external world. This Outside cannot emerge, it cannot seize us, since it's a question of being seized by the Outside, it can only seize us insofar as we have lost our relation with the external world.

And so, to the extent that we have lost our link with the external world, an Outside capable of seizing us would be revealed to us. An Outside capable of seizing us that would be revealed to us, *that would be thought*. I'm not trying to explain all this today… I'm trying to number Blanchot's ideas and Foucault's ideas. And indeed, if we then try, in a prescient manner, to find some ground for this Outside that seizes us, at what price will that be? At the price of having broken with the external world.

I return to this question because you have to understand that this will be our future coherence – if it works out well, but maybe it won't work out well at all… If it works out well, I insist on the need not to confuse the Outside with the external world, because once again, it's perhaps from this Outside – which is much more outside than the external world – it's perhaps in relation to this Outside that the external world does not itself constitute an Outside. So, it's from this Outside that is more outside than the external world, that we can find a reason to reconnect with the external world.

And I would say, if we try to find some ground for this – here I'm making some sort of filiation, of authors who echo one another – that Blanchot was very struck by a German psychiatrist-philosopher by the name of Karl Jaspers. I say psychiatrist-philosopher, since he started out as a psychiatrist and went on to become a highly important philosopher. And Jaspers had a strange conception, not of schizophrenia itself but of certain cases of schizophrenia, which you'll find in a splendid book called *Strindberg and Van Gogh.*[8]

And as though by chance, or perhaps not, you'll find a beautiful preface to this book by Blanchot.[9]

And Blanchot is very interested in a notion that Jaspers, as a psychiatrist, had tried to identify: the notion of "process". He used to say, there are some forms of schizophrenia for which the classical schemas don't seem to fit. What were the classical schemas? They were either reaction schemas or development schemas, meaning either madness as a reaction to something external – even if it is organic – or madness as part of a person's development, the development of an inside. And Jaspers says that there are many cases where one has the feeling that it's neither one nor the other. It's as if *the patient has been seized by a process*. See how he distinguished the notion of process from reaction to the external world, as well as from inner development. A process... a process that overturns their personality, as if the subject has had a revelation that will shatter them.

So, what I'm saying is very vague but all the better, all the better. A revelation that will shatter them… what does that mean? On this point, Jaspers was no doubt trying to avoid the misunderstandings he would provoke. And he won't be the last to try, and we'll never be able to avoid these misunderstandings, which will have it that Jaspers claims schizophrenia to be the most poetic illness in the world, and that all this is fantastic. Because Jaspers, from the outset, made a clear distinction between the process that seizes a person and the collapse that follows, and as a psychiatrist this collapse seemed completely pathological to him. But the process seemed to him something of an entirely different nature, *something beyond health and illness*. If you can't understand that, you won't understand anything about Jaspers, and you'd have a very serious psychiatrist saying irresponsible things like: all schizophrenics are Hölderlins. No, what he meant was that even if the collapse of a personality is in any case sickly and pathological, the process that provokes it falls outside the normal pathological categories. Okay.

If the process takes hold – Jaspers already uses these words, and Blanchot will use them in turn – if it takes hold of a mediocre nature, the collapse of the personality is irremediably pathological. After a certain period – and here Jaspers demonstrates considerable artistry as a psychiatrist – he describes this period in certain types of schizophrenia, this period of both dread and rapture, which at the beginning of the process is a kind of creative phase... after this, it is as though the person can no longer bear it and a collapse ensues. At which point, yes, the collapse is absolutely pathological.

But doesn't this process – beyond the normal and the pathological – always result in a collapse of personality, a rupture of personality, albeit with many nuances? Not in the same way in a hospitalized schizophrenic as it does in Hölderlin. As Blanchot would say, Hölderlin obviously had a rich and complex nature. He was by nature a poet. At least once, this process will have occurred, and yet there is also a collapse of personality in Hölderlin. It's difficult – it's been tried, it's been attempted, and the attempts are very interesting – but it is difficult not to recognize Hölderlin as a schizophrenic. Even if there is more at stake and, in a way, he holds on to the process.

This idea of Jaspers, which Jaspers develops admirably, is a question of finding… someone who is at the same time... You can see how important this would be later on,

particularly for anti-psychiatry. There is a direct lineage from Jaspers to antipsychiatry. When Ronald Laing announced his idea of schizophrenia as a journey, he too was prey to the same misunderstanding, with readers accusing him of making some kind of apology for schizophrenia. And yet Laing was just as cautious. Yes, schizophrenia was a voyage. Only, it was *a voyage which included its own shipwreck*. The voyage itself was neither normal nor pathological, it was beyond, it was of another nature. With these authors, it was no longer beyond good and evil, it was beyond the normal and pathological. It's the process. It's what Laing calls the "voyage". But the shipwreck *is* pathological.

Can we handle the voyage? Can we cope with the process without suffering a collapse of personality? If the answer is yes, I'll tell you, if the answer is yes, it's because in a way, *the collapse of personality had to have occurred beforehand*, at least that's how it seems to me. That's my answer, it's the only way it could happen. Either there will be a personality collapse, or the personality collapse will have taken place, in homeopathic doses, beforehand. I'm saying this so that you don't get everything confused, I'm saying this because this is my impression... forgive me, it's not, it's not out of arrogance, it's a question of not getting everything confused. This is my own impression. I think that the only way to bear – if these authors mean something real by their stories of process or voyage – the only way to bear the process or voyage, is if – and this accords well with everything we've been doing since the beginning of the year – if the rupture of the link with the world, and its correlate, meaning the dissolution of the person, has occurred before, and having occurred before, has done so in a homeopathic form or as some kind of vaccine.

I mean, Beckett isn't mad. Beckett isn't schizophrenic. In a way, my response would be: so why isn't he schizophrenic? Because he'd already dissolved his personality in, you know, in the Irish manner. I'd almost say it was the English manner, that he'd done it the English manner. In other words, ever since the English began to think, they've never really understood the meaning of the word "me". Never! That's their superiority. French and German philosophy is all about the "I", the "me", the subject. And the English arrive, and they say... they'd like nothing better than to understand, they'd like to… but no, they don't get it, they don't see what we mean. So, well. If you've taken your precautions, if you've made your break not with the world but with your link to the world, the dissolution of the person, beforehand, then you have a small chance. If not...

In any case, at whatever cost, the process has occurred at least twice in the history of poetry – the cost here being the collapse of personality and rupture with the world experienced by the schizophrenic. Once it happened with Hölderlin, and another time with Artaud. I'd say, you see, you have to read... it's as though, you know... Listen, I'll tell you a story, so we can have a bit of a rest.

There's someone here I like very much because we've known each other for a long time, and she's from a distant country. Don't look for her, you won't find her. So, every year, every year, she comes to Paris from a distant land. She comes to Paris in the same way that I go to the movies. She says to herself: I'm going to make my own movie, I'm going to Paris. And when she comes to Paris, she spends part of her time listening to philosophers because she finds it wonderfully satisfying. And she pretends – but I think

this is pure coquetry – she pretends not to understand anything at all. Besides, she's not interested in any of this. But I would say, I think she's not the only one, she's not the only one who has a way of listening to philosophy... like when you don't understand the words, and so on, and yet it's amazing, it's like, okay, you don't know the words. So, she doesn't understand the words, but it puts her in a state of joy, because what really interests her is, I would say… and that's why I'm telling this story... she writes novels, she writes plays. And I think all this is splendid, which is why I'm speaking about it and I am able to get something out of the texts she writes. And now she's written a kind of short story in which she says everything, why she takes these trips to Paris, why she goes to listen to philosophers when, as she always says, she doesn't understand anything. What is it that she finds so satisfying?

She says: philosophers are people who believe – I like this because it's completely in line with what we're doing this year. They believe two things, and they're wrong about both. But these two things are so bizarre that they think there's something to celebrate. Philosophers, a philosopher, is someone who, in a way, *believes they're already dead or have passed through death*. I think that's great, because it's like an Edgar Poe vision of what a philosopher is. It seems to me one of the finest texts I've ever read on the subject of what a philosopher is. So that's why I mention it. Someone who believes that, someone who believes that they are dead, or that they've passed through death, that they've come back from the dead – it all boils down to the same thing – they're dead, they've passed through death, they've come back from the dead... Then she laughs. She says: well, they're wrong. If they had, they wouldn't have come back in the first place, so it's all in their head. They think they went through death.

First mistake, then, but first belief. And then, a second belief that follows on from the first: they believe that, although they are dead or have passed through death, they continue to live. Which is a second mistake, because they're not living at all, are they? Obviously, this is both a vision… in this idea, it sems to me, there's a very profound vision of what is a philosopher and there is at the same time a critique of philosophy. But, in my view, we can forget the critique, especially as she says that this vision is what delights her. She looks at these people... they're zombies. They're zombies. They think they're dead and they think they can go on living while being dead, so they've got something wrong in the head! But for her, that's the charm of it all, you know? So, she come to Paris to see the zombies. And she says, even their gestures, their gestures, their ways of talking and so on, it all comes from the dead. It's simply that they believe they're still alive, okay, you have to see for yourselves, though you mustn't disturb them... but this is her joy.

So, I think that what delights her so much is actually the very essence of philosophy. Meaning that the philosopher is someone who, in a certain way, rightly or wrongly – it doesn't matter – thinks that they've come back from the dead, and rightly or wrongly, they think they are still living, but not just any old way, because they've come back from the dead, so they live in a very special way. In other words, they are *between two deaths*: a death they went through from within, and a death that awaits them from Outside. You might well say that the death that awaits us from the Outside is the case for everyone. Not at all, not at all. It's not our case in general. Generally speaking, we expect death to come

from the external world and from our internal organism. But the death that awaits us from Outside, and the death that comes to us from within, is something else. The death that comes to us from within is the death through which we have passed. Did we have to go through death? Have we gone through death?

One of the most decisive, most fundamental texts in the whole of philosophy is Plato's text in *Phaedo*, on the topic of… if the dead are born of the living, meaning that you have to have been alive in order to die, *if the dead are born of the living, conversely, the living are also born of the dead*. So, this is a very fine text, a wonderful text that is like one of the founding acts of philosophy. The philosopher, it doesn't matter if he is right or wrong, because he believes he's passed through death, but as a philosopher, not as a person. He believes he's come back from the dead. He believes he has returned from the land of the dead.

Then, he thinks that he's moving towards a death that awaits him from the Outside. When the Outside hollows out and lures the inside out of itself, he is between two deaths. But I'd say that it's not that he continues to live and believes he continues to live when he's not actually living much. I'd say that, between these two deaths, between the apparent death and the death to come, the philosopher throws a lightning bolt which is a bolt of life. It is life as a flash of lightning, and even if it doesn't go fast, this flash of life is something… okay, let's say he's a zombie... but only a zombie can sing of life. *I come back from the dead and I sing of life*. That's what philosophy is. And it's… it's to the extent that I come back from the dead that I sing of life. That's what it is.

What does this remind you of? Why am I speaking about this? You have to feel an idea. That's the process, that's the thought from Outside. In a way, it's the return of the dead. You might say that it's not only philosophers who can come back from the dead. It's not certain that it happens to all of us, because it's not our adventure, our birthright. But yes, that's why I'm talking about a mutation of thought, and why I said from the start that the war had been a fundamental factor in this mutation of thought.

The war had been a fundamental factor in this mutation of thought, not simply as war, but in its double form, in the form of its double horror: the extermination camps and the atomic bomb. Extermination camps, atomic bombs – what do they constitute, what do they define? They define people who have passed through death. I don't at all mean that this is what philosophers are. What I mean is that, whether they like it or not, philosophers are the ones who really come back to us from the dead. And one of the most important authors of the *Nouveau roman*, Jean Cayrol, wrote some famous texts – you'll have to look at these too, since we're grouping them – on what he called the modern hero which he defines as "Lazarean".

The Lazarean hero… well, what is the Lazarean hero? He's the one who comes back from the dead and has an intense life, it's definitely intense. I wouldn't even say that it's marked by death, but it has something to do with the death from which he returns. And according to Cayrol, who is himself a novelist, the *Nouveau roman* marks the staging of a fundamentally Lazarean hero. So, the *Nouveau roman* is the post-war novel par excellence.[10]

And, always seeking to make these kinds of short-circuits, if there's anyone who could be described as the most philosophical of filmmakers, it's obviously [Alain] Resnais. It's definitely Resnais. And it's no coincidence that, in this respect, Jean Cayrol and Resnais would collaborate twice, once on *Nuit et brouillard* [*Night and Fog*, 1956], a film that can't even be said to be "about" the extermination camps, but has an even more intimate relationship with the camps, and the again, on *Muriel* [1963], for which Cayrol was the screenwriter. Now, when I say that Resnais's characters are philosophers – you know, I don't mean it's a boring kind of cinema, but neither is philosophy itself boring... They're philosophers, or at least they're Lazarean characters. They are between two deaths, but between these two deaths, the death from which they return and the death towards which they are heading, the death from inside and the death from Outside. But from one death to the other, they throw up a spark of life, a flash of life, what Resnais would call *feeling*, or *love*.

And if Resnais's most recent film, *L'amour à mort* [*Love unto Death*,1984], is one of the most ambitious in the history of cinema, and a film that sums up his entire oeuvre, it's because the key situation that inspired all of Resnais's work is presented here in its purest form. Namely, the man who comes back from the dead, and who goes towards a death from the Outside… and between these two deaths, what can he do? And the tiredness, the weariness that takes hold of him and his body... well, if you look back at all of Resnais' work, you'll always find this theme.[11]

Passing through death, life is only life insofar as it returns from the dead, from among the dead. Hence the incredible life lesson that emerges from *Night and Fog*, which is anything but a documentary on the concentration camps, a work of such importance and beauty that I believe it shows us that, even if we weren't yet born at the time, at the moment of Nazism, before being born, we have literally passed through this death. We didn't remain there, no, we didn't remain there, though many did, but we have all passed through this death, which is one of the components of what we call "our modern world", a world with which we've lost our link.

And, in the milder cases, this death to which we move… in completely different cases, it won't be that of the extermination camps, it will be something that has nothing to do with them, the death involved in every culture, the death that makes up the strata and floors of the Bibliothèque Nationale. And we have to go through this death, this mortified culture, in order that culture can live. And here too, you have the same theme in Resnais' famous film...

A student: *Toute la mémoire du monde* [*All the Memory in the World*, 1956].

Deleuze: *Toute la mémoire du monde*, *Toute la mémoire du monde*. And then, in his other films, whether it be *Muriel*, whether it be… if you think of *Je t'aime, je t'aime* [1968]… *Je t'aime, je t'aime* is... it seems to me... or *Providence* [1977], these seem to me to be among Resnais's finest films, his finest films, you'll constantly find this theme of the man who comes back from the dead. He comes back from death. I even think it's a problem... You remember what I was telling you about the relation between problems and certain people. This is such an important problem that Resnais really lives with, so much that I'm

sure that he's even personally marked by it, he really lives it. I don't know anything about Resnais's personal life, but I'm sure he must see himself as having something to do with… as having somehow passed through death. And this is something one can undergo for what might appear to be the most trivial reasons: a childhood experience, a car accident, I don't know what.

So, there's a "process" that takes place whereby you'll never be the same as you were before. That's all I mean when I say that you should undergo this process in homeopathic doses and do it beforehand, or you'll be broken by it. So, all I wanted to say regarding this first point, by invoking Resnais and Jaspers earlier, is this: the process is the force of the Outside insofar as it takes us back *to* the dead and insofar as it brings us back *from* the dead. And I think that what I'm saying here is undoubtedly in line with Blanchot's thought – which is not an easy kind of thought, it's very complex – and certainly also with Foucault's thought. That was my first point on this idea of the thought from Outside. But once again, it doesn't tell us what this Outside is exactly.

What's going on? Why are they making all that noise? Are you having trouble getting in, are there any problems?

Student: He's asking if you've already had the break…

Deleuze: There's someone asking if I've taken a break? Ah! Are we going to take a break? Listen, he has to close the door, could you tell him there'll be no pause? Unless you want a break?

Student: No.

Deleuze: So, I'll go on... yes, no? Break later, okay? Fine. Yes, yes, we'll have one, but I'll be very brief here because the second point is something that bothers me. It's just to... So, second point, you see how I've just tried to define the thought from Outside in terms of a process, a process in the way Jaspers understands it, and in the way Blanchot understands it. Thought as a power or potency of the Outside, that is, once again, an Outside that has nothing to do with the external world. That's what we need to...

I would say that there's a second aspect of this thought from Outside, for which at this point we could almost make a demonstration, and yet a demonstration... Thought ceases to be linked to this intimate sense, to this form of interiority of the concept. You see, what we have here is a complete break with the classical image. But what happens then? Well, it no longer refers to a thinking subject, it no longer refers to an object of thought. What were they again? The thinking subject was the concept as Whole. As we've seen, it was the concept as Whole in the process of differentiating itself. It accompanied all concepts. It's not difficult to show that the concept as Whole is the "me", the "me" of German philosophy, okay. Now, the thought from Outside can no longer present itself in this way. So, what does it refer to? On the face of it, you might tell me that things seem to be going from bad to worse for this thought from Outside. At first glance, it can only refer to one thing, it can only refer to something that is *inside it*, inside it, but which in this inside presents itself as non-thought, the unthought, the unthinkable.

And this will be the second point that Blanchot will insist on, and that Foucault too, in a completely different manner, will underline in *The Order of Things*, when he devotes an entire paragraph, a whole chapter section, under the title "The Cogito and the Unthought", to explain how the cogito no longer relates to a thinking subject, but relates instead to *an unthought within thought*. What does this mean? Let's see if we can understand what it means: it's not a question of an unthought external to thought, because everyone knows about things unthought external to thought, such as the body or matter and so on. No. *It is in the very depths of thought that the unthought resides*. What does that mean? If thought is the process of the Outside, then thought must be in a fundamental relation with the unthought. You'll tell me… I'm dealing with this quite quickly because it... it sounds like nothing but words. Let's keep it as... we'll see.

Heidegger said something very odd, in his whole meditation on *What is Called Thinking?* You'll recall what he told us. He said: the question is not whether we have the possibility of thinking. The possibility of thinking, as we've seen, is the whole point of the classical image of thought. But whether we have the possibility – that is, the logical possibility and the organic-psychological possibility – of thinking is not our concern. Heidegger says that this still doesn't mean that we're capable of it, meaning capable of thinking. Okay. We will only be able to think if something, he says, gives us… that's the first proposition, that we have the possibility of thinking doesn't yet mean that we're capable of it, that is, I paraphrase, the *inner* possibility of thinking. Second proposition: we will be capable of it, we will become capable of thinking, only if something forces thought or gives us to think. In a way, the force of the Outside. *What gives us to think is the force of the Outside.*

Third proposition: from this point on – you have to understand what the inevitable consequences of this will be, you see it would take ten minutes to show this, so you have to try to feel it – from this point on, what is most thought-provoking – as he says in his style – what gives him to think in this world that gives to think, is the fact that we are not yet thinking. It's inevitable. And this is the splendid beginning of the book *What is Called Thinking?* We are not yet thinking. *What give us to think is the fact that we're not yet thinking*. In other words, *the unthought within thought is the fact that we are not yet thinking*. Thought is fundamentally in relation with an unthought. Or, as Blanchot will say, invoking the experience or process undergone by Artaud – Blanchot being the confluence of Artaud, to whom he devoted... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:29:12]

... sorry, that's not a quote, *I am the incapable of thought* – try to understand – it's like sniffing out phrases, what we're working with at the moment isn't our brains. I am the incapable of thought, and here I'm modelling myself on what he says regarding Van Gogh, "The Man Suicided by Society". Van Gogh is the man suicided by society, so in that sense if Van Gogh is the man suicided by society, Artaud is the Incapable of Thought. But being the incapable of thought doesn't simply mean that he's incapable of thinking. What does it mean to be incapable of thinking? Those are pathological cases. That would be pathological. But being the incapable of thought is something else. It's the process. Thought as the thought from Outside is fundamentally related to something that eludes thought.

Do you see what I mean? Foucault would have to develop this in some splendid texts by… by pulling it in completely new and original directions. And this is where it becomes clear that a book like *The Order of Things* is not simply a history of thought, but a great book of philosophy in its own right. For what is Foucault's theme of *The Order of Things*, if I try to summarize it just to set out the pieces of our program? It consists in attempting to define the classical world of knowledge. And he defines the classical world of knowledge by three poles, what he calls the trihedron of knowledge, of classical knowledge: wealth, and the exchange of wealth; discourse, and the organization of discourse; the organism, and the arrangement of organisms in series or otherwise. And this forms the great world of classical representation, the world of knowledge and learning.

And according to him, when is it that a... that a mutation take place? A mutation occurs – I'll take it again... from the other text – when the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself. What is it that happens when the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself? When the Outside hollows out and lures interiority out of itself is when the organism allows something deeper to be seen beneath or outside itself, something we will call *life*. And according to Foucault, this is [Georges] Cuvier… hence the historical aspect of the book, the aspect that *The Order of Things* assumes. It's Cuvier. The second point is that wealth and the exchange of wealth will reveal something deeper, something that is outside and that, here too, will define an Outside of the world, and what will it be this time? It will be *labor*, labor power as discovered by [David] Ricardo. And finally, when the frame of discourse cracks to reveal something deeper both running through and outside of itself, this something will be identified not as the order of discourse, but as *language* and the power of language. This time, it's [Franz] Bopp, the founder of linguistics. From then on, Cuvier, Ricardo, Bopp – but he could have given other names – appear to Foucault to mark the three poles of this mutation, this reversal. So, what does it achieve and how can this be expressed?

So, though what he's doing here appears to be history, the history of thought, it is actually nothing of the sort. Clearly not. Or yes, it is, but there's something else at work. What interests him is, quite simply, what it means to think, meaning how is it that today thinking is the force from Outside that places thought in a fundamental relationship with the unthought, with something unthought? And this radical unthought at the heart of thought will have three figures that according to Foucault will be the figures of the Outside: labor, language, life. These figures, thought confronts within itself, that is, not as something exterior as would a positive science, because this would, of course, give rise to positive sciences confronting the *object* of the Outside, the object of language or of biology. Political economy confronts the *object* of labor. Biology, a word that in fact doesn't appear until Cuvier, biology confronts the object of life. Linguistics confronts the object of language on the ruins of the classical world model. But at the same time as the positive sciences devote themselves to these three figures, there is something more profound that, in Foucault's view, makes these positive sciences possible and is not made possible by them – namely that thought as a force from Outside, thought as a process, has entered into a relation with three figures of the unthought that are: life, language and labor, or production.

So, it isn’t even a question of trying to define what thought is... You see, this unthought in thought is, in a way, the famous fact that we're not yet thinking. Thought as a force from… as a force from Outside is what remains to come, as Heidegger would also say. In what sense is it what remains to come? It's not because it lacks a present. It's because it never ceases, presently, in an eternal present, to put thought into relation with a fundamental unthought. So thought is eternally to come, in this sense. And if it is exercised now, it is still as a thought to come.

Well, never mind all this, these are questions you are already familiar with. All I needed to do was to show the coherence of the first aspect, the general idea of the Outside, and the second aspect, the fundamental relation between thought and the unthought. From this, there follows a third aspect, again as part of this same mutation, the thought from Outside, namely, the emergence of what we might call *interstices, interruptions or intervals*. That is what will count from now on: the interstice, the interruption, the interval. Why should this matter? Well, what does it matter if that's what counts?

Oh dear! Time for a pause, a break. Shall we take a break? No? Yes? Okay. [*Recording interrupted*] [1:38:59]

Student: [*Unheard question*]

Deleuze: ... which, for you, I feel charged with meaning. For me, the idea of a conqueror means nothing. Sentimentally speaking, it doesn't mean anything to me, but it's great if it means something to you, it has to. So, I'm okay with that, right? I'm fine with it. If you say to me: is that what you said? No. Is that what you meant? No. Is it close? Yes. What could be better?

Another student: I too have something to say about the process. It sometimes seems to me that this process, once it manifests itself, at the same time leaves traces and shades of collapse...

Deleuze: Yes, yes...

Student: So, you were saying that the individual's gamble or future consists precisely in maintaining the process and avoiding this collapse.

Deleuze: Yes, which is to say that I've never considered madness as anything other than an immense misery and misfortune.

Student: Yes, so that's where I want to add, precisely regarding this paradox and this force that gives the individual both a great possibility of being faithful to this process, but which at the same time gives them an urge, a temptation, a desire, still ambiguous or obscure, not just to throw himself into misery, but to give themself the illusion of changing something in the physical, and even the corporeal, order of the world... I'm expressing myself very badly, sorry…

Deleuze: No, you express yourself very well. I'm not sure that what we called “process” after Jaspers gives the individual who falls prey to it the desire to change. Rather, I think it gives them what we used to call “clairvoyance”, meaning the ability to see life. They see life. From where they have returned, they now see life. So, I believe that this type of clairvoyance, which has nothing mystical about it, is indeed a fundamental condition for action. If we don't act for and in accordance with life, we can't even act because, at that point, I think... well, that's all. Yes?

Student: [*A few words that Deleuze cuts off*]

Deleuze: So, if you say there's a paradox, there's a paradox, yes, there's a paradox. It's fundamentally a thought of paradox. In my opinion, the thing that goes furthest, up to now, is this book by Jaspers… this already old, wonderful book by Jaspers on Strindberg and Van Gogh ... But it’s not enough to go through the process to be Van Gogh, is it? It's clear that, at this point, we're touching on both mysteries and commonplaces, aren't we? There's no need to ask questions about the relation between madness, genius, the work of art, etc., questions that are badly posed. Rather, I'd like the very idea of process to shed a little light on a whole knot of questions... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:42:44]

Part 3

Student: [*Indistinct remarks*] ... it seems to me that the moment itself isn't sufficiently described.

Deleuze: Ah ah ah! Sorry for laughing like that. Yes, yes, yes. But once again, we're just making the program.

Student: No, no... I'm talking about...

Deleuze: In general?

The student: In general.

Deleuze: Well, this isn’t thought in general. You can count on one hand those who’ve come up with this kind of thought: Jasper, Blanchot, Foucault. So, there you have it, three, only three. I think Foucault made a lot of progress in relation to Blanchot. But Foucault's work was interrupted, because in what direction would this work have developed? Nobody can say. Yes?

Student: I'd like to explain a little what I mean by the word “conqueror”, and from a general point of view, I could tell you that a conqueror for example was a man who conquered cities in the Greek world. But there are other types of conquerors too. A philosopher, for example, is a conqueror of knowledge. That's all I wanted to say.

Deleuze: I think there's a book, there's a very fine book by Élie Faure about conquerors.[12]

Student: [*A few indistinct words*] … I mean, when I say that man, even if he's tired today...

Deleuze: I understand, yes, yes...

Student: ... even if there aren't enough…

Deleuze: Yes, yes, I understand, yes...

Student: ... he wants to search for something within himself until his death, which he wants to maintain...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

Student: I don't know if you can understand now.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, absolutely, absolutely. What you call a conqueror, I'd call a living person, yes, yes, or a seer, yes, yes. On this point, I'd definitely agree with you, yes. So, listen, we have to get back to the program.

If the third aspect of the thought from Outside is, as I was saying, the rise of interstices, well, then you find this in a number of different authors, and you find different names for it: intervals, interstices… [Roland] Barthes employed a lot of different terms to define this strange thing we're going to talk about.[13]

As far as Blanchot, one of the fundamental books on everything we're talking about here, on the thought of the Outside, is his book entitled *The Infinite Conversation* and, beginning on page 75, there's a chapter entitled "Interruption", which I'll summarize very roughly. He says: Well, you see, all discourse goes through interruptions or intermittences… – and it's me who's saying this, he doesn't – but it includes monologue, and even interior monologue. You have to catch your breath. To catch one's breath. I think of a term, a splendid fragment of a phrase that Blanchot deploys in this regard: "Such silence, even if [in the text] disapproving, constitutes the part that moves discourse".[14] This is the sensory-motor schema. You see, it's the motor part of speech: I speak and catch my breath. It's the motor part of speech, there's an interval.

And then, when the speech is not a monologue, but a dialogue, there are also intervals. Intervals of what kind? Intervals, says Blanchot in this text, which is very good, he says: Well, there are two well-known kinds of intervals: each one takes it in turn to speak. Each one has their turn to speak, but this can be in two very different ways, so there are two types of interval. In a dialogue, each has their turn to speak: "Okay, now it's your turn to speak". What does it mean to say: "Now, I'll stop here, it's your turn to speak"? Either it means that we speak in turn because each of us has their own point of view on the object, in which case the interval is an interval between two points of view on the same object. This would be the scientific interval. You might say: "The table looks white to me" … "Oh, no, for me it looks yellow". So, this would be the scientific interval. Or else, what we have is an interval of affectivity, meaning that you and I are seeking agreement. "It's

your turn to speak". And even if we're not seeking agreement, this can still be an affective interval. "So, you want to speak now, do you? Okay". It can be an interval whose goal is the union of the two, in a single consciousness. This would be the amorous interval. Fine.

And Blanchot analyzes all this very well, and he says: But there's a third interval. And he says, this one is extremely difficult to grasp, all the more so because it's always entangled with the other one, exactly like the thought from Outside is always entangled with classical thought. There's a third interval. And Blanchot says that here it is no longer only a question of "expressing oneself in an intermittent manner" … it's no longer a question of "expressing oneself in an intermittent manner", but of allowing "intermittence to speak". So, no longer expressing oneself in an intermittent manner but allowing intermittence to speak – "a speech that, non-unifying…" – in the other cases, we were attempting to unify – "a speech that, non-unifying, is no longer content with being a passage or bridge – a non-pontificating speech…" Here we have a play on words: "a non-pontificating speech, capable of clearing the two shores separated by the abyss, but without filling in the abyss or reuniting its shores."[15] You recognize the style, it's pure Blanchot, for those who have already read Blanchot. It has Blanchot's signature. Okay.

I'm attempting to translate, not that this is insufficient in itself, but I want to translate this in terms of our problem. You see, there' is always an interstice. Actually, in fact, there are two types of interstice. Sometimes the interstice is the minimum necessary for two ideas or two images to be brought together, or two people even… for two ideas, two images, two people to be brought together. In other words, the interstice is the gap over which the images must leap in order to fill it. Between two images, there's an interstice, and without this interstice, there would be no association of images. So, I would say in this case, the interstice is subordinate to the association. It's the minimum of void required for an association to unfold. Subordination of the interstice to the association of images. You see?

In the other case, that mysterious case Blanchot speaks of, it's no longer a question of expressing oneself in an intermittent manner, but of allowing intermittence to speak. Though we don't yet know where this is leading us, I'd say… I'd say it's the opposite. Here, it's no longer the association of images that counts. Each image – and you can see to what extent this is linked to all the things we've spent entire sessions on – *each image emerges from the void and falls back into the void*. Each image leaves the void and returns to the void. Rupture of association, in other words, rupture – as he called it – of the sensory-motor part of discourse. The interval is manifested for itself and subordinates what remains of association, because of course, one has to live. Okay. This time, the formula for this second interstice is, as you can see, quite simple. It's the opposite formula to the one I used earlier: subordination of remaining associations to the interstice. *The interstice begins to stand for itself*. Every image... The interstice is no longer the minimum difference required for two images to be associated by leaping over it. It begins to stand for itself, and subordinates all association to itself. The image leaves the void and returns to the void.

The interstices, then, in this second sense… won't they… – and here I could take up Blanchot, Roland Barthes, or again Foucault – won't they create, I don't mean a unified

style, but won't they play in a singular way on what makes each of these three styles recognizable? Will this not be an art of interstices that renounces associationism and that subordinates association to itself? And what will this interstice be between? Interstices everywhere. There will be a great interstice, as though the interstice between the two halves of the brain began to stand for itself. Would this itself involve questions related to the brain? You already know the answer, because we're going to be looking at this question of the brain, which is also part of our program. So, what will this fundamental interstice come between? Blanchot never ceases to restate it, and it will be a fundamental notion for him, particularly in *The Infinite Conversation*. This interstice that is perhaps the most important of all, the one *between speaking and seeing*, as in Chapter 3 "Speaking is not Seeing".

It is in this interstice between speaking and seeing that thought develops, thought as speaking and thought as seeing, and the interstice between the two. In what way is speaking not seeing? Well, that's… Why is it that we never speak about what we see, and we never see what we speak about? Well, in a completely different way, this is a notion you find very often in Barthes, and also in Foucault, notably in the little book he wrote about the writer Raymond Roussel. In Foucault's *Raymond Roussel*,[16] he analyses all the interstices that Raymond Roussel played upon. But we'll look at that later.

What I mean is, you see, it gives us an immediate answer: thought as a force from Outside no longer manifests itself through associations, it manifests itself through and within the interstice. *And the interstice is, at the same time, precisely the unthought*. So, all this ties together very nicely. I think the whole mutation I've tried to explain is very rigorous. There are extremely profound linkages in this intuition, in this new image of thought. And not only in the interstice between seeing and speaking… but in seeing itself there are all kinds of interstices, just as in speaking itself we find all kinds of interstices. The interstices will never stop attempting to multiply.

So, let's keep looking. Now something comes to the fore, something that imposes itself in our back-and-forth, in our strolls through philosophy and cinema. I believe that, between so-called classical cinema and so-called modern cinema, there has been an obvious shift, something so completely obvious that we will need to analyze it in great detail, though for the moment I'd just like to give you a rough idea. What is this obvious shift? Well, it's that in classical cinema, we pass from one image to another. It may sound like nothing, but it's not nothing, because in classical cinema, in the great cinema of the pre-war period, we will again encounter the problem of associating images. And in what form? This problem of associating images is not insignificant, since it drives what has always been called montage. Now, in order to edit, to associate images, to pass from one image to another, we need interstices. We need interstices. And we'll see that the art of interstices, in Eisenstein for example, is already pushed to a point that includes what we call false continuity. Okay. That doesn't prevent me… I'm only suggesting this... I don't in any way claim to be able to justify this at the moment, I'll only be able to do so later.

My hypothesis is that, in this great classical cinema of the pre-war period, the interstice, however strongly developed its art may be, remains subordinated to the association of images. It's the means of passing from one image to another, including through false

continuity. The interstice is subordinate to all the adventures of image association. And as proof of this, I'd just like to mention this. It's that, if you conceive of two series of images – here we have a small problem, which is if you're… if you're following what I'm saying you'll be able to sniff the imminent arrival of some mathematics – if you take two series of images, and make a cut between the two, I'd say that in classical cinema, the cut is either part of the preceding series, of which it is the last term, or part of the following series, of which it is the first term. This is obvious, for example, in the case of dissolves, where they operate by fading in and out, by cross-fading or by fading to black. Ah, I can already see the sign, even if you take it that way... I'm just saying, there are already all the types of interstices you can think of in this classical cinema. Yet they remain subordinate, perhaps – let's put a "perhaps" here, so I can avoid any objections – perhaps they remain subordinate to the art of associating images. It's the necessary void that images must cross in order to be associated. So, the rule in this case is that the interstice itself pertains either to the preceding images, or to the ones that follow.

Now, in post-war cinema, something shatters. Hence the importance for many filmmakers of the white or black screen. This is the obvious thing to remark. But there are variations, I'd say there are multiple variations. You'd have to be a great scholar to discover the dates, who made the films that... Was it experimental cinema that began making variations with black and white screens? Was it experimental cinema? Might the technique have been used by others? I don't know. I suppose it must be in experimental cinema.[17]

There's a very fine passage in Noël Burch's *Theory of Film Practice*,[18] where Burch explains this. He says that in post-war cinema – and here he's completely in line with our theme, or rather it's we who are in line with him – he says that the cut no longer has the value of punctuation, of simple punctuation. Punctuation corresponds exactly to what I was saying, when the interstice is subordinated to the association of images. Here, the cut has a punctuation value, a comma between two images. And he says, in his own language: with the valorization of the black screen or the white screen, the cut takes on a structural value, meaning that the image no longer enters into a relationship – which is perfect for us – the image no longer enters into a relationship with other images, which would be association. *It enters into a relation with the absence of image*. We feel we're at the core of what we're seeking. It could be the white screen, it could be the black screen, it could be, as I said, some other variation. But other variations of what kind? Well, there's the overexposed screen, the underexposed screen, snowy screen, feathery screen.

You recognize, for example – those of you who know about cinema – a whole series of variations that [Phillipe] Garrel has exploited, it seems to me, in an astonishing way. Because with Garrel, we are no longer even in the domain of Burch's formula. Once again, with Garrel, the black screen and white screen no longer even have a structural value, they assume a *genetic* value, they assume a genetic value with regard to the image. Okay, but before I mentioned Resnais's last film. And there it's clear, anyone who's seen it will remember that feathery screen that coincides with the music and introduces extremely precise intervals. Okay. I'm not saying any more… I'm just saying that it's obvious how in modern cinema, or in one line of modern cinema, we find ourselves faced with exactly the same event as the one I've just told you about, at the level of the image of

thought – namely that instead of the interstice being at the service of the association of images, this interstice begins to stand for itself and subordinates to itself all that remains of association, all that remains of the associative. In other words, the image is no longer related to another image, to the preceding or following image, but to the absence of an image.

This is perhaps very important, because I'd say that finally… well, do you know what this implies? Moreover, I would add, because we will have to look at all this again very closely, and I suppose that those of you who are involved in cinema will have a thousand examples in your head. I would say that it doesn't have to be a white screen or a black screen that has a certain duration. There's a type of interstice, meaning a cut between images, there's a type of interstice that even very quickly… meaning a use of false continuity – I don't mean false continuity alone, since false continuity might already be part of the classical conception – but there's a modern understanding and use of false continuity that makes it a model interstice, that is, no longer something that images have to leap across in order to be associated, but something that stands on its own. And this can be very rapid. It doesn't have to be a black screen or a white screen. It can happen very quickly.

To invoke the interstice between images as a way of breaking association is to break the very thing he calls – and it's clear what he means by this – the *chain*, the assembly line. To break free from the chain of images. We're not slaves, images are not slaves. You can recognize the style, you have to… it's pure Godard. We're not people of the assembly line. The old cinema was driven by the assembly line in a certain way, even when it was brilliant. Getting off the assembly line… what does it mean to get off the assembly line of images? You'll find all this in great detail in Godard's *Ici et Ailleurs* [*Here and Elsewhere*, 1976]. In the actual text of the film, you always have this idea that images are slaves to one another and that we remain slaves to images as long as they're on an assembly line. And in Godard's work, there are sometimes very long interstices, but sometimes also extremely rapid ones, with a use of false continuity that in my view was absolutely new in its time, and which brings about a reversal: the interstice is no longer at the service of the association of images. The interstice takes on a life of its own, bringing under its command whatever associations may still exist, but of which very little remains. In other words, the image must emerge from the void and fall back into the void.

Who taught him this? Because here you could think of a lot of names, but the one who was really the great master in this respect, and the great inventor, I think, was [Robert] Bresson. Now, which of Bresson's films would best demonstrate this? *Au Hasard Balthazar* [1966], perhaps, but you could also add other names besides that of Bresson. It's clear that he had a fundamental influence in this new conception of the interstice. You understand that what we're saying here is very important. Ultimately, there is no longer an off-screen – we'll look at this later – we're done with that, there's no more off-screen. In modern cinema, there is no off-screen. It is in this sense that, from that point on, he is already anticipating the future electronic image, where there would be none at all. By definition, the electronic image has no off-screen. It's completely reversible, with neither inside nor outside.

But then, why has modern cinema done away with the off-screen? For a very simple reason. It's because – how shall I put it… – it didn't discover the talkie, which already existed, but what it did discover – and here I refer you to Dominique Villain's book *L'œil à la caméra*[19] – it discovered that speech, and noises in general, were the object of a framing, meaning that there's a visual framing... no, that there is a sound framing no less than there is a visual framing. Hence also Godard's formula: what's important isn't the editing, it's the mixing. He means it's the mixing that decides the editing. Do you understand all this? Okay.[20]

Everything is displaced, because sound no longer testifies, or has the possibility of testifying for something unseen that would constitute an off-screen space. I hear a noise whose source is not visible in the image, no. In other words, the off-screen in classical cinema is absolutely essential to classical cinema, because it bears witness to the possibility of associations that are not given. In other words, it tells us that the associative chain is not closed, that it is not closed by the series of images presented to us, and that images continue off the screen. So, the off-screen is definitely a fundamental function of classical cinema.

When they discover this – and who discovers it first, perhaps it's [Orson] Welles.... though, of course, there were precursors, but maybe it began with Welles, the question of framing sound… I don't know who it starts with. Bresson, too, will be a key figure in the framing of sound, his role will be fundamental. You see, the problem is no longer the *unrealized possibility* of an off-screen extension of image associations. The problem becomes the interstice between two framings – the sound framing and the visual framing – which is why there's no more off-screen. *The off-screen has passed into the interstice*. What counts now is the interstice between sound framing and visual framing, with all the possibilities this engenders, because these two framings don't correspond in any way. [Jean] Eustache made an entire film, an entire film on this question, where visual framing and sound framing are completely… seemingly unrelated, meaning that everything occurs in the interstice.[21] And this will affect everyone.

And here I want to conclude. You see, my third point would be: *the force of the Outside is therefore this primacy that the interstice assumes*. The interstice destroys association and associativity in favor of a new mode. Something else is required. And then, the last point to make regarding this thought from Outside... and this will be perfect, is that we have to see how we find all the elements again at this level, because you see how this third mutation easily incorporates the other two. So, yes, bodies, bodies... [*Recording interrupted*; 2:14:26]

... and is it any coincidence that Blanchot's book, *The Infinite Conversation*, begins with an introduction written in italics – so we see how important it is to him, and you have to love Blanchot's comic timing, he has a very special sense of comic timing that not everyone is necessarily sensitive to – an astonishing text about a dialogue between two weary people. Why two weary people? Why do the weary have to go in pairs, according to Blanchot? Well, obviously you need two, because you need the interstice between the two. There's a weary man who arrives at the home of another weary man, and he tells him to come in, he stands by the door, he's weary, and so too is the man who welcomes him.

An admirable text. “The weariness common to both of them does not bring them together. As if weariness were to hold up to us the preeminent form of truth, the one we have pursued without pause all our lives, but that we necessarily miss on the day it offers itself, precisely because we are too weary.” [22]

It's a marvelous phrase, one that suits us perfectly. It's the force from Outside that gives to thought what is unthought, and at the very moment it gives it to us, it is necessarily weariness that gives it to us, *the weariness of our body that gives us the unthought*. But in giving it to us, it prevents us from thinking it and reinforces it as unthought, and why is this? Because we are weary. We're tired, and yet that doesn't mean we're tired of living, not at all. “Forgive me for having asked you to come to see me. I had something to say to you, but at present I feel so weary that I'm afraid I will be unable to express myself.” — “You are feeling very weary?” — “Yes, weary.” — “And this came upon you suddenly?”— “To tell the truth, no, and if I even took the liberty of calling you, it was because of this weariness, because it seemed to me that it would facilitate the conversation. I was even entirely sure of this, and still now I am almost sure of it. Only I had not realized that what weariness makes possible, weariness makes difficult.”[23] That's a marvel. Well, it’s something you’ll have to read for yourselves. I'll explain when we get to the end of our work.

And at the end… not quite at the end, but towards the end of the text, we have: “When he speaks of weariness, it is difficult to know what he is speaking of. Let us admit” – now listen carefully to this – “Let us admit that weariness makes speech less exact, thought less telling, communication more difficult; does not the inexactitude proper to this state reach through all of these signs a kind of precision that would also finally serve exact speech by offering something to uncommunicate?”[24] You see, “to uncommunicate”, that is, to non-communicate, to present as the incommunicable, this weariness which is nonetheless common to us, which is therefore the interstice, the interval between two weary people, and which presents us with and proposes to us something to “uncommunicate”, that is, the force of the Outside itself.

Let's get back to cinema. What did Antonioni do? It's obviously a huge impoverishment to reduce such a filmmaker’s work to a drama of understanding or incomprehension or communication. What did he do? What did he spend his time doing? He put waiting and tiredness into the body. He made the body a direct time-image. When he attacked [Vittorio] De Sica at the beginning of the neorealism movement, he said – and we commented on this very fine text by Antonioni, where he says that what's is excessive in neorealism is the bicycle. It's not the bicycle that's interesting, his bicycle has been stolen, but what's interesting is what will remain of it in his soul and body ten years afterwards. Tiredness, wear and tear, waiting, good. Why the time-image? [25]

But this isn't the drama of communication. It's precisely because, as Blanchot says, fatigue is what gives us something to “uncommunicate”, namely the force of the Outside, which is at the same time absolutely quintessential – well, not quintessential – but which is a fundamental element of Antonioni's cinema, beyond the external world, something that takes the characters beyond the external world. Think of *L’Avventura* [1960], the missing person beyond, beyond the external world, and the couple are under the gaze of

this Outside. And these tired bodies, these waiting bodies, are about to embark on their adventure.

I just want to say – so here I'll summarize what we've done today – I just want to say, regarding this third mutation, which is where I've got to: the third mutation is the thought from Outside. To understand this mutation, we need to link up the four notions. First notion: the idea of process, in the sense of Jaspers. Second notion: the idea of an essential relation between thought and an unthought, or an inability to think. Third notion: the idea of an interstice that becomes primary in relation to association. Fourth notion: tiredness and the Outside, the weariness of the body and the power or potency of the Outside.

For those of you who were here last year, I'd say we've changed the atmosphere, but not so much the elements. The power of the Outside is the direct presentation of time, what we called last year… what we researched and analyzed as being a direct presentation of time as opposed to an indirect representation of time. That's what it is, the thought from Outside, or the force of the Outside in thought, that passes through the body and through the tiredness of the body, obviously. Right. Next time, we'll see in what way mathematics gives us a way of thinking through all this. [*End of the session*] [2:22:31]

Notes

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[1] All these remarks are introductory points in Chapter 8 of *The Time-Image*, "Cinema, Body, Brain and Thought".
[2] In his *Diary* from Saint Paul 2 Cor 12.7.
[3] Number 229 (June 1966), pp. 523-546.
[4] Paris: Gallimard, 1966; *The Order of Things,* trans. Alan Sheridan *(*London: Routledge, 1989).
[5] On the link between *What is called thinking?*, Blanchot and Foucault, see "Life as a Work of Art" in *Negotiations,* trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), pp. 94 -101.
[6] Paul Claudel, *Traité de la co-naissance au monde et de soi-même* (1907 ; Paris: Mercure de France, 1913). See also the previous session for discussion of "co-naissance".
[7] On the distinction between "classical conception" and "linguistic conception", see *The Time-Image*, pp. 210 211.
[8] Karl Jaspers, *Strindberg and Van Gogh,* trans. Oskar Grunow and David Woloshin (Tucson: Arizona UP, 1977).
[9] "La folie par excellence", published in *Critique 45* (February, 1951), pp. 99-118. The English translation, "Madness *par excellence*", appears in *The Blanchot Reader*, ed. Michael Holland (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 110-128.
[10] According to Deleuze, Cayrol writes about the Lazarean hero in *Corps étrangers* (Paris: Seuil, 1959). See *The Time-Image*, p. 207 and p. 317, note 24.
[11] For this perspective on Resnais, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 206-210.
[12] Probably *La Conquête* (1917).
[13] On Barthes's notion of interstice, see *The Empire of Signs,* New York: Farrar, Strauss & Geroux, 1982. On the interval, see *Le Nouvel Observateur* (October 23, 1978)*,* in *Œuvres complètes*, *vol. 5,* Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995*,* pp. 475-6.
[14] *The Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hansen (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993), p. 76.
[15] Ibid, p. 78. The play on words Deleuze alludes to relates to the word "pontificating", which in French contains *pont*, meaning bridge.
[16] Paris: Gallimard, 1963. Eng. translation *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, New York: Doubleday, 1986.
[17] On the black or white screen, and the discussion that follows, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 200-201 and p. 316, Note 15.

[18] *Praxis du cinéma*, Paris: Gallimard, 1969; Eng. *Theory of Film Practice*, Princeton; Princeton UP, 1981.
[19] Paris: Cahiers du cinéma / Éditions de l'Étoile, 1984. At Deleuze's invitation, Villain will speak at session 22, May 14, 1985.
[20] On the subject of "mixing", see *The Time-Image*, pp. 180-181.
[21] This is Eustache's short film *Les Photos d'Alix* (1980), mentioned by Deleuze in *The Time-Image*, pp. 249-250.
[22] *The Infinite Conversation,* p. xiii.
[23] Ibid. p. xiv.
[24] Ibid. p. xx.
[25] Deleuze attributes these remarks to Antonioni, though here he is paraphrasing an interview quoted in a book by Pierre Leprohon, *Michelangelo Antonioni*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963, p. 90, cited by Deleuze in *The Time-Image*, p. 284, Note 40.