**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985**

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## Part 1

... I hope we'll be able to complete our program today fairly quickly, since we've been dragging on with it since the beginning of the year. Secondly, I'd like to summarize the main points of the program, including the bibliography. And thirdly, I will finally be able to explain what I expect of you… after which, perhaps, you won't come back...

So, first of all, I'll try to finish with this matter of the brain, the cerebral image, from the points of view of science, of lived experience as well as that of cinema. And, if you remember, I tried to say two very simple things, even if I was forcing the issue a bit… that, it seemed to me, it wasn't a sudden mutation that occurred but certain accents had already shifted in the scientific relation with the brain, and in our lived relation with the brain.

At the same time, you'll be able to fill in the gaps yourselves with the kind of cinema that has always partly presented itself as a cinema of the brain. Think of [Sergei] Eisenstein's great text on the relationship between the cinematic image and the cortex[1]… the notion of the cortex recurs constantly in Eisenstein. Well, if the cortex has something to do with the cinematographic image, it means there has also been a shift in the relation between cinema and the brain. And, as I was saying, the emphasis has shifted in two ways, that is, well… for a certain time, it seems to me that what dominated − and here I'm speaking of a trend – the approach that dominated the study of the brain was a certain conception based on *an axis of integration and differentiation*. And we saw last time how the process of integration and differentiation could ultimately define a totality and a circulation within the Whole.

As I was saying, increasingly the structure of integration and differentiation are perhaps being replaced – and again, "replaced" isn't the best term, you have to correct each time, you have to add your own nuances… I'm not going to add them for you – are perhaps being replaced by considerations of a new kind, namely, concerning a *topological* structure of the brain, where it is no longer a question of integration and differentiation. And in topology, you must know that, by definition, in a topological structure, distances are of no account. Of course, you don't yet need to know exactly what a topological structure is, you'll be able to see that later.

Now, if we want to discover the brain in terms of a topological structure… what would this involve? Here, what comes to the fore is *a topological relation of outside and inside* or, I might say, a type of *contact* that is independent of distance, a contact independent of

distances or, if you prefer, a *co-presence*, an attachment of the inside and the outside but equally of future and past, void and plenitude, front and back, black and white, cosmos and brain. It's the brain-cosmos.

I don't need to remind you that, in terms of cinema, science-fiction films, for example, will make broad use of this theme. And I emphasize that when I speak of a co-presence or an application of the inside to the outside, I'm speaking of *an Outside that is more distant than any external world*, and *an Inside that is deeper than any internal world*. From this point of view, the cinematographic image is really the co-presence or application of inside to outside, past to future, brain to cosmos, black to white. In a way, the black screen or the white screen, in light of the important role it gained in post-war cinema, would be the sign of this topological structure. And indeed, to try to be a little clearer, we have to ask ourselves: does the white screen or the black screen, or all their combinable, composable varieties, constitute a full image, or is it rather an empty image? In actual fact, what we have is a co-presence of empty and full, a co-presence of outside and inside. So, that was my first remark on the brain, how the accent is placed on the possibility of a topological structure that is not accounted for by Euclidean space.

And then we made a second remark. This second remark was: if we conceive of the limit of the brain as a topological co-presence, as a topological application of an absolute outside on an absolute inside, how does transmission, how do linkages… in short, sensory-motor linkages – that is, the passage of an impulse or a message from one neuron to another – actually take place inside the brain? And here we gave an equally obscure answer. We said: maybe it takes place in the form of *semi-aleatory relations*. And we set about trying to see what these semi-aleatory relations were, in other words, these mixtures. Mixtures of what? Mixtures of dependence and chance that could be grouped under the general heading of partially dependent aleatory phenomena or, if you prefer, semi-fortuitous linkages. And we also saw that an odd thing called Markov chains gave a singular status to these semi-fortuitous linkages.

And I thought, Well, couldn't we imagine that the transmission from one neuron to another, that the association from one neuron to another, could take the form of Markov chains, in other words, of semi-aleatory relations? If you were to accept this idea, however confused it may appear, if you were to accept this idea, there would be a major consequence. We'd have to say that the linkage… the linkages, take the form of a perpetually… a truly perpetually relinked *parceling out*. The status of the semi-fortuitous linkages is that of a relinked parceling out.

I'll tell you what I'm trying to get at straight away: in my view, relinked parceling out means that, in one way or another, *transmission takes place by relinking and never by linking*. What does it mean to say that transmission takes place by relinking and never by linking? It means that the prefix "re" of relinkage, must be interpreted correctly: *relinking is not secondary to linking*. Relinking is a particular type of linkage. For me, this is already getting more interesting: relinking would be a particular type of linkage. There would be parceling out through relinking that would not be at all secondary in relation to the continuities of linkage. We could contrast two types of linkage: on the one hand, continuity-type linkage, and on the other, parceling out by relinkage.

Or, if you prefer, to be even clearer, we could distinguish between three possible cases: in the first possible case, we have a continuous network, a continuous network of transmission or

association. A second possible case: there is a linkage of associated images that takes place via cut-points, a linkage of associated images that takes place via cut-points. What is the... you have to try to understand this point... What is the condition? If you've followed me from the beginning, you will know the condition: that the cuts be *rational*. When the cuts are rational, there is in fact a linkage of images that are associated by these cut-points. What is a rational cut-point? You remember… and this will explain everything, I hope you remember. Being a cut, it is *an instance that divides two series*, a series before and a series after, an inferior series and a superior series. As a rational cut-point, the cut-point itself forms part of one or other of the two series, either as the last term of the first series, or as the first term of the second series. In this case… unlike in the first case, where there's a continuous network, in this case I'd say there's a linkage of images associated by rational cut-points. There is a linkage.

Third case: *linkages by irrational cut-points*. How did we define irrational cut-points? First and foremost, they don't pertain to... they determine, they are cuts, since they determine a division into two series, but they don't themselves pertain to either of the two series. They *produce a parceling out* between the two series. And the relation is no longer a linkage of associated images, it's *a relinking of independent images*. And that's it in a nutshell. There is a relinkage of independent images, *without there ever having been a prior linkage of associated images*. These are two completely different types of linkage. In the second case, which interests me most is the fact that we have relinked fragments. It's no longer the topological aspect of the brain, it's the semi-aleatory or probabilistic aspect, if you like, of the brain produced by fragments that are constantly being relinked.

I go back to our old formula – since to me it seems the clearest – there is no longer a linkage of associated images… we saw the importance of these associations in the old cinema, where the cut-points were rational. I remind you once again of the importance of Eisenstein's texts, where he insists on what he calls caesuras, meaning cut-points, and the need for these to be rational, that is, to obey the "golden section" or a structure that would be close to the golden section, meaning that they imply *commensurable* relations, rational relations.

Well, now that's no longer the case: instead of a linkage of images associated by rational cut-points, what we have is a parceling out relinked by irrational cut-points. Hence, I can say that relinkage is never a secondary linkage, that is, one that comes after linking. Relinkage is an original type of linkage. It's a semi-fortuitous linkage. This is extremely important. I mean, we're getting somewhere here… I don't know why, but we're definitely getting somewhere… and it will be extremely important for what we do later on.

So, I want to insist on this – how shall I put it? – I want to insist that one of our fundamental results – because even if we're still only constructing the program, we're already getting certain results – one of the main results of what we've done this first term is the link we can now establish between three cinematographic notions… but this goes beyond cinema of course, and I could just as easily say between three philosophical concepts. First notion: *the black or white screen* and its variations. Second notion: *the irrational cut-point*, the irrational cut. Third notion: *relinked parceling out*.

What is the connection between all these? I could start, you see, from one of these notions and obtain the other two… that would be harmonious. I will settle for one case: I start with the black or white screen, and I would say, it's the co-application of the absolute outside and the absolute inside, the absolute past and the absolute future and so on. Okay. This is what in

the course of our research we've called "the force of the Outside", an Outside that is more distant than any external world, an Inside that is deeper than any internal world. How will it appear – the white or black screen may also manifest itself autonomously – how will it appear in a sequence of images? This is the second point. The answer is simple: it will appear in the form of an irrational cut… the irrational cuts that arise with modern cinema, with post-war cinema, notably, as I was saying, in the use of false-continuity. False-continuity is typically an irrational cut, in [Robert] Bresson's fragmentation of space, and in all sorts of other examples we've seen or will see in future. So, I can deduce very easily… from the black and white screen, I can move on to the irrational cut between images, in a sequence of images.

Thirdly, my question is: when two series are determined by an irrational cut and not by a rational cut, how is the linkage produced? My answer – and this seems to me an absolutely necessary deduction – is that the linkages can no longer be a linkage of associated images, it will be a relinkage of independent images. This point will enable us to respond to [Jean-Luc] Godard's formula: no longer one image *after* another but one image *plus* another. No longer one image after another but one image plus another. That would be the definition, and it's a way of saying that instead of a linkage of associated images we have a relinkage of independent images. You shouldn't start asking for concrete examples yet… first you have to understand this in the abstract, you have to understand it abstractly, and then concrete examples will come after, which will make things easier. Okay. So, I imagine you have... you've got to understand this at all costs, you see, in the end it's all the same notion, it's the same instance that presents itself as a black or white screen, as an irrational cut and as a relinked parcelling out, or as a relinkage of independent images. The three are absolutely connected.[2]

So, if you think that we need to make this a little more concrete… well, okay, let's try to make it a little more concrete. Last year, I alluded to a novel which seems to me to be one of the greatest novels in history, and which this year will be of direct concern to us, because now I'd like to comment on it and not just allude to it… it's a novel by a Russian writer, from the great period of Russian Constructivism. It's the great Constructivist novel.[3] And, as we saw when we were looking at [James] Joyce and the interior monologue, automatism and so on, well, perhaps now will be the time to compare this novel and find out what new techniques it has contributed, explore what relation it has, for example, to Joyce's novel.

It's a novel by Andrei Bely, who was a great author, for those who don't know him. But one of my wishes is that those who don't know him should take this opportunity to read his novel. The novel is called *Petersburg* [1913/1922]. In my view, it's an immense masterpiece, a truly great work.

Student: How do you spell it?

Deleuze: Bely, b–e–l–y, Andrei. Andrei Bely, and the novel is called *Petersburg*. Suppose we all leaf through it together… what do we discover? I'm not going to comment on it, I'll leave that for... You have to be with me in this, we'll have to find time for that. What do I find so striking? I'm leafing through the pages... What strikes me? The first thing that strikes me is the very haunting theme of the brain-cosmos, the brain-cosmos. A corridor – I'm referring to a very fine passage, an admirable passage from the novel, I'll try to make a rough summary – a corridor opens in the head of a character, in the brain of a character, and he follows this corridor that leads him to the cosmic void. I'll say nothing more, but the passage is so

beautiful that… you see, there is a corridor that opens up in your head, and you follow that corridor, you take that corridor, and you emerge into the cosmic void, into a small galaxy.

I'm still leafing through it, and throughout the novel there's this question of a bomb – it's a great revolutionary novel. There's talk of a bomb, but this bomb is located in different places. It's a bomb that's in the belly, in the body of the characters, who are constantly at risk of their body exploding. But it's also a real bomb, and it's the same one that shifts around all over the house, and the characters are on the lookout for this bomb. They hear it in their belly and they look for it outside. The bomb is explicitly described as co-present inside and outside, on both sides of a kind of membrane… the bomb inside and the bomb outside are applied to one another.

Third point: the whole novel is dominated by one of the heroes, who pops up in the most diverse places, always propelled by the same theme, which is the city of Petersburg itself. In Russian literature, Petersburg has a particular vocation. As it does in film, but in literature in particular, you already find these particular virtues of Petersburg that are so well described by Dostoevsky: it's the ghost town, the swamp town. It's the city where inside and outside confront one another. It's the brain-cosmos.

Lastly, if we leaf through without... What I'm saying is absolutely not a commentary, it's... I have the naive idea of trying to get you to go and check it out for yourself. A character, one of the heroes, pops up in the most unexpected places in town, wearing a domino, wearing a red domino, and he scares everyone and causes a scandal everywhere with his blood-red domino. And I'd say, literally, every passage in the novel is relinked with the red domino. There's never any association – this, in my view, is one of Bely's great techniques – there's never any association between a domino scene and another scene. There's a perpetual parceling out and relinkage. The relinkage occurs with the red domino.

Well, let me tell you a completely different story. A filmmaker called Alain Resnais… I find it very striking… I don't know if Resnais knows Bely's novel, I don't think he does… or even if he does, I doubt it had much influence.[4] I want to summarize some of the most well-known features of Resnais's work. The co-presence, the co-application, of an outside and an inside as definition and determining factor, a brain-cosmos. This is the great noosphere of *Je t'aime, Je t'aime* [1968]. The brain-cosmos as city. Is it a brain? Is it a world? It's for you to decide, but you find it everywhere in Resnais… it's the Bibliothèque Nationale.[5] Is it a cosmos? Is it a brain? Co-application, co-presence of outside and inside, world and brain. More to the point, what would Resnais's Petersburg be? Resnais's Petersburg is Boulogne, it's the Boulogne of *Muriel* [1963], it's the ghost town… it's the spectral town, the brain town.

Second feature, in *Providence* [1977], the bomb inside and the bomb outside, and the co-presence of the two bombs. The bomb is in the body of the old alcoholic novelist. His body rattles, his body rattles in all directions, the bomb as the organic state of a decrepit body. The same theme recurs constantly in Bely's work: the bomb that explodes in the decrepit body. But the bomb is also present in the cosmic states of *Providence*: in the thunder and lightning and in the nocturnal walks of the old alcoholic, insomniac novelist. And finally, it is in the social and political state. Perpetual bursts of machine-gun fire, gunshots and so on. Cosmic thunder and lightning, organic crackling, historical-political machine-gun bursts, and the whole of *Providence* produces a kind of topological contact between all these states, making this film, it seems to me, one of the masterpieces of modern cinema.

Third point, regarding Resnais. What is *Je t'aime, je t'aime* about? For those who have seen it… anyway, I'll tell you very quickly… someone who has attempted suicide is rescued and is then subjected to an experiment. He is sealed into the noosphere, the world-brain, and is made to relive a minute of his past, a precise minute of his past. This minute is a minute that took place – I'm telling you this because dates are extremely important – on September 5, 1966, at 4 p.m. In principle, this is the experiment. And in the course of the film, you have a perpetual return to this minute, the minute when the hero gets out of the water and returns to Catrine, the woman he loves or no longer loves, and there is a dialogue between them… no doubt this minute is of fundamental importance because it must have been a moment of uncertainty between the two states. There was still a chance between the moment when he still loved her and the moment when he no longer did. In my view, I'd say this an irrational cut. It is an in-between moment: between still loving and no longer loving.

But the noosphere is misfiring: instead of simply sending him back to that minute… it does send him back to the minute, yes, but each time this minute is linked with a series of images that are increasingly independent of that minute. At first, there are still vague associations between the minute in question and the series with which it's linked. But the more the film goes on, the more the minute is linked with series that are more distant, removed in time, separated in space. In other words, there's no longer any linkage, there's no longer any association... No, I mean, there is no longer a linkage of associated images, but the crucial minute never ceases passing into the other regime of linkage. So, we have a relinked parceling out, that is, the moment is relinked with a series of other images, a series of independent images.

I'm saying this independently of any connection between Bely's great novel and Resnais's work… I believe there is a system of echoes that provide us with a very rich field where we can study this relation between irrational cuts and relinkages, operations of relinkage. And we can also sense what we haven't yet touched on, namely the possibility of a cinema that should indeed be called a *serial* cinema. I would say that cinema can be considered serial when, instead of a linkage of associated images, you have relinkages of independent images. This would allow me to use the word serial in more than a merely metaphorical way when talking about cinema, as others too often do. In this way we can at least begin from a first definition of *series*. Okay.

I'll end this point – and I'd like to make this very clear – I'll end this point by saying… we could look for confirmation, that's part of our program. I was thinking we could look for something to confirm this in what is called abstract experimental cinema, and if I look perhaps… I ask myself, well, would we find confirmation there? We'll see all this later when we come to have a session on experimental cinema, but if I were to attempt a very, very rough periodization of abstract cinema, I would say there was indeed a moment, a first moment, the great moment before the war, when there was a great abstract cinema but which – we'll have to see – perhaps consisted in the double movement of integration and differentiation on one hand, and the linkage of associated images on the other.

It was the great age of… how can I put it? Geometric, abstract cinema. But in what sense would it be geometric? Here we should distinguish between different filmmakers, because it's not just geometric cinema, it's a type of cinema that is closer to painting. And there are obviously very different filmmakers, it seems to me, even if it wouldn't be hard to distinguish between a Kandinsky tendency and a Paul Klee tendency. I mean – and we'll come back to all these points – but I'll say very briefly here that there is a considerable difference, if you like,

between the techniques of these two painters. What I'm saying here may sound quite abstract but for Kandinsky what counts are the forces, the forces that are exerted on lines, and it's from this that he will arrive at his notion… at the fundamental notion of his aesthetic, as a great painter, the notion of *tension*. Tension is the relation between a line and the forces exerted upon it.[6]

For Paul Klee, the situation is different. You just have to compare – and maybe, maybe we'll have the time, maybe we will – you just have to compare some great texts, some great works of Klee and Kandinsky to see the difference... [*Recording interrupted;* 45:57]

… In abstract geometric cinema, there are two poles that group together different filmmakers. There is a pole which is close to Kandinsky and a pole which is close to Paul Klee, and this shouldn't at all surprise us. But I would say this is a type of cinema that remains within and corresponds to the old image of the brain, of integration-differentiation and linkage between associated images.

But if we jump – and of course there's a lot that will happen between times – but if we jump to American abstract experimental cinema of the late 50s, early 60s, what do we find? For those of you who have seen some of these films, please forgive me if I seem to be forcing the issue… I see a trinity, a kind of trinity with three fundamental components: the black screen, the white screen and all their variations. We find this in all of them. Here I could mention… well, there is this famous film, *Reflections on Black* [1955], I think, I think it's by… sorry, I don't quite know how to pronounce his name… Stan Brakhage.[7]

The second great procedure is *flickering* – and this is not a gratuitous process… when I sum it up like that it may sound gratuitous – the process of flickering, there's a whole cinema of flickering. I'll give you an example, a film… a film by [Tony] Conrad [*The Flicker*, 1965]. It's not the only one, but it's one of the films that, in my view, have created the most beautiful flickering effects. And I would say, I don't need to justify this right now, but I'd say that flickering obviously determines an irrational cut, we could almost say that it's made for that purpose.[8]

The third procedure is the *looping* procedure. Oh, but all this should open up, we're in the middle of making our program. What's a looping procedure? Well, a process in which a series of images return… I'm not trying to define the loop, I'm just giving a very rough description… it's a process in which a series of images are made to return with variations. One of the greatest experimental filmmakers who mastered this procedure is called Landow, George Landow. Loops. It's interesting because musicians, especially modern musicians, know a lot about loops, they create loops. We'll have to compare – perhaps you're getting a frightening sense of what I'm expecting from you – we'll have to compare musical loops and cinematographic loops, we'll have to look at all that. All I can say is that the loop is typically a relinked parcelling out. It's not a linkage of associated images, it's a relinkage of independent images. So, in terms of abstract cinema, this is exactly where we find our trinity.

In other words, what makes up our modern brain? How do you live your brain? I'll come back to that – I just want to conclude by considering the question of lived experience – how do you live your brain? Well, your brain… it flickers, and it relinks or it makes loops. A brain that flickers, relinks and loops… well, that's very important. I mean, it changes a lot. Our forefathers' brains didn't work like that! But it doesn't mean their brains were inferior… Our forefathers' brains integrated, differentiated and linked things together. Now, we don't do

that. We've become topological, semi-fortuitous and relinking. Which gives us a different relation to health, to illness, they're not the same procedures, right? Okay.

So, this has opened up a lot of things for us, and now it's time to sum up everything we've done this term, so that you can understand what I have in mind for the second term. What I need is... is this all clear? Is it clear enough? What interests me in everything I've done so far during the last hour is my trinity. It has to be really... you should keep it in mind because, after the vacation, we'll be starting from there. I mean, we'll pick up all this again, of course, so I'll be going back to it but... You see, that's why I insisted so much on the irrational cut in the work of a mathematician… on Markov chains, because Markov chains seemed to me to give an example of relinkage, relinked parcelling out and all that. And all this because I needed it, and you know what interests me… Well, of course, there's cinema, but there's also thought. In other words, philosophical concepts. It's not just... well, I suppose that's fine for now, it's clear, okay.

So, let's recap. What was our first topic? And what will it become? Because I don't want to say that we've finished. No, we've just introduced, we were just in the middle of introducing our problem. Our first topic is thought and automatism. And we started from a simple fact: the specific character of the cinematographic image is that it is automatic… but with two consequences: what would the automatism of the image – how can we put it – spread to? To a whole series of things, to cinema characters, to the cinematographic actor and to the spectator of cinema. As I said, right from the beginning it was clear that somnambulists, zombies, golems and so on would profoundly belong to cinema in the form of German Expressionism, or that automata would profoundly belong to cinema in the form of the French school.[9]

As I said, this won't end here but there will be a major evolution, and I said that Bresson's famous conception of the actor cannot be separated from the character, from this obvious fact that the cinematic image is automatic, and that this has consequences for the actor, who must no longer be a stage actor but what Bresson calls a "model". And I remind you that in Bresson's texts we saw the extent to which his notion of the model was based on what he himself called "automatism".[10]

All this refers to a bibliographical topic which includes all you can find around psychological automatism. One of the key books on psychological automatism is a book by Pierre Janet, which is no longer available… so, for those interested in this aspect, you should look for it in the library.[11] But there was another aspect we looked at, which was spiritual automatism, that is, all the automatic images that constitute a Whole, the Whole of the work… the Whole of the work insofar as it gives itself to thought. And more than this, the Whole insofar as it is not given in a single image but is thought as the Whole of the film. And thanks to the automatic nature of the image, cinema set the spiritual automaton in motion... [*Recording interrupted; 58:09*]

**Part 2**

... So, the first ambitions of cinema, and here, bibliographically, I refer to whatever you can find, in particular the texts by Eisenstein, [Dziga] Vertov, [Abel] Gance, [Jean] Epstein and Élie Faure that discuss the great first ambitions of cinema – great ambitions that consist mainly of three things: new thought, universal language, art of the masses. And this is the spiritual automaton.[12]

But to finish with this first topic… we've already seen how we're going to confront a major problem: from pre-war to post-war cinema, the spiritual automaton, and also the psychological automaton… the psychological automaton *and* the spiritual automaton will undergo a long and important evolution. It goes without saying that, between the somnambulist of German Expressionism or the robot of [Fritz] Lang's *Metropolis* [1927] … and the robots of [Stanley] Kubrick or Bresson's automata, the differences are enormous. And it's not just because machines exterior to cinema have changed. It's by virtue of a whole evolution within cinema that could finally bring together, or has already brought together, all the forms of a new spiritual automatism that are intrinsic to cinema. Perhaps we could also include [Hans-Jürgen] Syberberg? But we would need a lot of analysis to justify all that. This is my first topic, this was my first topic, okay.

The second topic was the evolution of the cinematographic image from the point of view of thought and its relationship to thought. And then, later… I mean later on, but from now on I will need you to… Because I'm happy to see that I don't have that much… alas, how much... alas, what needs to be reintroduced is... because I need, I really need you to keep all this until after the vacation, otherwise I'll have to start all over again from the beginning. I would need... twenty-four... Ah, it's a disaster, I'm not going to be able to manage, I have... Oh but yes, I can. I was going to say, I'd lost a piece of paper so I didn't have the count anymore. Ah, it's ten! It's all clear now. Ten. Ten aspects. I'd like to summarize this evolution in terms of ten aspects. I said to myself, it normally goes in threes. So, it's... it ends up being a bit boring if it goes in threes. So, ten is better, don't you think?

First aspect. As you can imagine… I'm doing it on purpose… I'm going to link the things we saw last year for those who were here – those who weren't here won't care in any case – with the things we've looked at this year, because I care about continuity in what we do. First aspect… we have… Ah, but we've almost finished with that in the program, I remember... In what sense can we speak of a rupture with the past? In what way can we say there's been a rupture between pre-war cinema and post-war cinema? I would say that every time I've used this word… from one point of view, this break is radical, but from another point of view, the break is very relative. So, there are no rules.

But its causes, as we've seen, weren't simply the war itself, it was what was central to the war, namely the rise of state propaganda, the great *mises en scène* of the state, the abomination of the camps, which left its mark on all filmmakers worthy of the name. So, what did it have to do with cinema? Well, because Hollywood was no longer possible. Hollywood was no longer possible. Nation states were doing so much better in terms of state propaganda, in terms of the grand *mises en scène*. And yet, on the other hand, a certain type of action cinema was made impossible by what had happened in the camps.

And at the same time, we could say that cinema was forced to renounce its great ambitions, the art of the masses… Because Eisenstein's idea that, through cinema, the masses would become subjects, subjects of their own destiny… unfortunately for him, Eisenstein would learn that it wasn't like that. Cinema as a universal language, a renunciation that was not due simply, not at all, to the advent of the talkies but to more profound reasons. In this respect, there are the two fundamental texts I've cited – Daney… Serge Daney's *La Rampe* [1983][13] and [Paul] Virilio's *The Logistics of Perception*.[14] So this was the first aspect.

Second aspect: as we saw the previous years, the great phenomenon of modern cinema was the *sensory-motor rupture*, which meant that a cinema of action was no longer possible.

There was no longer any sensory-motor linkage. As you can see, everything we've added this last term confirms our long-standing analysis. Sensory-motor rupture with all its effects. In other words, characters find themselves in a pure optical and sound situation. Pure optical and sound situations substitute sensory-motor situations. So, characters no longer react. What do they do? They become seers, or, as [Pierre] Vendryes put it, they enter into an aleatory relation with the external milieu.[15] What is this aleatory relation with the external milieu? It takes the form of a stroll, a walk. They no longer act, they wander around at their own risk, in the most dangerous places, and so on. What we have here is no longer the sensory-motor schema. It's the pure optical and sound situation, the schema of the stroll. You'll find examples of this in Neorealism and in the Nouvelle Vague, I won't go into that again.

As I said, this second aspect – if I were to link it up, if I were to try to link it up with what we did in previous years, when I was concerned with classifying signs, though now I'm no longer concerned with that, but it's just to put back some... – this second aspect is what I tentatively referred to as "opsigns" and "sonsigns", "opsigns" and "sonsigns", that is, pure optical and sound situations, as opposed to sensory-motor signs. So, that was my second point.

Third aspect: in the old cinema, there were films concerning dreams. A dream could even take up an entire film. None of which avoids the fact that the imaginary and the real corresponded to two discernible regimes. I'm not going back to that, those are topics from last year, or even from two years ago… no, from last year, I think. In modern cinema, it's very odd, the imaginary and the real are always distinct, but they are strangely indiscernible. Indiscernibility of the imaginary and the real. But why then… why are they still distinct? Because they run after each other. They never stop running after each other. There's an imaginary-real circuit that ensures that the two distinct elements cease to be discernible. So, indiscernibility of the imaginary and the real.

Last year, we saw how this resulted from a particular type of image: the *crystal-image*. The crystal-image – that we tried to identify in post-war cinema, and in the constitution of post-war cinema, in very, very different forms in the work of several great directors – attested to this indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary. I'd say... yes, for effect, I should have called these "crystosigns", I should have thought of that. Or I should have found a more complicated term. Crystal... well, I would need a more learned word. I'll look for one over the vacation. So, you see, in terms of this second aspect, we had opsigns and sonsigns, and for aspect number three we have these pathetic "crystosigns", or something of that order… no, it doesn't work. We need to find another word that would designate "crystosigns"… that would express what we see in a sign, I mean, what we see in a crystal.

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Prismosigns? That's no good either. No. We'll find it. So, that... okay... that was number three. Let's move on!

Four: the *movement-image*, namely the sensory-motor image – the movement-image was the development of the *sensory-motor image*, or it was the presupposition of the sensory-motor

image – gave rise to an indirect image of time. On the other hand, when we have purely optical and sound situations, when situations are no longer sensory-motor, the movement-image is somehow dethroned. It continues to move, not always, but it continues to move, it becomes a stroll, it's no longer action. Well, the indirect image of time that depended on the movement-image is replaced by a direct image… by *a direct time-image*. In other words, "opsigns" and "sonsigns" are directly linked to "chronosigns". Here we have the exact word, "chronosign". It works well, "chronosign"… it's elegant. So, we can say that we no longer have the indirect image of time that depends on the movement-image, what we have is a direct presentation of time. Or it's a direct time-image that appears, and that links up with the "opsigns" and "sonsigns". Okay, so "chronosigns" would be number four.

Five: a direct presentation of time is only conceivable if we are able to attain temporal structures beyond the mere appearance of time, that is, beyond simple succession. We saw last year how, in terms of their structure, direct images of time no longer bring into play the couple: real-imaginary, but rather the couple: true-false… and that the paradoxes of time sometimes presented themselves in the form of the *unsummonable* nature of the true, that is, time makes the true unsummonable, and we found a model of this in the work of Orson Welles. And sometimes in terms of an *inexplicability*, or inextricability of the true and the false, and for this inextricability or inexplicability we found a very precise model in another structure that could be represented by the films of [Alain] Robbe-Grillet. Or other times it was in the form of an *undecidability* of the true and the false, for which we found a model in the films of Resnais. These corresponded to three temporal structures that we found interesting, three structures of time that seemed interesting to us and where time was not defined by succession but, on the contrary, was conceived in terms of the coexistence of its own relations.

Six: as a consequence of all this, we have the undecidability of the true and the false, the inextricability of the true and the false, and the *powers of the false* at all costs. The powers of the false at all costs. Which can be translated, and it's exactly the same sequence as last year… so we're entering this year at number six: it's the whole world that has begun making [bad] cinema. Everything has been subsumed by the powers of the false. The world itself is making bad movies, if need be, through new means, through TV, through whatever. It's the world that makes this cinema. What do we need cinema for, if it's the world itself that makes cinema? That was our sixth point.

And our answer was this. Cinema, post-war cinema, would have a fundamental new function: *to restore our belief in the world*. Restore our belief in the world… in what sense? No longer by giving us a belief in another world but by giving us belief in *this* world. To restore our belief in this world. How can we believe in *this* world? From the point of view of cinema, it seemed to us that [Roberto] Rossellini, in all his interviews, said some very fine things to justify his conversion of art to what he calls an "ethic", where cinema would have only one function: to restore our belief in this world. But we've also seen how, bibliographically speaking, this problem – belief instead of knowledge, and how to believe in this world, asking us for reasons to believe in this world – was already an active problem at the heart of philosophy, notably from Kant onwards, from his formula of substituting belief for knowledge. Seven! Would you like to have a break? No? Not yet?

Our seventh point concerned the change in the regime of thought. In other words, it was about *noosigns*. n-o-o signs… that's a nice word, noosign… You see? We need a word like that in the case of "crystosign", because "crystosign" doesn't work… No, I can't think of

anything for the moment… Noosigns, okay... I'm going very quickly because, as you'll recall, we found that in the image of prewar cinema "noosigns" were composed of the two axes and their intersection. Namely: the integration-differentiation axis and the linkage of associated images axis. The two axes intersect, they react upon one another. This image of thought has been overturned. But in favor of what? In favor of a thought of the Outside, but one which, we must immediately add… a thought of the Outside with a capital O, but one which places thought in an immediate relation with an *unthought*, with an internal unthought.

What does it mean when the force of the Outside puts the unthought into thought, when the powers of the Outside put the unthought into thought? We found our criterion. An Outside more distant than any external world. That's what's at stake, an Outside more distant than any external world. And that's why it is this Outside that is capable of restoring our belief in the external world. If it were simply the outside *of* the external world, it wouldn't be able to restore our belief in the external world. And it is because it is an Outside that is more distant than any external world that, perhaps, when its wind blows on thought, it can restore belief in the external world… and at the same time put thought in touch with an unthought, a non-thought, with an unthinkable, an unthinkable that is more profound than any internal world. We return to the idea of a topological contact between Outside and Inside, but an Outside that is more distant than any external world, and an Inside that is deeper than any internal world.

We looked for this image of thought, which we tried to define a little, in some very different authors. And now we have to connect things up, we have to go back to this question since it's a fundamental one for us. And in terms of bibliography, we were working in the following directions: Antonin Artaud… Artaud and his lived experience of thought; Martin Heidegger and his very fine book *What is Called Thinking?* And Blanchot, Maurice Blanchot… who is strangely at the crossroads between Artaud and Heidegger, but with his own particular genius. You can look at all of Blanchot's writings, but especially *The Infinite Conversation*. And last but not least Michel Foucault, again all his work, but especially the second part of *The Order of Things*.

In terms of cinema, what was this Outside that was more distant than any external world, and this Inside that was deeper than any internal world? This Outside more distant than any external world is for example what occurs in the films of [Carl] Dreyer when the image is cut off from the external world. When the image is cut off from the external world, far from closing in on itself, it becomes animated by a prodigious Outside. And what is this Outside? Perhaps Bresson gave us an answer to this, which lay in his fragmented images, his fragmented images, cut off from the external world, with not a single image in which see an entire room… never, never do we see a kitchen, or even a chair in its entirety. There's a multiplicity of cuts. What Outside would be capable of blowing on this? The subtitle of one of Bresson's films is *The Wind Bloweth Where it Listeth*.[16] The Wind Bloweth Where it Listeth, that's Bresson's Outside. An Outside that is more distant than any external world is, perhaps, capable of restoring our belief in the external world.

And at the same time, an Inside deeper than any internal world, meaning that the thought animated by the Outside is brought into the presence of an unthought. And what is this unthought? Let me remind you: it could be Welles's *unsummonable*, it could be Robbe-Grillet's *inexplicable*, it could be Resnais's *undecidable*, or it could be Godard's *incommensurable*. The topology of Outside and Inside corresponded to the black or white screen and their applications, as the first noosign, the first great noosign… or maybe it's not noosign, after all... Yes? No?... Yes? Are we okay with "noosign"? Fine.

Eight… everything okay? Eight! Oh yes, I'm fine… I've only got ten to cover. So, eight! And we're speeding up now because the most recent things are fresher in our memory. In contrast to pre-war cinema, this force of the Outside manifests itself in what we called *cut-points*, irrational cuts in contrast to the rational cuts and the commensurable quantities of the old cinema.

In terms of bibliography, regarding classical cinema, commensurable quantities etc., you can look at Eisenstein's great passages in the chapter "Organic Unity and Pathos".[17] You can also see, for those who would like to – because I'm far from having exhausted the subject – you can see in terms of mathematics how these rational and irrational cuts occur… in any mathematics textbook, or any history of mathematics, which would include a chapter on [Richard] Dedekind. For cinema in particular, the fundamental irrational cut will be that between speaking and seeing. In other words, the disappearance of the off-screen of classical cinema in favor of the interstice in post-war cinema: the interstice between speaking and seeing. Regarding the bibliography, it will come as no surprise that here I cite Blanchot's text, "Speaking is Not Seeing"…[18] And of course Foucault.

At the same time, from the point of view of cinema, a whole field of study opens up to us, namely the off-screen is replaced by the interstice between, or, if you prefer, the out-of-frame is replaced by the interstice between two framings: the visual framing and sound framing. Here for the bibliography, you should look at Dominique Villain's book, *L'œil à la camera*.[19] And here we have to confront the whole question of what this interstice implies, this interstice that sometimes goes as far as... that enlarges, that reaches a point of producing a radical estrangement between the framed sound and the framed image, as in a famous short film by [Jean] Eustache[20], and often in the work of the Straubs. So, we have a whole... and it's in this play in which the interstice between the two framings, sound and visual, has replaced the off-screen or out-of-frame. It's in this space of play that all sorts of things will appear, this time no longer... [*Recording interrupted;* 1:31:52]

... the image became legible, which was already a notion… I don't know who was the first person to say that, I think it must have been Noël Burch, speaking about [Yasujiro] Ozu, when he said that in Ozu the image, the visual image becomes legible. What does that mean? What does this imply? Here we will have a whole field of "lectosigns" to study.[21]

Nine: a return – sometimes we are obliged to return to certain things – to the idea of *something unthought in thought*. And the possibility of an answer, as we've seen, to this question of the unthought in thought is the *body*. Give me a body! We saw that the first pole of experimental cinema emerged from this, the cinema of the body, with its twofold aspect of the everyday and the ceremonial, and the passage from one to the other. As we've seen, this cinema was to develop in the direction of a cinema of *attitudes*: body attitudes, a cinema of postures. But in what way were postures able to appeal to thought? Well, I would say that they solicit thought because, independently of any sensory-motor relation – obviously, we mustn't reintroduce a sensory-motor relation – independently of a sensory-motor relation, attitudes enter into a relation of the *gest* type. I remind you that the gest is the connection of one attitude to another, independently of any sensory-motor relation. In this respect, we will have *gestural signs*, gesture being defined here in this way: the linking of attitudes to one another, independently of any sensory-motor relationship.

Regarding this, in terms of the bibliography there is a short text by [Bertold] Brecht, in his writings on theatre, a text entitled "On Gestic Music"[22] as well as a commentary by Roland

Barthes on this text in *The Responsibility of Forms.*[23] And finally, if you're so inclined, you'll find everything you need on the art of postures in the texts of [Samuel] Beckett.

So, what about number ten? It's the *cinema of the brain* with the last topic we've just looked at, namely the parcelling out by re-inkage in contemporary cinema, or – which amounts to the same thing – the relinking of independent images as opposed to the linking of associated images that we found in classical cinema. In terms of bibliography on the question of the brain, see the chapter I quoted from [Gilbert] Simondon's book on individuation,[24] Steven Rose's book, *The Conscious Brain*,[25] [Jean– Pierre] Changeux's book, *L'homme neuronal*[26] and, of course, the great seminal novel by Andrei Bely.

To conclude, it's at the end of this second part that we'll be able to answer our fundamental question: in the passage from one automatism to another… what is exactly the difference between the automatism of pre-war cinema and the automatism of today's cinema? On that note, you can finally have a short break, and if you're good students, you won't leave because now I have to give you your homework… I mean, I still have to tell you what I expect of you. And then what we can do, perhaps, I'd really like to… after having a short break, I don't want you telling me that we should have spoken about something else… I've no interest in that, but what I would like you to tell me is if, for you, such and such a point doesn't work, or if we should dwell on such and such a point, or if we should add this or that point. Yes, I'd be delighted if you could add some of your own points. So, think about it for a moment and on this question, I have something personal to share with you. [*Tape interrupted;* 1:38:07]

In the second term, we'll be going back to some of the things we've sketched out and at the same time we'll be taking up others that our program hasn't explicitly mentioned, but that we're going to need. That's why I think that if you want to attend the next term, you'll need to have the whole program in mind. So that sometimes we can fill in an empty box, sometimes we can develop a box that has already been filled. I'll let you know as we go along, which I didn't do the other times, what our next session will involve. And you can decide whether you want to come or not.

Well, okay. As usual, I will need your help. And indeed, some of you often come up with some very important things. But, yes, yes... I've noticed, and everyone knows this, that the presentation format is something that isn't working at all, because first of all we have problems hearing the person speaking, and then there's a general lack of conviction... I mean that the person speaking isn't really convinced by what they're saying and neither is the person listening.

Student: Nobody listens!

Deleuze: Those who don't listen, it's because they're not convinced by it… and in the end, it poisons everybody, starting with the person who is speaking.

So, suddenly... I've been looking for a solution to this for exactly thirty years. And now I think I've found a solution, which is a very childish one. After all, I've come to know quite a few of you. So, what I would suggest – and of course, you have to agree – when I need something… I'll take the following example. Say I need something and I know that one of you has expertise in the field and has ideas about it. Of course, I have to ask their permission. If they say okay, they won't do a presentation, we'll do a sort of interview. It's quite a clever idea, don't you think? It took me thirty years… In other words, I would be the interviewer.

And their task will be to get their head around a subject they already know pretty well, and I will pose questions. And we'll see, we'll see what happens. After all, it's the Godard method, and we might as well try it. So, I will ask questions, so obviously they can tell me that it's not like that, they can tell me.... So, I'll give you some examples, hoping that the people concerned won't recognize themselves, since I don't have their agreement yet.

Imagine that someone, for example, has expertise in the history and practice of experimental cinema. I'd like to ask them if they would agree to let me, someone who has no expertise, interview them and ask them questions about the looping procedure, for example, and tell us how it works, not just technically – I'm not employing them only as a technician, I'm also taking them on as a historian, or as a filmmaker – and what effects this can produce, what aesthetic effects for example, what an aesthetic of the loop would consist in, and so on.

And then I realize that I would also need someone with musical expertise, who wasn't necessarily the same person. So now I do another interview, this time with a musician. It's not about bringing in people from outside. Bringing in people from outside seems to me, in fact, quite deplorable, because they wouldn't be aware of the work we are doing. For this reason, it has to be... in any case, they never respond to... so, it has to be someone who's taking part in the work we're doing. So, for the loop I'll also need a musician. Or, to take another example, in September we'll be looking at something that interests me a lot, which is what Eisenstein referred to as the *harmonics* of the image. It goes without saying that this refers to a musical notion, therefore I'll need someone with musical expertise to explore the question of harmonics. That's the way we're going to proceed. There are a thousand other examples I could mention… so, in the case of Bely, if anyone is familiar with Russian literature, I'd like to know how, for example, this book, this wonderful book by Bely, can be contextualized in its historical period, and perhaps we could look for... So, you see? Above all, I'd like to use your skills, and this would be in the form of an interview.

A student: Can I suggest another way?

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes..., of course.

Student: [*Indistinct words*] of this work. Someone who talks about it, who gives us some content and their general understanding of what you've said… and since you're talking yourself, the person interviewed, I mean, after your questions… because, it seems to me, if you start with two hours of questions, in all sincerity, I think that the person will, in one way or another, either be embarrassed and improvise something on the spot just to answer, which would be, how shall I put it… a bit unsatisfactory, or else, they will miss something out. So...

Deleuze: Yes, yes...

Student: Actually, I'm not talking about the fact that...

Deleuze: Yes, you doubt that... yes, yes... I understand.

Student: [*Indistinct words*] ... someone should just speak naturally, saying what they know about the thing, and then you can speak and pose your questions.

Deleuze: That's possible as well... that's possible... Moreover, we could vary things according to the wishes of the person who accepts the task. Of course, this wouldn't prevent us using the

other method, which is to say that whoever wishes to intervene can do so. That's what I wanted to tell you.

So, now I'm making a heartfelt appeal to you. Once again, we have a program with some boxes half-filled and others that are empty. Do you have any reactions specifically regarding this first term, any suggestions for adding this or that point? Or for taking something out? I'm ready to take out whatever you want. Do you have any remarks to make on our program? Or, to put it in a simpler way, are there any things you're still unclear about? Because I don't think you'll be able to follow at all if... it doesn't have to be crystal clear, but neither can it be obscure... are there any points you'd like me to go back over? For example, as I said, I'm very attached to the question of topology, to the question of relinkage, to the irrational cut and so on… Those things are very important to me. So, if that isn't clear to you, it means there's a misunderstanding between us. Anyway, I'm done for now, it's your turn to speak!

Student: I'd like to intervene. I'd like you to… [*indistinct words*] perhaps if you speak only about the philosophical side or about thought, without linking cinema and philosophy because, in all modesty, expecting us do a job like that would be a bit too complicated for me, at least for the moment. So… first of all, I'd like to speak, just speak… [*indistinct words*] automatically if you like... without even really taking up the points you've made, but seeking them out as I speak. And I think I have my reasons for speaking in this way, and since some weeks ago… [*indistinct word*] you invited us to think about the four figures you identified, namely: first, the substitution of belief for knowledge; secondly, Give me a body; thirdly, the thought from Outside; and fourthly, the fragility of… [*indistinct word*]

Deleuze: Which we saw again today, yes?

Student: As we saw today… today, I hope.... so, before coming out… [*indistinct words*] you repeated the four things I just mentioned…

Deleuze: Sorry?

Student: You repeated the four paths, returning to the Ego, provisional internalization. And then last year's paths also came back… namely last year too you drew out four figures… First, the finished crystal… so, something more or less non-existent, though you didn't put it precisely like that, or I believe… [*indistinct word*] so the lack, it's like the belief that's absent…

Secondly, the crystal… [*indistinct words*] the detached crystal that seems to me to correspond, in one way or another, to this absence or to this problem of the body, with all its possibilities and all its vulnerabilities. So, first there's the pure crystal and an absent belief. And then the crystal… [*indistinct words*] classically separated by philosophical thought, at least in Descartes. So, a body condemned by its vulnerabilities, or else a body that discovers its possibilities, here we're talking about something concrete... something concrete, containing both possibilities and vulnerabilities.

Thirdly, the crystal is shown decomposing. And I asked myself, what does that mean? And without looking it up, I think I've come up with a pretty good answer, to me at least… while I was strolling around Paris. So, I said to myself, this crystal that is decomposing, it's the moment of crisis, the moment of collapse, the moment of – I don't know how to put it – the moment of an individual seized by something that is perhaps much stronger than his physical

reality. So, concentrating on this thought from Outside, I said to myself: this is also a moment of crisis, without really being able to precisely define it.

But I was moving on to a course... precisely the course we were doing in the fourth category, namely: the crystal in the process of forming. So, the crystal in the process of forming would be like the fragility of the… [*indistinct words*] and why is that, I'm not quite clear at this point. Because, it seems to me that… [*indistinct words*] in the moments that precede, namely, the moment of crisis, the moment of the decomposing crystal, and the concept of the Outside, the individual who finds himself in the moment of crisis must at all costs rebuild himself, and find not only his identity but, let's say, also his activity and his reality.

Well, in short, while I was thinking along these lines, it seemed to me that there were… despite everything, I mean, despite all the richness that... I don't know how to put it... of what you're talking about and giving us… it seemed to me that there were, despite everything, a few things that weren't quite clear, or things that weren't quite present… firstly, regarding the notion of time. We talked about, or you spoke about, you spoke about the discovery, if I may say so, the discovery of a body – Give me a body, then! – you spoke first about substitution, you spoke about the thought from Outside, and now you speak about the mind and the brain and so on, whereas the notion of time is one that's important to me, as well as being a subject that we don't really understand, though it circulates and is discussed above all in the writings you quote… Heidegger, Blanchot, Foucault, even your own...

Deleuze: I can quickly... but it wouldn't change anything. I'm just cutting you off because my answer is very simple on this point – the whole of what you said is more complex – at this point, my answer is very simple: it's that I devoted the whole of last year to the time-image.

Student: Ah, well…

Deleuze: Do you understand? It's as if you were saying that I need to explain it. So, I was surprised to hear you saying that. Because we did the time-image last year, this year I'm not doing it again.

Student: Okay...

Deleuze: So, your point... this point is irrelevant. But that doesn't stop me from retaining two things from what you've said. Do you have anything else to say?

Student: Yes, very quickly...

Deleuze: Okay...

Student: First of all, the problem of the substitution of belief for knowledge seems to me to mean that the problem of belief is not a problem of speculation, of meditation. It's first and foremost a gap, if I dare say so... a fault line between me and the world. And I interpret this in saying to myself that *I no longer have a place in this world*.

Deleuze: Yes, you could say that. Yes, yes...

Student: So… for me, the substitution of belief for knowledge means more precisely: how does the individual – the individual as an individual, both as a person and as a collective

individual – how do you explain that this individual is excluded from the world, that they no longer find a place in the world? Because, if we go back to the problem of belief and its replacement, even with the best of intentions, we still run the risk of remaining at the level… again, at the notion of belief, at all levels and in all religious senses... But for me… it seems that I can find a place, first of all out of self-interest, and then… [*indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Wait! I have to cut you off again. What you're basically telling me is that we're missing a box… [*Recording interrupted;* 1:57:14]

**Part 3**

... I would say yes, yes, yes. And listening to you, I would translate it like this: what's missing in our program is a *political* box. And with regard to cinema, we posed the question: is there a change of regime from the images of pre-war to those of post-war cinema? It's obvious that have to consider what has changed in the field of political cinema from the Soviets to the cinema of today. And the change is clearly considerable. I'd say quite simply, Before, the Soviets… in what Eisenstein spiritually referred to as Bolshevization, the Soviets believed in the existence of a people.

What happened then? Why is it that political cinema, the only real political cinema we have today, has moved to the Third World? The first answer is that the great mutation of political cinema took place in the form of the realization that *the people were missing*, that there were no people. So, we have a shift in the regime of the political image just as important as the question of belief with which it overlaps. When you say that substituting belief for knowledge means that we're cut off from the world, and you ask how belief can re-establish a link with the world… on another level, you're absolutely right. There's a collective level, which is: How is it still possible for a people to form today? In other words, *Why has political cinema become a cinema of minorities*? It's quite obvious that between the political cinema of [Vsevolod] Poudovkine or Eisenstein, and the political cinema of the Turkish director [Yilmaz] Güney or others… and I take Güney as an example here, there's a gap, there is a huge gap.

So, I would say very definitely yes, for our program it's obvious that at some point – and here you are ahead of us on that point – we will see that we have to take into account the following question: *What is a people*? *What is a people in cinema*? In what sense are the people *missing*? What does it mean that the people are missing? And so on and so forth. On this point you're absolutely right, you've just given an example of the need we have to add something to the program.

Regarding the other two points, I'd say yes and no. If I've followed you correctly, there's one point that doesn't work for me, but I don't see any problem if it works for you… it's up to you. You wanted – and I'll say this in a nutshell, to be as quick as possible – you wanted to give me four categories. I'm very attached to my four categories. You take four categories I spoke of, and then you fold them back onto four other categories. You take four categories from this year, and then you say that you're interested in applying them to the four categories of the crystal. That's where I get irritated, and I get irritated because my answer would be: Ah, well, no, please don't reduce my categories. The more categories we have, the happier I am.

So, if you fold them back and make four categories out of eight, you'll understand, especially regarding the state of the crystal and the four mutations of thought… well, you have to force the issue to see the connections. Of course, there are connections. But how did you manage to establish this relation between the two categories of thought and crystal? It was by introducing – and don't take this in a pejorative sense – it was by introducing a problem that you're obviously interested in, and I must confess, I confess… without at all saying that I'm right… that I'm not interested in at all, namely a certain question of the Ego in relation to the state of things and in relation to thought. Because you've formed an analogy between all the questions about the various states of the crystal and possible states of the Ego. So, in fact, through this intermediary, it seems to me that you could make the categories of thought overlap with the categories of the crystal in terms of a kind of development or journey of the Ego, and that would be more interesting.

In my view, this would prevent it from becoming reduced, since it's not part of the *same* journey. But what interested me in the question of the crystal was the constitution of a certain type of image. Whether the crystal was decomposing or germinating, for example, the consequences of that as far as the Ego was concerned were of no interest to me. But then I'm one of those people – it's not a superiority complex, it's more an inferiority – who can't think about the question of the Ego. But I'm very struck by the fact that you can indeed make your reduction by posing a certain problem of the destiny of the Ego. It's completely legitimate, completely legitimate. I can just say: it's not my problem, but I can sense that it's a question for you. So, you're right.

Student: [*Indistinct words*] ... But the inner language…

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

Student: So, it's a never-ending case, in fact.

Deleuze: Ah, well, no...

Student: I mean, in relation to me.

Deleuze: By its very nature, it's interminable. Yes, yes, yes... No, no… it's very good what you said there is very rich, for the moment… Does anyone...

Student: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Try to speak louder, please… sorry.

Student: [*Indistinct words about the classification of signs*]

Deleuze: Yes.

Student: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Here again, I'll give you an answer that is going to be very disappointing for you. You see, we spent two years working on a classification of signs. So much so that when I took up the names of signs, it was an attempt to bring together… a nod to those who were there. So, if you tell me that it wouldn't be a bad idea to do another session, very, very

briefly… on what constitutes a sign, what I call a sign, we could think of doing that. But if I reintroduced this without any explanation, it was for the same reasons I said earlier on, regarding the question of time, it is because for us, at least for a number of us, we're done with that.

Student: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Yes… oh well, on one hand, as I've since written about it, I wasn't going to take it up again. But we can still do a session on the signs I haven't mentioned yet, okay.

Student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: An evolution? For me? Regarding this? Regarding this question of signs? It depends… because you are kind enough to allude to things I've written. But it depends when it was. The problem of signs has always haunted me and interested me, so it's something I've been speaking about for a long time. If you refer to the last time I spoke about it, which was last year regarding cinema, last year on cinema… I would say no, I haven't changed. But regarding texts that I wrote long before that, yes, my ideas have changed a lot. So, we can do a session on the question of signs, maybe I'll even change idea again. And it would be better, yes, yes... I think we'll have to talk about the signs we haven't yet spoken of in depth, like noosigns, lectosigns. Yes, yes, yes.

So, it's not just… and this is the last invitation I want to make, to those whose expertise in such and such a field I'm already aware of, obviously nothing could be more delightful to me than if one of you said, Well, I know a bit about such and such a field, and I can help you with that, I can help you. For example, since he's no longer here, I can refer to him… There was a guy last year who came to me and said he knew a bit about crystals, as he was doing something on crystals… and that served us well, at least it was useful to me, and that was very good.[27] So, I strongly invite you... it's enough if what you say fits into our program at some point, okay? So, if need be, I'll ask you to think about that. Yes, okay. Yes?

Georges Comtesse: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Can you speak louder? Can you try to speak louder?

Comtesse: On the question of the linkage of postures, in other words, in relation to the cinema of the body...

Deleuze: Yes?

Comtesse: In reference to Rivette and Godard. Particularly in Rivette, what's important in his cinema is not simply… If we take a precise example… [*indistinct words*] what's important in his cinema is not so much the *gest* of the linkage of postures, but the origin of this linkage in relation precisely to a certain body, which is a body that is hidden, or a body in flight. Let me explain. For example, in Rivette's cinema, the theatrical scene, even in his latest film which is currently in theaters, *L'amour par terre* [*Love On The Ground*, 1984] [*indistinct words*]… the theatrical scene, the scene of the theatrical *gest*, is for Rivette what he calls the scene of the suspension of violence, which always refers to… this theatrical scene, to a group, a private group, or a secret society that is literally hatching a conspiracy. But the conspiracy that the group, or the society, is hatching is itself a conspiracy hatched by a delirium. And the

question, the question is… in other words, theater refers back to the question of delirium, and it's from this delirium that the linkage of postures arises, it's only there that the question of the body is posed… in Rivette's cinema.

By this I mean that the fundamental question that arises, and the question of cinematic thought at that point, is: What is the body of delirium? The body of delirium… in other words, what is the fleeing body of delirium that imposes delirium, the conspiracy and the theatrical scene? In other words, the fleeing body of delirium would more or less be the same problem that a certain type of cinema would ask of the body of delirium or the body of madness, it's almost the same thing… and this question of the body of delirium is the same question that recurs, in a completely different form, in *Prénom Carmen* for example. In *Prénom Carmen*, at the beginning of *Prénom Carmen*, there's the seer, the seer… in other words the uncle figure played by Godard, Uncle Jean. The seer is in his bed, and he says "être, être" [*to be*]. In other words, he calls out the word of the call, the word of what doesn't exist, of what can't exist, namely the word of the absence of the real: *to be*. And then he adds, Today's youth forget everything, but they forget everything because they live with an excess of memory. And he adds, they're all in the black hole.

The fundamental question is: What lies between the words "to be" and this question of the black hole? And between that, there are all the linkages in the film, all the aggressive shocks of love, all the precipitous movements for which Orpheus would be grateful. In other words, everything that calls upon a cinema of the body. But the cinema of the body is not the image of the body… an image of the cinema of the body does not itself form part of the linkage of postures. It's what the linkage of postures refers to, that is, what is between "to be" and the black hole, or what might be deduced from delirium. It's in… it's in what could be deduced from delirium, or what's in between, that the question of the body could perhaps arise.

It's not... I'll take another example. If you take Rivette's latest film, *L'amour par terre…* he posed the question of automatism in a new way. For example, there's a moment when he films Jane Birkin's face in close-up, and her eye, Jane Birkin's eye, becomes like a bulging eye, or an eye traversed by… by terror. And at that moment, at that moment, there is what he calls an automatic transmission, meaning something transmitted automatically, but transmitted nonetheless. There's something in a body that automatically transmits itself to another body. And immediately afterwards, in a scene where she's injured by a woman in red, the man bears witness to the relation between the woman in red and the injured woman. This automatic transmission, I think, is a new kind of image in cinema that is not simply a time-image, a pure time-image, but one that could be called an image of desire, an image of delirium.

Deleuze: Fair enough, that's fine… that's all I want. For me, this intervention already fills part of our program. You tell me that we have to be careful, that the *gest* is insufficiently defined by the linkage of postures, because the *gest* must somehow also take into account – I don't remember what words you used – the origin from which the linkage derives. And you propose an answer: the origin from which the linkage flows would be the body of desire or the body of delirium. Well, okay, that's fine. If you like, you have given us your own development and response to the question of what we can call *gest*… That's fine for me.

Comtesse: And even, for example, at that level...

Deleuze: That's perfect. I'm not saying I agree… but it's perfect.

Comtesse: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Ah, yes, you can refer the unthought back to madness. Yes, yes.

Comtesse: There is no philosophy… no philosophy… philosophy doesn't exist because it hasn't yet constituted a logic of this body, so it can't claim it. There may be discourse in the direction of philosophy, towards philosophy, but no truly philosophical discourse yet. That's a point I'd like to make…

Deleuze: But that's not how it is for me! You know, Comtesse, there's just one little reproach that I find myself having to make to you over and over again: when you intervene, you tend to present what you say not only as something that has to be said – I'd agree with that – but as the *only* thing that can be said… and which, by its very nature, nullifies everything else. This confuses me a lot because you never cease to use me as a springboard. But you reject the springboard itself with such vigor and strength... and in any case, even in my moments of greatest certainty, I would never think of formulating sentences the way you do in the form: Regarding such and such a point, one can only say this. You should have more confidence in other people's inventiveness, and not just believe that what you say is the only possible thing to be said about a certain concept. Because, I'm sure you will agree with me, the concept of *gest* is in homage to Brecht.

Secondly, and this is not to diminish him, it also comes from Barthes. Now, I like the necessary homage he makes, which gives this notion a very interesting rigor… but in my opinion, he doesn't renew it. If I may be so bold – and regarding Barthes' text, it's not his aim to renew it – but even if this may sound presumptuous, I would say I take this idea from Brecht, but I think in a different sense from the way he does, so I think... [*Recording interrupted;* 2:17:51]

... what you do to people, or rather what you would like to do to people every time you speak, it's as if you're hurling a judgment from the heavens, the purpose of which is solely to pulverize whatever anyone else might want to say. So, I listen to you with great interest, and I say to myself: Well, yes, that's a possible path, although I can see everything that you keep going back to: lack, desire, delirium and madness, all of which will lead us back to saying that the unthinkable in thought must be madness, which in my view would be a big step backwards from where we are now. So, there it is... But if I have one reproach to make to you, it's this one alone. Try to understand that when you speak, you say very interesting things, but these things shouldn't cancel out other discourses.

Comtesse: Precisely, they don't cancel out other discourses. But when I said that philosophy doesn't exist...

Deleuze: And you said that this can be demonstrated…

Comtesse: And I'm not the only one saying that! [*Laughter, Deleuze included*] Oddly enough, oddly enough it's an author to whom you were referring, meaning the author who took away thought, and the model of knowledge, and who recognized… I'm speaking of Kant, who recognized that the thought of the unknown, or the thought of faith, is not a philosophy at all. And, as Kant said in a text we commented on last year, philosophy doesn't exist. It doesn't exist. And it's like a kind of unattainable mistress.

Deleuze: [*He laughs while speaking*] Listen, as always… you never bring us your texts. It's all very well for me to ask you to bring me a text. If you bring me a text… that's a promise, right? Do you promise to bring me a text by Kant saying that philosophy doesn't exist?

Comtesse: Of course!

Deleuze: Of course. [*Laughter*] Hey, you've got some nerve, because I'm still waiting for the texts. Last time, you promised me a text by Élie Faure, didn't you?[28]

Comtesse: [*Indistinct words*] [*Laughter*] ... How do you expect philosophy to exist when people aren't capable of thinking madness? [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: Listen, you're making me, you're making me... I have the impression that you're making me take a fantastic step backwards. It's odd. It's odd. Now we're going to find ourselves… well, yes of course, we're going to find ourselves with lack, with madness, and all that. It's your path, I respect it… but don't drag me into it. As for the more precise question, you're not going to tell me that it's Kant who wrote that philosophy cannot exist until madness can be thought. All I care about is that you've promised to bring me a text where Kant says that philosophy doesn't exist. Okay?

Comtesse: Of course! Last year, Jacques Derrida in his seminar commented on this, making very precise references. I'm referring to his comments...

Deleuze: So… is it Derrida or Kant?

Countess: I don't just refer to you, the way you accuse me, when I say this or that. I also refer to others…

Deleuze: Do you refer to others, Comtesse?

Comtesse: I hear a lot and see a lot before I speak.

Deleuze: I'm sure you do, but you only refer to others in order to make your lapidary claims. So, they can come from Derrida… but I hope, I'm sure that Derrida has much more nuance than you do. And I insist on the fact that you cannot come here and say: This is the truth. Maybe you can say it at a Derrida seminar, I don't know… but not here, not here. Otherwise, everything you're saying is perfectly okay, if we could only get rid of that aspect. Is there anything else? No? Well, happy holidays!

Student: I would like to propose a word for the crystal… [*indistinct word*] *zoe*, because like *zoe*, the crystal... [*indistinct words*]

Deleuze: Yes, but there's a problem, because *zoe*… *zoe* alludes to something living, and the face of the crystal distinguishes it from the living. That would be nice too but... Keep looking, okay? I'm sure you'll find something better. [*End of the session;* 2:23:14]

**Notes**

[1] See Sergei Eisenstein, *Non-Indifferent Nature*, trans. Herbert Marshall (1945-47; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[2] On these three aspects, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 212-215.

[3] On Andrei Bely, see Sessions 19 and 22 of the Cinema 3 seminar, May 19 and June 12 1984.

[4] On the connection between Bely and Resnais, see *The Time-Image*, p. 125 and p. 302 note 42, and pp. 212-213.

[5] See *Toute la mémoire du monde* (1956).

[6] On Kandinsky and Klee, see Sessions 1 and 2 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, October 28 and November 4, 1986. See also *The Time-Image*, op. cit. pp. 214.

[7] Deleuze makes the same reference in *The Time-Image*, op. cit. p. 200.

[8] On flickering cinema, see Session 8 of the Cinema 1 seminar, January 26 1982. See also *The Time-Image*, op. cit. p.215.

[9] See in particular Sessions 1 and 2, October 30 and November 6, 1984.

[10] See Bresson's *Notes on the Cinematographer,* London: Quartet, 1986. On Bresson and the automaton, see also *The Time-Image*, pp. 178-79 and pp. 312-313, note 42.

[11] See *Catalepsy, Memory and Suggestion in Psychological Automatism,* London: Routledge, 2021.

[12] See in particular Sessions 1 and 2, October 30 and November 6, 1984.

[13] Editions Gallimard, Cahiers du cinema.

[14] London: Verso, 1989.

[15] See the previous lesson.

[16] This is the subtitle of the film *A Man Escaped* (1956).

[17] This is a section of Volume 1 of Eisenstein's *Non-indifferent Nature*. See also *The Time-Image*, p. 317, note 37.

[18] See Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993

[19] Paris: Cahiers du cinema / Editions de l'Étoile, 1984.

[20] The film Deleuze refers to here is *Les Photos d'Alix* (1980), see The Time-Image, p. 249.

[21] On Ozu, see Burch's *To the Distant Observer*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, and also The Time-Image, op. cit. pp. 16-18.

[22] *Brecht on Theatre*, New York: Hill & Wang, 1964.

[23] New York: Hill & Wang, 1985. See the chapter *Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein*, pp. 89-97.

[24] See Simondon, *L'individu et sa genèse physico*–biologique, Paris*:* PUF, 1964 / Grenoble: Millon, 1994.

[25] New York: Knopf, 1973.

[26] Paris: Fayard, 1983.

[27] This is Jouanny, who spoke during Sessions 19 and 20 of the Cinema 3 Seminar, May 22 and 29, 1984.

[28] This refers to a discussion that took place during Session 3, November 13, 1984.