Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

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Part 1

... about what we did last time? No questions? No comments? Okay... So, you see, during the first trimester, we drew up a sort of program… and what was it based on? It was based on a very simple idea, namely that cinema posed the problem of the relation between image and thought in a highly specific and original way. And why did it pose this problem of the relation between image and thought in such a specific way? For a very, very simple reason, because with cinema, the image literally became automatic, that is, it was the movement-image, it was the image that moved by itself and within itself, and as an automatic image, it entered into a relation with our own spiritual automatism, with the spiritual automaton that represents thought.

So, that very broadly defined our framework. From there, we studied a dozen or so – I can't remember exactly, but we'll encounter them again in the course of this trimester – a dozen or so criteria concerning the relation between image and thought. But each of these criteria, I remind you, opened up to a kind of alternative between "classical" and "modern" images, in such a way that in each case, classical and modern, the relation with thought was not of the same nature. So, once again it wasn't at all a question of saying that one is better than the other. It was just a question of marking the possibilities of these branchings, these alternatives, these bifurcations.

And all this was simply a program, so, even if it means going back, what we have to do now is fill in this overall program. And what's more, I want to let you know how I'd like to proceed from now on. The way I'd like to proceed... you see, we've got… roughly speaking, we really have our program mapped out, and to fill it in, I've chosen to begin with an essay – because, for me, this is a very, very complicated matter, and the more I look at the texts, the more complicated it seems – an essay on Eisenstein, that is, on the image-thought relation according to Eisenstein. Perhaps this will lead us to – you will see, I'd almost say I'm doing this to help you understand how I'd like to proceed – it will fill a certain region of our program. But it may be that this study of Eisenstein will lead us to conclusions that will additionally fill in a completely different area of our program.

So, we're going to begin with image and thought in Eisenstein, and then, once we've drawn certain conclusions from this research, this will naturally lead us – I always warn you in

advance – it will naturally lead us to consider something we haven't yet looked at, namely how, with regard to such a complicated problem, we might conceive of the relation between cinema and language, and to see what we can learn about the image-thought relation from this. Okay, so that will keep us busy for a while.[1]

So, today we're going to be focusing on image and thought in Eisenstein's work, and as a preliminary warning I'd like to say that every time I read his writings – and I know many of you have – they leave me with mixed impressions. Like everyone else, I find them full of… full of genius. But at the same time, you get the feeling that he's trying to include everything, you name it, everything he knows, he tells us everything he knows. This is a serious mistake, it's a serious mistake. One of the rules of writing is: Never say everything you know. It's something you shouldn't do. Besides, his notions are never precise… no, they're never precise. Well, he's not a philosopher, his notions are never completely to the point. And yet, they are so rich.

And then, though they seem quite clear, in fact, each time I reread them, they appear more and more difficult. Which is why I'd almost like to tell you about my difficulties with Eisenstein's texts, just the sort of... But what I propose to do, for you and with you, is to try to put some order into this thought. I'd say it's a task, a minor task, a rather thankless task, but it doesn't matter. I'd like to try and put some order into all this.

So, I start from a very, very simple point: the constant comparison that Eisenstein and others make between the cinematographic image and the image in painting, and the way they tell us that the cinematographic image is like the completion of the pictorial image. Eisenstein isn't the only one. Someone I've already quoted… I refer you to a very fine text by a great art critic, Elie Faure who, speaking of Tintoretto, talks about a form of *prescience* of cinema, the way a painting by Tintoretto... and in a way that, to my eyes, doesn't seem so different… Eisenstein himself, in some famous texts, analyzes the work of El Greco, Leonardo da Vinci and Piranesi.[2]

Now, what interests me in these texts, in these texts that compare cinema with painting, are two points. It's that, at the same time, they put in question both movement and montage. They tell us that the painter represents a certain movement, or imposes a certain movement on us, and then they also tell us that there is a pictorial montage. Eisenstein insists particularly on this type of montage: for example, the different planes or "shots" [*plans*] of a painting, the different planes of a painting would be the equivalent of a montage. There would be foreground elements which, according to Eisenstein, would be like actual close-ups. Then, there would be the backgrounds and so on, and all this, in terms of the painting's overall composition, would constitute an actual montage. Okay.

But this doesn't mean there aren't two differences. The pictorial image doesn't itself create movement. It may compel us to do this but it doesn't produce movement by itself. It doesn't produce movement… I want to try and think about this. Obviously, it's very important. If I say, once again, that only the cinematographic image is automatic, that is, it creates movement, what does this imply? When it's not the image that creates movement, I would say that in a way it necessarily remains, at least partially… it necessarily remains *analogical*. What do I mean by "analogical" in this case? Having *a relation of resemblance to an external object*. Everyone knows that painting doesn't *consist* in this resemblance to the external object of a model, but we all know that painting *retains* this dimension. What happens when it's the image itself that creates movement? I mean, this seems very important to me. But

what I'm trying to say is that, for the moment, it's really confusing, because it's something that will only become clearer later on. This is something anyone can think about. Imagine a cinematographic image that by itself creates movement. Let's suppose that an image that doesn't produce movement retains a so-called analogical aspect, a relation of resemblance to an object, even if this isn't where its secret lies.

What happens to an image that creates movement? I'd say that, in my view, there's a good chance it will no longer be analogical, that *it no longer bears any resemblance to an object*. Why is this? Because it has *internalized* the object, because the object has become part of the image. The object is external to the image only insofar as the image is immobile. If the image produces movement, it internalizes its object, and the object becomes part of the image itself. I mean that the only relation the image will have is with the object itself *as an image*. It will have internalized the object. The object will now be a part of the image. In a sense, it will no longer be analogical.

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Hold on a minute. That's a very good question. I'm... I'm being obscure. I mean, what is the condition for an image to refer to an object that is external, that is, to be analogical? I would say that the condition is that the image must be immobile. I would say that if the image is mobile, it internalizes its object, which then *becomes part of the image*, that is, it no longer refers to a supposedly external object which it resembles. The object in the image has become part of the image in such a way that there is no longer any reference to an object it resembles. It refers only to the objects that are part of it.

It's a hypothesis, okay? So, what does it mean? That the image, insofar as it produces movement, insofar as it is mobile, has ensured the *modulation* of this object or thing that has become part of it. Instead of resembling an object, it modulates the object.[3] *It is the modulation of its object*. So, while I would say that an image of this type is analogical, it is so in a completely different sense, in the sense we mean when we say, for example, that a synthesizer is analog. At this point, the term analogical will no longer refer to a relation of resemblance but to the function of *modulation*. Because it is a movement-image, the cinematographic image will be modulatory, analogical in the sense of having the function of modulating its own object, and no longer analogical in the sense of having a relation of resemblance with its object.

Once again, this is very important to me because – it's a hypothesis for the moment – I would say that when we come to consider – that's why I mention it now – when we come to consider the problem of the relation between cinema and language, I notice that semiologists inspired by linguistics – whether we're talking about Christian Metz or Umberto Eco – to my knowledge, they all begin with the idea that the cinematographic image is analogical in the sense of having a relation of resemblance. And it's regarding this, it's from this… For them, this is an absolutely necessary presupposition in their endeavor to compare cinema to a language. We'll see why this is.

That's why, right from the start, I pose this question: Is the cinematographic image analogical, and if so in what sense? And my answer would be that it's not analogical in the sense of a relation of resemblance. Why not? Because its own object has become one of its parts, insofar as the image itself ensures movement. It's only from the point of view of an immobile image that we can distinguish the image from the object. What defines the movement-image is the fact that image and object are identical, and this is something that, as we saw in previous sessions, Bergson had admirably discovered in *Matter and Memory*, in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, namely, that the movement-image is the identity of the image and the object.

So, don't ask me too much, it's just a question I'm posing. I'm just giving you the answer that I would like to give, that is: Well, actually no… the cinematographic image is not analogical in the sense you think it is. Someone else has said this but fortunately he's no clearer about it than I am, because it's not easy for him either. This is [Pier Paolo] Pasolini. Pasolini's situation is complicated because he also creates a semiology, but in my view this semiology clashes very violently with the semiology of both Umberto Eco and Christian Metz.[4] If we take up Metz's formula that cinema is a language [*langage*] without a language system [*langue*] – we'll see later what this means, for the moment we'll simply retain the formula… Once again, this formula of a language without a language system presupposes – and we'll see in what way – that the cinematographic image is analogical, analogical in the sense of having a relation of resemblance. We'll look at why this is, but it's not the problem I want to consider today. As for Pasolini, it's odd, he doesn't pull any punches, as the saying goes, because he doesn't say anything at all. The cinematographic image is a language system, but what's more, he'd say, just to annoy the others, it's *a language system without language*.[5] Yes, it's a language system. But, but… he adds: *it's the language system of reality*.

And the text is extremely… Pasolini's texts, in this respect, are extremely difficult, which is why I want to begin with them, and in my view – I don't claim to have understood them perfectly, and others certainly haven't – but according to me, they haven't been well understood. He goes so far as to say that semiology must be a descriptive science of the real, which is to say, a phenomenology of reality. It's an odd way to define semiology, as a descriptive science of the real, and he says that nobody understands what he means. And then Umberto Eco reproaches him for semiological naiveté, and Pasolini takes this very badly. There's nothing he minds being called but to be called naive in this case, and to be called naive by Umberto Eco is, for Pasolini, something wholly unacceptable. So, he gets angry. He explains how Umberto Eco has understood absolutely nothing, neither about semiology nor about his own thought.

And how does he explain what he means when he says that "cinema is a language system, but it's the language system of reality"? Well, precisely this, that the object of the cinematographic image *is a constituent part of the image*, and it's because the object is a constituent part of the image that image and reality are strictly one, and that therefore, if cinema is a language system, it's the language system of reality. In other words, if the image is movement, if the image moves, there is no longer any ascribable difference between image and object. Which I would put another way. Just as he said… it's a language system but it's the language system of reality. I would take the liberty of saying: Okay, the cinematographic image is analogical, but analogical in the sense of *modulation of the real* and not resemblance to the object. Good. That would be the first difference between the cinematographic image and the analogical image.

And the second difference, which is undoubtedly complementary, is that the cinematographic act that operates on the image is called montage. Just as I was asked earlier if a cinematographic image can be considered in terms of an analogical relation, we'll now ask if montage – meaning the synthesis of images – can be related to a code. Because it's also true that linguistically inspired semiology has tried to reconfigure cinema under two forms: analogical character of the image and code, that is, a specifically cinematographic code that is applied to the image. And all linguistically-inspired semiology consists in showing us in what sense and in what way the analogical relation present in the image stretches beyond itself in the direction of specific codes, and this will be the operation undertaken by Metz… and Eco too, though in a completely different way.

What do the analogical and code have in common? What the analogical and code have in common, it seems to me, is that they are two *molding* operations.[6] The analogical, in the sense of relation of resemblance, is a perceptible mold, a perceptible casting, while code is an intelligible mold. Perhaps our hypothesis would be: Montage doesn't present or constitute a code any more than the cinematographic image represents an analogical relation. And here again, Pasolini's thinking is extremely complex, since he does indeed speak of a cinematographic code and even of a plurality of codes. But, he says, this applies only to films. And without doubt, it is through films that cinema exists.

This doesn't prevent films from presupposing something we'll call cinema. Pasolini will speak of an ideal cinematographic continuity, films being the cuts beneath this ideal or idealistic cinematographic continuity. So, if films imply codes, cinema, according to Pasolini, implies what he calls an *Ur-code*, an Ur-code, meaning something beyond codes. In other words, he desires something that would be both a code of codes, and that would at the same time be beyond codes, beyond a code, beyond code… and here I think that, however obscure it may sound, we should perhaps take this into account, that the very nature of the cinematographic image might be to simultaneously exclude both the relation of resemblance, which it replaces with a function of modulating the object, and the relation of code, which it replaces with montage.[7]

In terms of this double aspect, couldn't we then say – and this is what Eisenstein suggests, and I want to come back to Eisenstein in a minute… I know that everything I've said may sound very confusing, but once again, it's for the future, we'll see, it's for the future. Here, I've somewhat confusedly posed a problem that so far has only been studied at the level of the relation between cinema and language. But it's in terms of all these aspects, it seems to me, that, to return to Eisenstein, we can say, Yes, for someone like Eisenstein, it's obvious that cinema attains something that in painting remains only a potentiality. Is the pictorial image a combination of analogy and code? It seems doubtful to me but let's suppose we could say this is true. We've seen how it would be even more doubtful to assert this with regard to the cinematographic image. And why is that? Once again, because it creates movement. The pictorial image doesn't create movement, hence our doubts, in terms of the pictorial image, of understanding it under the double aspect of the analogical relation and code. But when it's the image itself that creates movement, it effectuates the potentiality of painting. Why? Because the movement is in action. It's not we who have to produce it as we do when we're viewing a painting, or when we're looking at an image. It's the image itself that does it. And what will be the act that effects this potentiality? The act that effects the potentiality of creating movement will be, precisely, montage.

During the first trimester we saw what we could draw from this, which coincides with Eisenstein's proposition: An image that creates movement is an image that produces a *shock*. And how can this shock be defined?[8] It forces us to think, but to think what? It forces us to think the *concept*. But what is a concept? Here, he finds himself becoming very Hegelian: the concept is the Whole. The image, insofar as it creates movement, produces a shock, it makes us think. The shock consists in this: it makes us think, and what it makes us think is the Whole, meaning the concept. From the image to the concept. And if you remember well – I have to remind you of this because it's such a crucial text – if you remember, those who were here… I don't know, was it two years ago?[9] In a way, everything starts with Kant, with Kant's splendid passages on the theory of the Sublime, where Kant's whole notion of the Sublime consists in saying this: In the Sublime, imagination is pushed to its limit. And pushed to its limit, it unleashes a thought that will think what exceeds the imagination, that is, the Whole. So, the operation of the Sublime would bring together two, two movements, the movement of the imagination which is taken to its own limit and which, therefore, leads thought to think the Whole. It leads thought to think the Whole as what exceeds imagination. Good.

Isn't this the essence of the movement-image? At the basis of the thought-image relation in cinema, there would be, to use a barbaric word, a kind of… a kind of *nooshock*, a *nooshock*, meaning that the movement-image will create a shock upon thought, by which thought is compelled to think the concept, that is, the Whole. Okay.

But how? This first movement appears very often in Eisenstein's texts. If I call it a "first movement", it's undoubtedly because there may be another, but I don't even know if there is another. This is why I come back to this Eisenstein text, which I think is more difficult than it appears...[10] [*Recording interrupted*] [39:26]

... from the image to thought, from percept to concept, and all Eisenstein's developments are concerned with how we pass from percept to concept, from the image to the Whole, and so on, or to put it another way, what is this *nooshock*, this shock that the image, that the movement-image exerts upon thought? Eisenstein's answer to this question seems entirely consistent to me: it's the *opposition* proper to movement-images, it's the opposition of movement-images that produces the shock. It's the opposition of movement-images that creates the passage from image to thought, from percept to concept. In this sense, Eisenstein is a dialectician. It is thus insofar as the movement-image develops powers of opposition that it effects a shock upon thought and forces thought to think the Whole, that is, the concept as the overcoming of opposition.

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: What?

Student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: That's what we're going to see, hence the question: What is this element of opposition in images, in cinematographic images defined as movement-images? This implies, then, that Eisenstein makes – whether he says this or not, it doesn't matter, he's faced with a kind of logical problem – that he makes a sort of classification of oppositions. And here – and again this is in line with my concern to make these cross-references, not applications, but these linkages between philosophy and I don't know what – he makes a connection, he hits upon a very old philosophical problem, that of classifying oppositions. It's very interesting,

this problem of classifying oppositions. You see, these are the kind of things you have to know by heart.

It's terrible, isn't it? It's true, you have to know, you have to know... I say that because I was listening to a program on television. It's terrible, really – it's worse than this cold – where there were people talking, and they explained that in the old days, in the mists of time, philosophy contained all the sciences, and this is an incontrovertible and well-known truth. These were very serious people. But it's an idea that… I don't know, the worst high school text book from even a hundred years ago wouldn't dare to assert, because it's false, it's completely false, it's idiotic, it's, it's completely idiotic. You see, for as long as there's been thought, philosophy has never in the least way *contained* the sciences. I mean, the Greeks never confused a philosopher with a mathematician... Some people are completely crazy, they're mad, they're complete idiots, they're… I don't know what. Yet they say these things with the utmost seriousness.

But I still prefer my own soup. It's... it's awful, you understand, it's awful to hear things like that. "Ah yes, at that time, philosophers were doing physics, they were doing mathematics, they were doing..." They're crazy. It may be true that, in some cases, the same *people* were both philosophers and mathematicians. But Euclid was never considered, even by the Greeks, to be a philosopher, never. Not to mention physicists or doctors… the Greeks never considered them to be philosophers. There isn't a biology, but there is a medicine, a Greek medicine that has nothing to do with philosophy. There is a Greek physics that has nothing to do with philosophy. There is a Greek mathematics that has nothing to do with philosophy. It's enough to read a single page of Plato to see that Plato never once thought philosophy encompassed mathematics. It's very odd, don't you think?

So why do I insist on this? I say this so you understand, you won't get anywhere if you don't know… and I think philosophy is... That's why I like to teach you something from time to time. I tell myself, this way, they won't get lost in the future. I'd like to teach you both things at the same time: on one hand, the need to know very precise things about which there is no room for discussion, and on the other, the need for each of us to make our own soup, which is very different. And here too there's nothing to discuss. Either way, it's fine… either way, it's fine. Either it's knowledge, but there isn't any, so there's nothing to discuss. Or it's research, and there again there's no room for discussion. So all is well.

Therefore, I would say, let's make the most of it. The classification of oppositions is something that has run through the whole history of philosophy. But more precisely, so you can see where Eisenstein has brought something to philosophy, I want to mention two instances in the history of thought. I'm mentioning two… because one is fundamental, which is the first classification of oppositions, that of Aristotle. That of Aristotle.

So, I move to the blackboard now because it's magic, and philosophers like magic… it's the magical square, it's the magical square of oppositions. This will make everything clear.

A, what I call A, is the proposition. For example, all men are white, a magical example, don't you think? A, all men are white. You see, these are things that, in the old days, people learned by heart. In the Middle Ages, they learned this by heart.

E is: no man is white. It's a universal, from all to none. Then I draw a line from A to E, all men are white, no man is white.

I, some men are white. O, some men are not white. So, this is the direction, what in logic we call the particular. Yes? Are you all right? Are you all right? In the middle, I put a dotted line because it's when you consider my four propositions... I'd say that A and I – "all men are white" and "some men are white" – are positive, affirmative, positive... what in logic we call "positive values". While "no man is white" and "some men are not white" are negative.

See how my square takes shape, because the universal and the particular are the logical point of view of the *quantity* of judgment, whereas positive and negative are the logical point of view of the *quality* of judgment. Right. Between A and E, that is, between the positive universal and the negative universal, the relation will be a relation of *contrary opposition*, which according to Aristotle is the first figure of opposition. What do we mean by a relation of contrary opposition? The incompatibility of two propositions. The two propositions "all men are white" and "no man is white" are incompatible. They are in a relation of contrary opposition. Between A and E, there is contrary opposition.

Between I and O, the positive particular and the negative particular, "some men are white" and "some men are not white", the relation is said to be one of *sub-contrary opposition*, and this time it signifies correlation. This is the second figure of opposition according to Aristotle. That's nice. You must understand that he's invented something great in terms of a theory of judgment. So today, we can refine it, we can extract something else from it, but we mustn't touch things like that, it's a small marvel. And so, the sub-contrary opposition, which means the correlation between two propositions, "some men are white" and "some men are not white". If some men are white, some men are not white, there's correlation.

What remains? There is A-O and E-I, A-O and E-I. For example, A-O is the relation between all these oppositions, the type of opposition that exists between "all men are white" and "some men are not white". E-I, it's the relationship between "no man is white" and "some men are white". You see? So, we either have the relation between the positive universal and the negative particular, or between the negative universal and the positive particular. This third figure of opposition will be called contradictory opposition, and it signifies the idea of alternative, it's either one or the other.

What's left? Well, if you've understood, what is left is something that goes without saying. What's left is a relation, to get my magic square, an A-I relation and an E-O relation, that is, A-I denotes a relation between the two propositions – "all men are white" and "some men are white" – and E-O a relation between "no man is white" and "some men are not white". This fourth figure of opposition is called *subalternate opposition*, subalternate opposition, and what does this mean? It refers to the implication... [*Recording interrupted*] [56:48]

Part 2

... in two forms: either possession-limitation, or privation-limitation. It designates implication, since if all men are white, it implies that some men are white.

The four figures of opposition according to Aristotle are: contrariety, subcontrariety, contradiction and subalternation. And as you can see, there is indeed an attempt at a criterion of necessity. But what will this criterion of necessity be based on? We can see that it is based on the nature of judgment, on the logical nature of judgment, and again, on the logical nature of judgment reduced to two aspects: logical quantity and logical quality. The criteria of

quantity are universal and particular, while the criteria of quality are positive and negative, and these are the criteria used to obtain the square, that is, the forms of opposition.

There's a lot to be said for this… and when I say there's no need to discuss it, okay… but isn't there a need to do something else? Indeed, a lot of logicians have tried. What's more, we can always ask questions: does universal and particular really account for the quantification of judgment? Do positive and negative exhaust the qualification of judgment? And what is the exact relation between quantity and quality, from the point of view of judgment? Well, there is all of this – but it remains a discussion within this magical square – and indeed, modern logicians have introduced, notably with what are called trivalent, or polyvalent logics, they have revised this Aristotelian conception of opposition in many different ways. But we're not going to go into all of that, because it would be a subject that would take a whole year to cover, so there's no... we're just keeping this as a basis.

But it's clear that we can conceive of a real mutation of the problem if we pose the problem of opposition no longer in terms of judgment, and of quantity and quality in judgment, but in terms of what we could call real oppositions or, if you prefer, dynamic oppositions… so at the level of real opposition and no longer conceptual opposition, or if you prefer, at the level of dynamic opposition. At the end of the 19th century, a philosopher, or rather a philosopher-sociologist, Gabriel Tarde, wrote a book entitled *De l'opposition universelle* [11] in which he proposes a particularly interesting classification of real oppositions. And in this book his classification takes two forms: formal and material. So, he considers classification in terms of *oppositions of phenomena*, dynamic oppositions of phenomena. Formally, the classification he proposes is as follows: dynamic opposition of successive phenomena, which is *rhythm*; dynamic opposition of simultaneous phenomena, in which there are two cases: linear, in which case it would be *polarity*, and radiating, in which case it would be *centrifugal-centripetal*.

The material classification will be as follows: first case, opposition of *series* according to order, according to the category of order. The opposition of series in terms of the category of order will refer to *inversion*. If you take, for example, the order of colors, an order of colors – blue, red, violet, green – the opposite is the inversion of the order – green, violet, red, blue. This will be the serial inversion, the inverted series. It's the opposition of series, that is, the inversion.

Second type of opposition, opposition of *degrees*. Something becomes progressively faster and then slower. A figure becomes more and more concave, then less and less concave. A love becomes progressively greater, then smaller and smaller. In short, the opposition of series we saw previously referred to the dynamic verbs "appear" and "disappear". The opposition of degrees refers to the dynamic verbs "increase" and "diminish", or "acquire" and "lose".

Third type of opposition: opposition of *forces*. How does the opposition of forces differ from the opposition of degrees? This time, it's not a question of more or less concave… more or less concave. The opposition of forces will be between concave and convex. The opposition of degrees was between not loving and loving, loving more or less. The opposition of forces is between loving and hating. This time, the opposition of forces is no longer "to acquire" or "to lose", it's "to do" and "to undo".

And Tarde is correct in pointing out that there is a risk of confusing the two. Take this example: you have a debt. You have a debt. In the first case, you repay the debt – that's a practical exercise. You have a debt and you repay it, it's an opposition. But what kind of opposition is it? Well, as you all now know, it's an opposition of degrees. Conversely, you have a debt, but you also have an amount of credit that is equal to this debt: this time, what we have is an opposition of forces. In practical life, it's very important to distinguish between these things. Yet the result is the same. The result is the same, which is why we risk confusing the two types of opposition. Whether you repay your debt or provide a credit equal to the debt, in one case you will have proceeded according to the opposition of degrees, while in the other it will be according to the opposition of forces.

Okay, so here's my question – it's not to save time, it's all part of my desire to give you a taste of Aristotle so you'll want to go and read him for yourself, I mean not all of you, but those who are interested in logic. I find the square splendid, I don't know what effect it has on you. But if textbooks are to make sense, they should recount this and that would be enough, that's all you need to know because... well, okay.

So, my question is quite simple: does Eisenstein have anything to say to us regarding all this? You'll tell me it's not his aim. Yes, it is! It is his aim, because he proposes a classification of real oppositions. And what I'd like to know is whether these oppositions, whether Eisenstein's classification, which has no equivalent among philosophers, is of interest to us… In what way can it be of interest to philosophy? Can it give us anything? How will the real opposition be defined this time? It's the opposition between the movement-image and what intervenes in a movement-image. Once again, I can… I don't even have to justify this real opposition. I can call it *real* if you grant me… if you grant me that the cinematographic image is such that, as a movement-image, it is indistinguishable from its object. So, the oppositions that appear in the movement-image will be real oppositions. Identity of image and object.

According to Eisenstein, it seems to me, there is a first type of opposition: quantitative opposition. This is the opposition between long and short, and it concerns the duration of the image: brief image, long image. This quantitative opposition, which concerns the duration of the image, its brevity or length, can be described as *metric*.

The second form of opposition, according to Eisenstein, I'd say, are qualitative oppositions. These qualitative oppositions take several forms. So why call them qualitative, you might ask? They can concern *one* and *several*. Several ships, a fleet, and a single ship. They can concern the element, the elements, substance, such as earth or water. They may concern intensity: light or darkness. Or the direction of movement: top to bottom, bottom to top, right to left, left to right. Why group them for convenience, under the term qualitative oppositions? Because in all these cases, the opposing terms are considered predicates. This type of opposition will be called *rhythmic* and no longer metric.

And what does this correspond to? All of a sudden, we have something that is of interest to us: Eisenstein abandons the cinema-painting comparison to launch a great comparison between cinema and music. I should point out that my whole introduction to today's session consisted in saying how the comparison between cinema and painting was only possible and satisfying up to a certain point. Is music capable of taking up the relay? For the moment, I'm really just sketching things out, because it's already so complicated. I'd say that qualitative oppositions for Eisenstein – that is, rhythmic oppositions – call, strangely enough, for a configuration of opposites in the form: point, counterpoint. Opposites occupy the positions of

point and counterpoint. But is this just a metaphor? It's obvious that in music, point and counterpoint have a meaning... No, and for the moment we'll just allow ourselves to be guided by this, we want to... we just have to wait and see what he comes up with.

The third type of opposition is one I'd like to call *relational*. And if it's different, it's because, this time, the object in the image is no longer regarded as a predicate, but as a subject. What would relational opposition consist in? You'll be aware of the continuation of the musical metaphor – but is it simply a metaphor, or is it something else? – when Eisenstein tells us that a cinematographic image has a *dominant*. This dominant is what I would call the s*ubject* of the image. And how is the dominant defined? It's defined as center of attraction. That's how it becomes the subject. The subject is the center of attraction.

Needless to say, this is full of musical undertones, since it's the very definition of what, in music, we call tonality, so the relational opposition will be called *tonal*. It will be a tonal opposition. What we call tonality in music, however perfunctory this may sound, consists in this: there are centers of attraction, meaning there are dominants that constitute centers of attraction. We can even talk about the "attraction potential" of a note. We'll speak about "attraction density" in sound theory. The affirmation of the existence of centers, defined by the attractive power of a dominant, a sonic dominant, belongs fundamentally to what is called tonal music.

So, between two centers, there can be a relation of opposition, precisely what we call relational or tonal opposition. A subject-center, that is, a center of attraction, will therefore attract… it will be an element of the image said to be dominant because of its power to attract other elements. Or else, it may be an image that attracts other images. For example, a certain quality of light can lead to a type of movement, a way of walking, and the evocation of a certain degree of heat. There will be a power of attraction. The attractive power of the center, the attractive power of the dominant will form an aggregate or entity, as we sometimes say in music, a sound entity or a sound aggregate. This aggregate is more or less stable depending on the attractive power of the center. You know that in music, there are more or less stable aggregates, and that in particular the whole problem I'm talking about for those who know, the whole problem of the major and the minor consists in the instability of the minor in the tonal system.

Couldn't we find the same thing? Why not? Take *The General Line* [1929], for example. No, sorry, *October* [1927]. In *October*, the provisional government invokes the good Lord, and Eisenstein composes his famous series where he links together the image of Christ with that of the Buddha, and I don't know what else, various masks, everything, a whole series, the whole series of religiosity if you like. He himself calls this an attraction, an attraction. But in this case, attraction is really a drift. It's not that it is a bad entity, it's not that it's a bad aggregate: it's an unstable aggregate. The dominant has produced… has played the role of attractive center.

Another example, this time in *The General Line*, the famous procession, where you have light, sun, heat, movement, the movement of the procession. From a dominant, here you have a stable aggregate. So, basically, I'd say that the relational opposition is no longer either metric or rhythmic. It's what he himself calls a tonal opposition, that is, an opposition between two centers of attraction, between two centers of attraction in the image. These two centers of attraction can be unequal. Why might they be unequal? One can be stable, the other

unstable, you have all possible combinations. This will be... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:25:26]

... modal opposition. It's no longer based on tonality, and this is where we're going to run into a whole series of complications. It's based on another phenomenon that would be a musical metaphor. It's no longer based on tonality, it's based on *resonance*. It's based on oppositions of resonance. What does this mean? You know how a sound is said to have harmonics… what are the harmonics of a sound? I'm speaking for those – I apologize to those who know this – I'm speaking for those who supposedly know nothing at all, so I'm just saying the most elementary things, which I'm explaining badly, and in a way that's inaccurate, but it's the minimum I need in order to have some points of reference.

The frequency of a sound corresponds to the number of vibrations per second. Any sound that is emitted has harmonics. The harmonics of a sound are sounds whose own frequency is a multiple of the frequency of the original sound. You have a sound A, it has a frequency n, the number of vibrations per second. Harmonics release their own harmonics in the form of sounds with frequencies of $2n$, $3n$, $4n$, and so on. So, there's a scale of harmonics, and harmonics are said to be close or distant. This is very important, because close harmonics will define consonant chords, and distant harmonics will define dissonant chords. You see, good.

Eisenstein tells us that the cinematographic image too, as a visual image, has harmonics and releases harmonics. The examples he gives may appear very, very unusual, because… he gives a surprising example. I don't remember where it is, it doesn't matter...

The harmonics... I don't know if I'll find it again. "For example: the sex appeal of a beautiful American heroine-star is attended by many stimuli: of texture – from the material of her gown; of light – from the balanced and emphatic lighting of her figure; of racial-national (positive for an American audience: "a native American type," or negative: "colonizer-oppressor" for a Black or Chinese audience)"[12], and so on and so forth. When he tries to speak more precisely, he assimilates the harmonics of the visual image… the visual image would have harmonics.

Now he assimilates the harmonics of the visual image to the phenomenon known as *synesthesia*. Synesthesia. You know what synesthetic phenomena are… they're apparently phenomena of juxtaposition of different senses, for example, juxtaposing a sound and a color. Rimbaud's famous sonnet ["Voyelles"] is considered a synesthetic phenomenon. The literature on synesthesia… the literature on synesthesia is endless, especially as it's rare for different people to see the same colors associated with the same letters. But here we have a case… what shall we say… for example, I say A and invite you to see a color. Could we say, then, that the color is a harmonic of the sound A? This is exactly what Eisenstein means. For him, there are visual harmonics, meaning that elements concerning other senses emerge from the visual image. So, these elements concerning other senses would be considered harmonics of the visual image.

Now you'll tell me that this was already the case in terms of tonal opposition, in terms of the opposition of attractive centers. We saw how an attractive center didn't only gather together visual elements. When I spoke about light and degrees of temperature, we already had a visual element together with an element of a completely different nature, concerning heat. None of this is very surprising, I know, what I'm saying is quite boring, in fact everything I'm saying today. But it doesn't matter, all this is very meticulous. Another thing that will be of

no surprise is something either you know or don't know, it doesn't matter, but in music, tonality… tonality implies resonance. And the system of tonal music presupposes the harmonics of sounds.

So, to go back to Eisenstein, I can only say that he had already grasped relational oppositions of the attractive-center type before he discovered harmonics. But it's undoubtedly because he realized that oppositions in the sense of oppositions of centers of attraction already involved different centers of perspective, that he went on to construct his theory of harmonics. But how can he assimilate the two notions, which are very different, the juxtaposition of heterogeneous sensory elements and harmonics? The harmonics of sound remain part of sound, whereas here, in the harmonies of the visual image, there are elements referring to other senses.

Obviously, we need to reflect on the phenomenon of synesthesia. Can we just say that this is a juxtaposition of heterogeneous perceptible qualities, for example, a visual quality and a sound quality? No, clearly, it's not as simple as that. What would this imply? It could be explained in terms of the brain. It could be explained in terms of the workings of the brain, since if we take the area of the brain stimulated by visual perception, we can say there is synesthesia when, under certain pathological conditions – and we will see what we mean by pathological here – the area of the brain stimulated by visual perception resonates with another area which would be, for example, an auditory area, an area specific to auditory perceptions. This can even be stimulated…. one can even imagine a modification of chronaxies. This process may be stimulated if synesthesia phenomena are amplified by drugs such as mescaline.

But no, it doesn't work like that. I say to myself that this is a bit too… or rather, there's someone who says it very well, and this is Merleau-Ponty in *Phenomenology of Perception*[13], where he devotes some very fine passages to synesthesia. He says something very simple, that synesthesia should almost be considered the rule. We never stop experiencing it. The problem is: why don't we notice it under normal conditions? It's a bit like with Bergson, if you remember, when I was telling you about Bergson's text on paramnesia. He says, but paramnesia, the realm of recollection – of the present, of the *déjà vu* – is something we shouldn't regard as an extraordinary phenomenon. On the contrary, we should look at it as something we experience all the time. He explains why this is the normal state. It's that you just don't see it, you can't see it. In our normal state, we can't see it. Why can't we see it? There are reasons for this. It's because it's not *useful*, so we're not aware of it.[14]

Take another case, because it's a modern disease, but I find it so interesting, precisely because I don't suffer from it: hypochondria, hypochondria, which is an old disease from the 19th century, one of the most wonderful diseases of 19th century psychiatry, and it's coming back, it's coming back with a vengeance. Actually, I'm very happy that it's making a comeback. Hypochondriacs, what do these case studies mean? They're phenomena – I've always found them fascinating – they're phenomena of *micro-perceptions*. They're perceptions that everyone has but to be normal means to be in a condition where you are not aware of them. For example, any doctor will tell you that we all have a staggering number of extrasystoles in our heart rhythm every day. Many doctors also explain that, at any given moment in your organism, there are cells that go mad, that is, they literally carcinize, lose their differentiation, dedifferentiate. Leibniz, to mix it all up by summoning a philosopher, came up with a great theory of tiny unconscious perceptions.

What is a hypochondriac? A hypochondriac is not at all an imaginary invalid. It's someone who perceives what they shouldn't perceive. Almost out of a sense of duty, in the moral sense, as someone said, which is why there's a whole question of guilt too. I'm making a detour here, but it's just to explain… that's why there's this whole question of guilt for the hypochondriac. They perceive something they shouldn't perceive. Imagine that you perceived all your extrasystoles. Life would become impossible, terrible! Or at the limit, imagine – though fortunately I haven't encountered anyone who's gone this far – that they have a perception, a cellular micro-perception in which they perceive that a particular cell has gone mad. Well, that's what a hypochondriac is. Life becomes literally impossible. Literally impossible, so they say, Oh my heart condition, Oh my heart, my heart! And they can take this very far. One of these years, I'd like to do a whole course on hypochondria, but I'm waiting for it to swamp us, so that it's more... and then it would be just for hypochondriacs, that would be great. Actually, no, there would be too many, so it would be reserved for the non-hypochondriacs!

Well, why do I say that? Yes, synesthesia is exactly the same thing. What Merleau-Ponty puts very nicely in his passage from the *Phenomenology of Perception* is that there is a double tension in perception. On the one hand, we perceive through specified qualities, the visible, the audible, and being specified, they don't communicate. And what we also perceive is *upon* the object, the quality I perceive *on* the object. Insofar as I perceive a quality, for example, blue, or a given sound, blue and the sound are separate. But at the same time, I perceive them *upon* an object. And insofar as I perceive them *upon* an object, each of my senses enters into a synesthetic relationship with the other senses.

There is great passage regarding this, everything he says in this respect is very convincing, and it's particularly apt for the cinematographic image, and he himself refers to cinema: "The senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the thing. One sees…" – in the normal state of perception – "One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass…"[15] – It's true, if you look at a glass, you just need to pay close attention. When you pay attention, it's obvious that when I see the glass from a distance, I have no need of the experience. It's not a matter of memory or habit, I just *see* certain things. I don't confuse, if you like, the way the glass breaks with the way a piece of wood breaks. "One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass" – the visible glass – "One sees the springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel…" – and so on and so forth – "The form of a fold in linen or cotton shows us the resilience or dryness of the fibre, the coldness or warmth of the material. Furthermore, the movement of visible objects is not the mere transference from place to place of colored patches which, in the visual field, correspond to those objects […] One sees the weight of a block of cast iron which sinks in the sand, the fluidity of water and the viscosity of syrup". This is true, you take syrup, and you can see its flavor, the viscosity of the syrup, all by simply seeing the syrup, and by seeing the way the syrup drips.

So, what does all this mean? What interest us above all… well, I return again to my original theme. If we take as given the hypothesis or supposition that the cinematographic image, being a movement-image, has integrated its object, and that there is now an indiscernibility between image and object – you see how everything suddenly becomes clear, well, relatively clear – the visual elements of the cinematographic image will find their harmonics in elements that possibly refer to other senses. There won't just be a juxtaposition of different qualities, and precisely because there is no juxtaposition, we can say that elements from the

other senses form part of the visual components of the cinematographic image, just as harmonics are part of sound.

In this respect, I have the impression that the sort of leap Eisenstein made from sound harmonics to synesthesia may be well-founded. And indeed, this is what he will tell us: at the level of visual harmonics, we can no longer simply say "I see". At the level of visual harmonics, you can no longer say "I see". In the three previous cases, there was this "I see". In terms of the harmonics of the visual image, we can no longer say "I see". This part of the text is quite wonderful, it's in *Film Form*: "A totally physiological sensation […] If the frame is a visual perception […] visual as well as aural overtones…" – which already implies they're not simply visual – "visual as well as aural overtones are a totally physiological sensation" – so the visual harmonics are entirely physiological sensations. "For the musical overtone…" – so now he's trying to explain this – "For the musical overtone, it is not strictly fitting to say 'I hear'". In other words, he assumes that, and this is an interesting idea, he assumes that in the case of a sound, I hear the sound, but I can no longer exactly say that I *hear* its overtones, its harmonics. Indeed, he's not wrong. All the more so for visual harmonics, which are no longer specified sensations, but what he calls totally physiological sensations. "For the musical overtone, it is not strictly fitting to say 'I hear'. Nor for the visual overtone, 'I see'. For both, a new uniform formula must enter our vocabulary: 'I feel.'" So here we have the transition from "I see" to "I feel".

So, this is what I call the *modal domain*, which consists in the possible relations of opposition between sounds and harmonics, not the opposition between a sound and its harmonics, but between two harmonics that refer… between two series of harmonics that refer to different sounds. So, I insist on this, I mean, you can see that in this development, which ceases to connect the cinematographic image with the pictorial image and instead brings it closer to the musical image, there's something… what is produced is a kind of inversion. If we go back a minute, we saw that we had four cases of opposition, four forms of opposition. It seems obvious to me that, from a logical point of view, it's the fourth, the one we've just seen, that is presupposed by the third. Indeed, the attractive power of a center or, if you prefer, its tonality, *presupposes resonance*, that is, the relation between a sound and its harmonics. And indeed, it's the relation between sound and its harmonics that determines modes and types of chords. However, Eisenstein discovered the third type of opposition before the fourth, and so here the fourth entails a rearrangement of the third. So, no problem there.

Finally, before we have a break, because all this is tiring, what do we have left? Well, we've just seen four types of opposition, and I don't know whether, philosophically speaking, this is a philosophically interesting classification of oppositions. I'll summarize: quantitative or metric opposition; qualitative or rhythmic opposition; relational or tonal opposition, opposition between centers of attraction; and finally, modal or harmonic opposition, which this time will be an opposition between an element of the image taken together with its harmonics and another element of the image taken with its own harmonics. Four types of opposition. But you feel the progression through these oppositions. As I've just said. we've passed from "I see" to "I feel", we've gone from visual percept to totally physiological percept, an "I feel"... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:53:35]

Part 3

... A further step and we would pass to "I think". We'd pass to "I think". On what conditions would we move on to "I think"? Here, he [*Eisenstein*] is very rapid in his considerations, saying that all we have to do is consider all these oppositions in their effect on the entire cortex – and I quote exactly – in their "effect on the cortex of the brain as a whole". All these oppositions considered in their effect on the entire cortex will define the cinematic "I think". In other words, we've kept to our program, or Eisenstein has kept to his program: we've gone from the percept-image to the concept.

And what is the concept? It is the Whole of the oppositions, and is therefore the very thing in which these oppositions transcend or overcome each other. As we've seen in previous years, what is this Whole? What is this Whole that defines thought in this respect, in relation to the cinematic image? The cinematographic image was movement, and the percept-image was the perception of movement that ensured the identity of image and object. What is thought? The thought of the Whole is the representation of time that flows from it, what I had called the indirect representation of time. We go from percept-image to concept, the concept being the representation of time. But how do we get there?

Would you like to have a short break? No? Yes? No? Yes? What time is it?

Lucien Gouty: Two minutes past twelve.

Deleuze: Ah, yes! So, let's have a break. You can go out in the cold, you can go for a walk, or smoke outside. Okay. Everyone apart from me. [*Recording interrupted*] [1:56:40]

… Eisenstein's first scale, the first path, and once again, this first path consists in this: we pass from the image as a percept to conscious thought. I hope you've managed to follow this. It's... I don't know if it's... I don't know if it's... Okay.

But there are already many problems along this path. The main problem is that, if we go from the image to the concept as a self-conscious, as a conscious, as conscious thought, as clear thought, if we take this path, what is its nature? The concept appears as, or the thought appears as, *the effect of* the image. Yes, in a way, the concept is the effect of an image. Only, as Eisenstein says, and he puts this formally, it's not a logical effect, or to put it in different terms, it's not an *analytical* effect. This doesn't mean that the concept is contained within the image. It's not a sum, he says, the concept is not a sum of images, it's a product. It's not a sum, it's a product. What does this mean? Well, you can understand it immediately, it means: we go from percept-images to conscious concepts, but we do so synthetically, that is, through a synthesis that is exercised on images. What is this synthesis? It's montage, it's montage.

In other words, it is montage and montage alone that produces the concept from images. Why is this? Because montage will be defined at this level as the organization and development of image oppositions, the organization and development of image oppositions regarding all forms of opposition. All forms of opposition must be taken into account. So according to Eisenstein the five forms of opposition we saw earlier correspond in effect to the five forms of montage. And Eisenstein will tell us: there is a metric montage, there's a rhythmic montage, there is a tonal montage – these are the very terms Eisenstein uses – there's a harmonic montage – you see how this doesn't refer to harmony in a general sense, it refers to harmony in the very precise sense of the harmonics of the image – so there is a harmonic montage and finally an intellectual montage.

It's true to say, then, that we're faced with a kind of perpetual oscillation – not a contradiction in Eisenstein's work – which, it seems to me, applies to all cinema of this period. In other words, it's the images that produce the concept, but through montage. The concept arises from the images, but it does so through montage. So that between images and montage, we have a kind of vertical construction, but a vertical construction that we must pass through in both directions: I go from images to montage, and from the montage I come back down to the images. And we can equally say that the concept depends on the montage and the concept arises from the images.

So, there will always be a kind of alternative: shot or montage, shot or montage, regarding which Eisenstein reproaches himself in numerous texts for having too much favored montage over image. Both must be maintained. He will never cease to seek the union of the two, since it is necessary to maintain both, given that the concept as conscious thought really does arise from the images, but at the same time depends on montage, that is, on the synthesis operated on images. So, if there is this circle, everything will be continually relaunched. If we are ceaselessly being sent back to… this is what he means, when he says that the image is potential montage. The image continually sends us back to montage, but at the same time montage conducts us back to the image. And it is the circulation of the two that produces the concept.

Okay, but what does this mean? For us, it has a major consequence, it means that Eisenstein's total conception should only be intelligible if *another movement* connects with the movement that conducts us from percept-image to conscious thought – and this is what I'd like to call the second path by which we pass from thought to image, no longer from image to thought but from thought to image. So here, in my reading at least, I'm persuaded that this second path exists. I'm convinced that it's very different from the first one that we've just seen, but I have the impression that Eisenstein will have great trouble trying to unify these two paths or even to think their relation.

So, let's now take the other path. In what sense are we supposed to pass from thought to image? Who is in the situation of passing from thought to image? I can already say – and he says so himself – that it is the *creator*. Let's say that the creator has a vague idea of what they want and they plan to realize it through images. This having a vague idea of what they want changes everything. This time, I'm starting from a muddled thought. Before, I was rising from the image to the conscious concept. Now I start from a muddled thought, an *unconscious* concept, and from this unconscious concept, I will move towards images. Whereas before, as I was moving towards the conscious concept, I began from the percept-image. Now instead I begin from the muddled idea or the unconscious concept, and I move towards the image, but in what sense? It will no longer be in the sense of the percept-image. It will be in the sense of the *affect-image*. The image will no longer be treated as a percept, it will be treated as an affect. Now, what is affect?

The percept-image was the image insofar as it expressed relations between its own objects. What is the affect-image? According to Eisenstein's texts, it is the image insofar as it expresses the filmmaker and spectator's reaction to what is seen in the image. It's very strange, this repurposing [*détournement*] of notions, this variation of notions. In that instant everything changes. I would say, to push things just a little, that the percept-image is the image insofar as it expresses the relations between its own objects, since we've seen that it internalizes the object. And the affect-image is the image insofar as it expresses a change in the Whole. And insofar as it expresses a change in the Whole, it summons a reaction. My

affective reaction to the image, my affective reaction to the image is a constituent part of the image.

Just as I said before that the object is part of the cinematographic image, we can also say that the affective reaction is part of the cinematographic image, and this is where things get really complicated. So, you see, it's a completely different path, from the muddled idea to the affect-image, to the affective image. In the first case, I passed from the percept-image to the conscious concept, and this occurred through the intermediary of montage. Montage acted as an actual plane. Let's call this plane – since these are Eisenstein's own words – it's a *plane of organization and development*, a plane of organization and development of images, and it's this plane of organization and development that gives us the concept.

On the second path, I pass from the muddled idea to the affect-image. Strangely enough, here Eisenstein will speak of composition. This passage takes place on a *plane of composition*. We'll see why. It's the way in which the filmmaker composes their work... [*Recording interrupted*] [2:11:04]

... different. There's a plane of organization and development, which is carried out by montage, and there's another, a much more mysterious, much less technical, much more inventive plane, which we'll call the plane of composition. On this plane of composition, I go from the muddled idea to the affect-image and this is how I compose the work. How do I pass from the muddled idea or the unconscious concept… from the unconscious thought to the affect-image? Isn't this through montage? No, it's no longer involved, it's no longer implicated. There is still montage, but even though the two operations are not independent, they mobilize completely different questions.

So, if we mix these two paths, in my view, Eisenstein's texts become incomprehensible. Whereas if we differentiate between the two, they become more comprehensible, but in a different way. For what does composition consist of? Well, what does it mean to go from the unconscious concept to the affect-image? In other words, to compose? Eisenstein says very rapidly that for him, this is the role of the interior monologue. It's the interior monologue. So here we have a new dimension, and one of the first times that Eisenstein alludes to the question of what most properly corresponds on this plane, the plane of composition, he finds that it is the interior monologue, and no longer montage, that is most suitable for the cinematographic image.

But what is the connection, you might ask? Exactly, what is the connection? The first time Eisenstein analyzes the suitability of the interior monologue for the cinematographic language, it's in connection with a project. He wants to adapt a novel by [Theodore] Dreiser, *An American Tragedy*. So here the interior monologue relates to what's going on in the character's head, in the classical sense of interior monologue, stream of consciousness as Eisenstein puts it – the stream of consciousness that courses through a character – stream of consciousness in the sense of the subconscious. But very soon, he takes thing much further, and will say that the interior monologue in cinema doesn't only apply to what goes on in a character's head, but to the film as a whole. And why does it apply to the film as a whole? Because the film as a whole can be considered an interior monologue insofar as it expresses an unconscious thought through images.

Here, the technique – and I cite from *Film Form* – the technique of "inner monologue could be used to construct things and not only for picturing an inner monologue…" – which is to

say, it can serve other purposes than recounting what's going on in a character's head, and this is his general definition of the interior monologue. "What is remarkable therein, and why I am discussing it, is that the laws of construction of inner speech turn out to be precisely those laws which lie at the foundation of the whole variety of laws governing the construction [*structure*] of the form and composition of artworks." I'm not in a hurry here, I'd like this to emerge little by little. It's through the composition of the interior monologue that we pass from the unconscious thought to the image insofar as the image is supposed to express the unconscious thought, including the reaction of both filmmaker and viewer to the image, what Eisenstein calls the emotional reaction. But what worries me is that here he uses the word structure, and for him structure is the plane of composition.[16]

So how will the interior monologue be constructed? Well, I don't know, I'd like you to feel. My problem is... no, you won't tell me, or maybe you will, but you won't tell me that this plane of composition is the same thing as the plane of organization. It's another dimension, another dimension. This time, in fact, it passes from unconscious thought to affect-images insofar as they include the emotional reaction. This is a completely different element from the previous case, where we passed from image to concept through montage. In this case, it is through the interior monologue and the composition of the inner monologue that he passes from unconscious thought to affect-images.

In my view, if you fold this new dimension back upon the previous one, his thought no longer has any... it doesn't make sense, it seems to me. Whereas if you maintain the difference between the two, does it make sense then? It's hard to say. What is the relation between the two? I'm trying to understand, because then, well, how do you compose? If the interior monologue is the way we pass from non-conscious thought… from unconscious thought, from unconscious concept to affect-images that express the affective reaction to the image, well, how then do we compose the interior monologue? What exactly is the interior monologue? Given that the inner monologue is no longer simply what's going on in a character's head.

And this is where the question of harmonics makes its return, but in a completely different way. It will perhaps be that harmonics can provide us with the only point… the only point, or rather, the hinge between the two planes. But in saying that, it means, in any case, that there is no unification. Indeed, how will he define the composition of the interior monologue? In my view, it will be more or less in terms of what he refers to as structuration, or structure. Well, at first glance, the interior monologue is the bearer of everything, since it expresses the unconscious concept. And indeed, he develops all this, even going so far as to say, in line with the fashion of the time, that it is primitive thought. It is primitive thought, the unconscious mechanisms of thought… thought by way of figures, metaphor and metonymy, synecdoche and so on. Of course, I'm not going to develop all these questions, it would take far too long. Here, we'll just take them as givens, metaphorical thinking, metonymic thinking, thinking that takes the part for the whole... primitive thinking.

Good, good, good. But, but... How is this composed? In any case, you can sense that this is its dream. Cinema, by its nature… Well, at least as much as the other arts, cinema must unite the most conscious thought with the deepest levels of the unconscious. Earlier, we saw the production of the most conscious thought. Now we're on the other plane. But the two planes come together so well that there is a composition of this interior monologue that can nonetheless carry anything you desire. To take as an example of an interior monologue that works for an entire sequence... not by representing everything that goes on in the people's

heads, but capable of conveying the sense of an entire film sequence, we find it again in *The General Line*, the famous creamer, or rather when the drop of milk becomes a fountain of milk, a fountain of milk that becomes a jet of water, a jet of water that becomes fireworks, and finally the fireworks become a graphic in the form of a zigzag that roughly represents a set of numbers. Here, we have a form of composition that functions in the manner of an interior monologue, which you can think of both as the interior monologue of what passes through the villagers' heads, and as the overall composition of the film.[17]

So here I take note of the fact that the interior monologue proceeds by means of supposedly primitive thought, metaphor, figure, and so on. But I'm asking something else: how is it composed? Well, how is it composed? It seems to me… it seems to me that Eisenstein is faced with a new situation: namely, if we take two images, it's possible that they may have the same harmonics. Given two very different images, they can have the same harmonics. Ultimately, the most different images would have the same harmonics. On this condition, it's possible to compose the interior monologue. Earlier, with the first conception of harmonics, there was no such possibility. What's more, is it even possible to think about this possibility? Could I say that two different sounds, even abstractly, from the point of view of abstract acoustics, could I say that two very different sounds have the same harmonics? Maybe, on condition that these harmonics are, in one case, the close harmonics of one of the sounds, and the distant harmonics of the other sound, since harmonics are more or less close or distant. But could I say that two different images have harmonics that… have the same close harmonics? Doesn't that mean... what does it mean? Let's try to see the...

Eisenstein's first principle of composition in *Film Form*, is that two different images have the same harmonics, thus eliciting the same emotional reaction, the same affective response. An example he continually repeats is a formula he is particularly fond of: a sad nature for a sorrowful hero, a sad nature for a sad hero. This is the structure… there's a whole vein of naturalism in Eisenstein, it's very odd. When he speaks about nature, for example in his famous book, or project, *Non-Indifferent Nature*, when he talks about nature, you'll notice that nature is always taken in the affective sense, that nature is never separated from emotional reaction, in other words, nature is ultimately identical to structure. It's a very odd conception. And he continually brings up *Battleship Potemkin* in this regard, a sad nature for a sorrowful hero, the resonance of man and nature, a unity of man and nature, a grieving nature for a grieving man. And this is well suited to the cinematographic image. I mean, insofar as… as [André] Bazin used to say, it goes from nature to man, and I'd say in this case… well, it's clear, we have the composition of a metaphor. Two images, nature and man, share the same harmonics: sadness.[18]

This is a principle of composition, he says, because clearly it will enable the composition of metaphors. But then he goes on to say… and this is the simplest case, page 154 – everything I'm commenting on is from page 152 to page 154. And this is what he tells us – it's all extremely complicated – he tells us how novelists have managed to achieve something that one should be able to achieve in cinema too. "How often in literature do we encounter descriptions of 'adultery'! No matter how varied the situations, circumstances, and imagist comparisons in which this has been portrayed – there is hardly a more impressive picture than the one where 'the sinful embrace of the lovers' is imagistically compared with murder." The lovers' criminal embraces are identified with murder, so you can immediately see which authors he might be thinking of. He may of course be thinking of Zola, one of his favorite authors. Or he may be thinking of [Leo] Tolstoy. And he quotes a passage from *Anna Karenina* [1878].

And here's this text, you know that Anna Karenina, commits adultery with a gentleman called Vronsky. "She felt herself so criminal and guilty that the only thing left for her was to humble herself and beg forgiveness; but as she had no one else in her life now except him" – Vronsky, her lover – "but she had no one in the world now except him, so that even her prayer for forgiveness was addressed to him. But as she had no one else in her life now except him, it was also to him that she addressed her plea for forgiveness. Looking at him, she physically felt her humiliation and could say nothing more. And he felt what a murderer must feel when he looks at the body he has deprived of life. This body deprived of life was their love, the first period of their love. There was something horrible and loathsome in his recollections of what had been paid for with this terrible price of shame. Shame at her spiritual nakedness weighed on her and communicated itself to him. But, despite all the murderer's horror before the murdered body, he had to cut this body into pieces and hide it, he had to make use of what the murderer had gained by his murder. And as the murderer falls upon this body with animosity, as if with passion, drags it off and cuts it up, so he covered her face and shoulders with kisses…" – beautiful, isn't it? – "She held his hand and did not move. Yes, these kisses were what had been bought by this shame. Yes, and this one hand, which will always be mine, is the hand of my accomplice."[19]

What makes him [Eisenstein] say this? He's not saying anything really, but he's exaggerating, he's exaggerating. He doesn't really say anything. He goes from what to what? In the first case, I come back to the thing from before: a sad nature for a sorrowful hero. Of course, this is something he can do quite easily in cinema. Quite easily... well, it takes real genius to pull off such scenes, where the structure is defined by the unity of affective composition between nature and man. But I would say that it's conceivable, it's not just... Eisenstein has always managed it, he's a master at it. [Jean] Renoir too, but using completely different techniques. Renoir is a master of this. If you think of *The Human Beast* [1939], and especially *A Day in the Country* [1936], the moment of the love scene and the rain that begins to fall, here too you have an image of nature and an image of man that produce the same harmonics, a kind of intense melancholy, the melancholy of the young girl and the melancholy of nature.

What is happening at the second level of Vronsky and Anna's story? You have to feel it. Tolstoy basically says, though in much more elegant terms, that Vronsky behaves like a murderer, and Anna like a victim, but it is in their very gestures, that is, it is Vronsky's kisses that are bestowed like… I don't know what, like knife stabs or pistol shots. And the way Anna receives his kisses is similar to the way a victim is immolated. Okay. This time, we no longer find ourselves in the situation of image A and image B producing the same affective harmonics. We're faced with an image A that produces the affective harmonics of an image B that is not given. They behave like criminals... they behave like criminals. But you don't have images of actual criminals. You might have that in some of the lesser works of silent cinema.

For example, a chick, a flock of sheep, you've composed a metaphor. Why is that? While we have a definition of metaphor, I would say that, well… if we agree on the notion of harmonics, we have a metaphor when two different images produce the same harmonics. Okay. So, you have a chick hurrying out of the metro, and then immediately afterwards the image of a flock of sheep. It's a metaphor because both images have the same harmonics. The harmonic understands perfectly our demand, the emotional reaction to the image, and this is the simplest case. I'd say it's an extrinsic metaphor, since the two images are both given.

This would be the case if you had an image of Anna and Vronsky kissing and then an image of someone disemboweling someone else. You'd have an extrinsic metaphor. But that's not

what we have here. In our second case, in Eisenstein's second principle of composition, you have an image A, Anna and Vronsky kissing, which captures the harmonics of an image B, which is *not* given. Here you have what I'd say was an *intrinsic* metaphor. There would be an intrinsic metaphor when a given image captures the harmonics of an image that is not given. Obviously, it's much more complex, it's a complex principle of composition, and achieving it in cinema is no mean feat. It's no mean feat, because I'm thinking of Renoir... I don't see it, I don't see it in Renoir's cinema. No more than I see it in Eisenstein's.

There's one case where I do see it, but I can't remember which film it is, because, I saw it when they were showing excerpts from [Marcel] L'Herbier's films on TV once. There's one film, I don't remember if it's *Man of the Sea* [1920] or *El Dorado* [1921]… I think it must be in another one, where there's a rape scene that is astonishing, really shocking.[20] Astonishing because we see the image, and visibly the rape doesn't end in the woman's death, not at all. Yet this rape is a murder, this rape is a murder, just as the embraces were criminal. The embraces were criminal, you feel how that was an intrinsic metaphor. And this rape is a murder, it too is an intrinsic metaphor. There's an extraordinary image of the actor, L'Herbier's favorite actor, who is just fantastic – as usual I can't remember his name [*Philippe Hériat*] – a guy who is an immense actor, one of the greats, and it's he who rapes the young girl. It's a kind of scene... it's a murder assassination, it's murder. So here I would say that L'Herbier manages to create an image that produces certain harmonics. An image of rape produces overtones of murder. It's an intrinsic metaphor.

So, I think that one of the previous years – but I didn't really recount the story then – so I'll go back to this example, which it seems to me, is the most beautiful, the most beautiful metaphor in the whole of cinema, the most beautiful metaphor in the whole of cinema, and it's an intrinsic metaphor. It's in Buster Keaton. There'll never be a more beautiful one than this... if you remember, it's in *The Navigator* [1924], where he's in a diving suit, okay, in *The Navigator*... No? Yes? Yes, you remember.[21] Basically, if you remember, he's in a diving suit, the air tube has been cut, and he, Buster Keaton is underwater on the sea bed. I don't quite remember how he manages to get back up to the surface, but he's suffocating in his diving helmet, because the helmet is full of the water that has entered and he's drowning in his own diving suit. And then there's the girl… it must have been her clumsiness that unintentionally resulted in the air tube being cut, because as always, she's the one who's got him into this fix. She pulls him up and tries to undo the suit.

So, it's obvious – I mean, what I'm telling you is not just in my head, she... I'm describing the scene, well, as I remember it – there's one little point where she's extremely clumsy. She grabs him... it's not easy to handle a diving suit, and you can feel that she's panicking, she's panicking, and she tries to keep hold of him, so she blocks him between her legs. So, we see, we see this... and then she tries to unscrew the helmet, but it's no use... Well, the scene becomes very intense, right up to the point where she's holding him and he's slipping, he keeps slipping away. She's trying to haul him up, she holds him between her legs but he keeps on slipping until… I don't know if it's he who has the intuition or if it's her – it doesn't matter who has the idea – but he takes a knife, seeing that she doesn't have the courage to do it, slits open the suit and all the water comes pouring out. Okay.

You see the sequence here: the girl, the guy with his big helmet who's wedged between the girl's legs, the knife, the water coming out… it's obvious, you can see it, it's not just something you imagine, you can see it. It's a childbirth, a prodigious childbirth, a childbirth with the water breaking. It's a kind of lyrical, fantastic childbirth, where the guy comes out,

comes out of this woman with his big head. And the water, and the amniotic sac… I wouldn't say it's a typical image, but here you realize that if Keaton had shown… if he had put two images together, if he had actually shown that in the sequence – a woman giving birth – the whole thing would have been ruined. That would have been an extrinsic metaphor. So how did he achieve this in terms of the formula… because it's pretty much the formula of image A, the unusual situation of the diving suit, the guy drowning in his own suit, that captures the harmonics of a completely different image, that of a childbirth. How does it capture these harmonics? By extraordinarily meticulous means. I mean, it's not a vague sensation. First of all, it requires handling the whole question – there are many things one can do in this sense – well, you have the question of the cutting of the air pipe, which would be the umbilical cord that came before… that came before these images, and that already put us in... and then you need the intervention of the knife, that is, a Caesarean delivery. It's a big Caesarean section. So, image A, Keaton's own image, has captured the harmonics of the Caesarean section.

I'd say that this is how composition works, either by extrinsic metaphor – and I made fun of this by taking inappropriate cases, but there are some prodigious extrinsic metaphors, all the nature-man relations we find in Eisenstein or in Renoir's *A Day in the Country*, where the extrinsic metaphors are sublime – or by intrinsic metaphor, which again... So this is what generates the metaphors and the whole system of figures as components of the interior monologue. And this is the actual principle of composition.

So now, in the first case, if I try to sum all this up, in the first case, we went from the percept-image to the clear concept. And this was the sensory shock, the sensory shock, what he himself called the sensory shock, that took us from the percept-image to the clear concept. That was the organization or development plane. So, we go from the muddled idea to the affect-images that give us an affective shock, this time through a plane of composition. The two are linked. The affective shock recharges the sensory shock, and what we might call the cinematographic idea is the sum of the two, the complete circuit.

So, we pass from the sensory shock or the percept-image, or clear concept, from the muddled concept to the affect-image which restores an affective shock, reinforces the sensory shock, and so on… You have this whole system that seems to me to completely correspond to... But what is the relationship between the two planes, between the plane of organization and development and the plane of composition? And at this level, what happens exactly? What is... [*Recording interrupted*] [2:48:42]

... especially those who have read Eisenstein, because you see, all I've tried to say today is that if you ignore the specificity... I'd say it's very simple: it seems to me that the second shot… it's something very interesting, because it's not a question of montage. On the other hand, I think we should say that this is what inspires montage. It's not in the same domain as the others, it's like an unlocalizable operation. These are rules that inspire montage, but not the rules that constitute montage. It's indeed the filmmaker's vision, literally what the filmmaker wants to express. It's not constitutive, it's inspirational. There is a whole realm of creation at work in this. I don't mean to say that there's no creation in montage but it's not the same. This is the creation of the artwork, so maybe that's how the work is produced. We'll see, so please do think about it… [*End of the session*] [2:50:01]

Notes

[1] Deleuze begins the discussion in Chapter 7 of *The Time-Image*, with the example of Eisenstein, pp.156-163. For Eisenstein's texts, see the collection *Film Form*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949. According to Deleuze, notably in the chapters "The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram", "The Filmic Fourth Dimension", "Methods of Montage', and in particular in his 1935 speech "Film Form: New Problems". See *The Time-Image* p. 308, note 4.

[2] See *The Time-Image*, p. 156 and p. 308 note 1. Faure's text is *Fonction du cinéma*, Paris: Denoël, 1981. See also sessions 1 and 3, October 30 and November 13, 1984.

[3] See *The Time-Image*, pp. 27-28.

[4] See *The Time-Image*, pp. 25-26.

[5] See *The Time-Image*, p. 28. This refers to Pasolini's book, *Heretical Empiricism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 1988.

[6] See *The Time-Image*, p. 285, note 4.

[7] See *The Time-Image,* p. 286, note 8.

[8] *See The Time-Image*, pp.156-158.

[9] See sessions 16, 17 and 18 of the Cinema 2 seminar, April 12, 19 and 26, 1983.

[10] See *The Time-Image*, pp. 157-158.

[11] The full title is *L'Opposition universelle: Essai d'une théorie des contraires*, Paris: Alcan, 1897.

[12] See Sergei Eisenstein, *Film Form*, New York: Meridian Books, 1957, p. 66.

[13] London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1962.

[14] On paramnesia, see *Mind-Energy* (1919). In *The Time-Image*, Deleuze explains these perspectives of Bergson and gives the reference to the passage, p. 295, note 23. He also links the text to Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, p. 155. See session 19 of the Cinema 3 seminar, May 22, 1984.

[15] See *Phenomenology of Perception,* p. 205.

[16] Here, Deleuze's critique is clearly based on the French translation of Eisenstein's text, which uses the word "structure" where the English version employs "construction".

[17] On this example from *The General Line,* see sessions 11, 12 and 19 of the seminar Cinema 2, February 28, March 1 and May 3, 1983, and also *The Movement-Image*, p. 181.

[18] For this reference to Bazin, see *What is Cinema Vol. 2*, Berkeley / Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 102-110. See also *The Time-Image*, p. 161-162.

[19] See *Anna Karenina* Part 2, chapter XI, London: Penguin, 2000, pp. 149-150.

[20] According to Deleuze, the scene occurs in the first of these (see *The Time-Image,* p. 309, note 9), though it is actually in *El Dorado*.

[21] See session 18 of the Cinema 1 seminar, May 11, 1982.