

Gilles Deleuze

Cinéma and Thought, 1984-1985

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Transcription : [La voix de Deleuze](#), Lise France (1st part), Morgane Marty (2nd part) and Charles Stivale (3rd part) ; additional revisions to the transcription and time-stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation, Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

What I wanted to do, if you don't mind, is to judge our work this year and for those who were present in other years, and if needs be, [to judge our work] in other years as well. By judging our work, I almost mean having reactions like: [there's] a particular point that we covered much too quickly; a particular point even that I frankly neglected or forgot, for lack of seeing its importance; a particular point that, in your view, I handled badly. So all these are possibilities for you, plus the ones that you'll find yourself. There you go. So, this consists partially in your reactions.

I'll tell you why: because it's been three, four years -- I don't remember -- since I set forth with you on this saga about cinema. Now that I'm coming to the end, I'm very interested in how you took it. I have the feeling that I had a lot of rather artificial moments, other moments in which things worked, like that. So, it's rather, it's your turn to speak because I personally attach importance to your reactions, not at all out of a desire to argue -- I agree with you in advance -- but because it can help me with what I'll do next year. So, it's up to you to speak. Comtesse told me that he wanted to take up or, in any case, to start with a specific and precise point concerning the Straubs [*Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet*].

Georges Comtesse: Regarding the beginning of sound framing, it's precisely the moment when we were talking about sound framing... I'm currently watching or writing something about the cinema of Marguerite Duras. It's a story of...

Deleuze: Your work is on Duras, yes.

Countess: So, a fragment on the cinema line of Marguerite Duras creates a sort of short circuit, and so starting off from things that have been stated, here I was trying to think a little bit of the same thing and perhaps something different [regarding] what she has stated about the sound frame. Because it seems to me, if we compare the two lines a little, the specific sound framing as you [Deleuze] defined it [*Noise in the classroom makes a few words inaudible*], it seems to me a concept which is, first of all, a concept that is framed, that is circumscribed by three ideas, three initially problematic framing ideas. What interested me is the extent to which this seemed to me a problematic frame which precisely circumscribed the concept of sound framing.

The three problematic ideas, those that were stated, I repeat, first off is that framing is achieved by a new technological treatment of a sound environment which realizes either an erasure of a part of the sound or a modification of the sound, or a... , or produces a new density of sound by new technologies. In other words, this treatment composes a depth of sound, a volume or a block of sound, a different sound material, different from the sources of the sound, of a different nature, in the organization of the sonorous beats [*temps sonores*], etc. So, for me the first case is a volume or a block of sound of unprecedented exploration, and I will go back over these three cases....

Second, the block, this block of sound, is framed by the idea of a necessary connection between thought and the order of time. Pure time would be like the framework of sound framing, almost like insertion into the frame [*la mise en cadrage*]. So temporal sound volume [as] a block of exploration of time.

Third, third frame: sound framing becomes a speech act of a new type, a dimension of thought or of a topological circuit of thought, that is, of a topological relation between the invisible central fire and the invisible pure light.

It seems to me, however, that what Marguerite Duras's "impossible cinema" attempts is precisely to break the temporal, and even philosophical, technological frameworks of sound framing. [The goal] is to provoke their relative explosion, [thus] to cause the unheard-of outside-the-frame [*hors-cadre*] to emerge, [an act] that imposes this outside-the-frame, that requires at once modern sound framing and some types of frame. The framing would become framing of an inaudible silence. If we refer in a very fragmentary way to some of Marguerite Duras's perspectives, sound framing is not simply extracted from a sound exterior through some complex technological operation. Rather, [sound framing] frames a silence, and by making this silence inaudible, it prolongs an immeasurable deafness. The sound volume would be at that moment like the resistance to saying the inaudible silence, the silence that, for example, even Nathalie Sarraute calls the voice of [*inaudible word*] which is certainly a conjunction with that, the voice of [*inaudible word*] which is both affect and movement of time.

Affect and movement of time, the voice of silence's possibilities, silence is a voice, like an act of language [*acte de langage*], an act of language, that is, aphasia of speech, speech aphasia especially of speech welded, welded to the self, I, you. For Marguerite Duras, this is the voice of vertigo, of dizzying disorder, the voice of violent intensity, the voice of the abyss, that she calls: "the wild voice of madness." We could also say, this is the voice of the stranger, the foreigner or the enemy. This is, in any case, the voice of violent intensity. Let's give an example of this, for example, in *Détruire, dit-elle* [1969], it's Elisabeth Alione, in *Détruire, dit-elle*, this violent intensity has provoked, because she crossed through it, her immobility -- she remains nullified on a chair in the park facing the forest -- and, in this immobility, she no longer feels anything but the anguish of the return of the violent intensity, with a fascinated gaze which is turned towards the imposing forest. Marguerite Duras writes about silence, this silence, in several texts published in various film magazines, in bulk therefore: "Filming is as if I were entering an abyss." Another text: "Without vertigo, there is no filmmaker; if you ignore vertigo, I don't know

what the hell you're doing in cinema, you're a good student, that's all.... I made *La Femme des Ganges* [1974] in a state of extreme emotion, almost an illness. That's why I endured this emotion, this violent intensity." Another text: "After *India Song* [1975], I thought I was going to die, I don't know what illness I'm suffering from in these cases." Another text: "The problem is being able to achieve that; [that] silence seems to me a novelty compared to the book; it didn't serve as a guide. We hear ourselves speaking too much to see ourselves in our silence, to realize it as a means to cross the void of time. But the voice that initials silence, that deepens the external distance with violent intensity, that then sinks into the interior of time, cannot see itself in what it says. [The voice] saw nothing in Hiroshima! A disjointed voice, disjointed from silence, that speaks without seeing itself, hypnotic, mnemonic through excess of forgetting. It does not see itself in what it looks at, but above all, it does not see itself, [and] by that very fact, in what it says, that is, it does not see itself: burnt to crisp, burned, exploded, blasted away like Hiroshima, a destroyed city." In *Une aussi longue absence* [1961], Albert Langlois is protected from silence, he is sheltered from silence by the wall of the powerful amnesia of time, of the time of the order of the lunar present that [Pier Paolo] Pasolini calls... [*Recording interrupted*] [11:51]

... it is no longer an affected voice, already stricken, she says, by the infernal memory of Albert Langlois. The voice of silence dislocates the power block of time as a resonance of the temporal sound volume. Crossing the void of time, precipitating the crisis of the separate lunar present, secretly terrorist, of the forces of the lunar present of the amnesiac power of time, of the block of time, this is the chance, the possibility of translating silence, of speaking the language of silence. It's the chance of the act of language.

Marguerite Duras's filmic space ultimately never ceases translating that which exceeds, that which overflows the frames of the sound framing, that is to say at least five things: 1- the silence of amnesiac time, of the time of reproduction; 2- the time of silence as the time of repetition; 3- the power of repetition as the power of violent intensity, the power of madness; 4- the block of oscillation, the block of power, the genealogical block of repetition, the silent block of the sickness [and] of death, that is, of the almost insurmountable faith outside the block of the inside; 5- the outside of the block as the universe of the impossible real, the universe of inconsistency.

In *Image et son*, [Michel] Lonsdale spoke of the use of the sound world in *India Song* [1975] independently, he said, of the visual world.¹ Only this does not necessarily lead to defining the relations between voice and image. I am not eliminating the problem of these relations. This does not necessarily and directly lead to that; because voice and images are linked to pure amnesiac time, to its block of calling to order or of recalling to order, to this empty time disconnected from silence, the framework of sound framing. Henceforth, the voice is autonomous from the image because it is affected by silence, by the power of silence as a power of repetition. This silence of repetition is the repetition of silence that covers the multiplicity of voices in *India Song*, voices that never cease henceforth repeating without realizing [silence], without becoming contemporary with it, the universe or the outside of the power block, the universe pierced by inconsistency, by inertia, by frozen whirlwinds, by destructive fatigues, a universe that breaks the rhythmic movement of the corporeal reality that perhaps imposes the fallacious faith in the body beyond the corporeal.

Marguerite Duras says soberly: "I worked with these physical ailments, these ruins in my head." Madness undoes the disjunction of desire and the empty body, but the exhaustion of madness afflicts the universe, like what Marguerite Duras calls the uninhabitable place, the uninhabitable non-place of the body, the universe between voices and images, rendering voices unable to provide sense, rendering images inaccessible to visibility. This neither quite concerns the burned voice, with its exhausted slowness in *La femmes des Ganges* [1974] that demands death, nor the mad voice of Anne Marie Stretter, this mad voice that gives death, that no longer demands death, but that gives death, that sees horror and only emerges from this vision, that only emerges from its skeptical prostration for a suicidal process. As Marguerite Duras says, Anne Marie was both a donor of death and a mother of children. Anne Marie Stretter is the mad voice of living death, of faith in death, of care as an invisible gift, of the gift as care. But as Marguerite Duras says: "By depicting this incomplete, gasping life, this life 'off', I will not show everything" -- not everything -- "because there is a reverse side of the silent block of power, an outside of the block or an unconscious universe." To say: the unlivable universe of the impossible real and not the signifying scene of the impossible real, to reach the abysmal, unheard-of coexistence and the absence of the public space of translation. In *Détruire, dit-elle* [1969], the name Stein is the name both of the realized universe, realized in its block of specification, for example, both the name of the realized universe and of the lines of emergence, of the lines of life, beyond, and of the illness of life which mortifies death and of the illness of death which makes death live or be reborn. Duras says: "Stein came along at the moment when I was sufficiently destroyed." Stein belongs neither to the world of being, nor to the world of existence; he is not, he does not exist. He exceeds the limit of time as the limit of repetition, the double cut. He is neither one world nor another. He is the oblivion of the infernal memory "of" worlds because he overflows the law, the boundary, the limit of silence, because he reaches the extreme, the extreme universe where he crosses the edge. As Marguerite Duras says, he is from a world "to come".

Before Stein, music, the *pharmakon* of suffering, the drug of pain, lived only from the extreme, approached, rejected. But like Stein, music is yet to come. And about music, Duras writes, and I will end on this: "It is only when the darkness is almost complete that [music] arrives clearly with an incalculable force, in a sublime sweetness." [*Pause*]

Deleuze: In the manner that I'll react to what you just said, I'm trying to understand where our, where our difference lies, and I see it clearly here -- but how funny this is, but it's the last session so it's not serious; [this session] ought to be quite joyful -- and in a certain way, what lies between us is always the same. If I follow you, I'll provide both versions; [*Pause; Deleuze coughs*] indeed, I'm not at all sure that I'm right. For me, Comtesse has summarized very faithfully what I was presenting to you, in fact, the dissociation of the sound image and the visual image. For me, it's very simple -- well, it's very simple! -- If we admit this dissociation, Comtesse here did the utmost of what he was capable; in my opinion, everything he attributed to me is absolutely precise.

And if I understand correctly, he says, ultimately for you [Deleuze], once you [Comtesse] have said that you consider that the dissociation of the sound image and the visual image in no way excludes a relation between the two, but implies a new type of relation -- what I called: a non-rational cycle, instead of a circle of the commensurable in the manner of old cinema -- well, Comtesse tells me: ultimately, you [Deleuze] want everything to happen between the two

images, one sinking towards the central fire, that is, towards an invisible, [while] the other is rising towards an unspeakable, towards a pure light. And Comtesse clearly points out that, for me, this irrational circuit will be a new aspect of what I have not stopped trying to define this year and last year, namely a direct time-image, a direct presentation of Time.

So, everything he attributes to me is correct, I mean, it's precise. If I followed him correctly, he is saying: well, my point of view is quite different. Because he suggests -- following a method that is specific to you, which you have handled very well -- that my point of view is very secondary and subordinate in relation to this different point of view. If I understand correctly, what you are seeking, beyond the sound image and the visual image, and therefore beyond their irrational relation, is something that exists, let's call it, no matter, "higher" or "deeper." This "higher" or this "deeper," by the same token -- and Comtesse's logical linkages are perfect -- by the same token, will in a certain way exist beyond the time-image. In this way, he connects -- I don't know, he might tell us -- he connects with a point made by Raymonde Carasco through which, in order to truly define the cinematographic regime, it was appropriate to seek something higher or deeper than the movement-image and the time-image.

So, having said that, Comtesse continues: in fact, because this higher and deeper aspect produces a true "dissolution" of the block of time, it exceeds time. And when Comtesse defines it, if I understand correctly, he defines it fundamentally by: silence. On one condition, if I understand correctly: [on the condition] that silence is extracted, as it were, and considered as privileged, as exceeding the speech act itself. Fine.

So, here's my response: it's always the same story between Comtesse and me. In a certain way, I believe that within what is for me -- well, this touches on things that we can no longer even discuss, we just have to mark the differences -- I believe that within what is perpetually for me a relation or a set of relations of "immanence", Comtesse, for reasons of his own, would like to introduce an instance that I call, very broadly, an form of agency [*une instance*] functioning as "transcendence," while recognizing that Comtesse will give it an original meaning.

Second difference: [*Pause*] it turns out that -- and Comtesse has never stopped throwing this back at me, continually throwing it back at me without any pejorative sense -- it turns out that this agency of transcendence, in this case silence, is fundamentally linked to death. Whereas for me, not only do cycles exist cycles of immanence, but they are uniquely vital cycles in relation to which death is something absolutely subordinate. What I'm saying is: we are not fascinated by the same thing.

So, in fact, Comtesse is right, because here we kind of find the question. If we had room for discussion -- but once again, there's no room for discussion -- if we had room for discussion, what I would say? I'd obviously say [that] for me, silence has absolutely no privilege, whether in Marguerite Duras or in any other filmmaker's works. I understand that Comtesse can provide me with texts, but texts, texts, [while] you have to respect them greatly, you have to compare them to others. For example, I'd say: does silence have a privilege over the vice-consul's cry in *India Song*? Does silence have a privilege over the cry? Does silence or the cry have a privilege over music?

For me, I would be quite incapable of turning silence into any transcendent agency whatsoever for the simple reason that I consider silence as an integral practice of music and of the speech act. For me, it is an "integral" part, that is, it is an "immanent" part of music and of the speech act. And it would not occur to me to extract silence as a way to give it a function that, from whatever angle you view it, would be a function of transcendence. Similarly, for me, the non-visible in the visual image seems to refer to nothing transcendent, but both the non-visible of the visual image and the non-sound, and the soundless of the sound image, define for me the irrational break between the two, or internal to both of them. As a result, far from going beyond this kind of broken cycle that I was trying to define, they are constituent elements of this cycle.

So, all this was not at all to respond to Comtesse with "you're wrong, because...". I'm just trying to point out our difference as I see it. Having said that, I'm telling you: when we have reached this point, it's not a great point, but when we have reached this point, what do you want? There is no room for saying: one is wrong, the other is right; there is room to assess what each of us is committed to. I'm committed to undoing any interest in death; [Comtesse] is committed to evolving with in death and to grasping something there that is higher than the two viable images. I'm committed to not seeking any "beyond" for the time-image. Because when [the time-image] has become autonomous, that is, when it has reversed its subordination to the movement-image, for me, there can be nothing beyond the time-image. For Comtesse, if I understand correctly, the time-image would only be like "a level."

I mean that, for me, time is what exceeds. Ultimately, I exist under Shakespeare's expression that I have often quoted, that appears beautiful to me: "time is out of joint."² When time gets out of joint, that is, is no longer subordinated to movement, literally -- see what "joints" [*gonds*, hinges] are; hinges (joints) are what the door of time turns around -- when time gets out of joint (off its hinges), that means: time presents itself in person. The very idea that there is a "beyond time" is totally foreign to me. The idea that there is a beyond life is totally foreign to me. On the contrary, I believe [that] Comtesse in his own work is quite precisely involved with something that exceeds time. For me, nothing can exceed time because time is the worst excess. So, something that exceeds time and that exceeds life.

If I haven't betrayed Comtesse's thought, any more than he has betrayed mine, I would say: for my part, I have no need for the notions that Comtesse has just analyzed or evoked. Does Comtesse need mine? Ultimately, that's not the impression I have. In fact, everything you said could very well stand independently from my irrational cycle between the visual aspect and sound, that is, because what you've told me, basically, is like a kind of polite homage; this time, starting from your visual-sound dissociation -- my dissociation, [but] I'm not the first to develop it -- starting from this visual-sound dissociation, something more profound is yet to be expressed. Agreed, so I'm almost asking Comtesse both "haven't I betrayed his thought?", and to others, whether they have a reaction to this first conversation.

And once again within such a joyful session, what makes me happy is that I always find myself having the same difference, with Comtesse, [*Here, Deleuze begins to speak very quietly, almost intimately, to Comtesse*] and this same difference, as you have shown me your friendship by attending [the seminars] for such a long time, this difference constitutes something that we have maintained from the start. So, we run no risk... I sense that we will take it to our graves!

[*Laughter*] In fact, you are posing a problem at a level that is not mine, and no doubt I pose a problem that is not yours. I'm telling you, you'll have to – I'm starting to speak like Zarathustra – you'll have to cast me aside when all I do is hinder you. I'm preventing you from working all the way to the end of something; [whether] I'm preventing you or not, you're taking a detour. In so doing, you're taking a detour that I believe you no longer need here because this is your whole story, ultimately this has always been your focus: [*Pause*] "something more profound." This something more profound... So, my fear, my fear, I get enormously frightened when I hear that "death would be something more profound." In fact, [hearing that], I'm seized by affliction and worry. I can't do otherwise. I can't do otherwise.

But here, as always, let me make this appeal: there's a kind of... It's not about saying that ideas are like tastes. [*Pause*] It's about saying something that, to my knowledge, only Nietzsche saw: that at the root of the problems that someone posed and [the root] of the style of these problems, real impulses of the mind emerge. So, a kind of taste exists -- but not in the sense of "to each his/her own taste" -- a kind of taste exists, [and] there you find your path [*vous vous reconnaissez*]! That's what makes you like a particular author or not, this kind of prodigious familiarity that you feel with a particular author, a prodigious and respectful familiarity. What's always painful is hearing, for example, on TV or elsewhere [when] people lose all respect and call Rousseau "good old Jean-Jacques" or Schopenhauer, "Uncle Arthur". [*Laughter*]

What I call the astonishing familiarity that we each feel with certain authors we love is a very intense act of respect, with the result that we avoid calling them nicknames. But [what] we ourselves "feel" is a sense of being in their world; we feel caught up in their world. We don't take ourselves as being their equal; we think we're even less than their equal. Why? Because we know how much work that represents; we know what this work is like, and [all that] is not easy. But, in any case, we know that we have something in common. So, it's obvious that we don't have the same authors, fortunately! Fortunately! So, in fact, there are authors in whom we will recognize genius, and then in a certain way, they don't speak to us, etc., that is, to you or me. We don't have much interest in them, whatever their genius might be, forget it! And then there are authors that engage our interest. With all the more reason, we can't say that some [authors] are better than others. And sometimes, that applies to the same author in the privilege of the texts that we consider.

That's why we have to avoid argument [*discussions*] because I feel that between Comtesse and me, we could each brandish references by Duras. That would have little interest, except in terms of major misinterpretations, but in the end, furnishing reference texts has never decided the relative value of one text compared to another. So, what I mean is very... That's what I like most about these things, even in classes. [When] I talk about an author, I suppose that a certain number of you don't know him or her. What I'm going to tell you with all my heart is: go take a look [at that author's works]. It's quite possible that you're a match for one another [*vous vous répondez*], [whereas] with another author, there's no interest at all. So, this points to the necessity in a class of multiplying the authors so that ultimately, we can tell ourselves: from the group of authors considered, for each person one or two authors will be a match. They won't be the same! They won't be the same! This distribution is peculiar.

So, I'll come back to what I was saying. If you like, there's a guy... a problem exists. So, in that event, if we decided to insult each other, things would become extremely unpleasant and completely futile and completely inappropriate. Comtesse might tell me, "you haven't understood anything at the 'deepest level'", and I might reply to Comtesse, "You go back to dredge up death for us, I don't know what, [you dredge up] things the source of which I don't know if it's in a particular relationship with your conception of psychoanalysis", all that. But we'd have pulled ourselves away from the topic at hand, namely that, in fact, in terms of the schema, for me, these are perpetually schemas of immanence. And that's where, for Comtesse, it seems that I am missing something. I only believe in immanence. It's not my fault, something I say without making [excuses]... All the rest seems nonsense to me! You shouldn't push me too hard. I could always offer a course on transcendence, but... Ha Ha Ha! [*Deleuze laughs*] But I feel like I'd be bored to death. So, on the contrary, I don't know if Comtesse wouldn't be bored or isn't perpetually bored by this atmosphere of immanence that I'm trying to... Yeah, there you have it! Am I not betraying your thought? Am I?

Comtesse: In what I presented, I spoke both about myself and not about myself; I only presented the confrontation around this specific visual-sound problem.

Deleuze: Your relation, yes, I agree completely!

Comtesse: ... [specific visual-sound problem] with Marguerite Duras's particular kind of experimentation.

Deleuze: I agree completely, yes indeed, but from your own perspective!

Comtesse: I'd add something else. I don't at all have, as you might assume, a fascination with death, far from it. Quite the contrary! So, putting Marguerite Duras aside, I simply think, that [concerning] the immanent experimentation of the lines of life, the lines of life can only truly assert themselves "against" everything that wants to break them. There are at least two things, there are at least two worlds that, by every means, can break the experimentation of the lines of life; these are what I call: the world of the illness of life and the world of the illness of death. So long as I affirm these lines, I'll be searching precisely for what tries to break the experimentation of the lines of life. From that point of view, I don't think that such a big difference exists. On one side, there would be someone who would be fascinated by life and, on the other, someone who would be fascinated by death, something that would reinstate a curious binary relation!
[*Laughter*]

Deleuze: I was wrong; suddenly, we agree entirely!

Comtesse: Talking about Nietzsche, the way in which for several years, beyond an initial period [in which] people undertook something like a rather wild reading [of Nietzsche], the goal was to extract Nietzsche's main axes, his main vital themes. Now, for several years, a whole underground reading of Nietzsche has occurred as a result of which, this underground reading, we can no longer say completely that Nietzsche is someone who belongs totally to the world of life. That's no longer something that can be affirmed!

Deleuze: Ah, there I can hear your voice a bit more! [*Laughter*] We can always ... what, what are you referring to? Why do you call it “underground reading”?

Comtesse: There are lots of texts, Nietzsche’s texts today, for example, the texts from [Walter] Kaufmann, the texts from [Jacques] Derrida, the texts from [Pierre] Klossowski, etc., there are many articles as well. The other day, I was reading an extraordinary text on suffering in Nietzsche’s works which appeared in a new philosophy journal that someone gave me, one of the themes of which is the journey -- I don't know the name of the journal -- one can't say entirely... One can't! In a certain way, there is no privilege, there is no privilege, that is, I belong to the world, to a world, and you are fascinated by another world. I don't accept this binary relation, especially since I'm trying to break by all means the faith in death that is [the faith] of sick people, and God knows that I encounter them every week.

Deleuze: Well, where [do you encounter them]? Not here! [*Laughter*] Suddenly, I was getting worried! [*Laughter*] We might agree entirely except that what you just said about Nietzsche bothers me. But in the end, to call that “underground reading” is your way of saying they’re right. [*Deleuze laughs with the group*] Ah yes, that [reading] is not underground all that much! I don't get how Derrida’s understanding of Nietzsche is underground?

Comtesse: Underground, for example, in relation to a dazzling, flamboyant Nietzsche, [*indistinct word*] which occurred in the mode of understanding at a particular juncture. This is well known. There’s has been a break in relation to that [mode], [through] another, much more sensitive manner, and much more attentive to Nietzsche’s symptoms than, let’s say, to his thematics, his topics. It wasn't enough simply to take up the idea of the will to power, of the eternal return, but to question these, and to question them precisely in relation to Nietzsche's way of life, as well.

Deleuze: What are you talking about! Ok, fine! So, we agree even more than I thought, except for a disagreement on Nietzsche's history. Does Raymonde have something to say about that, about all that?

Raymonde Carasco: I’m going to try to answer three points.

Deleuze: Very good.

Carasco: First of all, for Comtesse who implicitly addressed me, I think, or if not addressed, at least I felt a little bit, a little bit targeted in what you were saying because you used the term "hors-cadre" as, let's say, "elsewhere," something other than the question of the irrational relation between image and sound, between image and sound framing. As I wrote a book or rather, under a title called *Hors-cadre Eisenstein*, I gathered together a certain number of articles, and I know you read it, I thought I was a little bit summoned to speak about it.³ Fine. And then there’s also the matter of what you mentioned to me on the topic of the afterlife, of a possible afterlife, that I had proposed at least implicitly in the article that you [*Deleuze*] discussed with us, namely on Roland Barthes and the question of the photogram.⁴ As a third point, I wanted to respond in a somewhat general way to the question you asked, namely, how people have reacted to all the work you have undertaken on cinema over the past four years. And so, I’m going to try to answer these three questions.

Well, what bothers me a little is, let's say, having a point of view, let's say, a personal one; I would like to try to get that out of the way as quickly as possible. It so happens that I have worked on cinema essentially starting with [Sergei] Eisenstein in a kind of work on the unconscious and not only. My subject was the material imagination of philosophers and, little by little, that centered on Eisenstein. Between 1970 and 1975, I wrote a series of articles that I assembled in the form of a master's thesis [*troisième cycle*] on Eisenstein which was called *Hors-cadre*. So, that was before I came to listen to you [*Deleuze*]. I admit that I don't have much to say today about this book because if I were to discuss it, I think I would rewrite it, and I would discuss something other than the book. Sometimes I read it, and I tell myself: ah, that's good! Sometimes I read it, and I don't understand a thing. I can't even manage to read it, so I'm not going to talk about that. So, I'm not going to talk about Eisenstein's concept of the outside-the-frame [*hors-cadre*], the way I might define it today. What I thought I developed there, I think needs to be put aside. First point.

That said, I don't think at all that the *hors-cadre* is inside the frame in Eisenstein's very definition from that you started with, since the valid point from which I started that is in Eisenstein's text, in the article entitled "Hors-cadre," is precisely that the "hors-cadre" is inside the frame and that it creates the interstice between the shots, and let's say, today, between the sound image and the visual image. So, in my view, it is not at all outside the irrational relationship between sound framing and visual framing but is something quite similar. That's how I'd express it today. I'm not saying that I wrote that, but I'm saying that's how I'm expressing it today, after having written this essay. Good.

The second thing, to answer you in any case, it seems to me that on the question of death and Marguerite Duras, I myself had a moment of kind of refusal and withdrawal faced with the Duras's cinema of passion and death, that is, after *India Song*. And then I believe that knowing a little better, on the one hand, Marguerite Duras and her writings and her films, I nevertheless think that in Marguerite Duras's works, there is precisely a concept of death, of the illness of death, which is perhaps not mortifying and which would have to be defined in the same way as the concept of desire. This is a parenthesis. I believe that Marguerite Duras is nevertheless someone extremely joyful and funny who affirms something which is life, trust in the other, trust in life. This is the thing which makes me like Marguerite Duras very much; so that's a first point.

The second point [is]: perhaps for the question of a "beyond", or an "on this side" [*en deçà*], or the movement-image, so, ultimately, today I think that... I don't want to say that I confused two things, but perhaps that's a bit what occurred. What I sought from the concept of *hors-cadre* in Eisenstein's cinematography -- it was ultimately that and it still interests me today -- is a kind of set of relations, that I would consider as strong, between cinema, writing and painting. It seems to me that what Eisenstein calls cinematography, what he calls montage, is also outside of cinema; it seems to me that there are things to be discovered, first to be researched and discovered on the side, therefore, of certain new forms, which we will call modern, in painting, cinema and writing. So, along this path, it seems to me that there is a relation other than analogical to be discovered, for example, between [Paul] Cézanne's painting and the Straubs' [films]. It seems to me that what you have developed recently is something other than analogical.

And it is necessary... There is something to researched in that [aspect]. Hence my current research starting with [Maurice] Blanchot and which necessarily implies a relation, for example, with Duras. As a result, under the requirement of the fragmentary, of discontinuity, of the neutral, of the outside, these notions close to concepts that Blanchot, I believe, does not construct, I believe that there is something to be researched that I will continue to look for. And what interests me in Duras is the new destiny between cinema and writing that she evokes, especially perhaps already in Pasolini's *Teorema* [1968], the film and the text, etc.

Fine, so, on this topic, the problem that I encountered and that I still encounter is that if we define cinematography as a space-time, let's say, between cinema, writing, painting and music, in which the determined art categories are overlapped, let's say, by another line -- that we can call in different ways, that we can call a poetics, a cinematography like Eisenstein's; there are certainly other words available, [but] words are always too closed off -- while I undertook this work, I came up against a very fundamental question: we effectively enter most of the time into a relationship of analogy, generalities get stated because the painting and the cinema-image are not the same image, effectively. And if... and therefore, a kind of impasse exists within this research.

For a long time, I did indeed refuse to enter -- because I had done prior work and already held a different perspective -- I refused to approach cinema, for my own purposes, through the lens of the movement-image. For my own purposes, I resisted this entry point for a long time. Yet today I realize -- and here I have truly upended my previous stance entirely -- that one must, in fact, begin with the definition of cinema based on the movement-image because, ultimately, the sole distinctive, specific characteristic of cinema is precisely that. And if we do not start there, well, we fall into the trap of excessive generalization.

So, fine, what I wanted to say, if I want to talk about [Roland] Barthes's text and the question of the photogram, which Barthes lays out very specifically, is that of an image that he calls filmic, which is... [Pause] which is not a movement-image since the impression of optical sense disappears when we see the film in reality, so if I were to say today...⁵ [*Recording interruption*] [58:16]

Part 2

Raymonde Carasco: So, the hypothesis which is perhaps a little empty, a little general, but which at least allows us to sustain Barthes's text and have it sustain... my hypothesis would be that, in fact, the filmic has nothing, nothing at all to do with cinema, which we would therefore define, first of all, through the movement-image, as a specific art and as a specific image. So, [if] it has nothing to do with cinema, it is not a cinema-image. Nor is it purely and simply reducible to photography, since we speak, we can speak through language -- the way we name things is important -- it's a photogram, not photographs. So, it's an element, at once ordinary and not ordinary, in a series of photographs. So, fine, we can't simply reduce it to photography, since we say photogram, and the photogram belongs to a series of photographs that define cinema.

But that's not what seems important to us. What seems important to us today and what sustains Barthes's text -- this is also stated in Barthes's text, right, this isn't overinterpreted -- is that ultimately, what Barthes is talking about is text. Under the term filmic, he's actually talking

about another text. [What he's discussing] has more to do with writing than with cinema or photography, since it's the element in cinema relating to something that he calls the "text," that Blanchot or Duras call "writing," that we could call cinematography, fine. So, that would be a second, a second answer.

So, where I think, where I completely agree with you is, let's say, about the time-image. That is, I don't think there is anything beyond the time-image, neither on one side nor on the other, beyond, and that ultimately, under the term "text", there is something perhaps to be discovered fine. I don't know if that's clear?

Deleuze: Very, very clear. At least, for me.

Carasco: That's my second point. So, as I've already said, the third one is that, for my part, when I saw that you started this work on the movement-image, at the start, I often told myself, "no, this isn't working out," so, I resisted; there were things that weren't working well for me. Let me add that I've never allowed myself to judge; I wouldn't allow myself to judge, anyone or anything. But I told myself, if he starts off like that, just let him follow through with it, and I had the impression that you were undertaking a kind of archeological excavation, a task of excavation. And he's going to discover something, and in any case, that's going to lead somewhere.

So anyway, for two years, I wasn't -- even if I found it very beautiful from your point of view and within your logic, in how you proposed to construct a logic of the image -- I had points of resistance, that I expressed, I think, in two articles. That was at a time when that's how I was writing; I told myself, fine, now you have to write and ultimately to see what [my position] is in relation to [Deleuze's], well, even if I have a topic that's my own... [*a few indistinct words*]

That was the first thing. The second: last year, on the other hand, I must say that I found your course to be extraordinarily beautiful. I'm deliberately speaking in an aesthetic way. I had the feeling of beauty last year throughout the course -- except for this kind of gloominess that came in May -- but [a sense] of the illuminations in this course. It was a very luminous and beautiful course, and in my opinion, it is something like a masterpiece over the year -- I am speaking in terms of form -- within the course, in listening, in listening to a course -- what was said obviously -- [there was] something completed, luminous and beautiful. Fine. And there, well, [*Pause*] I resisted, [thinking] that this is another point of view on the historical break, and I think that is not important. That this occurs after the war, and besides, you say it yourself, that it's a false question.

And this year, this year, this year, I had the impression -- I told you, I think, at the beginning of the year -- that you were reopening a project, and so there wasn't this kind of splendor of form, of light of form, that there was last year. And, I found that there were moments, for example, when we were talking about [Christian] Metz; I had worked on that for a while, when I battered myself senseless, and so I said, no, no, I'll never come back to this topic. And so I suffered, let's say, [*Carasco starts laughing as she talks*] I think [I suffered along] with you, telling myself: what courage Gilles has to take all this up again, and then to stick with it, not letting it go, well, well, not skipping over it. And then afterwards, I don't think I was there, I had gone to Mexico, it seems to me that you took the speech act away from that, and that that is fundamental.

Anyway, to come back, anyway, from my point of view, in the end... in the end, well, that clarified a lot of things for me, that is, I know why the movement-image didn't really suit me. It's because, in fact, what interests me is making films, and the films that I can make have nothing to do with... talkies, with Hollywood cinema, and what's more, I've never really understood that cinema. So, that's all about my own blind spot, blocks of blindness, things that we can't see because, well, we don't have the time. We can think about seeing them, but we don't reflect on them. So, it's my, my own blindness. So that explains what I was saying, what I was saying sometimes.

Deleuze: Yeh.

Carasco: So, finally, this year I am, well, obviously I find that this is absolutely indisputable; I mean, that there is a kind, there are nonetheless truths in philosophy. Namely, the question of the irrational cut and the rational cut, one [or] two modes of montage, let's say, and also within the visual image itself or the relation of sound- image and image... well, that, I think that is something that you have discovered, that you have constructed as a concept. And for my part, that is something completely... [Pause] Fine, that's something that belongs to the thought of, it is the thought of cinema, and it is a concept that is not, well, that is not untenable.

Deleuze: What you're saying is important because, for me, it's the essence of what we did this year. It was the point starting from which everything is distributed. If you feel that this worked out well, that's very important to me. Because, ultimately, I'll tell you, it was the center of our work this year.

Carasco: From that point on, I am obliged to follow you, if you like, starting from the movement-image.

Deleuze: I'm a little obsessed by -- here, I'm holding on to what you just told me -- by texts by [Hans-Jürgen] Syberberg which -- I'll tell you after what I'm proposing to you -- but Syberberg, he doesn't hold back, right? Everyone knows -- fine, it's his business -- that his relationship with Hitler is extremely ambiguous, despite everything. As [Jean-Claude] Biette noted in a very good article on Syberberg,⁶ what's nevertheless disturbing every time Syberberg speaks of Hitler, what he formally condemns in Hitler is the way he treated the dead. But it's not the way he treated the living. So, what shocks Syberberg is, for example, that he subjected, that Hitler subjected [Richard] Wagner to a particular kind of treatment, or that he burned the works of a particular great dead author. But that Schoenberg was condemned by Hitler, one would think that... so it's ambiguous. But if you like, if I consider the successive dates of the three great books on cinema, I don't think I'm mistaken about the dates:

1933: [Siegfried] Kracauer. Kracauer is a supporter of the Frankfurt School, k-r-a-c-a-u-e-r, and he wrote -- I think in '33 -- a famous book, *From Caligari to Hitler*,⁷ where he shows that German expressionist cinema is a long foreshadowing; he invokes the German soul and how the German soul is reflected in expressionist cinema in the form of foreshadowing, a rise of something like Hitlerism. But the point of view he maintains is what I would say... it's a very, very interesting book. It appeared, the translation appeared in [Éditions] L'Age d'Homme, and it was the first step of, I believe, a very important analysis, but I would say that Kracauer's analysis

still remains extrinsic. I mean, it's about showing how, in a certain way, cinema "reflects" the adventure of the German soul, an adventure that was to go all the way to Hitler's power grab.

The second major text, 1936, Walter Benjamin [*Deleuze pronounces it in the French way, Benyamine*] or Benjamin, as you wish, on "the arts of reproduction,"⁸ where, in a way where, if we had to talk about entirely, I would discuss it longer but... where he defines a tendency in modern art as the art of mass reproduction. A painting, he tells us, is not mass reproduced, [*Pause*] music is not mass reproduced. With the modern era, it so happens that art, or what presents itself as art, becomes the object of mass reproduction. So, he will not define cinema by the movement-image; he will define it by -- like the photo, like the record -- he will define it by the art of reproduction.

A lot could be said here, that is, I profoundly disagree with this definition. But no matter, this is the second step because what Benjamin shows, in a very impressive way, is that the art of mass reproduction finds its supreme object in the reproduction "of the" [*des*] masses. And with, he shifts from one meaning of the word "mass" to the other, the reproduction "in" massive form [*en masse*] finds its object in a reproduction "of the" masses: large demonstrations, meetings, large sporting events, political meetings, large parades, popular festivals or pseudo-popular festivals, and finally, war [as] the art of the masses par excellence. And he proposes his great expression which is an expression of provocation: it is obviously Hitler who pushed farthest this identity of the art of reproduction "in" massive form [*en masse*] and the art of reproduction "of the" masses. [*Pause*]

As a result, he will be able to define Nazism or fascism in general in the following form: it is politics become art, it is politics become art. And we see very well what he means. We cannot attribute to Benjamin Syberberg's ambiguities. Benjamin's anti-Hitlerism is not... he means, he cites all sorts of themes from the Italian Futurists, politics as well as modern art. And he says: well yes, the great meetings of Nuremberg realize modern art. Politics has become art. And he ends his very fine article with the phrase, "when politics has become art, there is only one thing left to oppose it, for art in its turn to become politics." Well, that is to say... there is nothing left to do but oppose Brecht, really. Fine. In a sense, some progress occurs compared to Kracauer, some very clear progress since Benjamin places himself in the point of view of the interior of cinema. In the end, he tells us, when art has become the art of reproduction, its true object is the reproduction of the masses themselves, that is, the great State manipulations signaled by Hitler. So, this time, an intrinsic point of view emerges.

The third stage [is] Syberberg's reflection, which interests me immensely and is examined quite well by [Serge] Daney in his book *La Rampe*,⁹ Hitler as filmmaker, [*Deleuze coughs*] Hitler as filmmaker. And what does Hitler as filmmaker mean? Syberberg's film [is] *Hitler* -- subtitle -- *A Film in Germany* [1977], so what does that mean? It means that Hitler is going to be attacked, but is going to be attacked as a man. He is attacked in a documentary as he was attacked through archival documents. He is going to be attacked on the very terrain of cinema, hence Syberberg's ambiguity. He is as a filmmaker, having at his disposal -- so he goes so far as to say [this] -- a filmmaker with incredible means, and yet a bad filmmaker. In his role as both a great and a bad filmmaker, Syberberg will attack Hitler, and that [attack] will be the subject of the film *Hitler*, or one of the subjects of Syberberg's film, *Hitler*. And what does he mean? He means, you know,

the true culmination of Hitler, or rather, the true expression of Hitler, is Leni Riefenstahl. You know who Leni Riefenstahl was? She was Hitler's appointed cinematographer. She made many films. And there, we cannot say, unlike Nazi cinema, unlike Hitlerian cinema in general, we cannot say that [her filmmaking] was mediocre. First of all, she had fantastic means at her disposal. When she filmed the Olympic Games or when she filmed Nuremberg, it is as if, as Syberberg says, Hitler only went to Nuremberg so that Leni Riefenstahl would film him. The art of mass reproduction had become the art of reproduction of the masses.

So, fine. But he goes further. He says all that is the movement-image's fault. It's the movement-image's fault. All that is the culmination of the movement-image. That's why, for me, he seems to go further than Benjamin. It's not because it's the art of reproduction. It's because it's the art of the movement-image. Leni Riefenstahl extends movement in the image, the mobility of the camera, and montage to the extreme. That is, I think it would be true historically, she extends the cinema of the movement-image to the extreme. That is, it competes with Hollywood, and we saw this this year, when we were talking about a book by [Paul] Virilio, who on this point is very, it seems to me [he] draws a lot of inspiration from both Benjamin and Syberberg, when Virilio says: well yes, there has always been a very peculiar point, which is that until the end of Nazism, Goebbels wanted to compete with Hollywood.¹⁰ This was a kind of obsession for the Minister of Culture and Propaganda: to beat Hollywood on its own ground.

So, what does this provide us? The movement-image presumably was developed throughout an entire age which would be the pre-war era, yielding the great Hollywood productions and, in parallel, the disturbing brother of Hollywood – this isn't to compare them -- but the disturbing double of Hollywood, the great State manipulations, the great Hitlerian production. Is that right? Isn't that right? In any case, due to the war, in a certain way, the death knell of this cinema rang forth.

And here's where Syberberg's focus is: when cinema started up again after the war, it could no longer be based on -- here, if you like, he agrees with me by a completely different mode of reasoning than those we've followed here; we arrive at a similar result, [and] that's why I'm telling you this following what Raymonde just said when she stated, in a certain way, you have to start with the movement-image to understand cinema -- but anyway, I believe that the notion of the movement-image is much richer than the notion of the reproducible image, than the idea of reproduction in Benjamin; this is not, it's not a very good idea. But [the idea] of the movement-image which has as its outcome, it has a common point, the art of reproduction for Benjamin has as its outcome [in] the reproduction of the masses, that is, Nazism. Syberberg tells us that cinema of the movement-image culminates in Leni Riefenstahl with her master behind her, that is, Hitler. Fine.

So, when cinema starts up again, all the extrinsic and intrinsic reasons are: as extrinsic, the war that occurred; as intrinsic: the need to invent a new cinema, but will it happen [and] in what form? But that's where what Syberberg says is quite interesting. Here's exactly what he says: but there were powers that the cinema of the movement-image, that the cinema of the movement-image. in its race to the tomb, hadn't had the time to -- it's as if [for] the cinema of the movement-image, this tomb would be Hitler's tomb, a bizarre idea, completely twisted, all that, but we can derive something from this! [*Deleuze laughs*] It's German metaphysics. So

[Syberberg] says, but from the start, potentials for cinema [*puissances du cinema*] existed that were completely crushed by the movement-image. And what are these potentials? He cites them: projection and transparency. [*Pause*] He understands himself well; although he doesn't cite him, this is a nod to [Georges] Méliès, projection and transparency. And he means projection -- you may well ask me, what does "projection has been sacrificed" mean? -- in the very precise sense in which he uses it, he means what's called "frontal projection," and which was obtained by... we'll see, I don't want to explain for the moment, we'll see what I have to offer you later. Let's say that "frontal projection" is a particular mode of projection which, in fact, was used in Hollywood at a certain time and then was completely abandoned, and that Syberberg perfected and resurrected. He proceeds by frontal projection and, he explains, with slides, with transparencies. And he explains in detail that the art of frontal projection involves a subordination of movement to something else. [*Pause*]

We find our central question -- and I might add, in its fullest form -- in Syberberg's work, regarding the dissociation of the visual image and the sound image. We encounter this in a thousand ways -- or rather, in several distinct ways -- most notably in his entire theory of puppets, which is intimately linked to the system of transparency projection. His entire theory of puppets or marionettes is closely aligned with this [concept]. That is why I have already referred to it as a nod to Méliès. The objective, then, is to resurrect those potentials [*puissances*] that were crushed by the movement-image. And as he argues, these potentials imply that movement must either vanish, in terms of a certain camera immobility, dictated most often -- and I emphasize most often, though not always -- by the use of frontal projection [*Pause*], or, at the level of the image itself, undergo a rarefaction of movement, that movement must be slow and remain constantly controllable. So, it's clearly movement, the very theme of Syberberg's work, along with projection and transparency as techniques sacrificed by the movement-image, that serves, on the contrary, to effect a reversal of subordination; that is, movement must be rendered subordinate with only that portion of it remaining which the new type of image allows to subsist.

And the new type of image, of course, involves this dissociation between the sound image/visual image pair, but, more profoundly, what is it? More profoundly, what purpose does it serve? This dissociation is, specifically, the cycle, the irrational cycle. The irrational cycle is a term Syberberg employs constantly. All his thinking boils down to the assertion that what Germany brings into the world is the irrational. Yet, along comes Hitler to seize upon this German irrationality and twist it into the very embodiment of abjection. Nevertheless, [Syberberg] never ceases to argue that what must be pitted against Hitler is not Reason, but rather the very irrationality that Hitler had hijacked. [This position] recurs frequently, sometimes even taking the form of a platitude, namely, that what must be opposed to Hitler is not statistics, but rather Wagner and Mozart. The question that obviously troubles the reader is this: Is that enough? Is reclaiming the irrational truly the solution?

So, how exactly does this come about? I maintain [that it's] through the irrational circuit of the sound-image and the visual-image. Here, too, what will this become? Well, in Syberberg's work, it culminates in a statement, an authentic statement taken directly from *Parsifal*, from the *Parsifal* libretto... or rather, from Wagner himself. When the old knight leads, [*Pause*] leads Parsifal the simpleton -- the simple young man -- leads Parsifal the fool, the simpleton, through landscapes that seem to emerge from the brain, from Wagner's immense brain, what does the old

knight say? The old knight says: Here -- here, space is born of time; here, space is born of time", a splendid expression from Wagner that corresponds exactly to Shakespeare's expression: "Time is out of joint." For "time is out of joint" means that time is no longer subordinate to space; it's no longer merely a means of measuring space, [*Pause*] just as here, space is born of time, emerges from time. It signifies a reversal of the relationship. From the movement-image and the time-image, here comes the time-image. Too late... too late... There is but one theme shared between Syberberg and [Luchino] Visconti: the theme of "too late", a "too late" so intense, so poetic... "Too late," because the world is at an end. The German soul is not optimistic; the German irrational brings us none of life's consolations. "Too late," because the world is finished; "too late", and yet, at the very same time, this "too late" is redemption.

I'm suggesting that this is the only resemblance with Visconti because, in a previous seminar, I undertook an analysis of Visconti in which I tried to emphasize the haunting nature of the phrase "too late" running through all of Visconti's films, acting as a kind of formation that stands at the very pinnacle of Visconti's oeuvre: too late.¹¹ The discovery of beauty occurs too late. Too late, too late. Which is not, which is not always a sad thing. Too late. The revelation of beauty: too late for the musician in *Death in Venice* [1971], too late for the collector in *Conversation Piece* [1974]. It's *too late* everywhere in Visconti's work. It is time itself. Do you understand why this is not sad? It is not because time arrives too late; it is because "too late" constitutes the very realization of time. So, perhaps "too late" is redemptive! "Too late! Too late!" sing the Gods— yet they sing "too late" even as they welcome me in. So, one never knows. And with Syberberg, it's the same: too late. Too late after Hitler—too late.

But what interests me, if you will, in this line of Syberberg's thought is that he himself sometimes invokes *Caligari* (it goes without saying that he's familiar with the texts by Benjamin and Kracauer), it was from *Caligari* (the first, or one of the first Expressionist films) to Hitler as a character.¹² And it's as if Syberberg wished to add the other panel to this: for Kracauer, the trajectory was from an Expressionist film to Hitler. The other panel would be: from Hitler to a new film. Hence the subtitle: *Hitler: A Film in Germany*, from Hitler to a new film.

What justifies this transition from Hitler to a new film? It because Hitler must be judged by cinema, as a filmmaker. And, starting from Hitler, cinema can only defeat him on his own terrain, that is, by subverting the movement-image, by subverting the movement-image in such a way that a different image emerges, one capable of breaking with Hitler, with the fascism of movement. This will be the time-image; this will be the dissociation of the sonorous and the visual, and so on, a dissociation of the sonorous and the visual culminating, for instance, in a scene involving Hitler -- and such scenes are numerous -- set within the suddenly deserted and ruined Chancellery, thus, an empty space [of] the deserted and ruined Chancellery. Here we find empty space, in an initially unseen corner where Hitler's voice rises up. It turns out to be a group of young kids using an old phonograph to play a record of Hitler, which they're hoping to sell to tourists. You see the dissociation between the visual image which has become empty and the sound image which has become a speech act.

How can the speech act be turned back against Hitler while the layers of the visual image, slides upon slides, sinks and slides down, and becomes buried beneath rubble? "Too late", this signifies there's too much rubble, and that Hitler has captured the speech act all too thoroughly; yet the

“too late” may also be one of redemption: isn’t there a way to turn back against Hitler the very speech act of which he has made himself the custodian? Isn’t there a way, rising above the rubble, to conjure forth once more not a world, but the visible body: the visible body of a primordial couple, perhaps capable of creating a new world, provided they’re capable of “receiving” the speech act?

Hence Syberberg’s great discovery, his great audacity in *Parsifal* [1983]: at the very end, he created two coexisting Parsifals, a male Parsifal (a boy) and a female Parsifal (a girl), who emerge from the rubble and are capable of receiving. For this is playback, and even playback in which it’s not the couple themselves who are singing, but it’s a form of fantastic playback, since the actors, the two Parsifals, the boy and the girl, are present in the full visibility of their bodies. You see, no reconciliation occurs between the visual image and the sound image; rather, within the visibility of their bodies, the two Parsifals become capable of "receiving" -- of receiving -- and here lies the very operation of playback. In Syberberg’s specific case, this constitutes an extremely original application of the technique. They are obviously not miming; they’re obviously not miming the act of singing. Why? Because there is a male voice paired with a female Parsifal; that’s not the point. What matters is that, within the visibility of their bodies and in the totality of that visible presence, they become capable of receiving the act of singing, and through this very act of reception, the circuit is established, that ever-irrational circuit. Fine.

So, I mentioned this because I believe, more so than might be immediately apparent, it ties in somewhat with what [someone] was saying... Personally, I find myself thinking: just look at what a young person, or a young filmmaker, faces today. It’s quite obvious that, unless... and even then -- even if they set out to make purely commercial cinema – it’s true that [this cinema] no longer possesses the same character as before. The very style of performance has changed. Even the most mediocre cinema has undergone this transformation. Otherwise, assuming that movement-image cinema still exists at all, one can’t deny that young filmmakers working within that tradition now find themselves in a situation where they are confronted with a new state of play. This is a new reality, I believe, offering no scope for resurrecting the cinema of the movement-image. That path is simply no longer viable. Instead, cinema now operates through entirely different channels, specifically, through novel relationships between the visual and the sonorous, and, in any case, traversing this irrational cycle of visual and sound images, what ultimately emerges is a time-image.

That is, it was stupid from the very start; yet the stupidest statement ever made about cinema -- and one that people have never ceased repeating -- is that the cinematic image exists in the present tense. And once again, as I mentioned by way of summarizing what we have covered this year, this is an absurdity that has, it seems to me, compromised any true understanding of time in cinema, a notion that crumbles under the slightest scrutiny. I mean, it is so patently false, so utterly stupid as to be laughable, on the one hand, and on the other... For, once again, the only person I know of -- [Alain] Robbe-Grillet -- who actually said this... (well, everyone has said it, in a sense), but among the truly significant figures, Robbe-Grillet is the only one who actually articulated it; yes, yes, that much is true: The cinematic image exists in the present tense. But here’s the catch: people forget that Robbe-Grillet is having his joke. And I must point out that Robbe-Grillet only jokes when it serves his own interests to do so. [*Laughter*]

And obviously, Robbe-Grillet feels he has good reason to laugh because he, Robbe-Grillet, wasn't alone in creating cinema of the present tense. So, after all, he wasn't completely obtuse: when someone presents him with a formula along the lines of, "The cinematic image exists in the present tense", Robbe-Grillet replies, "No one is making you say this", implying, for his part, "I'm the only one actually creating cinema." At the same time, however, he maintains that the form of the image exists in the present given that it requires Herculean efforts on his part to construct images in the present tense, and demands an entire specialized technique and a unique cinematic approach, the very qualities by which you recognize the signature style of Robbe-Grillet (whether you happen to like it or not). All this is for the precise purpose of achieving images that exist in the present. If the cinematic image were inherently in the present tense, he would have no reason to go to such lengths, nor to make films -- once again, whether one likes them or not -- that possess such a highly unconventional feel.

So, there you have what I wanted to add to what Raymonde just said... [*Pause*] because... well, yes, that's what I'd like to propose. So, theoretically, this was supposed to be our final session. I won't be able to make it next Tuesday. The Tuesday after that [June 18th], I have to be back early, so I'll be stopping by here. For anyone who's interested -- and be aware that I'm certainly not trying to pressure you into coming! -- I'll be dropping by sometime between ten and ten-thirty. If a few of you happen to be around, we could take a look at the Syberberg material, since I had previously set Syberberg aside, or we could just continue with whatever we were doing, if that's what some of you would prefer... So, that would be on the 15th, right? Not next week, but the week after. So, what about you? I'd really love [to hear your thoughts...] What about you? Did you have something you wanted to say, or perhaps quite a lot to say?

A student: [*Inaudible remarks; he is referring to certain terms introduced by Deleuze in the Cinema 3 seminar (the concept of time) and Cinema 4 seminar (the concept of automatism).*]: Actually [*inaudible remarks*] what was discussed in '83-'84, and then in '84-'85 [*inaudible remarks*] the concept of time proposed in '83-'84, and that of automatism for '84-'85. Why... [*inaudible remarks*] ... did you draw that parallel between these conceptions, between thought and cinema, and the specific mode of thought linked to cinema...?

Deleuze : Yes, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible remarks*] So, if I focus solely on the perspective developed this year, that is, if I set aside the movement-image and move on to the time-image and the [*inaudible words*] image, then, on the one hand, regarding thought, the discussion centered on *voyance* [clairvoyance] and for the corresponding cinematic image, it was the mental image. This year, operating at the level of thought, we encountered this expression [*Inaudible remarks*]. So, if I now consider automatism alongside thought, I feel that some issues might arise given that there was extensive discussion of the "thought of the outside" in relation to the mental image. Alongside this, there would be the audiovisual image, specifically, the audiovisual image involving the attempt to develop the concept of sound framing. Here, let's say, the question concerns the image as [*indistinct word*] in association with the speech act and the simultaneous unfolding of both order and [*indistinct word*]. You just emphasized that irrational circulation constitutes the new [*indistinct words*] of time. Furthermore, you placed great emphasis and spoke

to Comtesse about this, about the reasons behind [*Inaudible remarks*] a lack of interest in any "beyond" [*Inaudible remarks*].

My problem concerns the filiation between, let's say, the two courses, that is, the interweaving of what we covered last year and what we've covered this year regarding automatism. During your expositions, you touched upon [*Inaudible remarks; the reference is likely to the discussion of motor function*] and cybernetics. Unfortunately, [*Inaudible remarks*] [*Laughter*] might we not still be in a relationship of dependence upon time, even in the case [*indistinct word*] of the automatic? [*Pause*] Otherwise, might the image of time be what provides the explanation? [*Inaudible remarks*] We are led to re-interpret philosophy because time itself has been the subject of interpretation... [*Inaudible remarks*] Should something else perhaps be taken into account? [*Inaudible remarks*] On the side of thought, there is surely... [*Inaudible remarks*]... the concept of thought... [*Inaudible remarks*]... and thought itself would stand in relation to its "outside" and to the mental. I am merely pondering this question of [*Indistinct word and subsequent remarks inaudible*] in relation to time [*Inaudible remarks*]. But it's the problem of [*indistinct word*]: on the one hand... [*inaudible remarks*]... in relation to [*indistinct word*]; and on the other hand, in relation to time. There was something... [*Inaudible remarks*]... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:44:35]

... The student: [*Inaudible remarks*] We can summarize [*Inaudible remarks*] and secondly, there is the relationship of [*indistinct word*] with automatism on the one hand, [*Inaudible remarks*] in relation to time.

Deleuze: Hmm...

The student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: What you're saying is very interesting, but it puts everything at stake. So, my response -- and please don't take this as a criticism at all -- what's quite curious is that I get the feeling you've understood every single thing, but that you haven't grasped the relationships between those things. That is, in fact, you understand each individual thing very well [*Pause*], yet you haven't grasped the whole. But perhaps there are reasons for this; maybe it's not because you failed to understand; maybe it's because my overall structure was poorly constructed. As a result, I'm not responding to you with any intention of lecturing you. It's simply as if you understood every single part, yet somehow mixed everything together. That's the impression your intervention left on me. So, I almost find myself thinking: perhaps that is your expression.

I'm trying to explain this, you see? I'm trying to explain this because you asked a series of questions. I'll start with the concept of the automaton. Two frames of reference exist regarding this notion of the automata, and one must especially not confuse them. The automaton is viewed from two distinct angles, grounded in both philosophy and psychology. At times, it refers to the spiritual automaton; at other times, to the psychic automaton. There you are. That constitutes a distinction. How, then, do we ground this distinction? The spiritual automaton -- a very old expression, one already found in 17th-century philosophy -- denotes the autonomy of thought: thought as it unfolds the sequence of its own ideas. That's what the spiritual automaton is. [*Pause*] So, in a sense, this is thought grasped in the very autonomy of its self-mastery. [*Pause*]

What is the psychological automaton? If you will -- the automaton, the spiritual automaton -- its model would be the thinking machine. As early as the 17th century, there were texts by Leibniz addressing this very point. [Pause] What, then, is the psychological automaton? It's something very different. The psychological automaton is a creature stripped of its power to think, that is, it can no longer evaluate data from the external world because it obeys an internal imprint. This would be the hypnotized subject, someone under suggestion, the magnetized subject, the sleepwalker, or whatever else you might care to name. Fine.

What do these two automata have in common? You can clearly see that there's a certain independence from the external world. The spiritual automaton is independent -- that is, the reason, hence the shared term "automaton" -- the spiritual automaton is independent of the external world since it is thought that has achieved its autonomy and the rigorous order of its demonstrations. And the psychological automaton is itself independent of the external world since it is cut off from it, reduced to following an imprint that a master has implanted within it. [Pause] I maintain that these are the two figures of the automaton: the psychological automaton and the spiritual automaton. All manner of transitions occurs between the two, as well as other axes of distinction. Classically speaking, there are three types of automata: the clockwork automaton; the motor automaton -- the driving force behind large machines, large motive engines -- [Pause]; and, third, the information-processing and cybernetic automaton of our own era. [Pause]

Let's get back to cinema, to answer the first question. I'd say that, rather than defining cinema by the art of reproduction, I would define it by automatic movement, specifically in the first form of the movement-image. Indeed, it is dominated by precisely what theater was unable to achieve: namely vast clockwork movements and vast sensorimotor machines, whether in the form of explicit machinery (think of the trains of the French School, or the train in Abel Gance's *La Roue* [1923], or the train in Jean Renoir's *La Bête humaine* [1938]), or else the clockwork mechanisms so dear to the French School. I'd describe them as movement-automata. [Pause]

After the war, we find ourselves facing two possibilities; we have entered an era of the "third automaton" -- whether cybernetic or informational -- manifesting in two distinct forms. The first is an extrinsic form, one that holds little interest for us, yet may appeal to many others, as it involves the use of special effects. Take, for instance, in Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* [1968], the giant computer, that sort of thing. However, even in the absence of such reliance on extrinsic machinery, the very character of the automaton has undergone a transformation. Why? Because the automaton is no longer defined, as it was in pre-war cinema, by its motricity or in relation to motricity. Consider all the automatons of Expressionist cinema, all those psychological automatons of Expressionism: they are defined by their motricity: the somnambulist in *Dr. Caligari*, for instance, is tasked with going out to strangle or murder someone: this is a matter of motricity. The robot in *Metropolis* [1927, by Fritz Lang], all of these examples. This is a cinema of motricity, that is, an automatism of movement, and it corresponds precisely to the concept of the movement-image.

In these new kinds of automata, even when they're not computers, but rather psychological automata, all of them produce a strange effect upon us, yet invoke nothing whatsoever from technology: [Robert] Bresson, [Alain] Resnais. As I was telling you regarding Resnais: Resnais's

characters are veritable zombies. But what's the difference between Resnais's zombies and the zombies of the Expressionist school? Zombies are the living dead. What, then, is the difference? It is this: don't forget that Bresson is not concerned with technology; he does not write about computers; he couldn't care less about them. On the other hand, however, he reflects profoundly upon automatism. And once again, what he calls "the model", a key concept in his work, is always, without exception, related back to the automaton and to automatism. See his *Notes sur le cinématographe*.¹³ But what a revolution he brings about! In what sense is his work modern—even though he makes absolutely no appeal to modern machines? It remains modern; it remains completely modern because the automaton is no longer defined by what it does, but by what it says. It's defined in relation to the speech act rather than in relation to motricity. And this constitutes Bresson's treatment of the voice. [*Pause*]

Rightly or wrongly -- I will only be able to explain myself on this point later -- rightly or wrongly, I say: you have a first period of the spiritual and psychological automatism of the two, which must be understood in relation to the movement-image. These are the clockwork automata, the motor automata, to which corresponds a particular spiritual automaton, namely, the great circle of the movement-image, the autonomous circle of the movement-image as totemic. But in the other cinema, in post-war cinema, I'm saying -- and pay attention here -- there, too, you'll find the two kinds of automata: the spiritual automaton and the psychological automaton; for example, in Syberberg's *Parsifal*, the spiritual automaton is the immense head of Wagner, from which everything issues. The psychological automaton is the couple: Parsifal-girl and Parsifal-boy... [*Recording interrupted*] [1:57:52]

Part 3

... You will therefore encounter the two types of automata, but in an absolutely different guise. This time, [*Pause*] they will be in the service not of the movement-image and the circle of the movement-image, but rather in the service of the time-image and the irrational circuit, of the visual image and the sound image that corresponds to the time-image, that corresponds to time. [*Pause*]

As a result, here's what I'm getting at: it seems to me that what's troubling you, what prevents you from making the connections, is that, whether because you had reasons not to accept it, or because things got mixed up for you, you failed to take into account the sort of distinction we were drawing between the movement-image and the time-image. For, it goes without saying that the time-image doesn't introduces thought into cinema; there is a figure of thought at the level of the movement-image, a perfect figure which I've always maintained is just as beautiful (don't try to determine which is the most beautiful), always just as beautiful, just as profound, but it's not the same one. Consequently, if I attempt to sort things out, much as you tried to do when you said, "that doesn't work", if I attempt to bring some order to the relationship between last year and this year, I'd ask myself: well, what exactly is going on? [*Pause*]

First point: all of this, the whole thing, constituted the time-image in its difference from the movement-image. As I was saying, the first difference, [*Pause*] is that sensorimotor situations collapse. Do you see? This is essential to the collapse of the movement-image: sensorimotor situations break down. The characters may never have moved so much, yet they move in purely

random relations with their milieu. They move like windshield wipers, really, just strolling around. This is no longer the action-image at all; it's no longer an action. They are no longer situated within sensorimotor contexts; that is, they find themselves perpetually in situations where they simply do not know what to do, and merely watch what unfolds. This is what we call *voyance* [clairvoyance].

So, you see that I had a simple opposition between the movement-image, equating to a sensorimotor situation, and the *x*-image, a rupture of sensorimotor situations. In favor of what? This is what I call a pure optical and sound situation. They exist within optical and sound situations. What is happening? What does this consist of? And as I was saying, this stems from Neorealism. It stems from the great, brilliant works of the early [Roberto] Rossellini. It stems from *Europe '51* [1952]; it stems from *Stromboli* [1950], whatever examples you might choose: the volcanic eruption [*in Stromboli*], the foreign woman [*in Europe '51*], and what takes place in this? My God, my God, what is there to say about this? You can see that, already, I am laying the groundwork for what's to come: to suggest [the existence of] a pure optical and sound situation is necessarily lined to waves of language. though that would be getting ahead of ourselves.

I am simply saying: yes indeed, your situation has a specific designation: situations are no longer sensorimotor; they're pure optical and sound. We no longer find ourselves facing actants; we find ourselves facing seers [*voyants*], and the cinematic character becomes a seer. Although [the character] may well move about -- oh, he'll move; he 'll move as much as he pleases; he'll move even more than you might wish -- yet he remains completely disoriented. Why? Because he'll move within empty spaces, within disconnected spaces, within disoriented spaces, within derelict spaces. And the pure optical and sound situation is clearly distinct from the sensorimotor situation, but specifically in this regard: the sensorimotor situation implies qualified environments. This is the cinema of classical Hollywood. [*Pause*] Optical and sound situations, conversely, imply any-spaces-whatever [*espaces quelconques*], spaces with parts that don't connect. This is Neorealism; this is the New Wave; this is the New York school; this is the great Cassavetes. Fine, so there we have the first point.¹⁴

Second point: I could say... You see, each of these points must entail a confrontation between the two types of images. You can already sense that my second type of image is going to be the time-image. As regards the first characteristic, I cannot yet say why. So, I'm going to move very quickly. Second characteristic: with what does a pure optical and sound situation link up, since I cannot say that it links up with a reaction? No situation-reaction linkage exists any longer since the seer does not react or, if he does react, it is merely by chance.

Consider some films that are so familiar to us that they include the very characters who've shaped our sensibilities ever since... take [Martin] Scorsese; take *Taxi Driver* [1976], for instance.¹⁵ No matter how much the guy fidgets [*Deleuze laughs*], it's as if he isn't doing anything at all. He sees, observes. He sees through the windshield, the glass, in the rearview mirror of his taxi; he sees what's happening out on the sidewalk. Fine. At that point, he says to himself: Now it's my turn to act. He goes out there, he kills some random person, fine; he becomes a hero for a day, and then, by the next day, he's forgotten. He's the quintessential

"seer", with this one caveat: he actually sees nothing. So, he is a seer who sees nothing. This is a very, very particular type of character, one that renders the great classical actors almost unbearable to us. By "unbearable," I mean... well, unbearable except within their own films, except in those films from which they should never be extracted. It represents an entirely new mode of acting, one I don't believe I've had the opportunity to discuss yet, but it goes without saying that what we call a modern actor is, precisely, this type of "seer-actor."¹⁶ And this type of "seer-actor" is prone to taking long strolls. He is the seer out for a walk. That is why Jean-Pierre Léaud, for example, is so typical of this generation of actors. Fine.

What's bothering us now? For example, I think -- and this is a pure anecdote, I just saw *Adieu, Bonaparte* [1985, by Youssef Chahine]. It's not a bad film, *Adieu, Bonaparte*, not a bad film at all, but I feel there's something off about [Michel] Piccoli. Piccoli is a good actor; he was trained by the very best directors. He has worked with everyone, so clearly, he has learned a great deal. But here's the thing: he has too much success. That kind of success is a terrible thing. He has too much success, and now, it seemed to me, at least, he has started acting exactly like Brasseur senior [Pierre] used to act. I remember Brasseur senior's great tours de force in pre-war French cinema. It wasn't theater at all; he knew very well how to distinguish between film roles and stage roles. He was brilliant. I'm not talking about the son [Claude]; it's the father I'm referring to, although the son is certainly not without talent. But anyway, the father, always with his big, showy performances... So, in this case, Piccoli's performance feels like the kind of tour de force you'd expect from a great pre-war actor; I mean, just think of it: they cut off his leg! This is a specific genre -- and he really hams it up -- not a unique genre, exactly, but the scenes are absolutely reminiscent, but at every turn, I was constantly reminded [*Inaudible*] of Brasseur or Jules Berry. His mannerisms are very, very pre-war. And this stems from the fact that Piccoli -- in my opinion, at least (we'll see what the future holds; I make no definitive claims) -- no longer acts the way he used to. He used to be a very modern actor, but now, he has let himself be corrupted by success. He's returning to the old manner of the movement-image of the classical... [*Deleuze does not finish his thought*]

Anyway, never mind. I don't know why I got onto this subject... Oh, right! The new breed of actors. They're seers; they always are... [Take] Bulle Ogier. What constitutes Bulle Ogier's genius? You place her on a road, right there, and she sees something. As for doing something -- well, in that case, it's not a matter of doing anything; no, it's a stroll. Consider; what makes Bulle Ogier's daughter [Pascale Ogier], who died so tragically, seem so fully a part of this school? She grasped it immediately. I don't mean to attribute this to her mother in any way; I simply mean that there was a direct legacy in play; she truly acted in a modern style, in a sense that strikes me as superior to... There are specific ways, here, of performing this: namely, by discovering pure optical and sound situations.¹⁷

Fine, so my question is this: what does it link up with, given that we cannot say it links up with motricity functions, with motor actions? Fine, well, we attempted to provide an answer last year: namely, that these pure optical and sound images split in two, that is, they form mutual images: actual images and virtual images. That allowed us to take a step forward. It involved the coalescence of the actual image and the virtual image, that is, of the actual image and its mirror

image, within which the pure optical and sound image unfolded, as if the pure optical and sound image were, yes, quite literally, splitting in two to become an actual image and a virtual image. [Pause]¹⁸

And that is what we called the virtual image; that is what we called the crystal-image.¹⁹ You see, this is not at all the same thing as the pure optical and sound image. The crystal-image represents a further step [Pause] -- and this was where we made our great breakthrough, or the beginning of our great breakthrough -- namely: well, the crystal-image is the seed of time [Pause], it's the seed of time. Why? I do not have the time to revisit that now, but no matter, that's how things presented themselves. So, I could already then state that the movement-image was, first, a sensorimotor situation; and second, a linkage of that sensorimotor situation with either reactions, memories, or dreams. On the other hand, the new image, the optical and sound image, stood in relation to its own double: the actual image and the virtual image.

And what did that consist of? It was the mirror image. You might say: but the mirror already existed, and in what sense did it already exist? It did indeed already exist but, for example, in German Expressionism, yes, but only to unfold within dreams. Here, on the contrary, an absolute stifling of dreams occurs, a suppression of all the power of dreams. This is not dreaming; it's the formation of the crystal-image, the coalescence of an actual image and a virtual image. One of the great precursors is [Max] Ophüls [Pause], and these crystal-images, it seems to me, can be found in the work of both [Federico] Fellini and Visconti, albeit in two very different ways. And whenever a conception of time emerged, it was truly the seed of time.

Third point: well then, what takes place within the movement? And as you see, at each of my points, I have my two images: the movement-image and the time-image. Third point: in the movement-image, what was taking place? What was taking place -- something we examined at length in previous years -- was this: time was subordinated to movement, which itself was merely the object of an indirect representation. This indirect representation of time was splendid -- once again, I'm not suggesting that it wasn't good -- it was splendid. And this indirect representation of time appeared sometimes as time qua interval of movement, and sometimes as time qua the totality of movement within the moment. This is a way of saying it was beautiful; but it's also a way of saying that, within it, time remained subordinated to movement. Time appeared therein as the non-opening of movement.

On the other hand, what do I see? -- This was our next step -- What do I see within the crystal-image? [Pause] Do you understand? We were taking a step, a new step. First step: the liberation of pure optical and sound situations; second step: the constitution of the crystal-image as the specific development of the medium of the pure optical and sound image. Third phase: what do I see within the crystal-image? What I see within the crystal-image is the direct representation of time. Which implies, obviously, a time that is subordinate neither to the movement-image -- that is, to physics [Pause] -- nor to the character -- that is, to psychology -- a time that is neither physical nor psychological. [Pause] But we were going to discover this figure of time. In what form? Time as simultaneity, or as coexistence. It's the direct presentation of time because time, in shedding its subordination to movement, has shed the empirical form of succession. Time is

defined by coexistence or simultaneity. [*Pause*] Coexistence and simultaneity of what? In this fourth phase, we were positing... [*Recording interrupted*] [2:15:18]

... [something] sketched out in the work of Orson Welles, and finding its full affirmation in Resnais's cinema. A typical example: *Je t'aime, je t'aime* [1968], though everything else pointed in this direction, tended toward this very end. Or a simultaneity of what? We speak of a simultaneity of points of the present. What did that actually mean? [*Deleuze coughs*] Here, too, time abandons its form of empirical succession; instead, points of the present emerge -- internal points -- namely, there's a present of the past as such, a present of the future, and a present of the present.²⁰ Well, these internal presents are not successive; they're simultaneous; they're simultaneous. This time around, this simultaneity of the three points of the present manifested itself to us in Robbe-Grillet's cinema. So, there were two figures of time, two figures of the direct time-image... [*Deleuze coughs*]

A student: Is the smoke bothering you?

Deleuze: Huh?

The student: Is smoke bothering you?

Deleuze: No, I don't know what's bothering me... It's life. [*He coughs again*] It's life... [*Pause*] No, it's the heat...

Right, so, do you see? Fourth [point]... fifth... Is it the fifth [point]?

A student: You're on the fourth point.

Fifth... sixth. [*Laughter*] He moves pretty fast, doesn't he? [*Deleuze speaks to someone nearby*] Sixth? I don't even remember anymore... [*He's perhaps addressing the person who asked the initial question*] Is this helping you, or not? Because if it's not helping you... \

The student: [*Inaudible comments*].

Deleuze: Yes, that's it, that's it, that's it!

The student: [*Inaudible comments*].

Deleuze: That's it, so then, everything is fine! Are you ok? So then... Do you want me to continue or not?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*].

Deleuze: So, regarding the fifth point, you understand, this will go very quickly. On the side of the movement-image, what do I have? I have that famous story we examined for quite a long while. On the side of the movement-image, there's indeed an autonomous thought, that is, a spiritual automaton -- there's a psychological automaton and a sensorimotor automaton -- and on the side of the movement-image, there is also a spiritual automaton. What is it? The spiritual automaton is the Whole, [*Pause*] it's the Whole, that is, montage, namely, as the same time that... Here it is exactly: in the movement-image, at the very moment that images associate themselves

according to the sensorimotor schema -- Do you see? So, we find everything again at this level -- these associated images are internalized within a Whole, the Whole of the film, [Pause] and the Whole is externalized into the images capable of association, and here we have the formula for the relationship between image and thought. [Pause] [Deleuze coughs] in the work of [Sergei] Eisenstein. [Deleuze coughs] What does this imply? It implies commensurability, the commensurability of images with the Whole, and the commensurability among the elements within the image. This is what has been called the regime of the rational cut. [Pause] There you have it. Therefore, this is a genuine spiritual automaton.

On the side of the time-image, things are quite different. Why? Because a non-totalizable character will be substituted for the commensurability between the Whole as a concept and the image. What does a "non-totalizable character" mean? It means that the image will refer to an outside more distant than any external world, and to an inside deeper than any internal world. [Pause] In other words, the image will possess a non-totalizable "reverse side" and "front side." [Pause] This impossibility of totalization will appear in works by each of the major authors we've been examining, in the various forms we've already considered, and that I listed last time, anyway, a list of terms that seemed convenient to me: starting from Godard's "incommensurable" to Robbe-Grillet's "inextricable," Resnais's "undecidable," and so on.²¹ This points to a specific regime, one that we might call the regime of the irrational cut. [Pause]

One final point... no, the penultimate point: this regime of the irrational cut was to find its privileged embodiment in the dissociation of sound images and visual images, [Pause] that is, of the speech act and the stratigraphic layers, of the speech act that rises and the stratigraphic layers that sink down, always grappling with the themes of the outside and the inside. [Pause]

One final point... but, but, but, but, but... but, this incommensurability between the two types of images does not preclude a relationship; a relationship does exist between them, it's simply that this relationship is irrational. In other words, this relationship takes the form of "free indirect discourse." What, then, is this relationship? It's the time-image conceived as a non-rational circuit, [Pause; Deleuze coughs] namely, a very precise relationship that we looked for in the works by Straub, by Duras, that we left merely sketched out in the work by Syberberg, an intertwining of words that rise upward and visual strata that sink downward. And it's precisely here, as indeed it must be, that the direct presentation of the time-image, as we have previously examined it, truly begins. So, at this level, we must once again refer to [the concept of] the "spiritual automaton", but here we have an entirely different spiritual automaton from the one constituted by the "totality" as it corresponded to the movement-image, operating under the law of the commensurable.

There we are. Was this helpful for you?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*].

Deleuze: Fine, so is this good?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*].

Deleuze: What I mean is, we have to consider the time-image as inspiring a spiritual automaton and psychological automata of an entirely new nature. It inspires a new spiritual automatism, namely, what I'd call -- to use a pretentious term -- a topology, that is, [Pause] this... this... this non-totalizable reversibility of the outside and the inside, this proximity independent of distance. [Pause] And we had seen space in Resnais's work as being very close to a topological space, if one were to sum it all up. And the psychological automata are directly related to the speech act rather than to the act of thought.

So, there it is; once again, that's what I'm proposing to you although this is really for those who... Did you have something you wanted to say? No? Alright then. So, I'll be back here, not next week, but the week after. If no one shows up, I send you my blessings. Don't come just to do me a favor, ok? If no one is here, I'll send you my very warmest blessings. And if someone is here, I'll send you my very warmest blessings just the same. [Laughter] Anyway, there you have it, and what we could do, perhaps, especially those of you who are somewhat familiar with the material (though for those who aren't it makes no difference) would be either to revisit some questions that didn't get asked today, or else to focus a bit on Syberberg. [End of the session] [2:29:10]

Notes

¹ In all likelihood, Deleuze refers here to the interview with Michel Lonsdale that appeared in the film journal *Image et son*, 291 (December 1974), within a special section on *India Song*.

² This is a reference to "Hamlet"; on this subject, see sessions 5, 12 and 16 of the Cinema 3 seminar, December 13, 1983, and February 28 and April 17, 1984. See also "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy" in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 27-35.

³ Raymonde Carasco, *Hors-cadre Eisenstein* (Paris: P. Brochet, 1979).

⁴ See Carasco's conversation with Deleuze during session 12, 5 February 1985.

⁵ See Carasco's intervention during session 11, 29 January 1985

⁶ See *Cahiers du cinéma*, 305 (November 1979); see *The Time-Image*, p. 332, note 17.

⁷ In fact, the book was published in 1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, reprint 2004).

⁸ Walter Benjamin, "The work of art in the era of mechanical reproduction" (1935), in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-252. See also *The Time-Image*, p. 330, note 5.

⁹ *La Rampe* (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma/Gallimard, 1983).

¹⁰ Paul Virilio, *Logistique de la perception, Guerre et cinéma*, vol. 1 (Paris : Cahiers du cinéma/Éditions de l'étoile, 1984 ; revised ed., Le Seuil, 1991); see also session 4, and *The Time-Image*, pp. 164-165.

¹¹ See Session 21 of the Cinema 3 seminar, 5 June 1984, and *The Time-Image*, pp. 126-128.

¹² Deleuze here cites Kracauer's title, *From Caligari to Hitler* (see note 7).

¹³ Robert Bresson, *Notes sur le cinématographe* (Notes on Cinematography) (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).

¹⁴ See *The Time-Image*, pp. 165-169; on Cassavetes, see pp. 195-201, 250-251.

¹⁵ See a similar reference at the end of this seminar, session 2.

¹⁶ See *The Time-Image*, p. 58.

¹⁷ See *The Time-Image*, p. 31.

¹⁸ See Sessions 18, 19, and 20 of the Cinema 3 seminar, 15, 22, and 29 May 1984.

¹⁹ See *The Time-Image*, Chapter 4, and the second half of the Cinema 3 seminar.

²⁰ See *The Time-Image*, pp. 358-359.

²¹ See the list of these traits toward the end of Session 24, the previous week.