

Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries: Charles J. Stivale

Cinema and Thought, October 30, 1984 to June 18, 1985

(26 Sessions)

As he starts the fourth year of his reflections on relations between cinema and philosophy, Deleuze explains that the method of thought has two aspects, temporal and spatial, presupposing an implicit image of thought, one that is variable, with history. He proposes the chronotope, as space-time, as the implicit image of thought, one riddled with philosophical cries, and that the problematic of this fourth seminar on cinema will be precisely the theme of "what is philosophy?", undertaken from the perspective of this encounter between the image of thought and the cinematographic image.

Session 1 - October 30, 1984

After outlining the work of the previous three years, Deleuze states that the fourth year theme will "what is philosophy?" through an encounter between cinema and philosophy, that is, the thought-image. Proposing the existence of a basic "image of thought" as "chronotope", Deleuze addresses the encounter between the image of thought and the cinematographic image by reviewing pioneers of the cinematographic image and theory (Eisenstein, Gance, Epstein), with critical references to Serge Daney and Louis Schefer, from four points of view – quantitative, qualitative, relational, and modal. As these pioneers were belittled by modern sources, Deleuze considers the intersection of linguistically inspired semiology in cinema (cf. Christian Metz), and linkages between the State and cinema, war and cinema, propaganda, and Hollywood (cf. Elie Faure, Paul Virilio, and Daney). With Godard as an example of a filmmaker translating thought through cinema, Deleuze sees this example as the new alliance between thought and cinema following World War II. Then, after devoting an hour to how cinema emerged particularly through the "automatism" of the movement-image, Deleuze shifts toward thought itself, through examining different psychological and artistic precedents (cf. Pierre Janet; Clérambault; Surrealists' automatic writing, Joycean interior monologue) as well as particular cinema examples (cf. Eisenstein, Welles, Resnais). Seeking a parallel path in the logical order of thoughts flowing into thinking and consciousness, Deleuze derives from Spinoza the "spiritual automaton", e.g., Paul Valéry's *Monsieur Teste* as well as, in cinema, Pasolini and Bresson. [With session 2, this session follows to a great extent the material developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 7, "Thought and Cinema."]

Session 2 - November 6, 1984

Emphasizing again the ambitions of cinema's misunderstood pioneers, Deleuze speaks to the need to examine the linguistic question in cinema as it relates to "universal language" as well as a possible new relationship between thought and cinema. He first focuses on the different facets of the automatic nature of the cinematographic image, i.e., its connections to unconscious and subconscious mechanisms of thought and psychological automatism, linking this development (through Spinoza and Leibniz) to Valéry's *Monsieur Teste* and to Heidegger, thereby deriving

through a kind of thought-shock, a *noocho*, two types of automata – psychic and spiritual -- corresponding to the image of thought. Then, with reference to reflections on depth of field from Alexandre Astruc, Deleuze starts to study the consequences of mutations in the image of thought within the cinema-thought relationship. First outlining a series of four mutations -- first, the substitution of belief for knowledge (*le savoir*); second, substitution of an outside for an intimate sense or an inside; third, reversal of relations between thought and the body; fourth, mutation of our relations with the brain – Deleuze indicates diverse corresponding examples in cinema, and then provide corresponding pairs of philosophical examples: Pascal and Hume; Kant and Fichte; Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; Charles Renouvier and Jules Lequier. He limits himself to Hume and Kant, leading him to present the contemporary breakdown, both internal and external, of our belief in the world, referring to the revolution in the interior monologue created by Dos Passos. With cinema as a possible attempt to return us to a belief in the world, he refers to Godard's work for whom the world itself is "cinéma", and also proposes Rossellini as a filmmaker who lived this example and who demanded from art an ethics, that is, a way to create a link between humans and this world, through a "cinema of belief", not a "cinema of knowledge". [Much of this development corresponds to section 2 of *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.]

Session 3 - November 13, 1984

After clarifying a number of points already considered (e.g., the description of the image of thought as chronotope or space-time), Deleuze develops the two aspects of the method its "order of reasons", hence in temporal fashion (example: Descartes) and its spatial aspect fulfilled through its own methodical distribution, seeking truth through three different methods (cf. Plato, Descartes and Kant). As in the previous session, he analyzes four mutations on the levels of the image of thought and of cinema. For the first mutation -- substitution of knowledge by belief – Deleuze considers the image of thought developed by several philosophers and artists (notably, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Claudel), and with Kant, this model's rupture creates the modern circumstance of humans losing belief in this world, notably through three forms examined previously: pure optical and sound situations, indifferent events, and empty or disconnected spaces. He draws on successive authors a) to illustrate this rupture and possible revival of belief in the world (cf. Rossellini and Godard); b) to consider the second mutation of thought as "giving oneself a body" (cf. Artaud, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Brecht). Deleuze concludes that bodily postures are genetic elements of belief, hence leading to a cinema of attitudes of the body, but he also notes that the ceremonial or daily version of the *gestus* in certain experimental films risks eliminating it (the *gestus*) altogether. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.]

Session 4 - November 20, 1984

Continuing to ask what reasons might exist for believing in this world, Deleuze answers that this means believing in *life* in this world, that is, in the body itself, even in its fragility and fatigue, that is, a body of and in time. Then, he proceeds to the third mutation, thought that comes from the outside (cf. Blanchot and Foucault), i.e. thinkers who share the belief that thinking's purpose is an exercise of the outside. After tracing the classical model of knowledge, Deleuze considers Blanchot's attraction to Jaspers's concept of "processes", explaining a type of schizophrenia, that Deleuze says is the force of the outside insofar as it causes a return from the dead, and a mode of

thought that conforms both to Blanchot and Foucault, a “thought of the outside”. Considering successive traits of this “thought”, Deleuze studies Blanchot’s *Infinite Conversation* in which types of interstices emerge: first, the gap over which two images must leap to close the gap; second, the interstice manifesting itself in itself and subordinating any association; and third, the interstice between “speaking” and “seeing”. The interstice leads Deleuze to link this mutation to cinema through “montage” which, pre-World War II, assured associations, whereas after World War II, something explodes, images varying within different sorts of interstices, liberating the interstices (cf. Garrel, Resnais, Godard, Bresson, Godard), with the importance of sound as well as image within not just montage, but “mixage”. Moreover, the interstices between frames come to eliminate out-of-field as a function of association of images. Finally, referring again to Blanchot’s *Infinite Conversation*, Deleuze considers the book’s opening dialogue between two fatigued interlocutors developing an “incommunicable” between them, the interstice, the force of the outside itself (cf. Antonioni). Concluding the third mutation, thought of the Outside, with its linkage of four notions (the idea of “process”; of essential rapport of thought with an unthought; of a primary interstice; and of bodily fatigue and power of the Outside which is also the direct presentation of time), Deleuze sees force passing through the body and through its fatigue which, as the next session reveals, links directly to mathematics. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 7 & 8.]

Session 5 - November 27, 1984

With the possibility that the session’s opening cassette is missing, Deleuze retraces the mutations detailed previously, with the discussion of Pythagoras missing, and he discusses Richard Dedekind’s research on the problem of the continuous, the infinity of a line’s breaks and gaps, and irrational breaks (cf. *The Time-Image*, chapter 7), linking this to the situations of pre-World War II and post-war cinema. Deleuze discusses the parallel of these postwar cinematographic traits to those located previously in Blanchot and Foucault, i.e., the thought of the Outside, the interstice or interval, first discussing Eisenstein on rational breaks, then shifting to post-war types of irrational breaks (cf. Bresson, Godard, Resnais). Deleuze then moves to the fourth mutation, “give me a brain!”, inspired by cerebral models, our lived relation with the brain, and the possibility of a modern cinema of the brain. Here Deleuze briefly proposes different filmmakers of such a cinema mode (cf. Kubrick, Resnais), [See development in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8] with the pre-war and post-war developments in the scientific conception of the brain to be considered.

Session 6 – December 11, 1984

Discussing three viewpoints on the brain (brain biology; lived relations with the brain; the brain as cinema) from which brain transformations have occurred, he pursues the biological, scientific review, and then from the lived, experiential perspective, he considers the classical, arborescent model of the brain with numerous theoretical references (cf. Jakobson on types of aphasia) allowing Deleuze to raise complications posed by this model. Then, shifting to the lived, experiential point of view, Deleuze links the arborescent model to another model from a classic perspective, that of interior and exterior milieus with details drawn from Simondon’s *L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*. With Simondon, Deleuze considers the brain’s topological structure, particularly questions of outside-inside, and then links thought of the Outside to the complementary sensorimotor axis. After the break, Deleuze outlines four lines of research for

understanding cerebral linkages: the mathematical concept of Markov chains and the study of semi-accidental phenomena and mixtures of dependence and uncertainty; a second research line, within cosmobiology, of understanding the amplified fluctuation of enzymes and proteins from the perspective of the genesis of life; a third line of research (cf. Prigogine and Stengers), the thresholds at which the amplified fluctuations can be maintained in an orderly fashion; finally, the constitution of an internal milieu as an amplified fluctuation allowing the living creature, and even the brain (through hypotheses) to enter into aleatory relations with an external milieu (cf. cybernetician Pierre Vendryes). Deleuze answers the final question -- how transmission occurs within the brain -- with relinkages in independent series, suggesting finally the possibility of understanding cinema no longer as linkages but relinkages of independent series.

Session 7 – December 18, 1984

Deleuze completes the discussion of the brain: first, the emphasis placed on the possibility of a topological structure of the brain; second, sensorimotor linkages occurring as semi-random phenomena or relinked parceling (*morcelage*), with linkages manifesting particularly as irrational cut-points; the interconnections between three cinematographic (and indeed philosophical) concepts: the white or black screen and its varieties; the irrational break or cut; and the relinked parceling (*morcelage*). He comments at length on the latter (cf. Andrei Bely's novel *Petersburg*; Resnais's noospheres in "Muriel", "Providence", "Je t'aime, je t'aime"). He then connects painting, specifically Kandinsky and Klee, to American experimental films (Tony Conrad, Brakhage, George Landow). Deleuze then recaps the material covered to date: first, the simple departure point of thought and automatism, at once psychological and spiritual; second, cinema's new spiritual automatism and this cinematographic image's evolution in terms of thought itself (which unfolds following ten specific points; summary list below), as well as associated bibliographic and cinematographic references. Following a break, Deleuze discusses with students (for 45 minutes) what his expectations for specific students henceforth to discuss specific topics prepared in advance, with suggestions provided on different topics. Deleuze then closes by responding generously but firmly to a long intervention by Georges Comtesse.

Ten-point recapitulation of sessions 1-7: 1/ Rupture between pre-WW II and post-war cinema; 2/ Post-war sensorimotor rupture; 3/ Post-war indiscernibility between imaginary and real (crystal-image); 4/ Movement-image yields to indirect image of time; 5/ Direct image of time only occurring within interplay of true and false; 6/ Hence, the power of the false, at any price, also yields function of returning belief to the world -- it is here, Deleuze says, that the previous seminar intersects with the current one --; 7/ Emergence of a change of regime of thought, noosign, along two axes alongside emergence of thought of the Outside; 8/ Force of the Outside occurring in irrational cuts and interstices; 9/ The unthought of within thought revealed as the body; 10/ Emergence of cinema of the brain.

Session 8 – January 8, 1985

Starting with an Eisenstein essay connecting thought to cinema, Deleuze examines Eisenstein's questions on movement and montage, and after contrasting Pasolini's semiology to that of Eco and Christian Metz, he distinguishes the cinematographic image from the analogical image, insisting that an image creating its own motion is one also creating a shock to thought, a *noochoc*, that Eisenstein attributes to oppositions of movement-images. Then, after establishing some philosophical bases (Aristotle's classification of oppositions; Tarde's 19th-century mode

classification), Deleuze then considers Eisenstein's discovery of harmonics in the cinematographic image. Linking this to a reflection on synesthesia (cf. Merleau-Ponty), Deleuze offers Eisenstein's list of five oppositions linked to five forms of montage and his explanation for achieving various composition techniques (cf. examples from Eisenstein, Buster Keaton, Renoir). Finally Deleuze summarizes the development: from the percept-image to the clear concept through the sensory shock, then from the confused concept to affect-images reintroducing an affective shock, together creating a complete circuit, all part of the creative domain [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 7.]

Session 9 – January 15, 1985

First reviewing two movements in thought-image relations for Eisenstein, Deleuze proceeds to Eisenstein's third plane, the identity of image and concept or "Nature and man" and reviews Eisenstein's dispute with Griffith and with Stalinists. With key points derived from Eisenstein in place, Deleuze shifts to the post WW II era, reviewing the three forms of rupture, with the third (the rupture with metaphor) as best illustrated in films by Duras and Godard, to which Deleuze adds a fourth series of rupture in figurative language: the rise of artificiality, the function of literality, and the collapse of interior monologue. Citing Dos Passos's fiction as an influence on cinema effects, Deleuze argues that the shift toward plurilingualism is accompanied, notably in Godard, with cinema becoming "serial," and might be linked to so-called "serial" or atonal music. Deleuze draws characteristics from Robbe-Grillet, and to address how such images might be attained, Deleuze turns to examples from Godard's cinema, how the series created for each film are situated within a genre or a category. After tracing different Godardian genres, Deleuze concludes by asking participants to consider in the next session what the connections might exist between categories invented by Godard.

Session 10 – January 22, 1985

Pausing the seminar's forward movement with an invited participant, musicologist Pascale Criton, Deleuze asks Criton to comment on three precise musicological perspectives. Criton confirms most of Deleuze's analysis regarding pre- and post-World War II cinema developments, and with nearly an hour left in class, Deleuze comments on Godard's cinema, with some assistance from Georges Comtesse, emphasizing the Godardian categories, reviewing Godard's deployment of a serial method, and considering use of a particular interview with philosopher Brice Parain, in "Vivre sa vie". He connects the serialization of daily life to Kantian distinctions of constitutive and reflective terms in judgment and offers an extended example from the domain of jurisprudence (his oft cited example of the taxi driver's dispute regarding smokers), attempting to show how a series is derived from a sequence of images reflected within a genre. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.]

Session 11 – January 29, 1985

Deleuze studies the serial method in discussion with participants, situating the irrational cut in this structure, and distinguishing horizontal serial constructions from vertical ones (cf. Godard's horizontal in "Pierrot le fou", "Vivre sa vie" and "Sauve qui peut (la vie)"; vertical in "Passion" and "Prénom, Carmen"; generalized vertical in "Le Mépris"). Deleuze then proposes a parallel between Hegel's phenomenology and logic, on one hand, and figures of consciousness/series of images and concept moments/categories, on the other. Referring to figures of consciousness in a

post-Hegelian philosopher, Eric Weil, Deleuze connects this analysis to an article by Serge Daney on Godard's manner of employing discourse in his films, and introduces the concept of distinct forms of discourse, at once in philosophy and cinema, maintaining that attitude gives to the image a possibility of being serialized, while it is the gesture (*geste* or *gestus*) that endows something with categorical or coherent discursive value. On this, Deleuze cites four exemplary texts for discussion: first, reviewing the brief yet influential Brecht text, Deleuze then comments on Barthes's essay "Le troisième sens", and finishes by presenting Carasco's essay, "L'image-cinéma qu'aimait Roland Barthes" (The cinema-image that Barthes loved), announcing the Carasco will participate in another "interview" in the next session. Deleuze comments that he not only cannot grasp Barthes's key points, but that Carasco's commentary on Barthes also eludes him, hence the next session's discussion/interview. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 8.]

Session 12 – February 5, 1985

After reviewing earlier key points, Deleuze recalls Barthes's commentary on the senses of "obvious" (*obvie*) and "obtuse" (*obtus*), linking the latter to the gesture's definition and then outlines four questions arising from this connection, especially given Raymonde Carasco's interpretation of Barthes. Carasco as guest participant "converses" with Deleuze on these questions (for 48 minutes), maintaining that the sense of "obtuse" passes through writing (*écriture*) or poetic art, attempting to explain how this "sense" emerges in Barthes's reflections. She also reflects on the importance of a rhythm concept for understanding poetics of cinema which she links to a global mental film image or totality in different filmmakers and also to Blanchot's sense of images' duplicity. Deleuze then reflects on two of Barthes's examples, considering the types of "masks" revealed by characters within the photo stills selected by Barthes, for Deleuze, a way of teasing out an understanding of the "obtuse" as a kind of limit. Exploring this understanding as a kind of fabulation, he refers to Quebec filmmaker Pierre Perrault and his "cinema of the living", and then reflects on political cinema, third world cinema, (cf. Jean Rouch). Returning to Godard for what Deleuze calls a "cinema of attitudes and gestures", he moves from attitude to *gestus* as in Godard's forms of theatricalization, and also a cinema of politics which has inherent links to the kind of fabulation that Deleuze emphasizes. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 6 and 8.]

Session 13 – February 26, 1985

After outlining forthcoming topics in the seminar, Deleuze returns to his "arbitrary comparison" between Eisenstein (representing classical cinema; cf. "Alexander Nevsky") and Godard (representing modern; cf. "Sauve qui peut (la vie)" and "Prénom Carmen"). He also details the previous emphasis on attitudes and gestures within the series, offering four examples (Carmelo Bene's brief cinema career; French New Wave and post-New Wave, or the "cinema of bodies"; "feminine cinema"; and so-called "direct cinema", notably Cassavetes), and then insists on the importance of a passage from attitudes to *gestus*, that is, the "power of fabulation" (cf. Perrault and Rouch. Deleuze then changes direction toward languages and language system (*langue*), the next focus, namely on "a series of commonplaces on linguistics." To consider the extent to which Christian Metz might be considered Kantian, Deleuze summarizes their intersection, particularly regarding the analysis of cinema in terms of conditions of possibility and rules of use-based specific facts. When the session ends quite abruptly, in mid-sentence, Deleuze is

emphasizing the importance of the notion of conditions of possibility in Kant's philosophy, which he will need to examine in Metz's semiotics. [Much of this development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9, but also with references to chapter 2.]

Session 14 – March 5, 1985

While this session's truncated length suggests some kind of omission, Deleuze reviews the previous session and then outlines three levels of analysis to be pursued, with a knot of problems located at each level. First, he addresses different facets of the terms "paradigm" and "syntagma", also adding other key terms, "langue" (language system) defined various, e.g., as a double articulation system (monemes and phonemes). He then shifts towards Metz's perspective, no longer considering cinema at the level of *langue*, but rather seeking the subjective language rules, that is, syntagmatic and paradigmatic rules. Deleuze situates Metz's perspective, that is, if specific speech acts can be called cinematographic, how these might be classified, and then shifts toward a Kantian perspective of rules of use and not essence. Finally, Deleuze raises a general question for another session: what are properly cinematographic syntagma and paradigms, and what is (for Metz) the Grand Syntagmatic?

Session 15 – March 12, 1985

Deleuze pursues the study of Metz's semiocriticism (cf. previous session) by recalling the three basic elements of Metz's semiocriticism, notably cinematographic language existing through a double articulation (monemes and phonemes) according to syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, detailing the eight autonomous segments of Metz's Grand Syntagmatic. He notes Metz's movement away from Hollywood's "cinema of narration" toward "New Wave" while ironically maintaining that this cinema is absolutely narrative as well. Noting Robbe-Grillet's term "dys-narrative", Deleuze argues that the paradigm wins over the syntagma in this cinema and then develops the "codes" that work through the cinema image, with code(s) of montage as all-encompassing. Based on this outline, Deleuze starts to explain his misgivings about Metz's perspective, first, regarding narration as so-called "fact" with the complete elimination of movement; second, regarding the cinematographic image as an analogical statement or image. [Much of the later development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 6.]

Session 16 – March 19, 1985

Still outlining aspects of Metz's semiocriticism, Deleuze reiterates some misgivings and recalls work from the first seminars, offering a succinct summary of the sensorimotor scheme in relation to the movement-image and its three types of images, and he relies on previous analyses to insist that these changes result from the image's shift toward a direct presentation of time (see Cinema seminar III, 1983-84). A student question causes Deleuze to diverge into several digressive directions, first on "cinema of truth" (cf. Pierre Perrault and Jean Rouch), then on the Palestinians and the concept of a "people to come." Georges Comtesse's brief intervention on Rouch's films causes an extremely pointed exchange with Deleuze (at approximately minute 79), leading to an early break in the session. Returning to the second misgiving, the cinematographic image supposedly being assimilable to a statement through analogy, Deleuze evokes Pasolini's approach to the double articulation and then counters Metz's semiocritical perspective on the image. To dive deeply into the senses of "langue" itself, he proposes different linguistic perspectives: first, developing Hjelmslev's thought, Deleuze concludes that cinema is the non-

linguistically formed matter that is a correlate to any language or “langue”. Then he turns to the “strange linguistics” of Gustave Guillaume, notably his concept of a word’s “signified of power” (*signifié de puissance*) which, while being unchangeable, depends on its use in discourse to endow the word with a specific “signified of effect”. Guillaume’s distinctions matter for Deleuze’s development of distinctions of the indefinite versus the definite article in terms of signifieds of power. This discussion leads Deleuze toward a clearer sense of the concept of “matter” developed from Hjelmslev, and with Pasolini, toward understanding cinema as a “‘langue’ of reality” linked not to paradigms or syntagma, but solely to a signified of power. [Much of the later development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 10.]

Session 17 – March 26, 1985

Deleuze announces that the class will first complete the transition from the linguistic and semio-critical review and then shift to discussion of the intersection between visual and sound elements. He thus continues with the linguistics of Gustave Guillaume and Hjelmslev, their different concepts corresponding to “processes of thought-movement”, with verbs producing processes of “chrono-genesis”. After arguing that Guillaume’s system of differential-inclusive oppositions had significant subsequent consequences for semiology and post-structuralist linguistics, Deleuze presents his own doubts about three key points of semiology’s take on cinema, arguing for “pure semiotics” operating with images, signs, and non-language processes determining these images and signs, creating something “utterable” (*énonçable*). This “anti-semiological semiotics” is one developing a Bergsonian process of thought-movement on which instantaneous views are obtained. Deleuze then shifts to the second phase, to study what a properly cinematographic image is and what its relation is with non-language processes both in silent and sound films, also announcing possible interventions after the Easter break (e.g., Giorgio Passerone, Eric Alliez). He then forecasts development in coming session of the cinematographic statement’s three key stages (silent cinema with reference to Soviet, American, and French examples; spoken cinema part 1, pre-World War II; and post-War cinema). He starts here with the silent era’s successive visual facets (e.g., images and intertitles), and concludes with Benveniste’s distinction of story plane (corresponding to the historical visual image) and discourse plane (non-historical visual image), understood in terms of the passage from readable and visible silent cinema into the intertwining of these within the phases of spoken cinema. [Much of the later section’s development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.]

Session 18 – April 16, 1985

One of the most peculiar of any session finds Deleuze contending with an intrusive female student who engages in a confrontational and quasi-amorous dialogue with Deleuze. Then he reviews many key points discussed before Easter break (cf. *The Time-Image*, chapter 9 part 1), proceeding again through the “seen” and “read” aspects of silent films. Then, asking what occurs when speech is no longer read but heard, Deleuze anticipates future discussion of post-World War II cinema by reflecting on television’s impact on filmmakers as their work becomes audiovisual. Considering speech and, more specifically, the speech act, as an auditory element as well as visual, Deleuze suggests that spoken components cause one to see something visual and how the visual image renders itself readable, a “something” Deleuze calls “interactions”. He returns to Benveniste’s use of “shifters”, undertaking an analysis of Lang’s “M” and identifying the movement of speech acts as a kind of wave form, the propagation or opposition or innovation

of “waves of belief and desire”, with the interactions occurring within the wave movements in “M”. Deleuze closes with the themes of collaboration and degradation as interactive modes, comparing silent films (“Strike”, “The Last Man”) and first phase speaking films (“M”, “The Blue Angel”). Insisting that the speech act causes an interaction to be seen in the visual image, Deleuze concludes by establishing aspects of the auditory relationship with the image, at once visible and readable, as a focus for most of the remaining sessions.

[Please note that the order presented here of the 16 April 1985 session transcript varies significantly from the transcripts on the Web Deleuze and Paris 8 sites where the version posted reverses sections 1 and 2. The version's order here is transposed to follow the recording: part 1 now starts after Easter break (and contains the awkward intervention by a student), ending on the topic of “le parlant”; part 2 starts on “le parlant” and ends on discussion of Simmel; part 3 starts with discussion of Simmel and ends with Deleuze dismissing class.]

Session 19 – April 23, 1985

Deleuze continues on the topic of “speech acts”, reemphasizing how the “readable” aspect of film viewing shifted toward the “hearable”, but also tending to weave together, causing new sorts of visions within the visual image, notably the rise of speech acts. Following World War II, in the second or modern phase, with the sound component gaining its autonomy, the “out-of-field” aspect is eliminated. Arguing this autonomy as being due to the growth of television, Deleuze then derives from Kant two terms with Greek etymology, “autonomy” and “heautonomy”, to indicate that after World War II, sound and the visual become two “autonomous” components of a one and same audiovisual image (cf. Rossellini and Godard), followed by “heautonomous” images (cf. Straubs, Duras, Syberberg), the complex relation developed previously of incommensurability, the irrational point and relinkages. Deleuze addresses the interactional nature of images (cf. Benveniste), but then distinguishes “persons” between which speech acts are engaged (for Benveniste) from speech acts as “interactions” (cf. Lang’s “M”). Deleuze enters the classification proper with three categories of traits, focusing on the first type: interactional speech acts with different poles (cf. in American comedy, Hawks, Capra, Lubitsch). Linking how conversations and sub-conversations develop a direct representation of conversation with its madness, Deleuze moves toward an aspect of this first type of speech act involving time and its bifurcations (cf. Mankiewicz). He argues that these bifurcations suggest a second kind, an “off” speech act inserted into the visual image through a circulation between one speech act hidden behind another, concluding with the spoken component’s three properties: causing visions as interactions and bifurcations; to be seen itself, the voice itself becoming visible in space; and itself to see, moving toward the second category, the reflexive speech act. [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapters 9 & 10.]

Session 20 – April 30, 1985

Returning to the pre-World War II stage of spoken films, Deleuze reflects on what it means for the sound component to gain its autonomy, and noting different sub-divisions of noises and voices depending on the style, he indicates how music develops a sound framing and a sound continuum, this continuum related to the existence of the out-of-field (*hors-champ*). Deleuze provides distinctions of an absolute out-of-field and a relative out-of-field; a broader global transformation, a “Whole-that-changes”, distinct from simple movement in space, developing a

temporal change; and voices “off” in relation to voices “in”, linked to two categories of speech acts, interactive and reflexive. With reference to Michel Chion, Deleuze examines facets of such speech acts and voices, and then shifts to musical elements as a special facet of the sound continuum linked to the visual image. The role of music first considered as exterior to the film in the silent period, Deleuze addresses music’s shift in the first speaking period as subjugated by the visual image. Through Deleuze’s extended conversation (only partially audible) with Pascal Auger on moments in the sound, music and visual image intersection, he indicates the importance of vibration as infinitesimal element of visual movement in common with musical movement, also linking work by several musicians to the term the Whole-that-changes. Deleuze turns toward Nietzsche’s conception of music in *The Birth of Tragedy*, also linking this to Schopenhauer and Wagner’s *Parsifal* in order to confirm the distinction of levels of the Whole, indirect representation in the visual image and direct presentation in music. [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.]

Session 21– May 7, 1985

Starting this session with questions on sound framing and taking up the second phase of spoken cinema, Deleuze examines how the sound component gains its own quite distinct framing in relation to visual framing, proposing two hypotheses, one “strong” and one “weak”. First phase: the new image regime after World War II and the idea of a specific sound framing emerging increasingly through specific technological operations. However, student questions and comments intervene (on the role of animated films in this development; the role of stereo versus monaural sound for this framing), and then, in the second phase, the disappearance of an out-of-field (*hors-champ*) occurs, replaced with an interstice between visual and sound framings. Deleuze proposes different manifestations of automata in various national cinema traditions and discusses issues of framing in comparison to issues of abstract expressionism, suggesting that by whatever means, sound framing served as a means for cinema authors to beckon the future. Then, insisting that this marked a shift toward an “heautonomy”, Deleuze defines more precisely each type of image or framing (cf. Rohmer’s “Claire’s Knee”; Resnais’s “Last Year in Marienbad”), suggesting that, on one hand, the sound image is a speech act as fabulation or founding act of the event, and on the other hand, the visual images now are “any-spaces-whatever.” Exploring examples of spatial layers, he again points to different works (Resnais, Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet) with different ways of examining not just spatial layering, but also how each layer buries something necessarily revealed. Deleuze considers how these images attain an incommensurable, irrational, free indirect relation, extract a pure speech act from an environment, and more precisely, speech acts ripped from materials that resist, but also resistance arising from the speech acts themselves. Then shifting to the visual image, i.e., empty, geological and telluric spaces, Deleuze argues that the visual image’s role is to bury what the speech act ripped out to be expressed, providing examples of the circuit between the telluric image and the sound images, both maintaining at once their “heautonomy” and their indirect, irrational and incommensurable relationship. [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.]

Session 22– May 14, 1985

Deleuze suspends discussion of cinematographic speech acts for this special session on technical and technological matters, but also recalls the operative hypothesis, that the modern visual image

is no longer defined through the inclusion of an out-of-field or an exteriority in relation to the seen image and filled with sound elements, with visual and sound images have gained their autonomy, or “heautonomy”. Relying on Béla Balázs’s work regarding the first stage of speaking cinema, Deleuze wonders if one can speak equally of sound framing and sound montage, of the role of technical advances in this alternative, and of possible transformations of cinema music in this process. However, this technical session includes Dominique Villain on sound framing, with various interventions (particularly Richard Pinhas) on related topics, notably on details of sound technology (microphones, filters, stereo). Then, Deleuze asks Pascale Criton to respond to the previous interventions, interrupted by Pinhas’s particular objections, discord causing Deleuze’s confusion about how the session unfolded. [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.]

Session 23 – May 21, 1985

Deleuze rapidly reviews the bases of discussion of spoken cinema, and following review of previous sessions, Deleuze emphasizes the importance of music to the autonomous status of the sound image and framing in relation to the visual image. Recalling having identified two kinds of speech acts, interactional and reflexive, Deleuze says that the “thunderclap” comes with the sound image itself maintaining its autonomy, itself becoming image, and suggesting the existence of a third type of speech act, Deleuze reexamines the technique of indirect free style (cf. Rohmer and Bresson). His purpose is to determine how the speech act is expressed when the sound element becomes an autonomous image, and then to ponder what such a speech act would consist of. This speech act is linked to the lie as an act of fabulation (cf. Robbe-Grillet, Rohmer, Jean Rouch, Pierre Perrault, Pasolini), then Deleuze returns to the any-space-whatever (*espace quelconque*) in modern cinema. As the sound image becomes autonomous, the visual image becomes telluric, tectonic (cf. Antonioni, Pasolini, and the Straubs), concluding that when the sound image and visual image become “heautonomous”, i.e., respectively autonomous in relation to one another, the sound image refers to a new type of speech act (the act of fabulation), and the visual image creates the event while also referring to a new kind of space, telluric space, tectonic space, geological space, buried within the event. [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 9.]

[Please note that this transcript here varies from the transcript order in the corresponding session on Web Deleuze and the Paris 8 sites, where the transcripts’ sections 2 and 3 are reversed. The version here follows the recording’s order, with part 3 connecting with discussion of Charles Péguy at the end of part 2 and ending with Deleuze dismissing the class.]

Cinema 4.24 – May 28, 1985

With the seminar’s two final sessions destined for students’ questions, Deleuze continues considering what he calls the disjunction between the visual and sound image and gives three examples of the sound-visual “heautonomy” (cf. Marguerite Duras, the Straubs, and Syberberg) describing the kinds of layering that occurs within certain films and between films, also the kind of broken circuit evident in the films’ irrational cuts. Emphasizing some commonalities between these filmmakers’ works, Deleuze emphasizes their differences, notably in speech acts, in the visual image, and in the sound-visual relationship. Deleuze also discusses issues of lighting in

the Straubs' films with Raymonde Carasco and Dominique Villain, and then as announced earlier, he suspends the cinema discussion to discuss Blanchot's essay "Speaking is not seeing" ["Parler, ce n'est pas voir"] [cf. *The Infinite Conversation*] to consider the unspeakable (*indicible*), the speech act attaining the limit of speech, corresponding to the act of resistance for the Straubs, the act of love for Duras. Deleuze through Blanchot contrasts the daily experience of sight, "vision", with the superior experience of "voyance" (illuminated vision), the visual at its limit. Finally, after posing the basic question "is an image of thought to be expected from cinema, and if so, what kind?", he reviews characteristics of the image of thought corresponding to the earlier period, contrasting four characteristics of the modern era and then provides a list of filmmakers with the kind of limits that they attain. Deleuze closes by requesting questions from students for the next sessions, concluding with particular finality by affirming, "I believe I've finished everything I had to say about cinema, so there you have it, I'm done with cinema". [Much of the development corresponds to *The Time-Image*, chapter 10.]

Cinema 4.25 – June 4, 1985

The session corresponds to three sets of comments followed by Deleuze's remarks: first, Georges Comtesse's extended intervention on instances of immanence (Deleuze's interpretation) and transcendence and silence (Comtesse's emphasis) in Duras, particularly "India Song"; second, Raymonde Carasco's intervention, first responding quickly to Comtesse, then reflecting, as a filmmaker, academic and cinema scholar, on how she understands the import of the four seminars and particularly the conceptual framework articulated by Deleuze, to which he returns to his self-professed obsession, Syberberg's cinema. Deleuze lists three important works for him – by Kracauer, Benjamin, and Syberberg – in order to trace the arc of reflection on the German soul in German cinema, the rise of the art of mass reproduction, and with reference to Daney and Virilio, Leni Riefensthal's role in developing this tendency as well as Goebbels's rivalry with Hollywood. Deleuze completes this reflection by considering the "stupidest sentence about cinema", that the cinematographic image is in the present, and notably how Robbe-Grillet manipulated this thought for his own ends. Third, Deleuze responds to one student's barely audible set of questions with a forty-minute summary of the conceptual evolution of year 3 into and through year 4 (with different manifestations of the time-image most clearly summarized in session 24). Deleuze explains the student's difficulty by possibly not having fully understood the nature of the "cut" between movement-image and time-image, thus providing a point-by-point review of differences between these two key concepts. Deleuze concludes the session by reminding the participants that he will be available in two weeks for a supplementary discussion session.

Cinema 4.26 – June 18, 1985

In another q&a session, the first question, on the concept of the "utterable" (*l'énonçable*) (see session 17) in relation to another concept, the act of fabulation. Deleuze's 90-minute response returns him to discussing questions of linguistics (notably, Hjelmslev and Gustave Guillaume), then to consider, with Bergson, how the sign operates a "cut" or "point of view" within sense as a kind of pre-linguistic material. Cinema, Deleuze argues, is the representation of the utterable, either as movement-image or time-image, but particularly as process of temporalization, and experimental cinema, Deleuze says the enunciable is developed in any-spaces-whatever, i.e., the

pure potentiality of the event. This perspective shifts Deleuze's focus to develop questions of the proposition and the event (cf. *Logic of Sense*), juxtaposing the Stoics' concept of the "expressible". Deleuze links the proposition and sense to cinema since, for him only through the cinema image – movement-image, time-image –, does the signified of power, or sense, or matter directly emerge as structure of movement or process of temporalization, via a shift from interior monologue to indirect free discourse. The session's final part focuses loosely on possible topics for the 1985-86 seminar: first, "what is philosophy?", but then, after hearing different suggestions, Deleuze mentions Blanchot and Foucault, even a return to Syberberg in relation to concepts from Blanchot. This process of speculation leads Deleuze to return finally to reflections on forms of political cinema (developed in *The Time-Image*, chapter 8), specifically on "acts of fabulation" in cinema and in art related to the notion of "the people are missing" and the concomitant need to fabulate as a process of self-invention as a "movement".