

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus I*, 1971-1972

Lecture 01, 16 November 1971

Translated by Rojan Josh; transcribed by [WebDeleuze](#); revised transcript, Charles J. Stivale

Codes, Capitalism, Flows, Decoding Flows, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Psychoanalysis

... What is it that moves over the body of a society? It is always flows, and a person is always a cutting off [*coupure*] of a flow. A person is always a point of departure for the production of a flow, a point of destination for the reception of a flow, a flow of any kind; or, better yet, an interception of many flows.

If a person has hair, this hair can move through many stages: the hairstyle of a young girl is not the same as that of a married woman, it is not the same as that of a widow: there is a whole hairstyle code. A person, insofar as she styles her hair, typically presents herself as an interceptor in relation to flows of hair that exceed her and exceed her case and these flows of hair are themselves coded according to very different codes: widow code, young girl code, married woman code, etc. This is ultimately the essential problem of coding and of the territorialization which is always coding flows with it, as a fundamental means of operation: marking persons (because persons are situated at the interception and at the cutting off [*coupure*] of flows, they exist at the points where flows are cut off [*coupure*]).

But now, more than marking persons—marking persons is the apparent means of operation—coding has a deeper function, that is to say, a society is only afraid of one thing: the deluge; it is not afraid of the void, it is not afraid of dearth or scarcity. Over a society, over its social body, something flows [*coule*] and we do not know what it is, something flows that is not coded, and something which, in relation to this society, even appears as the uncoded. Something which would flow and which would carry away this society to a kind of deterritorialization which would make the earth upon which it has set itself up dissolve: this, then, is the crisis. We encounter something that crumbles, and we do not know what it is, it responds to no code, it flees underneath the codes.

And this is even true, in this respect, for capitalism which for a long time believed it could always secure simili-codes; this, then, is what we call the well-known power [*puissance*] of recuperation within capitalism—when we say recuperate we mean: each time something seems to escape capitalism, seems to pass beneath its simili-codes; it reabsorbs all this, it adds one more axiom and the machine starts up again. Think of capitalism in the 19th century: it sees the flowing of a pole of flow that is, literally, a flow, the flow of workers, a proletariat flow: well, what is this which flows, which flows wickedly and which carries away our earth, where are we headed? The thinkers of the 19th century have a very strange response, notably the French

historical school: it was the first in the 19th century to have thought in terms of classes, they are the ones who invent the theoretical notion of classes and invent it precisely as an essential fragment of the capitalist code, namely: the legitimacy of capitalism comes from this: the victory of the bourgeoisie as a class opposed to the aristocracy.

The system that appears in the works of Saint Simon, Augustin Thierry, Edgar Quinet is the radical seizure of consciousness by the bourgeoisie as a class and they interpret all of history as a class struggle. It is not Marx who invents the understanding of history as a class struggle, it is the bourgeois historical school of the 19th century: 1789, yes, it is a class struggle, they are struck blind when they see flowing, on the actual surface of the social body, this weird flow that they do not recognize: the proletariat flow. The idea that this is a class is not possible, it is not one at this moment: the day when capitalism can no longer deny that the proletariat is a class, this coincides with the moment when, in its head, it found the moment to recode all this.

That which we call the power [*puissance*] of recuperation of capitalism, what is it? [It consists] in having at its disposal a kind of axiomatic, and when it sets upon [*dispose de*] some new thing which it does not recognize, as with every axiomatic, it is an axiomatic with a limit that cannot be saturated: it is always ready to add one more axiom to restore its functioning.

When capitalism can no longer deny that the proletariat is a class, when it comes to recognize a type of class bipolarity, under the influence of workers' struggles in the 19th century, and under the influence of the revolution, this moment is extraordinarily ambiguous, for it is an important moment in the revolutionary struggle, but it is also an essential moment in capitalist recuperation: I make you one more axiom, I make you axioms for the working class and for the union power [*puissance*] that represents them, and the capitalist machine grinds its gears and starts up again, it has sealed the breach. In other words, all the bodies of a society are essential: to prevent the flowing over society, over its back, over its body, of flows that it cannot code and to which it cannot assign a territoriality.

Need, scarcity, famine, a society can code these, what it cannot code, is when this thing appears, when it says to itself: what is up with these guys? So, in a first phase, the repressive apparatus puts itself into motion, if we can't code it, we will try to annihilate it. In a second phase, we try to find new axioms which allow it to be recoded for better or worse.

A social body is well defined as follows: there is perpetual trickery, flows flow over from one pole to another, and they are perpetually coded, and there are flows that escape from the codes. And then there is the social effort to recuperate all that, to axiomatize all this, to manipulate the code a little, so as to make room for flows that are also dangerous: all of a sudden. There are young people who do not respond to the code: they insist on having a flow of hair which was not expected, what shall we do now? We try to recode it, we will add an axiom, we will try to recuperate [it] but then [if] there is something within it that continues not to let itself be coded, what then?

In other words, this is the fundamental action of a society: to code the flows and to treat as an enemy anyone who presents himself, in relation to society, as an uncodable flow, because, once again, it challenges [*met en question*] the entire earth, the whole body of this society.

I will say this of every society, except perhaps of our own—that is, capitalism, even though just now I spoke of capitalism as if it coded all the flows in the same way as all other societies and did not have any other problems, but perhaps I was going too fast.

There is a fundamental paradox in capitalism as a social formation: if it is true that the terror of all the other social formations was decoded flows, capitalism, for its part, historically constituted itself on an unbelievable thing: namely, that which was the terror of other societies: the existence and the reality of decoded flows and these, capitalism made its proper concern.

If this were true, it would explain that capitalism is, in a very precise sense, the universal form of all societies: in a negative sense, capitalism would be that which all societies dreaded above all, and we cannot help but have the impression that, historically speaking, capitalism... In a certain sense, is what every social formation constantly tried to exorcise, what it constantly tried to avoid, why? Because it was the ruin of every other social formation. And the paradox of capitalism is that a social formation constituted itself on the basis of that which was the negative of all the others. This means that capitalism was not able to constitute itself except through a conjunction, an encounter between decoded flows of all kinds. The thing which was dreaded most of all by every social formation was the basis for a social formation that had to engulf all the others: that what was the negative of all formations has become the very positivity of ours, this makes one shudder.

And in what sense was capitalism constituted on the conjunction of decoded flows? It required extraordinary encounters at the end of a process [*processus*] of decodings of every kind, which were formed with the decline of feudalism. These decodings of all kinds consisted in the decoding of land flows, under the form of the constitution of large private properties, the decoding of monetary flows, under the form of the development of merchant fortunes, the decoding of a flow of workers under the form of expropriation, of the deterritorialization of serfs and peasant landholders. And this is not enough, for if we take the example of Rome, the decoding in decadent Rome, all this clearly happened: the decoding of flows of property under the form of large private properties, the decoding of monetary flows under the forms of large private fortunes, the decoding of laborers with the formation of an urban sub-proletariat: everything is found here, almost everything. The elements of capitalism are found here all together, only there is no encounter.

What was necessary for the encounter to be made between the decoded flows of capital or of money and the decoded flows of laborers, for the encounter to be made between the flow of emergent capital and the flow of deterritorialized manpower, literally, the flow of decoded money and the flow of deterritorialized laborers. Indeed, the manner in which money is decoded so as to become money capital and the manner in which the laborer is ripped from the earth in order to become the owner of his/her labor power [*force de travail*] alone: these are two processes totally independent from each other, there must be an encounter between the two.

Indeed, for the process of the decoding of money to form capital that is made all across the embryonic forms of commercial capital and banking capital, the flow of labor, the free possessor of his/her labor power alone, is made across a whole other line that is the deterritorialization of the laborer at the end of feudalism, and this could very well not have been encountered. A

conjunction of decoded and deterritorialized flows, this is at the basis of capitalism. Capitalism is constituted on the failure of all the pre-existent codes and social territorialities.

If we admit this, what does this represent? The capitalist machine, it is literally demented. A social machine that functions on the basis of decoded, deterritorialized flows, once again, it is not that societies did not have any idea of this; they had the idea in the form of panic, they acted to prevent this — it was the overturning of all the social codes known up to that point — ; so, a society that constitutes itself on the negative of all pre-existing societies, how can it function? A society for which it is proper to decode and deterritorialize all the flows -- flow of production, flow of consumption -- how can it function, under what form? Perhaps capitalism has other processes than coding to make it work, perhaps it is completely different.

What I have been seeking up until now was to reground, at a certain level, the problem of the relation capitalism / schizophrenia, and the grounding of a relation is found in something common between capitalism and the schizo: what they have totally in common. And it is perhaps a community that is never realized, that does not assume a concrete figure; it is a community of a principle that remains abstract, namely, the one like the other does not cease to filter, to emit, to intercept, to concentrate decoded and deterritorialized flows.

This is their profound identity, and it is not at the level of a way of life that capitalism renders us schizophrenic. It is at the level of the economic process: all this only works through a system of conjunction -- say the word then -- on condition of accepting that this word implies a veritable difference in nature from codes. It is capitalism that functions like an axiomatic, an axiomatic of decoded flows. All other social formations functioned on the basis of a coding and of a territorialization of flows and between a capitalist machine that makes an axiomatic of decoded flows such as they are or deterritorialized flows, such as they are, and other social formations, there is truly a difference in nature that makes capitalism the negative of other societies. Now, the schizo, in his own way, with his own tottering walk, he does the same thing. In a sense, he is more capitalist than the capitalist, more 'prole' than the 'prole': he decodes, he deterritorializes the flows and knots together a kind of identity in nature of capitalism and the schizo.

Schizophrenia is the negative of the capitalist formation. In a sense, schizophrenia goes further, capitalism functioned on a conjunction of decoded flows, on one condition, that is, at the same time that it perpetually decoded flows of money, flows of labor, etc., it incorporated them, it constructed a new type of machine, at the same time, not afterwards, that was not a coding machine, but an axiomatic machine.

It is in this way that it succeeds in making a coherent system, on condition that we say what profoundly distinguishes an axiomatic of decoded flows and a coding of flows. Whereas the schizo, he does more, he does not let himself be axiomatized either, he always goes further with the decoded flows, making do with no flows at all, rather than letting himself be coded, no earth at all, rather than letting himself be territorialized.

What is their relation to each other? It is from this point that the problem arises. One must study more closely the relation capitalism / schizophrenia, giving the greatest importance to this: is it true and in what sense can we define capitalism as a machine that functions on the basis of

decoded flows, on the basis of deterritorialized flows? In what sense is it the negative of all social formations, and along the same lines, in what sense is schizophrenia the negative of capitalism, that it goes even further in decoding and in deterritorialization? And just where does it go, and where does that take it? Towards a new earth, towards no earth at all, towards the deluge?

If I try to link up with the problems of psychoanalysis, in what sense, in what manner—this is strictly a beginning—, I assume that there is something in common between capitalism, as a social structure, and schizophrenia as a process. Something in common that makes it so that the schizo is produced as the negative of capitalism -- itself the negative of all the rest --, and that this relation, we can now comprehend it by considering its terms: coding of flows, decoded and deterritorialized flows, axiomatic of decoded flows, etc.

It remains to be seen what in the psychoanalytic and psychiatric problem continues to preoccupy us. One must reread three texts of Marx: in book I: the production of surplus value, the chapter on the tendential fall in the last book, and finally, in the *Grundrisse*, the chapter on automation.

Richard Zrehen: I did not understand what you said in regard to the analogy between capitalism and schizophrenia, when you said capitalism is the negative of other societies and the schizo is the negative of capitalism, I would have understood that capitalism is to other societies what the schizo is to capitalism, but, I would have thought, on the contrary, that you were not going to make this opposition. I would have thought of the opposition: capitalism / other societies and schizophrenia/ something else, instead of an analogy in three terms, to make one in four terms.

Cyril: Richard means to say the opposition between: capitalism/ other societies and schizophrenia and neuroses, for example.

Deleuze: Haaa, yes, yes, yes, yes. We are defining flows in political economy, its importance with actual economists confirms what I have been saying. For the moment, a flow is something, in a society, that flows from one pole to another, and that passes through a person, only to the degree that persons are interceptors.

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Let me take an example, you say that in a society one does not stop decoding, I'm not sure: I believe that there are two things in a society, one of which pertains to the principle by which a society comes to an end [*se termine*], one of which pertains to the death of a society: all death, in a certain manner, appears—this is the great principle of Thanatos—from inside [*dedans*] and all death comes from outside [*dehors*]. I mean that there is an internal menace in every society, this menace being represented by the danger of flows decoding themselves, it makes sense.

There is never a flow first, and then a code that imposes itself upon it. The two are coexistent. Which is the problem, if I again take up the studies, already quite old, of [Claude] Levi-Strauss on marriage: he tells us: the essential in a society is circulation and exchange. Marriage, alliance, is exchanging, and what is important is that it circulates and that it exchanges. There is, then, a

flow of women—raising something to a coefficient flow seems to me to be a social operation, the social operation of flows. At the level of society, there are no women, there is a flow of women that refers to a code, a code of age-old things, of clans, of tribes, but there is always flow of women, and then, in a second moment, a code: the code and the flow are absolutely formed face to face with one another.

What is it the problem then, at the level of marriage, in a so-called primitive society? It is that, in relation to flows of women, by virtue of a code, there is something that must pass through. It involves forming a sort of system, not at all like Levi-Strauss suggests, not at all a logical combinatory [*combinatoire*], but a physical system with territorialities: something enters, something exits. So here we clearly see that, brought into relation with a physical system of marriage, women present themselves in the form of a flow. Regarding this flow, the social code means this: in relation to such a flow, something of the flow must pass through, i.e.: flow; something must not go through; and, third — this will make up the three fundamental terms of every code — something must effect the passing through or, on the contrary, the blocking: for example, in matrilineal systems, everyone knows the importance of the maternal [*utérine*] uncle, why, in the flow of women, what passes through is the permitted or even prescribed marriage.

A schizo, in a society like that, he is not there; literally, it belongs to us, over there, it is something else.

There, it is different: there is a very good case studied by Pierre Clastres; there is a guy who does not know, he does not know whom he must marry, he attempts a voyage of deterritorialization to see a faraway sorcerer.¹ There is a great English ethnologist named [Edmund] Leach whose whole thesis consists in saying: it never works like Levi-Strauss says it does, he does not believe in Levi-Strauss's system: no one knows who to marry; Leach makes a fundamental discovery, that which he calls local groups and distinguishes from groups of filiation. Local groups, these are the little groups that machine [*machinent*] marriages and alliances and they do not deduce them from filiations: the alliance is a kind of strategy that responds to political givens. A local group is literally a group (perverse, specialists in coding) that determines, for each caste, what can pass through, what cannot pass through, that which must be blocked, that which can flow.²

In a matrilineal system, what is blocked? That which is blocked in all systems, that which falls under the rules of the prohibition of incest. Here, something in the flow of women is blocked; namely, certain persons are eliminated from the flow of marriageable women, in relation to other persons. That which, on the contrary, passes through is, we could say, the first permitted incest: the first legal incests in the form of preferential marriages; but everyone knows that the first permitted incests are never practiced in fact, it is still too close to that which is blocked. You see that the flow is interrupted here, something in the flow is blocked, something passes through, and here, there are the great perverts who machine marriages, who block or who effect passages. In the history of the maternal uncle, the aunt is blocked as an image of forbidden incest, in the form of a jesting kinship, the nephew has, with his aunt, a very joyous relation, with his uncle, a relation of theft, but theft, injuries, these are coded; see [Bronislaw] Malinowski.

A student: These local groups have magical powers?

Deleuze: They have an overtly political power [*pouvoir*], they sometimes call upon sorcery, but they are not witchcraft groups, they are political groups who define the strategy of a village in relation to another village, and a clan in relation to another clan.

Every code in relation to flows implies that we prevent something of this flow from passing through, we block it, we let something pass: there will be people having a key position as interceptors, i.e. so as to prevent passage or, on the contrary, to effect passage, and when we take note that these characters are such that, according to the code, certain prestations return to them; we better understand how the whole system works.

In all societies, the problem was always to code flows and to recode those that tended to escape—when is it that the codes vacillate in so-called primitive societies: essentially at the moment of colonialization, there where the code flees under the pressure of capitalism. For that is what it represents in a society of codes, the introduction of money; it scatters to the winds their entire circuit of flows, in the sense that they distinguish essentially three types of flows: the flows of production to be consumed, the flows of prestige, objects of prestige and flows of women. When money is introduced therein, it is a catastrophe -- see what [Robert] Jaulin analyses as ethnocide: money, Oedipus complex.³

They try to relate money to their code, as such it can only be a prestige good. It is not a production or consumption good, it is not a woman, but the young people of the tribe who understand quicker than the elders take advantage of money in order to seize hold of the circuit of consumption goods, the circuit of consumption that was traditionally, in certain tribes, controlled by women. So the young people, with money, seize hold of the circuit of consumption. With money which itself can no longer be coded, within a certain framework, we begin with money, and we end with money.

M[oney]-C[ommodity]-M[oney], there is absolutely no means of coding this thing here because the qualified flows are replaced by a flow of abstract quantity whose proper essence is the infinite reproduction for which the formula is M-C-M. No code can support infinite reproduction. What is formidable in so-called primitive societies is how debt exists, but exists in the form of a finite block, debt is finite.

So, in this sense flows pass their time by fleeing, it does not prevent the codes from being correlative and coding the flows. Undoubtedly, it escapes from all sides, and the one who does not let her/himself be coded, and so we say: that's a madman; we will code him/her: the village madman, we will make a code of the code.

The originality of capitalism is that it no longer counts on any code. There are code residues, but no one believes in them: we no longer believe in anything. The last code that capitalism knew how to produce was fascism: an effort to recode and reterritorialize even at the economic level, at the level of the functioning of the market in the fascist economy. Here we clearly see an extreme effort to resuscitate a kind of code that would function like the code of capitalism; literally, it could have lasted in the form in which it has lasted. As for capitalism, it is incapable of furnishing a code that covers the ensemble of the social field like a grid [*quadrille*], because its problems no longer pose themselves in terms of code. Its problem is to make a mechanism of

decoded flows as such, so it is uniquely in this sense that I oppose capitalism as a social formation to all the other known social formations.

Can we say that between a coding of flows corresponding to pre-capitalist formations and a decoded axiomatic, there is a difference in nature, or is there simply a variation? There is a radical difference in nature! Capitalism cannot furnish any code.

We cannot say that the struggle against a system is totally independent of the manner in which this system was characterized. It is difficult to consider that the struggle of socialism against capitalism in the 19th century was independent of the theory of surplus value, in so far as this theory specified the characteristic of capitalism.

Suppose that capitalism can be defined as an economic machine excluding the codes and making decoded flows function by taking them into an axiomatic. This already permits us to bring together the capitalist situation and the schizophrenic situation. Even at the level of analysis that has a practical influence, the analysis of monetary mechanisms (the neocapitalist economists, this is schizophrenic) when we see how the monetary practice of capitalism works, at the concrete level, and not just in theory, its schizoid character, can we say that it is totally indifferent to revolutionary practice?

All that we are doing in relation to psychoanalysis and psychiatry comes down to what? Desire, or, it matters little, the unconscious: it is not imaginary or symbolic, it is uniquely machinic, and as long as you have not reached the region of the machine of desire, as long as you remain in the imaginary, the structural or the symbolic, you do not have a genuine hold on the unconscious. They are machines that, like all machines, are confirmed as such by their functioning. Confirmations: the painter [Richard] Lindner obsessed by "Boy with machine", a huge little boy in the foreground holding a strange little machine, a kind of little kite and behind him, a big social technical machine and his little machine is plugged into the big one, in the background.⁴ That is what I attempted last year to call the orphan unconscious, the true unconscious, the one that does not pass through daddy-mommy, the one that passes through delirious machines, these being in a given relation with the large social machines.

Second confirmation: an Englishman, W.G. Niederland, did research on Schreber's father.⁵ This is what I object to in the text of Freud: it is as if psychoanalysis was a veritable millstone which crushed the deepest character of the guy, namely, his social character... When we read Schreber, the Great Mongol, the Aryans, the Jews, etc. And when we read Freud, not a word about all this, it is as if it was just some manifest content and that one had to discover the latent content = the eternal daddy-mommy of Oedipus. All the political, politico-sexual, politico-libidinal content, because in the end, when Schreber père imagined himself to be a little Alsatian girl defending Alsace against a French officer, there is political libido here. It is sexual and political at the same time, the one in the other; we learn that Schreber was well-known because he had invented a system of education == Schreber Gardens. He had produced a system of universal pedagogy.

Schizoanalysis proceeds in a direction that is the opposite of psychoanalysis, indeed, each time that the subject narrates something that brings her/him in the vicinity of Oedipus or castration, the schizo being analyzed says "Enough." What he sees as important, is that: Schreber père

invents a pedagogic system of universal value, that is not brought to bear on his own child, but globally: Pangymnasticon. If we suppress from the delirium [*delire*] of the son the politico-global dimension of the paternal pedagogic system, we can longer understand anything. The father does not supply a structural function, but a political system: I am saying that the libido passes through here, not through daddy and mommy, through the political system. In the Pangymnasticon, there are machines: no system without machines, a system, rigorously speaking, is a structural unity of machines, so much so that one must burst the system to reach the machines. And what are Schreber's machines: they are sado-paranoiac machines, a type of delirious machine. They are sado-paranoiac in the sense that they are applied to children, preferably to little girls.

With these machines, the children stay calm; in this delirium, the universal pedagogic dimension clearly appears: it is not a delirium about his son, it is a delirium that he constructs about the formation of a higher race. Schreber père acts against his son, not as a father, but as a libidinal promoter of a delirious investment of the social field. It is no longer the paternal function, but rather that the father is there to make something delirious pass through. This is certain, but the father acts here as an agent of transmission in relation to a field that is not the familial field, but that is a political and historical field, once again, the names of history and not the name of the father.

Georges Comtesse: We do not catch flies with vinegar, even if it's machinic.

Deleuze: Schreber père's system had a global development (belts for good conduct). It was a big social machine, and it was, at the same time, sown in the social machine, full of little delirious sado-paranoiac machines. So too, in the delirium of the son, certainly it is papa, but as a representative of what authority does he intervene. He intervenes as an agent of transmission in a libidinal investment of a certain type of social formation. On the contrary, the drama of psychoanalysis is the eternal familialism that consists in referring the libido, and with it all sexuality, to the familial machine, and we can go on to structuralize it, it changes nothing, we remain within the closed circle of: symbolic castration, structuring function of the family, parental characters, and we continue to crush all the outside [*dehors*]. [Maurice] Blanchot: a new type of relation with the outside.⁶

Yet, and this is the critical point, psychoanalysis tends to suppress any relation of itself and of the subject who has just been analyzed with the outside. On itself alone it pretends to reterritorialize us, onto the territoriality or onto the most mediocre earth, the most shabby, the oedipal territoriality, or worse, onto the couch. Here, we clearly see the relation of psychoanalysis and capitalism: if it is true that in capitalism, flows are decoded, are deterritorialized constantly, i.e. that capitalism produces the schizo like it produces money, the whole capitalist project [*tentative*] consists in reinventing artificial territorialities in order to reinscribe people, to vaguely recode them: they invent anything: HLM [*Habitation à Loyer Moyen*, i.e.: government-controlled housing], home, and there is familial reterritorialization, the family, it is after all the social cell, so they will reterritorialize the guy in a family (community psychiatry): they reterritorialize people there where all the territorialities are floating ones, they proceed through an artificial, imaginary, residual reterritorialization.

And psychoanalysis—classical psychoanalysis—fabricates familial reterritorialization, most of all by skipping over all that is effective in delirium, all that is aggressive in delirium, namely, that delirium is a system of politico-social investments, not just of any type: it is the libido that hooks itself onto political social determinations. Schreber is not dreaming at all when he makes love to his mother; he dreams when he is being raped like a little Alsatian girl by a French officer. This depends on something much deeper than Oedipus, namely, the manner in which the libido invests social formations, to the point that one must distinguish two types of social investments by desire: social investments of interests that are of the preconscious type, that, if necessary, pass through classes. And below these, not exactly in harmony with them, unconscious investments, the libidinal investments of desire.

Traditional psychoanalysis enclosed the libidinal investments of desire in the familial triangle and structuralism is the last attempt [*tentative*] to save Oedipus at the moment when Oedipus is coming apart at the seams.

The task of schizoanalysis is to see that parents play a role in the unconscious only as agents of interception, agents of transmission in a system of the flows of desire, of desiring machines, and what counts is my unconscious relation with my desiring machines. What are my own desiring machines, and, through them, the unconscious relation of these desiring machines with the large social machines with which they carry out...and that hence, there is no reason to support psychoanalysis in its attempt to reterritorialize us.

I take an example from [Serge] Leclaire's last book [*Démasquer le réel (Paris: Seuil, 1971)*; see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 323-324]; there is something that no longer works: "The most fundamental act in the history of psychoanalysis was a decentering that consisted in passing from the parents' room as referent to the analytical office." There was a time when we believed in Oedipus, and in the reality of seduction, it was not going strong even then, because the whole unconscious had been familiarized, a crushing of the libido onto daddy-mommy-me: the whole development of psychoanalysis was made in this direction [*sens*]: substitution of the phantasm for real seduction and substitution of castration for Oedipus. Leclaire: "To tell the truth, the displacement of the living kernel of the oedipal conjuncture, of the familial scene to the psychoanalytic scene, is strictly correlative to a sociological mutation in which we can psychoanalytically demarcate a recourse to the level of the familial institution," page 30. The family is shabby: the unconscious protests and no longer works to triangulate itself, happily there is the analyst to serve as a relay.

It no longer supports the family, custody and the concealment [*dérobement*] of an all-powerful real. We say, ouf!, we will finally have a relation with the extra familial real, ha! no! says Leclaire, for that which serves as a relay for the family, and that which becomes the guardian, the unveiling veiling of the all-powerful real is the office of the analyst.

You can no longer triangulate, oedipalize in the family; it no longer works. You will come onto the couch to triangulate and oedipalize yourself. And indeed, adds Leclaire: "If the psychoanalytic couch has become the place where the confrontation with the real is unfolded." The confrontation with the real does not take place on the earth, in the movement of territorialization, reterritorialization, of deterritorialization, it takes place on this rotten earth that is the couch of the analyst. "It is of no importance that the oedipal scene has no referent exterior

to the office, that castration has no referent outside the office of the analyst,” which signifies that psychoanalysis, like capitalism, finds itself faced with the decoded flows of desire, finds itself before the schizophrenic phenomena of decoding and deterritorialization, has chosen to make for itself a little axiomatic. The couch, the ultimate earth of European man today, his very own little earth.

This situation of psychoanalysis tends to introduce an axiomatic excluding all reference, excluding all relation with the outside whatever it may be, appears as a catastrophic movement of interiority when it comes to understanding the true investments of desire. From the moment we seized upon the family as referent, it was all screwed up. The last earth, the couch that valorizes and justifies itself on its own terms. It was compromised from the beginning, from the moment when we cut desire off from the double dimension—what I call the double dimension of desire: and its relation, on the one hand, with desiring machines irreducible to any symbolic or structural dimension, to functional desiring machines, and the problem of schizoanalysis is to know how these desiring machines work, and to reach the level where they work in someone's unconscious, which assumes that we will skip over Oedipus, castration, etc.

On the other hand, with social-political-cosmic investments, and here one must not say, that there would be any desexualization of the findings of psychoanalysis, for I am saying that desire, in its fundamental sexual form, can only be understood in its sexual investments. In so far as they do not bear on daddy-mommy, this is secondary, but in so far as they bear, on the one hand, on desiring machines, and on the other hand, in so far as they traverse our sexual, homosexual, heterosexual loves.

What is invested is always what cuts up [*des coupures*] of the dimensions of a historical social field, and certainly, the father and the mother play a role within it, they are agents of communication of desiring machines, on one hand of the machines with each other, and on the other hand, of the desiring machines with the large desiring machines.

Schizoanalysis is made up of three operations: A destructive task: skipping over the oedipal and castrating structures in order to reach a region of the unconscious where there is no castration etc., because desiring machines ignore this.

A positive task: That is to see and to analyze functionally, there is nothing to interpret = we do not interpret a machine, we grasp its functioning and its failures, the why of its failures: it is the oedipal collar, the psychoanalytic collar of the couch that introduces failures into desiring machines.

The third task: Desiring machines only work as long as they invest the social machines. And what are the types of libidinal investments, distinct from the preconscious investments of interests? These sexual investments -- cross all the beings that we love, all our loves -- it is a complex of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, that which we love. It is always a certain mulatto, a movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization; it is not the scrawny and hysteric territoriality of the couch. And across each being that we love, what we invest is a social field; these are the dimensions of this social field, and the parents are agents of transmission in the social field.

See George Jackson's letter,⁷ the classic black mother who says to her son, don't fool around and marry well, make money. This classic mother here, is she acting like a mother and like an oedipal object of desire, or is she acting in such a way that she transmits a certain type of libidinal investment of the social field, namely the type that marries well, he makes love, and this in the strictest sense of the term, with something through his wife, unconsciously, with a certain number of economic, political, social processes? And that love has always been a means through which the libido attains something other than the beloved person, namely a whole cutting up [*découpage*] of the historical social field, ultimately we always make love with the names of history.

The other mother [of Jackson] -- the one who says "grab your gun" -- it follows that the two act as agents of transmission in a certain type of social-historical investment, that from one to the other the pole of these investments has singularly changed, that in one case, we can say that they are reactionary investments, at the limit fascist, in the other case, it is a revolutionary libidinal investment. Our loves are like the conduits and the pathways of these investments that are not, once again, of a familial nature, but of a historico-political nature. And the final problem of schizoanalysis is not only the positive study of desiring machines, but the positive study of the manner in which desiring machines carry out the investment of social machines, whether it be in forming investments of the libido of a revolutionary type, whether it be in forming libidinal investments of the revolutionary type.

The domain of schizoanalysis distinguishes itself at this moment from the domain of politics, in the sense that the preconscious political investments are investments of class interests that are determinable by certain types of studies. But these still do not tell us anything about the other type of investments, namely specifically libidinal investments -- desire. To the point that it can happen that a preconscious revolutionary investment can be doubled by a libidinal investment of the fascist type = which explains how displacements are made from one pole of delirium to another pole of delirium, how a delirium has fundamentally two poles—which Artaud said so well: "the mystery of all is `Heliogabalus the Anarchist,'" because these are the two poles. It is not only a contradiction; it is a fundamental human contradiction, namely a pole of unconscious investment of the fascist type, and an unconscious investment of the revolutionary type. What fascinates me in a delirium is the radical absence of daddy-mommy, except as agents of transmission, except as agents of interception for there they have a role. But on the other hand, the task of schizoanalysis is to release in delirium the unconscious dimensions of a fascist investment and a revolutionary investment, and at a certain point, it slips; at a certain point it oscillates, this is the deep domain of the libido.

In the most reactionary, most folkloric territoriality, a revolutionary ferment can surge forth -- we never know -- something schizo, something mad, a deterritorialization: the Basque problem. They did much for fascism; in other conditions, these same minorities could have determined -- I am not saying this happens by chance -- they could have secured a revolutionary role. It is extremely ambiguous: it is not at the level of political analysis, it is at the level of analysis of the unconscious: the way it whirls about [*comment ça tourne*]. (Maud Mannoni: antipsychiatry in the question of the court judgement on Schreber = a completely fascist delirium).⁸ If antipsychiatry has a sense, if schizoanalysis has a sense, it is at the level of an analysis of the unconscious, to tip delirium from the pole that is always present, the reactionary fascist pole that implies a certain

type of libidinal investment, towards the other pole, no matter if it is hard and slow, the revolutionary pole.

Richard Zheren: Why only two poles?

Deleuze: We can make many, but fundamentally, there are clearly two great types of investment, two poles. The reference of libidinal investments is daddy-mommy; these are the territorialities, and the deterritorializations, this must be found in the unconscious, especially at the level of its loves. Phantasm of naturality: of a pure race, movement of the pendulum = revolutionary phantasm of deterritorialization.

If you're saying that, on the analyst's couch, what flows still flows, alright then. But the problem that I would pose here is: there are types of flow that pass beneath the door, what psychoanalysts call the viscosity of the libido, an overly viscous libido that does not let itself be grasped by the code of psychoanalysis, alright here yes, there is deterritorialization. But psychoanalysis says: negative reaction [*contre-indication*]. What annoys me in psychoanalysis of the Lacanian camp is the cult of castration.

The family is a system of transmission, the social investments of one generation passed on to another, but I absolutely do not think that the family is a necessary element in the making of social investments because, in any case, there are desiring machines that, on their own, constitute social libidinal investments of the large social machines. If you say: the madman is someone who remains with his desiring machines and who does not carry out social investments, I do not follow you. In all madness, I see an intense investment of a particular type of historical, political, social field, even in catatonic persons. This goes for adults as well as children, it is from earliest childhood that the desiring machines are plugged into the social field.

In themselves, all territorialities are equal to each other in relation to the movement of deterritorialization, but there is something like a schizoanalysis of territorialities, of their types of functioning. And by functioning, I understand the following: if the desiring machines are on the side of a great deterritorialization, i.e. on the path of desire beyond territorialities, if to desire is to be deterritorialized, one must say that each type of territoriality is able to support such or such a genre of machinic index: the machinic index is that which, in a territoriality, will be able to make it flee in the direction [*sens*] of a deterritorialization.

So, I take the example of the dream, from the point of view that I am attempting to explicate the role of machines, it is very important, different from that of psychoanalysis. When a plane flies or a sewing machine -- the dream is a kind of little imaginary territoriality, sleep or a nightmare is a deterritorialization -- we can say that deterritorialization and the reterritorialities only exist as a function of each other. But you can evaluate the force of a possible deterritorialization from the indexes on such or such a territoriality, i.e. how much it supports of a flow that flees. Flee and in fleeing, makes flee, not the others, but something from the system, a fragment.

A machinic index in a territoriality is what measures the power [*puissance*] of flight in this territoriality by making flows flee, in this regard all territorialities are not equal to each other. There are artificial territorialities; the more it flees and the more we can flee while fleeing, the

more it is deterritorialized. Our loves are always situated on a territoriality that, in relation to us, deterritorializes us or else reterritorializes us. In this regard, there are misunderstandings + a whole game of investments that are the problem of schizoanalysis. Instead of having the family as a referent, it has as a referent the movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

Richard Zrehen: I want to say that you employed the term “code” for so-called primitive societies. While I think it is not possible to think of them in terms of code, because of the well-known mark, because there is a mark, which requires exchange, it is because there is a debt that we have an obligation to exchange. What happens from their society to ours, is the loss of the debt, so when you say that the schizo is the negative of the capitalist and that capitalism is the negative of primitive societies, it is evident exactly what is lost, it is castration.

With this mark of principle, you are anticipating what makes up capitalism while crossing out castration. What is foreclosed in capitalism is this initial mark and what Marx tried to do was to reintroduce the notion of debt. When you propose to me a reactionary pole of investments and a revolutionary pole, I say that you are already taking the concepts of “revolutionary” and of `reactionary as already instituted in a field that does not permit an appreciation of what you are trying to say. You are using breaks [*coupure*], I will certainly admit that Oedipus and castration are *dépassé*, but capitalism... [*End of the session*]

Notes

¹ See *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 148; the reference is to Pierre Clastres, “L’arc et le panier”, *L’Homme* (April 1966) p. 70.

² On Leach, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 149-150.

³ On Jaulin’s analysis, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 168-169.

⁴ For the Richard Lindner painting, see the reproduction opposite the title page of the Vintage *Anti-Oedipus*.

⁵ On the “W.G. Nierderland” reference in *Anti-Oedipus*, see p. 297, the reference to “Schreber, Father and Son”, *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 28 (1959), pp. 151-169.

⁶ See Michel Foucault’s essay on Blanchot, often quoted by Deleuze: “The Thought from Outside,” in *Foucault/Blanchot*, trans. Brian Massumi, Maurice Blanchot, and Michel Foucault (New York: Zone Books, 1987).

⁷ The actual reference is missing in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 277, to *Soledad Brother: Prison Letters of George Jackson* (New York: Bantam, 1970).

⁸ This parenthesis in the transcript is quite ambiguous given that in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari state their opposition to Mannoni on this question: “We can’t go along with Maud Mannoni when she sees the first historical act of antipsychiatry in the 1902 decision granting Judge Schreber his liberty and responsibility, despite the recognized continuation of his delirious ideas”, p. 364; the reference is to Mannoni’s *Le psychiatre, son fou et la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1970)].