

Gilles Deleuze

On Anti-Oedipus, 1972-1973

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Conceptions of the Statement – Flow of financing

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There is a critical thread and a very vague positive line of research. The critical thread is that evidently, far from favoring the emergence of statements, psychoanalysis prevents any emergence of statements, and it deprives us of any chance of holding onto statements which are our own. This runs through everything. But the positive part, what interested us, was: what are the conditions of the production of statements which are specific to us, whether they are statements of individuals or statements of groups? And by virtue of the same thing, what are the conditions of a [*indistinct word*]? It is not surprising that psychoanalysis, by nature, deprives us of all possibility of enunciation; it is truly by nature that it considers the unconscious as something after the fact. The unconscious as, once again, something which is always already there, and to be reduced through a machine of interpretation. For our part, we consider the unconscious, on the contrary, as something which is never there, and which is to be produced, to be produced by a machine of experimentation. If I tried to sum up everything I have developed this year, it is that.

In passing, I would like to underline a few small things: last year, we attempted, with Guattari, a kind of critique of Oedipus, and in that regard, [*word missing*] there are lots of people who have said to us: Oedipus, you've understood nothing about it, Oedipus was never the father and the mother. So, what is it?

We are then told: Oedipus is the entrance to culture, or Oedipus is the entrance to the symbolic order, or Oedipus is the finitude of being, or Oedipus is the lack of being that is desire, or the lack of being which is life, or etc. There are even perverse variations: some say it's not the father and the mother, it's symbolic triangulation, or quaternation. This is the position of the symbolic school, the *École freudienne*.¹ And there are others who say: okay, it's daddy and mommy, only the triangulation is not Oedipus: that's Rene Girard.² That seems even funnier to me because, when we ask how it works, whether they are from the *École freudienne* or another school, it's all very well their saying: Oedipus is the symbolic, or: it is the entrance into the symbolic – the question is how does that work in concrete terms? Let me take a text by an author I shall not name, where he tells us of his patient: “He proceeds, without for all that having abandoned his sucking, chewing and obscene articulation ...” – it's a bit harsh treating his patient like that, because at the end of the day, the articulation of analysts can also sometimes leave something to be desired – “... through a sequence on the Bouches du Rhône, the Camargue, the pleasures of horse riding and the sea. Invitation to a voyage that I punctuate with a “*bouche de la mère*” [mouth of the mother]. In turn, disgusted, I would be tempted to say ...” – there the patient has something going for him – “... he stops in the grip of the greatest perplexity, before the gap that echoes back from his own speech.” That is a marvel.

It's like the letter where the guy said: "I want to go to a hippy group"; for me, that means something quite specific.³ Maybe he's making a mistake – but that's not the question – but "I want to go to a hippy group" means: I want to produce the unconscious. It means: I'm stuck, I'm in an environment where all production of the unconscious is impossible, I want to produce the unconscious. A schizoanalysis sets off in this direction: why does he want to produce the unconscious in this specific place? How is he going to produce it, etc? And his analyst said to him: "Hippy group = big pippee, you are impotent, it's always your theme of impotence." Here we see the radical misdeeds, the disgusting misdeeds of the machine of interpretation. The guy has no chance of escaping, he cannot hold onto a single statement. When someone comes and says to someone: "I want to go to a hippy group" and the other replies: "Ah, it's always your theme of impotence, castration again!", one is screwed from the beginning.

Now, in this text, I note first of all a blatant contempt for the patient, an unbearable contempt. Why is the patient defined by a "sucking, chewing and obscene articulation" while the analyst endows himself with a clear, luminous and intelligent voice? Then, the guy talks about the Bouches du Rhône and the analyst, with all his finesse, says: Bouches du Rhône = *bouche de la mère*. The machine of interpretation prevents the guy from making the slightest statement. In this regard, the commentary of the analyst has a touching naivety, because he even notices that the guy is completely disgusted: "In turn, disgusted, I would be tempted to say, he stops ..." Nothing troubles an analyst; he translates: he is disgusted, not by the enormity of what I have just said, he is disgusted by the perspicacity of what I have just said – "... before the gap which echoes back from his own speech." The gap that echoes back from his own speech, that's not difficult: when you pass any statement whatever in front of the machine of interpretation, necessarily, by the same fact, the immediate effect of this passage is what we saw last time: a splitting of the subject into subject of the statement and subject of enunciation; you are subject of a statement when you say 'the Bouches du Rhône', but the true subject of the statement is you-as-interpreted, namely 'the Bouches du Rhône is the mother's mouth.' The analyst has split the subject and he is surprised afterwards that the other is perplexed in the face of the gap that echoes back from his own speech. He didn't even have the time to say anything, that's what's so fascinating in this psychoanalytic operation.

So what I insist on is that it is in the same way that psychoanalysis inhibits all production of statements and treats the unconscious as something to reduce through the interpretation machine; and on the contrary, that it incites statements or even manages to hear, to make enunciation possible, whether it be of individuals or of groups – at the same time, that is what it is to produce the unconscious; the unconscious: you do not have it, the unconscious is not *there*, the unconscious is not in your early childhood. The unconscious is something which is produced and which can only be produced in places, in circumstances which are precisely non-repressive places, circumstances and events.

One of the aspects of repression is precisely – and it is through this that psychoanalysis participates in repression in the strictest sense – ..., on the contrary, the condition of production of the unconscious implies places where repression is no longer exercised in the form of a splitting of the subject (we will distinguish in you the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation, and this splitting will be precisely the splitting of castration). It is in this sense that for the past few weeks we have been revolving around the idea: to produce statements or to produce the unconscious: this is strictly the same thing. This is what I explained badly last time, because I said that to understand this properly, you have to see that

when I say that the unconscious is not already there, that we must not look for it in childhood, I mean something quite simple: I don't at all mean, as in ordinary psychoanalytic vocabulary, that what counts is the actual [*actuels*] factors⁴ of a disorder, as opposed to the infantile factors, I mean something else again, because once again, the valorization of the actual factors against the infantile factors, in particular at the level of neurosis – that came about in the context of all the ruptures, all the dissidences with Freud; and the disagreements with Freud never changed anything fundamental. I mean, on the contrary, that, however far back you go in someone's childhood, the problem is already this: how is a child going to produce the unconscious? It is in this sense that I say that it is never 'there'. It is never there because the child already found himself faced with the task: are they going to prevent me – even if he does not formulate it in this way – from producing the unconscious or am I going to be in favourable conditions to produce it?

It is obvious that one of the fundamental aspects of repression in education is to prevent the production of the unconscious in the child. In what way? I'm confused and this is why I'm coming back to this: I was saying that what really needs to be distinguished is *childhood blocs* and *childhood memory*. Only here, childhood memory is not something which exists after the fact. Not at all. We have to go back to Bergson, because he is very good, Bergson. Bergson is anyway the one who, one day, came up with a crazy theory of memory; and then became the first philosopher who, as philosopher, truly got under the skin of the psychiatrists. He wrote *Matter and Memory*, which put a kind of disorder into psychiatry; ... that's already very good. Bergson had a very simple and very beautiful idea; he said: memory is contemporaneous with what one remembers; it is at the same time that something is present or is past.⁵ For a very simple reason: because if we had to wait for the present to pass in order to create the memory of the present that has become past, in order to create the memory of the former present, it would never constitute itself. If it were necessary to wait until the former present was no more for the memory of this present to be formed, there would be no possibility of forming a memory; it is therefore necessary, and this was the schema of a kind of divergent line, [that] at each moment the present doubles in two directions, one stretched towards the future, one stretched towards the past⁶; that is to say: it is at the same time that the present is lived as present and that the memory of this present is created; which allowed him to explain in parentheses the phenomenon known as paramnesia, that is to say, phenomena of *déjà vu*, *déjà vécu* [already experienced]; he said that there is nothing surprising about it, it's just a disorder of perception. Since the memory is constituted contemporaneously with that of which it is the memory, all it takes is a disorder in the line of bifurcation so that, instead of perceiving the thing as present, you perceive the memory of the thing, since the memory is contemporaneous with the thing, and, at that moment, you have a phenomenon of paramnesia.

It is in this sense that we should distinguish childhood blocs and childhood memories. And the childhood bloc is truly [*indistinct word*] from early childhood. And there, I say that in the childhood bloc you will find nothing of what psychoanalysis tells us to be the life of childhood; you will find nothing Oedipal there. You will find a completely different affair there; you will find there a whole ensemble of machinic connections, machinic connections which form the true life of the unconscious, non-figural and non-symbolic. A child playing hopscotch or playing with a ball: there is a whole system there of blocs of childhood in the living state, in the actual state, and you will find there a life of childhood that does not refer to psychoanalytical coordinates, that is to say, the famous coordinates of Oedipus-castration. It is at the same time that the memory of this life is constituted. There is contemporaneity

between the living bloc of childhood and the memory of childhood, and the memory of childhood is fundamentally Oedipal, just like the dream.

Of course, the psychoanalysts are justified at the level of the dream: it is the same movement which produces Oedipus and which produces the dream – but that's not what counts. Childhood memory is Oedipal because the child constitutes, creates his childhood memory contemporaneously with the corresponding childhood bloc, but he creates it entirely already related to the Oedipal coordinates, because he creates it wholly at the level of a veritable narrative conduct: what I am going to tell mummy, what I am going to tell daddy; at the level of consciousness, of the pre-conscious, of the unconscious, a kid does not pass a day without selecting, that is to say without living on a double register – but once again strictly at the same time, – that of which he has the memory and the memory itself, namely the lived bloc of childhood which determines desiring connections, and the childhood memory which, on the contrary, is already a past, but a past strictly contemporaneous with the present of which it is the past, and which retains what, of the desires of the child, will be able to be related to the father and to the mother. This is narrative conduct. Here, we would have to go back to [Pierre] Janet: old Janet had a very nice theory about [*missing word* – narrative?]⁷, about memory and recollection as being essentially a conduct that consists in referring to the people to whom one is (at least possibly) going to recount a narrative [*récit*].⁸

So, in effect, there is already a whole crushing of the unconscious which is produced at the level of childhood memory, not at all because memory is produced after the fact, but on the contrary, because it is contemporaneous with what is remembered, because it is strictly at the same time as the corresponding present; it is not at the same time as a new present which would succeed the old one, it is contemporary with the old present of which it is the memory. And it is in this way that it represents a fantastic work of selection, where only those connections of a child's desire will be retained that are capable of being related to daddy and mommy. Memory, by nature, is Oedipal, and it is memory that has projected the shadow of an unconscious which would already be there, and always was already there, and which would be to be interpreted. So that the task vis-a-vis the child is to disengage childhood blocs from the childhood memories that cover them over. Childhood blocs are the child's pieces of experimentation. Childhood memory – that's a child who, whatever he does, against his will, finds himself defenseless in the face of interpretations, and he finds himself defenseless in the face of these interpretations of the adult because childhood memory is precisely the process through which the child of a narrative is constituted as subject of the statement, and therefore refers to a superior authority, whether it be the father or something else, who will discover the true subjects of enunciation, that is to say that he will make an interpretation; so that here I would say: the childhood bloc is really the machinic assemblages which produce the real statements of the child. Once again, it is never a subject which produces the statements, it is the machinic connections, it is the connections of desire that traverse the child and which produce such or such statement.

Now, the combination *machinic assemblages–production of statements* is opposed to the process of interpretation which is based entirely on childhood memory, the splitting of a subject into subject of statement and subject of enunciation with, as a postulate, that what would produce statements are not machinic assemblages. These are not free connections of desire, rather what would produce statements is the subject. The idea that it is the subject which produces statements is already the sufficient condition for no statement to be produced, it is already the great inhibition of every statement, ensured by the machine of interpretation.

The problem of the child – once it is said that one never ceases being a child, that already goes without saying, there is no difference in nature at the level of desire ... There is no desire of the child on the one hand, and desire of the adult on the other, but that does not prevent there from being a catastrophic, dramatic difference. It's that there are people who live childhood and their own childhood under the form of childhood memories. And there, we cannot say enough to what extent psychoanalysis is not the only one responsible for this, but to what extent it supports this oppressive force that makes us live our childhood under the form of childhood memories, all sorts of social forces, familial forces, etc., forces which push us to live our childhood under the form of childhood memories, and which from then on, send us back to interpretation: "Mummy, tell me, is it really true that that happened to me when I was little?" This time, it is the machine of familial interpretation: above all, you should not ask your mum for anything, above all not a childhood memory. Or, there is the other technique, which consists in living one's childhood, once it is said that one has always remained there, in the form of a reinjection of childhood blocs. The problem of desire, in desiring relationships, is indeed: how to make this kind of injection and how to reinject blocs of childhood.

And here, I'm thinking back to an author I've talked a lot about this year, it's Kafka. With Kafka, it seems so curious to me how he plays on so many tables at the same time because he has so much humour; sometimes he really makes an inscription of childhood memories: example: the 'Letter to the Father'; and everyone says: you see how Oedipal he is! But not at all, because he's doing that for his own personal joke, he is full of joy, he's ladling on the childhood memories. But when he passes on to another degree both of humour and of seriousness, he doesn't do that at all, for example in *The Castle*; that proceeds in a completely different manner, by injecting childhood blocs into adult scenes. The Surveyor in *The Castle* is constantly traversed by veritable blocs of childhood which are intertwined with things of a completely different kind, and there, there are no longer Oedipal coordinates at all, there are sexual coordinates, homosexual coordinates, there are coordinates of every nature, but it is very different.

My problem is not only anti-psychoanalytical; it is anti-psychoanalytical in that psychoanalysis contributes with all its might to preventing the production of statements and the production of the unconscious, because the production of statements and production of the unconscious are the same thing. To produce a statement is to produce the unconscious. But it is not only psychoanalysis which prevents the production of statements and the production of the unconscious – once again, the production of the unconscious or the production of statements, we have to call it what it is, it is always a revolution. We can even define the revolutionary period in any domain by this: new statements are produced; and thereby a charge of the unconscious is not released, it is produced. And that this is accompanied by a fantastic release of childhood blocs, in opposition to the memories on which the old system functions, it's obvious.

And today, we had to examine this question of the production of statements as seen through its authors, whom we began to talk about last time. I had just attempted to say how that presented itself in Baudrillard's case. I'll just keep this from Baudrillard's answer, because that's all I will need today: Baudrillard tells us that what produces statements is a transformation, it's when exchange-value transforms itself into sign-value. And when this operation is produced, there is a creation of statements, whether these statements are verbal or not verbal. So it is this transformation which is itself productive of statements. In the last instance, we saw that this transformation of exchange-value into sign-value referred to – the

sign-value itself referred to – something that was going to make us very sad, namely the splitting of the subject, whether this subject occluded or hid castration, or whether it exhibited it; in other words, we fell back onto the classical thesis which seems to me the thesis of Western, Christian, Cartesian philosophy, etc. Namely that what produces the statement is the subject, and from the fact that it produces the statement, it can only produce it as split into subject of statement and subject of enunciation. The psychoanalytical grain of salt consisting in saying that the splitting is castration, whereas Descartes would have said that all that is reflection ... but in any case everywhere it is the subject who is the producer of statements, and it is not by chance that it is the same in Lacan: on the problem of the production of statements, he brings back the *cogito*. See page 819 of the *Écrits*, but perhaps it is page 719.⁹

So, in our study of Baudrillard, we started out gaily saying to ourselves: here's a thesis on: under what conditions are statements produced? And the beginning of the answer interested us a great deal, namely, what produces statements is the transformation of exchange-value into sign-value. And then, if we were very dejected afterwards, it was insofar as the sign-value referred us to a split subject, therefore to what is simultaneously the most classical and the most psychoanalytic thesis, when the splitting of the subject, on the contrary, is what prevents the production of statements. And it is not by chance that then, on the inverse side, on the other aspect of our problem, which is *production of statements = production of the unconscious*, Baudrillard, in the same way that he told us that what produced statements is ultimately the split subject, from then on, at the level of the inverse, there was obviously no longer any production of the unconscious, there was nothing more than an unconscious of castration, and the unconscious of the statement was castration itself, namely castration occluded by sign-value. We had so many hopes ...

So then I said to myself that we had to look at things from the side of Jean-Pierre Faye and his two recent books, *Théorie du récit* [*Theory of Narrative*] and *Langages totalitaires* [*Totalitarian Languages*], because there too, it is indeed the same problem, namely the production of statements or the production of the unconscious.¹⁰ He does not quite put it like that, so I'm in bad faith; because if he does not quite put it like that, it's because it is perhaps not his problem. What allows me to say that in a way it *is* his problem is that the whole of Faye's beautiful book consists in interrogating the condition of the production of statements in a period of history. What I find interesting is how what Faye says is close to Baudrillard – although I shall have to go rather quickly – and how it is very different from him. I can say right away that it is very different, because the answer will not be of the type: what produces the statement is a subject. There will also be – which there is not in Baudrillard – a true transformation in connection with the production of statements. There will be a true transformation – the nature of which I'm not certain about – of the relation of the statement with the unconscious. Therefore, with these two criteria, I can already say that this thesis is all the more interesting to us.

The first thing which strikes me, truly by chance, because I'm not making a judgment, it's only impressions: I say to myself that the common point with Baudrillard is that he too starts from exchange. He starts from exchange-value.

So Faye also starts from exchange, and his own schema – this is what fascinates me in his book and I think it is a very important book: the examples he gives will exceed what he says about them – his problem is how, starting from exchange, the production of statements, which for his part he calls *narratives*, is made. How are narratives produced starting from exchange? And here, something very curious happens; three texts are very important. First of

all, on page 18 of *Theory of Narrative*, he cites a text by a historian of the 17th or 18th century named Mably¹¹; and this is what Mably says in a historical narrative: “Some young Huns were hunting on the banks of the Palus a doe they had chased across a marshland which they regarded as an impassable sea. And, recklessly following their prey, they were astonished to find themselves in a new world. These hunters, eager to tell their families the wonders they had seen, returned to their dwellings, and the narratives through which they aroused the curiosity of their compatriots were to change the face of nations. Never were a people more terrible than Huns.”¹²

Faye’s commentary: “At the beginning and on the right bank of the Rhine, there are the conditions and modes of material production and of exchange.” – So exchange is primary – “Then suddenly – triggering the sudden ‘revolution’ of this crossing of the Rhine – intervenes the unforeseen event of these ‘narratives’ which will ‘change the face of nations’: of this production of supplementary and, so to speak, discontinuous, action, through *the effect of narrative*”.¹³

What strikes me as fascinating is that in the same example what intervenes, as if by chance, is a kind of migratory flow, the Huns; and he does not particularly focus on this, it has the air of being a simple example. We go from the material conditions of exchange to the production of narrative forms, i.e. to the production of statements; the same example allows a factor to intervene which for the moment he does not put into play in his schema, namely the Huns crossing the river, that is to say, a *flow* of a certain nature. Isn’t this dimension, which is already there in the example, but which he doesn’t make use of, isn’t that enough to explode the pseudo-genesis starting from exchange?

Second moment of Faye’s thesis: how to account for this, that the conditions of exchange will engender ... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... you see how we remain in exchange. The commodity as “material change” and as belonging to exchange, he says; or on the other hand, the commodity in its form which culminates with what Marx calls, at the beginning of *Capital*, the “money-form”; or, as Faye says, the commodity as “change of form”. “History begins with this double process: material change [*changement*] and exchange”, on the one hand, and on the other hand, “change [*change*] of form.”¹⁴

If I compare this with Baudrillard’s schema, he told us that exchange-value is transformed under certain conditions, and that it is sign-value that is productive of statements; here, exchange value or exchange, envisaged in its materiality, is transformed into commodity form. And on that, Faye will draw a whole parallel between the commodity form and the narrative form. Parallel at what level? At this level: that the narrative circulates just as much the commodity, and that it circulates according to rules homologous to those of the commodity, and that a narrative is fundamentally circulatory in the same way as a commodity.

I say to myself that, at the level of this second thesis of Faye, here too we find something both very interesting and very irritating. The general problem of the production of statements was: how does desire, and in what sense does desire make up part of the deepest structures of a social formation, or if you prefer, in more familiar terms, how does desire make up part of the infrastructure itself? Now such a question implies the refusal of any return to a thesis that one could call parallelist or metaphorical, and a metaphoricist or parallelist thesis is indeed

the ordinary psychoanalytical thesis. If we admit that the question is well posed, to ask how and under what conditions desire makes up part of the infrastructure itself, any answer which proceeded through a simple parallelism between economic forms and forms of desire, between political economy and desiring economy, therefore which would maintain a dualism and only unite the two through a metaphor or through a parallelism, without showing at all that, on the contrary, desire works on economic structures, that is to say, that there is only a single economy, any restoration of a duality in the economy at the level of a parallelism of a so-called economy and a so-called desiring economy, any establishment of a link between the two, in the form of a metaphor – all that seemed ruinous to us, because it returns to the oldest positions.

Now, Faye is in the process, in turn – when the problem was how to explain that desire had taken on, in a social field, the bizarre forms that emerged with fascism, and thereby how the production of fascist statements in the social field of Germany was constructed at such a moment, which indeed implied a problem of the investment by desire of a whole social historical field – he is in the process of restoring, just like Baudrillard, a simple parallelism between the commodity form and the form of the narrative, or the narrative considered as form of statements.

All this is because he started, like Baudrillard, from the problem of exchange-value, and that is not possible. If we start from exchange-value, we do not give ourselves the conditions, we will be left wondering how exchange-value transforms itself. Baudrillard's answer: it transforms itself into sign-value; Faye's answer: it transforms itself into commodity form, and there is a parallelism between commodity form and narrative form. But, in any case, it is a restoration of a parallelism between the two economies; and one cannot start from exchange-value as production of statements or as a condition for the production of statements, for a very simple reason: there has never been exchange-value.

The whole operation which consists today in suppressing use-value in the economy, or in carrying its critique as far as possible, in order to find exchange-value as primary in relation to use-value: in what way is it insufficient? Exchange no less than use is said to be second in relation to exchange¹⁵; exchange is obviously second in relation to something of a completely different nature, namely that exchange implies a kind of flow of communication which can only have the slightest consistency in relation with a completely different flow. In political economy, exchange refers to an aspect of money which is a superficial aspect, or at least a secondary aspect, and the money-form in the commodity very precisely illustrates just that, so that to seek on the side of the commodity form a condition, if only by analogy, for the production of statements is already lost in advance. The money-form refers to money [*argent*] as purchasing power, and money as purchasing power can be considered as a flow; for example, we will be told today that the flow of wages indeed refers to money as purchasing power, and that is what exchange value is.

An economy has never functioned like that. An economy, in whatever social formation it may be, can only inscribe exchanges, can only make the circuits of exchange at the basis of money function as purchasing power, as a function of a flow of a wholly different nature. Once again, exchange belongs to arithmetic, it only belongs to the plus and minus, and it clearly appears in this form with Marx, for example when Marx explains how to buy the cheapest and sell the dearest.¹⁶ At the level of money as purchasing power, it always belongs to arithmetic; and furthermore, one of the aspects of the Marxist theory of surplus value still

belongs to arithmetic, namely that we pay this to the worker, while he is made to work according to another quantity.

Now an economic field cannot be defined by a simple arithmetic because arithmetic is the homogeneity of quantities and an economic system is based, on the contrary, on a fundamental heterogeneity of quantities, namely – and in particular, it seems obvious to me that Leftism always rediscovers an autonomous problem of power [*pouvoir*], it's not like the cretins [*missing word – say?*], the official and traditional Marxists, it's not at all because Leftism neglects the importance of so-called economic mechanisms [*instances*], it's for a completely different reason. It is not because Leftism would return to a kind of idealism of power: when Foucault is increasingly interested today in the conditions of the exercise of power and when he says that the exercise of power is not a mere tracing of economic structures – and it goes without saying that that does not mean that power falls from the sky, nor does it mean that power is independent of economic structures – then what might that mean today, this rebirth of a specific problem, of a specific problem of power, to the point that, for a certain time, one has recognized as being almost the basic Leftist manifesto, a certain posing of the problem in terms of power. That means that an economic field is never defined arithmetically according to an exchange-value or a form of exchange, because the form of exchange which refers to money as purchasing power [*pouvoir d'achat*] forms a flow which can only flow in a social field, which can only be exercised in a social field, when put in relation with a flow of another nature.

What does that mean, a flow of another nature? The phrase 'other nature' has a very rigorous meaning; it means a flow of another power [*puissance*], namely that the economic operations of a social formation, however simple they appear to us, and even if they appear to us as exchangeist – in parentheses, structuralism is fundamentally exchangeist – the economic operations are carried out under a form of differential relations, and differential relations are not at all $A + a$ or $A - a$, they are relations of the dy/dx type, which means something very simple: the differential relation is the putting in relation of quantities which are not of the same power, in other words, it always takes at least two flows which are not at the same power, and that's where money [*argent*] is to be found. In money in general [*argent*] or in actual money [*monnaie*]¹⁷, you have a form of power [*puissance*] I which is money as purchasing power [*pouvoir d'achat*], and then a form of power [*puissance*] X, money as structure of financing. In appearance, it is the same money and what makes one believe that it is the same is the existence of a differential relation. But it goes without saying that the structure of financing is not even made with money [*argent*] that is realizable here and now; and even so all exchange, or all money as purchasing power, presupposes money [*monnaie*] as structure of financing.

And that is what is important in an economic structure like capitalism, it is the duality of the two flows, money as structure of financing, the flow of financing, and the flow of purchasing power – assuming of course that the flow of purchasing power is strictly subordinated as a flow of lesser power to the flow of financing. It is in this sense that one should not think of a powerful man, for example Monsieur Dassault¹⁸, or a banker, as someone who has more money in his wallet than a worker. A banker's fortune, by definition, is a fortune in the form of a financing structure that is not realizable here and now. It is, literally, a completely different flow with a completely different nature to the flow of purchasing power. His power does not come from a greater purchasing power, his power comes from the fact that he handles and determines the direction of financial flows. He has a power over the flow of

purchasing power of his workers, but because, first of all, he is the master of a flow of financing.

So that taking exchange-value as a starting point in economics is a disaster, since money itself only intervenes in exchange-value, that is to say, gives to the commodity its form, as a function of a flow of a completely different kind; and that if there was not a flow of a completely different sort, then we would understand nothing about anything, starting with problems of power. This is because, from the moment that the economic field, the flow of financing is affected by an infinitely greater power, of a power X, in relation to the flow of purchasing power affected by the power I, this is why I would say that in one case, there are signs of power, whereas in the case of purchasing power, where money serves as means of exchange, what's involved (and I am using a barbarism) are 'impotent' signs. However rich you are, however strong your purchasing power, money as purchasing power defines a set of impotent signs which only receive their power from the other flow, the flow of financing. And just as money as purchasing power is governed by laws of exchange, so is the other flow governed by completely different laws, namely laws of the creation and destruction of money.

This is why an engendering of the power of statements or of the production of the unconscious starting from the circuit of exchange never works; it is because in fact, this circuit of exchange only intervenes or is only valid in relation to a circuit of a different power which is the circuit of creation-destruction.

This is what I would say in order to round off this overview and these criticisms – it's all rather confused – of Faye's book. When he does precise analyses of the mechanisms of the Nazi economy, there too his example has applications far beyond.

Let us return to the Huns. Faye told us: there is the circuit of exchange, and then there is narrative. A young Hun watched all that happen and came to tell all about it; he said to his friends: yonder, there is money [*argent*], etc. I'm not necessarily saying that the two flows which come into play to define a production of narrative or a production of statements or a production of the unconscious – I'm not say that these two flows must necessarily be the flow of financing and the flow of purchasing power. I'm saying that, whatever the case, there will be two flows of different powers. It is not by chance that we find ourselves before a nomadic flow, a flow of nomadism in full migration, the Huns, and a flow of a wholly different nature, a flow of exchange which presupposes a certain mobility, but which is found in a given territory, on the other side of the Rhine. It might come across that I'm talking nonsense here, and that's true, but ...

A student: Where do you place the purchase of means of production?

Deleuze: That's complicated, because the purchase of means of production straddles the two; it will involve both the two flows of different powers. There is indeed a moment when the seller of the means of production is paid. There, there is indeed a conversion into money as purchasing power, and it is necessary. I am not saying at all that the two flows are without relation to each other, since on the contrary, the differential relation puts them in relation. There is always a moment when there is the conversion of a monetary mass, or a creation-destruction of money, with a purchasing power, it is even the problem many economists are posing at the moment: how this conversion is made? So the purchase of means of production does indeed imply money as purchasing power, but the means of production themselves,

insofar as they make up part of an enterprise, and insofar as they have only been purchased, for example, as a function of a business capital, of business investments, of a relation between one enterprise and another which brings into play, step by step, the whole of the economy in a social field – that already supposes a structure of financing. This distinction can be expressed in all sorts of ways: I can say that it is the distinction between creation-destruction of money and purchasing power, I can say that it is the distinction that other economists make between capital on the one side, and money [*argent*] on the other. I can say that we can make the distinction between wage bill [*masse salariale*] and monetary mass. So for your example of money in its relations with the means of production, I think we would find that the means of production are traversed by the two flows. Perhaps the example of the Nazi economy, about which I would like to say a few words, will make this even clearer.

What strikes me is that, in a social formation – if you grant me that it is not arithmetical operations of exchange which establish the variables, but it is differential relations between different quantities of power – on the one hand, power [*pouvoir*] and the specificity of power is directly grounded on the same thing. If there is a problem of power, and a problem which should not be subordinated to the economy, any more than it should be posed in a simply ideological manner, it comes from this: power consists precisely in the primacy that the flow of a higher power [*puissance*] has over the flow of a lower power. In other words, to think power [*pouvoir*] in terms of exchange and what happens starting from exchange value, is an enterprise as stupid as seeking the productions of statements in exchange. In the two examples I'm taking: capitalism, flow of capital under the form of structure of financing, flow of exchange under the form of purchasing power, exchange being second, i.e. being the flow of lesser power, the capitalist system constituting the differential relations between the two flows, it is quite obvious that the higher flow of power has at least the character of having its own type of mobility and of determining the limits of the mobility of the other.

Capital has its own mobility. This is even its international character, it is its system of flight, it is the movement of the circulation of capital. The lesser flow of purchasing power which corresponds to the flow, or if you like, of which one of the components is the flow of labor – that has also its mobility. There is a mobility of capital and there is also a mobility of the worker. Now, the capitalist system, economically, is indeed a system which will propose from the beginning to fix the mobility of labor according to the exigencies of the mobility of capital, so that labor and purchasing power do not at all have a mobility which would be their own, but their mobility is strictly measured and regulated by the requirements of the mobility of capital. Therefore, in any economic field, I would not only say that there is a differential relation between at least two quantities of different powers, it will be necessary to say that there is a relation between these quantities, in such a way that the one is not only endowed with a fundamental mobility which one could call, for convenience sake, 'nomadism', in the most general sense of the word; but that the other, the impotent quantity, the quantity of lesser power, will only receive mobility as required by the superior quantity of power which, therefore, will encode it, divide it up, prevent it from moving if need be, will oblige it to move according to the requirements of the other quantity if necessary, etc. These are all problems of the 19th century, of how to organise the mobility of labor according to the requirements of capital, i.e. of the mobility of capital itself.

But what I like is that in Faye's example, what do we see? We see nomads, the Huns, they cross the Rhine; they themselves are a migrant flow which follows another flow, a hunting flow: following a sheep¹⁹, the little Hun crosses the Rhine, looks around, and then goes and

tells his friends what it's like on the other side of Rhine; and Mably says: never was anything more terrible than when they crossed the Rhine.

In a completely different domain – for the moment, we are not trying to make a link, we are just seeking an echo – there is this nomadic flow which enters into relation with a flow of exchange: what happens? – In a very recent book by [Georges] Duby, *Warriors and Peasants*²⁰, there is something very important for us in the same direction which will act as a junction. The historian Duby explains something similar to this, which takes place at the end of the 10th century. At the end of the 10th century, things are going very badly: it is the period of the decomposition of the Carolingian empire. Money [*argent*] is no longer backed by the powers [*puissances*] of financing, by powers of the imperial type. And money is still there, sort of, but as it is never starting from that that you do anything, but since it is the other aspect of money which makes possible the use of money as purchasing power, in the imperial decomposition of Carolingian power, money literally no longer functions at all. Use is made of it in medals and above all, it goes into the monasteries, or it is even put into graves: this is funerary wealth, where it is no longer used as such in exchanges.²¹ Exchange then falls back – to speak like Faye – into its material condition, a kind of barter. You see the situation!

And then the admirable Vikings arrive at the borders. From the North. From the East arrive the Hungarians. I insist: at the periphery of the system. Duby's book is written for us: at the periphery of the system the Vikings swoop in with their ships, the Hungarians with their horses, and on their way, they dig up the graves, pillage them and plunder the monasteries. There too, it is a strange flow: a flow of Vikings in ships, a flow of Hungarians on horseback, and Duby explains, in some splendid pages, that it's them, it's these savages, who ravage the periphery, who upturn graves, who burn the monasteries, they are the ones who are going to revive the whole economy.²² Anyway, I'm exaggerating a little, but they are going to be a very important peripheral factor for the relaunching of an economy which was dying. They bring about a kind of release, a liberation of money throughout the whole of Europe, which will reinject into the economy a monetary power that money [*monnaie*], reduced to its purchasing power or to its exchange-value, had completely lost; they create economic investment through destruction. Here too, you have another example where a flow defined by its superior mobility and power – the power of its horses, of its ships, of its military tactics, etc, will revive a whole [*missing word* – economy?] as a function of a relation between heterogeneous flows of quantities, of natures, of powers, and I say: whatever the diversity of the examples, you will always find that one of the two flows can be defined as nomadic and mobile, and the other will have to be defined as less mobile and less nomadic, i.e. as receiving its fixity from the exigencies of the other.

If I follow the example analysed so admirably by Duby, what happens? The peasants soon have had enough of the sight of these Vikings, and astonishing things then start to happen. The roaming Vikings are not just nomads, but they are nomads in the process of migrating. We have the double determination of nomadism, and this represents what we called, in our vocabulary, a flow of nomads that we can characterise by, very profoundly, its deterritorialization. A first deterritorialized flow, but also equally deterritorializing, since they burn the towns when they can (often they do not succeed, but anyway); this flow of nomads is so deterritorializing that they do not even respect the dead, they dig up the earth, they take the silver [*argent*], carting it off elsewhere; it is therefore a deterritorialized and deterritorializing flow.

At another corner of the social field, there are the peasants. They find themselves in front of these Vikings and obviously, they flee. That delivers a large blow to the peasants' residence, that is to say, to the way in which the peasant is attached by the lord to the land. They flee and they are also affected by a coefficient, this time secondary to the deterritorialization, to the point that the problem of power [*pouvoir*] at that moment is, on the one hand, to organize the struggle against the Vikings or the Hungarians, but also how to stem the peasant deterritorialization. That will then lead in turn, if necessary, to an easing of the peasant situation; it will be necessary to create better situations for the peasants, it will be necessary to bring about, against the double danger, a kind of reterritorialization in all respects, namely: a change in the nature of the towns, which increase in population, since people come to take refuge in the towns; an improvement in the defense of the towns, and then a corresponding gain in autonomy for the towns. At the level of the peasants, very often, a new mode appears in the 10th century involving, instead of attachment to the land, the payment of rents in money [*argent*] as purchasing power.²³ Why does money as purchasing power come back into the equation? We are referred back to the revival of money, to the injection of money that the Vikings brought about through pillage. These same Vikings, who reinjected money into the economy, noticed rather quickly that with money, they could buy land.

You see, it is not even enough to say two flows. It would be necessary to distinguish five, six. There is a first flow of power 'n', essentially deterritorializing – the Vikings, the Hungarians –, a second deterritorialized flow, the peasants; flows of reterritorialization at the level of the towns; at the level of power [*pouvoir*]; at the level of the fact that the nomads will make themselves sedentary. All of that will be ways of reterritorializing. And feudalism, as a social formation – I am not saying that this is its only cause, nor even an essential cause – but feudalism as a social formation and the definitive liquidation of the Carolingian empire, it is constituted starting from all these flows of a new type which traverse the social field at a single moment, which confirms a hypothesis we were circling around, namely that new formations are not at all made by accumulation, by a process of aggregation, they are truly made by stampede. When it acts, there is a whole play of flows in a social field, which deterritorialize the old forms of social formations, where reterritorializations of another type are then reformed, and the whole of economic reality is effectively transformed.

To finish with this point, I would say that, when Faye analyses the Nazi economy, it goes far beyond his schema; his schema dealt with exchange, commodity form, narrative form as a function of statements, because what Faye shows precisely at the level of Nazi economy, is how it functioned on several levels, namely in particular in the case of the problem of the 'miracle' of Doctor Schacht in the Nazi economy.²⁴ This was precisely (roughly): how to construct a structure of financing when one has no purchasing power? An interesting problem, which was linked to the crisis of the collapse of money as purchasing power. What did one see? Of course, the flow of purchasing power is always second in relation to the structures of financing; that does not prevent a well-defined crisis when the structures of financing are completely blocked, for example by unemployment, by the collapse of purchasing power; there are other reasons; but that is one of them. So what will happen? The Nazi paradox, at that moment, is: how to create capital without money ... The mechanism of gold would not allow such an attempt (unanchoring in relation to gold), hence how to create capital without purchasing power or how to construct the financing structure without any means of payment, in such a way that this structure of financing that is supposedly created provides means of payment? This is very well analysed in the large book by Faye²⁵, and what he tries to show is how, in effect, the Nazis proceeded in a very particular manner, precisely insofar as the creditors – they embark on a policy of rearmament – the creditors of the army,

the suppliers of the army, draw up bills on an organization [*organisme*]²⁶ that has a very meagre capital. The discounting of this same organization is re-discounted by the State. This organization is nothing more than an emanation of the Nazi State itself. In other words, a part of the trick is that the State guarantees the debts that it itself makes. This operation in the Nazi economy, during the time of Doctor Schacht, involved about seven different relays ...²⁷

What matters is the time that passes between the issue [of bills] and the injection or the production of the means of purchase; and in that space of time, production itself has increased. And it is this whole trick by which production increases between the issue and the time of putting into circulation, which will permit a whole play between discounting and re-discounting, which will allow a veritable production of capital without any means of purchase; with, at the end of this production of the structure of financing, a return in means of purchase, production having increased. Which implies, in the case of the Nazi economy, not only a war-oriented economy, but what in a sense is more important, that this war-oriented economy is built up in the form of a paradoxical financing, a financing involving the two moments of discounting: the discounting of the organization, or the discounting of the qualified institution, and the re-discounting of the State, with all that allows, namely a whole series of camouflages where the declarations of Doctor Schacht hide this false moment of liberalism, hides an apparent policy of large works, which might disquiet the right and which was borrowed from the Nazi pseudo-left; the policy of large works, in its turn, hides something more profound than it, namely the conversion of the economy into a war economy; the conversion to a war economy itself hides something deeper still: the exact character of the financing of this economy.²⁸ So, at this level, there are all kinds of production of statements nested one inside the other ... [*Intermission*]

I'll just remark that in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* the problem posed is not simply that of the nature of statements. [Foucault] calls a set of statements a discursive formation.²⁹ Assuming a discursive formation, I believe that one of the points which concerns us most consists in saying: a statement and a discursive formation of which it is part can only be born and can only be formed under the conditions of a multiplicity (even if it means defining what he means by multiplicity). But if we already just stick to this general thesis, namely: it is always a multiplicity which is constitutive of a field or of a domain of statements, in what way does that concern us?

Through the study of Baudrillard and Faye, it seems to me that we have arrived at a first result: it is not exchange or exchange-value which give the conditions of enunciation; in other words, it is not communication, and if we had to go all the way, that would imply a certain conception of language, namely that language is not communication. And it was said that if the production of statements could not happen starting from exchange-value and the corresponding communication, it was for a very precise reason, namely that, positively, the production of statements implied relations between flows, very different indices of these flows, and relations of a particular type between these flows. That is what we have held onto throughout the examination of Baudrillard and Faye.

And now we see that from the beginning of a reading of Foucault, we encounter a notion which might be complementary: a statement in its 'as such', that is to say, grasped in its novelty, in its emergence on the interior of a discursive formation, such a phenomenon, such a statement always refers to a multiplicity, because multiplicity, on our account, or more precisely intensive multiplicity, we have come to encounter it as a fundamental phenomenon unfolding or emerging on the body without organs, on bodies without organs of very different

types, no less than flows and the relations between flows. Foucault's whole theme consists in telling us – or in any case in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, the problem consists – I am not completely sure about this – in a causality that is productive of statements. If the problem arises for him, it indeed concerns an immanent causality, it is not at all a causality which would be extrinsic, external, it is a question of finding in a discursive formation itself what produces statements; it is therefore a question of a very specific type of causality, and once again, it is not even certain that Foucault would say, at the time of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, that such a problem of causality was posed, and the direction in which he goes is to say that statements always have a “correlative space”³⁰, and he distinguishes three types of spaces linked to the statement. On the one hand, the complementary space enclosed by statements of the same family or of the same discursive formation; in the second place, the correlative space ... no, I'm mistaken, in the first place, there is the associated space which is formed by statements of the same family; the correlative space we are going to define because, if there is an immanent causality of the statement, it is perhaps at the level of the correlative space; and third point, the complementary space which consists in the non-discursive formations, institutions, events, in unspecified relation with which the statements, the families of statements, are found.

So the real problem for us is the correlative space. In very beautiful, very important texts, he takes two examples: statements on delinquency in the 19th century, and statements on clinical anatomy in the 19th century.³¹ And what he tries to show is that these statements never refer to a type of object that one could determine as such or such a type, that is to say as one thing; nor do they refer to a type of concept under which one could unify the set of statements of the same family; nor indeed do they refer to any type of sequence. If I stick to the case which seems to me the clearest, that of the objects of statements, that of the objects upon which statements bear, he tries to show how these objects upon which one or several statements bear, are not one, but are organized in what he calls a space of dispersion ...

Henri Gobard: It is better not to go any further because the whole of this discourse is going over the heads of those who think that the UV [final course credit] is a permanent cinema. You offer yourself up as an object of consumption, etc., etc.

Deleuze: In what way is it a permanent cinema?

Gobard: [*Indistinct sentences*]³²

Deleuze: It's true that this morning, it had a distinctly 'Club Mediterranean' feel. What to do?

Gobard: We have to give the tourists a voice so that they too can produce statements.
[*Nobody says anything*]

Deleuze: Something true is said there ... Since no one has anything to say, I'll be off then.
[*End of the session*]

Notes

¹ The psychoanalytic institutional body founded in 1964 by Jacques Lacan.

² A unique reference to René Girard, who is not discussed in any of Deleuze's published works. Deleuze appears to be referring to Girard's theory of mimetic desire, as developed in *Deceit, Desire and the Novel*

(translated by Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965 [1961]) and *Violence and the Sacred* (translated by Patrick Gregory, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977 [1972]).

³ Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 'Interview on *Anti-Oedipus* with Raymond Bellour' (1973): "There is a guy who wrote to me with a typical example of what Félix just cited as a psychoanalytical interpretation. The guy told his analyst that he wanted to go to a hippie group in India, he wanted to get the hell out, and the analyst responded immediately: 'Hippie group is big pippee, you see how it's always your theme of impotence.'" Translated by Ames Hodges in Deleuze, *Letters and Other Texts* (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2020), p. 197.

⁴ The word *actuels* could be translated as 'contemporary', but as the context suggests, the term has a particular history within psychoanalytic theory. See the entry 'Actual Neurosis', in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1967]), pp. 10-12. For Wilhelm Reich's re-evaluation of the role of the 'actual' in neurosis, see *The Function of the Orgasm* (translated by Theodore P. Wolfe, London: Panther, 1968), pp. 101-108.

⁵ See Henri Bergson, 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition', in *Mind-Energy* (translated by H. Wildon Carr, London: Macmillan, 1920 [1919]), p. 128-130. Deleuze discusses this conception in *Bergsonism* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 1988 [1966]), pp. 58-59, 125 n. 15; cf. also *Difference and Repetition* (translated by Paul Patton, London: Athlone, 1995 [1968]), pp. 81-82.

⁶ Bergson, 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition', p. 130: "Either the present leaves no trace in memory, or it is twofold at every moment, its very up-rush being in two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back towards the past, whilst the other springs forward towards the future." Deleuze gives a figurative representation of this 'schema' in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1989 [1985]), p. 295 n. 23, but notes that Bergson himself does not present a figure of the schema.

⁷ The missing word would be *récit*. See footnote 8 below.

⁸ Pierre Janet's theory of narrative [*le récit*] is developed in *L'Évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps* [*The Evolution of Memory and the Notion of Time*] (Paris: Chahine, 1928).

⁹ There is a reference to the *cogito* in Lacan, 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire', *Écrits*, (translated by Bruce Fink et al., New York: W.W. Norton, 2006 [1966]), p. 819 (French pagination).

¹⁰ Jean Pierre Faye, *Langages totalitaires* (Paris: Hermann, 1972); *Théorie du récit* [*Theory of Narrative*], subtitled *Introduction aux 'Langages totalitaires'* (Paris: Hermann, 1972). Cf. also *La Critique du langage et son économie* [*The Critique of Language and its Economy*] (Paris: Galilée, 1973). These works are cited in *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988 [1980]), pp. 82, 139, 231, 536 n. 11, 570, n. 62. None of these works is translated into English. For a concise introduction to Faye's work, see John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), Chapter 6, 'Narratives of National Socialism: An Analysis of the Work of Jean Pierre Faye', pp. 205-231.

¹¹ Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785). The first section of the opening chapter on 'Narration' in Faye's *Théorie du récit* is entitled 'The Mably Effect,' and is based on a reading of Mably's *Observations sur l'Histoire de France*, 1765 (2nd edition, 1788).

¹² Deleuze quotes the first sentence (taken from Mably's *Observations*, cited in Faye, *Théorie du récit*, pp. 18-19) slightly inaccurately; an English rendering of the sentence might read: "Some young Huns were hunting on the banks of the Maeotian swamp [*Palus Méotides*]; a doe they had been chasing crossed a marshland which they regarded as an impassable sea."

¹³ Faye, *Théorie du récit*, p. 19.

¹⁴ Faye, *Théorie du récit*, p. 21: "History begins with this double process: material change and exchange, or change of form." Faye is commenting on the following passage in Marx's *Capital*: "Wir haben also den ganzen Prozess nach der Formseite zu betrachten, also nur den Formwechsel oder die Metamorphose der Waren, welche den gesellschaftlichen Stoffwechsel vermittelt." ["We therefore have to consider the whole process in its formal aspect; that is to say, the change in form or the metamorphosis of commodities through which the social metabolism is mediated." (*Capital*, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990 [1867], pp. 198-199)]. Faye cites the French translation "*changement matériel dans la société*" for "*gesellschaftlichen Stoffwechsel*" ("social metabolism").

¹⁵ *L'échange non moins que l'usage est dit second par rapport à l'échange*. This clause lacks sense, but the ensuing clause makes clear that exchange is in turn "second" in relation to the flow of financing. Sense can be restored by ignoring the words "*par rapport à l'échange*" ["in relation to exchange"].

¹⁶ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Part Two, 'The Transformation of Money into Capital', pp. 247-280.

¹⁷ In the Second Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus*, Session 4, footnote 37, it was noted that Deleuze seems to use *argent* as a neutral term for money, and to specify two forms of *monnaie*: money as financing structure and money as means of payment. Therefore the present slightly augmented translation seems more acceptable than the literal but absurd translation "money [*argent*] or money [*monnaie*]."

¹⁸ Marcel Dassault (1892-1986), engineer, industrialist and founder, in 1952, of the Banque commerciale de Paris.

¹⁹ Deleuze correctly stated earlier that it was a doe, not a sheep.

²⁰ Georges Duby, *Guerriers et paysans* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), translated as *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century* (translated by Howard B. Clarke, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Cited in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 537, n. 19.

²¹ *Argent*, of course, means ‘silver’ as well as ‘money’.

²² Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, pp. 115-120.

²³ Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, pp. 117-118: “As they fled from Vikings, Saracens or Hungarians, many slaves and dependants took the opportunity to break the bonds tying them to their lords. They settled elsewhere in the service of new lords, ones who treated them as free men and exploited them less harshly. For in order to repopulate their estates with workers, big landowners were probably forced to make the system of rents and services more flexible. [...] Compulsory labor services had already been replaced by money rents [...]”.

²⁴ Hjalmar Schacht was the president of the German Central Bank in the first years of Nazi rule. Faye talks of the Nazi “financial miracle” in *Théorie du récit*, p. 9, and in *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 666, 670.

²⁵ See Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 659-683.

²⁶ The ‘organization’ was a limited liability company, *Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft* (‘Mefo’ for short), set up by Schacht solely to issue bills of exchange to arms manufacturers. Faye cites Schacht’s description: “Mefo papers are bills, drawn generally by the suppliers of the Army [...] on a company Metallforschung G.m.b.H. endowed with a reduced capital, and whose rediscounting by the Reichsbank was guaranteed by the Reich” (cited in *Langages totalitaires*, p. 665). Faye analyses the “paradoxical” nature of the Mefo bills on pp. 665-667.

²⁷ “Seven relays” between the Reichsbank and the arms manufacturers, without any redemption of the bills (in order to avoid inflation) were necessary in order “to allow, between the initial moment of issue and its final afflux in effective monetary circulation, for the interposition of the *time* of development, of production” (Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, p. 674).

²⁸ Schacht publicly criticised the proposed policy of “German Keynesians” (Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, p. 670) to introduce “large works” (ibid, 664), or public work programmes, while keeping the programme of Mefo bills secret or “masked” (*Théorie du récit*, pp. 44-46; *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 662, 665).

²⁹ See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (translated by A.M. Sheridan-Smith, London: Tavistock, 1972 [1969]), Part II, Chapter 2, ‘Discursive Formations’ (pp. 31-39), and Part III, Chapter 1, ‘Defining the Statement’ (pp. 79-87).

³⁰ For ‘correlative spaces’, see Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 207.

³¹ On delinquency, see Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 43; on clinical anatomy, ibid, 53.

³² In the Le Terrier transcript: “Gobard talks about the deep isomorphy between the Saint Lazare station and Vincennes philo, with the result: the room of lost words.”