

Gilles Deleuze

**Seminar on
Anti-Oedipus II**

1972-1973

On Anti-Oedipus II, 1972-1973

Session 1, 12 February 1973

BwO – Drugs – Signifier – Paranoia

Transcription: WebDeleuze; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale and Christian Kerslake

Translated by Christian Kerslake

Kyрил Ryjik: [...] in incest in psychoanalysis and in anthropology, there is an aspect of incest that you leave aside, the place of which one does not see in schizo incest. So why the word ‘incest’ in that case?

Deleuze: To state the basic principle, it was a question of seeking what the conditions of statements [*énoncés*] were in general¹; and after all, one could pose psychoanalysis under this form: what are the conditions of statements, supposing that statements have relations with desire, that is to say, with the unconscious? Statements are not at all the products of a system of signification; they are the product of machinic assemblages², they are the product of collective agents of enunciation. Which implies that there are no individual statements, and that behind statements – when for example one is able to assign some epoch where statements change, a historical epoch where a new type of statement is created, for example the great breaks of the Russian revolution type, or indeed of the phalanx type in the Greek city;³ a new type of statement appears, and on the horizon of this type of statement there is a machinic assemblage that makes it possible, i.e. a system of political agents of enunciation. ‘Collective’ does not mean ‘people’, nor ‘society’, but something more [*phrase missing* – ‘like multiplicities’?].⁴ We must seek in machinic assemblages that belong to the unconscious the conditions for the emergence of new statements, the bearers of desire, or what concerns desire.

Once again, it is no longer a question of opposing, like two poles, a pole that we would assign to paranoia, and a pole that we would assign to schizophrenia. On the contrary, it’s about saying that everything, absolutely everything, is part at the same moment of a machinic assemblage which is determinable, and we simply have to see how this assemblage is made insofar as it is productive of statements.

It seemed to me that every machinic assemblage literally hooked itself onto a certain type of body without organs. The question we are dealing with is: assuming that every machinic assemblage happens, hooks itself onto, mounts itself on a body without organs, how is that fabricated, a body without organs? What can serve this or that person as a body without organs? This is also the drug-user’s problem: how do they make it so that, assuming this is true, this really is a formation of the unconscious, upon which [*phrase missing*], and that it functions as a condition so that assemblages, connections, are established, so that there is something that one can call a body without organs? Groups are bodies without organs; political groups, community groups, etc., imply species of bodies without organs, sometimes imperceptible, sometimes perceptible, on which the entire machine assemblage that will

produce statements will attach itself. The archetype of the body without organs is the desert. It is like the support, like the support of desire itself.

What is going to attach itself? In a schizoanalysis, the problem of the unconscious is not a problem of generations. [André] Green has dispatched an article on *Anti-Oedipus*, and he says: in any case, these guys are a bit dim, because they're forgetting that a schizo still has a father and a mother.⁵ Well, that's just lamentable: listen to a schizo. A schizo has neither father nor mother, it's so obvious. It is not as a schizo that he is born of a father and of a mother – a schizo, as schizo, has no father or mother, he has a body without organs. The problem of the unconscious is not a problem of generations, but of population.⁶ What populates the body without organs, what makes assemblages, connections? Someone's happiness is their own way of making bodies without organs. As a fundamental difference with psychoanalysis, I insist once again: we do not know in advance. This duff concept of regression, it's a way of saying: what you are is your affair, at least in principle, we know it in advance, since what you are is what you are. While here it's the opposite principle: you don't know in advance what you are. It's the same with accounts of drugs: you don't know in advance.

There is a very beautiful book by a gentleman called [Carlos] Castaneda which recounts his apprenticeship in peyote with an Indian, and the Indian explains to him that whatever the case, you need an ally.⁷ You need a benefactor to guide you in this apprenticeship, this is the Indian himself, but you also need an ally, that is to say something which has a power. In order to make yourself a body without organs – a very lofty task, a very sublime task – an ally is necessary, not necessarily someone else, but you need an ally which will be the point of departure for a whole assemblage capable of functioning on such a body.

We saw, last time, on this body without organs, a kind of mass distribution, phenomena of mass, of population.⁸ Why do these organize themselves? Because the immediate effect of the body without organs is identical with the experience, the experimentation, of a depersonalization. What seems fascinating to me is that it is at the very moment of an attempt at depersonalization that one acquires the true meaning of proper names, that is to say, one receives one's true proper name at the very moment of depersonalization. Why?

Let's suppose that there are groupings of mass, these are not necessarily social masses, because here, in relation to the body without organs, as opposed to the organism of a subject, the subject itself gives itself over to crawling around on the BwO, to tracing spirals. It conducts its search on the body without organs like a guy walking about [*se balade*] in the desert. This is the test of desire. Like the Unnameable in Beckett, it traces its spirals.⁹ It itself, as depersonalized on the BwO, even its very organs, which in so far as they are now related, not to its organism, but to the body without organs – they have all completely changed their relationships. Once again, the BwO is indeed a defection from the organism, the disorganization of the organism for the benefit of another instance; and this other instance, the organs of the subject, the subject itself, etc., are as if projected onto it, and enter into a new kind of relation with other subjects. All that takes shape like masses, pullulations, where, literally, on the body without organs, one no longer really knows who is who: my hand, your eye, a shoe. A camel on the BwO of the desert, a jackal, a man on the camel, that makes up a chain.

At this level, in any case, the mass inscribed on the body without organs delimits like a territory. The elements of mass, whatever they are, define signs. And what ensures the coherence, the connections between signs?

What defines the mass, it seems to me, is a whole system of networks between signs. Sign refers to sign. That's the mass system. And it refers to the sign under the condition of a major signifier. Here we have the paranoid system. The whole force of Lacan is to have made psychoanalysis pass from the Oedipal apparatus to the paranoid machine. There is a major signifier which subsumes the signs, which maintains them in the mass system, which organizes their network. That seems to me to be the criterion of paranoid delirium: it's the phenomenon of the network of signs, where sign refers to sign.¹⁰

Ryjik: You're making some kind of description, it's not very clear, but you're describing something. And if there is the same collection without a signifier, what is that?

Deleuze: That's next.

Ryjik: But does that form a network, or does it not form a network?

Deleuze: It forms a thread [*enfilade*], not a network.

It is necessary to see how this major signifier appears. The purely descriptive system says: there is a regime of the sign under the signifier, and this is the network such as we find it in paranoid delirium. This seems to me the first stage of what it would be necessary to call the deterritorialization of the sign. It's when, on a territory, the sign, instead of being a sign as such, passes – Have you finished coughing up? It's disgusting – passes under the domination of a signifier. Your question is substantial: where does this signifier come from?

Signs, in another mode altogether, follow trajectories of flight; there is all the same a concrete criterion. This time, it is no longer the sign referring to another sign in a network, it is a direction starting from which a sign enters into a linear thread [*s'enfile*] with other signs. As opposed to paranoid delirium, it is for example erotomaniac delirium¹¹, or grievance delusion.¹² All of this still happens on the BwO. The sign, this time, has liberated itself from the mortgage and domination of the signifier. In which form it liberates itself from it in order to become and take on the status of director, accelerator and retarder of particles.

The two coexisting states of the sign are: the paranoid sign, namely the sign under the signifier, forming a network insofar as it is subsumed by the signifier, and then: the sign-particle, liberated from the signifier and serving as teleguidance for a particle.

The body without organs is populated in a singular fashion. It is no longer masses, species of coexisting lines, that always traverse this desert, and that guide particles on coexisting lines that diverge and intersect. Anything is possible in things like this. It is no longer the mass phenomenon, it is the pack [*meute*] phenomenon. It's not at all the same thing because the subject, i.e. this weird kind of thing which is sometimes in the mass, sometimes in packs, enters into connection under the form of a network with other subjects, other organs, but sometimes in accordance with its lines of flight, where it also enters into specific types of relationship with others, but in pack relationships and no longer ones of mass.

The huge difference between the position of mass and the position of pack is why I'm so interested in the Wolf Man, and Freud's radical non-understanding. The position of mass is always a position affected with paranoid characteristics; this is all the less pejorative as for me, this year, it's all about saying: long live paranoia, there is not enough of it, we need to fix that ...

Ryjik: Well, that's something different! [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: The paranoid position of mass is: I will be in the mass, I will not separate myself from the mass, and I will be at the heart of the mass, in two possible capacities: either as chief, and therefore having a certain relationship of identification with the mass – for the mass can be the grave¹³, it can be an empty mass, it doesn't matter; or as partisan where, in any case, it is necessary to be swept up in the crowd [*masse*], to be as close as possible to the crowd, with one condition: to avoid being on the edge [*bordure*]. It is necessary to avoid being on the edge, being on the margins, in the position of mass: to not be last, you have to be close to the chief. The border is a position that it is only possible to guarantee in a mass, so that when one is in service, one must be there.

Henri Gobard: On the problem of the edge: if one is on the inside, there is no edge ... Everything you say is a kind of fantastic justification of anything whatever, in any way whatever, for anywhere wherever ...

Richard Zrehen: ... and for anyone whoever!

Gobard: Maybe not for anyone whoever, that's the problem; in your desert, instead of putting a camel, put a white bear: what will happen? How would your analysis work on something which, to me, seems monstrous, truly worse than Nazism, if that's possible: namely the transplantation of organs! Cardiac patients no longer have organs, an organ is transplanted into them, ... I'm against it, because it leads to the transformation of bodies into systems of spare parts, and that is precisely the Nazi mentality of the concentration camps ... [Christiaan] Barnard is a Nazi, and contemporary science, biology and medicine belongs to the Nazi type ...¹⁴

A student: Why did you have to sit there next to Deleuze, instead of sitting at the back?

Gobard: No, no, if you had arrived earlier, you would have seen that I sat here in order to make a sounding board. Someone was making a recording; and secondly, because it was pissing me off with all the assholes smoking ...¹⁵

Richard Zrehen: I was wondering whether the intensive powers on the body without organs, the thresholds of intensity, the energetic passages, if you like, whose schema has been borrowed from embryology, even if it is no longer just that, since it is all the same a serious basis, I wondered if there was not a way of 'quantifying' or 'qualifying' these thresholds, these passages, these fillings-up through intensive quantities, of the body without organs; and immediately, the only association I could make was the modification of colors indicating an intensity in the level of the cold or the heat given off, something like that. You just talked about statements which, visibly, on the body without organs, exactly fulfill, perhaps at another level, the foundation of intensive powers.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, but I am so far from having finished. The intensities, I haven't placed them on the inside yet, but I would see no reason to privilege colors or phenomena of hot or cold; localizations also count for a lot. The Wolf Man, his relationship with wolves, is absolutely inseparable from two bodily localizations, which are the jaw and the anus. The psychoanalyst who took over with the young man after Freud says that the Wolf Man says that one of his dentists keeps telling him: you have too hard a bite, your teeth will fall out.¹⁶ There, we clearly see something of a kind of current of intensity: a higher intensity, the jaw-bite; the teeth too fragile for such a jaw-bite: lower intensity; and what we have there is a definite kind of passage of intensity between a minimum and a maximum, which is of a very particular type, of a localization type.

To return to the position of mass, one can say that there is no edge, for the simple reason that the problem of the mass is: to determine segregation and exclusion. There are simply falls and rises. The position of pack is completely different. Its essential character is that there is a border-phenomenon. The essential always happens at the edge. In the book *Crowds and Power* [*Masse et Puissance*] by [Elias] Canetti there is a very good description of the pack. He says something very important about the distinction between mass and pack (page 109): "In the pack which, from time to time, forms out of the group, and which most strongly expresses its feeling of unity" – that's strange, that's not true – "the individual can never lose itself as completely as modern man can in any crowd today. In the changing constellation of the pack ..." – he, at least, understands wolves: in the pack each member guides itself through its companion, and at the same time, the positions never cease varying. They vary all the time, and they define themselves through distances. Distances between the members of the pack. Distances which are constantly variable and indecomposable. This is what makes it so that the pack is always distributed over, that the members of the pack are always on, a periphery. "In the changing constellation of the pack [...], he will again and again find himself at its edge. He may be in the center, and then, immediately afterwards, at the edge again; at the edge and then back in the center. When the pack forms a ring round the fire" – that's quite stirring, that bit – "each man will have neighbors to right and left, but no one behind him; his back is naked and exposed to the wilderness."¹⁷ This is absolutely the position of pack. I adhere to the pack through – so here, it is indeed another regime of organs, it is not a regime of networks – I adhere to the pack through a foot, a hand, a paw, through the anus, through an eye. This is the position of pack.

I add, there is all that at the same time on the body without organs: the paranoid [*parano*] position of mass, the schizo position of pack, and I mean: packs, masses, all these types of multiplicity. The unconscious is the art of multiplicities; this is a way of saying that psychoanalysis understands nothing at all since it has always treated the unconscious from the point of view of an art of unities: the father, the mother, castration. Every time psychoanalysts find themselves faced with multiplicities, as we have seen with the Wolf Man, it is a question of denying that there are multiplicities. Freud cannot bear the idea that there are six or seven wolves in the story of the Wolf Man; it is necessary that there is only one, because a single wolf, that's the father. And the Wolf Man can cry all he likes: the wolves, the wolves, the wolves; Freud says: a single wolf, a single wolf, a single wolf.

These masses and these packs of the unconscious can just as well be existing groups, but these existing groups, for example, political groups, they also have an unconscious, an unconscious – and here, I'm saying *at the same time* – that's why everything functions together. It is no longer a question of saying: let's oppose paranoid/schizophrenic in a duality, because the same group has a mass unconscious and a pack unconscious as well. It lives off a

whole system of signifying signs, under the signifier, but at the same time, it lives off a whole system of particle-signs which are its ways of getting the hell out, its ways of drifting. It is at once the most immobile bloc and simultaneously the most adrift thing there is. It is therefore at the same time that it is necessary to make all that function. To these two machinic poles apparatuses are added. If I try to define the two machinic poles which, for the moment, cover the bodies without organs, I would say that the one is the mass machine, which one could call the semiotic signifying machine: it is the system of signs under the domination of the signifier, and forming the paranoid network. The other machine, that of the sign-particles, the pack machine, is the semiotic a-signifying machine: it is the sign-particle system, the coupling of sign and particle. Each member of a pack is a particle, each particle could be anything; as a mass element, it could be anything.

So, upon that, apparatuses intervene that are certainly linked to these machines. And again, it's not a question of saying: Oedipus does not exist. It's about saying: there is only an Oedipal apparatus, and the Oedipal apparatus, it's a funny thing, because it plays between the mass machines and the pack machines. Its whole play is between the two; it borrows elements from mass machines. I believe that the meaning of the Oedipal apparatus is to plug the flights of packs, to bring them back to the masses ... I'm forgetting a lot of things in the current, but another distinction that it would be necessary to make between mass machines and those belonging to packs, would be that masses, at least in appearance, always present, at a certain moment, a phenomenon of unity of direction. They are simultaneously egalitarian and hierarchised. We must not at all say, like the Marxists, that egalitarianism is an ideological phenomenon, or that it is a certain formal phenomenon; it must be said that class organization, in historical formations, in its most diverse forms, has always been made in real relation – it does not at all belong to ideology – with some form of communitarian egalitarianism. Class organization in the bourgeois system is made in the form of a real equality determined under the conditions of capitalism. Class formation in the so-called despotic systems implies the real egalitarianism of rural communities. Class organization in the ancient city implies the victory of the plebs; that, as Engels says very well, implies a certain position of egalitarianism in relation to which slavery will be able to take place and be produced. So it is not at all opposed, that the mass structure is simultaneously an egalitarian structure, and that it is all the more strongly and more severely hierarchised, presenting a kind of unity of direction at every moment. Whereas the pack phenomenon is really what one calls Brownian motion; whenever there is a pack, you will find this kind of pattern traced on the body without organs.

The Oedipal apparatus is this strange thing that tries to plug these kinds of flights of particles, and which tries to lead them back. It is necessary to make the four things function in the machinic assemblage at the same time, and this is perhaps what produces the statements of the unconscious. There are counter-Oedipean apparatuses ...

Ryjik: With what you were saying before, are you trying to say that the Oedipal apparatus has a privileged situation between the two?

Deleuze: No! No more than the counter-Oedipal apparatus. The counter-Oedipal apparatus must no doubt make the inverse manoeuvre; it will let packs loose. You understand, nobody knows in advance for anyone: what might seem most Oedipal, it could very well be that it's a guy in the process of tipping over into an anti-Oedipal apparatus that will make everything crack. We will never say to someone: you are in regression. Never, never. Or else we will

never say to him: you are this because you were that. First of all, it is disgusting, and then it is not true.

I resume. This love so strange of Kafka for Felice¹⁸, what is going on in there? Well, Felice is everywhere. Kafka, what is he up to? First, he has his method ... let's suppose he has found a little something which can serve him as a body without organs. On it, he is in love with Felice. Kafka is all the same an executive, a future great bureaucrat, the whole machine of commerce fascinates him. His problem is once again the situation of the Jews in the Austrian empire; he is caught up in a problem of mass: the imperial mass of the Austrian empire which will precisely be described in *The Castle* in marvelous terms: when one is far from the castle, it is truly an imperial ensemble, it is a mass, and when one approaches the castle, it is much more like a system of hovels at a distance from each other, as if, to the extent that one approaches, the mass figure melts into a pack figure. And that corresponds very well to the Austrian empire which, experienced from within, is a kind of marquetry, not at all a pyramidal system, but rather a kind of segmentary system. He is caught up in all that, with modern machines, work accidents. He had connections with anarchist circles. The political mass, the imperial mass, the commercial mass, the bureaucratic mass, that's what he's concerned with. It is obviously impossible to separate Felice from what she is as well. Kafka, however, takes her for a maid, and it turns out that Felice is not a maid. So here is Felice, who has a certain position in a mass structure, and at the same time, she has big carnivorous teeth, which attracts and disgusts Kafka. He is vegetarian and will cease being vegetarian from the moment of his love affair with Felice; he is fascinated by the idea of teeth between which, in which bits of meat remain, he's got a weird thing about it.¹⁹ One of Kafka's fundamental problems is: where does [*missing word* – 'food']²⁰ come from, and this is undoubtedly connected to a position of the body without organs ... and these huge carnivorous teeth, that's another side of it. It is the particle which makes Felice escape, which tears her in some way from the imperial bureaucratic technocratic signifier, makes her break loose onto a completely different line, where, this time, the sign of the big teeth, or rather the Felice-sign, guides, accelerates, and precipitates huge teeth particles, which are set racing in the other coexisting system. Thereupon, third element. Of course, there is Oedipus, and this is Kafka's problem: how am I going to manage, in the situation I've put myself, to not marry Felice? She wants marriage, while he sets his extraordinary conditions: this, this, this. She wants a family right away, she paints him a picture of marriage, it is an innocent one: she wants a homestead, you'll eat meat everyday ...; he faints. Kafka has a habit of turning tricks like that, and it's fantastic, because that explains the existence of Marthe Robert.²¹ There's a proof of the existence of Marthe Robert for you. Kafka always played a formidable game with his father. His father never stopped winding him up, it's true: there is therefore an Oedipal statement; but moving quickly, what did Kafka tell himself?

He said to himself what we need to say to ourselves today about paranoia, but he said it to himself at the level of Oedipus. In the prodigious letters to his sister who had a child, he says that this kid must not be left in the family, he has to get the hell out of there.²² And for his part, in order to ward off Oedipal statements – because they do exist – he will ward them off in the form: transform the Oedipal statement into an enunciation-machine for making letters.

Once again, there is no freedom, there are ways out. If one wants freedom, one is asking too much: then one is lost and it's all fucked in advance. What is needed is to find ways out, and Kafka's way out is: my father is winding me up, so I'm going to write to him. That will always be the Kafkaian way out, converting Oedipus into a writing machine. It is a great idea; and so he writes his famous letter to his father. It is a way out because, thanks to the writing

machine, he can add: in other words, I am going to be more Oedipal than you. Exactly as with the paranoiac, one has to succeed at being more paranoid than him. This is why we have to revalorize the paranoid: the only defense against the paranoiac is even more paranoia.

So Marthe Robert says: you can clearly see how Oedipal he is. Necessarily, he doesn't stop ladling it on in order to make all Oedipean statements pass into the enunciation of a writing machine that is apparently Oedipal, but in fact is anti-Oedipal, that is to say which is going to splinter Oedipal connections in favor of a system of connections of a perverse writing machine. Once he pulls this off with his father, you know it's going to work like that even more with the women he loves.

Felice offers him conjugality, that is to say, the adult form of Oedipus. Very quickly, he will counter with the parade he put into effect so well with his father. He is never able to come and see her where she is, because it is necessary that he writes to her; that's the insurance against conjugality. He sends her all manner of letters, he can only love through letters; he sets conditions, conditions of conditions, etc. In all of that, it is the whole of Oedipus and the whole problem of conjugality that is dissolved, to the benefit of something else altogether.

Anything can work like that. Everything that one puts on the side of the Oedipal apparatus, namely incest, castration, the vacation letter ("My dear Dad, my dear Mum, I am having a lovely holiday"), anything at all, can pass into non-Oedipal apparatuses. And a whole analysis is necessary to arrive at knowledge; that's why there is always hope. Homosexuality can be like [*missing word*], completely Oedipal from one end to the other. It all depends on the use; it can pass into other conditions, into an anti-Oedipal apparatus of an entirely different nature.

When I speak of a schizo incest, as making up part of an anti-Oedipal apparatus, ie. incest with the sister – but the sister can be anyone, – Oedipal incest is love with someone assimilated with the mother in one way or another; schizo incest is love with someone somehow assimilated with the sister. The passage from Oedipal incest to schizo incest is like a conversion, a transformation of the Oedipal apparatus into an anti-Oedipal apparatus, which means that schizo incest is what opens onto a kind of world of connections and which will lead, literally, to a kind of de-familiarization of the individual. Now, it may very well be that there are incests with the sister which are Oedipal, to the extent that the sister would be treated as the substitute for the mother.²³

In order to finish with all this, I would like, just as a bit of a proof, to comment on a text by Kafka, 'Jackals and Arabs.'²⁴ One can see very well why he mixes everything up, why he sets traps. In 'Jackals and Arabs', we can say that everything is there, for Freud or for Marthe Robert. There are the Arabs who explicitly belong to the male line; and then there are the jackals which are explicitly attached to the maternal line. Right at the beginning, the jackal says: "we have been waiting for you for eternity; my mother waited for you, and her mother, and all our foremothers right back to the first mother of all the jackals."²⁵ Between the jackals and the Arabs, there is, on the edge, the man of the North, that is to say the Jackal Man. It's only Freud who doesn't know what a pack of wolves is. The jackals take the man of the North aside and say to him that the Arabs are disgusting, and they're disgusting because they kill animals for food. They kill calves to eat. That's really Kafka's fundamental obsession: where does food come from?

The jackals say that it can't continue, because they are against it; they say: us, we're the opposite: we eat to clean up carrion. So: either kill living animals to eat, or eat to clean up dead animals. Hence the Arab-jackal tension. Now the man of the North shows up and the jackals say to him: you're going to kill the Arabs; and they bring a large pair of rusty scissors. I won't stop to dwell on what the psychoanalysts are able to make of these scissors. All this is happening in the desert. The Arabs are presented as an armed mass, extended throughout the desert. The jackals are presented as a pack that goes deeper and deeper into the desert, which is forced to plunge deeper and deeper into the desert: mad particles. And at the end of the text, the Arab says about the jackals: "they're madmen, complete madmen."²⁶ And the jackals reveal the secret of the story of the scissors – the man of the North was ready to say: you want me to kill them, but the jackals aren't interested in that: it's a question of cleanliness, it's the test of the desert. That means that, in this kind of tension, the Arab mass, the pack of jackals, a manifest Oedipal apparatus and a counter-Oedipal apparatus, will put in play the test of desire under the form: it is a question of cleanliness.

Once these four elements are given, what will happen, if I am granted that every statement is the product of an assemblage? How might we define a statement as the product of a machinic assemblage? It goes without saying that all that is indeed the problem of unconscious, i.e. that an analysis which does not reach multiplicities, a double type of multiplicities, multiplicities of mass and multiplicities of packs, which are now in a double way what an individual participates in, as well as being what is internal to an individual – well, we can say that the analysis has not even begun. When one has not reached the edge-positions, the paranoiac positions of mass, the type of anti-Oedipal apparatus someone is in the process of setting up, their Oedipal apparatus, one has got absolutely nowhere near the formations of the unconscious – and above all when one does not know what assemblage is involved, and how it functioned for them and in them, that is to say, what type of statement it was capable of producing; and types of statements, when necessary, which are very far from what happens in the unconscious.

This is the problem of multiplicities, to put each thing into play in the others, like multiplicities of multiplicities. It is this analysis of multiplicities as being simultaneously exterior and interior to the individual that must be achieved, otherwise one has attained nothing of the unconscious. [*End of the session*]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Anti-Oedipus/A Thousand Plateaus, 1972-1973

Lecture 02, 26 March 1973

Transcribed by [WebDeleuze](#)

Translated by Daniel W. Smith

Dualism, Monism and Multiplicities; Desire-Pleasure-Jouissance

In the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault said some profound things about statements [énoncés] that concern several domains at once, even if not at the same time. I take two very vague examples. There is a moment in the Greek City when statements of a new type emerge, and these statements of a new type emerge within assignable temporal arrangements, in several domains. They can be statements concerning love, concerning marriage, concerning war, yet we feel that there is a kind of kinship or community among these statements. We have seen certain thinkers try to give explanations of how statements emerge in diverse domains that have this kind of kinship. In Greece, for example, during the "hoplite" reform, new types of statements concerning war and strategy emerge, but also new statements concerning marriage and politics. All this, it has been said, cannot be unrelated.

There are some people who immediately say, for example, that there is a system of analogies or a system of homologies, and that perhaps all these statements refer to a common structure. They are called: structuralists. Others will say that these productions of statements depend on a certain domain which is determinative in relation to the others. Such people, for example, we will call: Marxists. Perhaps it would be better to look for something else.

There's a book from which one can learn many things, titled *Sexual Life in Ancient China* [by Robert H. van Gulik (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961)]. This book shows clearly that manuals of love and manuals of military strategy are indiscernible, and that new strategic and military statements are produced at the same time as new amorous statements. That's curious. I ask myself: OK, how can we extract ourselves, at the same time, from a structuralist vision that seeks correspondences, analogies, and homologies, and from a Marxist vision that seeks determinants. I indeed see one possible hypothesis, but it's so confused . . . It's perfect. It would consist in saying: at a given moment, for reasons that, of course, must still be determined, it is as if a social space were covered by what we would have to call an abstract machine. We would have to give a name to this non-qualified abstract machine, a name that would mark its absence of qualification, so that everything will be clear. We could call it -- at the same time, this abstract machine, at a given moment, will break with the abstract machine of the preceding epochs -- in other words, it will always be at the cutting edge [à la pointe], thus it would receive the name machinic point [pointe machinique]. It would be the machinic point of a group or a given collectivity; it would indicate, within a group and at a given moment, the maximum of deterritorialization as well as, and at the same time, its power of innovation. This is somewhat abstract at the moment, it's like algebra. It's this abstract machine which, in conditions that will have to be determined, it's this machinic point of

deterritorialization that is reterritorialized in this or that machine, or in this or that military machine, amorous machine, productive of new statements. This is a possible hypothesis.

I have the impression that there are things in [André] Leroi-Gourhan we could use here, we would have to see how that works. This machinic point would indicate a kind of speed of deterritorialization. There are systems of indices under which reterritorializations are made in qualified machines, war machines, machines of love, machines of marriage.

Kyрил Ryjik: This is your "series" [*enfilades*] which are taken up again in networks?

Deleuze: Ah, no, that's something else. As you sense, at bottom this is not our hypothesis. That's because in this problem of where statements come from, what their production is related to, the sub-jacent response will consist in answering: there are no individual statements, and this is one of the multiple traps of psychoanalysis, which is the successor of a type of thinking which we could call Western thought and which says that there are individual statements. And finally, the form or logic of individual statements has been fixed by the cogito. It has been fixed by the cogito which comprehends the production of statements from the subject, from a subject. Cogito: this means that every statement is the production of a subject. It means that first; and second, it means that every statement splits the subject that produces it. Lacan is the last Cartesian. Then every statement refers to a subject, and every statement splits, cuts, separates the subject that produces it. These are propositions that are linked up naturally, because if it is true that a statement is produced by a subject, then for that very reason, this subject will be divided into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. This is what the literal process [*démarche*] of the cogito consists of.

The process of the cogito, you recall, is: I can say "I think, therefore I am," but I can't say "I walk, therefore I am." Descartes explains this in his Responses to Objections, in Descartes's rare comic pages. Someone has objected, "Why don't you say 'I walk' like 'I am'?" and he says, "I can't." That amounts to saying that "I walk" is a subject of the statement, whereas "I think" is the subject of enunciation. [*In this regard, see A Thousand Plateaus, p. 128*]

Then, perhaps I'm not walking, but there's one thing I'm sure of, and that is that I'm thinking of walking. In other words, the subject cannot produce a statement without being thereby split [*scindé*] by the statement into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement. This introduces the entire metaphysics of the subject into psychoanalysis. If we look closely at the cogito. . .

A student: But there is no alterity in Descartes.

Deleuze: What is it that you are looking for? And dualism! There is a dualism at the level of thought and the object thought. There is a dualism at the level of soul and body, there are as many dualisms as you like. And if we ask: What is the source of all the Cartesian dualisms? - it lies in this scission internal to the subject, between the subjects of the statement, which allow no conclusion, and a subject of enunciation, which is subtracted from doubt: "I think."

In the entire series of Cartesian dualisms (soul-body, thought-extension, statement-enunciation), the only remark and the only question is that this isn't the final aspect. The duality of subjects of the statement and subjects of enunciation -- once again, the subjects of statements of the type "I am walking," "I am breathing," "I imagine," and the subjects of

enunciation "I think" -- Is it not this duality that will inhabit all the dualisms of reflection and all the other dualisms of substances, bodies, etc.?

I take up again, I'm thinking of the text where Descartes says, it may be -- I see a unicorn, or I imagine a unicorn -- it may indeed be that the unicorn does not exist, it may very well be that the proposition, that the statement "I see a unicorn" is false. But in return, it's true that I think I am seeing a unicorn. At this level, a kind of disengagement of a subject of enunciation occurs, and thereby all the subjects of possible statements. Whence he will say to you: I cannot say "I walk, therefore I am," for from a subject of the statement, I cannot conclude a being of enunciation, or the being of a subject of enunciation; but I can say "I think, therefore I am," because from a subject of enunciation I can conclude the being of this subject.

Now all the dualisms of Descartes, even passion and action, depend strictly on this operation of the cogito, which consists of relating statements to a subject of enunciation, which will consequently split the subject in two: the subject of the statement, and the subject of enunciation. This will be found, for example, at the Cartesian level, in the subject of the statement, which in the end refers to the union of the soul with the body, and the subject of enunciation, which refers to the thinking subject. When I say that, in a certain manner, psychoanalysis is the final inheritor of Cartesianism, it is because, even looking at the cogito, it is very curious at what point it is an Oedipal apparatus, a sublimated Oedipal apparatus. [*On Descartes and the cogito, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 128-129*]

It could very well be that I myself, as a living being, have been made by my father and my mother. But the fact that I think, that isn't explained by my father and mother, that's explained by what? If we consider the cogito as a machine, we can see three great moments in it: doubt--which is typically a type of paranoiac machine; the non-deceiving God is a miraculating [trans: reading "miraculante" for "déraillante"] machine, and the "I think" is a celibate machine. That is the Oedipal space of pure thought. There are Oedipuses everywhere; there are not only familial Oedipuses, there are also scientific Oedipuses; and the philosophical Oedipus is the cogito, it is the Oedipal machine at the level of thought. This is what one calls dualism. Dualism is what prevents thought. Dualism always wants to deny the essence of thought, namely, that thought is a process. And the source of dualism, it seems to me, is this type of reduction, this flattening of all statements of thought, precisely, by this speculative, Oedipal apparatus in which the statement, on the one hand, is related to the subject, to a subject, and on the other hand, and simultaneously, the subject is split into a subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. In this perspective, the subject is rethought.

There is only one form of thought, it's the same thing: one can only think in a monistic or pluralistic manner. The only enemy is two. Monism and pluralism: it's the same thing, because, in a certain manner, it seems to me that every opposition, even all possibilities of oppositions between the one and the multiple . . . This is because the source of dualism is precisely the opposition between something that can be affirmed as one, and something that can be affirmed as multiple, and more precisely, what signals it as one is precisely the subject of enunciation, and what signals it as multiple is always the subject of the statement . . . [*On this same development of the "one" and the "multiple", see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 32-34*]

We saw last time how to bring about the suppression of the opposition between the one and the multiple. It happens the moment the one and the multiple cease to be adjectives and give way to the substantive: there are only multiplicities. That is to say, when the substantive "multiplicities" takes the place of the one, of the multiple and their . . . [*missing text, perhaps:*

adjectives], and at this moment, one and multiple lose absolutely all meaning, at the same time as the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. There are multiplicities, which obviously implies a theory and practice of multiplicities. Wherever we leave the domain of multiplicities, we once again fall into dualisms, i.e., into the domain of non-thought, we leave the domain of thought as process.

Now to show at what point things become botched, I always think of this history of desire. What I have been saying since the beginning amounts to saying that thinking and desiring are the same thing. The best way to avoid seeing or to refuse to see that desire is thought, that the position of desire in thought is a veritable process, is obviously to link desire to lack. Once desire is linked to lack, one is immediately in the domain, one has already assumed the basis of dualism. But today I would like to say that there are more underhanded ways of reintroducing lack into desire, either through the Other, or through dualism. Here, so-called Western thought is constructed from the relation between desire and pleasure, a completely rotten [*pourrie*] conception.

The first malediction of desire, the first malediction that weighs on desire like a Christian curse, and goes back to the Greeks, is that desire is lack. The second malediction is: desire will be satisfied by pleasure, or will be in an enunciable relation with *jouissance*. Of course, there will be those who will tell us that these are not the same thing. Nonetheless, there is a peculiar circuit here: desire-pleasure-*jouissance*. And all that, once again, is a way of cursing and liquidating desire. [*For this same sequence of maledictions, see A Thousand Plateaus, p. 154*]

The idea of pleasure is a completely rotten [*pourrie*] idea. One only has to look at Freud's texts, at the level of desire-pleasure, which amount to saying that desire is above all a disagreeable tension. There are one or two texts where Freud says that, after all, perhaps there are agreeable tensions, but again that doesn't take us very far. Broadly speaking, desire is lived as such a disagreeable tension that -- a horrible, hideous word is required here, that's how bad this thing is -- a discharge is necessary. And this discharge, this is what pleasure is! People will have peace, and then, alas! desire is reborn, a new discharge will be necessary. The types of conceptions that are called, in scholarly terms, hedonistic, namely, the search for pleasure, and the types of mystical conceptions that curse desire, by virtue of what is fundamental in lack -- I would simply like you to sense that, in any case, they both consider desire to be a dirty little thing that wakes us up, and that wakes us up in the most disagreeable manner: either by putting us in relation with a fundamental lack, which can then be assuaged by a kind of activity of discharge, and then one will have peace, and then it will all begin over again When one introduces the notion of *jouissance* into all that -- you can see I'm in the process of trying to make a circle, very muddled, a pious circle, a religious circle of the theory of desire -- we can see to what an extent psychoanalysis is impregnated, and how great the psychoanalytic piety is. This circle, one of its segments is desire-lack, another segment is pleasure-discharge, and once again, they are completely linked.

And then I ask myself: What's wrong with Reich? There are two great errors in Reich: the first error is dualism, then he passes to the side: it's the dualism between two economies, between a political economy and a libidinal economy. If one speaks of a duality between two economies, one will always be able to promise to make the connection [*branchement*], but the connection will never be made. And this error of dualism has a repercussion at another level: desire is still thought of as a lack, and thus it is still thought with pleasure, as its unit of measure. And Reich has indeed given the word pleasure a stronger and more violent word, he

calls it orgasm. His entire conception of the orgasm, which he will try to turn against Freud, consists in pushing desire to the limit insofar as it is linked to lack. If it cannot manage to obtain the discharge that assuages it, it will produce what Reich calls stasis. Desire is fundamentally related to the orgasm, and in order to relate desire to pleasure or to the orgasm, one must relate it to lack. It is exactly the same thing. The first proposition is the inverse of the second.

If we add the third arc of the circle: desire-lack, all that always concerns desire which is directed toward transcendence. In effect, if desire lacks something, it is like intentionality aiming at what it lacks, it is defined as a function of transcendence, in the same way that it is measured as a function of a unit that is not its own, which will be pleasure or the orgasm, which assures its discharge. And, in order to close the circle, which for the moment has only two arcs -- obviously, the theme that consists in establishing a distinction between *jouissance* and pleasure is very useful. This is what will make the whole thing function together. I am thinking notably of a distinction dear to Lacan, but I'm not familiar with it, the distinction between *jouissance* and pleasure.

I recall what Barthes said about it in his last book, *The Pleasure of the Text* [Paris: Seuil, 1973] where he explains it a little. He distinguishes texts of pleasure and texts of *jouissance*. This is what he says about texts of pleasure: "the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading. Text of *jouissance*: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts, ... unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories... Now the subject who keeps the two texts in his field and in his hands the reins of pleasure and *jouissance* is an anachronic subject, for he simultaneously and contradictorily participates in the profound hedonism of all culture ... and in the destruction of that culture: he enjoys the consistency of his selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its loss" -- the loss of self -- "(that is his bliss [*jouissance*]). He is a subject split twice over, doubly perverse." [Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text* (Hill & Wang, 1975, trans. Richard Miller, p.14; trans. modified)]

Incredible. We here recover the duality of the subject of the statement, capable of pleasure, and the subject of enunciation, deserving of *jouissance*. Only, just as the subject of the statement never raises itself to the subject of enunciation, because the subject of enunciation is finally the great signifier, it goes without saying that *jouissance* is impossible. This means, as Barthes is in the process of explaining, that *jouissance* is in a fundamental relationship with death, so that we can close our circle: desire-lack, desire-pleasure or orgasm, desire *jouissance*.

Happily, in an even clearer text, Barthes goes so far as to say: "Is pleasure only a minor bliss? Is bliss nothing but extreme pleasure?" No. It's not that one is stronger than the other, or the other less strong; they differ in nature. If one says that pleasure and *jouissance* are "parallel forces, that they cannot meet, and that between them is more than a struggle: an incommunication, then I must certainly believe that history, our history, is not peaceable and perhaps not even intelligent, that the text of bliss always rises out of it like a scandal (an irregularity), that it is always the trace of a cut, of an assertion..." [Barthes, *Pleasure*, p.20, trans. modified]. We could go on. . . . What's happening here?

I'm thinking of this book on sexual life in ancient China. It recounts a strange story, in the end we are all Chinese: in Taoism, it varies throughout the ages, in any case, the reader is

struck by the glory of the men and women in it. . . . But that's not what marks its difference from Western thought, because, from the side of Western thought, that doesn't work more strongly; the difference is elsewhere.

What's different is the way desire is experienced in a totally different manner: it's not related to any transcendence, it's not related to any lack, it's not measured by any pleasure, and it's not transcended by any jouissance, under the form or myth of the impossible. Desire is posited as a pure process. Concretely, this means that it is not at all the orgasm; their problem is not at all the Western problem, which is: How to extract sexuality from genitality. Their problem is: How to extract sexuality from the orgasm? Then, broadly speaking, they say: You understand, pleasure or orgasm, that's not the achievement of the process, it is either its interruption or its exasperation, or the two amount to the same thing, and it's completely deplorable! No doubt, that has to happen, but then one has to perceive these moments of suspension as veritable suspensions that allow the process to once again be set in motion. They have a theory of female energy and male energy, which consists in saying, broadly: female energy is inexhaustible, male energy, it's more annoying, it's exhaustible. The problem, in any case, is that the man takes something from the female energy which is inexhaustible, or that each takes something from the other. How can that be done?

Flows are necessary -- and indeed this is a thought in terms of flows -- the feminine flow, following very determined trajectories, rises up following the lines of masculine flow, along the spinal column, to go to the brain, and that's desire in its immanence as a process. One borrows a flow, one absorbs a flow, one defines a pure field of immanence of desire, in relation to which pleasure, orgasm, jouissance are defined as veritable suspensions or interruptions. That is, not as the satisfaction of desire, but as the contrary: an exasperation of the process that makes desire come out of its own immanence, i.e., its own productivity. All this is interesting for us, to the degree that, in this thought, desire simultaneously loses any link with lack, with pleasure or orgasm, or with jouissance. It is conceived as the production of a flow, it defines a field of immanence, and a field of immanence--that means a multiplicity in which, effectively, any splitting of the subject into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement becomes strictly impossible, since in our revolving machine it was very simple: the subject of enunciation was the subject of impossible jouissance, the subject of the statement was the subject of pleasure and of the search for pleasure, and desire-lack was the splitting of the two. That should tell you to what degree, from Descartes to Lacan, this repugnant thought of the cogito is not only a metaphysical thought.

The entire history of desire -- and once again, Reich falls in the same way -- this way of linking desire to a beyond, whether it's that of lack, or pleasure, or jouissance, and of posing the dualism between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. And it isn't by chance that it's the same people who are doing it today, i.e., the Lacanians, i.e., engendering all statements from the subject, which consequently, and retroactively, becomes the subject split into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. What is inscribed is the subject of enunciation, which links desire with the impossible jouissance; the subject of the statement, which links desire with pleasure; and the cleavage of the two subjects, which links desire with lack or castration. And at the level of theory, the production of statements exactly covers this rotten theory of desire, word for word.

It is in this sense that I'm saying that thought is indeed monist, in the very apprehension of the identity of thought and process; as well as in the apprehension of the identity of process and desire: desire as constitutive of its own field of immanence, that is, as constitutive of the

multiplicities that populate it. But all this is perhaps obscure, a monistic field is indeed a field inhabited by multiplicities.

Ryjik: Yes, but I find that dangerous, because monism is considered to be something completely different, like the result of a dialectic coming from dualism. Hegel, for example.

Deleuze: But that's a false monism.

This magical operation that consists in forbidding the employment of the adjectives one and multiple, in order to retain only the substantive multiplicities. . . . This is the operation that gives an account of the identity of monism and pluralism, and which related the true source of dualism to the duality established between the two adjectives: the one and the multiple. The ground of dualism has always been: there are things that are one. Here one always recovers Descartes, because today we are talking about Descartes, i.e., Lacan. And then there are things that are divisible. Dualism is not defined by two, dualism is defined by the employment of the one and the multiple as adjectives. This is already true in Duns Scotus.

So that, instead of using the one and the multiple as adjectives, one substitutes the substantive multiplicities in the form: there is nothing that is one, there is nothing that is multiple, everything is multiplicities. At this moment, one can see the strict identity of monism and pluralism in this form of a process of immanence which can be neither interested -- and this is what the Chinese tell us in their sexual wisdom -- nor exasperated. The process of immanence is also a multiplicity, i.e., to design a field of immanence populated by a multiplicity.

Ryjik: A minute ago, you spoke a dualism as a result of Oedipus. Since, on the other hand, you think of Oedipus as a transitory machine between the affairs of the mass, the pack, or the affairs of paranoia or schizophrenia, you thus have a production of this dualism from a dualism that is proper to you (you don't return like that) at the level of the functioning of this process. This is what you have been explaining for two or three years.

Deleuze: That has been over for two or three years, it's finished. Here, today, I am reintroducing no dualism. Forget the rest.

When I say: the cogito is Oedipal, it matters little. . . . It would be necessary to find, moreover. . . . The first formulations of the cogito must be in Sophocles' *Oedipus*, even in the Cartesian texts, this entire progression is there, the assimilation to the three stages of the Oedipal machine, with paranoiac doubt, the non-deceiving, miraculating God, and the "I think," that appears to me to be almost [the bachelor machine].

That is, what I mean is that any theory which, in one way or another, relates the production of statements to a subject is firstly a theory that will necessarily divide the subject in two: the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. Secondly, it will involve us in all sorts of submissions, by telling us, in the most hypocritical manner, that you're the boss! What I would like to make clear is this is all the same thing. And thirdly, the figures of desire, in the sense that desire is linked to lack, or, what amounts to the same thing, desire is linked to the trinity pleasure-orgasm-jouissance. Voilà.

Why this second point? Why this most hypocritical submission? It is because this history of the splitting of the subject always consists in saying: it is you who command, i.e., you will accede to the commandment to the degree that you submit yourself to an order, which you are

not subject to without also being its legislator. This is the famous order of democracy. You are a legislator insofar as you are a subject; and it is not by chance that the person who pushed this doctrine the farthest, the formalism of this doctrine, is the inheritor of Descartes from the viewpoint of the cogito, namely, Kant, and that the submission to reason is presented to us as the manner in which we become legislators. This always refers us to the division of the subject into a subject of the statement and a subject of enunciation: you will obey as the subject of the statement, but because it is you who command as the subject of enunciation, and we are led to grasp this great split identity -- as a barred identity, whatever you like -- between the legislator and the subject. It's the same thing; it's the same mechanism, which thereby claims to engender statements in relation to a subject; which posits the duality of a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement as the source of all the other dualisms, which thus suppresses thought as a process; and which, thirdly, destroys any position of desire, because by relating desire to lack, pleasure, and jouissance, it in effect leaps in favor of the appearance of thought, i.e., in favor of an image of thought. We could contemplate the image of thought in dualism, whereas there is no reality to thought except in the monism of the process and in the multiplicities that populate the field of immanence.

So that when the Chinese define this field of immanence of desire traversed by flows -- which pursue neither the possible pleasure at the level of the subject of the statement, nor the impossible jouissance at the level of a pseudo-subject of enunciation -- at the same time, they give themselves all the conditions for an entire theory of desire and a theory of the production of statements.

A final step to take: Why do they look for the theory of the production of statements in a military art, that is, in a war machine, a strategic war machine, while at the same time looking for the theory of desire in manuals of sexuality? The two types of manuals are strictly [*missing word*] with each other. Which is to say that they define multiplicities communicating within the process, or within the field of immanence itself.

Ryjik: With this little difference, that the manuals of sexology are completely phallographic and Chinese politics is completely imperial.

Deleuze: OK, but that's a detail, because that's not what makes the difference between the East and the West. You could say the same thing about the West; if you're looking for the difference, it's certainly not there. That it's phallographic and imperial, OK, but that's more the common background. What this means is that it's not enough to define desire as a field of immanence in order to escape imperialism, etc.

Is this clear, this relation between the theory of statements and the conception of desire?
[*Pause in the session*]

No one can say anything about the difference in Lacan between pleasure and jouissance?

A student: Desire entails an enunciable relation with jouissance.

Deleuze: We can see how this all takes part in the same thing. To say that jouissance is not pleasure, that it takes part in a kind of system, which, in order to simplify it, I would present as a circular conception of desire in which, at the bottom, there is always the same starting postulate -- and it is true that Western philosophy has always consisted in saying: if desire exists, it is the very sign, or the very fact, that you are lacking something.

Everything starts from that. A first welding of desire-lack is brought about; from there, it goes without saying that desire is defined as a function of a field of transcendence; desire is desire for what one does not have; that begins with Plato, it continues with Lacan. This is the first malediction of desire, it's the first way to curse desire; but it is not sufficient. -- What I'm doing is following Plato's method in the *Phaedo*, when he constructs a circle from arcs. --

The second arc: if desire is fundamentally aimed at an Other, open to a transcendence, if it is subjected to this first malediction, what is it that can come to fulfil it? What can fulfil it will never be the object toward which it tends, except in appearance, for it is the Other, it is unattainable, is the pure transcendent. Thus, that can't be what fulfils it. What comes to fulfil it or satisfy it, what gives it a pseudo-immanence, will be what is called a state of pleasure. But at this second level, it's understood that this immanence is a false immanence, since desire has been fundamentally defined in relation to a transcendence, and this fulfilment is, literally, an illusion. Second malediction of desire: it's a matter of calming desire for a moment, and then the malediction will begin again. And then it will be necessary to call it up again, and then it's the conception of pleasure-discharge. This word is enough to indicate that the title of this second arc of the circle is "To Provisionally Have Done With Desire." This is what's fascinating to me: the point at which all this is retained in Reich's protest against Freud. He retains this conception of desire-discharge, which he thematizes in the theory of the orgasm. This second arc clearly defines this type of illusory immanence through which pleasure fulfils desire, that is to say, it obliterates it for a while. But, as in any good construction -- because all this is a pure construction -- it's not true, it's false from start to finish.

A third arc is needed to close the circle, since you have this supposed truth of desire linked with a transcendence of the Other, this illusion or this deception through which desire encounters calming discharges in which it disappears, even if it reappears the next day. A third arc is needed to give an account of this: that even through these states of sleep, satisfaction, etc., the irreducibility of desire to states of pleasure, which only satisfy it in appearance, must be reaffirmed, it must be reaffirmed in another mode: transcendence. And this reaffirmation is the impossible jouissance-death relation. And from start to finish, it is the same conception. And when someone tells us: watch out, don't confuse desire, pleasure, jouissance, obviously we shouldn't confuse them because we need them to make the three arcs of the same circle, namely, the three arcs that bear down on desire.

The three maledictions are: You will lack every time you desire; you will only hope for discharges; you will pursue the impossible jouissance. Desire is thus completely ensnared, it is taken up in a circle.

How then is the problem of statements the same thing? It's the same at the level of the Cartesian cogito, since you also construct your circle at the level of I walk, I breathe, I imagine, I see a unicorn, a system of statements in which the I [je] is the subject of the statement, and that is something like the appearance. Perhaps it's not true, perhaps God is deceiving me, perhaps I believe I'm walking but I'm not walking. Second arc: but watch out, for if it's true that I can be deceived when I say I'm walking, in return I cannot deceive myself when I say "I think I'm walking." If it is true that I can be deceived when I say "I see a unicorn," I cannot be deceived when I say "I think I'm seeing a unicorn." That's the extraction of the "I think, therefore I am," it's the extraction of the subject of enunciation; and the production of the statement, of any statement, is made in the form of a splitting of the subject

into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement, as the condition of the production of any possible statement.

Desire-lack is found at the level of the splitting of the subject, of the cut, the bar. The desire-pleasure system is found at the level of the subject of the statement. And the desire-jouissance system is found at the level of the glory of the subject of enunciation, once again with the mystification of the circle: you will command all the more insofar as you obey, i.e., you will be all the more ready to be a true subject of enunciation insofar as you conform yourself to the bar that separates you as a subject of the statement from the subject of enunciation. In other words, it's through castration that you accede to desire. To say: it's through castration that you accede to desire, or to say: it's through the splitting of the subject that you accede to the production of statements, is the same thing.

Ryjik: You don't want to go further with Descartes' God and Lacan's signifier?

Deleuze: I don't want to, but I will, ouaf! ouaf! ouaf!

The problem becomes: supposing we say that only statements. . . that's desire. Every desire is a statement, all statements are desires. If things are indeed like that, what we must give an account of is the system of appearance; then it goes without saying that Nietzsche was completely right, it's truly a Platonic Christian system. And if that leads to psychoanalysis, it's not by chance, because psychoanalysis is the thing that says to us, "Come here, lie down, you're finally going to be able to speak in your name," and which, at the same time, withdraws in advance all possible conditions for the production of statements, precisely because it has subordinated all production of statements to the splitting of the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement, i.e., you will command all the more insofar as you accept castration and you pursue the impossible jouissance.

Richard III: It seems to me that desire-discharge is taken up again in Lacan in the form of metonymy, it's not far -- but this is only an intuition -- from desire -- *aufhebung*, and that finally the entire history of desire which is displaced, and which one never manages to get to, is the trajectory of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, broadly speaking. With precisely this jouissance, as an impossible horizon, which would be absolute knowledge.

Gilles Deleuze: If you like, but there is no reason to privilege Hegel, because he is one of the multiple cases where desire is defined as lack, but in the pages just before those on the master and slave, everything passes through this circle: desire-lack, the illusion of pleasure, and desire-jouissance.

Richard III: What's really interesting is that if you tie desire to the field of the Other and to the treasure of the signifier, you truly have the process of *Erinnerung*. . .

Gilles Deleuze: Yes, it's not by chance that Lacan passed through Hegel; he has suppressed his Hegelian texts . . .

The problem is that it will be necessary to explain the formation of this appearance: Under what conditions do statements appear to be produced by a subject which, as the producer of statements, would then necessarily be split into a subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. And above all, what does that permit as a falling-back [rabattement]? These are things we have already done, you have two possible fallings-back: either the subject of

enunciation -- in any case, the splitting makes them fall back on each other -- either the subject of enunciation will fall back on the subject of the statement, and that will be the Oedipal apparatus, or else the subject of the statement will be granted to the subject of enunciation, and that will be the paranoid apparatus. The paranoid is the subject of the statement that takes itself to be the subject of enunciation.

I fear that there is no explanation that will make the formula any less dismal. The paranoid is truly someone who establishes himself between everything that can be used as a sign in a network, or a system of networks, such that the sign refers to another sign. The sign no longer refers either to the earth, or to a body, or to a thing, the sign refers to another sign in a system of networks. Consequently, and at the same time, it is subsumed under a signifier. And this signifier is what represents it for another signifier, the subject, following a well-known formula, namely: the signifier is precisely the subject of enunciation. And the position of the paranoid is very typical and very formidable, because he is both the person who doubts the most and the person who has the greatest power. Paranoia swarms in every direction: a sign here, oh, here's another one, oh, but over there, etc. It's not like that in all deliriums. Once again, a paranoid is networks, and when he is taken in the networks, he doubts everything, he says to himself: perhaps I'm being deceived. As a subject of the statement, he is perpetually in a kind of doubt, but at the same time, he recuperates everything, and he recuperates a certitude, he is the distributor of signs, he is powerful and omnipotent to the degree that he leaps, he is unstable, at the level of the subject of enunciation, and the formula of the paranoid is at the level: I have guessed in advance. He passes his time oscillating inside his network of signs.

It will be necessary to give an account of this production of an appearance. Once again, the appearance consists in this: statements would be produced by a subject thus split. How was this thing here able to produce that thing there? And this is the problem: How to say "me" [*moi*]? How to dare to say "me"? As soon as I say "me," I situate myself both as a subject of the statement and a subject of enunciation. And whenever there is this cleavage, there's all this rubbish [*saloperie*] that comes along with it. I mean, for example: "Me as a human being." All social functions are constructed on that, all repressive functions are constructed on this cleavage: me as human being, you understand, but as a father, I must act! Me as human being, I'm on your side; but as a cop, I have to apply the law! As a cop, I have to apply the law, which means that I'm the subject of the statement. As a man, I understand you: that means I'm the subject of enunciation. I will be a legislator all the more insofar as I am a subject, you will be a subject all the more insofar as you are legislators, we all understand each other. . . . This is a way of saying: OK, we are all castrated, it works.

What we were saying last week was: there are no individual statements, no statement can be produced by an individual. Our hypothesis was that what produces statements were machinic assemblages, or what amounts to the same thing, collective agents of enunciation -- on the condition that we understand that collective does not mean peoples, but that it means, in whatever sense the term is taken: what must be called collective agents of enunciation are all multiplicities, whatever their nature. So that we must explain how machinic agents of enunciation effectively produce variable statements in such and such circumstances, and produce new types of statements; how these statements are necessarily desires; and how, within this production, the illusion of the subject is engendered, of a subject split into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement, who has the impression of producing statements which, in fact, are produced by machinic assemblages or by the multiplicities acting in him.

We have to see how all this happens. We have to pose the problem practically! We have to pose a series of oppositions, we have to make a table: how is a body without organs produced, the first production of the statement. I mean: if something, in given conditions, does not function as a body without organs, there is no surface on which to inscribe a statement. A body without organs is the surface of inscription for every statement or for every desire. Except there is not a single body without organs, there are as many as you like. It's a thing to produce or fabricate. A body without organs does not preexist. Last time, I took the desert as a model, but on the condition that certain things take place on it. The desert is indeed a place or a surface for the production of statements. There are no statements linked to drugs that do not presuppose as prior the constitution of a body without organs. . . . whatever takes place on the order of the event, i.e., the statement or desire, the event is finally the very identity of the statement and of desire, whatever takes place implies the constitution of a body without organs. As long as you have not made your body without organs, alone, with someone else, with n people, nothing is possible, you have to find your own.

In the bad column, that of the false conception of desire, we'll put the organism. Here, it would be necessary to show how a body without organs is formed on this organism, how there appears on it a probe head, a machinic point, and this machinic point is this instance of movement that will be found later in this or that assemblage. The body without organs, the desert, is fundamentally populated. The problem of the unconscious is not really that of generations, it is a problem of population, it is a matter of know how one populates. When [André] Green writes, don't go too far, a schizophrenic is someone who has a father and mother like everybody else, it's not true. [*The reference to Green occurs earlier, in Anti-Oedipus, notably p. 305*]

I have here a text by an old schizo, it's very beautiful, this text. It's made up of tales: "I love to invent people, tribes, racial origins . . . and to imagine other behaviors, a thousand other ways of being. I have always had a complex for exploration, and I only like to count on very fantastic explorations. For example, my deserts are like diversions, desert-diversions, for whomever can imagine these strange simulators of [*missing word*], these kinds of oneiric songs. I let myself go; I have the tendency to put my guilty experiences on my characters, to mistreat them" -- you see it is a matter of populating the desert -- "to use mental cruelty against them, by provocation. I have the rage to imagine how that can work, a being in an extreme situation, after all, it's a passion . . ." [*tape inaudible*]. In all these tales, it is solely a question of deserts populated with tribes: "I return from my tribes. As of today, I am the adoptive son of fifteen tribes, no more, no less. And they in turn are my adopted tribes, for I love each of them more than if I had been born into it." [*For this citation, unattributed, see A Thousand Plateaus, p. 30*] Over there, a child has the right to adopt another tribe. There are many renegade children, and they don't feel exiled at all. But their true parents? What do you mean by their true parents? Their true progenitors, their parents, are first of all whomever the child recognizes as such, progenitors or adopted, that is to say, the tribes. One is a child of a population and not the child of a father or a mother. A schizo thinks like that.

In the other column, as opposed to assemblages of multiplicities, there is the theme of the subject of enunciation, the split subject as the source of dualisms. To the anti-Oedipal apparatus is opposed the Oedipal apparatus, or to the becoming inhuman, the becoming animal, is opposed the becoming human of the other column. To monism-pluralism is opposed the dualities that follow from the false conception of the statement. To desire or the thought-process is opposed the conception of desire-lack-pleasure-jouissance; just as the two statuses of the sign we looked at last time are opposed, namely, the sign gathered together in

a network that subordinates it to the signifier, and on the contrary, the sign that sets to work on its own account, that frees itself from the hypothesis of the signifier and which is coupled with a particle or a system of particles, i.e., the sign-particle as opposed to the sign-signifier. It would be necessary to know what machinic point marks the maximum of deterritorialization on this body without organs; this history of the machinic point that will mark the currents of deterritorialization on the BwO seems to me to be very complicated. It is also necessary to see the machinic assemblages that flow from it, and then the becomings animal, or, what amounts to the same thing, the intensities. The deterritorialized intensities that crisscross [quadrillent] the body without organs. And in all this, the subject is, à la lettre, a nomadic particle which traverses all that, the lines of deterritorialization, the intensities. The problem of the genesis of the illusion is: What is going to fix the subject? At the same time, it will be turned into an organism, it will be submitted to the cogito, it will be fixed, its submission will be assured, by telling it: it's you who produces statements.

Next time, we'll have to look at Carlos Casteneda's book. [*While Deleuze and Guattari cite several in A Thousand Plateaus, this first reference is likely to the first in the Don Juan series, The Teachings of Don Juan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)*] It recounts, broadly speaking, not an initiation, but truly an experimentation. The guy would indeed like to be initiated, because he's a poor guy, and the Indian tells him no problem. Carlos says to him: teach me, I want to know, i.e., he treats the old Indian like one treats one's psychoanalyst, and the Indian tells him: begin by finding your body without organs. Carlos's search for his BwO is pathetic, he is looking in a restrained space, in a kind of desert, that's the joyous experimentation; and in a certain way, this search is to find the place where one is at ease [*la place où on est bien*]. From a schizoanalytic perspective, the guy has to find where he is at ease, and in what position, if he wants to hang from the ceiling. . . . There's no reason for him to lie down. And Carlos looks for his place by rolling around in the grass, he seeks until he finds. Once he's found his place, he no longer lives as a subject, but as a tiny thing [*truc*], a tiny particle, and then there is a more brilliant particle, the Indian.

Then, a machinic assemblage begins. In what form? In the form that it is necessary to have an ally. On the one hand, it is necessary to have a teacher, an experimenter, but it is also necessary to have a powerful ally. All this begins to make a little machine where something is going to happen; a certain distribution of intensities is already being drawn on this body without organs. And then he sees a dog, he plays at being dog [*il fait le chien*], but it's not that either, he doesn't play dog; he is in the process of undoing the organization of the body in favor of something else. One feels that the problem is not that of becoming animal; the dog is not a dog. The Indian says: that's not a dog, it's anything at all, whatever you like. What is this type of becoming inhuman, which is expressed badly in saying "he's playing dog"? He has traversed certain intensities, which one can represent by: dog, as in Kafka. Kafka also plays dog, but he doesn't need drugs to do so; he invented another machine for himself in order to do it. At the end, Carlos annoys the Indian so much that the Indian says to him, "But this dog, what, you take yourself for what? It's not your whore of a mother." That's anti-psychoanalysis. This dog here is the outcome [*sortie*] of the Oedipal apparatus. He followed his body without organs, lines of deterritorialization following deterritorialized intensities.

Why these intensities rather than others? He'll then become a lizard; then he'll progress, he'll become a crow. To play the crow [*faire le corbeau*] truly consists in making the legs and wings of the crow grow from his face, to be populated with crows. It was not to play dog, it was to be populated with dogs. To play dog, it is not enough to go "woof, woof, woof," one

has to pass through other experimentations. This changes everything in the problem of totemism.

When structuralists speak of totemism, it's rather poor, dry. Totemism has always had certain relations with the history of drugs, but it is not that at all, for in the second book, where the experimentation continues even more strongly, we witness the passage from becoming inhuman, from becoming intense to something yet again which is a kind of becoming molecular, as if the disorganisation of the organism in favor of a body living in another mode, again implying something more. And that's clairvoyance. What does it mean to see inside? [*Given the context, the reference is no doubt to Carlos Castaneda's second book, A Separate Reality (1971)*]

That consists above all in seeing water, and Carlos, through an entire series of stages, sees the water that is modified, hardened, immobilized, and which, above all, is dissociated. At the end, it is molecularized and he grasps the water through its constitutive bubbles; but he can't grasp and see the water through the constitutive molecular bubbles except in connection [liaison] with what is produced by experimentation . . . [*End of the text and recording from WebDeleuze*]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Anti-Oedipus, 1972-1973

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Transcription: WebDeleuze and Le Terrier; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translated by Christian Kerslake

... one would be engaging in a flattening operation. We're starting from a point where what happens in a completely private way to an alcoholic or a drug user, or what happens to an army in an operation of conquest, or what happens to a historically assignable State, to social formations – we are going to consider all of that as if it were spread out on a plane of equivalence. From one plane to another, relations and networks are then woven, so that we better understand the difference between these planes. Thus, we can proceed by treating everything on the same plane: a guy in the process of [*missing phrase*], a nomad setting out to conquer something ... No reason not to put that on the same screen, if there's a point to it – because it's certainly not the same thing – but in order to see what fabric can be woven between all that.

Why is this linked to the problem of the production of statements?

Last time, I attempted to distinguish the kinds of strata which were produced on the body without organs and which inhibited, and which were even made to inhibit, the functioning of the body without organs.²⁷ I would like to start again from there. Everything happens as if the body without organs, once given, was prevented from functioning. All the same we have some ideas on how it functions. The body without organs can be anything: it can be a living body, it can be a place, it can be a land, anything you like. The body without organs designates a use.

A body without organs being assumed, it always *undergoes*, that is why it is never given. What I call body without organs is a kind of limit that, in a logic of desire, we must land on, or one must approach to it. Yes, the best we can do is to approach it, because maybe if we did more than approach it or reach for it, then the body without organs would reverse itself and would brandish its death-face to us. It takes a lot of prudence to make oneself a body without organs; it takes a lot of prudence not to get blown up, patience is needed. In any case, all the more so, if it is a limit to approach prudently, that's because in order to approach it, things have to be blown up.

We know that it is precisely through lines of flight that we manage to approach the body without organs. Flight from what? What are we running from? We're starting to have ideas about that; and on the other hand, not all lines of flight are equally valid. And yet, once again, I will consider them at the beginning as equivalents: the drugged line of flight, the revolutionary line of flight, which, however, are completely different from each other. For the moment I'm not looking for how they are different, even if that ultimately becomes the problem: how they can both plug into each other and how they can be completely different. They do not put the same machines into play.

What prevents the body without organs from functioning, and what makes it so that, for us, the body without organs is always to be fabricated, is that it undergoes all sorts of inhibitions. It is never given except through inhibitions that need to be blasted away. Everything happens as if it were caught in a triple bandage, and I would like to try to clearly situate the notions that correspond to this triple inhibitory bandage.

These bandages, we can just as well call them strata. As opposed to what? The stratum is almost like a kind of formation on the body without organs that will cause it to fall back on itself, to refold itself, to form one-to-one relationships. The body without organs taken in a stratum is folded, refolded, forms a falling back that produces one-to-one relationships, and it is these one-to-one relationships which prevent the functioning of the BwO (body without organs), because the BwO, if it manages to function, functions in the form of a regime of polyvocal connections. So that crimping it, imposing techniques which push it back down, so that it no longer functions through polyvocal relations – that is already to take away all chances from it. In other words, everything happens on the body without organs, both its inhibitions and its formation, its constitution, its fabrication.

And so the three strata are rules through which the body without organs does not function, does not succeed in freeing itself. I think that they are opposed – I'm attempting to throw out a whole series of words here to see what sticks and what doesn't – that they should be opposed to the body without organs itself, which is not stratified. And it is not stratified because it is the plane of consistency, or what comes down to the same thing, the field of immanence of desire. That means desire in its positivity, desire as process, and desire as process precisely can only be defined negatively on the basis of what betrays it.

And we saw on previous occasions that the three great betrayals, the three maledictions on desire are: to relate desire to lack; to relate desire to pleasure, or to the orgasm – see [Wilhelm] Reich, fatal error; or to relate desire to enjoyment [*jouissance*]. The three theses are connected. To put lack into desire is to completely misrecognize the process. Once you have put lack into desire, you will only be able to measure the apparent fulfilments of desire with pleasure. Therefore, the reference to pleasure follows directly from desire-lack; and you can only relate it to a transcendence which is that of impossible enjoyment referring to castration and the split subject. That is to say that these three propositions form the same soiling of desire, the same way of cursing desire.

On the other hand, desire and the body without organs at the limit are the same thing, for the simple reason that the body without organs is the plane of consistency, the field of immanence of desire taken as process. This plane of consistency is beaten back down, prevented from functioning by the strata. Hence terminologically, I oppose – but once again if you can find better words, I'm not attached to these –, I oppose plane of consistency and the strata which precisely prevent desire from discovering its plane of consistency, and which will proceed to orient desire around lack, pleasure, and enjoyment, that is to say, they will form the repressive mystification of desire.

So, if I continue to spread everything out on the same plane, I say let's look for examples where desire does indeed appear as a process unfolding itself on the body without organs taken as field of immanence or of consistency of desire. And here we could place the ancient Chinese warrior; and again, it is we Westerners who interpret the sexual practices of the ancient Chinese and Taoist Chinese, in any case, as a delay of enjoyment. You have to be a filthy European to understand Taoist techniques like that. It is, on the contrary, the extraction

of desire from its pseudo-finality of pleasure in order to discover the immanence proper to desire in its belonging to a field of consistency. It is not at all to delay enjoyment.

But I could just as well point to, in our civilizations – look at those who have studied masochism – certain maso techniques, for example. The Chinese Tao, the Western maso, that too gets interpreted as bringing into operation phenomena of delay of enjoyment, whereas its operation is to discover a process immanent to desire, such that desire no longer relates to pleasure. The whole problem is precisely what, in Taoist China, appears as the absence of all perversion, as a desiring activity without perversion, the field of perversions being completely external to that. In our societies, at least in the case of the maso, the equivalent can only appear as perversion. It is obvious that the general economy of desire is not the same.

So there you have it, I start from this first great opposition: plane of consistency of desire of the body without organs and the strata which bind the body without organs. These strata, last time, I saw three of them.

The first stratum is that of organization. The stratum of organization is very simple: it consists in making the body without organs into an organism. And I use the word ‘make’ as in making a child²⁸: one makes him an organism; one organizes him according to the principle of the yield of useful energies, of energies of work. One imposes on what happens on the BwO. What happens is very variable; the job is not over with the fabrication of a body without organs. On the contrary, it is not a scene, nor a place; the BwO is like a mastery, starting from which something will happen because something will be produced. The stratum of organization is entirely made to take what is on the point of happening, to take what is already happening on the body without organs, into a system which will direct all that in a completely different direction. It will divert it.

And this system, which will precisely extract the useful energies – called useful as a function of social production, to inhibit so-called useless energies – well, this system is the articulatory relation or the double organic organization. And this double organic organization, which is truly at the basis of the constitution of the organism ... the best example is muscle tone. You have to look at the theory of muscle tone found among biologists, and I’m thinking of an interesting theory proposed by [*indistinct name*], which shows that muscle tone is a statistical given.²⁹ And it’s interesting, because the way in which the fabrication of the organism proceeds, when one makes an organism out of the body without organs, comes down to saying that all the molecular phenomena which happen on the body without organs will be taken up into large ensembles known as statistical. And this is even the first level of the double articulation; they will be caught up in crowd [*foules*] phenomena, and this is going to be the first stage of the passage from the molecular dimension belonging to the body without organs – and the BwO is nothing other than a giant molecule.

And these molecular phenomena will be organized into large organic molar ensembles of the skeleton type, and there, contemporary biologists show very well the extent to which the organism is a statistical given, that is to say implying a microbiology, namely implying the reduction of molecular, microbiological phenomena, to large statistical ensembles, or else, as for muscle tone – and this is related – the role of the nervous system in the molar constitution of organisms endowed with such a system.

But then this role of the nervous system also explains something else to us, namely that the organism in its relations with the external world is endowed with this strange faculty of *representation*, by which it annexes to itself a portion of the external world: the organism is not constituted as a form – what defines the form being precisely the double articulation – without apprehending external reality as a form which corresponds, not by resemblance, but according to relationships that biologists have tried to determine, namely [*indistinct words*]. And there is a whole derivation between the organic form itself, which we can call Form I, based on the double articulation, and the organization of the perceived world of representation, where the external world is grasped through the relay of the nervous system under the species of a form of another type, Form II: that's [Raymond] Ruyer's direction of research on the passage from the organic Form I to the Form II of perception.³⁰ So all that's to do with the first stratum.

And I say 'first' because one has to start somewhere; above all, one should not interpret it as chronologically first. Already the formation of the organism is very much connected to social pressures, and when I said it was in accordance with the principle of useful energy, that indeed calls upon a whole world of social production. So, I retain, for this first stratum of organization, a certain number of concepts which seem to me key: useful or useless energy, the articulatory relation or double organic articulation, muscle tone and the nervous system, and representation. We can call that the volume of organization.

And then the second stratum will be the stratum of signification. And the stratum of signification, we could just as well say that it follows from the first, as that the first supposes it. And this time, we will no longer speak of the volume of the organism, but for reasons that we will see presently, we will speak of the angle of significance. It is this second stratum which prevents the body without organs as much from functioning as from being attained. And this time, its difference with the first is that the stratum of organization resulted in a world of representation distinct from reality, so that the great break which corresponded to the stratum of organization was – first rupture, the rupture of double articulation – and then it was just as much the rupture *representation-real* – [but now] the stratum of signification passes to the interior of representation and it also consists ... this time, it's a rupture that happens on the inside of representation, between what we will call the Signifier and the Signified. Therefore, this break is of a completely different type, and it consists in what? It consists first of all in a phenomenon of double articulation. This phenomenon of double articulation does not coincide with signifier-signified. Double articulation is constitutive of the signifier. It includes a first level which is also a certain way of forcing the molecular phenomena which occur on the BwO to enter into the large ensembles, large ensembles corresponding to statistical laws.

Only, this time, these molecular phenomena, they are what? At the level of representation, it's what can be called, for convenience, *figures of expression*. And so at a first level of this articulation which is made within the framework of representation, the figures of expression are taken up into ensembles that constitute distinctive units. Distinctive units, among linguists, in their theory of representation in its relationship to speech, among linguists, these are called *phonemes*, or even more simply, one can call them *letters*, although this not the same thing.

So, the first level of representation which takes molecular phenomena into statistical ensembles is: the figures of expression are taken up into statistical units, units not yet significant but distinctive, that is to say which enter into relations of distinction with each

other and which are called phonemes. The double articulation comes about because what are called phonemes (distinctive units) are in turn taken up into the statistical units of another type, this time significant or signifying units that one calls *morphemes*. There, the double articulation does not correspond to the duality signifier-signified; it is wholly at the basis of the constitution of the signifier. It is the signifier as such which implies double articulation, this time the double articulation of representation and no longer of the organism. There would already be here a whole problem consisting in seeing what the relationship is between the organic double articulation and the double articulation of representation.

Thus the figures of expression as molecular phenomena are organized into these two successive types of statistical units which constitute the signifier, that is to say, they are translated into phonemes and morphemes.

And that's why what seems to me very important in a linguist like [Louis] Hjelmslev is the way in which he goes beyond both the domain of morphemes and the domain of phonemes, in order to tell us a little something about the figures of expression in the free state, taken below what he himself calls the conditions of identity of phonemes. And he is perhaps the only one to have attained a kind of molecular linguistics, a micro-linguistics, and it's very important and sad – but maybe that will improve – that Hjelmslev was as if crushed by the other currents of linguistics.³¹

Once you have this constitutive double articulation of the signifier, from that moment there is no longer much difficulty in generating the signified as the correlate of the signifier. So the double articulation bears on the engendering of the signifier and not on signifier-signified relations. The signified will be, roughly, the set of icons (notion of C.S. Peirce) which correspond to the signifying elements such as they are formed by the double articulation, the icons being images. And on the side of the signified-icons, just as earlier the signifier implied a double articulation imposed on the figures of expression, on the side of the signified, the icons here also suppose a kind of system in which are caught up, this time, not figures of expression, but *figures of content*. The imprisonment of figures of content in icons, in the signified, and the statistical treatment of figures of content so as to form icons, that is to say the set of images that correspond to the signifying elements, and then the parallel operation at the level of the figures of expression taken up into the double articulation phonemes-morphemes, all that combines very well.

Simply, to finish with this level, with this second stratum, if I establish the signifier-signified line, therefore, with at one end the capture of figures of expression, at the other end the capture of figures of content, with the two poles I mentioned last time ... For example, to be a bit less obscure here, it represents, if you like, at the level of the nursery school, the way in which one teaches children to draw, or when one teaches them to write; or, at the other pole, the nursery school lesson about things, in the forms of drawing or in the forms of graphism that one imposes on them – the figures of expression that are taken up into an imposed form, those which will function as the signifier; and the others as the signified, that is to say, the set of lessons of things, this is the signified which refers to the set of graphisms; that's how it works in the classic nursery school.

Therefore, in my line, I can say that the set of figures of expression led back to the signifier, caught in the net of the signifier, and which I represent by a sort of circle around the signifier – the set of figures of expression is thus reduced to a slavery, caught up in these units which impose upon them so that they no longer play freely, no longer enter into free connections.

On the other side, I can make the circle of the signified where, this time, it will be the set of figures of content taken up in the system of lessons about things, equally enslaved and prevented from entering into free connections. We assume that these two circles have an intersection, and this intersection which is the very articulation signifier-signified, the articulation graphic form-lesson about things, it is this intersection of the two circles, the circle of the signifier and the circle of the signified, which constitutes what I called for convenience the *dominant real*.

While the first stratum led to a representation-real break, the second stratum opens onto something quite different: a break interior to representation with a new phenomenon of double articulation which culminates with a duality which is no longer that of representation and the real but is what in the representation of the dominant real differs from what will have to be called a *masked real*. The masked real is what continues to work under the net of the signifier and under the net of the signified, namely the free connections between figures of expression and figures of content, treated in molecular manner, that is to say insofar as they are not taken up in systems of enslavement.

And then, the third and last stratum – they follow from one another, but it would not be difficult to do the inverse procedure, of showing that III is already presupposed by II. And here, at the meeting point of the intersection, I would say the third stratum can be defined, namely the stratum of *subjectivation*, to which corresponds more precisely the point of subjectivation.³²

The point of subjectivation is very curious, it must be very important, but I don't quite yet see how. I would say that there is no dominant real without a point of subjectivation, and this point is not at all the point where the subject emerges. It is the point from which the angle of significance and the variable opening of this angle are organized. It is always starting from a point of subjectivation that the cut [*découpage*] of the dominant real is made, and it is always starting from the point of subjectivation that the machine of signification will come into play, and all the more, the machine of organization.*

There is always – and it is in this sense that this third stratum is presupposed by the other two – there is no organization of an organism, there is no significance of significations, there is no determination of a dominant real, without a point of subjectivation which corresponds to it. It's not at all that it's the point of subjectivation which makes the dominant real. Strictly speaking, it measures it, it fixes its variable limits. Why variable? Because each of us evidently has several points of subjectivation; but the point of subjectivation is not what will fabricate the dominant real. It is what will permeate it, allowing us to rediscover ourselves there, to fix ourselves to such and such a place in the dominant real and to maintain ourselves, and to organize almost all our understanding and our resignation to the dominant real. Starting from the point of subjectivation, one has the impression that one understands everything, and that what belongs to the dominant real is there for eternity.

If I take someone, their points of subjectivation are very numerous and, ultimately, I ask myself – that would make things easier – if the point of subjectivation isn't a new function. And it is through this that the third stratum flows from the second, if it is not a new function of the signified itself, that is to say, of icons. Last time, I said: we see how, once the dominant real has been assigned for someone, the dominant real, for example, let's suppose, of a worker, this is where one can see the angle of significance of a resigned worker: it's the factory, the job, the family. And then he will say: it's always been like that, there will always

be bosses, machines everywhere; all that is organized in a dominant real. The masked real is what is masked by the dominant real, namely the trafficking of the bosses, or the force or non-force of revolutionary groups who propose to blow up the dominant real, etc.

But the guy who is caught up in the dominant real, in the first case, he submits to it. That means that, in a certain way, he must fuse with the impression of understanding this dominant real. Now, I say that this is indeed the role of the point of subjectivation, which is not at all in him; the point of subjectivation is what will constitute him, as a subject fixed in such and such a place, but it is not the point of his subjectivity. The point of subjectivation is the point from which the angle of significance of the dominant real will narrow and will vary its opening, for example when the guy passes from his work to his family. The point of subjectivation assumes the “Get on, the boss said so”; the boss functions as an icon in a very special sense, that is to say, a point of subjectivation starting from which the description or assignation of a dominant real is made.

And then, he gets home from work, he finds his wife, and I guess it’s not marvellous, he gives her his wages. His wife acts as another point of subjectivation. If he is a fetishist, his wife, as a global person, acts as a point of subjectivation sketching another dominant real in the dominant real. It’s not the same angle, but it overlaps. And then comes the moment of love, and he is a fetishist, so he loves his wife’s dress even more than his wife ... a woman’s dress, or a woman’s shoe also forms a point of subjectivation. We pass our time jumping from one point of subjectivation to other points of subjectivation. But there is always a masked real.

Typical case of a point of subjectivation: the chief.³³ The chief has said this: long live Hitler. There is the dominant real of Nazism and then the great icon, the figure of the chief who intervenes as a point of subjectivation starting from which each Nazi properly fuses with the dominant real which imposes some particular place on him in the corresponding society.

What function do these three strata serve? It seems to me that this is where social formations function, namely the three great social orders are: you will be organized or otherwise you will be deprived; the second is: you will signify and you will be signified, you will interpret and you will be interpreted, or otherwise you will be a dangerous deviant; and you will be subjectivated, that is to say fixed, your place assigned, and you will only move if the point of subjectivation tells you to move, otherwise you will be a dangerous nomad. There is a dominant reality of work, there is a dominant real of labor; this dominant real does not have an invariable opening, it has a variable angle. This is what one will call the mobility of manpower. The mobility of manpower is brought about starting from a point of subjectivation specific to the capitalist formation, and which is the mobility of capital.

And starting from the 19th century, one of the essential problems for political economy had been the comparative mobility of manpower, the mobility of the workforce in relation to the mobility of capital: how to make it so that there is no mobility of labor that would exceed the mobility of capital or which would be carried off in other directions. That would produce nomads. And how to make it so that the workers agree to go where the mobility of capital, that is to say, capitalist investment, goes? I would say that, under this aspect, capital taken in its mobility is the mobility of the point of subjectivation on which depends the mobility of a subject in the dominant real.

To the first stratum correspond the exclusions of the depraved, that is to say, those who make their organism function according to a principle of useless energies, that is to say, those who are not socially productive. And already, this depravity is a certain way in which someone has blown up the organism or the organization of the body in order to rediscover something of a body without organs, the BwO being essentially a captor of so-called useless energies. To the second stratum corresponds the exclusion of the experimenter, the experimenter being precisely the one who traces a domain of non-significance. And to the third stratum, correspond the exclusions of the nomad.

We must continue to spread everything out on the same plane, this whole system is connected, and this is the reason I'm fascinated by the text by [Antonin] Artaud, 'To Have Done with the Judgment of God', where he only describes the first stratum, namely how one makes the body into an organism, how one forces the body to take the form of an organism. Hence Artaud's cries: "My body has been stolen"³⁴, that is to say: where I had a body as a living body, I have been made into an organism. Now in fact, it is this triple system of the three strata together which forms the judgment of God, that is to say the theological system. And what is profoundly connected there are the activity of organization, the activity of interpretation which corresponds to the stratum of signification, and the activity of subjectivation.

And one can find them at all levels, that is to say, all regimes of organization imply this: once again, you will be organized and you will organize, you will be interpreted and you will interpret, you will be subjectivated and you will move as soon as someone tells you to. We find that everywhere, and we can even call the system of the judgment of God, or the despotic system, the totality of these three strata; or the imperial system. It is simply the forms that differ: in every system – and once again, for the moment, it is a matter of putting everything on the same plane – ... Fascism: the problem would be: what is the type of organization, including the organization of properly fascist bodies, what is the properly fascist machine of interpretation and what are the points of subjectivation of fascism? And it will be necessary to seek that for every imperial formation.

The conjugal apparatus is similar. We must consider it in the same way. The conjugal relationship indeed implies a kind of organization of bodies which even has a whole jurisdiction, namely the belonging of bodies between spouses; a certain principle of useful energy, namely desire related to the lack; an angle of significance which constitutes the properly conjugal machine of interpretation with its dominant real: ah, my kitchen, ah, my children. This is the dominant real, and the point of subjectivation, which is often very variable, the point of subjectivation can be the husband, the husband as chief: my husband, that's what he likes, I'm going to make him the dinner he likes this evening. There we have a point of subjectivation from which the dominant real is cut out. Or else it's the kid who takes the role of the little boss [*petit chef*]; or maybe it's the vacuum cleaner. You have infinite points of subjectivation, they form little constellations.

We should carry out inquiries into households; we would take several households, and we would fix their three strata: the organization of the body of the husband on the collective body, or its non-organization; then the stratum of significance; and then the stratum of subjectivation and the variations of points of subjectivation. One could analyze the imperial machine in these terms, or the [psycho-]analytic machine. From the moment there is a despotic formation, you always find the three strata that prevent the formation of a field of immanence of desire. This is why, at this level of analysis, I can consider everything,

formally, structurally, everything as equivalent: whether it is the Nazi despotic machine, whether it is the conjugal machine, or whether it is the psychoanalytic machine. For the moment, it doesn't matter about the differences.

In the case of the psychoanalytic machine, we can push the analysis further. First, what plays the role of the body without organs? There are always several bodies without organs nested one inside the others; there is never just one. What plays the role of a body without organs is first of all the cabinet of the analyst. Then the analyst, insofar as he does not listen or talk, is made to function as a body without organs. But it is a BwO which is necessarily trapped since it only functions as BwO in order to prevent the functioning of the body without organs, that is to say, in order to trace on the BwO strata which will allow phenomena from the body without organs to enter into the disciplinary units of the organization of signification and subjectivation.

First question then: what is the analogue of a body without organs in psychoanalysis? Second question: how does the organization of strata get made in psychoanalysis, or in conjugality, or in fascism? There is also a fundamental organization, an organization of bodies which happens in psychoanalysis. Then we would have to look into – because it is very variable – we would have to interrogate the whole domain of the psychosomatic; or else it would vary with the types of illness, for example, in the case of hysteria. It is obvious that there is a very precise corporeal organization; and then – and this is the essential – in line with the formation of the different strata, it is now this or now that stratum that will have a privilege over the others.

In the psychoanalytic machine, the stratum which devours almost everything, at the limit, is the stratum of signification, that is to say, its norms of signification: whatever you do, it means something. Notice that that corresponds especially with the conjugal relation. It perhaps refers even more to the contemporary conjugal relationship than to the facts of childhood ... [*indistinct remarks*]. In the conjugal relationship you have this interpretation machine: 'What did he do?' What does that mean, 'What did he do?', this machine where everything means something: 'Wait, he does not like his soup today, what's happened?' That's the exclusion of all right to a-signification. Everything has a signification, and we can no longer do anything a-signifying. That's the interpretation machine; it's no one's fault, that's what the thing is made for.

And then there are points of subjectivation. There was the point of subjectivation of the childhood type: it was starting from childhood that the dominant real was determined, such as it was traced through the cabinet of the analyst, and that helps explain why this thing is truly a drug. How does analysis become, literally, their dominant real? Why do they end up organizing their entire schedule from one session to the next, so that everything depends on the next session? What's going to happen next time? What will happen in the next session? What happened in the last session? ... It's really like any despotic machine, the alignment of a dominant reality in which one is subjectivated.

So, childhood was for a long time the psychoanalytical point of subjectivation, but now, with guys like [Serge] Leclair or [*indistinct name*], there's no longer even any need for childhood. They discover an even more artificial, even more perverse, point of subjectivation, no longer the childhood scene, but the analytic scene in the closed cabinet of the analyst.³⁵ It is a displacement of the point of psychoanalytic subjectivation that is very important: the psychoanalyst is no longer valid as the representative of the father and the mother, but is

valid through himself, like a master of an axiomatic or of an accounting of desire, the truth of desire no longer referring to a childhood reality, but referring to what happens in the cabinet.

So, with regard to the whole system, we can do this analysis to show how a body without organs is there as a field of immanence of desire, and at the same time is completely prevented from functioning by the organization of strata, that is to say, by the organization of the volume of the organism, of the angle of significance and the points of subjectivation.

That is the first point that I wanted to take up. All the same, that gives us a set of concepts that leads to an evident conclusion: in our enterprise of seeking the body without organs, in a certain way, I can say that it is always there, whether you make it or not, it is always there. It's simply that if you don't take the trouble to take it into your own hands and to make it yourself, it is done to you, and it is done to you in accordance with the strata that prevent it from functioning. At that moment, you are taken up into the system of organization, of significance and subjectivation. In any case, it is there.

So, what to do? To make oneself a body without organs, what can that mean, since in any case, there already is one.³⁶ It means something very simple: to make one which is destratified. To make one which functions. And to make one which functions, what does that mean? It means, by all the evidence, to make one that has broken its triple bandage, its triple link, its three strata, that is to say, to make one which, in a certain manner, has broken with the organization of the organism; which, in another way, has broken with the angle of significance; and which, in yet another way, is desubjectivated, that is to say, a body which is discretely – I'll explain later what I mean by 'discretely' –, the most discrete, the most depraved, or the most disorganized, a-signifying and desubjectivated.

All that obviously refers to what happens on the body without organs, and this time, I'm only defining it negatively. These are very practical tasks: kill the interpretation in yourself. The machine of interpretation is the manipulation of the angle of significance. When I say that it is necessary to be prudent, that comes down to saying that the constant danger, at the limit – I'm dramatizing a little – is death. It's because of that that the psychoanalysts, for example, do not abandon the death instinct. In their incapacity to understand that the body without organs is the life of desire in the raw state, in the pure state, it is desire in its plane of consistency, in its field of immanence, because they have identified life with this artificial pseudo-life of organization, signification and subjectivation; and in the face of any attempt to blow up these three strata, they will say: this is the death drive; and in fact, it can be that.

At random, I'll take the examples we've got: the drugged body.³⁷ It's quite obvious that, in a certain way, it is a body that rediscovers itself as a body without organs; that is to say that it – in one way or another, depending on the type of drug, it will not be in the same way – blows up the stratum of organization. The maso: that's the key perversion, because a perversion, like fetishism, seems to me to be completely inscribed in the domain of strata. There is something very cunning in fetishism, it's that there is such a mobility to the point of subjectivation, or such a derision, where the point of subjectivation being taken as a partial object, the fetishist makes use of the point of subjectivation in such a cunning manner, that his way of using it amounts to a way of suppressing it, even if he still passes through the point of subjectivation. But take as examples the drugged body or the maso body: these are ways of blowing up – even if, as you say, only for a certain time and artificially –, the organization of the organism in order to rediscover a body without organs.

The second completely complementary attempt is no longer to blow up the organism for a certain time and artificially, but to kill in oneself (and if possible in others) the machine of interpretation: which is experimentation. To kill the interpretation machine; otherwise, you're fucked, you're already caught up in a despotic regime of the sign where sign eternally refers to sign, and where you can no longer have done with anything. Psychoanalysis is only the most perfect of the interpretation machines in the capitalist system. But there are others, and better known ones: religions, for example, in other social formations, are great machines of significance or of interpretation; and there is even a religious use of drugs. It should be said that we are never saved by anything.

There are even two dangers, that's why I say patience and prudence are always necessary. After all and once again, according to the principle of experimentation, nobody ever knows in advance what is suitable for him; it takes a really long time to know. So fine, a guy can throw himself into drugs, and then it turns out it's not his thing, but he thinks it is his thing. A guy can throw himself into drugs in such a way that he gets completely wasted. Well, that's death, it's the death drive like the psychoanalysts say.

To arrive at no longer interpreting, to arrive at what is so moving ... For example, the machine of interpretation in the conjugal relationship is constantly nourished in the love relationship, because when I say conjugal relationship, it is not a question of husband and wife. It is not enough to not be married to not have conjugal relations. The MLF [Mouvement de Libération des Femmes] is full of conjugal relationships; the FHAR [Front homosexuel d'action révolutionnaire] is full of conjugal relationships; free communities secrete the conjugal relationship. I use 'conjugal relationships' exactly as a synonym for the relation of interpretation or the signifying relation where each asks themselves about the other: "He just said that, what do I think that he thinks that I think? etc.": at the end of the day, exactly what Laing nicely called 'knots'.³⁸ From the moment there is a knot, there is an angle of significance, something to interpret. "You're in a bad mood, you've got that pinched look at the corner of your mouth, why are you in a bad mood?" "No, no, I'm not in a bad mood ..."

Once again, the peak of interpretation is when the psychoanalyst does not say a word. This is the very height of interpretation. The guy leaves saying: "what a great session today." Someone told me that there are subjects like that in analysis who go for a month, sixth months, two years, without the analyst saying a word, and it's obviously because the synthesis of signification is empty, he does not need to add anything to what he synthesizes. It is an empty synthesis, a formal synthesis where the sign, instead of coupling with the thing and working on a thing, the sign refers to another sign. No need to say anything; at the limit, in the conjugal relationship, everything can be done by glances.

There are two kinds of people who are wrong: those who say that the real battle is on the outside; the people who say that are the traditional Marxists: in order to change man, let's change the external world. And then there are the priests or the moralists who say: the real battle is on the inside: let us change man. Bizarrely, in a completely different way, certain Maoist depositions have taken up certain themes of this need to change man. What does that mean: let's change man first of all, the struggle must be interior first of all? Many Americans have said that as well. What they mean when they are fully moralists and fully priests, is: the battle on the outside is not necessary; the battle on the inside is the deepest, and the battle on the inside is not the same as the pseudo-battle on the outside, which must be given up. The battle on the inside is against our egoism, against our vices; it is against our temptations, that is to say, it makes the three strata function.

For my part, I would like to say something completely different. I mean: the battle on the inside, I understand very well what that means; anyway I think so. It should just be said that the battle on the inside and the battle on the outside concern the same things. Institutions crystallized on the inside and internal secretions within me: these are the same things. So that a battle is indeed necessary, but a perpetual battle, a constant combat over the fact ...
[indistinct sentences] ... The conjugal relationship is crystallized in institutions that have a certain power, but at the same time it is an internal secretion. Even if you don't get married, you participate in conjugality from the moment you make interpretations, from the moment you make signification.

We have to constantly defeat this kind of gland which is in us and which produces interpretation in correspondence with the significations crystallized on the outside. It is at the same time that there is a whole system, a whole code of the signifier on the outside, and a whole gland of interpretation inside us. The battle against jealousy, for example. Some might well say – and they are partly right – “Well, I don't feel jealous”. It doesn't stop us saying at some kink in the path, “Woah, shit, how do I feel about that?” We had a gland which, in a less abundant form than others, had spread and confected jealousy. We weren't aware of it, and then, at some moment, it's too late: we were doing nothing but that.

The Oedipus complex is an objective institution crystallized in society in the form of human sex acts and rules of marriage; and it also completely governs the parent-child relationship. But it is also completely a gland of internal secretion; Oedipus is part of the conjugal relationship: think of conjugal relationships without children, the obscure sadness; there is always one member of the couple who becomes the other's child, who is mothered by the other.

It is exactly the same revolutionary fight we have to engage with on the outside and on the inside. Once again, how many revolutionaries think it's enough ... – I insist on this because this is how I save myself from moralism; I am not saying there's a battle on the inside which is of a different nature to the battle on the outside, I'm saying there is a single and same battle. It is strictly the same because fascism, that too is outside us and inside us – how many revolutionary militants are there who treat their wife as not even a bourgeois has ever treated his wife? How many are there who secrete conjugality to the point of shame? How many are there even among the most courageous militants of the MLF, who secrete mothering and interpretation, making the MLF the opposite of what a revolutionary group must be, that is to say, instead of being a group for experimentation, it has become a group for interpretation.

I will take an example which seems quite fascinating to me, the possibility of a political struggle against the conjugal relationship, against the Oedipal relationship, and I say each time, since it is a question of detonating the strata which prevent us from acceding to the field of immanence, to the plane of consistency of desire – once again, it is necessary to proceed with caution: look at the difference between a drug user who gets completely wasted and a drug user who knows how to handle his stuff. That seems to me to be the art of experimentation. Experimentation implies prudence; the risk is obviously the opposite of destratifying, the risk of suicide. That comes partly from treating the battle solely as a battle against the outside. If we don't know that Oedipus, fascism, the little chief, is also in us – and again, we see revolutionaries who are right little bosses at the very moment they are leading the external battle against the little bosses, against the factory foremen –, there once again you have a slippage. They don't lead the way in internal experimentation in the same way as

they lead the way in external experimentation. Here I believe it's truly a single and same battle, which we can't get out of, whichever stratum we want to detonate.

And the most dangerous, the most deadly, are attempts to undo something of the experimentation of the body, of the organization of the body into the organism. To become disorganized, meticulously to [*word not clear*] ... literally a higher life, or what Nietzsche called the great Health, to undo signification and interpretations, not in order to become some kind of moron, but in order to conduct real experimentation, that is to say to become an experimenter, and finally to become a nomad even in the place one is, that is to say to undo the points of subjectivation; all that is extremely difficult. It is not enough to get the hell out to become nomadic; it is not enough to cease to interpret in order to become an experimenter; and above all it is not enough to disorganize the organism to become a body without organs with things happening on it. Every time, it can be death, above all when you are no longer supported by the strata. And the strata function as bandages, in a certain sense; they prevent you from breaking up.

What always fascinates me is the coexistence of the two, of the types, the way in which the types rub shoulders the whole time – the possible breaking up and then the experimentation. So that if one does not tread very carefully – see Castaneda ... And in all these attempts, there is a fear, and there is every reason to have fear, not only at the most obvious level of disorganization, but even at the level of desubjectivation. It's because the anchoring points from the point of subjectivation are very precious to you; when there are no longer any anchoring points a kind of anxiety starts up; there are all sorts of formations of anxiety which correspond to defection from the strata.³⁹

There, I've talked about a whole bunch of notions, and I would like you to complete them.

A student: I had the impression that you conceived the drugged body as something external; in fact, I think that, by definition, every body is drugged from the beginning. It would be necessary to look at the different kinds of drugs ...

Deleuze: If you give that extension to the word drugs, there are two kinds of drug use: the machine of interpretation, psychoanalysis, that's a drug; the conjugal relationship is a drug; and these are drugs whose use is specifically in conformity with stratifications ...

[*Interruption of the recording*]

Richard [Pinhas]: You didn't dwell that much on what constituted the masked real, and I was wondering if, in relation to the dominant real, at the level of the productive assemblages of statements, one could not propose the hypothesis that, corresponding to this double approach *dominant real – masked real*, there might be at the level of statements also a double approach. Namely: already constituted statements which are always the repetition of structures, or of relays, of networks which are those, roughly speaking, of domination, of signifying effects which reproduce the law, the law in the sense of domination; and on the other side, at the other pole, points, event-based particles that one could call enunciations, as opposed to statements already in place, already constituted and bringing repetition; enunciations which, by virtue of nothing other than their innovative nature, experimental if you like, already explode, just by their presence, certain relays, certain networks of already constituted statements.

Deleuze: Okay, yes, okay; I haven't yet spoken of the masked real, because the masked real is precisely what happens on the body without organs when it is destratified. The dominant real is what masks the masked real, exactly in the same way as it takes up phenomena proper to the body without organs into statistical ensembles.

What interested me was a study on muscle tone, a study of the tonus as biological given. Or do you see other strata, then? For my part, I don't see any others; very broadly speaking, it seemed to me that there are the three great ones, and they are linked together: I will make you an organism, I will make you an interpreter, and I will subjectivate you. That is the theological system. What remains for us to see is what happens on the body without organs, underneath the strata, and each time, it will be necessary to show how it is the inverse side of the strata.

So, at the same time as the body without organs destratifies itself, things happen on it, it's contemporary. What order of things, and how are they opposed to strata? I am just going to make a kind of list of things which happen on the body without organs. First, distributions of intensities; the body without organs from this point of view is truly intensity = 0, but taken as matrix of all intensities or the principle of all productions of intensities.⁴⁰ So that what happens on the body without organs is a distribution of intensities, and in this sense, the BwO is not only matrix of production of intensities, it is also a map of distribution of intensities.

And yet 'map of distribution' is poorly put, and the less poorly put it is, the better it works, because *map*, that indicates something spatial, and the body without organs is not space, it belongs to matter insofar as it fills space according to such and such a degree of intensity, that is to say, according to the degree of the intensities which pass on it. Here there is already a whole domain: the intensities distributed on the body without organs. Now, the intensities are opposed, in the stratum of the organism, they are opposed to the world of representation. Intensities are fundamentally non-representative, they represent nothing, and it is in this sense that they will be a fundamental element in the machine of experimentation, as opposed to the machine of interpretation. I am restituting intensities as fundamental.

The second thing that transpires, and it is perhaps the same thing, is multiplicities. I say that it is perhaps the same thing because these multiplicities which are produced on the body without organs are precisely intensive multiplicities, and multiplicity belongs fundamentally to intensity. In what sense? In a very precise sense, namely that it is necessary to call intensive quantity any multiplicity that is apprehended in the instant. From the moment there is a multiplicity apprehended as multiplicity in an instant, there is intensive quantity. In the domain of extension, it is the opposite. What is apprehended in an instant is thereby posited as unity, and multiplicity can only be apprehended successively.

If it is true that intensities are opposed to the world of representation at the level of the strata, multiplicities are slightly different. They are opposed to extensive quantities or to qualitative forms which also in turn make up part of the strata at several levels, as much of the stratum of organization as of the stratum of signification. We have seen that one type of fundamental intensive multiplicity was a multiplicity that one could call a pack, as opposed to the extensive multiplicities of mass. The extensive multiplicities of mass are rather on the side of the strata, and the intensive multiplicities of packs are rather on the side of the body without organs and of its liberation with regard to the strata.

Third thing which happens on the body without organs: these are the flows. And again, this is another way of saying the same thing; why? Flows are not the same thing as intensive quantities, but intensive quantities are always measures of flow. And it is not surprising because intensive quantities, being themselves multiplicities, multiplicities being themselves intensive quantities, intensities being themselves multiplicities, an intensity, that does not mean anything by itself, it does not mean anything. An intensity can only signify a difference of intensity, a difference between a maximum and a minimum, between a higher intensity and a lower intensity, beyond the putting in relation of two intensities under the conditions of their being put in relation.

And there, that's a whole problem, to know under what physical, aetiological conditions intensities enter into a relation, because supposing that the intensities enter into relation on the basis of a constitutive inequality, because they are completely unequal, and it is relations of inequality that define the difference of intensities, something happens, something flows which is precisely a flow from one intensity to the other, and the direction of the flow is determined by the passage from the highest to the lowest, or can be determined as being either in the direction of entropy, or in the direction of negentropy.

Fourth determination – but you have to sense that it's the same thing; all that, it's aspects of the same thing – free machinic connections, the whole domain of machinic connections, in opposing free connections to two kinds of other connections or relations: mechanical relations or finalist relations. For mechanical relations and relations of finality are constitutive of the organism. On the contrary, the domain of machinic connections, when two things make machines out of each other ... One could pose this problem: under what conditions can two things, two beings or any two things whatever be said to form a machinic connection: what is necessary and under which circumstances are such connections formed? – but that's not a part of the problems that remain to us. In any case, these machinic connections which are assumed to happen on the body without organs constitute precisely the whole domain of machines it is necessary to call *a-signifying*: they do not mean anything; they are defined uniquely by their use, their functioning, that's all; they are not the object of interpretations, any more than intensities are objects of interpretation. The fourth domain is that of a-signifying machines.

These a-signifying machines are particularly connected to a regime that I called for convenience sake the *sign-particle* regime, and this is opposed to the strata since the strata, at least the second one, the stratum of significance, implies a completely different regime of sign, the regime of the sign under the signifier, and from the beginning I have attempted to oppose the regime of the sign-particle to the regime where sign refers to sign to infinity, under a signifier which constitutes the machine of interpretation. On the contrary, the machine of experimentation on the body without organs is the sign-particle couple.

Sixth possible determination of what happens on the body without organs, as opposed to the strata: it would be necessary to say that the strata define territories or processes of reterritorialization. What happens on the BwO, and this is why the BwO as intensive matrix is a desert, the desert not being at all something empty and depopulated, but being precisely the place inhabited by intensive multiplicities, by a pack, it is the place of packs ... What happens on the BwO at this level, as opposed to the territorialities, are lines of deterritorialization. [*End of the recording and of the session*]

Gilles Deleuze

On *Anti-Oedipus*

Lecture 04, 28 May 1973

Marx – Desire/Need – Faye – Money – On Baudrillard

Transcription: WebDeleuze and Le Terrier; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translated by Christian Kerslake

Last time we were seeking, at very insignificant levels, how types of body without organs could be constituted and what might happen on a body without organs, once it is said that the body without organs is something which is to be made.⁴¹ We saw that what happened on a body without organs was all sorts of things: multiplicities, flows, figures of content, figures of expression, and all that entered into relationships that formed machinic assemblages. Now all of this was directly our problem, namely: what produces statements? And in the insignificant examples we found last time, the statements in question could be, for example, the statements of alcoholics, or statements of perversion, or schizo statements; and I was quite clear that at this stage of research, there was no reason to make a difference in nature between a great statement of the schizo type, or a military statement for example, an imperial statement, or an alcoholic statement. This was the problem of statements, which implied that statements must be considered in the mechanism of their production, independently of their content and of the importance of this content.

There has been a presupposition which has been there the whole of this year, namely: what produces statements is never a subject; they are collective agents of enunciation, they are machinic assemblages – again, not at all calling on ‘social factors’, but calling on collective agents or collective assemblages [*agencements*] of multiplicities which pass through us, which are neither interior nor exterior to us, but which are indeed productive of the statements that we form.

I would like to begin with a first remark. Our attempt here is neither attached to Marxism nor to Freudo-Marxism. With regard to Marxism, I’m not even looking for the details, I would say that there are three big differences. The first difference is that Marxism poses problems in terms of need. On the contrary, our problem was posed in terms of desires. There is a great practical difference: from the moment that problems are posed in terms of need, what is invoked is ultimately an authority [*instance*] supposed to be judge, both of the nature of these needs and of their distribution, and of the measure of their satisfaction. To pose problems in terms of needs is already to make appeal, I think, to what will reveal itself to be a party organization. On the contrary, to speak in terms of desires is to say that, not the subject, because there is perhaps no subject of desire, but that the instance of desire is the sole judge of the desires of which it is the bearer, whether it is an individual or a group; and in this sense the whole problem is displaced: not that there is no place for thinking about a centralization or about a connection between apparatuses of desire, but what is certain is that the connection between apparatuses of desire cannot be made under the form of a party apparatus which would play a decisive role. I believe that the position of a problem in terms of needs and in terms of desire is absolutely different.

The second difference is that Marxism supports a certain opposition between the economic infrastructure and the ideological, between the infrastructure as instance of production and ideology. For us, at no time did the problem of ideology arise, because we have a simple idea: it is not so much that ideology is in itself a deformation of something or transformation of something; it is not at all that ideology is, for example, a false consciousness; but that, literally, there is no ideology. It does not exist.

There is no ideology. There are only organizations of power; and what one calls ideologies are the statements of organizations of power. For example, there is no Christian ideology; there is on the other hand ... fundamentally, Christianity, throughout its entire history, is not an organization of power of one particular type, but its history has been traversed by the invention of a multiplicity, of a variety of organizations of power, right up to the formation of the primary one, the idea of an international power; and what one calls Christian ideology, or the history of Christian ideology, is only the succession of statements corresponding to the organization of ecclesiastical power.

In the same way, I think there is no ideology of education, and to carry out a critique of the ideology of education is to fall into a false problem. Education must be thought starting from a type of organization of power exerted on children, and ideology, there too, is only the statement corresponding to the organization of power [*indistinct word*]. And perhaps if Marxism, under its traditional form, insists so much on a kind of duality between infrastructure and ideology, it was all the better to hide something which organized itself in it, namely the organization of power around a centralizing party, and the whole dualism and the whole Marxist reflection on the economy ... Ideology has this role of mask in relation to the organization of power; already at the time of Marx and the International, then with Lenin, then in Stalin's time, etc.

The third difference is, I believe, that Marxism carries out its work in a kind of movement which is at the same time that of recapitulation, or of a kind of recollection of memory, or of a kind of development: development of the productive forces. Our point of view is completely different: we conceive the production of statements, not at all under the species of a development, of a recollection of memory, but on the contrary, starting from a power which is that of forgetting, starting from a force which is that of experimentation, and starting from this experimentation insofar as it operates in non-development.

I think it's these three practical differences which mean that our problem has never been that of a return to Marx. Much more, our problem is much more forgetting, including the forgetting of Marx. But in the forgetting, little fragments float. I would also say why such an attempt can in no way participate in any tendency that could be qualified as Freudo-Marxism; and in this respect, it seems to me that there are two essential reasons why, speaking for myself, I would feel absolutely alien to every venture of Freudo-Marxism ...

The first is that the Freudo-Marxist attempts are also made from a kind of appeal to memory, and to *returning*, whatever the complexity of the return: it's about *going back* to Freud (the *École freudienne*⁴²), it's about a *return* to Marx (Althusser); even if the Marx that emerges is singularly original, even if the Freud that emerges is original, that does not prevent such attempts, which start through a return, seeming to be easy to define to me: it's about, at that moment, saving the machine.

It seems obvious that the return to Freud, such as it has been carried out at the *École freudienne*, has allowed for the plugging of breaches in the psychoanalytic apparatus. The ‘epistemological’ return⁴³ has played out in order to save, in a certain way, the bureaucratic apparatus of psychoanalysis. The return to Marx, that was the same thing: saving the bureaucratic apparatus of the party, giving to this apparatus the guarantee of a return to [missing text]. The task for us would be to consider these bureaucratic apparatuses, both psychoanalytic and communist, to consider them in their current situation where, after a long period of misunderstanding, they are once more forging an alliance; to carry as far as possible the critique of these apparatuses such as they are – which excludes any return to Marx, any return to Freud.

The second reason is that all the Freudo-Marxist attempts consist in seeking the reconciliations between two lines of economy: a well-known economy that goes under the name of political, and an economy that would be libidinal, desiring, pulsional.⁴⁴ From the moment that one seeks such a reconciliation, the only thing one can expect of such an attempt is some kind of symbolization or some species of parallelism. A parallelism between the two economies, or a point on which one of these economies would be plugged onto the other, or a point on which one of these economies would detach itself from the other, etc. In other words, every Freudo-Marxist attempt is marked as a function of its starting-point by a dualism in which one will end up invoking parallelist themes as feeble, as lamentable, as symbolic equivalents, as parallelisms like *money = shit*, etc. It seems to me that everything that comes from Freudo-Marxism, as much on the side of [Wilhelm] Reich as with [Herbert] Marcuse, verifies this weakness.

We, on the contrary, our starting point is very simple: there is and there has only ever been a single economy, and it is the same economy which is fundamentally, from the beginning, at once desiring or libidinal and political. We consider the three following terms as close synonyms: position of desire, production of the unconscious, production of statements. This obviously implies, as much vis-à-vis Marxism as with psychoanalysis, a certain point of view which is foreign to both. Whatever one does, psychoanalysis always considers the unconscious as already produced, and as something to be reduced by a machine of experimentation, and an experimentation that is not only individual, but an experimentation which surely can be collective, in the sense that revolutions are discharges of the unconscious, are productions of the unconscious – and in this sense, they are perhaps the key to the domain of what we have been calling experimentation.

Any system made to prevent the production of the unconscious is at the same time a system made to prevent the production of new statements, or a system made to prevent the positing of desire, in a place and in a time, as it produces itself. The production of statements must no longer fundamentally belong to a split which would put production on the side of an economic infrastructure, and frame statements from the point of view of a science or an ideology; rather the production of statements must truly constitute a part of the very sphere of production. What makes a posing of desire possible, or what makes the production of new statements possible? I could just as well ask, for it is the same problem: how does one prevent a statement from spreading, how does one avoid getting stuck in a rut with a statement, it comes down to the same thing as saying: how to produce new statements? How to ensure that a statement does not crystallize, so that a statement does not enter into the imperialist system that is the imperialist system of the sign under the signifier? That is a whole bloc of problems. It amounts just as well to saying: how to pose a desire in a group or in an individual, how to produce the unconscious?

We have seen in what sense the body without organs was the object of a production and how, starting from it, all sorts of things were produced. The underlying idea we had was that what was produced on the body without organs was the assemblage, a kind of assemblage proper to the posing of desire, to releasing the charges of unconscious, to producing an unconscious which is never already there, or to producing new statements. And after all, a historical break is defined by all sorts of things, but among others, by a production of statements.

Are there any questions or comments before continuing?

Henri Gobard: I would like to know if you have considered the problem of the transition from oral to writing, and ask you if, in fact, the condition of imperialism was not linked to transcription, to writing itself, because in an oral world, it would be much more difficult.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yes. yes. In a way, I want to answer yes and no. We looked at the role of writing in an imperial system last year; what interests me more is an idea that appears in [Louis] Hjelmslev: there is a point of view where that no longer matters, that is to say where there is an indifference of the substance.⁴⁵ Ultimately, he says, the substance is phonic, whether it is oral, whether it is written, or something else, whether it is coded in the form, for example, of semaphore language, morse language, it doesn't matter that much. There is a point where you are completely right, and that's in the history of social formations; and then, there is a point where ultimately almost the same machinic assemblage can bear on completely indifferent substances. The difference would intervene at the level of qualified flows: it is obvious that the oral flow and the flow of writing are not the same thing. But at the level of the machinic assemblage which, in a certain manner – but obviously it's not the same level – if one assumes a machinic assemblage at a given period, bearing on any flows whatever, it will be the same one (with differences of intensities) that will seize hold of the oral phonic substance, written substance, and every other kind of substance. We can come back to that.

Ideology is, literally, the system of statements which correspond to – not at all which hide – some organization of power. Ideology absolutely does not consist in deceiving people; ideology is just the system of statements that flow from an organization of power such as it is: for example, between the Reformation and Catholicism, the problem is one of organizations of power, and we must not only take into account the struggle Reformation/Catholicism, we also have to take into account the settling of accounts at work within the Reformation, between statements of the popular type and the liquidation of the Reformist left, the conciliation with the princes of other reformed [countries], that is to say, what produced a type of organization of new power; and on the side of Catholicism, equally, we must take account of the whole system of heresies evidently implied by the discussions on the Trinity, putting into play very directly and very profoundly problems of organization of power concerning the Church. And it doesn't even mask anything: it could only be stated like that.

Ideology absolutely does not seem to me something deceptive at all: the most beautiful discussions in the Middle Ages on Scholasticism, on the Trinity – all that articulates very clearly and very clearly puts into play what the organization of the church is going to be, what the role of priest is going to be, it does not hide anything.

Gobard: I am very happy that you say it does not hide anything, because that corroborates my own research, namely that what is true is not the depth, it is the surface; you have to trust appearances.

Deleuze: A statement is *what is said*. At our level, there is never anything to interpret.

A student: [*Question on need*]

Deleuze: You are asking me to theoretically justify how need and authority [*instance*], judge of needs, are connected; I can do that. I think that in the idea of need, there is fundamentally the idea of a lack of something, and that, from the moment something is lacking, there is necessarily a judge who will evaluate both the lack and the relation of what is lacking with the lack itself, that is to say, with the need; from that moment there is a whole system of organization of power; so the subject of need will be divested, and this is why socialist systems have the most often spoken in terms of need and not in terms of desire. Need is something in which lack is inscribed. And if desire is a process, then it is obvious that only the group as bearer of desire, or only the individual as bearer of desire, is judge of its own desire.

When society brings about the repression of desire, it is always in the name of: people have needs, and we are charged with satisfying them. The repression of desire is never done in the name of: there are desires, you have to take them into account, but be reasonable; it's always done in the name of need. When there is a conception of desire according to which desire would be a lack of something, it's all well and good establishing the most severe distinction of nature between need and desire, these distinctions of nature are only words. We will see a certain theoretical shoring up where desire begins because it is lack of a lack, because it is lack to the second degree, as opposed to need. In any case, it will already have been pushed back into the domain of need, and at that moment there will be a judge of desire, even if it is only the psychoanalyst.

Today, we're going to forget about everything we did before, but everything we did previously on the body without organs will be essential to us. Simply, bizarrely, a shift will take place, because, with the preceding planes, we had no reason to place a perverse statement, an alcoholic statement, a schizo statement, a social statement, a political statement on different planes; it was necessary, on the contrary, to treat them all like equivalents, that is to say, all producing themselves on bodies without organs of a different type. From now on, there will be a whole system involving the different types of BwO, the different types of statements, and the relationships between these statements. Here, it is going to be necessary to establish a whole differential system.

What is this question of the production of statements? It is a relatively recent problem: three books in France pose, or else do not pose but revolve around, this question: how statements are produced, or what comes down to the same thing more concretely: how does one have done with old statements? How does one produce new statements? The three books are those of [Jean] Baudrillard, [Jean-Pierre] Faye and [Michel] Foucault. For Baudrillard, the examples of the production of statements are borrowed from aesthetics and in particular from a very concrete aesthetic involving the auction, the sale of paintings at an auction.⁴⁶ In the case of Foucault, the great examples he gives of the production of statements concern above all madness, in the 19th century, the production of new statements concerning madness, such as it happens in the 19th century, and on the other hand, the constitutive statements of the

medical clinic in the 19th century as well.⁴⁷ In Faye, the core matter of his reflection on the production of new statements is Nazism: in what sense was Nazism the producer of statements with a new sense?⁴⁸ We must also look at Guattari's book and notably the passage concerning the Leninist break which explicitly asks how to give an account of the production of new statements at the moment of the Bolshevik revolution.⁴⁹

It seems to me that these theories have a common background which consists of several points: first, they are distinguished from the linguistic studies with which we have been submerged. Why? Because the linguistic studies have consisted above all in analyzing language in its formal elements of various tenors; while here, it concerns something absolutely different: a kind of discovery and insistence that linguistics had forgotten about the creative power of language; and here we can locate where that comes from. It obviously refers back to Chomsky. That's the first common aspect to all the studies. There is a second aspect, which is that the problem of the production of statements, as a function therefore of a creative power of language, forces us to leave behind an overly simple conception of production, for the reason that statements themselves are part of the domain of production. From that moment, what is broken is the production/ideology duality. That implies therefore a transformation of the concept of production, namely a transformation which no longer goes in the traditional Marxist direction, where production is above all envisaged as material production. So we have the overhauling of the concept of production, and the suppression of the production/ideology duality, for the benefit of what? Here too, this is one of the common points among the three authors: to the benefit of the problem of power and of the organization of this power, precisely because blowing up the ordinary production/ideology duality will no doubt introduce the problem of the organization of power, as already forming part of an indissolubly economico-political structure.

The third common point is the attempt, sometimes successful, sometimes not successful, to break precisely with the linguistic category of signifier and signified. Fourth common point: it is to renew the problem of the unconscious by posing it at the level of statements. No longer to refer the unconscious to a machine of interpretation. Perhaps what I am saying does not hold equally for the three authors, but it is eminently valid for Foucault. It amounts to an attempt to discover the way in which desire invests economic forms themselves. These, it seems to me, are all the points in common between these three authors.

We will begin with the book by Baudrillard and see in what sense it fits, and in what sense it does not fit into the attempt. I ask those who know this book to give their opinion. The first thesis, in the *Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*⁵⁰ ... Just a parenthesis: as today it will really be about the study of texts, it probably goes without saying that it will be quite boring, and if those who aren't interested want to leave, that's fine by me; nevertheless [if you're not familiar with the texts in question], that shouldn't stop you from understanding anything either ...

Baudrillard's first proposition is a veritable elimination and subordination of the category of production, and in any case, the category of production as material production. And there, that's a real rupture with Marxism. And why is the category of material production like the statement?⁵¹ Here, Baudrillard's arguments are very clear: because material production refers to use-value, and because use-value itself presupposes completely artificial notions, like those of need and ideology. In other words, we must not start from use-value; from that moment, we must not start from material production, because material production is already wholly criss-crossed by a system of another nature: it is not use-value which is primary, and in

Baudrillard there is a whole critique of use-value at work right from the beginning of his book. Which comes down to saying, second proposition, that what is primary is exchange. In a certain way, that comes down to saying something Marx also said, namely, that production in capitalism is the reproduction of capital; but at the beginning of *Capital*, one can indeed also find the path exchange-value, use-value. Baudrillard proposes a kind of reversal of the relation: exchange-value is primary, exchange is primary. Why? Because production itself, as material production, presupposes a “differential” matter of exchange: the big mistake is to make of differentiation “a superadded variable, [...] a variable given by the situation”, whereas it is “a relational variable of the structure.”⁵² As Veblen had seen – he is a great disciple of Veblen –, “the whole of society is regulated by the production of distinctive material.”⁵³ Now, precisely according to him, production is already differential production, production of distinctive materials, and this is insofar as it presupposes a whole system of exchange; in other words, exchange-value is primary, it is what is going to criss-cross production, and from that moment, it is this that is going to be primary in relation to use-value.

From there, things get complicated, because Baudrillard’s third proposition is this: starting from exchange-value, a transmutation is produced. So here we are in a simple situation; someone is telling you that exchange-value is primary in relation to use-value, which can also mean: the exigencies of consumption are primary in relation to production, and in effect, at the level of the exigencies of consumption, there is already a handling of a distinctive material, of a differential material. Good. That implies an idea that it is necessary to retain for later, namely that the basis (I am not saying the form), the basis of capitalism is exchange-value. [*Interruption of the recording*]

... Baudrillard’s third thesis concerns, in a certain way, a veritable transmutation of exchange-value, and for him, as for us, that will be the essential, namely the way in which exchange-value will transform itself into what he will call *sign exchange-value*, or what he calls sign-value, or what he calls sign-form.⁵⁴ That is going to be the crux of his problem, and I say to myself that it is also going to be ours, because how exchange-value ... [*Unfinished sentence*] I’m not sure if it’s well posed, starting from exchange-value, because again: how does exchange-value transmute itself into sign-value, or sign-form – that’s another way of saying: how are statements produced in a system of exchange? How does the production of statements come about?

The answer consists in saying, if I understand correctly, that there is a destruction of exchange-value: in the circuit of exchange, there is a destruction of exchange-value, and the destruction of exchange-value occurs in expenditure – I won’t insist on it, but one feels [Georges] Bataille looming here –, and that it is in expenditure that the purchased object takes on sign-value, and that it is there that there is a production of signs. It is therefore in the act of expenditure that exchange-value becomes sign-value, and it is there that a production of signs comes about which does not belong to the superstructure, and which does not belong to ideology, but which does truly belong to the economic system.

That that truly belongs to the economic system, that’s also part of our concern – otherwise we would not have spoken about Baudrillard – namely: to introduce statements and to introduce desire into the economic infrastructure. What is the difference with exchange-value?

It is that, at that moment, the differential material which was already included in exchange-value ceases to be a pure matter and becomes form, sign-form. And it is there, in this

transformation of exchange-value which itself was the bearer of material surplus value, in the transformation of exchange-value into sign-value, that a specific surplus-value of domination appears. And this is where the organization of power happens. This is page 115 and what follows.⁵⁵ On page 206, we find the formula: “Exchange-value is realized ...” – is realized at the very moment it is annihilated as exchange-value – “is realized in sign-value.”⁵⁶ Once again, this production of sign-value is itself accomplished in expenditure. Hence the idea that a true psychoanalysis, that is to say a true desiring economy, must be brought about at the level of consumption and expenditure.

Fourth thesis: with the apparition of sign-value or of sign-form, there arises – this seems bizarre to me – the *signifier-signified* couple, because the sign is the set of the two. And there is produced a term-by-term assignation, signifier-signified, of which he gives at least one example in the case of the work of art, the signifier being the form, the signified being the function, and the set of the two constituting the sign or sign-value. Now, this constitutive signifier-signified, or the very elements of the sign, is as if traversed by something famous, namely the bar.⁵⁷ The bar is very important: it is what assigns a system of relations between the signifier and the signified; it is the bar that separates the signifier and the signified. If I understand right, the sign is therefore this bar itself which distributes signifier and signified, term by term, and he devotes a long footnote to Lacan saying: yes, Lacan does not make the signifier-signified term by term, but it comes down to the same thing, there is a domain of the signifier, a domain of the signified, and there is the bar.⁵⁸

And, last proposition: this bar of the signifier and signified, this constitutive bar of the sign and the sign-form, well, far from revealing something, it hides and occults. What it hides and occults, we don't know yet. What is important at this level is that this is where I also see, whether fulfilled or non-fulfilled it does not matter, a part of the program of the theory of production of statements, namely to attempt to situate the problem of the unconscious and to renew the problem of the unconscious as a function of this question of the production of statements.

So, finally, the last thesis: what does it hide, this bar of the signifier and the signified, constitutive of the sign? We learn that it hides castration. According to him, the whole of modern capitalism is a way of concealing a sublime truth which is that of castration. It occludes castration because ... I'm presenting it very badly: it's because, as you can sense, I don't understand anything here ... It occludes castration because, he literally says in the article on ‘The Body’⁵⁹: castration is only *signified*, and that, it is not good.⁶⁰ When castration is only signified, it is occluded because it is only signified, and that doesn't bode well. Why? Castration is simultaneously signified and occluded as signified. That doesn't go well because it seems, according to the article, that it is misrecognized; in what sense? Because what is misrecognized is the essence of desire, it is its proper [*indistinct word*], namely, it is lack. Look at [*For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*] page 259 – ah, my reference is wrong.

Richard [Pinhas]: I think I've got your reference.

Deleuze: [*Indistinct sentence*]

Richard: “Lack is always that in terms of which we miss others, and through which others miss us”, page 208.

Deleuze: That's quite a statement. I've found the page 69: "[...] the entirely latent discourse, in the object, of the symbolic absence [*manque*] of the subject from himself and the other"⁶¹ – yes yes yes yes – desire is “the desire for something lost, where it is lack, an absence on which the objects that signify it have come to be inscribed; what can it mean to take such objects literally, as if they were merely what they are?”⁶²

So, this misrecognition of castration because castration is only signified, that corresponds to what stage? He says: it's like this – it is very forced – and he chooses striptease as an example. He talks of the bar of the stockings on the thigh, which refers to the bar *signifier-signified*.⁶³ Castration is only signified, if I understand correctly. And the bar can be anything: “the clothes that come off, signalling the emergence of the body as phallus.”⁶⁴ All that is a “denial of castration.”⁶⁵ The ideal is the idea of a “naked body”, “full”, where castration is therefore occluded.

This is interesting to us because it makes the body without organs play a very specific role. The body without organs is precisely a body which operates the denial of castration. The difference of the sexes is ignored.⁶⁶ “More nude than nude”⁶⁷, “the woman painted in gold” ... and he says, I can't quite remember, but the spirit of it is: full body, non-porous, without exudation nor expression, without grain or roughness, vitrified.⁶⁸

The difference with Lacan is that the bar *signifier-signified*, far from indicating castration, is, on the contrary, the sign that it is occluded, the mark of an occultation, the mark of a misrecognition of castration.

Baudrillard's last thesis: so, from that moment, since you see that this misrecognition of castration is not good, you see that basically there is a whole thesis here referring back to castration as belonging fundamentally to the essence of desire. The last thesis appears as: what is the true order of desire, including in an economy, an order of desire which would invest the economy as a function of a non-misrecognized castration, as a function of a recognized castration? His answer is this: it must be something other than sign-value.

For the moment, we have been playing on *exchange-value*, *sign-value*; and exchange-value became sign-value in a kind of transmutation; sign-value gave us the bar signifier-signified; that is to say, occulted castration. How to get oneself out of such a catastrophic situation, where desire misrecognizes castration, that is to say, misrecognizes its own being? Baudrillard says that there was a time when things were better. The time when things were better must be defined through a third term: this is *symbolic value*.⁶⁹ Symbolic value is beyond the signifier and the signified. It implies a kind of non-appearance; it is therefore opposed to sign-value. It is distinguished from sign-value, and Baudrillard's whole book will play on the three terms exchange-value, sign-value and symbolic value, and symbolic value is beyond or below the signifier and the signified, why? Because it is lived under the reign of ambivalence.⁷⁰

It is through ambivalence that one disburdens oneself of the signifier and signified, because, in Baudrillard, if I understand well, ambivalence is not simply the ambivalence of feelings in the sense of love/hate; it is the ambivalence of the signifiers and signifieds themselves. One no longer knows what is signifier and what is signified, and it is in this ambivalence that the value-sign is surpassed towards symbolic value; and we have seen that sign-value is referred to consumption and to the forgetting and denial of castration, while this value thing, symbolic value, refers to the recognition of castration and no longer to consumption [*consommation*],

but to consummation [*consummation*]. We find ourselves right in the middle of the economy of gift/counter-gift.

Let me quickly take up these propositions again: use-value is not primary, it is exchange-value that is primary. Exchange-value produces a distinctive or differential material. It must be transmuted into sign-value which, for its part, raises the differential or distinctive material to the level of form. Sign-value operates in expenditure and in consumption. The sign is constituted by the bar of signifier and the signified and it occludes the truth of desire which is castration, to the profit of a full body which is the body of the woman painted in gold. Finally, beyond all that, there is something which is symbolic value, made up of gift and counter-gift, of ambivalence, of recognition of castration, and which implies the very dissolution of the signifier and signified.

I'd like it if those who know Baudrillard a bit could say if my summary is correct. Who has read Baudrillard well?

Richard Pinhas: There is something thing that strikes me as odd in Baudrillard's procedure, and it's the only thing I can't manage to explain to myself in relation to his methodology itself: he starts from something very Marxist, very traditional, which is the problem of difference and of indifference, the relationship of the producer to the objects he produces, and to his means of production. And Marx's classical thesis is that with capitalism, we have to do with a social formation which functions with the producers separated from the means of production, in a relation of indifference to the objects they produce, something absolutely different from all other social formations, and the example he gives is of the artisan who makes his own object, that is to say, an unmediated relation with the object. And, starting from this indifference, Baudrillard will seek in the Freudian terms of the difference of the sexes and the denial of this difference – he will say that, with capitalism, since there is indifference to the objects produced, to objects sold, and since finally the only universal there is the abstract universal of value, he will say that the indifference vis-à-vis objects is covered over once again by [another] indifference: a denial of the split between the sexes. And I think that makes sense: at last, one sees how the mapping [*recouvrement*] of the Freudian field on a Marxist field works.

Deleuze: If you want to say that it's typically Freudo-Marxist, I am entirely in agreement.

Richard Pinhas: And this approach will yield a reconciliation in symbolic exchange as a result. I absolutely do not understand how he brings about this symbolic exchange.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. Basically, you understand even less than me. I was looking for someone who understands better ... [*Silence of students*] Since you don't want to speak, I'll tell you what seems bizarre to me. To the question: what produces statements? ... What produces statements in a capitalist formation or in another [social formation], since, after all, what choice is left to us? In any case, desire is lack, lack of itself, loss of itself, it is castration; indeed it's through castration that one accedes to desire. What produces statements in the capitalist regime is what occludes castration, namely the bar ... But I don't understand why the bar occludes castration.

Gobard: It's because he must be using 'castration' with two different meanings; the first, the old infantile and Freudian idea that the woman is a man deprived of sex, and the second where castration is the terminology used to speak of the difference of the sexes.

Deleuze: Yes. He even says that symbolic castration is beyond the difference of the sexes. [Pause] In any case, what produces statements is castration. So that interests us and it does not interest us. It interests us since castration being, according to Baudrillard, at the very heart of desire, it is indeed a way of linking the problem of the production of statements to the problem of the posing of desire, and the formula ‘what produces statements is castration’ ... – so in effect, a striptease dancer has a system of non-verbal statements that is linked to a code, the code of strip-tease; an African dance is another code; there are non-verbal statements – castration would therefore be what produces all statements, in two possible modes: either an occluded castration, or as an exhibited castration; which amounts to saying that what produces statements, in any case, is the splitting of the subject. Either the subject can be split by the bar of the signifier and signified, or it can be split in some other way – why it should be split, I don’t know – I’m keeping in mind the article on ‘The Body’ with regard to symbolic value. What is the difference between what exhibits and what hides castration, asks Baudrillard?

The difference is that in the case of what exhibits castration, one sees the radical difference – I am quoting exactly⁷¹ – that traverses the subject in its irreducible ambivalence. But that’s a bit odd, because ambivalence was what came out of castration, but it turns out that the regime of ambivalence is another irreducible difference. In any case, it is a splitting of the subject that produces the statement. It is once again the old thesis we saw a long time ago: namely, the production of statements by a subject brings with it, through the effect of the statement itself, the splitting of the subject into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement.

If, to the question: what produces statements? we are told that it is the splitting of the subject, our preceding analyses were tending towards a contrary result, namely that the splitting of the subject was a very precise effect obtained in order to prevent all production of statements. It is easy to show that, from the moment that a subject is split into subject of the statement and subject of enunciation, far from that engendering the least statement, it is the condition under which no statement can be produced. It is the same condition, and not by chance, that is at work with the psychoanalytic machine, when I was asking why and how it is that the psychoanalytic machine is set up to prevent any production of statements, at the very moment that it pretends to say to the poor patient: go right ahead, you can produce your statements here. All that was needed was the machine of interpretation. The whole of psychoanalysis lies in this: in your relations with your friends, with your work, with your children, etc., you are subject of the statement; in your relations with me, the psychoanalyst, and through the relation to me, the psychoanalyst, you are subject of enunciation.

Hence Lacan’s formidable stroke of calling the analysed person *analysand*. That consists in saying to someone: come and sit yourself on the couch, you will be the producer of statements, you will be the subject of enunciation. Before, psychoanalysts were much more modest because they said something like: if you are on the couch, and if you speak, you will, through the intermediary of my interpretation, accede to the status of subject of enunciation. This is why with the Lacanian recalibration, the psychoanalyst has less and less need to speak, he is more and more silent. The splitting is always assured in the same manner: throughout all your real life, you will be the subject of the statement; you accede to subject of enunciation in relation to the analyst who interprets what you are doing in your real life, so that you are only subject of enunciation in the cabinet of the analyst.

Now, it is precisely this machine that suppresses all the conditions of enunciation. So that if Baudrillard's thesis consists in saying to us: what produces statements is a split subject. Whether it is split according to the system of sign-value, or split in the system of symbolic value, it amounts to the same: it confuses the production of statements with its very opposite, namely what prevents and what suppresses all the conditions for the production of statements. That's the first point.

The second point is that it is all very well to put use-value into question; he is surely right. But to put use-value into question in order to rely on exchange-value does not seem to me sufficient because, while you're at it, if you keep exchange value, you reintroduce use-value. Baudrillard has alighted on an interesting problem, but which seems to me lost in advance: how to engender sign-value, that is to say, the sign-form, as he himself often says, that is to say, how to produce statements, how to engender them starting from exchange-value? Now, it seems that his answer either invokes a miracle or a parallelism. The miracle would be the act of expenditure which would transform, within exchange, exchange value into sign-value. In this case, I don't see any very precise analysis, except strangely enough, in the case of the sale of paintings at an auction⁷² – and all the same it's a bit weird to conceive the capitalist system in the mode of the sale of paintings at auction. Because of his elimination of the category of production, the subordination of production to consumption, what he retains as the model of the capitalist object is not the machine, it is the gadget; this was already visible in his first book *The System of Objects*, where what he had in mind was a psychoanalysis of the object, and he was obliged therefore to conceive of machines as super-gadgets, instead of conceiving gadgets as residues of machines or as miniaturized machines.⁷³ The model of the gadget: he is indeed obliged to take such a model, that is to say, to ignore the whole machinic power [*puissance*] of both desire and of capitalism; he is indeed forced to completely occlude the power of the machine and the nature of the machine, in order to engender, starting from exchange-value ... in order to crapulously engender sign-value, or the sign-form, from exchange-value, through a simple operation of expenditure.

When use-value has been suppressed, while conserving exchange-value, one does not give oneself any condition to account for any transmutation at all, except in one case: the system of parallelism. As far as the book on the *Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* goes, it seems to me that what's involved is an operation that remains completely miraculous – this transformation of exchange-value into sign-value. With regard to the article on 'The Body', a parallelist point of view clearly appears between money [*argent*] and phallus.

This money-phallus parallelism, which will guarantee the passage from exchange-value, which is made with material money, to sign-value which is made with the formal phallus – a passage from material money, from material exchange, to formal phallic sign – this is what allows him, simply in the name of a metaphor or of a parallelism, to nimbly get away with saying: it is not embarrassing to establish a metaphor between money and the phallus because the phallus itself is a metaphor ...

We fall back into a parallelist system; it was a question of knowing how desire invested the economy, and we fall back onto a simple parallelism between two economies; namely the transformation exchange-value/sign-value can only be done through a parallelism between money grasped as distinctive materiality and the phallus grasped as differential formality, this is where a system of parallelism between the two comes into play, and from that moment, it no longer at all keeps its implicit promise, namely: to show how desire invests the economy;

it makes a junction through symbolization, through metaphor or through parallelism between two economies, a political economy and an economy of desire.

Finally, third point, because it's time for a rest: why is it that exchange-value is no more serious a notion than use-value. Why doesn't it work?

It seems to me that it is for the following reason: first point: first of all, it seems to me that exchange, in Marxism, is an extraordinarily ambiguous and confused notion because the term 'exchange' brings along with it, as a concept, the theme of a certain equality between the things exchanged or exchangeable things. Marx says it very well, in principle; and, in fact, the problem of exchange is that what is exchanged are *not* equal things: namely, economically there is a fundamentally unequal character to economic exchange. On the conditions of the inequality of exchange, I cite for you two important and contemporary texts: *Unequal Exchange* [by Arghiri Emmanuel] published by Maspéro⁷⁴ and the book *Accumulation on a World Scale* by Samir Amin at Éditions de Minuit⁷⁵, where he takes up and corrects the theory of unequal exchange; and the book by Samir Amin is very good. He takes up the theory of unequal exchange, but he doesn't at all take it up as belonging fundamentally to exchange, but he takes it up at the level of the Third World, that is to say: under what conditions, on the periphery of capitalism, under what conditions and why, is the exchange *Third-World-developed countries* fundamentally an unequal exchange?

This notion of exchange brings with it by right a principle of equality and in fact mobilises an essential inequality; and the whole Marxist problem of surplus value comes from that: how to account for the inequality of exchange? And Marx's answer is precisely an arithmetical answer; and you understand why it can only be an arithmetical answer that accounts for the inequality and for the exchange, when the problem has been posed only in terms of exchange.

When the problem has been posed only in terms of exchange, there can be no answer to the question: why the inequality of exchange? There can only be an arithmetical answer, precisely because exchange has absorbed by right this sort of postulate of equality, and it's a matter of accounting, starting from an equality presupposed by right, for an inequality affirmed in fact. From that moment, this can only be done under the form of a plus and a minus, and one aspect of the Marxist theory of surplus value is precisely to explain how the inequality of exchange is situated at the level of the sale and purchase of labor power, that is to say, how a surplus value is created linked to the wage-earners or to the purchase of labor power, a surplus value translatable in terms of plus and minus, which will account for the inequality of exchange.

Now, what doesn't work in that? Once again, it's that, in a certain way, it can't keep the promises given. The promise given was to show how, in a social formation, social production was coded by something more profound, that is to say, how ultimately production was not primary. Now, in order to show how production is not primary at the level of the economy, we opt for the exchange mechanism.

A sort of circuit of exchange would first of all be abstract, and there is a place for that, and in relation to which it would be necessary to engender the immediacy of fact, which could only be done, once again, through an arithmetical process. When Marx talks of exchange, he indeed talks of it as an abstract form; there is no society which functions like that. Also, I said last year that it was necessary to substitute a completely different mechanism for it.

What traverses a society is not a circuit of exchange; it is a completely different circuit which does not refer us to arithmetic, but which refers us to a differential apparatus. And it is very curious that Baudrillard himself feels the need to invoke a differential matter, a distinctive matter and a differential form, but starting from an exchangeist structure which, it seems to me, does not support it. What defines, on the contrary, a social field, whether it is capitalist or something else, is not at all the unequal or equal quantities which would enter into a relation of exchange, it is the quantities of different powers, quantities of powers in the mathematical sense of the word power [*puissance*]; these are different potentialities. The question is not: equal quantities or unequal quantities, because that's the problem of exchange, but that has never worked with this thing.

What functions in an economic formation is the different powers of quantities, that is to say the flows that traverse the social field. These are not quantities of the same power, and therefore the (pseudo-)mathematical apparatus which can account for that is obviously not arithmetic, it is necessarily differential calculus, since differential calculus, I remind you, is made to treat quantities which are not of the same power.⁷⁶ The differential relation is precisely a relation which makes it possible to confront and compare quantities which are not of the same power. Differential calculus would be stripped of meaning if your idea was just to apply it to quantities of equal power. Therefore, it does not seem to me at all that one should start from a circuit of exchange, where one would play with a presupposed equality and an inequality to be engendered, which is closer to the relation *exchange-value–sign-form* in the false genesis proposed by Baudrillard. Rather one must start from what is immediately given in a political economic field, namely quantities which are different.

Money [*argent*] in the capitalist system appeared to us last year as a system of these quantities of different powers. Where money [*argent*] intervenes as structure of financing, I would say the quantity is of power X, and where it concerns money taken as means of payment, let's put money taken as quantity of power I. It is not the same money that is endowed with a purchasing power and that constitutes the capital of a society. It is not the same 'money' [*argent*] which is money [*monnaie*] and which is capital.⁷⁷ All the economists know this since the question of the economy since the crisis is: how to create capital with only a little money [*monnaie*], or even, at the limit, without money [*monnaie*] [*missing word*]. The problem of Nazism – see Faye's book – the economic problem of Doctor Schacht was: how is it possible to make capital without money?⁷⁸ Now, money [*argent*] as purchasing power at your disposal, which is a medium of exchange, – if it is true that use-value⁷⁹ is second in relation to exchange-value, exchange-value itself is second in relation to something else, namely the differential relations between quantities of different powers, between irreducible quantities of powers.

These two irreducible forms of money [*argent*], I said last year that they have a fictive homogeneity which is guaranteed by the banking system, which is guaranteed by the central bank. And what we will see in the case of Nazism is how, at the moment they wanted to de-index capital from gold, they precisely had to bring about a whole system of discounting and re-discounting, operations of discounting and multiple discounting, precisely in order to guarantee this play of quantities of power that are absolutely different, money [*monnaie*] as structure of financing and money [*monnaie*] as means of payment: And that is what I want to say: money as means of payment is thus money as exchange-value and through which exchange occurs; money as structure of financing is absolutely not that; money as structure of financing is, since Keynes, the object of creation and destruction. It is creation and destruction. And even when, for example, you have a monetary mass which remains constant,

for example of 1000 over two years, that does not mean at all that, as the classical economists said, the monetary mass has stayed constant, it means that there have been creations of money and destructions of money which would be equivalent to each other, which is absolutely different; but money as structure of financing never ceases to be traversed by movements of creation and destruction. It is money as means of payment that is determined by its status as a means of exchange.

Here I am sticking to – and this is why I’m making progress in my analysis – it may seem slight, but I’m just sticking to our thing about there being two flows. I was saying that two flows [*flux*] are needed when something flows [*coule*]. The other day, for the alcoholic, it was his flow of masturbation and his flow of writing. Here, at the level of the body of capital, there are indeed two flows; it’s two flows, in some relation, it’s the flow of money as structure of financing and the flow of money as exchange-value or means of payment. This thing interests me a lot, because, if you recall the analysis of the drunken crisis last time⁸⁰, – and I don’t care whether it’s money [*argent*] or it’s rot or it’s sperm; but if I don’t care whether it’s one or the other, it is not at all at the level of a dumb metaphorical system of equivalences of the psychoanalytic genre, it’s at the level of this: in any case, it’s the abstract machine which is at play in both cases, independently of the quality of the flows. In any case, you will have a minimum of two flows which stream on a body without organs; you have a system of completely fictive equivalences guaranteed by the play of the banks, the play of discounting and re-discounting; what matters is that two flows being given, one is necessarily more deterritorialized than the other; and there, it is obvious that in this case with my two flows of money, money as means of payment, means of exchange, purchasing power, it’s the same thing: you receive at the end of the month a wage, this wage corresponds to a purchasing power, to a means of exchange ... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... it can only be understood in its relationship with a flow of a radically different power [*puissance*] and which it is not a power [*puissance*] of purchasing power [*pouvoir d’achat*], is not a power of exchange, but is a power which surpasses us because of the very instruments of the capitalist machine, because of capitalism itself – namely a power of a completely different nature, of creation-destruction, the structure of financing.

Therefore, that exchange is by nature unequal, there is no need to explain it within the circuit of exchange. You only have to see that the flow of exchange which presupposes money as purchasing power, derives from a differential relation with a flow of a completely different power, from which it receives, by nature, a fundamentally unequal character. In this case, there is always one of the two flows which plays the deterritorialized-deterritorializing role, which comes to the same, and which, as a result, is like the dominant one, or the one that envelopes the other. In this case, there is no need to continue, as Gobard says, that goes without saying.

What does that mean, *wages–purchasing power*? It is precisely exchange. In capitalism, it is the means by which one reterritorializes wages, the fixed wage, demands for an increase in wages ... You see, all the processes of reterritorialization in the capitalist system – namely with your wages, you will go and buy yourself your little house, you will buy your fridge ... I’m not being ironic here: I am defining processes of territoriality and reterritorialization that we know well. And the demand for wages is reterritorialization within the framework of the trade union; there is a whole chain of territorialities: the family, purchasing power, the party, the union, which play on this flow of money to the power I, namely what goes in and what comes out of the wallet of a worker or of a non-worker, which is defined as wealth or as

poverty, and which is therefore a flow of a certain nature – this is what is assumed by exchange and which already includes inequality. The other, the flow of structure of financing, object of creation and destruction which is capital, in opposition, if you like, to money [*monnaie*] as purchasing power – because ultimately, a capital is not realizable. It is only realizable in one case, that of bankruptcy, when it ceases to be capital. An enterprise does not realize its capital. I am not saying that capital exhausts the structure of financing, I'm saying that capital forms part of money [*argent*] as structure of financing. There are other things which form part of it: for example: State subsidies, for example: investments, but these things are never realizable here and now, and it is at their level that the creations-destructions of money [*monnaie*] take place, which involves, through concrete mechanisms: banks, emissions of money [*monnaie*].

Although a monetary mass can remain constant, that does not prevent it from being constantly and several times renewed, several times created and several times destroyed. Now, it is obvious that this is deterritorialized money [*argent*] because it fundamentally rests on a play of multiple inscriptions, on a play of discount and re-discount, and it is even because it is so deterritorialized that it can intervene several times. We would have to get in a specialist to explain to us the relationship between the contemporary economy, the American economy, and the Nazi economy, because there is at least something in common; it is that in a given time, the same sum is used several times; that is how one can make capital with very little money [*monnaie*]. The same sum serves several times through the play of discounts and re-discounts over a period of time where the same sum intervenes at several levels. Now, in the mechanism of the contemporary economy, in the case of a rather mysterious entity like Euro-dollars, this is also very clear: it is precisely a system where a single sum will intervene several times by way of a play of writings, effecting an auto-accumulation. Here, you have the example of a form of money [*argent*], at the limit deterritorialized – it's called Euro-dollars, which implies all the same that there is, within the very movement of deterritorialization, something like territorial anchoring points, like points of reterritorialization which will prepare other flows: the territorial flow of money as purchasing power. Now, I say that it is the deterritorialized flow, creation-destruction, of power X and the other flow, the territorial flow of purchasing power, which constitutes the whole basic economic system, and not at all exchange.

A student: [*Indistinct words*]

Deleuze: What do you do with coins [*sous*]? You exchange them; it is not the money [*argent*] which itself is more territorialized, it is that in its very use, it is a means of exchange, and that what you exchange it for is by nature territorializing. Either you hoard your money, and you make a territorial usage of it, or you exchange it for objects, and these objects form your environment, your territory. While capital as structure of financing is if need be territorialized to the extent that it is attached to such and such an enterprise, the day that no longer works – it no longer works in the East, so let's head off to the South. The mobility of capital is the measure of its deterritorialization; although one should not exaggerate, there are indices of territoriality in structures of financing: for example, a given territory will make a call. And they make territorial appeals to capital under what form? They will say for example: look how cheap our labour is. So it's through that, the territorial characteristics of money as means of payment, that the indices of territoriality are established in capital as structure of financing, which by itself is deterritorialized; and if that does not work at some location, a well-known phenomenon takes place: capital flight. One must not be surprised that there are movements of capital flight, it is in the very nature of capital. What is surprising is that capital stays still,

but it only rests in appearance since, once again, when a monetary mass remains constant, it is only in appearance that there is constancy of mass; in fact, there is a series of creations and destructions at the end of which you find the same abstract quantity. But in fact, it has not ceased moving.

I just want to conclude on this: there is no question of making the genesis of anything whatsoever by starting with statements that start from the circuit of exchange. Moreover, starting from the circuit of exchange, it is not surprising that Baudrillard discovers castration: starting from the circuit of exchange you will never engender anything but statements of the Poujadist type. You will never engender the least master statement, the least dominant statement of a social formation, you will only engender platitudinous statements of everyday life. What is generative of statements is the differential relation between the flows of quantities of irreducible powers, and it is in the separation and interplay of these flows that statements will be produced. And I am announcing, for what follows, that this seems to me a key to the question that Faye sets himself, namely how were Nazi statements produced at a certain time? We will see that it is not according to this general formula, but that it is according to a variant of this general formula that these were produced.

I summarise. The genesis of statements that Baudrillard proposes comes down to this: what would be productive of statements is a subject, it is the subject. Now from the moment one says that, the trick is already played, there is nothing to claw back: as soon as one says that, it means a subject split into subject of the statement and subject of enunciation; now this splitting, otherwise named castration, is not what produces statements, but what prevents the production of statements.

Secondly, he promised to show us how desire invested the social economic field, and he promised this to us by announcing to us a genesis of sign-value starting from exchange value. Now this attempt leads to the restoration of a simple money-phallus parallelism, and which, on the other hand, is in principle impossible, because exchange-value is absolutely no more primary than use-value. And, finally, it is not by chance that, within the framework of his system, the true model of the capitalist object for him is the gadget; this is linked to the two things just mentioned. The only positive thing we have retained is the idea that statements always presuppose a field of flows, on condition that these flows do not presuppose once more an exchangeist circuit but presuppose flows on condition that these flows are considered as quantities affected with different powers, in such a manner that one of the flows can always be assigned as deterritorializing, and the other as territorial.

It is perhaps in this way that we will see more concretely how the production of statements is made ... [*End of recording*]

Gilles Deleuze

On Anti-Oedipus, 1972-1973

Lecture 05, 4 June 1973

Conceptions of the Statement – Flow of financing

Transcription: WebDeleuze and Le Terrier; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translated by Christian Kerslake

There is a critical thread and a very vague positive line of research. The critical thread is that evidently, far from favoring the emergence of statements, psychoanalysis prevents any emergence of statements, and it deprives us of any chance of holding onto statements which are our own. This runs through everything. But the positive part, what interested us, was: what are the conditions of the production of statements which are specific to us, whether they are statements of individuals or statements of groups? And by virtue of the same thing, what are the conditions of a [*indistinct word*]? It is not surprising that psychoanalysis, by nature, deprives us of all possibility of enunciation; it is truly by nature that it considers the unconscious as something after the fact. The unconscious as, once again, something which is always already there, and to be reduced through a machine of interpretation. For our part, we consider the unconscious, on the contrary, as something which is never there, and which is to be produced, to be produced by a machine of experimentation. If I tried to sum up everything I have developed this year, it is that.

In passing, I would like to underline a few small things: last year, we attempted, with Guattari, a kind of critique of Oedipus, and in that regard, [*word missing*] there are lots of people who have said to us: Oedipus, you've understood nothing about it, Oedipus was never the father and the mother. So, what is it?

We are then told: Oedipus is the entrance to culture, or Oedipus is the entrance to the symbolic order, or Oedipus is the finitude of being, or Oedipus is the lack of being that is desire, or the lack of being which is life, or etc. There are even perverse variations: some say it's not the father and the mother, it's symbolic triangulation, or quaternation. This is the position of the symbolic school, the *École freudienne*.⁸¹ And there are others who say: okay, it's daddy and mommy, only the triangulation is not Oedipus: that's Rene Girard.⁸² That seems even funnier to me because, when we ask how it works, whether they are from the *École freudienne* or another school, it's all very well their saying: Oedipus is the symbolic, or: it is the entrance into the symbolic – the question is how does that work in concrete terms? Let me take a text by an author I shall not name, where he tells us of his patient: “He proceeds, without for all that having abandoned his sucking, chewing and obscene articulation ...” – it's a bit harsh treating his patient like that, because at the end of the day, the articulation of analysts can also sometimes leave something to be desired – “... through a sequence on the Bouches du Rhône, the Camargue, the pleasures of horse riding and the sea. Invitation to a voyage that I punctuate with a “*bouche de la mère*” [mouth of the mother]. In turn, disgusted, I would be tempted to say ...” – there the patient has something going for him – “... he stops in the grip of the greatest perplexity, before the gap that echoes back from his own speech.” That is a marvel.

It's like the letter where the guy said: "I want to go to a hippy group"; for me, that means something quite specific.⁸³ Maybe he's making a mistake – but that's not the question – but "I want to go to a hippy group" means: I want to produce the unconscious. It means: I'm stuck, I'm in an environment where all production of the unconscious is impossible, I want to produce the unconscious. A schizoanalysis sets off in this direction: why does he want to produce the unconscious in this specific place? How is he going to produce it, etc? And his analyst said to him: "Hippy group = big pippee, you are impotent, it's always your theme of impotence." Here we see the radical misdeeds, the disgusting misdeeds of the machine of interpretation. The guy has no chance of escaping, he cannot hold onto a single statement. When someone comes and says to someone: "I want to go to a hippy group" and the other replies: "Ah, it's always your theme of impotence, castration again!", one is screwed from the beginning.

Now, in this text, I note first of all a blatant contempt for the patient, an unbearable contempt. Why is the patient defined by a "sucking, chewing and obscene articulation" while the analyst endows himself with a clear, luminous and intelligent voice? Then, the guy talks about the Bouches du Rhône and the analyst, with all his finesse, says: Bouches du Rhône = *bouche de la mère*. The machine of interpretation prevents the guy from making the slightest statement. In this regard, the commentary of the analyst has a touching naivety, because he even notices that the guy is completely disgusted: "In turn, disgusted, I would be tempted to say, he stops ..." Nothing troubles an analyst; he translates: he is disgusted, not by the enormity of what I have just said, he is disgusted by the perspicacity of what I have just said – "... before the gap which echoes back from his own speech." The gap that echoes back from his own speech, that's not difficult: when you pass any statement whatever in front of the machine of interpretation, necessarily, by the same fact, the immediate effect of this passage is what we saw last time: a splitting of the subject into subject of the statement and subject of enunciation; you are subject of a statement when you say 'the Bouches du Rhône', but the true subject of the statement is you-as-interpreted, namely 'the Bouches du Rhône is the mother's mouth.' The analyst has split the subject and he is surprised afterwards that the other is perplexed in the face of the gap that echoes back from his own speech. He didn't even have the time to say anything, that's what's so fascinating in this psychoanalytic operation.

So what I insist on is that it is in the same way that psychoanalysis inhibits all production of statements and treats the unconscious as something to reduce through the interpretation machine; and on the contrary, that it incites statements or even manages to hear, to make enunciation possible, whether it be of individuals or of groups – at the same time, that is what it is to produce the unconscious; the unconscious: you do not have it, the unconscious is not *there*, the unconscious is not in your early childhood. The unconscious is something which is produced and which can only be produced in places, in circumstances which are precisely non-repressive places, circumstances and events.

One of the aspects of repression is precisely – and it is through this that psychoanalysis participates in repression in the strictest sense – ..., on the contrary, the condition of production of the unconscious implies places where repression is no longer exercised in the form of a splitting of the subject (we will distinguish in you the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation, and this splitting will be precisely the splitting of castration). It is in this sense that for the past few weeks we have been revolving around the idea: to produce statements or to produce the unconscious: this is strictly the same thing. This is what I explained badly last time, because I said that to understand this properly, you have to see that

when I say that the unconscious is not already there, that we must not look for it in childhood, I mean something quite simple: I don't at all mean, as in ordinary psychoanalytic vocabulary, that what counts is the actual [*actuels*] factors⁸⁴ of a disorder, as opposed to the infantile factors, I mean something else again, because once again, the valorization of the actual factors against the infantile factors, in particular at the level of neurosis – that came about in the context of all the ruptures, all the dissidences with Freud; and the disagreements with Freud never changed anything fundamental. I mean, on the contrary, that, however far back you go in someone's childhood, the problem is already this: how is a child going to produce the unconscious? It is in this sense that I say that it is never 'there'. It is never there because the child already found himself faced with the task: are they going to prevent me – even if he does not formulate it in this way – from producing the unconscious or am I going to be in favourable conditions to produce it?

It is obvious that one of the fundamental aspects of repression in education is to prevent the production of the unconscious in the child. In what way? I'm confused and this is why I'm coming back to this: I was saying that what really needs to be distinguished is *childhood blocs* and *childhood memory*. Only here, childhood memory is not something which exists after the fact. Not at all. We have to go back to Bergson, because he is very good, Bergson. Bergson is anyway the one who, one day, came up with a crazy theory of memory; and then became the first philosopher who, as philosopher, truly got under the skin of the psychiatrists. He wrote *Matter and Memory*, which put a kind of disorder into psychiatry; ... that's already very good. Bergson had a very simple and very beautiful idea; he said: memory is contemporaneous with what one remembers; it is at the same time that something is present or is past.⁸⁵ For a very simple reason: because if we had to wait for the present to pass in order to create the memory of the present that has become past, in order to create the memory of the former present, it would never constitute itself. If it were necessary to wait until the former present was no more for the memory of this present to be formed, there would be no possibility of forming a memory; it is therefore necessary, and this was the schema of a kind of divergent line, [that] at each moment the present doubles in two directions, one stretched towards the future, one stretched towards the past⁸⁶; that is to say: it is at the same time that the present is lived as present and that the memory of this present is created; which allowed him to explain in parentheses the phenomenon known as paramnesia, that is to say, phenomena of *déjà vu*, *déjà vécu* [already experienced]; he said that there is nothing surprising about it, it's just a disorder of perception. Since the memory is constituted contemporaneously with that of which it is the memory, all it takes is a disorder in the line of bifurcation so that, instead of perceiving the thing as present, you perceive the memory of the thing, since the memory is contemporaneous with the thing, and, at that moment, you have a phenomenon of paramnesia.

It is in this sense that we should distinguish childhood blocs and childhood memories. And the childhood bloc is truly [*indistinct word*] from early childhood. And there, I say that in the childhood bloc you will find nothing of what psychoanalysis tells us to be the life of childhood; you will find nothing Oedipal there. You will find a completely different affair there; you will find there a whole ensemble of machinic connections, machinic connections which form the true life of the unconscious, non-figural and non-symbolic. A child playing hopscotch or playing with a ball: there is a whole system there of blocs of childhood in the living state, in the actual state, and you will find there a life of childhood that does not refer to psychoanalytical coordinates, that is to say, the famous coordinates of Oedipus-castration. It is at the same time that the memory of this life is constituted. There is contemporaneity

between the living bloc of childhood and the memory of childhood, and the memory of childhood is fundamentally Oedipal, just like the dream.

Of course, the psychoanalysts are justified at the level of the dream: it is the same movement which produces Oedipus and which produces the dream – but that's not what counts. Childhood memory is Oedipal because the child constitutes, creates his childhood memory contemporaneously with the corresponding childhood bloc, but he creates it entirely already related to the Oedipal coordinates, because he creates it wholly at the level of a veritable narrative conduct: what I am going to tell mummy, what I am going to tell daddy; at the level of consciousness, of the pre-conscious, of the unconscious, a kid does not pass a day without selecting, that is to say without living on a double register – but once again strictly at the same time, – that of which he has the memory and the memory itself, namely the lived bloc of childhood which determines desiring connections, and the childhood memory which, on the contrary, is already a past, but a past strictly contemporaneous with the present of which it is the past, and which retains what, of the desires of the child, will be able to be related to the father and to the mother. This is narrative conduct. Here, we would have to go back to [Pierre] Janet: old Janet had a very nice theory about [*missing word* – narrative?]⁸⁷, about memory and recollection as being essentially a conduct that consists in referring to the people to whom one is (at least possibly) going to recount a narrative [*récit*].⁸⁸

So, in effect, there is already a whole crushing of the unconscious which is produced at the level of childhood memory, not at all because memory is produced after the fact, but on the contrary, because it is contemporaneous with what is remembered, because it is strictly at the same time as the corresponding present; it is not at the same time as a new present which would succeed the old one, it is contemporary with the old present of which it is the memory. And it is in this way that it represents a fantastic work of selection, where only those connections of a child's desire will be retained that are capable of being related to daddy and mommy. Memory, by nature, is Oedipal, and it is memory that has projected the shadow of an unconscious which would already be there, and always was already there, and which would be to be interpreted. So that the task vis-a-vis the child is to disengage childhood blocs from the childhood memories that cover them over. Childhood blocs are the child's pieces of experimentation. Childhood memory – that's a child who, whatever he does, against his will, finds himself defenseless in the face of interpretations, and he finds himself defenseless in the face of these interpretations of the adult because childhood memory is precisely the process through which the child of a narrative is constituted as subject of the statement, and therefore refers to a superior authority, whether it be the father or something else, who will discover the true subjects of enunciation, that is to say that he will make an interpretation; so that here I would say: the childhood bloc is really the machinic assemblages which produce the real statements of the child. Once again, it is never a subject which produces the statements, it is the machinic connections, it is the connections of desire that traverse the child and which produce such or such statement.

Now, the combination *machinic assemblages–production of statements* is opposed to the process of interpretation which is based entirely on childhood memory, the splitting of a subject into subject of statement and subject of enunciation with, as a postulate, that what would produce statements are not machinic assemblages. These are not free connections of desire, rather what would produce statements is the subject. The idea that it is the subject which produces statements is already the sufficient condition for no statement to be produced, it is already the great inhibition of every statement, ensured by the machine of interpretation.

The problem of the child – once it is said that one never ceases being a child, that already goes without saying, there is no difference in nature at the level of desire ... There is no desire of the child on the one hand, and desire of the adult on the other, but that does not prevent there from being a catastrophic, dramatic difference. It's that there are people who live childhood and their own childhood under the form of childhood memories. And there, we cannot say enough to what extent psychoanalysis is not the only one responsible for this, but to what extent it supports this oppressive force that makes us live our childhood under the form of childhood memories, all sorts of social forces, familial forces, etc., forces which push us to live our childhood under the form of childhood memories, and which from then on, send us back to interpretation: "Mummy, tell me, is it really true that that happened to me when I was little?" This time, it is the machine of familial interpretation: above all, you should not ask your mum for anything, above all not a childhood memory. Or, there is the other technique, which consists in living one's childhood, once it is said that one has always remained there, in the form of a reinjection of childhood blocs. The problem of desire, in desiring relationships, is indeed: how to make this kind of injection and how to reinject blocs of childhood.

And here, I'm thinking back to an author I've talked a lot about this year, it's Kafka. With Kafka, it seems so curious to me how he plays on so many tables at the same time because he has so much humour; sometimes he really makes an inscription of childhood memories: example: the 'Letter to the Father'; and everyone says: you see how Oedipal he is! But not at all, because he's doing that for his own personal joke, he is full of joy, he's ladling on the childhood memories. But when he passes on to another degree both of humour and of seriousness, he doesn't do that at all, for example in *The Castle*; that proceeds in a completely different manner, by injecting childhood blocs into adult scenes. The Surveyor in *The Castle* is constantly traversed by veritable blocs of childhood which are intertwined with things of a completely different kind, and there, there are no longer Oedipal coordinates at all, there are sexual coordinates, homosexual coordinates, there are coordinates of every nature, but it is very different.

My problem is not only anti-psychoanalytical; it is anti-psychoanalytical in that psychoanalysis contributes with all its might to preventing the production of statements and the production of the unconscious, because the production of statements and production of the unconscious are the same thing. To produce a statement is to produce the unconscious. But it is not only psychoanalysis which prevents the production of statements and the production of the unconscious – once again, the production of the unconscious or the production of statements, we have to call it what it is, it is always a revolution. We can even define the revolutionary period in any domain by this: new statements are produced; and thereby a charge of the unconscious is not released, it is produced. And that this is accompanied by a fantastic release of childhood blocs, in opposition to the memories on which the old system functions, it's obvious.

And today, we had to examine this question of the production of statements as seen through its authors, whom we began to talk about last time. I had just attempted to say how that presented itself in Baudrillard's case. I'll just keep this from Baudrillard's answer, because that's all I will need today: Baudrillard tells us that what produces statements is a transformation, it's when exchange-value transforms itself into sign-value. And when this operation is produced, there is a creation of statements, whether these statements are verbal or not verbal. So it is this transformation which is itself productive of statements. In the last instance, we saw that this transformation of exchange-value into sign-value referred to – the

sign-value itself referred to – something that was going to make us very sad, namely the splitting of the subject, whether this subject occluded or hid castration, or whether it exhibited it; in other words, we fell back onto the classical thesis which seems to me the thesis of Western, Christian, Cartesian philosophy, etc. Namely that what produces the statement is the subject, and from the fact that it produces the statement, it can only produce it as split into subject of statement and subject of enunciation. The psychoanalytical grain of salt consisting in saying that the splitting is castration, whereas Descartes would have said that all that is reflection ... but in any case everywhere it is the subject who is the producer of statements, and it is not by chance that it is the same in Lacan: on the problem of the production of statements, he brings back the *cogito*. See page 819 of the *Écrits*, but perhaps it is page 719.⁸⁹

So, in our study of Baudrillard, we started out gaily saying to ourselves: here's a thesis on: under what conditions are statements produced? And the beginning of the answer interested us a great deal, namely, what produces statements is the transformation of exchange-value into sign-value. And then, if we were very dejected afterwards, it was insofar as the sign-value referred us to a split subject, therefore to what is simultaneously the most classical and the most psychoanalytic thesis, when the splitting of the subject, on the contrary, is what prevents the production of statements. And it is not by chance that then, on the inverse side, on the other aspect of our problem, which is *production of statements = production of the unconscious*, Baudrillard, in the same way that he told us that what produced statements is ultimately the split subject, from then on, at the level of the inverse, there was obviously no longer any production of the unconscious, there was nothing more than an unconscious of castration, and the unconscious of the statement was castration itself, namely castration occluded by sign-value. We had so many hopes ...

So then I said to myself that we had to look at things from the side of Jean-Pierre Faye and his two recent books, *Théorie du récit* [*Theory of Narrative*] and *Langages totalitaires* [*Totalitarian Languages*], because there too, it is indeed the same problem, namely the production of statements or the production of the unconscious.⁹⁰ He does not quite put it like that, so I'm in bad faith; because if he does not quite put it like that, it's because it is perhaps not his problem. What allows me to say that in a way it *is* his problem is that the whole of Faye's beautiful book consists in interrogating the condition of the production of statements in a period of history. What I find interesting is how what Faye says is close to Baudrillard – although I shall have to go rather quickly – and how it is very different from him. I can say right away that it is very different, because the answer will not be of the type: what produces the statement is a subject. There will also be – which there is not in Baudrillard – a true transformation in connection with the production of statements. There will be a true transformation – the nature of which I'm not certain about – of the relation of the statement with the unconscious. Therefore, with these two criteria, I can already say that this thesis is all the more interesting to us.

The first thing which strikes me, truly by chance, because I'm not making a judgment, it's only impressions: I say to myself that the common point with Baudrillard is that he too starts from exchange. He starts from exchange-value.

So Faye also starts from exchange, and his own schema – this is what fascinates me in his book and I think it is a very important book: the examples he gives will exceed what he says about them – his problem is how, starting from exchange, the production of statements, which for his part he calls *narratives*, is made. How are narratives produced starting from exchange? And here, something very curious happens; three texts are very important. First of

all, on page 18 of *Theory of Narrative*, he cites a text by a historian of the 17th or 18th century named Mably⁹¹; and this is what Mably says in a historical narrative: “Some young Huns were hunting on the banks of the Palus a doe they had chased across a marshland which they regarded as an impassable sea. And, recklessly following their prey, they were astonished to find themselves in a new world. These hunters, eager to tell their families the wonders they had seen, returned to their dwellings, and the narratives through which they aroused the curiosity of their compatriots were to change the face of nations. Never were a people more terrible than Huns.”⁹²

Faye’s commentary: “At the beginning and on the right bank of the Rhine, there are the conditions and modes of material production and of exchange.” – So exchange is primary – “Then suddenly – triggering the sudden ‘revolution’ of this crossing of the Rhine – intervenes the unforeseen event of these ‘narratives’ which will ‘change the face of nations’: of this production of supplementary and, so to speak, discontinuous, action, through *the effect of narrative*”.⁹³

What strikes me as fascinating is that in the same example what intervenes, as if by chance, is a kind of migratory flow, the Huns; and he does not particularly focus on this, it has the air of being a simple example. We go from the material conditions of exchange to the production of narrative forms, i.e. to the production of statements; the same example allows a factor to intervene which for the moment he does not put into play in his schema, namely the Huns crossing the river, that is to say, a *flow* of a certain nature. Isn’t this dimension, which is already there in the example, but which he doesn’t make use of, isn’t that enough to explode the pseudo-genesis starting from exchange?

Second moment of Faye’s thesis: how to account for this, that the conditions of exchange will engender ... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... you see how we remain in exchange. The commodity as “material change” and as belonging to exchange, he says; or on the other hand, the commodity in its form which culminates with what Marx calls, at the beginning of *Capital*, the “money-form”; or, as Faye says, the commodity as “change of form”. “History begins with this double process: material change [*changement*] and exchange”, on the one hand, and on the other hand, “change [*change*] of form.”⁹⁴

If I compare this with Baudrillard’s schema, he told us that exchange-value is transformed under certain conditions, and that it is sign-value that is productive of statements; here, exchange value or exchange, envisaged in its materiality, is transformed into commodity form. And on that, Faye will draw a whole parallel between the commodity form and the narrative form. Parallel at what level? At this level: that the narrative circulates just as much the commodity, and that it circulates according to rules homologous to those of the commodity, and that a narrative is fundamentally circulatory in the same way as a commodity.

I say to myself that, at the level of this second thesis of Faye, here too we find something both very interesting and very irritating. The general problem of the production of statements was: how does desire, and in what sense does desire make up part of the deepest structures of a social formation, or if you prefer, in more familiar terms, how does desire make up part of the infrastructure itself? Now such a question implies the refusal of any return to a thesis that one could call parallelist or metaphorical, and a metaphoricist or parallelist thesis is indeed

the ordinary psychoanalytical thesis. If we admit that the question is well posed, to ask how and under what conditions desire makes up part of the infrastructure itself, any answer which proceeded through a simple parallelism between economic forms and forms of desire, between political economy and desiring economy, therefore which would maintain a dualism and only unite the two through a metaphor or through a parallelism, without showing at all that, on the contrary, desire works on economic structures, that is to say, that there is only a single economy, any restoration of a duality in the economy at the level of a parallelism of a so-called economy and a so-called desiring economy, any establishment of a link between the two, in the form of a metaphor – all that seemed ruinous to us, because it returns to the oldest positions.

Now, Faye is in the process, in turn – when the problem was how to explain that desire had taken on, in a social field, the bizarre forms that emerged with fascism, and thereby how the production of fascist statements in the social field of Germany was constructed at such a moment, which indeed implied a problem of the investment by desire of a whole social historical field – he is in the process of restoring, just like Baudrillard, a simple parallelism between the commodity form and the form of the narrative, or the narrative considered as form of statements.

All this is because he started, like Baudrillard, from the problem of exchange-value, and that is not possible. If we start from exchange-value, we do not give ourselves the conditions, we will be left wondering how exchange-value transforms itself. Baudrillard's answer: it transforms itself into sign-value; Faye's answer: it transforms itself into commodity form, and there is a parallelism between commodity form and narrative form. But, in any case, it is a restoration of a parallelism between the two economies; and one cannot start from exchange-value as production of statements or as a condition for the production of statements, for a very simple reason: there has never been exchange-value.

The whole operation which consists today in suppressing use-value in the economy, or in carrying its critique as far as possible, in order to find exchange-value as primary in relation to use-value: in what way is it insufficient? Exchange no less than use is said to be second in relation to exchange⁹⁵; exchange is obviously second in relation to something of a completely different nature, namely that exchange implies a kind of flow of communication which can only have the slightest consistency in relation with a completely different flow. In political economy, exchange refers to an aspect of money which is a superficial aspect, or at least a secondary aspect, and the money-form in the commodity very precisely illustrates just that, so that to seek on the side of the commodity form a condition, if only by analogy, for the production of statements is already lost in advance. The money-form refers to money [*argent*] as purchasing power, and money as purchasing power can be considered as a flow; for example, we will be told today that the flow of wages indeed refers to money as purchasing power, and that is what exchange value is.

An economy has never functioned like that. An economy, in whatever social formation it may be, can only inscribe exchanges, can only make the circuits of exchange at the basis of money function as purchasing power, as a function of a flow of a wholly different nature. Once again, exchange belongs to arithmetic, it only belongs to the plus and minus, and it clearly appears in this form with Marx, for example when Marx explains how to buy the cheapest and sell the dearest.⁹⁶ At the level of money as purchasing power, it always belongs to arithmetic; and furthermore, one of the aspects of the Marxist theory of surplus value still

belongs to arithmetic, namely that we pay this to the worker, while he is made to work according to another quantity.

Now an economic field cannot be defined by a simple arithmetic because arithmetic is the homogeneity of quantities and an economic system is based, on the contrary, on a fundamental heterogeneity of quantities, namely – and in particular, it seems obvious to me that Leftism always rediscovers an autonomous problem of power [*pouvoir*], it's not like the cretins [*missing word* – say?], the official and traditional Marxists, it's not at all because Leftism neglects the importance of so-called economic mechanisms [*instances*], it's for a completely different reason. It is not because Leftism would return to a kind of idealism of power: when Foucault is increasingly interested today in the conditions of the exercise of power and when he says that the exercise of power is not a mere tracing of economic structures – and it goes without saying that that does not mean that power falls from the sky, nor does it mean that power is independent of economic structures – then what might that mean today, this rebirth of a specific problem, of a specific problem of power, to the point that, for a certain time, one has recognized as being almost the basic Leftist manifesto, a certain posing of the problem in terms of power. That means that an economic field is never defined arithmetically according to an exchange-value or a form of exchange, because the form of exchange which refers to money as purchasing power [*pouvoir d'achat*] forms a flow which can only flow in a social field, which can only be exercised in a social field, when put in relation with a flow of another nature.

What does that mean, a flow of another nature? The phrase 'other nature' has a very rigorous meaning; it means a flow of another power [*puissance*], namely that the economic operations of a social formation, however simple they appear to us, and even if they appear to us as exchangeist – in parentheses, structuralism is fundamentally exchangeist – the economic operations are carried out under a form of differential relations, and differential relations are not at all $A + a$ or $A - a$, they are relations of the dy/dx type, which means something very simple: the differential relation is the putting in relation of quantities which are not of the same power, in other words, it always takes at least two flows which are not at the same power, and that's where money [*argent*] is to be found. In money in general [*argent*] or in actual money [*monnaie*]⁹⁷, you have a form of power [*puissance*] I which is money as purchasing power [*pouvoir d'achat*], and then a form of power [*puissance*] X, money as structure of financing. In appearance, it is the same money and what makes one believe that it is the same is the existence of a differential relation. But it goes without saying that the structure of financing is not even made with money [*argent*] that is realizable here and now; and even so all exchange, or all money as purchasing power, presupposes money [*monnaie*] as structure of financing.

And that is what is important in an economic structure like capitalism, it is the duality of the two flows, money as structure of financing, the flow of financing, and the flow of purchasing power – assuming of course that the flow of purchasing power is strictly subordinated as a flow of lesser power to the flow of financing. It is in this sense that one should not think of a powerful man, for example Monsieur Dassault⁹⁸, or a banker, as someone who has more money in his wallet than a worker. A banker's fortune, by definition, is a fortune in the form of a financing structure that is not realizable here and now. It is, literally, a completely different flow with a completely different nature to the flow of purchasing power. His power does not come from a greater purchasing power, his power comes from the fact that he handles and determines the direction of financial flows. He has a power over the flow of

purchasing power of his workers, but because, first of all, he is the master of a flow of financing.

So that taking exchange-value as a starting point in economics is a disaster, since money itself only intervenes in exchange-value, that is to say, gives to the commodity its form, as a function of a flow of a completely different kind; and that if there was not a flow of a completely different sort, then we would understand nothing about anything, starting with problems of power. This is because, from the moment that the economic field, the flow of financing is affected by an infinitely greater power, of a power X, in relation to the flow of purchasing power affected by the power I, this is why I would say that in one case, there are signs of power, whereas in the case of purchasing power, where money serves as means of exchange, what's involved (and I am using a barbarism) are 'impotent' signs. However rich you are, however strong your purchasing power, money as purchasing power defines a set of impotent signs which only receive their power from the other flow, the flow of financing. And just as money as purchasing power is governed by laws of exchange, so is the other flow governed by completely different laws, namely laws of the creation and destruction of money.

This is why an engendering of the power of statements or of the production of the unconscious starting from the circuit of exchange never works; it is because in fact, this circuit of exchange only intervenes or is only valid in relation to a circuit of a different power which is the circuit of creation-destruction.

This is what I would say in order to round off this overview and these criticisms – it's all rather confused – of Faye's book. When he does precise analyses of the mechanisms of the Nazi economy, there too his example has applications far beyond.

Let us return to the Huns. Faye told us: there is the circuit of exchange, and then there is narrative. A young Hun watched all that happen and came to tell all about it; he said to his friends: yonder, there is money [*argent*], etc. I'm not necessarily saying that the two flows which come into play to define a production of narrative or a production of statements or a production of the unconscious – I'm not say that these two flows must necessarily be the flow of financing and the flow of purchasing power. I'm saying that, whatever the case, there will be two flows of different powers. It is not by chance that we find ourselves before a nomadic flow, a flow of nomadism in full migration, the Huns, and a flow of a wholly different nature, a flow of exchange which presupposes a certain mobility, but which is found in a given territory, on the other side of the Rhine. It might come across that I'm talking nonsense here, and that's true, but ...

A student: Where do you place the purchase of means of production?

Deleuze: That's complicated, because the purchase of means of production straddles the two; it will involve both the two flows of different powers. There is indeed a moment when the seller of the means of production is paid. There, there is indeed a conversion into money as purchasing power, and it is necessary. I am not saying at all that the two flows are without relation to each other, since on the contrary, the differential relation puts them in relation. There is always a moment when there is the conversion of a monetary mass, or a creation-destruction of money, with a purchasing power, it is even the problem many economists are posing at the moment: how this conversion is made? So the purchase of means of production does indeed imply money as purchasing power, but the means of production themselves,

insofar as they make up part of an enterprise, and insofar as they have only been purchased, for example, as a function of a business capital, of business investments, of a relation between one enterprise and another which brings into play, step by step, the whole of the economy in a social field – that already supposes a structure of financing. This distinction can be expressed in all sorts of ways: I can say that it is the distinction between creation-destruction of money and purchasing power, I can say that it is the distinction that other economists make between capital on the one side, and money [*argent*] on the other. I can say that we can make the distinction between wage bill [*masse salariale*] and monetary mass. So for your example of money in its relations with the means of production, I think we would find that the means of production are traversed by the two flows. Perhaps the example of the Nazi economy, about which I would like to say a few words, will make this even clearer.

What strikes me is that, in a social formation – if you grant me that it is not arithmetical operations of exchange which establish the variables, but it is differential relations between different quantities of power – on the one hand, power [*pouvoir*] and the specificity of power is directly grounded on the same thing. If there is a problem of power, and a problem which should not be subordinated to the economy, any more than it should be posed in a simply ideological manner, it comes from this: power consists precisely in the primacy that the flow of a higher power [*puissance*] has over the flow of a lower power. In other words, to think power [*pouvoir*] in terms of exchange and what happens starting from exchange value, is an enterprise as stupid as seeking the productions of statements in exchange. In the two examples I'm taking: capitalism, flow of capital under the form of structure of financing, flow of exchange under the form of purchasing power, exchange being second, i.e. being the flow of lesser power, the capitalist system constituting the differential relations between the two flows, it is quite obvious that the higher flow of power has at least the character of having its own type of mobility and of determining the limits of the mobility of the other.

Capital has its own mobility. This is even its international character, it is its system of flight, it is the movement of the circulation of capital. The lesser flow of purchasing power which corresponds to the flow, or if you like, of which one of the components is the flow of labor – that has also its mobility. There is a mobility of capital and there is also a mobility of the worker. Now, the capitalist system, economically, is indeed a system which will propose from the beginning to fix the mobility of labor according to the exigencies of the mobility of capital, so that labor and purchasing power do not at all have a mobility which would be their own, but their mobility is strictly measured and regulated by the requirements of the mobility of capital. Therefore, in any economic field, I would not only say that there is a differential relation between at least two quantities of different powers, it will be necessary to say that there is a relation between these quantities, in such a way that the one is not only endowed with a fundamental mobility which one could call, for convenience sake, 'nomadism', in the most general sense of the word; but that the other, the impotent quantity, the quantity of lesser power, will only receive mobility as required by the superior quantity of power which, therefore, will encode it, divide it up, prevent it from moving if need be, will oblige it to move according to the requirements of the other quantity if necessary, etc. These are all problems of the 19th century, of how to organise the mobility of labor according to the requirements of capital, i.e. of the mobility of capital itself.

But what I like is that in Faye's example, what do we see? We see nomads, the Huns, they cross the Rhine; they themselves are a migrant flow which follows another flow, a hunting flow: following a sheep⁹⁹, the little Hun crosses the Rhine, looks around, and then goes and

tells his friends what it's like on the other side of Rhine; and Mably says: never was anything more terrible than when they crossed the Rhine.

In a completely different domain – for the moment, we are not trying to make a link, we are just seeking an echo – there is this nomadic flow which enters into relation with a flow of exchange: what happens? – In a very recent book by [Georges] Duby, *Warriors and Peasants*¹⁰⁰, there is something very important for us in the same direction which will act as a junction. The historian Duby explains something similar to this, which takes place at the end of the 10th century. At the end of the 10th century, things are going very badly: it is the period of the decomposition of the Carolingian empire. Money [*argent*] is no longer backed by the powers [*puissances*] of financing, by powers of the imperial type. And money is still there, sort of, but as it is never starting from that that you do anything, but since it is the other aspect of money which makes possible the use of money as purchasing power, in the imperial decomposition of Carolingian power, money literally no longer functions at all. Use is made of it in medals and above all, it goes into the monasteries, or it is even put into graves: this is funerary wealth, where it is no longer used as such in exchanges.¹⁰¹ Exchange then falls back – to speak like Faye – into its material condition, a kind of barter. You see the situation!

And then the admirable Vikings arrive at the borders. From the North. From the East arrive the Hungarians. I insist: at the periphery of the system. Duby's book is written for us: at the periphery of the system the Vikings swoop in with their ships, the Hungarians with their horses, and on their way, they dig up the graves, pillage them and plunder the monasteries. There too, it is a strange flow: a flow of Vikings in ships, a flow of Hungarians on horseback, and Duby explains, in some splendid pages, that it's them, it's these savages, who ravage the periphery, who upturn graves, who burn the monasteries, they are the ones who are going to revive the whole economy.¹⁰² Anyway, I'm exaggerating a little, but they are going to be a very important peripheral factor for the relaunching of an economy which was dying. They bring about a kind of release, a liberation of money throughout the whole of Europe, which will reinject into the economy a monetary power that money [*monnaie*], reduced to its purchasing power or to its exchange-value, had completely lost; they create economic investment through destruction. Here too, you have another example where a flow defined by its superior mobility and power – the power of its horses, of its ships, of its military tactics, etc, will revive a whole [*missing word* – economy?] as a function of a relation between heterogeneous flows of quantities, of natures, of powers, and I say: whatever the diversity of the examples, you will always find that one of the two flows can be defined as nomadic and mobile, and the other will have to be defined as less mobile and less nomadic, i.e. as receiving its fixity from the exigencies of the other.

If I follow the example analysed so admirably by Duby, what happens? The peasants soon have had enough of the sight of these Vikings, and astonishing things then start to happen. The roaming Vikings are not just nomads, but they are nomads in the process of migrating. We have the double determination of nomadism, and this represents what we called, in our vocabulary, a flow of nomads that we can characterise by, very profoundly, its deterritorialization. A first deterritorialized flow, but also equally deterritorializing, since they burn the towns when they can (often they do not succeed, but anyway); this flow of nomads is so deterritorializing that they do not even respect the dead, they dig up the earth, they take the silver [*argent*], carting it off elsewhere; it is therefore a deterritorialized and deterritorializing flow.

At another corner of the social field, there are the peasants. They find themselves in front of these Vikings and obviously, they flee. That delivers a large blow to the peasants' residence, that is to say, to the way in which the peasant is attached by the lord to the land. They flee and they are also affected by a coefficient, this time secondary to the deterritorialization, to the point that the problem of power [*pouvoir*] at that moment is, on the one hand, to organize the struggle against the Vikings or the Hungarians, but also how to stem the peasant deterritorialization. That will then lead in turn, if necessary, to an easing of the peasant situation; it will be necessary to create better situations for the peasants, it will be necessary to bring about, against the double danger, a kind of reterritorialization in all respects, namely: a change in the nature of the towns, which increase in population, since people come to take refuge in the towns; an improvement in the defense of the towns, and then a corresponding gain in autonomy for the towns. At the level of the peasants, very often, a new mode appears in the 10th century involving, instead of attachment to the land, the payment of rents in money [*argent*] as purchasing power.¹⁰³ Why does money as purchasing power come back into the equation? We are referred back to the revival of money, to the injection of money that the Vikings brought about through pillage. These same Vikings, who reinjected money into the economy, noticed rather quickly that with money, they could buy land.

You see, it is not even enough to say two flows. It would be necessary to distinguish five, six. There is a first flow of power 'n', essentially deterritorializing – the Vikings, the Hungarians –, a second deterritorialized flow, the peasants; flows of reterritorialization at the level of the towns; at the level of power [*pouvoir*]; at the level of the fact that the nomads will make themselves sedentary. All of that will be ways of reterritorializing. And feudalism, as a social formation – I am not saying that this is its only cause, nor even an essential cause – but feudalism as a social formation and the definitive liquidation of the Carolingian empire, it is constituted starting from all these flows of a new type which traverse the social field at a single moment, which confirms a hypothesis we were circling around, namely that new formations are not at all made by accumulation, by a process of aggregation, they are truly made by stampede. When it acts, there is a whole play of flows in a social field, which deterritorialize the old forms of social formations, where reterritorializations of another type are then reformed, and the whole of economic reality is effectively transformed.

To finish with this point, I would say that, when Faye analyses the Nazi economy, it goes far beyond his schema; his schema dealt with exchange, commodity form, narrative form as a function of statements, because what Faye shows precisely at the level of Nazi economy, is how it functioned on several levels, namely in particular in the case of the problem of the 'miracle' of Doctor Schacht in the Nazi economy.¹⁰⁴ This was precisely (roughly): how to construct a structure of financing when one has no purchasing power? An interesting problem, which was linked to the crisis of the collapse of money as purchasing power. What did one see? Of course, the flow of purchasing power is always second in relation to the structures of financing; that does not prevent a well-defined crisis when the structures of financing are completely blocked, for example by unemployment, by the collapse of purchasing power; there are other reasons; but that is one of them. So what will happen? The Nazi paradox, at that moment, is: how to create capital without money ... The mechanism of gold would not allow such an attempt (unanchoring in relation to gold), hence how to create capital without purchasing power or how to construct the financing structure without any means of payment, in such a way that this structure of financing that is supposedly created provides means of payment? This is very well analysed in the large book by Faye¹⁰⁵, and what he tries to show is how, in effect, the Nazis proceeded in a very particular manner, precisely insofar as the creditors – they embark on a policy of rearmament – the creditors of

the army, the suppliers of the army, draw up bills on an organization [*organisme*]¹⁰⁶ that has a very meagre capital. The discounting of this same organization is re-discounted by the State. This organization is nothing more than an emanation of the Nazi State itself. In other words, a part of the trick is that the State guarantees the debts that it itself makes. This operation in the Nazi economy, during the time of Doctor Schacht, involved about seven different relays ...¹⁰⁷

What matters is the time that passes between the issue [of bills] and the injection or the production of the means of purchase; and in that space of time, production itself has increased. And it is this whole trick by which production increases between the issue and the time of putting into circulation, which will permit a whole play between discounting and re-discounting, which will allow a veritable production of capital without any means of purchase; with, at the end of this production of the structure of financing, a return in means of purchase, production having increased. Which implies, in the case of the Nazi economy, not only a war-oriented economy, but what in a sense is more important, that this war-oriented economy is built up in the form of a paradoxical financing, a financing involving the two moments of discounting: the discounting of the organization, or the discounting of the qualified institution, and the re-discounting of the State, with all that allows, namely a whole series of camouflages where the declarations of Doctor Schacht hide this false moment of liberalism, hides an apparent policy of large works, which might disquiet the right and which was borrowed from the Nazi pseudo-left; the policy of large works, in its turn, hides something more profound than it, namely the conversion of the economy into a war economy; the conversion to a war economy itself hides something deeper still: the exact character of the financing of this economy.¹⁰⁸ So, at this level, there are all kinds of production of statements nested one inside the other ... [*Intermission*]

I'll just remark that in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* the problem posed is not simply that of the nature of statements. [Foucault] calls a set of statements a discursive formation.¹⁰⁹ Assuming a discursive formation, I believe that one of the points which concerns us most consists in saying: a statement and a discursive formation of which it is part can only be born and can only be formed under the conditions of a multiplicity (even if it means defining what he means by multiplicity). But if we already just stick to this general thesis, namely: it is always a multiplicity which is constitutive of a field or of a domain of statements, in what way does that concern us?

Through the study of Baudrillard and Faye, it seems to me that we have arrived at a first result: it is not exchange or exchange-value which give the conditions of enunciation; in other words, it is not communication, and if we had to go all the way, that would imply a certain conception of language, namely that language is not communication. And it was said that if the production of statements could not happen starting from exchange-value and the corresponding communication, it was for a very precise reason, namely that, positively, the production of statements implied relations between flows, very different indices of these flows, and relations of a particular type between these flows. That is what we have held onto throughout the examination of Baudrillard and Faye.

And now we see that from the beginning of a reading of Foucault, we encounter a notion which might be complementary: a statement in its 'as such', that is to say, grasped in its novelty, in its emergence on the interior of a discursive formation, such a phenomenon, such a statement always refers to a multiplicity, because multiplicity, on our account, or more precisely intensive multiplicity, we have come to encounter it as a fundamental phenomenon unfolding or emerging on the body without organs, on bodies without organs of very different

types, no less than flows and the relations between flows. Foucault's whole theme consists in telling us – or in any case in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, the problem consists – I am not completely sure about this – in a causality that is productive of statements. If the problem arises for him, it indeed concerns an immanent causality, it is not at all a causality which would be extrinsic, external, it is a question of finding in a discursive formation itself what produces statements; it is therefore a question of a very specific type of causality, and once again, it is not even certain that Foucault would say, at the time of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, that such a problem of causality was posed, and the direction in which he goes is to say that statements always have a “correlative space”¹¹⁰, and he distinguishes three types of spaces linked to the statement. On the one hand, the complementary space enclosed by statements of the same family or of the same discursive formation; in the second place, the correlative space ... no, I'm mistaken, in the first place, there is the associated space which is formed by statements of the same family; the correlative space we are going to define because, if there is an immanent causality of the statement, it is perhaps at the level of the correlative space; and third point, the complementary space which consists in the non-discursive formations, institutions, events, in unspecified relation with which the statements, the families of statements, are found.

So the real problem for us is the correlative space. In very beautiful, very important texts, he takes two examples: statements on delinquency in the 19th century, and statements on clinical anatomy in the 19th century.¹¹¹ And what he tries to show is that these statements never refer to a type of object that one could determine as such or such a type, that is to say as one thing; nor do they refer to a type of concept under which one could unify the set of statements of the same family; nor indeed do they refer to any type of sequence. If I stick to the case which seems to me the clearest, that of the objects of statements, that of the objects upon which statements bear, he tries to show how these objects upon which one or several statements bear, are not one, but are organized in what he calls a space of dispersion ...

Henri Gobard: It is better not to go any further because the whole of this discourse is going over the heads of those who think that the UV [final course credit] is a permanent cinema. You offer yourself up as an object of consumption, etc., etc.

Deleuze: In what way is it a permanent cinema?

Gobard: [*Indistinct sentences*]¹¹²

Deleuze: It's true that this morning, it had a distinctly 'Club Mediterranean' feel. What to do?

Gobard: We have to give the tourists a voice so that they too can produce statements.
[*Nobody says anything*]

Deleuze: Something true is said there ... Since no one has anything to say, I'll be off then.
[*End of the session*]

Notes

¹ The term *énoncé* can be translated as 'statement' or 'utterance'. In this Seminar, Deleuze is playing off various contemporary uses of the term *énoncé*, e.g., in Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (translated by

A.M. Sheridan-Smith, London: Tavistock, 1972 [1969]); in Jean-Pierre Faye, *Théorie du Récit* [*Theory of Narrative*] (Paris: Hermann, 1972) (discussed in the fourth and fifth sessions of this Seminar); and in Jacques Lacan's opposition between the *sujet de l'énoncé* ['subject of the statement'] and the *sujet de l'énonciation* ['subject of enunciation']; cf. Lacan, 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire', in *Écrits* (translated by Bruce Fink et al., New York: W.W. Norton, 2006 [1966]), pp. 800-802 [French pagination].

² The term *agencement* has no exact English translation, and might be translated as 'arrangement', 'layout', 'configuration', or 'assemblage'. The last-named term is used here, but it should be borne in mind that the French term carries connotations of agency and activation that are absent from the English 'assemblage'.

³ Cf. Marcel Detienne, 'La phalange. Problèmes et controverses', in Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne* (Paris – La Haye: Mouton and Co., 1968), discussed in *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 [1980]), pp. 399 and 560 n.78.

⁴ Cf. *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 37: "There are no individual statements, there never are. Every statement is the product of a machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of enunciation (take "collective agents" to mean not peoples or societies but multiplicities)." The missing French phrase would be *comme multiplicités*. Much of the material developed in this session finds its way into this plateau, '1914: One or Several Wolves', in *A Thousand Plateaus* (pp. 26-38).

⁵ André Green's review of *Anti-Oedipus*, 'À quoi ça sert', was published in *Le Monde* on 28 April 1972, and then republished in expanded form in the *Revue française de psychanalyse*, vol. 36(3), 1972, pp. 491-499. Deleuze is presumably referring to the closing passage: "The whole book is based on the assertion that the schizo does not play Oedipus and rejects our system. Does this mean that he has neither father nor mother? Can we affirm that the schizo, in his psychosis, maintains no relationship with the imago of his progenitors? The whole of experience and theory are against this" (*Revue française* version, p. 499).

⁶ In the article, Green claims that "*Anti-Oedipus* is the negation of the double difference (of the sexes and generations)" (ibid, p. 497).

⁷ Carlos Castaneda, *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972 [1968]). On the 'ally', see pp. 9, 32-34. For discussions of Castaneda in *A Thousand Plateaus*, cf. pp. 227-229, 248-249.

⁸ The reference to the "last session" points to the existence of a session (or sessions) prior to this one. The final session of the first Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus* (18 April 1972) ends with a discussion of the body without organs, but there is no discussion of 'masses.' Elias Canetti's *Crowds and Power* (translated by Carol Stewart, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973 [1960]) is not mentioned the first Seminar, nor is the idea of 'mass' thematized. However, Canetti's distinction between crowds and packs is briefly mentioned in *Anti-Oedipus* itself (translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1983), p. 279, where it is discussed in relation to paranoia (with a reference to the closing chapter of *Crowds and Power*, 'Rulers and Paranoiacs'). *Crowds and Power* was originally entitled *Masse und Macht* in German (1960) and was translated into French as *Masse et puissance* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). In German, Freud's *Group Psychology* is *Massenpsychologie*. The term 'mass' in the present Seminar often means 'crowd', and its use can be related to themes in the first part of Canetti's *Crowds and Power*, 'The Crowd', pp. 15-87. See the discussion of masses and packs in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 33-34.

⁹ Cf. Samuel Beckett, *The Unnameable*, in *Trilogy* (London: Picador, 1979 [1959]): "I must have got embroiled in a kind of inverted spiral" (p. 290); "I've never left the island, God help me. I was under the impression I spent my life in spirals round the earth" (p. 300).

¹⁰ In a discussion of early 20th century psychiatry in *A Thousand Plateaus* (pp. 119-120), singling out the work of Paul Sérieux and Joseph Capgras on the one hand and Gaëtan de Clérambault on the other, Deleuze and Guattari develop a contrast between a "paranoid-interpretive ideal regime of significance", which they associate with 'delusion [or delirium] of interpretation', and a "passional, postsignifying subjective regime", associated with 'passional' delusions like erotomania and grievance delusion [*délire de revendication*]. It is likely that this distinction also has a source in Lacan's extensive discussion of Sérieux and Capgras' work *Les Folies raisonnantes* [*Reasoning Madness*] (1st ed. 1906), along with Clérambault's work and other related works from the French school, in his doctoral thesis *De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité* [*On Paranoid Psychosis in its Relations with the Personality*] (Paris: Seuil, 1975 [1932]), pp. 64-76. Delirium of interpretation is twice described there as "radiating" out from a central delusion (p. 67; cf. 71). Lacan in turn roots Sérieux and Capgras' account of paranoid interpretation in Kraepelin's classic formulation of paranoia as "the insidious development, under the dependence of internal causes and according to a continuous evolution, of a durable and unshakable delirious system [*système délirant*], and which is established with a complete retention of clarity and of order in thought, will and action" (first given in the 1899 edition of his *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*) (Lacan, p. 23). Deleuze's formulation here of paranoid interpretation as involving networks in which 'sign refers to sign' seems to arise out of this context.

- ¹¹ Lacan, *De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité*, pp. 24 and 72 (where Clérambault's work on erotomania is discussed).
- ¹² There is no exact English translation for the French term *revendication*, frequently used in Lacan's 1932 dissertation on paranoid psychosis and common among the French psychiatrists he discusses. *Délire de revendication* is sometimes translated into English as 'litigious delusion', sometimes more literally as 'delusion of claim'. The translation 'grievance delusion' has a greater extension than 'litigious delusion' (which is more suited to the specific phenomenon of vexatious litigation).
- ¹³ Possibly a reference to Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, 'Cemeteries', p. 275.
- ¹⁴ The transcript of this passage ends with the non-word "esclaruerunt ...?"
- ¹⁵ A note in the WebDeleuze transcript adds: "Nota Bene: Richard III, on this day, had no 'havana' at his disposal."
- ¹⁶ Ruth Mack Brunswick, 'A Supplement to Freud's History of an Infantile Neurosis' (1928), republished in Muriel Gardiner (ed.) *The Wolf-Man by the Wolf-Man* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 277: "The dentist now told him [...] that he had a 'hard bite' and would soon probably lose not only the fillings, but all his teeth as well." With regard to the anus, see Sigmund Freud, 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis' (The 'Wolf Man'), chapter VII, 'Anal Erotism and the Castration Complex'.
- ¹⁷ Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 109, cited in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 33-34.
- ¹⁸ Franz Kafka, *Letters to Felice*, edited by Erich Heller and Jürgen Born, translated by James Stern and Elisabeth Duckworth, New York: Schocken Books, 1973). Elias Canetti published a guide to the voluminous letters, *Kafka's Other Trial: The Letters to Felice* (translated by Christopher Middleton, London: Calder and Boyars, 1974 [1969]). See Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (translated by Dana Polan, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986 [1975]), pp. 29-34, and *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 36.
- ¹⁹ Kafka, *Letters to Felice*, p. 355.
- ²⁰ That 'food' is the missing term is made clear in a later paragraph. Cf. also Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, p. 20.
- ²¹ In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, Deleuze and Guattari criticise Marthe Robert's annotations to the French 1963 *Cercle du livre précieux* critical edition of Kafka's *Oeuvres complètes* for introducing "a psychoanalytical Oedipal interpretation" (p. 92, cf. 93), but praise her "excellent study" on Kafka, 'Citoyen de l'utopie', *Les Critiques de notre temps et Kafka* (Paris: Garnier, 1973) (p. 95). Robert's 1979 book-length study of Kafka, *Seul comme Kafka* was published in English as *Franz Kafka's Loneliness* (translated by Ralph Manheim, London: Faber & Faber, 1982).
- ²² See Kafka's letters of 1921 to his sister Elli, in Franz Kafka, *Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors* (translated by Richard and Clara Winston, New York: Schocken, 1977).
- ²³ On schizo incest in Kafka, see *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, pp. 66-68. On incest with the sister in anthropology, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 159, 200.
- ²⁴ Franz Kafka, 'Jackals and Arabs', in *Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Stories* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp. 129-132; cited in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 37.
- ²⁵ Kafka, 'Jackals and Arabs', p. 129 (translation modified).
- ²⁶ Kafka, 'Jackals and Arabs', p. 132 (translation modified).
- ²⁷ The session referred to was presumably not recorded.
- ²⁸ *Faire un enfant* is a common French expression for 'to have a baby', or 'to have a child'.
- ²⁹ Although the identity of the biologist and the study in question are unknown, the topic is framed here in a way that is consistent with the ideas from Raymond Ruyer, who is mentioned by name at the end of this section on the 'stratum of organization' (see footnote 4). Ruyer developed a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' (or statistical) sciences in his *Éléments de psycho-biologie [Elements of Psycho-Biology]* (Paris: PUF, 1946), cf. Introduction, pp. 1-20. In *The Genesis of Living Forms* (translated by Jon Roffe and Nicholas B. de Weydenthal, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020 [1958]), there is a brief discussion of how the "contractile properties of molecules" play a role in "muscular contraction" (p. 42). Nevertheless, the unidentified study on the *tonus musculaire* is clearly by a different author.
- ³⁰ See Raymond Ruyer, *The Genesis of Living Forms*, Chapter 11, 'Forms I, II and III', pp. 147-156.
- ³¹ See Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, translated by Francis J. Whitfield, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969 [1943]. For discussions by Deleuze and Guattari of Hjelmslev's linguistics, see *Anti-Oedipus* (translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983 [1972]), pp. 242-243, and *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988 [1980]), pp. 43-45, 99, 108, 528 n. 46.
- ³² See *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 129-132, where this concept is introduced.

³³ On the chief or leader, see Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (translated by James Strachey, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1955 [1921], Vol. 18), Chapter V, 'Two Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army.'

³⁴ The phrase *On a volé mon corps* ["My body has been stolen"] does not occur in *Pour en finir avec la jugement de Dieu* ['To Have Done with the Judgment of God' (1947)], but Artaud does talk of *la suffocation/ en moi/ de l'idée de corps* ["the suffocation in me of the idea of the body"], 'To Have Done with the Judgment of God', in Antonin Artaud, *Selected Writings* (edited by Susan Sontag, translated by Helen Weaver, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 567 (translation modified). Artaud's use of the phrase *corps sans organes* [the body without organs] can be found on p. 571. Cf. the discussions of Artaud in *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 150, 163.

³⁵ Cf. Serge Leclair, *Psychoanalyzing* (translated by Peggy Kamuf, Stanford: Stanford University, 1998 [1968], chapter 1.

³⁶ The plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus* addressed to this problem, 'November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?', was first published in *Minuit*, 10, September 1974.

³⁷ In this regard, see pp. 150-154 in *A Thousand Plateaus*.

³⁸ R.D. Laing, *Knots* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971 [1970]).

³⁹ On Castaneda with regard to experimentation, see Sessions 1 and 2 of this Seminar, and *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 227-228.

⁴⁰ See the discussion in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 189.

⁴¹ Either Deleuze is referring to an unrecorded part of Session 3 (14 May 1973) of this Seminar, or to an intervening, unrecorded session that would presumably have taken place on 21 May 1973; cf. footnote 40 below.

⁴² The *École freudienne* was a psychoanalytic institutional body founded in 1964 by Jacques Lacan (and dissolved in 1980).

⁴³ Probably a reference to the work of the 'Circle of Epistemology' [*Cercle d'épistémologie*], published in the journal *Cahiers pour l'Analyse* from 1966-1969.

⁴⁴ *Pulsion* is often translated as 'drive'; *pulsionnel* can be translated as 'instinctual' or 'impulsive'; however, there is a case for the coinage 'pulsional', to denote 'what appertains to drives'. The term *pulsionnel* is frequently used in the French psychoanalytic theory of the time (and in philosophical commentaries on it).

⁴⁵ Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, translated by Francis J. Whitfield, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969 [1943].

⁴⁶ Jean Baudrillard, 'The Art Auction: Sign Exchange and Sumptuary Value', in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* [*Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe*] (translated by Charles Levin, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981 [1972]).

⁴⁷ The recent book by Foucault is presumably *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (translated by A.M. Sheridan-Smith, London: Tavistock, 1972 [1969]), which takes up and re-evaluates Foucault's own work in *History of Madness* (translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalifa, London: Routledge, 2006 [1961]) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (translated by A.M. Sheridan, London: Tavistock Publications, 1973 [1963]).

⁴⁸ Jean-Pierre Faye, *Langages totalitaires* [*Totalitarian Languages*] (Paris: Hermann, 1972). In the fifth recorded session of the current Seminar Deleuze also refers to Faye's *Théorie du récit* [*Theory of Narrative*], subtitled *Introduction aux 'Langages totalitaires'* (Paris: Hermann, 1972). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, there are several references to these works, as well as to a collection of essays, *La Critique du langage et son économie* [*The Critique of Language and its Economy*] (Paris: Galilée, 1973): *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988 [1980]), pp. 82, 139, 231, 536 n.11, 570, n. 62.

⁴⁹ Félix Guattari, 'Causality, Subjectivity and History', translated by Rosemary Sheed in *Psychoanalysis and Transversality* (South Pasadena, California: Semiotext(e), 2015).

⁵⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, op. cit., note 6 above.

⁵¹ Here Deleuze is possibly referring to the first section of Baudrillard's chapter on 'The Art Auction' in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, 'The Other Face of Political Economy', where the logic of "material production" is subordinated to a "logic of sumptuary values" primarily involving "sign values" (pp. 112-116). Cf. Chapter Three, 'Fetishism and Ideology: The Semiological Reduction', pp. 88-90 on the difference between material production and ideological production. Cf. also Chapter Nine, 'Requiem for the Media', p. 166 n.5, where the notion of production itself is put into question. Baudrillard subsequently ratchets up his critique of the notion of production in *The Mirror of Production* (translated by Mark Poster, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975 [1973]), pp. 17-51, where Deleuze's own valorization of production is in turn targeted (p. 17).

⁵² Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, Chapter Two, 'The Ideological Genesis of Needs': "We should refer at this point to Veblen, who, even if he posited the logic of differentiation more in terms of individuals than of classes, of prestige interaction rather than of exchange structure, nevertheless offers

in a way far superior to those who have followed him and who have pretended to surpass him the discovery of a principle of total social analysis, the basis of a radical logic, in the mechanisms of differentiation. This is not a superadded, contextual variable, situationally given, but a relational variable of structure” (p. 76). On Veblen, cf. also *For a Critique*, Chapter One, ‘Sign-Function and Class Logic’, p. 31.

⁵³ Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, Chapter Two, ‘The Ideological Genesis of Needs’, p. 76; translation modified.

⁵⁴ The notion of ‘sign exchange value’ is introduced at the beginning of Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, in Chapter One, ‘Sign-Function and Class Logic’, pp. 29-32. On ‘sign value’, see Chapter Two, ‘The Ideological Genesis of Needs’, p. 65; on ‘sign form’, see Chapter Five, ‘The Art Auction’, p. 112.

⁵⁵ Baudrillard, *For a Critique of a Political Economy of the Sign*, Chapter Five, ‘The Art Auction’, pp. 115-120.

⁵⁶ Baudrillard, *For a Critique of a Political Economy of the Sign*, Chapter Eleven, ‘Concerning the Fulfillment of Desire in Exchange Value’, pp. 204-212.

⁵⁷ On the ‘bar’ between signifier and signified, see Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’, *Écrits*, translated by Bruce Fink et al., New York: W.W. Norton, 2006 [1966], pp. 497-504 (French pagination).

⁵⁸ Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, ‘Toward a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign’, p. 161-162, n. 19.

⁵⁹ Baudrillard, ‘The Body, or the Mass Grave of Signs’ [*Le corps ou le charnier de signes*], first published in *Topique*, no. 9-10, 1972, then reprinted in *L’échange symbolique et la mort (Symbolic Exchange and Death)*, translated by Iain Hamilton Grant, London: Sage Publications, 1993 [1976].

⁶⁰ The basis for Deleuze’s statement is to be found at the beginning of the third paragraph of ‘The Body’: “In this fundamental schema, analogous to that of the linguistic sign, castration is *signified* (it passes into the state of a sign) and therefore subject to misrecognition [*méconnaissance*].” (p. 100). See footnote 23 below for the full passage.

⁶¹ Baudrillard, *For a Critique of a Political Economy of the Sign*, ‘The Ideological Genesis of Needs’, p. 69.

⁶² Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, p. 69, note 6: “Desire, on the other hand, is signified throughout an entire chain of signifiers. And when it happens to be a desire for something experienced as lost, when it is a lack, an absence on which the objects that signify it have come to be inscribed, does it make any sense to treat such objects literally, as if they were merely what they are? And what can the notion of need possibly refer to, in these circumstances?” (translation modified) (« *Le désir, lui, se signifie au long de toute une chaîne de signifiants. Et du moment où il est désir de quelque chose de perdu, où il est manque, absence sur laquelle viennent s’inscrire les objets qui la signifient — que peut bien vouloir dire prendre les objets pour ce qu’ils sont? Que signifie la notion de besoin?* »).

⁶³ Baudrillard, ‘The Body’, p. 101-102: “Fashion, advertising, nude-look, nude theatre, strip-tease: the play-script of erection and castration is everywhere. It has an absolute variety and an absolute monotony. Ankle boots and thigh boots, a short coat under a long coat, over the elbow gloves and stocking-tops on the thigh, hair over the eyes or the stripper’s G-string, but also bracelets, necklaces, rings, belts, jewels and chains the scenario is the same everywhere: a mark that takes on the force of a sign and thereby even a perverse erotic function, a boundary to figure castration which *parodies* castration as the symbolic articulation of *lack*, under the structural form of a bar articulating two *full* terms (which then on either side play the part of the signifier and the signified in the classical economy of the sign). The bar makes a zone of the body work as its corresponding terms here. This is not an erogenous zone at all, but an erotic, eroticised zone, a fragment erected into the phallic signifier of a sexuality that has become a pure and simple concept, a pure and simple signified. // In this fundamental schema, analogous to that of the linguistic sign, castration is *signified* (it passes into the state of a sign) and therefore subject to misrecognition. The nude and the not-nude play in a structural opposition and thus contribute to the *designation* of the fetish. The image of the stocking top on the thigh derives its erotic potential not from the proximity of the real genital and its *positive* promise (from this naïve functionalist perspective, the naked thigh would have to play the same role), but from the apprehension surrounding the genitals (the panic of recognising castration) being *arrested in a staged castration*. The innocuous mark, the line of the stocking above which, instead of lack, ambivalence and the chasm, there is nothing more than a sexual plenitude. The naked thigh and, metonymically, the entire body has become a *phallic effigy* by means of this caesura, a fetishistic object to be contemplated and manipulated, deprived of all its menace. As in fetishism, desire can then be fulfilled at the cost of warding off castration and the death drive.”

⁶⁴ Baudrillard, ‘The Body’, p. 102: “The bar is always there as the clothes come off, signalling the emergence of the body as phallus.”

⁶⁵ Baudrillard, ‘The Body’, p. 102: “The body is not arranged into masculine or feminine symbols: at a much deeper level, it is the site of the drama and the denial of castration” (cf. p. 104). Baudrillard bases his ideas here on Freud’s theory of fetishism (in particular, the 1927 paper ‘Fetishism’, translated by James Strachey et al.,

Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1955, Vol. 21). In an earlier essay, 'Fetishism and Ideology: The Semiological Reduction' (first published in the *Objets du fétichisme* [Objects of fetishism] issue of the *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse*, No. 2, Autumn 1970), Baudrillard develops a similar line of thought: "[T]he perverse psychological structure of the fetishist is organized, in the fetish object, around a mark, around the abstraction of a mark that negates, bars and exorcises the difference of the sexes" (p. 92). Baudrillard is also here developing ideas about castration, fetishism and the phallus from Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. One possible source of Baudrillard's idea that the woman's body itself ends up functioning as both a 'fetish' and a 'phallus' can be found in Lacan, 'The Signification of the Phallus' (*Écrits*, p. 694, French pagination).

⁶⁶ Cf. the second section of Baudrillard, 'The Body', on 'Secondary Nudity', or fetishised nudity (pp. 104-107).

⁶⁷ Baudrillard, 'The Body', p. 105: "The tights in which 'you are more naked than is natural [*au naturel*]'" Cf. p. 121, n.2.

⁶⁸ Cf. Baudrillard, 'The Body', p. 105: "The James Bond film *Goldfinger* provides a perfect example of this ['secondary nudity']. In it, a woman is painted in gold, all her orifices are blocked up in a radical make-up, making her body a flawless phallus (that the make-up should be gold only emphasises the homology with political economy), which of course amounts to death. The nude gold-varnished playgirl will die by having incarnated to an absurd extent the phantasm of the erotic, but this is the case for every skin in functional aesthetics, in the mass culture of the body. 'Body hugging' tights, girdles, stockings, gloves, dresses and clothes, not to mention sun-tans: the *leitmotiv* of the 'second skin' and the transparent pellicle always come to vitrify the body."

⁶⁹ The first use of the term 'symbolic value' in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* occurs in 'The Ideological Genesis of Needs', p. 65, where it is related to the example of the gift, which had been discussed at the beginning of the book in the first essay, 'Sign Function and Class Logic', pp. 30-31, in the context of 'symbolic exchange'.

⁷⁰ Cf. *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, 'The Ideological Genesis of Needs', p. 65: "The ambivalence of all symbolic exchange material (looks, objects, dreams, excrement) derives from this; the gift is a medium of relation *and* distance; it is always love and aggression". Cf. p. 66.

⁷¹ Possibly a reference to the opening sentence of 'The Body': "The entire contemporary history of the body is the history of its demarcation, the network of marks and signs that have since covered it, divided it up, annihilated its difference and its radical ambivalence in order to organise it into a structural material for sign-exchange [...]" (p. 101).

⁷² Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, 'The Art Auction: Sign Exchange and Sumptuary Value', pp. 115-120.

⁷³ Jean Baudrillard, *The System of Objects* (translated by James Benedict, London: Verso Books 1996 [1968]), Section C, 'The Metafunctional Dysfunctional System: Gadgets and Robots', pp. 109-133. Baudrillard also uses the term *machin*, translated as 'gizmo'. On the 'schizo-functional' world of gadgets and gizmos, cf. p. 113; on gizmos and machines, cf. pp. 114-118: "The word 'machine', in becoming applicable to the realm of social labor, has acquired a precise enough generic sense; as recently as the late eighteenth century, however, it had much the same meaning as 'gizmo' [*machin*] today" (p. 115).

⁷⁴ Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study in the Imperialism of Trade* (translated by Brian Pearce, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972 [1969]).

⁷⁵ Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment* (translated by Brian Pearce, 2. Vols combined, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974 [1970]).

⁷⁶ Cf. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (translated by Paul Patton, London: Athlone Press, 1994 [1968]), p. 174: "Calculus considers only those magnitudes where at least one is of a power superior to another."

⁷⁷ The French distinction between *argent* and *monnaie* is sometimes mapped onto the English distinction between 'money' and 'currency', and in this and the following sentence such a transposition would have its advantages. However, in the following paragraphs, Deleuze seems to use *argent* as a neutral term for money, and to specify two forms of *monnaie*: money as financing structure (which is said to include capital) and money as means of payment (or purchasing power). Since 'currency' is not synonymous with 'means of payment', it is not used here for *monnaie*. This makes rendering the present sentence awkward, and the makeshift solution of putting quote marks around 'money' for *argent* has been chosen. In any case, it is not clear whether Deleuze's uses of *argent* and *monnaie* are systematically differentiated.

⁷⁸ See Jean-Pierre Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 664-676 (cited in *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 570-571, n. 62), where the secret economic plan of Hjalmar Schacht, the president of the German Central Bank in the first years of Nazi rule, to fund German rearmament through the system of 'Mefo bills', is discussed. Deleuze returns to this topic in the fifth recorded session of this Seminar, taking up Faye's account of the complex relationship between the movements of the Nazi economy and the 'narrative' level of political statements.

⁷⁹ The transcript has *valeur d'échange* ('exchange value'), but *valeur d'usage* ('use-value') would make more sense.

⁸⁰ There is no discussion of a case of alcoholism or a "drunken crisis" in the transcript of the third recorded session (14 May 1973) of this Seminar, therefore (see footnote 1 above), either the discussion occurred in an unrecorded part of that session, or Deleuze's remark refers to an unrecorded intervening session.

⁸¹ The psychoanalytic institutional body founded in 1964 by Jacques Lacan.

⁸² A unique reference to René Girard, who is not discussed in any of Deleuze's published works. Deleuze appears to be referring to Girard's theory of mimetic desire, as developed in *Deceit, Desire and the Novel* (translated by Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965 [1961]) and *Violence and the Sacred* (translated by Patrick Gregory, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977 [1972]).

⁸³ Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 'Interview on *Anti-Oedipus* with Raymond Bellour' (1973): "There is a guy who wrote to me with a typical example of what Félix just cited as a psychoanalytical interpretation. The guy told his analyst that he wanted to go to a hippie group in India, he wanted to get the hell out, and the analyst responded immediately: 'Hippie group is big pippee, you see how it's always your theme of impotence.'" Translated by Ames Hodges in Deleuze, *Letters and Other Texts* (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2020), p. 197.

⁸⁴ The word *actuels* could be translated as 'contemporary', but as the context suggests, the term has a particular history within psychoanalytic theory. See the entry 'Actual Neurosis', in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, London: Karnac Books, 1988 [1967]), pp. 10-12. For Wilhelm Reich's re-evaluation of the role of the 'actual' in neurosis, see *The Function of the Orgasm* (translated by Theodore P. Wolfe, London: Panther, 1968), pp. 101-108.

⁸⁵ See Henri Bergson, 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition', in *Mind-Energy* (translated by H. Wildon Carr, London: Macmillan, 1920 [1919]), p. 128-130. Deleuze discusses this conception in *Bergsonism* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 1988 [1966]), pp. 58-59, 125 n. 15; cf. also *Difference and Repetition* (translated by Paul Patton, London: Athlone, 1995 [1968]), pp. 81-82.

⁸⁶ Bergson, 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition', p. 130: "Either the present leaves no trace in memory, or it is twofold at every moment, its very up-rush being in two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back towards the past, whilst the other springs forward towards the future." Deleuze gives a figurative representation of this 'schema' in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1989 [1985]), p. 295 n. 23, but notes that Bergson himself does not present a figure of the schema.

⁸⁷ The missing word would be *récit*. See footnote 8 below.

⁸⁸ Pierre Janet's theory of narrative [*le récit*] is developed in *L'Évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps* [*The Evolution of Memory and the Notion of Time*] (Paris: Chahine, 1928).

⁸⁹ There is a reference to the *cogito* in Lacan, 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire', *Écrits*, (translated by Bruce Fink et al., New York: W.W. Norton, 2006 [1966]), p. 819 (French pagination).

⁹⁰ Jean Pierre Faye, *Langages totalitaires* (Paris: Hermann, 1972); *Théorie du récit* [*Theory of Narrative*], subtitled *Introduction aux 'Langages totalitaires'* (Paris: Hermann, 1972). Cf. also *La Critique du langage et son économie* [*The Critique of Language and its Economy*] (Paris: Galilée, 1973). These works are cited in *A Thousand Plateaus* (translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988 [1980]), pp. 82, 139, 231, 536 n. 11, 570, n. 62. None of these works is translated into English. For a concise introduction to Faye's work, see John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), Chapter 6, 'Narratives of National Socialism: An Analysis of the Work of Jean Pierre Faye', pp. 205-231.

⁹¹ Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785). The first section of the opening chapter on 'Narration' in Faye's *Théorie du récit* is entitled 'The Mably Effect,' and is based on a reading of Mably's *Observations sur l'Histoire de France*, 1765 (2nd edition, 1788).

⁹² Deleuze quotes the first sentence (taken from Mably's *Observations*, cited in Faye, *Théorie du récit*, pp. 18-19) slightly inaccurately; an English rendering of the sentence might read: "Some young Huns were hunting on the banks of the Maeotian swamp [*Palus Méotides*]; a doe they had been chasing crossed a marshland which they regarded as an impassable sea."

⁹³ Faye, *Théorie du récit*, p. 19.

⁹⁴ Faye, *Théorie du récit*, p. 21: "History begins with this double process: material change and exchange, or change of form." Faye is commenting on the following passage in Marx's *Capital*: "Wir haben also den ganzen Prozess nach der Formseite zu betrachten, also nur den Formwechsel oder die Metamorphose der Waren, welche den gesellschaftlichen Stoffwechsel vermittelt." ["We therefore have to consider the whole process in its formal aspect; that is to say, the change in form or the metamorphosis of commodities through which the social metabolism is mediated."] (*Capital*, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990 [1867]),

pp. 198-199)]. Faye cites the French translation “*changement matériel dans la société*” for “*gesellschaftlichen Stoffwechsel*” (“social metabolism”).

⁹⁵ *L'échange non moins que l'usage est dit second par rapport à l'échange*. This clause lacks sense, but the ensuing clause makes clear that exchange is in turn “second” in relation to the flow of financing. Sense can be restored by ignoring the words “*par rapport à l'échange*” [“in relation to exchange”].

⁹⁶ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Part Two, ‘The Transformation of Money into Capital’, pp. 247-280.

⁹⁷ In the Second Seminar on Anti-Oedipus, Session 4, footnote 37, it was noted that Deleuze seems to use *argent* as a neutral term for money, and to specify two forms of *monnaie*: money as financing structure and money as means of payment. Therefore the present slightly augmented translation seems more acceptable than the literal but absurd translation “money [*argent*] or money [*monnaie*].”

⁹⁸ Marcel Dassault (1892-1986), engineer, industrialist and founder, in 1952, of the Banque commerciale de Paris.

⁹⁹ Deleuze correctly stated earlier that it was a doe, not a sheep.

¹⁰⁰ Georges Duby, *Guerriers et paysans* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), translated as *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century* (translated by Howard B. Clarke, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Cited in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 537, n. 19.

¹⁰¹ *Argent*, of course, means ‘silver’ as well as ‘money’.

¹⁰² Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, pp. 115-120.

¹⁰³ Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, pp. 117-118: “As they fled from Vikings, Saracens or Hungarians, many slaves and dependants took the opportunity to break the bonds tying them to their lords. They settled elsewhere in the service of new lords, ones who treated them as free men and exploited them less harshly. For in order to repopulate their estates with workers, big landowners were probably forced to make the system of rents and services more flexible. [...] Compulsory labor services had already been replaced by money rents [...]”.

¹⁰⁴ Hjalmar Schacht was the president of the German Central Bank in the first years of Nazi rule. Faye talks of the Nazi “financial miracle” in *Théorie du récit*, p. 9, and in *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 666, 670.

¹⁰⁵ See Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 659-683.

¹⁰⁶ The ‘organization’ was a limited liability company, *Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft* (‘Mefo’ for short), set up by Schacht solely to issue bills of exchange to arms manufacturers. Faye cites Schacht’s description: “Mefo papers are bills, drawn generally by the suppliers of the Army [...] on a company Metallforschung G.m.b.H. endowed with a reduced capital, and whose rediscounting by the Reichsbank was guaranteed by the Reich” (cited in *Langages totalitaires*, p. 665). Faye analyses the “paradoxical” nature of the Mefo bills on pp. 665-667.

¹⁰⁷ “Seven relays” between the Reichsbank and the arms manufacturers, without any redemption of the bills (in order to avoid inflation) were necessary in order “to allow, between the initial moment of issue and its final afflux in effective monetary circulation, for the interposition of the *time* of development, of production” (Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, p. 674).

¹⁰⁸ Schacht publicly criticised the proposed policy of “German Keynesians” (Faye, *Langages totalitaires*, p. 670) to introduce “large works” (ibid, 664), or public work programmes, while keeping the programme of Mefo bills secret or “masked” (*Théorie du récit*, pp. 44-46; *Langages totalitaires*, pp. 662, 665).

¹⁰⁹ See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (translated by A.M. Sheridan-Smith, London: Tavistock, 1972 [1969]), Part II, Chapter 2, ‘Discursive Formations’ (pp. 31-39), and Part III, Chapter 1, ‘Defining the Statement’ (pp. 79-87).

¹¹⁰ For ‘correlative spaces’, see Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 207.

¹¹¹ On delinquency, see Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 43; on clinical anatomy, ibid, 53.

¹¹² In the Le Terrier transcript: “Gobard talks about the deep isomorphy between the Saint Lazare station and Vincennes philo, with the result: the room of lost words.”