

**Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries: Charles J. Stivale**

**On *Anti-Oedipus II*, 1972-73**

With only five sessions available in this seminar, Deleuze continues to expand the concepts developed for *Anti-Oedipus* with the long view of the second volume, *A Thousand Plateaus*. In the final session (June 4, 1973 [*sic*]), Deleuze summarizes succinctly what he developed in this seminar, “We consider the unconscious as something that is never there, which to be produced, produced by a machine of experimentation”. Although I retain the dates provided on WebDeleuze for these seminars, please note that none of the dates provided corresponds to Tuesdays (when Deleuze’s seminar was scheduled) in Winter-Spring, 1973; each date is off by one day.

**Session 1, February 12, 1973**

Deleuze’s initial comment concerns his and Guattari’s goal of searching for the conditions of statements (*énoncés*) within, for example, psychoanalysis, i.e. regarding desire and the unconscious. Referring then to the previous session, he quickly shifts to how mass groupings or distributions function in relation to a subject’s trajectory on a body without organs, and he identifies the mass system as inscribing a network of signs on the body without organs as a territory. Deleuze points to two coexistent states of the sign, one paranoid, another freed from the signifier, and he maintains that these states correspond to two positions on the body without organs, a position of mass and a position of packs (*meute*). These two positions intersect in the unconscious, not in opposition, but in interplay within a bi-polar machinic apparatus, the mass machine as the signifying semiotic machine, hierarchized and egalitarian, on one hand, and on the other, the pack machine of particle-signs, types of Brownian movement, as the a-signifying semiotic machine. Deleuze examines Kafka’s love for Felice, an example of how one cannot know which apparatus might come to dominate in a given situation, mass or pack, with Kafka seeking to convert an Oedipus position into a writing machine (e.g., his *Letter to the Father*). Finally, Deleuze returns to the initial student question about schizo incest, stating that this incest opens the schizo to a world of connections and a kind of defamiliarization of the individual.

**Session 2, March 26, 1973**

Given the date attributed to this session by WebDeleuze, over a month separates it from the previous session. Commencing with a reference to Foucault regarding the emergence of statements over several domains at once, Deleuze seeks a different explanation for this emergence beyond those given by structuralists and Marxists, and he reviews in some detail various problems with a dualistic perspective, identifying psychoanalysis as the final inheritor of Cartesianism, thereby denying thought as a process which, for him, is fundamentally multiple. Deleuze emphasizes the importance of suppressing the one-multiple opposition, substituting the substantive “multiplicities” for the One, and he considers how the history of desire has been ruined in this regard by viewing desire as lack, the first malediction of desire, the second and third being desire as satisfied by pleasure or related to *jouissance*. Deleuze considers how this

corrupt perspective emerges in Freud and also where Reich goes wrong, with whom he contrasts Barthes's perspectives in *The Pleasure of the Text*'s distinction of texts of pleasure and texts of jouissance. He argues that a perspective of process, through which desire emerges out of its own immanence and productivity, stands in sharp contrast with the Freudian and Lacanian view of lack-pleasure-jouissance, posing the dualism between subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. To a student's comment that his distinctions are similar to previous dualisms (e.g. the mass versus the pack), Deleuze insists that he reintroduces no dualisms here and argues that there is no reality to thought except in the monism of the process and in the multiplicities that populate the field of immanence. After a session break, Deleuze returns to the Western view of desire as a sign of lack (the first malediction), the second being recourse to an illusion of pleasure, the third being the impossible jouissance-death relationship. In contrast to this, Deleuze posits the production of statements through collective agents of enunciation (and not individuals), i.e. multiplicities of varied nature, and such statements are desires, accompanied by the illusion of the split subject being engendered. Deleuze imagines a graph with two columns: the first is "the bad column" of the false conception of desire, whereas in the other column is the anti-Oedipal apparatus which he outlines. At what machinic point, Deleuze asks, is the maximum of deterritorialization on the body without organs reached? He leaves this project in suspense, but suggests that for the next session, Carlos Castaneda's books (*The Teachings of Don Juan* and *A Separate Reality* are the likely sources) provide a view of experimentation in search of a body without organs within a machinic assemblage with a certain distribution of intensities.

### Session 3, May 14, 1973

As with the previous session, the date provided by WebDeleuze indicates a gap between the two sessions, for example, with only a fleeting reference to Castaneda. Just as the plateau 6, on making oneself a body without organs in *A Thousand Plateaus* (e.g., pp. 161-162, 227) provides a fuller study of Castaneda, much of this session develops material in the same plateau. Deleuze is clear that caution is required in creating a body without organ, and he identifies a three-fold blockage of its functioning on different strata forcing the body without organs into biunivocal relations: first, the stratum of organization; second, the stratum of signification presupposed by the first stratum, that is, the angle of signifying (*signifiance*), a cut occurring within representation, a double articulation constituting the signifier. In contrast to limits within this structure, Deleuze points to linguistic perspectives proposed by Louis Hjelmslev regarding figures of expression in a free state. Finally, the third stratum, presupposed in the second one, corresponds to a point of subjectivation, variable for each individual, from which both the angle of signifying and the dominant real emerge, that is, within the organization machine. With reference to an Artaud text, Deleuze argues that the three strata form God's judgment, or the despotic system, and he examines different domains for this system's manifestation. He insists that one must actively engage in managing the body without organs, hence the importance of "making oneself" a body without organs, that is, a functioning, destratified body without organs, undoing the three strata within oneself: destroying organization, interpretation and subjectivation. Deleuze also signals two erroneous perspectives on such struggle, one maintaining that it's external (e.g. Marxists), others maintaining that it's within (e.g., religious advisors), whereas the struggle consists in institutions crystallizing within us in the three different manners, like a secretion of interpretation within and outside. Then, responding to

student questions, Deleuze returns to the earlier point regarding the dominant real versus the masked real, and also how the body remains stratified and might escape strata. He suggests a list of occurrences on the body without organs, concluding this summary by describing the body without organs as an intensive matrix or desert as locus populated by intensive multiplicities and lines of deterritorialization.

#### **Session 4, May 28, 1973**

In a session that seems to follow directly from the previous one (despite the brief hiatus), Deleuze continues discussing how the body without organs is constituted, created, with multiplicities, flows, figures of content and expression, all entering into machinic assemblages. Deleuze distances his approach from Marxism as well as from Freudo-Marxism, that is, l'École freudienne (Lacan's organizational structure). Deleuze defines his task (with Guattari) as distinct from such apparatuses as well as admitting but one economy, not political, but solely desiring, libidinal and political together. Hence the importance of the body without organs for producing a type of assemblage for positing desire, for unleashing jolts of the unconscious, and for creating new statements. In response to student questions, Deleuze first considers the production of statements vis-à-vis modes of ideological institutions (for example, Catholicism and Protestantism) and the relationship of need (*besoin*) to lack and to the repression of desire. Then, referring to three authors' work (Baudrillard, Jean-Pierre Faye and Foucault), he considers the production of statements, in the esthetics of art auctions (Baudrillard), in terms of madness and the medical clinic starting in the nineteenth century (Foucault), and in the milieu of Nazi statements (Faye). Deleuze returns to a more detailed reading of Baudrillard, and discussing aspects of Baudrillard's key points that he cannot fully understand, Deleuze concludes that for Baudrillard, it is castration, at the heart of desire, that produces statements, with the subject traversed by ambivalence, a cleavage within the subject producing statements. Deleuze concludes, first, that what generates statements is the differential relation between irreducible quantities of powers (*puissances*), asking the participants to reflect, in relation to Jean-Pierre Faye's text, on how Nazi statements were produced in a particular era. Second, Deleuze insists that the sole positive aspect in Baudrillard's analysis is the idea of statements always presupposing flows understood as quantities affected by different powers (*puissances*) such that one flow's function might be deterritorializing and another's territorial.

#### **Session 5, June 4, 1973**

This final session's transcript commences in mid-session, with Deleuze discussing how psychoanalysis prevents the emergence of a subject's own statements (with several notable examples), but also presenting the positive query as what condition would allow this very emergence of individual or group statements. He refers to the previous year's critique of Oedipus through the distortions produced in a patient's statements during the psychoanalytic session, and Deleuze suggests locating blocs of childhood and childhood memories, not Oedipal details, but machinic connections forming the true life of the unconscious. Deleuze briefly refers to Kafka as a counterexample, his inscription of childhood memories in the "Letter to the Father" which reveals, Deleuze argues, Kafka's humor, whereas in other texts (Deleuze cites *The Castle*),

Kafka injects blocks of childhood into adult scenes, thereby producing diverse coordinates. Deleuze then reviews the conclusions reached in the previous discussion of Baudrillard, notably statements being produced by the transformation of exchange-value into sign-value. Then Deleuze proposes to consider recent writing by Jean-Pierre Faye, *Langages totalitaires* (Paris: Hermann, 1972), i.e., texts that provide evidence of material conditions of exchange. Deleuze maintains that engendering the power of statements or production of the unconscious never emerges from the circuit of exchange, but rather is based on a fundamental heterogeneity of quantities, notably a differential relationship of varying powers (*puissances*). In response to a student, Deleuze addresses the question of converting money into purchasing power in relation to capital's mobility, maintaining that in any economic field, there's not only the differential relationship between quantities with different powers, but also a relationship between these quantities that must be called "nomadism", whereas the disempowered flow will be entirely subordinate to the requirements of capital. After a break, Deleuze provides a brief summary of his reading of Baudrillard and Faye connects Foucault's *The Archeology of Knowledge* to their analyses, the statement having a form "as such" (*en tant que tel*), that is, its emergence as innovation, as a kind of multiplicity within a discursive formation, particularly in Foucault's discussion (in *The Archeology of Knowledge*) of the production of nineteenth-century statements in specific types of space.